Local Conflicts and Foreign Fighters: The ‘Afghan Arabs’ Phenomena During Afghan Conflict (1978–2021)

The Emergence of Afghan Arabs Phenomena

This article uses the Arab League’s geographical definition of Arabs. Article I of its Charter, written in 1945, states that ‘The league … is composed of … Arab states…. Any independent Arab state has the right to become a member of the league’. The Arabs mentioned in this article are mostly Muslims belonging to either member state of the Arab League. The term ‘Afghan Arabs’ solely refers to all those Arab Muslims who came to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the aftermath of the Communist coup and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or later. They are different from an Afghan ethnic group (Arabs) living in Afghanistan for centuries that consider themselves to have an Arab heritage.

Mohammed M. Hafez defines Afghan Arabs as ‘Arabs who volunteered to aid the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan dispersed from the conflict zone to pursue their newfound passion: Jihad, in the path of God’. However, he believes that the term initially was a derogatory one for those people who were ‘troublemakers or religious zealots who donned Afghan-style clothing’ (Hafez, 2009). One Afghan Arab, Mustafa Hamid, agrees with the ‘derogatory’ nature attached to this group, which he points out was much smaller in number than the non-Arab fighters (Hamid & Farrall, 2015, p. 21).

It is unknown when the term ‘Afghan Arabs’ was first used and by whom. However, some Afghan Arabs believe they heard this term during the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. It was given to them by others. For instance, Mustafa Hamid says he heard this term for the first time in 1989 (Hamid & Farrall, 2015, p. 21), while Essam Daraz argues that it was used in 1990 (Daraz, 1993). Both say this was used as derogatory term. Abdullah Anas, the son-in-law of Abdullah Azzam, believes the media gave this name to most Arabs that came to join Afghan jihad (Anas, 2019, p. 4).

An Egyptian journalist, who covered Afghan jihad and lived for 18 months with Osama bin Laden (OBL) in Afghanistan, says that the term Afghan Arabs was first used in the backdrop of some incidents in Algeria in 1990. The Algerian youth in these incidents were trained in Afghanistan and participated in Afghan ‘jihad’ (Daraz, 1993). According to Essam Daraz, while these were labelled as Algerian Afghans, the term Arab Afghans was extended to all Arabs ‘who came to Afghanistan’ to ‘help their fellow Muslims fight against the Soviets and the pro-soviet Afghans’ (Daraz, 1993).

Why Did the Arabs Come to Afghan ‘Jihad’ and Become Afghan Arabs?

In this article, I argue that there were internal as well as external factors which led to the creation of Afghan Arabs. The religious factor persuaded Afghan Arabs to support the Afghan ‘jihad’, frustration among Islamists was an internal factor, while external factors were the role of numerous states in the Afghan jihad. Besides, a spiritual–religious leader, Abdullah Azzam also played a role in the smooth inflow of Afghan Arabs to the Af-Pak region.

Internal Factors

The religious factor: Most Afghan Arabs mainly consider this factor as motivating them to come to Afghanistan. Abdullah Anas, the Algerian Afghan Arab, scholar and son-in-law of Abdullah Azzam, says in one of his interviews:

We simply saw that an Islamic country fell under occupation, that the occupier was a communist infidel, and that we had to confront it and help the Muslims who were there. (Al-Adab, n.d.)

He further says in his memoirs that his involvement in Afghan ‘jihad’ was not due to a ‘rage or rebellion’ but to get ‘martyrdom’ and ‘defend’ their fellow Muslims (Anas, 2019, p. 9). Another Egyptian Afghan Arab, who came to Afghanistan and wrote several books on Afghanistan, identifies religion as one of four reasons that persuaded Egyptians to come to Afghanistan (Daraz, 1993).

Second, during the Cold War, some Arab Islamists also wanted to establish an Islamic government implementing Islamic sharia. This is better understood in the words of Abdullah Azzam and Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, an ex-Muslim Brotherhood member and a member of the Jamat-ul-Jihad. For instance, Sheikh Omar once said, ‘When the Afghans rose and declared a Jihad—as Jihad had been dead for the longest time—I cannot tell you how proud I was’ (Rubin, 1997). On the other hand, according to an Afghan interpreter of Abdullah Azzam, Azzam believed that any government that does not implement sharia is not a part of Dar al-Islam. According to him, he hopes and waits for such a government in Afghanistan that implements Islam and to which all the Muslims migrate (Muzdah, 2020).

The frustration-aggression theory: Robert Gurr viewed a ‘frustration–aggression mechanism’ as a leading factor behind the turn to violence. According to him, people become frustrated if they do not achieve what they ought to, and hence they turn to violence (Gurr, 1970, pp. 36–37). Mustafa Hamid, an Afghan Arab journalist allegedly an advisor to Al-Qaeda in the past, also mentions that the Arabs were frustrated, and there was ‘a sense of anger’ towards ‘corruption and brutal repression … of various regimes’ ‘foreign interference’ and Israel and the complete defeat of Egypt in 1967 (Hamid & Farrall, 2015, pp. 22–24). Hence, Afghanistan provided them a ‘location’ where they could ‘take action’ (Hamid & Farrall, 2015, pp. 22, 24). Another Egyptian Afghan Arab who came to Afghanistan identifies four reasons that persuaded Afghan Arabs to come to Afghan jihad. Two out of these four reasons directly dealt with this frustration and aggression theory. According to him, the reasons were the general frustration in Egypt among Islamists. They saw Afghan jihad as an opportunity to ‘restore confidence’ that was shattered by the bipolar system which they viewed as humiliating the Arab world and one in which they had no stake (Daraz, 1993).

External Factors: Making Grounds for Afghan Arabs to Come to Afghan Jihad

Afghan Arabs’ smooth migration to the Af-Pak region would have been constrained if external factors did not create the grounds for Afghan Arabs to come and fulfil their ‘religious’ duty. Three factors were instrumental in attracting Afghan Arabs to the Afghan conflict. In the absence of these, their numbers would likely have been much smaller.

First, the Afghan mujahideen policies concerning Afghan Arabs: Most Afghan mujahideen groups were not greatly concerned about inviting more volunteers; there had been an abundance of them in the thousands of Afghan refugees in refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran. However, they wanted to mobilise the Arab world for funding and support. Some of them believed that money would come with the Arabs (Hamid & Farrall, 2015, p. 37). In 1980, when Sayyaf, a mujahideen commander, visited Abu Dhabi, he was encouraged by Jalaluddin Haqqani, the founder of the Haqqani terror network in Afghanistan, and Yunus Khali, of the Hezb-i-Islam, to ask Arabs to come to Afghanistan. According to them, unless they come to Pakistan and Afghanistan, they would not know the ground realities. However, Mustafa Hamid, one of the first Arabs to join the war in Afghanistan, says Sayyaf only asked for support and donations, not volunteers (Hamid & Farrall, 2015, p. 30). According to one estimate, between 1979 and 1981, the highest-ranked Afghan mujahideen representatives visited the Gulf region eight times for outsourcing funds and awareness-raising campaigns on the ‘situation of Afghanistan’ (Heggammer, 2020, p. 149). Abdullah Azzam, an architect of the policy for the increasing inflow of Afghan Arabs to Afghanistan, is also on record to have said that Afghans consider the presence of one Afghan Arab among themselves worth more than $1 million (Azzam, 1990, p. 2).

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami, on the other hand, had appointed a liaison for foreign fighters—Afghan Arabs—Jan Baz Sarfaraz, and he visited Middle Eastern countries several times to recruit Arab fighters and raise financial resources (Sands & Qazizai, 2019, pp. 203–204, 207–208). When Khalid Islambouli killed the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat on the 6th of October 1981, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar ‘made sure’ that his party became ‘ready’ to ‘welcome these killers into its ranks’ (Sands & Qazizai, 2019, p. 191).

In addition, unlike Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Yunus Khalis and Jalaluddin Haqqani, Burhanuddin Rabbani did not favour the participation of Arab volunteers in the Afghan jihad. In an interview in the late 1990s, he said: ‘During the liberation war, our movement (Jamiyat-e Eslami) continuously opposed the involvement of foreign fighters’ due to ‘abundance’ of local fighters, while the ‘non-afghan brothers’ can help Afghans through their ‘value of what would be their travel expenses … in cash’. He pointed out that he ‘needed funds and arms, not men’ (Wikileaks, n.d.). This did not mean he was totally against them as there were few (for instance, Abdullah Anas) who regularly visited northern Afghanistan or were a part of Jamiat-e-Islami led by Rabbani. One of the reasons the volunteer Arabs went in smaller numbers to Jamiat-e-Islami was that their stronghold areas were mostly in northern Afghanistan which was far from Peshawar. Hezb-e-Islami of Hekmatyar and Khalis were mostly headquartered near the Durand Line, and hence it was much easier for them while going in and out to/from battlefields.

Second, the policies of Pakistan, the USA and Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt, regarding Afghan jihad, were favourable, supporting the movement of Afghan Arabs to Afghanistan. Since 1982, the Pakistani intelligence agency ISI had encouraged recruiting Muslims for jihad in Afghanistan, and all other states agreed with it. According to Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, the reason behind this was that Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq wanted to cement ‘Islamic unity’ and ‘turn’ Pakistan into a contender for the leadership of the Muslim world. Saudi Arabia saw this ‘opportunity’ to not only ‘promote’ Wahhabism but also ‘get rid’ of its radicals. In contrast, Washington aimed to show that the ‘entire Muslim world’ is fighting against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (Rashid, 2000, p. 172). The Egyptian President Anwar Sadat is also said to have met the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and ‘encouraged [them to] help’ the Afghan mujahideen and ‘send volunteers there’ (Gerges, 2009, p. 69). He also wanted to get rid of ‘extremists’.

The Pakistani embassies were also ‘direct[ed]’ to give visas without asking those who want to come to Afghan jihad (Rashid, 2000, p. 172). The former director of Inter-Services Intelligence, Hamid Gull, once said:

We are fighting a Jihad, and this is the first Islamic international brigade in the modern era. The Communists have their international brigades, the West has NATO, why can’t the Muslims unite and form a common front?’ (Rashid, 2000, p. 129)

Third, apart from the Afghan mujahideen and some states’ policies, Abdullah Azzam’s books glorifying Afghan jihad and his fatwa concerning jihad in Afghanistan can also be considered another vital factor that persuaded Arabs to come to Afghanistan. At the initial and middle stages, most of the Arabs who mostly came to Afghanistan were tiny in number, and were either closer to him or came after contacting him. Some of his books in this regard were Join the Caravan; Defence of the Muslim Lands: The First Obligation After Faith; The Signs of Ar-Rahman in the Jihad of Afghanistan; Tarbiyah Jihadiyah; and a few books on the collection of biographies and elegies of Arab Afghan martyrs (for instance, Lovers of the Paradise Maidens). The most significant of these were Join the Caravan and Defence of the Muslim Lands, where he provided some 16 reasons to fight in the Afghan jihad, and a later book issued a fatwa and insisted that jihad is ‘Fard ul Ain’ (compulsory) on all Muslims. The Signs of Ar-Rahman was another controversial book where he provided stories of karamats (supernatural wonders or miracles) of mujahideen in Afghan jihad. Another book translated into Dari as Roydad ha was Sarguzasht ha provided stories glorifying jihad and Afghans’ respect for the Arabs. In one of his books, he mentions that ‘Afghans say that one Arab’s presence between them is greater than $1 million’ (Azzam, 1990, p. 2). Mustafa Hamid recalls in his memoirs that Abdullah Azzam had such a ‘moving literary style where he used Koranic verses, poetry and the final wills of the martyrs’, and it ‘led to an influx of volunteers … and monetary donations’ (Hamid, n.d.b).

The Three Phases of Afghan Arabs in the Afghan Conflict

For simplicity, we divide the Afghan Arab’s presence and engagement in the Afghan conflict into three periods.

First Period (1978–2001)

During the first period, the role of the Afghan Arabs was diverse: from voluntary fighters to mediators, aligning with one Afghan group against the other, and providing humanitarian assistance and media coverage.

The initial phase of Afghan Arab volunteer fighters started before the USSR invasion of Afghanistan. One Afghan Arab claimed that he visited Afghanistan in June 1979 (Hamid & Farrall, 2015, p. 34). Abdullah Anas and Abu Musab al-Suri, the two veterans of Afghan jihad, estimate a dozen Arab Afghans visited between 1979 and 1984 (Anas, 2019, p. 42; Hamid & Farrall, 2015, p. 33). However, another Afghan Arab, Mustafa Hamid, notes that Abdullah Anas came late to the Afghan ‘jihad’. According to him, the number is underestimated (although he does not estimate any number for this period; Hamid & Farrall, 2015, p. 33).

However, as the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan ‘prolonged’, ‘Peshawar became a hub for fighters to organise and mobilise across the border into Afghanistan’ (Rubin, 1997). These Afghan Arab volunteers had established their training camps in Paktia and Pakistan (for these training camps, see Hamid & Farrall, 2015).

In sum, there were, different estimates about how many Afghan Arabs visited the Af-Pak region. Abdullah Anas estimated that by late 1992, the number of Afghan Arabs reached 4,000–5,000 (Interview with Abdullah Anas Al-Adab, n.d.). The head of the Taliban’s cultural committee believes that between 1984 and 1990, more than 10,000 Afghan Arabs were trained in the military camps along the Pak-Afghan border (Saqib, 2014). Jamal Khashoggi, the Saudi journalist who covered the Afghan jihad with frequent visits to Afghanistan and Pakistan says that at one time, Afghan Arabs never surpassed 2,000–3,000. However, altogether the total number could have been 10,000 (Bergen, 2006). On the other hand, a Pakistani intelligence report says that over 13,000 Arabs participated in the war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan (5,000 from Saudi Arabia, 3,000 from Yemen, 2,000 from Egypt, 2,800 from Algeria, 400 from Tunis, 370 from Iraq, 200 from Libya and some from Jordan; Rana et al., 2010, pp. 13–15).

In 1984, the first Arab Afghan killed was an Algerian national, Nour al-Din, and the first Egyptian killed was Hamdi al-Banna in 1986 (Daraz, 1993). The first Arab to die from the Arabian Peninsula was Yahya Senyor Al-Jeddawi in 1985, for whom Abdullah Azzam wrote a ‘martyrdom’ epitaph (Williams, 2011). In 2000, OBL published a list of 2,359 people from 8 Arab countries who died during the Afghan ‘jihad’. The list included 540 from Algeria, 526 from Egypt, 433 from Saudi Arabia, 285 from Libya, 184 from Iraq, 180 from Syria, 111 from Sudan and 100 from Tunisia (Roy, 2001).

All the Afghan Arabs who volunteered to fight were not untrained; some of them had already been ex-military men and experts in military affairs. For instance, Muhammad Makkawi was a member of the Egyptian ex-special force, Abu Hafs al-Masri was ‘trained in missile use’ and Abu Jihad al-Masri ‘served in the anti-aircraft missile section’ of the Egyptian Army. Abu Ubaidah al- Banshiri was a police officer (Hamid & Farrall, 2015, p. 24). However, the bulk of Afghan Arabs were untrained, except those involved in the Syrian and Palestinian conflicts before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Later on, they received training in al-Badar and Qais training camps during Afghan jihad (Hamid & Farrall, 2015).

Second, before the Soviet invasion, some Arabs tried to reconcile Afghan mujahideen groups but failed. Before the Soviet invasion in 1979, Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar captured a military garrison (Asmar) in Kunar, capturing more than 3,000 Kalashnikovs, 107 rockets, 27 mortars, two helicopters, 64 jeeps, and trucks, among others (Sands & Qazizai, 2019, p. 157). Different Afghan mujahideen parties fought over who would take the military weapons. Kamal al-Sananeery, a Muslim Brotherhood leader, was sent to resolve this issue. He was not successful in his efforts. However, according to Muzdha, Afghan Arabs favoured unity between mujahideen parties (Muzdah, 2020). The official website of the Muslim Brotherhood has written a biography of Kamal al-Sananeery and mentioned his role in uniting and reconciling different Afghan jihadi factions during Afghan jihad. After the Soviet invasion, divided over meeting the challenge of the superpower in Afghanistan; the Muslim Brotherhood’s leader Umar al-Tilmisani visited Pakistan and met with different Afghan mujahideen factions. His visit and efforts united the Afghan mujahideen under the leadership of Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf in Ittihad-e-Islami Baraye Azadi-e-Afghanistan (the Islamic Union for the Freedom of Afghanistan; Sands & Qazizai, 2019, p. 188). However, unity later fell apart.

In addition, Abdullah Azzam also tried a few times to reconcile the two most influential personalities of Afghan jihad: Ahmad Shah Massoud of Jamiat-e-Islami and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the Afghan jihad Hezb-e-Islami, but failed. For instance, in the Farkhar incident, when Hekmatyar’s fighters killed a few people of Ahmad Shah Massoud’s men, Massoud hanged that commander and fighters (Anas, 2019; Hamid, n.d.b) in retaliation.

Third, the interfernce of Afghan Arab leaders and assinations also played a prominent role. Before the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, some Afghan Arabs allegedly backed by Hekmatyar in Peshawar ‘established a takfiri court’ to charge Massoud with various offenses. It varied ‘from sexual impropriety with French female aid workers to banning Sharia in areas under his jurisdiction’. The court’s judges were Osama and Abdul Majeed Zindani, but Abdullah Azzam differed, and as a result, the court ‘failed’ to pass such an apostate verdict against him (Sands & Qazizai, 2019, p. 262). Azzam did not remain inactive and went to northern Afghanistan to meet Ahmad Shah Massoud. After his meeting, he was impressed by him and called him ‘far greater than Napoleon’ and in his ‘will’ advised Afghan Arabs to respect Afghan mujahideen leaders, including Massoud (see the memoirs of Abdullah Anas for the first account of this meeting in Anas, 2019).

The Afghan Arabs also had a role in killing a Salafi leader Mawlavi Jamil al-Rahman, in 1991. Jamil al-Rahman opposed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and instead, with the support of Arabs, established a separate Salafi party, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, in Kunar. In 1988, when the Afghan government abandoned this province, a power rivalry broke out between Hezb-e-Islami and Jamil al-Rahman, and later both sides agreed on a power-sharing deal. However, in 1991, Afghan Arabs met Jamil al-Rahman in his guest house in Bajaur, Pakistan, to settle disputes between him and Hekmatyar. At the same time, an Egyptian named Abdullah Rumi, who once worked in Al-Jihad magazine, run by Abdullah Azzam, shot Jamil al- Rahman to death as he returned home from his guest house (Sands & Qazizai, 2019, pp. 280–281).

Fourth, the Afghan Arabs were also engaged in the media sector during Afghan jihad. Abdullah Azzam, through MAK, published a few Arabic magazines, including Al-Jihad, which were instrumental in shaping the Arab views in the Arab world, attracting recruiters and assisting in raising funds. Jarret M. Brachman believes that the Al-Jihad magazine was ‘the most famous Jihadist periodical of the twentieth century … produced almost single-handedly at first by Azzam’ (Brachman, 2009, p. 112). MAK published Al-Jihad magazine from December 1984 to May 1995, and it published 72 issues. It mainly discussed fighting against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and ‘opportunities for a “global Jihad” throughout the Arab world and beyond’ (East View, n.d.). According to East View’s Afghan Serials Collection, some issues also included anti-Jewish, anti-American materials. In addition, the magazine also published pictures of ‘martyrs’ and covered stories and published opinion articles (East View, n.d.).

The other jihadi publications included Al-Bunyan al-Marsous, published in Peshawar from 1985 until 1992. The publication claimed that it is the ‘voice of the original line in Afghanistan’. OBL’s assistants, Wadih el-Hage and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, worked with this magazine (Brachman, 2009, p. 112).

Two Egyptian jihadist organisations, Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Islamic Jihad, and Islamic Group published Al-Fath and Al-Mourabitoun magazines, respectively. In the mid-1990s, Zawahiri’s Islamic Jihad published another magazine, Majallat al-Mujahidin. It had published more than 60 issues, and some of the articles published were entitled ‘The Road to Jerusalem Passes Through Cairo’, ‘Advising the Nation to Avoid the Fatwa of Bin Baz’ and ‘Why Proceed with Jihad?’ (Brachman, 2009, pp. 115–116).

Muslim Brotherhood, related to Afghan Arabs, also published magazines in Arabic. Kemal Helbawy, responsible for Muslim Brotherhood’s activities in Afghanistan for six years between 1988 and 1994, joined Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami member-affiliated think tank Institute of Policy Studies in Islamabad. He published an Arabic journal Afghanistan: The Past and Present (Afghanistan: al-Hazir wa al-mustaqbal), from 1989 to 1992. It published 15 issues and mainly discussed the political transition after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. In addition, he also published and was an editor of the weekly magazine Qadaya Dawaliyya (International Issues) from 1988 to 1994 (East View, n.d.; Helbawy, 2010).

Apart from these magazines, the Afghan Arabs were also responsible for publishing and developing jihadi literature in books, leaflets and memoirs. Abdullah Azzam published dozens of books, including hundreds of audio and video cassettes. In addition, many Afghan Arabs also wrote their memoirs, such as Abdullah Anas (Anas, 2002, 2019), Mustafa Hamid (Abu Walid ul Masri; Hamid, n.d.b; Hamid & Farrall, 2015), Jamil al-Dhiyabi (al-Dhiyabi, 2006), Mustafa Badi (Badi, 2004), Muhammad Salah (Salah, 2001), Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (al-Maqdisi, n.d.), Basil Muhammad (Muhammad, 1991), Mohammad al- Majdhub (al-Majdhub, 1984) and some others.

In addition, MAK published an encyclopaedia of the Afghan jihad. It was an 11-volume encyclopaedia, with more than 8,000 pages that dealt with ‘explosives, first aid, pistols and revolvers, bombs and mines, security intelligence, tactics practiced, weapons, tanks, close fighting, topography area survey, and armament’. The encyclopaedia was dedicated to Abdullah Azzam, OBL, unnamed Afghans who helped Afghan Arabs, those who helped publish the encyclopaedia and Pakistan (seen by author and see Gerecht, 2001). Later, this encyclopaedia was converted into a soft form (on CDs) and reached Europe and other Asian countries (Gerecht, 2001).

Lastly, Arab Afghans also provided humanitarian, health and education assistance. All Afghan Arabs that came to Afghanistan–Pakistan during Afghan jihad did not solely volunteer as fighters. The bulk of them were engaged in humanitarian assistance and in the education and health sectors. Some of the organisations were Lajnat ul-Dawah al-Islamia, Islamic Relief Agency, International Islamic Relief Organization, World Assembly of Muslim Youth, Saudi Red Crescent Society, Kuwait Red Crescent Society, UAE Red Crescent Society, World Islamic League, Islamic Welfare Society, Maktab al-Khidamat (of Abdullah Azzam) and Qatar Charity Society, and some others were the Arab organisations and NGOs active at that time (Abdul Baqi, n.d.).

The Muslim Brotherhood member Fathi Muhammad Rifai opened a centre in Peshawar and developed a standard school curriculum for Afghan refugees from Grade 1 to Grade 12. According to Misbah Abdul Baqi, it had two distinguishing characteristics: first, a commitment to Islamic injunctions, and second, taking basing it on the current situation in Afghanistan (Abdul Baqi, n.d.). However, an American university (University of Nebraska) also prepared an alternative to this curriculum in 1986. Kemal Helbawy, responsible for Muslim Brotherhood activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan, noted that the Muslim Brotherhood ‘managed to establish and run hospitals’ and ‘managed schools, hospitals, clinics, and other development projects inside Afghanistan’ (Helbawy, 2010).

Second Period (1992–2001)

In 1989, the Soviet troops left Afghanistan and, in the same year, Abdullah Azzam was killed. The Soviet withdrawal and the collapse of the communist regime in Afghanistan divided the Afghan Arabs on future strategies in the ensuing Afghan Civil War or, as Islamists put it, fighting began between ‘mujahideens’ over power. Abdullah Azzam had predicted this situation and already advised Arabs to not side with any party after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. He is reported to have said that:

We don’t care who rules Afghanistan from among the seven leaders (Hekmatyar, Rabbani, Mujadidi, Nabi Mohammadi, Sayyaf…). We are not entitled to interfere in their affairs. If they agree on any one of them and swear their allegiance to him, we will recognize him. We do not interfere in their private affairs. If the mujahedeen enter Kabul and start fighting among each other, then it is not right for us to take sides. (Linschoten & Kuehn, 2012, pp. 112–113)

However, Abdullah Azzam’s advice was forgotten by some Afghan Arabs. In 1992, when under Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, an interim government of Afghan mujahideen was established, some Afghan Arabs, due to the influence of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, ‘declared’ him as kafir. Hekmatyar had already rejected establishing interim governments under Mojaddedi and Rabbani, respectively (Sands & Qazizai, 2019, p. 241).

Some Afghan Arabs called the intra-Afghan war between different mujahideen groups fitnah or an internal struggle. Hence, they either went back to their own countries, Peshawar, or other conflicts such as the new emerging conflicts of Tajikistan, Chechnya and Bosnia (Muzdah, 2020). Normally, these individuals solely came to help their fellow Muslims in their fight against the Soviets. For instance, Abdullah Anas recounts that during the Afghan civil war, he was not ‘convinced’ to stay in Afghanistan. Muhammad Salah, another Afghan Arab, recalls that Afghan Arabs had to choose whether to fight against other Afghan mujahideen factions whose intra-Afghan fighting was for ‘power’ or leave Afghanistan (Linschoten & Kuehn, 2012). Hence, individuals related to the Muslim Brotherhood, and other extremist groups left Afghanistan. For instance, some Afghan Arabs went to the conflicts in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, although the number is not known. In Chechnya, the first group of Arabs, comprised chiefly of Afghan Arabs and led by them, such as Omar Khattab, entered Chechnya in 1995. He had three training camps to train Chechens (Moore & Tumelty, 2008; Williams, n.d.). Although the number of Afghan Arabs in Chechnya were few they were estimated to be around 80 during the 1990s (Moore & Tumelty, 2008). However, Khattab was engaged in Tajikistan’s civil war before this.

Others who could not return to their own countries due to their extremist views and did not want to go to other conflicts remained in Afghanistan. They also differed in their decisions on whom to support. Some of them sided with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, believing that the communists had allied with Ahmad Shah Massoud. A few remained with Sayyaf and fought against Shia groups during the Afghan Civil War as Sayyaf was an ally of the Jamiat-e-Islami, which ran the government. Hence, they allied with the government. Rabbani gave citizenship and passports to them to further persuade other Afghan Arabs to join governmental forces (Muzdah, 2020). According to one estimate, during Burhanuddin Rabbani’s government approximately 1,000 Afghan Arabs were given Afghan nationality (Abdul Baqi, n.d.). However, when Rabbani’s government signed an extradition agreement with Egypt, individuals originating from Egypt slowly changed sides to support opposition forces. During this time, many also joined Al-Qaeda and became a part of it.

The Arab Afghans between 1995 and 1996 were small in number. However, with the re-entry of OBL into Afghanistan from Sudan, their number slowly increased, and they sided with the Taliban. The Afghan mujahideen factions invited and persuaded Osama to come to Afghanistan, believing either his presence would sustain the Taliban which was ‘heavy US pressures’ or he could become an ‘asset’ during mujahideen–Taliban peace talks (Muzdah, 2020). However, this soon backfired for Afghan mujahideen groups as Al-Qaeda chose the Taliban. Due to this, Ahmad Shah Massoud, a member of Jamiat-e-Islami and a powerful commander, criticised Afghan Arabs in 1997:

My Jihad faction did not have good relations with the Arab-Afghans during the years of Jihad. In contrast, they had excellent relations with the factions of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. When my faction entered Kabul in 1992, the Arab-Afghans fought in the ranks of Hekmatyar’s forces against us. We will ask those (Arabs) to leave our country. Bin Laden does more harm than good. (Rashid, 2000)

In 2001, when Al-Qaeda wanted to assassinate Ahmad Shah Massoud, Arab Afghans were divided into two groups regarding whether to kill him or not. Some Arab fighters recalled Abdullah Azzam’s fatwa that Arabs should not become anti-Massoud. Others argued that he was a hindrance in making Afghanistan a completely fundamental Islamic state under one government—the Taliban rule. Hence, his elimination was in the ‘interest’ of Muslims (Rashid, 2000). The assassination of Massoud was ordered by the Afghan Arabs, notably OBL. OBL had two motives for this act: to become closer to the Taliban and to remove a person said to have been ‘responsible’ for collecting information about OBL and other Afghan Arabs for the CIA (Linschoten & Kuehn, 2012, pp. 233–237). A former Taliban diplomat, Waheed Muzdah, recalls that the assassination was carried out by Afghan Arab Abu Hani al-Misri when he made grounds for sending Arab journalists to Massoud (Muzdah, n.d.). According to a Taliban leader, when he called Taliban leader Mullah Omar about Massoud’s assassination, he said the Taliban did not know about Massoud’s assassination nor were involved in it. Hence, ‘we are neither expressing joy and nor grief about it’ (Mutmaeen, 2016).

Third Period (2002–2021)

According to various Western and Taliban sources, the Taliban formally regrouped, restructured their commissions (particularly cultural and military) and started an ‘insurgency’ between 2003 and 2004 (Dam, 2021; Mutmaeen, 2016). However, Taliban and Al-Qaeda members had been engaged in the war against American and NATO troops in Afghanistan before it. Taliban’s first prominent battle against the US forces occurred at Shahi Kot in 2002 (March). According to Mullah Omar’s former spokesman, Mullah Omar’s first audio tape was also released in 2003, naming Mullah Baradar and Mullah Obaidullah as Taliban leaders (Mutmaeen, 2016), while some of the Afghan Arabs who turned into Al-Qaeda members fought alongside the Taliban to defend first the urban areas (Juma Namangani and Muhammad Atif were killed in US airstrikes in November 2001) and then took position to defend Tora Bora (Williams, 2008).

However, after consecutive defeats, the Afghan Arabs and Al-Qaeda members took three routes as a withdrawal strategy for their survival to safe havens outside Afghanistan: Iran, Pakistan’s tribal areas and Pakistan’s urban areas (Stenersen, 2017, pp. 177–178). There were various factors whose interplay made it possible for some Al-Qaeda members, including the Afghan Arabs who had become Al-Qaeda members, to survive and have safe havens in these destinations. In Iran, the Al-Qaeda members were both ‘hostages’ and ‘guests’, making this relationship more that of ‘frenemies’ (Levy & Scott-Clark, 2017; Loidolt, 2021). This was primarily due to US President George W. Bush’s labelling of Iran as a part of the ‘axis of evil’ in 2002, the US invasion of Iraq, Al-Qaeda’s troubling history as a Sunni group with Shias, and their differences of interests in Iraq. However, it was Al-Qaeda who ‘reconciled’ with Iran mostly in the post-2001 period based on Al-Qaeda documents because of getting safe havens (Loidolt, 2020).

In Pakistan, there were domestic political dynamics, extremist groups’ networks, historical linkages and the Pakistani state’s policies towards Afghanistan that enabled Al-Qaeda and the Taliban to survive US–NATO-led Operation Enduring Freedom. In 2002, under a military dictator General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan conducted parliamentary elections. Thanks to the exile of two prominent Pakistani politicians Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, and the rising anti-America sentiments in Pakistan paved the way for Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) to win elections in the former North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Balochistan. Both provinces border Afghanistan along the Durand Line. Besides, the MMA used its election symbol (book) and criticised the then leader of Awami National Party (ANP) Abdul Wali Khan’s stance and statements about the Taliban and OBL to its advantage (Yousufzai, 2012, p. 119). It is interesting to note that MMA had its origin in the Difa-e-Afghanistan Pakistan Council, a group of several Pakistani religious parties, when the Taliban government was toppled and Pakistan became a non-NATO ally in the war on terror (Arqam, 2018). MMA not only turned a ‘blind eye’ towards the rise of the Pakistani Taliban in Pakistani tribal areas and SWAT (Siddique, 2014, pp. 120–121) but was also reluctant to curb or take action against the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda. MMA’s 15-point election manifesto in 2002 also indicates this. It states that MMA will ‘extend moral, political and diplomatic help and support to all suppressed’, including Afghans (see MMA Manifesto 2002 in Misra, 2003). The Afghan Taliban had excellent relations with the Deobandi Maulana Fazal- ur-Rehman, Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (F) leader, and Maulana Sami ul Haq, leader of Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (S). From its higher echelons to foot soldiers, most of the Taliban’s leadership had been educated in the madrasas affiliated to these two religious conservative Deobandi parties (Ur-Rehman, 2021).

On the other hand, Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan was three-tiered: Islamabad supported US Operation Enduring Freedom and the war on terror in Afghanistan. Second, Pakistan tried to persuade some Taliban to become a part of the new settlement under the Bonn Agreement, including lobbying the USA to accept the Taliban under the notion of ‘moderates’. The Khuddam ul Quran, a new group, formed in Peshawar comprising members of the Taliban movement in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, is an instance. Third was by supporting the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan (Shahzad, 2007). It does not mean Pakistan supported all the Taliban. They arrested (Mullah Baradar and Mullah Obaidullah), allegedly killed (Mullah Obaidullah and Ustad Yasir) and hand over some of the Taliban (Mullah Zaeef) to the USA. At the same time, the remaining Taliban enjoyed a friction-free environment in Pakistan’s urban, rural and tribal areas. Pakistan differentiated between good and bad Taliban, a position which was regularly criticised by the then Afghan governments and NATO allies.

Whether the secret Pakistani agency ISI ‘officially’ helped some Al-Qaeda members, including OBL, is still unknown. The Abbottabad 2011 raid, which killed Osama, does not shed more light on this matter as per the US declassified documents. However, some verbal statements from former Pakistani officials and US administrations show a somewhat different picture (Sirrs, 2016, pp. 275–281). It enhances the suspicion that if not the ISI, certain elements within it were certainly helping Al-Qaeda and Osama (Shahzad, 2011). As well, Al-Qaeda had close ties with Pakistani jihadist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan in Pakistan and had sympathisers within the MMA religious parties, particularly Jamaat-e-Islami. Al-Qaeda, including Afghan Arabs, exploited these relations and close ties with the Haqqani Network and Afghan Taliban, who already enjoyed a friction-free environment in Pakistani safe havens (Williams, 2008). Besides, some of the Al-Qaeda members had been married to either Afghan or tribal women, further making the bonds stronger (Stenersen, 2013). Thanks to these networks and safe havens, Al-Qaeda operated in the Af-Pak region and beyond (Hoffman & Reinares, 2014). The Pakistani military’s peace accords with the Pakistani Taliban in tribal areas had further ‘taken the pressure off’ Al-Qaeda (Gregory, 2007) because it had left the departure of foreign fighters to Pakistani jihadist groups, which in reality did not happen. It was reported, during the 2000s, that Al-Qaeda had 29 training camps in the region (Williams, 2008). By 2004, according to a Pakistani minister of interior, ‘Shakai had become a base for Al Qaeda, and it was used as a training and a transit camp by Al Qaeda’ (Loidolt, 2022). In 2007, the US intelligence and MI5 directors stated that Al-Qaeda’s ‘stronger operational connections and relationships … radiate’ from Pakistan, where its leaders were hiding (Gregory, 2007). Senior Al-Qaeda member Sheikh Saeed reported to Osama in early 2010 that ‘approximately 80%’ of its total budget was spent in the Af-Pak region (Loidolt, 2022). As a result, based on Al-Qaeda’s internal documents in 2010, Al-Qaeda had found presence in ‘at least’ nine Afghan provinces, including ‘a battalion in Kunar and Nuristan’ led by an Al-Qaeda member (Stenersen, 2016).

During this period (2002–2021), compared to the past periods, the Afghan Arabs’ role was limited to a few technical issues such as training, media coverage and involvement as volunteer fighters. In this period, apart from a very few there were no conflcits reported between the two.

In the post-2001 period, it is difficult to accurately estimate the total number of Al-Qaeda in general and Afghan Arabs in particular. However, estimates by some intelligence agencies and researchers indicate there were between 1,000 and 3,000 foreign fighters in Afghanistan in the 2001–2014 period (Duyvesteyn & Peeters, 2015), while the Afghan National Security Advisor (NSA) in 2017 estimated this to be nearly 10,000, not disaggregating the data for Arabs (Clark, 2017). In 2018, the Afghan NSA estimated over 13,000 foreign fighters fighting in Afghanistan: 6,000–7,000 from Pakistan, 2,000–3,000 from regional terrorist organisations, nearly 3,000 from ISIS-affiliated international members and 200–400 Al-Qaeda members (Asharq Al-Awsat, 2018).

However, some studies show the presence of Arab foot soldiers in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. For instance, between 2002 and 2006, nearly 120 Al-Qaeda foot soldiers were killed in Afghanistan and Pakistan, based on official biographies. About 76 were from the Arab League member states, including 23, 10, 7 and 7 from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria and Morocco, respectively (Stenersen, 2011). The majority of these foot soldiers were involved in insurgent attacks such as rocket attacks, ambushes and roadside bombs (60%). In comparison, the remaining were trainers (14%), engaged in administrative/media works (14%) and suicide operations (11%; Stenersen, 2011). Interestingly, the majority of these foreign fighters (76%) had been present in Afghanistan before 9/11 (Stenersen, 2011).

Second, the Al Qaeda introduced the art of suicide bombings: Afghans in their entire history never used suicide bombings, whether it was during the Soviet–Afghan war or the Taliban’s advancement towards northern Afghanistan. The first suicide bombing in Afghanistan was carried out by an Arab, which resulted in the assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud. According to United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan, between 2001 and 2004, only five suicide bombings were carried out. The numbers increased to 17 in 2005, while in 2006, they reached 123 (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2007). Before 2006, the majority of attacks were associated with Al-Qaeda (Williams, 2007). Prior to 9/11, according to one estimate, Al-Qaeda asked for a list of suicide bombers. Only from Kabul, Kandahar and eastern Afghanistan did 122 individuals show willingness. However, it is not known whether these were all Arabs or other ethnicities were also included (Muzdah, 2003, p. 74). On the other hand, the Taliban also adopted this technique in 2006 (made it a part of their Layeha) after learning and being influenced by Al-Qaeda, where its media wing Al-Shahab played an important role (Williams, 2007). The top Taliban leaders, such as Mansoor Dadullah, had also endorsed Al-Qaeda for teaching them the art of suicide bombings (Williams, 2008).

Third, Al-Qaeda’s media wing played an important role in persuading the Taliban to reconcile with adopting suicide bombing as a tool because it was contrary to the Deobandi school of thought. According to one estimate, between 2005 and 2012, Al-Qaeda filmed and published nearly 117 videos, and over half of these videos were filmed in Paktika (53) and Kunar (18) provinces ‘bordering’ Waziristan and Bajaur. This also shows the space provided to them by the Haqqani Network in south-eastern Afghanistan (Stenersen, 2013).

In the post-2001 period, the Taliban’s Al-Qaeda strategy was two-tiered: First, do not condemn and cut ties. Taliban have never publically condemned Al-Qaeda and have never made statements against them. In the Doha agreement, they have accepted that they will not prohibit others, including Al-Qaeda, from using Afghan soil to ‘threaten’ the USA and its allies (United States Department of State, 2020). However, in 2011, when Osama was killed in Abbottabad, Pakistan, the Taliban issued a statement calling him ‘the preacher of Islamic Jihad’ and ‘great Shaheed’, whose sacrifices will make the history of Islamic ummah ‘proud’. His death will not demoralise them but will only ‘strengthen’ their ‘Jihad’ (Nunn.Asia, 2011b). Even some Taliban commanders vowed to get revenge for Osama’s killing in Afghanistan (Nunn.Asia, 2011a). Later, when the Taliban sent an official letter to Islamic State’s leader in Iraq, they called the Arab Afghans, including Al-Qaeda leaders, ‘international heroes of contemporary Jihadists’. Individually, they called Abdullah Azzam ‘Imam ul Mujahideen’, Osama as ‘Quaid ul Mujahideen’, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as ‘Qahir ul Salibeen’ and Khattab as ‘Qahir ul Mulhideen’ (Nunn.Asia, 2015).

On the other hand, the Doha agreement between the Taliban and the USA also does not mean for them to cut their ‘ties’ with others (Mujahid, 2020). Taliban’s spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid also clarifies that in the Doha agreement, the real issue was not to whom the Taliban have ties with but to not let them use Afghanistan’s soil threaten the USA and its allies. His interview with TOLO news was contradictory at best as he said in the post-2001 period, ‘Taliban did not have any ties [with Al-Qaeda]’; hence, when there are no ties, how can it be cut off? Besides, contradicting his initial statement, he said that cutting ties is ‘illogical’ as they cannot cut ties with their fellow Muslims, considering it contrary to ‘religious’ bonding (TOLOnews, 2021).

Second, reject Al-Qaeda’s presence while providing them a controlled cover. The Taliban has repeatedly claimed that there is zero Al-Qaeda presence in Afghanistan. In this regard, they had repeatedly rejected all reports stemming from the United Nations and the USA which claimed the contrary. However, this contradicts some of the videos, Taliban members’ articles in particular and the Taliban movement’s statements/regulations overall. A video recording a meeting between Al-Qaeda leader (Mustafa Abu al-Yazid) and Taliban commander (Mansoor Dadullah) first appeared in 2007, where the Al-Qaeda leader said that the ‘ties … affection … .brotherhood [have] increased’(Stenersen, 2013). One member of the Taliban’s cultural committee in a few articles claimed that in the post-2001 period, Al-Qaeda operated independently in fighting against Americans. Even when the Taliban formally restructured its commissions, Al-Qaeda still operated. He named three Al-Qaeda leaders for Afghanistan and the Pakistan region, Khalid Habib, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (Abu Saeed al-Masri) and Abdul Hadi Iraqi. The first two were killed in US drone strikes in northern Waziristan, and the last was captured. He considered them to be responsible for Al-Qaeda activities in Afghanistan (Saqib, 2019b). However, in another article, he claims that after the Taliban became officially well structured, those engaged independently in fighting Americans became a part of the Taliban (mainly Afghans). According to him, henceforth, Al-Qaeda did not have any official structures in Afghanistan (Saqib, 2017).

Contrary to this, in 2015 US forces discovered an Al-Qaeda base in southern Afghanistan (Kandahar). In October, in a joint attack comprising 63 airstrikes and the involvement of 200 ground forces, over 160 suspected terrorists were killed. This surpassed the overall estimate of Al-Qaeda members in Afghanistan to be around 50–100. Hence, some intelligence agencies re-estimated the total number of Al-Qaeda members in Afghanistan to be over these previously estimated numbers (Stenersen, 2016). Similarly, in October 2016, when US troops killed Farouq al-Qahtani and Bilal al-Ateeby, the two Al-Qaeda leaders, though the Taliban rejected them as Al-Qaeda leaders, they did not reject them as Al-Qaeda members (Saqib, 2017). Taliban’s other tactic to cover the killing of Al-Qaeda leaders and members in Afghanistan was to label it as a ‘propaganda’ tool aimed at the ‘continuation of war’ or simply claiming attacks resulting in ‘civilian casualties’ (Saqib, 2017; Nunn.Asia, 2019, 2021). Ironically, contrary to the Taliban’s official stance (irrespective of its members’ opinions or statements), it issued a long decree of 26 points in September 2020 about registration and conditions for living in Afganistan for Al-Qaeda members. These related to giving allegiance, refraining from travelling independently, making accusations against the Taliban and using their flag. They also called upon them to engage only in Afghanistan, not give statements that are contradictory to the Taliban, not interfere in other countries’ affairs as well as Taliban’s and ‘strictly obey’ Taliban’s decrees (Amiri & Jackson, 2021). Later, in February 2021, the Taliban directed all its officials to not include ‘foreigners’ in their ranks or ‘hide them secretly’ (Amiri & Jackson, 2021).

Not All Afghan Arabs Were Al-Qaeda: The Division Among Afghan Arabs

Mustafa Hamid, a veteran of Afghan jihad and one of the Afghan Arabs, better explains that the Afghan Arabs in Afghanistan were less organised than those Arabs who fought in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war (Hamid, n.d.a). During Afghan jihad, the Afghan Arabs were not cohesive but somewhat fragmented. The Afghan Arabs that came to support Afghan mujahideen can be categorised into three main groups: Muslim Brotherhood, Salafist and Salafist jihadist. However, they all had differences with each other and with Abdullah Azzam.

Essam Daraz, the Egyptian journalist who participated in Afghan jihad as a journalist and wrote many books on Afghan jihad, believes that there were three different parties of Afghan Arabs: the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Jamat-e-Islami and the Salafists. According to him, such different schools of thought created differences among their followers leading to clashes with each other. He mentions an incident where the Afghan Arabs fought in the Kuwaiti Red Crescent Hospital in Peshawar. Each group also criticised the other. For instance, Al Jamat-e-Islami criticised the Muslim Brotherhood because they were solely limited to education, relief work, health and media. According to that group, the only way to support Afghans was to fight shoulder to shoulder with them (Daraz, 1993).

An Afghan writer and an interpreter to Abdullah Azzam also mentioned that there were different parties of Afghan Arabs, and they did not operate under one banner. These parties were Jamat-ul-Jihad, Qaeda-tul-Ansar (according to Muzdah, later Jamat-ul-Jihad and Qaeda-tul-Ansar merged into one party under Qaeda-tul-Tanzeem led by OBL) and the Jamiat-ul-Muqatila (a Libyan party led by Abu Mazar-ul-Saadi) (Muzdah, 2020).

The Muslim Brotherhood’s official policy in Afghan jihad was not to be involved militarily but to support Afghan mujahideen in education, health and media sections. Some of the leaders of Muslim Brotherhood, such as Kamal Al-Sananery (Egypt), Sheikh Mehmood Sawaf (Iraq) and Sheikh Abdul Majeed Zandani (Yemen), had a ‘very clear strategy to support Afghans other than engagement in military training’ (Abdul Baqi, n.d.). Misbah Abdul Baqi, who closely researched Muslim Brotherhood, believes that the reason behind this was to show that they (Muslim Brotherhood) were ‘supporters’ not ‘the owners’ of the Afghan jihad. They continued this approach throughout the Afghan jihad (Abdul Baqi, n.d.). Mustafa Hamid, an Afghan Arab, agrees with this policy and recalls his meetings with Kamal Al-Sananery in 1981 and Mustafa Mashhur in 1984. They rejected being militarily involved in the Afghan jihad despite being asked in the conversations (Hamid & Farrall, 2015, p. 32). Mustafa Hamid believed that the Muslim Brotherhood allowed its members to participate as fighters only in a personal and individual capacity, but not as an official policy (Hamid & Farrall, 2015, p. 33). He summarises the Muslim Brotherhood’s official policy during the Afghan jihad in four points: (a) ‘use media to incite Muslims’ to ‘support Afghan Mujahedeen’; (b) ‘collect donations and send them to the Mujahedeen organizations in Peshawar or distribute them to refugee camps’; (c) ‘send doctors to work in hospitals for treating the Mujahedeen’; and (4) ‘support Abdul Rasul Sayyaf as the leader of the Union’(Hamid & Farrall, 2015, p. 32). However, the official representative of the Muslim Brotherhood in Pakistan, Kemal Helbawy, disagrees with the last point of Mustafa Hamid. He says that there was no distinction between Afghan factions and leaders during his Muslim Brotherhood activities in Afghanistan (Helbawy, 2010).

Abdullah Azzam also had some slight differences with the Muslim Brotherhood’s approach in Afghanistan. The Muslim Brotherhood believed that the Afghan issue was the one of the issues of the Muslim world; hence, they did not put their full weight behind it. In contrast, Azzam believed to the contrary that Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood should ‘devote themselves’ to this issue and grab this ‘opportunity’ to ‘establish’ Allah’s ‘law’ in Afghanistan. The second difference was that Azzam believed the Muslim Brotherhood should ‘concentrate’ on war. However, the Muslim Brotherhood believed that the war should be ‘handled by the Afghans themselves’ and others should assist them in other fields such as ‘relief, education, health, counseling and eliminating the disparities among them’ (Abdul Baqi, n.d.). An Afghan researcher believes that Azzam ‘gave up his point of view’ in his last years (Abdul Baqi, n.d.). The main reason behind such differences was that Azzam believed the ‘jihad’ in Afghanistan is compulsory for all Muslims, while the Muslim Brotherhood believed it is solely ‘mandatory’ for Afghans.

Apart from this, there were also reported differences between Abdullah Azzam, OBL and Ayman Al-Zawahiri. Azzam’s jihad was more defensive; it aimed solely to support the ‘prosecuted’ Muslims worldwide. However, Zawahiri wanted to wage jihad against fellow Muslims (i.e., to topple the pro-West Egyptian government he considered infidels). Unlike Zawahiri’s agenda, Abdullah Azzam did not have a local agenda. He ‘emphasised’ on ‘resistance’, not ‘aggression or expansion’ (Gerges, 2009, pp. 135–136). He did not believe that the non-Muslims were ‘infidels’ and hence ‘change’ should be brought through transforming the ‘hearts and minds’ (Abdul Baqi, n.d.). OBL, who once followed Azzam, became impressed with Egyptian Zawahiri. However, his approach was somehow different from Azzam and Zawahiri’s. He considered fighting ‘America and Jews first, the axis of evil’ (Abdul Baqi, n.d.). Differences sometimes led to conspiracy theories such as that Zawahiri assassinated Azzam in 1989 in Peshawar because he considered him an ‘American spy’ (Gerges, 2009, p. 137). A famous Afghan Arab recalls in his memoirs that three groups of Salafists were criticising Azzam: (a) Saudi-backed Salafists such as Jamil al-Rahman; (b) Salafist jihadist ‘denouncing’ Saudi Arabia (headquartered at the Kuwait Red Crescent Society); and (c) the Egyptian jihad organisation (Hamid, n.d.b). The latter even distributed a 13-page leaflet criticising Azzam, while Azzam responded to them in his speeches (Hamid, n.d.b).

There were also differences between two Egyptian jihadist groups, namely the Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group. Both parties published periodical magazines Al-Fath and Al-Mourabitoun, respectively. The Islamic Group, through its Al-Mourabitoun magazine, ‘accus[ed]’ Ayman al-Zawahiri for ‘embezzling funds’ after his organisation the Islamic Jihad had risen to support mujahideen (Brachman, 2009, p. 115). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, efforts failed to unite and merge both parties. The Islamic Jihad, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, differed with the notion that the leader of the Islamic Group, Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman (famously known as Blind Sheikh), should lead them. Although the Islamic Jihad respected the Blind Sheikh, they objected to his leadership due to wilayat al’darir (rule of the blind, a theological question in Islam; Gerges, 2009, p. 100).

During the 1996–2001, 11 different Arab groups were operating in Afghanistan, including Al-Qaeda. These groups were either named after a particular country of northern African Arab states or had individual names such as Al-Qaeda, Ghuraba and Khalden group (Lia, 2009, pp. 248–250). Abu Musab al-Suri, a Ghuraba camp leader, also had open differences with Osama. It was mainly because he believed Saudian jihadists might be ‘disguised’ as Muslim Brotherhood members or ‘blindly obeying’ their Sheikh (Lia, 2009, p. 179). Interestingly, Al-Qaeda and Osama had differences with a Saudi NGO, Munazima Al Wafa, as they believed the NGO being Saudi-backed aimed to split Al-Qaeda. According to Muzdah, the NGO also granted economic help to Taliban leaders and attracted many anti-Al-Qaeda Arabs (Muzdah, 2003, p. 71). Second, al-Suri thought ‘not respecting’ the Taliban’s rules and regulations would ‘jeopardize’ Arab presence in Afghanistan (Lia, 2009, p. 284). He even told one of his companions that Mullah Omar should be ‘obeyed’, not OBL (Lia, 2009, p. 285). On the other hand, he had also told the Taliban, with whom he had excellent ties and was an editor of their Arabic magazine, to curb Osama’s activities as ‘he does not know what is he doing?’ (Muzdah, 2003, p. 72). Abu Musab al-Suri’s differences were only with the leader of Al-Qaeda and were not over major issues with Al-Qaeda as a whole or as an organisation (Lia, 2009).

The Taliban responded to these divisions, by introducing a 13-point regulation in 2000, mostly related to registration of foreign fighters, living in particular ‘designated areas’, and restraints on giving interviews to media. However, this stirred opposition within Arab ranks, with one of its leaders writing that ‘we are getting ready to leave’. Some of them feared the information on their registrations would be shared with Americans via Pakistan (Stenersen, 2017, pp. 120–123). However, the regulations were not fully implemented. Second, to bring the divided foreign fighters under an umbrellas, the Taliban held a three-day meeting in Kandahar in 2001, announcing Osama as the leader of all Arabs in Afghanistan (Muzdah, 2003, p. 73).

The Afghan Arabs and Afghan Mujahideen/Taliban: Not Always Brothers in Arms

It is perceived that Afghan Arabs were always brothers in arms with Afghan mujahideen, who fought shoulder to shoulder against the Soviet invaders. However, there were also differences among them, and sometimes Afghan Arabs also turned their guns against Afghan mujahideen groups.

Afghanistan is predominantly a Muslim-majority country, where Hanafi jurisprudence has been followed for centuries, while most of the Arabs that came to fight against the Soviet Union were either Salafis or followers of other Sunni jurisprudence such as Maliki and Shafiyee. This difference between jurisprudence became a source of tension between Afghan Arabs and Afghan mujahideen. Muzdah also highlights this difference between Arabs and Afghan mujahideen. First, the way Arabs pray (mainly saying aloud Amen and doing Rafayul Yadayn) became a source of differences and tensions. The Afghans believed that the Soviets were against their religion and the Arabs were against their madhab (jurisprudence). This also led to fighting between them. Hence, Azzam came to the rescue and issued a fatwa that all Arabs coming to Afghanistan pray based on the Hanafi school of thought. In addition, he also wrote a booklet on the role of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence in curbing the deviations of the Abbasid Caliphate, to influence the Afghan Arabs not to question the Hanafi jurisprudence (Azzam, 2016). The second difference between the Arabs was that they asked Azzam whether it was okay to fight under such a commander who was less attentive to religious deeds. Azzam’s next fatwa allowed jihad but advised the leader to change with time. Muzdah believes that during the Afghan jihad, only Iranian media raised the differences of madhab between Arabs and Afghans.

In contrast, the Western media only raised this issue after signing the Geneva agreement to weaken this link (Muzdah, 2020). Abdullah Anas and Mustafa Hamid, two veteran Afghan Arabs, also point out differences between Afghan mujahideen and Afghan Arabs based on Islamic jurisprudence. Abdullah Anas, for instance, an Afghan mujahideen, was against combining the Zuhr with Asar prayers as one when the Afghan Arabs ‘begged’ to do so. Further, they also sometimes mocked the way of their recitation (Anas, 2019, p. 43). On the other hand, Mustafa Hamid also highlights that the Salafi Afghan Arabs ‘caused problems’ as they ‘attacked Afghans over their beliefs’ because Afghans were mostly Hanifis and Sufis, while Salafis ‘hated both’. This, according to him, often reached ‘very close to fighting’ between Afghan Arabs and Afghan mujahideen groups (Hamid & Farrall, 2015, p. 37).

An Egyptian fighter who came to Afghanistan also mentions these differences over madhabs and says that Afghans emphasised their Hanafi style of praying over the body of Yemeni ‘Shaheed’, resulting in other non-Egyptian Arabs not participating in the praying of the ‘Shaheed’ (Faraj, 2002, p. 27).

Another Egyptian fighter also points out this difference in the Sunni school of thought. As Afghans put amulets, they went to graves of saints, and some even smoked, the Arabs saw this as shirk and haram, Salafists beliefs. He does recall an incident where an Arab went back home due to these activities (Daraz, 1993).

However, on the other hand, Afghan mujahideen leaders rejected this division between Afghan Arabs and Afghan mujahideen by issuing a booklet entitled Akas-ul-Amal-e Rahbar an-e-Mujahideen (the reactions of the leaders of mujahideen) rejecting the allegations behind Afghan Arabs’ Wahhabism and instead emphasised on pan-Islamism (Muzdah, 2020).

Later, when the Soviets left and the Soviet-backed Afghan government of Dr Najeebullah collapsed, the differences widened from solely a madhab issue to strategic planning. Some of the hard-core extremists sided first with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and then some extremists came together under the umbrella of Al-Qaeda to support the Taliban in intra-Afghan fighting. In the initial stages, Osama and Al-Qaeda were more than ‘guests’ for the Taliban due to gifts to Mullah Omar and its associates and then in buying military commanders of opposition mujahideen groups (Muzdah, 2003, p. 67).

However, this does not mean that both Al-Qaeda and the Taliban had a smooth relationship without any hindrances. There were two camps inside Taliban and Al-Qaeda, whose views were opposed to each other. Inside the Al-Qaeda camp, individuals and personalities were against giving the Taliban complete ‘legitimacy’ and were against ‘allegiance’ to the Taliban. Al-Qaeda’s leader Osama did give ‘allegiance’ to the Taliban leader in 2000, and that too was a proxy allegiance (Brown, 2010). Besides, some Arab fighters thought of the Taliban’s Afghanistan as a ‘temporary haven’ but not a first stepping stone towards a ‘Caliphate’ because their attention was limited to Afghanistan (Lia, 2009, p. 240). Al-Qaeda’s leader Abu Musab al-Suri puts it that the support among Afghan Arabs, including Al-Qaeda, varied ‘from total rejection, especially among so-called Salafists, to support’ (Lia, 2009, p. 239). Among the Taliban, two groups had different opinions about Osama and Al-Qaeda. According to Mullah Omar’s former spokesman, political leaders of the Taliban ‘loved and cooperated’ with Osama but were against his activities. At the same time, the lower-rank Taliban fighters (or ‘common Taliban’) were ‘hardcore supporters’ of Osama (Mutmaeen, 2016, p. 195). Hence, according to Waheed Muzdah, Osama once said, ‘There are two sources against our Jihad: one is the USA, and the other is Taliban’s ministry of foreign affairs’, by which he meant Taliban’s foreign minister Mullah Abdul Wakil Muttawakil (Muzdah, 2003, p. 159).

The main reason behind such views was Al-Qaeda’s global agenda and its impact on the Taliban in recognition, aid and sanctions. Just before the 9/11 attacks, in August 2001, the Taliban’s minister of education, Amir Khan Muttaqi, met Osama in Kandahar, where Osama protested the limits placed on his activities his activities. Osama told Muttaqi that Omar was the ‘Imam of jihad’, so all the Muslims should stand behind him, and if the Imam made any mistakes, the followers should correct him. Besides, he told him, ‘I am not doing anything despite talking’. Muttaqi responded that wars start with ‘talks’ (Saqib, 2016). According to the Taliban’s foreign ministry official, at the end of the meeting, Osama told Muttaqi that ‘Okay, we will solve your internal problem so you could not say that we were solely a headache for you’ (Muzdah, 2003, p. 161). Next month, the leader of Jamiat-e-Islami, Ahmad Shah Massoud, was assassinated.

In the post-2001 period, although both Al-Qaeda and the Taliban fought against the USA and Afghan troops in Afghanistan, they had different goals and aims in Pakistan and beyond. Al-Qaeda and some Pakistani militants waged war against Pakistan and were also involved in international terrorism operating from Pakistani soil. However, the Taliban did neither of the two. On the other hand, there are fewer reported and documented differences between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. However, some voices from within Taliban ranks were alarmed about the ‘unconditional’ allegiance to Al-Qaeda. According to them, ‘independence’ is the nature of Al-Qaeda ideology, where they neglect ‘local social characteristics, religious and political sensitivities’ (Saqib, 2019c). They argue they had never taken the Taliban’s advice while announcing Zawahiri as Al-Qaeda leader and establishing Al-Qaeda on the Indian subcontinent (Saqib, 2019b).

Moreover, if the Taliban ‘continues with its unconditional allegiance’, it will have a dire impact on them. Some of them are even worried that someone would ‘use’ Al-Qaeda’s name to their disadvantage (Saqib, 2019c). Interestingly, these views were published in a two-part article soon after Al-Qaeda’s media wing published a video in May 2019 about its activities in Afghanistan. The Taliban rejected the video as they believed the scenes mainly were taken from one of the Taliban’s videos published four years ago (Saqib, 2019a).