Economic Community of West African States,Regional security and the Implementation of Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric or Reality?

Introduction

One of the defining features of many African countries is the fact that they experienced colonial rule. Apart from creating an extremely fragmented state system and political marginality, which later encouraged the formation of a large number of interstate organisations and institutions (Gibbs 2009, 703), colonial rule also prevented the socioeconomic development of African countries in the interest of the local population. Indeed, not only did colonial rule destroy pre-colonial African economies, but also Schraeder (2004) notes that the economic infrastructure needed to promote growth in Africa was completely ignored in favour of a perverse form of infrastructural development. With such a colonial legacy, at independence, Iheduru (2011, 215) points out that the ‘elite consensus, at least rhetorically, was that economic integration would make it possible to promote intraregional trade with neighbours and to pool resources for investment and efficient industrialisation by taking advantage of the economies of scale that large markets provide’. It is, therefore, unsurprising that many African countries have sought to improve their socioeconomic conditions through the promotion of regional economic integration. One regional area to do so was the West Africa region that formed the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975. Despite regional integration contributing to fast economic growth in many African countries since the mid-1990s (Radelet 2010), they have also had to contend with a number of security-related challenges and emerging threats such as the proliferation of small arms, bad governance, piracy, drug trafficking, terrorism, and cross-border criminality. Nowhere is this more evident than in the ECOWAS sub-region where member-states have had to undertake a number of interventions in the last two decades to stem the tide of violence and conflict.

Based on a review and analysis of available literature and other secondary sources of data, the focus of this article is on the role and contribution of ECOWAS member-states in the promotion of peace and security in the sub-region. The specific and core questions to be addressed are as follows: To what extent have the internationally adopted humanitarian intervention and Responsibility to Protect (R2P) influenced and impacted intervention policies of ECOWAS member-states to promote peace and security? What are the prevailing challenges to achieving the goals of humanitarian intervention and R2P in the ECOWAS sub-region? What needs to be done to overcome the challenges and problems with the efforts to achieve the goals and objectives of humanitarian intervention and R2P? In addressing these questions, the article’s main contribution lies in its analysis of the extent to which West African countries have become aware of the importance of promoting peace and security to achieve their economic goals and objectives. It would demonstrate how ECOWAS has taken the principles underlying humanitarian intervention and the R2P very seriously and, therefore, intervened when concerns with human rights abuses, and mass atrocities are taking place in the sub-region. In doing so, the article begins with an examination of theoretical arguments underpinning humanitarian intervention and R2P. Particularly, it analyses the main tenets and some of the criticisms that have been levelled against humanitarian intervention and the R2P principles. This is followed by an examination of the history of ECOWAS, and the extent to which it has promoted peace and security and applied humanitarian intervention and the R2P principles in the sub-region. Section 3 discusses the challenges to the promotion of security and the implementation of the humanitarian intervention and R2P principles. The final section offers suggestions regarding how to overcome the constraints and ensure that peace and security is rightly attained to spur the development processes in the ECOWAS sub-region.

Humanitarian Intervention and R2P: Theoretical Discussion

International politics has historically been constructed around the principle of state sovereignty, a highly contested concept (Barkin 2001). As a core principle of international politics and international law since the signing of the Westphalia Treaty of 1648 (Osiander 2001), sovereignty has both an internal and external component. As Donnelly (2014) notes, while internal sovereignty involves supreme domestic authority, external sovereignty is a principle and set of practices for regulating the interaction of those who claim internal supremacy. Although the Westphalia concept of sovereignty and its principles are still the effective currency in the international system and nation-states’ jurisdiction is still recognised, it has recently come under attack from new and emerging principles and norms (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2010). Sovereignty is no longer seen as conferring upon the sovereign an absolute right to do as they wish with their citizens, or with others who happen to fall under their sway (Traub 2009). According to Semb (2000), the growing importance of human rights implanted the idea that sovereignty should no longer be allowed to shield systematic human rights violations. The growing interdependence of the contemporary international system has meant that issues pertaining to human rights and the desire to monitor and protect them when abuses occur have become a preoccupation of the international community. For some writers (Krain 2005, Peters 2009, Traub 2009), state sovereignty implies responsibility for the protection of basic human rights and the state’s accountability. In sum, the international community has made the promotion of human rights, and peace and security through the principles of humanitarian intervention and the concomitant R2P an important part of the political landscape. For its proponents, humanitarian intervention simply signals the imperative of action in the face of mass violence and is intertwined with a perception of sovereignty as conditional to a state’s respect for the human rights of its citizens (Badescu 2011). As Abiew (1999) points out, humanitarian intervention refers primarily to forcible means employed by a state, group of states, an international or regional organisation, or humanitarian agencies with the aim (or at least one of its principal aims) of ending egregious human rights violations perpetrated by governments or preventing or alleviating human suffering in situations of internal conflicts. Boettcher (2004) adds that humanitarian intervention also involves the intervention of one or more countries, or one or more international organisations, in another country without the consent of that country’s government.

The prescriptive framework and the principles for the contentious humanitarian intervention have recently become embodied in R2P (Badescu 2011). With its philosophical roots in the dilemma of political authority in times of civil war and revolution (Thakur 2012) and described by Thakur (2011) as the ‘game-changer’ and a powerful new galvanising norm, R2P originated in a 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Adams 2019, Crossley 2018). Agreed to and endorsed in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit, the main pillars of R2P are the protection responsibilities of the state, international assistance and capacity-building, and timely and decisive response to prevent and halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Specifically, Welsh (2009) as well as Bellamy and Williams (2011) note that the State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement. Second, the international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulfilling this responsibility, and to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations from these crimes, if a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations. Third, the international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations from these crimes. If a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations, in accordance with the UN Charter. Thus, as Deng et al. (1996) argue, sovereignty became linked with humanitarian intervention and international responsibility in the sense that states were expected to provide the basic needs of its people as well as protection of human rights and assistance for vulnerable populations. If states fail to discharge the responsibilities of sovereignty, whether through the state or alternatives to it, they cannot legitimately complain against international humanitarian intervention or against its withdrawal and neglect. No longer can states hide behind the guise of sovereignty and commit atrocities against their citizens. For Krain (2005, 365), ‘while interventions can hasten perpetrators to ramp up their genocidal action within that period of time, and might not end genocides or politicides, it could on the other hand lead to a stalemate, and also force perpetrators to change policies and curtail mass killings of civilians and non-combatants as well as significantly reduce the severity of the killings’. In sum, as Crossley (2018) has stated, the ‘three-pillars approach’ of R2P emphasises government co-operation and consent, suggesting that if a situation were such that a state was manifestly failing to protect its population and outside support was ineffective or denied, the respon-sibility falls to the international community to intervene.

While a laudable idea in the promotion of international peace and security, as well as human rights, the principles of humanitarian intervention and R2P have come in for some severe criticisms (Adams 2019). First, Crossley (2018) has noted that pluralist thinkers were concerned about the implication that intervention on humanitarian grounds was to become a duty or obligation, rather than remain, as had been customary, a discretionary right. Additionally, given that humanitarian intervention and R2P involves the use of force in certain instances in the territory of a sovereign nation without its consent, this constitutes a violation of its sovereignty, and therefore a principal aspect of generally accepted international political order and system. Indeed, as Bellamy (2014, 16) points out, critics contend that R2P threatens to undermine important sources of stability by imposing extraterritorial human rights on states, granting neo-imperial rights that allow the powerful to impose their will on the weak, legitimising the use of force and increasing risks to civilians and their human rights over and above any gains it purports to make. Moreover, critics argue that R2P could not provide the legal authorisation to satisfy the moral desire to proactively enforce human rights. Given that R2P does not legally bind UN member-states to protect civilians, it means that nations will not deploy their military if they do not legally have to. In effect, Thakur (2012) argues that because R2P authorises but does not mandate particular types of executive action, legal scholars believe that R2P imposes no new obligations on states or international organisations and has no ‘normative effect’ and ‘introduces no conceptual innovation’.

There is also the concern of what exactly it means to react, including the use of military force to protect human rights and avoid mass atrocities. There is the suspicion that R2P could serve to justify (unilateral) military action or foreign interference in domestic affairs, strengthen Western domination of weaker developing countries, justified as the protection of populations at risk (Crossley 2018). How is the international community to ensure that the use of military force would not result in the abuse of this principle by the more powerful military powers? As Tanguy (2003, 145) notes, there is the fear and concern that through humanitarian intervention, ‘the strong can do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must’. In particular, critics see the right to intervene as the ‘instrument of inconsistent, cruelly selective intervention policies, hijacked by the national interests and ethnocentrism of the more powerful states, in blatant contradiction to the principles of equality and sovereignty, and in dubious relation to the principle of self-determination’ (ibid. 143). Given the fact that ‘the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention were actually designed as dams against the historical flood of imperial interventions by the more powerful states, and that the threat of these is perceived as real’ (ibid.), the concerns and criticisms raised above are all issues that are yet to be clearly defined and agreed to in the use of R2P. Welsh (2009) adds that there is a risk that by placing so much emphasis on Pillars 1 and 2, R2P is further enmeshed in the already well-established agendas of capacity-building and conflict prevention, and obscure what is truly novel about the concept—namely, generating and exercising the international responsibility to respond to mass atrocities when state authorities fail to protect their populations. More significantly, in some areas, R2P calls for greater UN activism in areas traditionally seen as being within the domestic jurisdiction of states.

Moreover, there is also the issue of selectivity, hypocrisy and double standards when it comes to the application of R2P by outside forces and actors. One often hears the question: why does the international community intervene in Libya but not Syria, Mali, Yemen or others. The failure and tepid respond to patterns of discrimination that eventually led to a genocide against the Rohingya population by Myanmar’s (Burma) security forces during 2017, according to Adams (2019), highlights the concerns critics have with the R2P principles given that the international community and UN Security Council can in certain instances be paralysed and inert and not consistently and uniformly apply R2P principles. As Paris (2014) notes, this reveals the deep tensions in the strategic logic of preventive humanitarian intervention, which is at the heart of R2P. On the one hand, if there is no intervention in the face of looming mass atrocities, R2P is likely to be criticised as phony or hollow. On the other hand, when a preventive operation is launched, even if it achieves its initial goal of averting an atrocity, both the intervention and R2P are still likely to be judged harshly. A final challenge to R2P has centred on the issue of authority: deciding to use force where necessary and how to overcome the dangers posed by the veto. With the existence of the five-member security council, countries like the United States of America could easily veto interventions that they may deem not to be in their own interests. Thus, there is a concern that the R2P is nothing more than a political and diplomatic instrument that the great powers use or misuse to advance their strategic goals (Tanguy 2003). Thus, for detractors, humanitarian intervention and ‘R2P is an oxymoron that serves as a pretext for selective military intervention without legal sanctioning, and an exercise that only achieves uncertain results’ (Badescu 2011).

Be that as it may, Donnelly (2014) argues that one thing that is clear is that following the humanitarian disasters as well as incidents of atrocities in the 1990s, when grave human rights abuses, mass violence and crimes against humanity were committed in places like Rwanda, Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo, the idea of humanitarian intervention, R2P and the norms associated with them have emerged as important variables in the international political system. Although R2P remains conceptually contested and politically controversial and does not fill all gaps in the normative architecture of the world order (Thakur 2015), Cronin (2007) notes that for more than 60 years, the international community has consistently condemned acts of genocide, thus demonstrating that the traditional notions and interpretation of sovereignty did not involve having absolute power by states. Thus, for all its imperfections, various writers (Badescu 2011, Bellamy 2014, Bellamy et al. 2010, Thakur 2015) have argued that R2P offers the best chance in our own time to build an international community that is less tolerant of mass atrocities and more predisposed to preventing crimes against humanity. R2P might make the world less tolerant of mass atrocities, more protective of its victims, and better disposed towards collective action to prevent these crimes.

ECOWAS, Humanitarian Intervention and R2P

The preceding discussions have shown how emerging conflicts has necessitated the adoption of new principles, such as R2P, and the increasing refocus on the centuries-old doctrine of humanitarian intervention. This is especially pertinent in West Africa, which as Charbonneau (2017, 4) notes, has experienced multiple wars, regional conflict systems and international interventions. The last 10 years have shown the region to be a ‘core hotspot of international security with, among other examples, the post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, the Ebola outbreak, the Malian conflict, the popular ousting of President Compaoré in Burkina Faso, the war against Boko Haram, the creation of the G5 Sahel, and the African (ECOWAS) intervention in Gambia.’ The issue that arises though is whether ECOWAS member-states have been able to adequately intervene in the domestic affairs of others in the sub-region to adequately deal with incidents of human rights abuses, violence and crimes against humanity. In addressing this issue, it needs to be pointed out that ECOWAS was formed in 1975 with the initial goal of promoting economic co-operation and integration. With an initial focus on economic growth and development through integration, issues pertaining to peace and security did not feature prominently in the ECOWAS’ agenda. However, in 1978, in its Protocol on Non-Aggression, the ECOWAS sought to promote peace and harmonious understanding among the member-states for the achievement of its aimed goals by agreeing to ‘refrain from the threat or use of force or aggression against the territorial integrity of political independence of other Member States’ (Mgbeoji 2003).

While deemed a way of promoting integration, critics noted that in cases of breach or violation, there were no mechanisms in place to sanction those involved. To plug the loopholes in the Non-Aggression Pact, Mgbeoji (ibid., 63) notes that ECOWAS adopted the Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance of Defence (PMAD) in 1981. The PMAD was a way of deterring and dealing with external aggression and externally supported domestic insurrection and revolt, which constituted major threat to stability in the community (ibid.). Specifically, not only did PMAD include the provision for Allied Armed Forces of the Community but also under the PMAD, ‘any armed threat or aggression directed against any Member State shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire Community and members were to be given mutual aid and assistance for defence’ (Nkrumah and Viljoen 2014). Thus, due to the pressure of political events, ‘ECOWAS transformed from seeking economic integration into an organisation also responsible for finding solutions to armed conflicts and other political crisis which were undermining peace and security within the sub-region’ (Yabi 2010). While not completing shunning its underlying economic objective, the increasing conflict and violence in the region has led to a redirection and increasing focus on issues pertaining to the promotion of peace and security. As Sampson (2011) notes, the revised treaty of the ECOWAS and its supplementary protocols, discussed in detail below, was ultimately aimed at promoting peace and security, which it considered essential to realising its economic objectives.

For Charbonneau (2017, 6), ECOWAS—especially the ECOWAS Commission —has taken a strong stance on the promotion of democracy over recent decades. It is, therefore, unsurprising that ECOWAS has played a crucial role in conflict prevention and crisis response in member-states since the 1990s. In the promotion of regional security, there was, for example, the extraordinary effort of ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which was formed in 1990 in helping to resolve conflicts in countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone. Given the ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression that states that the Community ‘cannot attain its objectives save in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among Member States’, ECOWAS faced problems and challenges justifying the interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Arthur 2010). However, justified on humanitarian grounds, ECOWAS felt it had to act to prevent further human suffering. ECOWAS also believed that the outbreak of civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone represented major threats to the peace and stability of the whole of the West Africa sub-region and because of the grave human rights violations that were occurring in the two countries. According to Arthur (ibid.), compelled by the unfolding crisis, ECOWAS leaders resolved and sent a peacekeeping force, ECOMOG to both Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s to oversee a ceasefire agreement, bring the civil war to an end, and also avert a humanitarian catastrophe. The relapse into violent civil conflict in Liberia forced ECOWAS to intervene and broker another ceasefire and peace agreement, which resulted in the rebel leader, Charles Taylor’s resignation and expulsion to Nigeria in August 2003.

Although ECOWAS intervened to manage the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, it had neither the institutional structures nor legal framework in its charter to legitimately undertake such operations (Sampson 2011). Indeed, while the UN welcomed the ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone after they occurred, the interventions severely challenged global order and international law since it represented one of the rare cases where a group of countries practically usurped the function and the role of the Security Council by using force to resolve an apparently domestic crisis that they perceived to constitute a threat to international peace and security (Mgbeoji 2003). It is to overcome these challenges and the general red-tape that often accompanies UN mandate that ECOWAS subsequently revised its treaty and enacted supplementary protocols, which now shape and define its security agenda and also legitimises intervention in sub-regional conflicts (Sampson 2011).

First, there is the Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security (MCPMRPS) that was adopted in 1999. Apart from the potential of evolving to be the most comprehensive conflict management mechanism on the African continent, the MCPMRPS placed the principles embodied in humanitarian intervention and R2P on sound legal grounds, and also provided a clear vision, mandate, and guidance for the conduct of peace support operations including complex and multidimensional missions (Aning and Salihu 2011, Levitt 2001). The most salient features of the MCPMRPS called for the establishment of a Mediation and Security Council (MSC), which is composed of representatives of ECOWAS member-states, and which in times of crisis will be ‘empowered to take decisions on issues of regional peace and security on behalf of the Authority of Heads of State and Government’. More specifically, the MSC may ‘authorise all forms of interventions, including the decision to deploy political and military missions’ (Levitt 2001). Similarly, under the MCPMRPS, internal conflict situations that are sustained and maintained from within, the MSC may employ military missions when circumstances exist that threaten to trigger humanitarian disaster, pose a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region (Aning and Salihu 2011, Levitt 2001). According to the protocol, while the Assembly shall delegate to the MSC the power to take on its behalf decision for the appropriate implementation of the provisions of the Mechanism, ‘the Assembly of Heads of States shall be the highest decision-making body on issues relating to conflict prevention, management and resolution, peacekeeping and security, humanitarian support, peace building, control of cross-border crime, proliferation of small arms as well as other issues covered by the provisions of the Mechanism’. Hence, from the above provisions, it is clear according to Sarkin (2009), that under ECOWAS law, military force may lawfully be dispatched in times of armed conflict to safeguard displaced persons. In addition to the MSC, Yabi (2010) notes that the MCPMRPS resulted in the creation of a web of institutions and support organs such as the Council of Elders that engages primarily in preventive diplomacy, and the ECOWAS ECOMOG as well as Sub-Regional Peace and Security Observation System otherwise known as the Early Warning System (EWS), which focusses on conflict prevention. There is also the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) tasked with monitoring and enforcement action. Article 25 of the mechanism further stipulates the conditions under which the mechanism could be invoked, which include serious violations and abuses of human rights.

Apart from MCPMRPS, there is also the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (EPDGG) that was adopted by the Heads of States and Government in December 2001 to strengthen the internal mechanisms that would prevent crisis eruption. Not only does it recognise the intrinsic relationship between democracy and good governance on one hand, and peace and security on the other, but also it seeks to strengthen democratic principles and culture so as to avert unnecessary conflicts that have plagued West African states (Sampson 2011). As Sampson (ibid.) points out, the ‘EPDGG represents as an expression of a new, collective political resolve of ECOWAS member-states to take the process of preventing and resolving crises and violent conflicts forward, and to achieve peace and security through the development of democracy and good governance. The protocol marks an important stage in the sub-region’s political development, which was characterised for long periods by the armed forces’ deep involvement in political decision-making. It also provides an emphatic statement of the incompatibility of democracy and good governance with military-run government and the military’s involvement in politics’. Furthermore, the ECOWAS adopted in 2008 the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), which it believes can contribute to creating an environment that would ensure a more peaceful way of settling political and economic disputes (Bah and Aning 2009). As Nkrumah and Viljoen (2014, 251) note, with its focus on preventive diplomacy, Article 41 of the ECPF established the responsibility to prevent intra and interstate conflict; the responsibility to react against grave and compelling humanitarian disaster; and the responsibility to rebuild, reconstruct, rehabilitate and reconcile after conflict.

Similarly, there is the ECOWAS Humanitarian Policy, adopted in 2012 in Cotonou, Benin Republic by Ministers in charge of Humanitarian Affairs in West Africa. According to the ECOWAS Commission (2012, 7), the Humanitarian Policy seeks to ‘standardize the practice of humanitarian action in ECOWAS Member States by fostering a balanced linkage between humanitarian action, human Security and human Development throughout the ECOWAS space based on the principle of regional solidarity. The overall strategic objective guiding the ECOWAS Humanitarian Policy is the prediction, prevention and overall management of disasters and conflicts towards limitation or elimination of effects thereby preventing death, human suffering, and development losses; and enhancing the protection and social situations of all West African citizens and residents as basic conditions for regional integration, peace, security and development.’ Finally, as part of its efforts to provide for a regional counter-terrorism strategy, at its 42nd ordinary session in Yamoussoukro, Cote d’Ivoire in February 2013, the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS adopted the Political Declaration on a Common Position Against Terrorism, which included a Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan. As Ewi (2013) points out, ‘the principal purpose of the Declaration and Strategy is to prevent and eradicate terrorism and related criminal acts in West Africa, with a view to creating conditions conducive to sound economic development and ensuring the well-being of all ECOWAS citizens. The plans also seek to give effect to regional, continental and international counter-terrorism instruments and to provide a common operational framework for action’.

Since the adoption of these protocols, norms, structures and principles, the ECOWAS has been heavily involved in various preventative interventions. First, the ECOWAS played an important role in restoring power to President Joao Vieira in Guinea-Bissau in 1998 following the struggle for power between the president and the Armed Forces Chief, Ansumane Mane. As Obi (2009) points out, the suspension of Ansumane Mane as the chief of the armed forces by Joao Vieira based on accusations that Mane had been involved in the illegal supply of arms to the rebels of the Mouvement des forces democratiques de la Casamance operating in Casamance (southern Senegal) triggered the civil war. Following mediation efforts by the ECOWAS under the chairmanship of the Togolese president, the Abuja Accord paved the way for the cessation of hostilities and the deployment of the first ECOMOG contingents. ECOMOG facilitated a disarmament process and was able to recover some heavy and light weapons (Kabia 2009, Yabi 2010). The ECOWAS again intervened in Guinea-Bissau in 2012 following military unrest in 2010 and a failed coup attempt in 2011, which arose as a result of infighting in the military between the Navy and the Army (Okeke et al. 2014).

Other examples of ECOWAS’ preventative interventions that are worth mentioning include the political crises in Mali, Burkina Faso, Gambia, and Côte d’Ivoire. In Mali, as various writers (Aning and Edu-Afful 2016, Döring and Herpolsheimer 2018) have noted, following a March 2012 coup d’état led by Captain Amadou Sanogo, a number of Islamist extremist groups mainly in the northern part of the country took advantage of the political turmoil to expand their activities, operations, and presence in the vast northern territory of the country. At the time, northern Mali was already a battleground for the minority Tuareg rebels and government forces. According to Aning and Edu-Afful (2016), the activities of these groups, who had succeeded in taking over the northern part of Mali, not only threatened to destroy the Malian state and by extension the entire region, it also had serious humanitarian consequences for the displaced persons and people fleeing from the conflict. They note that the ECOWAS, through a multi-prone approach, intervened by initiating steps to find a lasting solution to the political situation. First, the sub-regional body condemned the coup d’état, directed its leaders to relinquish power to the legitimate government and also requested that the country be restored to constitutional rule, facilitated the design of a roadmap to restore democracy and also to reform the Malian army. As little progress was achieved, ECOWAS tightened its coercive strategies by imposing economic and diplomatic sanctions on Mali in March 2012. The ECOWAS also proposed the establishment of a peace enforcement mission in Mali (ECOWAS Mission in Mali (Aning and Edu-Afful 2016). While MICEMA was later absorbed into the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), thus, operating under a joint command of the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS (Aning and Edu-Afful 2016, Döring and Herpolsheimer 2018), French military intervention (Operation Serval), which was launched on 11 January 2013 and lasted until 15 July 2014 (Henke 2017), with support from AFISMA, helped to stabilise the situation in Mali.

In a similar vein, in September 2015, after a military coup in Burkina Faso led by General Gilbert Diendéré and the country’s elite presidential guards, the Presidential Security Regiment, which deposed interim and transitional President Michel Kafando, the ECOWAS facilitated the quick restoration of civilian rule. Also, ECOWAS intervened in the Gambia after incumbent President Yahya Jammeh, who had held power since a 1994 military coup, refused to accept the electoral results, step down and hand over power to Adama Barrow, who had won elections in December 2016 (Hartmann 2017). For Adams (2019), ECOWAS’ intervention played an important role in preventing another violent conflict with potentially disastrous consequences for the country and for West Africa as a whole. It remains, for Adams (2019) as well as Hartmann (2017), an example of how early warning, the threat of military force intervention, preventive diplomacy and structural reform can make all the difference in the world.

A final example of conflict prevention and ECOWAS’ deployment of R2P was evident in the case of Côte d’Ivoire in 2010 where there were concerns about the potential for mass atrocities (Bellamy and Williams 2011). ECOWAS first became involved in Côte d’Ivoire when in 2002, an attempted coup by soldiers from the northern part of the country resulted in a civil war. Following ECOWAS’ lead to promote dialogue between the rebels and government, the conflict and crises officially ended in 2003, and the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire, which was deployed together with French and UN peacekeepers patrolled the buffer zone, which separated the north and the government-controlled south. However, as Bellamy and Williams (ibid.) state, the ECOWAS got involved again when fears arose that significant numbers of civilians were at risk in Côte d’Ivoire following a dispute over the 2010 election results. ECOWAS undertook actions such as levelling sanctions against the Laurent Gbagbo administration by freezing credit and bank accounts through the international banking system, which undercut Gbagbo’s ability to pay civil servants and soldiers and thereby reducing his allies to a small coterie of dedicated followers. According to Bellamy and Williams (ibid.), it also threatened military intervention if Laurent Gbagbo did not leave office and hand over power to Alassane Ouattara, who was adjudged to have won the elections. Despite challenges, diplomatic efforts and intervention by the ECOWAS, suspension of its membership, together with UN and French military intervention to forcefully remove Laurent Gbagbo from power, helped to avert a civil war and bring relative peace and security in the country. Leadership by the ECOWAS, France and the UN Secretariat helped to stabilise the situation and minimise casualties in Côte d’Ivoire (ibid.).

In sum, the ECOWAS demonstrated in the Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Niger crises that not only are coups no longer deemed fashionable but also contravention of democratic principles are unacceptable. Indeed, from the promulgation in 1978 of the ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression to the ECPF of 2008, ECOWAS, as Aning and Atuobi (2012) point out, has developed norms, protocols and structures to promote democracy, humanitarianism, respect human rights and human dignity. The combined effects of these protocols and other conflict prevention framework have placed a responsibility on the ECOWAS to demand accountability from member-states on R2P related issues in line with paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit. It also demonstrates, as Okyere and Porter (2015) argue, how seriously ECOWAS takes its commitment and R2P, and that sover-eignty can no longer be an excuse to violate the fundamental human rights of the citizens of a country.

Challenges and Problems with Implementation of ECOWAS Protocols, Humanitarian Intervention and R2P

The foregoing has shown the efforts by the ECOWAS to promote security and implement principles embodied in humanitarian intervention and R2P. Given the negative ramifications—security threat, internally displaced persons, human rights abuses, and refugee movement—in the whole of the West Africa sub-region, the ECOWAS has adopted a policy of intervention to deal with security-related problems and challenges (Arthur 2010). Having one of the most advanced mechanisms for addressing regional peace and security in Africa (Obi 2009), the ECOWAS interventions in a number of member-states, as Sampson (2011) points out, were classic demonstration of regional security enforcements for and behalf of the international community.

Despite these and other efforts aimed at addressing security problems and challenges in the sub-region, a number of prevailing concerns and issues exist regarding the organisation’s practical abilities to achieve its goals. First, Aning and Atuobi (2011) note that given that military intervention is likely to be complex and prolonged, there is the likelihood that few West African states will be willing to provide troops for it. Previous military intervention in Sierra Leone and Liberia for example, saw the involvement of few West African countries (notably Nigeria and Ghana). Most West African leaders are unlikely to send their forces to work in a dangerous environment where casualties could be high, and the resultant domestic political consequence equally high. Moreover, morally, some quasi-democratic leaders, who came to office through contested election results will not be in a position to send their military to restore democracy in a neighbouring country, for fear that they will suffer the same fate in future. These are exacerbated by the lack of adequate financial, logistics and military resources to promote regional security and to carry through principles underlying humanitarian intervention and R2P (Kabia 2009, Yabi 2010). For example, Kabia (2009, 140) states that in Guinea-Bissau, ‘ECOMOG had only a few vehicles, which frequently broke down. The lack of radio and communication equipment also meant that the force could not patrol at night’. Similar to the case of Guinea-Bissau, Obi (2009) argues that the ECOWAS peace mission to Côte d’Ivoire was largely underwritten with French (ex-colonial master) and international community support thus showing that ‘African solutions to African problems’ needs international support and legitimacy. Although the ECOWAS funds over 85% of its budget by generating resources from its member states for its programmes and operational activities as well as through its Community Levy, unlike other major organisations like the United Nations and the European Union, who have considerable resources available and are, therefore, in the position to attract high calibre personnel, like other regional organisations, the ECOWAS does not have that luxury. With ill-equipped and outnumbered peacekeepers, coupled with their dependence on the donor community for financial support, it makes it a challenge for the ECOWAS to fully implement its goals as they pertain to R2P. As Wonnenberg (2011) points out, without reliable alternative sources of funding, the neutrality and ability to maintain its operational capacity is severely weakened. Such inherent institutional deficiencies, lacking financial and technical capacities, makes it difficult, if not doubtful that regional organisations will in their present form be able to solve Africa’s security challenges in a profound manner.

The lack of adequate funds and logistics are worsened by the fact that while member-states are usually willing to sign on to documents pertaining to them, there is often no commitment to domesticate such inherent principles in national laws (Aning and Atuobi 2012). As Shaw (2000) notes, the diversity of actors, interests and relations in various regional organisations complicates notions of human development/security. Moreover, the lack of consensus and internal disagreements tend to affect intervention measures. For example, during the civil war and crises in Liberia, and to a lesser extent Sierra Leone in the 1990s, there was intense schisms and a lack of consensus in ECOWAS’ ranks on how to deal with the problem and the way forward. As Kabia (2009) and Arthur (2010) note, ECOWAS itself was divided into two rival camps: Anglophone and Francophone. Some Francophone states, like Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, consistently refused to contribute troops to ECOMOG and supplied the National Patriotic Front of Liberia with military, material and financial support in their confrontation with ECOMOG. The siding of ECOWAS leaders with one faction or the other unnecessarily escalated the conflict and prolonged the ECOMOG assignment, thus, tarnishing the credibility of the ECOMOG peacekeeping mission.

A corollary threat towards the realisation of the sub-region’s peace and security aspirations is the fact that ECOWAS leaders are known for making high sounding declarations and policies which they are slow to implement. For example, Kabia (2011) notes that while the Convention on Small Arms was signed in 2006, it took nearly four years for it to come into effect because countries delayed in ratifying the treaty. Failure to match rhetoric with force projection capability undermines an organisation’s credibility. Also, limited personnel and logistical capacities; member-states’ own relative instability; and fears of reprisal attacks against member-states’ citizens in the conflict zone are likely to apply to many similar organisations acting in conditions of serious financial constraints (Yabi 2012). These challenges are compounded by the concerns with the perception that regional hegemons like Nigeria try to impose their will on the rest of the ECOWAS member-states. In particular, Chambers, Foresti, and Harris (2012, 4) point out that ‘ECOWAS military dependency on Nigeria means that it will be unlikely to be able to address unrest in Nigeria itself, as seen in the challenges the country faces in dealing with the Boko Haram insurgency and atrocities, which represent a significant share of the region’s conflicts.’

Another challenge to implementing R2P principles is institutional preparedness, that is, to build the operational capacity within the international institutions, governments and regional organisations, so as to ensure capability to respond to mass atrocity crimes. As Kuwali (2009) notes, although regional organisations such as the ECOWAS have early warning mechanisms and early response mechanisms, they do not have adequate preventive mechanisms. Thus, despite the thresholds for intervention being serious human rights violations, there is no proper co-ordination between human rights institutions and the mainstream organs of the regional organisations. In addition, the lack of capacity with sub-regional organisations like the ECOWAS impedes their ability to raise a significant intervention force when necessary (Aning and Atuobi, 2011, 2012), and such capacity gaps continue to inhibit the effective implementation of humanitarian intervention and R2P (Okyere and Porter 2015). Okyere and Porter (ibid., 4) point out that other ‘notable capacity gaps are institutional weaknesses that manifest in state fragility and constrict states’ ability to prevent and respond to atrocity crimes. The lack of checks and balances in governance, the lack of separation of powers and independent structures like human rights commissions, and the co-optation of institutions that mainly serve as appendices to the state are some of the constraints to effective atrocity prevention. Institutional weakness is common with fragile and failing states, and many African states are particularly vulnerable to mass atrocity crimes owing to the collapse of the rule of law, lack of an independent judiciary, and the absence of transparent democratic systems, which results in a cycle of impunity’. Thus, while ECOWAS is disposed to intervene militarily to support regional stability, the willingness of the organisation to take decisive action to contain crises outstrips their current capacity to do so. In the ECOWAS’ engagement in Mali for example, Haysom (2014) points out that there was no significant tangible attention to the needs of people affected by the conflict: it did not play a role in aid co-ordination and access, act as a donor or service provider or human rights abuses against non-combatants.

Finally, there are concerns with some of the protocols that underpin various intervention measures. For example, apart from the inconsistency of the MCPMRPS with UN obligations because it seeks to dislodge the UN Security Council as the authoritative agency having primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in Africa (Nwankwo 2014, 94), the protocol on democracy, as noted by Nwankwo (2014), is imprecise with regards to implementation of sanctions. Under Article 45, the only sanctions ECOWAS can directly impose are limited political sanctions relating to individual states’ membership of ECOWAS, such as suspension from ECOWAS meetings. Other wider economic sanctions depend on an agreement by member states at the Heads of government level and on the actions of other multilateral organisations that member-states belong to. Another shortcoming of the protocol on democracy is the possibility of misinterpreting some of its provisions on elections. The ambiguity on the issue of mechanisms for solving election disputes allowed Gbagbo to legitimise his actions during the Côte d’Ivoire electoral crisis of 2010 (ibid., 103–4).

ECOWAS Protocols, Humanitarian Intervention and R2P Implementation: The Way Forward

The above discussions have shown that the ECOWAS has taken some impressive legal and institutional steps to transform itself into a credible and major actor for peace and security in Africa, and also demonstrated its willingness to intervene militarily (Vines 2013). The ECOWAS has become very reactive to disturbing political and security developments within the community space. Its EWS and recourse to preventive diplomacy have undoubtedly already helped in reducing significantly the potential of tensions being transformed into political crisis and later into violent conflicts (Yabi 2010). While the ECOWAS has made considerable progress in establishing norms and structures that are relevant for the promotion of security and implementation of humanitarian intervention and R2P, there is a gaping lacuna between member-states’ rhetorical acceptance of these norms at the ECOWAS level and their factual willingness to operationalise such norms domestically (Aning and Atuobi 2012). As Kabia (2009, 5) argues, ‘the lack of an effective humanitarian policy, a coherent political plan, and well thought-out peacebuilding and exit strategy undermined the significant humanitarian gains of ECOMOG missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, and resulted in flawed peace processes and haphazard peacebuilding programmes’.

It is in this regard that, first, ensuring viability, functional autonomy and independence of policy and decision-making will, in the long term, require reduction in donor dependence and self-financing from the budget of regional organisations and dedicated member state contributions (Giorgis 2010). In the absence of financial resources, the intervening capacity and capabilities of the ECOWAS would be severely curtailed. The willingness and capacity gaps that dog intervention missions expose the risks of mounting a response without the necessary resources to improve the situation. This means that in the future, regional organisations should assess their capabilities and resources before embarking on a course of action (Bah 2009). Thus, the enhancement of financial and logistical response mechanism of the EFS, as well as the provision of support to ECOWAS and national structures would further make the implementation of the R2P more effective (Powell and Barany 2005). It is a good sign that to reduce their reliance on external donors for their operations, the ECOWAS has put in place its own resource mobilisation strategy from its members. For example, the ECOWAS has instituted a Community Levy, a percentage of which is dedicated to the ECOWAS Peace Fund. Resources from the Fund have been used for a range of activities including anti-corruption initiatives in some of its member states (Fisher et al. 2010).

Furthermore, Klingebiel et al. (2008) argue that the absence of clear lines of communication or hierarchical structure among various organisations promoting peace and security on the continent makes it complicated as there is no co-ordination when they are implementing their human security protective mandates, but also breeds the danger of confusion, duplication of effort and a dissipation of energies and resources. This was very much evident in the Niger crisis when the ECOWAS and the AU appeared unco-ordinated in their response. While the AU co-ordinates, monitors and devises policies and acts at a political level, the RECs are intended to implement at regional level decisions taken at the continental level (ibid.). It is, therefore, a good sign that issues of communication and co-ordination between the AU and RECs have seen some improvements following the opening of liaison offices at the headquarters of the respective institutions (Fisher et al. 2010). As Obi (2009) argues, to be more effective, West African peacekeepers and ECOMOG–UN operations require more systematic joint planning and better harmonisation of perspectives on peace operations.

Moreover, Okyere and Porter (2015, 7) point out that ‘owing to the importance of citizen awareness in the implementation of R2P, it is necessary to embrace new ways of disseminating R2P principles to a wider network, particularly at the grassroots level. Despite its acceptance at the global level, understanding and appreciation of R2P remains limited and often conflated with general conflict prevention strategies. Therefore, political leaders and government officials should be encouraged to employ R2P language in their statements and national agenda setting. Similarly, ongoing efforts to domesticate atrocity prevention at the national level should be encouraged to ensure full institutionalization of the norm.’ Coupled with that, there is the need for strengthening the ability to elicit state compliance with R2P norms and capacitating its institutions, mechanisms and procedures to promote the protection of citizens from recalcitrant member-states (Aning and Atuobi 2012, 217). Also, as Tanguy (2003, 144) argues, ‘military intervention is a blunt, costly, dangerous, and limited instrument for the protection of basic rights and security’. While much more can and should be achieved through other means, it is the case that the political will to militarily intervene remains one of crucial means to attaining the objectives of R2P. For Krain (2005, 363), the success of humanitarian intervention to stop genocides and politicides, and for that matter, achieve the goals of R2P will very much depend on the ability and will of the interveners to seriously challenge those responsible for the various crimes in question. He notes that interventions that directly challenge the perpetrator or aid the target are the only effective type of military responses that increases the probability that the magnitude of the slaughter can be slowed or stopped. This is because only strong military action that will succeed in the diversion of attention and resources of the perpetrators of mass atrocities away from their campaigns of brutality (ibid., 367). In fact, it is to efficiently and timely respond to crisis situations that the creation of the ESF was suggested by the AU as part of the Africa Peace and Security Architecture. The vision of the ESF is to define, build, organise and maintain an ECOWAS standby regional capability in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance to a level of self-sustenance in the areas of personnel and logistic support, in order to respond to internal or external regional crises or threats to peace and security (Fisher et al. 2010).

Finally, while the role of military intervention in the promotion of peace and security is not in doubt, in recognition of the importance of mediation, the ECOWAS Commission in 2015 also established the Mediation Facilitation Division (MFD), within its Political Affairs Directorate to promote preventive diplomacy in the region. The MFD was for example, engaged in political dialogue processes during the conflicts in Guinea-Bissau, Burkina Faso and Niger. Moreover, Ogbonnaya, Ogujiuba and Stiegler (2014) argue that since the preponderance of terrorist groups like Boko Haram with international linkages poses threats to state security, sovereignty, territorial integrity, national economies and political stability of political regimes, there is the need for collaboration among ECOWAS member-states and their governments in various areas to deal with issues pertaining to transnational crime and terrorism, and reduce the socioeconomic inequality that generates aggressive behaviour among the less privileged. Also, Yabi (2010, 55) notes that to ‘address the structural causes of political instability, insecurity and violence, ECOWAS should be able to influence the real functioning of member-states. It cannot go beyond certain limits because of the sovereignty of countries and political will of their leaders. This is the reason why one must guard against perceiving ECOWAS as a possible substitute to the State, a means of getting round them or freeing themselves of responsibility for their weaknesses, dysfunction and lack of legitimacy of their leaders. With regard to conflict prevention and other issues, the strengthening of regional mechanisms must go hand-in-hand with the consolidation of mechanisms and institutions at the level of each and every Member State while giving priority to the most fragile among them’.

Concluding Remarks

The focus of the article was on the efforts by ECOWAS member-states to uphold the principles embodied in humanitarian intervention and R2P and intervene in crisis situation in the sub-region. While the sovereignty of a nation-state has historically been the basis of international politics, the emerging consensus is that there are certain crimes such as genocide, and human rights abuses that states that embark on in their country and on its people should not be tolerated by the international community. The article noted that officially adopted in 2005 by the UN, the principle of R2P asserts that the responsibility for the protection of vulnerable populations from war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide lies with states. In addition, the international community shares this responsibility and pledges to take collective action should national authorities be unable or unwilling to execute their responsibility. The issue that often arises though is how to reconcile these two competing principles, sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. While not disputing the importance of sovereignty, the R2P has codified in the international community the importance of intervening in cases of atrocities against citizens of a country. In fact, regional organisations such as the ECOWAS have become important ‘gatekeepers’, influencing how issues are framed and the range of plausible policy options available to the Security Council (Bellamy and Williams 2011).

Be that as it may, adopting and implementing humanitarian intervention and the R2P principles is not without its challenges. Nowhere has this been evident than in the efforts by ECOWAS member-states to implement and enforce them in the sub-region. The article demonstrated that the ECOWAS has experienced both progress and challenges in preventing and responding to mass atrocities, human rights abuses and with its implementation of the humanitarian intervention and R2P principles. It noted that despite the strides, ECOWAS member-states’ efforts to achieve the goals set out in humanitarian intervention and R2P have been plagued by inadequate resources, and conflicting perspective on how to deal with abuses and crimes against humanity. In particular, the financial burden it places on participating countries and the inadequate funds available for their missions, lack of agreement, poor co-ordination, as well as inadequate human and logistics capacity, have constrained the ability of ECOWAS member-countries to achieve their peace and security objectives. Moreover, as Acharya and Johnston (2007, 262) note, policies at the regional sub-level often underestimate the resilience of the state, since ‘regional institutions in the developing world are more likely to possess design features that preserve state sovereignty than to challenge it’. Thus, for ECOWAS’ peace and security and humanitarian intervention and R2P efforts to be effective, not only should the actors involved have the requisite capacity but also political will and commitment, citizen awareness, co-operation among member-states and with the international community should remain crucial to the process.