From Olympic massacre to the Olympic Stress Syndrome

Introduction

In this article I argue that the development of measures against terrorism at the Olympics from the Munich Games in 1972 until today has fostered new national and international security co operations for the benefit of non-Olympic events. From the mismanagement of the Bavarian police in Munich in 1972 until today we now have new national anti-terrorism measures in former Olympic host nations, new anti-terrorism cooperation between Western and Eastern countries and a different security cooperation approach between developed and underdeveloped countries – thanks to the lessons learned from successive Olympic Games. We have to ask where this will end. In my analysis I argue that we are approaching an Olympic Stress Syndrome in the field of Olympic anti-terrorism measures: the output is increased national and international cooperation, the outcome can be counter-productive – making it harder to stage Olympic Games in the future and placing democratic rights under pressure within those host nations with a less democratic past.

The perception of security has changed since the first Games in Athens in 1896. In Athens, the Greek authorities prepared for pickpockets from Istanbul, Cairo and Alexandria. At the Games in Berlin in 1936 foreign athletes and officials in the Olympic Village were subject to mail censorship. The Mexico Games in 1968 were heavily influenced by the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Kennedy, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and student protests in Mexico. During the Seoul Olympics in 1988 the American navy was present in the Korean Gulf fearing attack from North Korea. Terrorism became a real concern for the Olympic organizers after the Summer Games in Munich in 1972. One reason why the Olympic Games became an attractive arena for terrorists was on account of the extensive media coverage they commanded, beginning with those staged in Mexico in 1968.

The security concerns for the London Olympics 2012 are – obviously – different from previous Games and probably more complex. Moreover, the London authorities have had many opportunities to rehearse its security measures prior to the Games in 2012. During the wedding of Prince William to Kate Middleton in April 2011, the protection of dignitaries and the management of peaceful public masses were tested quite considerably. On the day of the wedding some 5000 police officers were on the streets of London; helicopters monitored the central parts of the city whilst the terror alert remained high. Both police resources and military components were involved. During the subsequent street riots throughout many cities in England during August 2011, 16,000 police officers were deployed to protect people and property from a somewhat more unpredictable threat: young people simply running amok. These measures exist in addition to the existing anti-terrorism arrangements, which are executed in cooperation with private companies and foreign authorities.

The literature gap

Before mega events – such as Summer Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup – we have witnessed an increasing amount of literature on history, culture and science – related to the host countries of such events. We witnessed this phenomenon before the World Cups in Germany in 2006 and in South Africa in 2010 and prior to the Beijing Olympics Games of 2008.

The academic literature on international relations and international sports studies has long ignored the linkages between sports and international relations (Levermore and Budd, 2004). Indeed, recent handbooks on international relations and sports studies serve only to demonstrate this point. ¹ Not surprisingly, then, the relationship between sports and international terrorism has also, until recently, been poorly addressed (Taylor and Toohey, 2007). ² Recent contributions highlight the distinction between terrorism against the Olympic state and terrorism by the Olympic state (Andrews et al., 2010), developments in risk assessment and integrated security approaches (see Richards et al., 2011) and surveillance and control at mega events (Bennett and Haggerty, 2011). However, what is still missing is an analysis of the impact of the Games in shaping new security arrangements – nationally and globally.

Selection of Games

In this article I will analyse the Olympic Games to reveal how they have helped to shape new anti-terrorism structures. However, I will not present an exhaustive assessment of all Olympic Games to achieve this purpose. Instead I will mainly focus on four Summer Games – Munich 1972, Atlanta 1996, Athens 2004 and Beijing 2008.

By discussing only these four Games we can draw only general conclusions about the role of the Games in the broader fight against terrorism. Nevertheless, an evaluation and analysis of these four Games can provide us with useful knowledge about the security environment in the different eras during which they were staged, and give us an understanding of the various paradoxes and dilemmas related to the security organization of the Summer Games throughout these periods. At the same time they give us a good backdrop in which to analyse the development of anti-terrorism cooperation since the beginning of the 1970s until today. However, this is not a comparative analysis of the four Games, but an analysis of the development of security arrangements since the Games in Munich 1972.

Each Games influence the subsequent staging of the next tournament in all areas of preparation, and in this vein the Games staged in Munich should represent the ‘start of all studies’ on Olympic security and terrorism. The disaster in 1972 has influenced the anti-terrorism work underpinning all subsequent Games. Four years later, 1976 in Montreal, there was an increased focus on security. No expense was spared and the security organization in Montreal provided a basic schema for all subsequent Olympic venue security operations. It also marked the increasing prominence of electronic surveillance (Fussey, 2011; Taylor and Toohey, 2007). ³ In the 1980 Lake Placid Winter Games and the 1984 Los Angeles Summer Games, private security agents were deployed extensively and became a prominent feature at the two subsequent Games in the USA (Atlanta 1996 and Salt Lake City 2002) (Fussey, 2011). In the Moscow Games of 1980 we witnessed a new cooperation between the communist countries of Europe and new African countries; the Games held in Seoul in 1988 fostered new cooperation structures between Asian countries and Asian and Western countries. In the Barcelona Games of 1992 we saw the birth of the cooperation between the Olympic movement and the UN based around the conflict then taking place in the Balkans (Loland and Selliaas, 2009). At the Lillehammer Games we were introduced to the Olympic Truce, and the Games in Lake Placid in 1980 and Salt Lake City 2002 were marked by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the 9/11 terror attacks, respectively. Most of the innovations and cooperation structures are brought forward to the next Games. However, it is important to say that, generally speaking, the Winter Games have been less concerned with security issues in comparison with the Summer Games (with Salt Lake City Games in 2002 being an exception; see Atkinson and Young, 2002) and thereby also been the stage for most innovations and cooperation systems.

As such successive Olympic Games involve increasing security concerns, and the lessons and experiences from each one are passed on to the next – modified, improved and combined with the very latest technology in the field of security. Olympic security has often served as the technological driver of new developments for use in the broader security context. ⁴ The Olympic Games are not an experiment, but a real-life exercise and test for official authorities and various non-governmental organizations. This means that security cooperation before, during and after Olympic Games can benefit anti-terrorism in other areas.

On the other hand, the uniqueness and the size of the Games make it difficult to identify an Olympic security concept. The knowledge gained at previous Olympics can be used by the subsequent Olympic organizers. However, the variation in the risk of all Games also depends on geopolitical, general or local circumstances at the time of the Games (Bennett and Haggerty, 2011; Preuss, 2004).

The choice of case studies featuring Munich, Atlanta, Athens and Beijing during the course of this article is made for four key reasons. First, they represent, as previously mentioned, Games from different eras (Cold War, post-Cold War and post-9/11). Second, they represent the point at which new counter-terrorism measures not seen before were introduced to the sporting domain (Raman, 2007). Even if every Olympics introduces new technology and cooperation structures as mentioned above, I will argue that the four Games selected for this study mark completely new cooperation structures in the fight against terrorism. Third, they illustrate the progress of counter-security measures between sovereign states, from a total lack of coordination to a full-scale cooperation focusing on preventive measures. Fourth, the Summer Olympic Games represent the single largest social gathering to be protected from terrorists (in the Beijing Olympics, a total of 204 nations participated) and each is different and generally bigger from the previous one (altius, citius, fortius!).

Theoretical and methodological remarks

Since 1972 there have been two schools of thought concerning terrorism – those who primarily are interested in addressing the root causes of terrorism and those concerned with fighting the manifestations of terrorism. The latter school has been more prominent over the last three decades. Combating terrorism is not easy since we are dealing with a constantly changing phenomenon. In recent decades we have discovered that terrorism/terrorists have become more lethal, dependent on state sponsorship, increasingly non-secular, more suicidal, increasingly aligned with transnational organized crime groups, organized in more loosely affiliated groups, and allegedly striving to obtain Weapons of Mass Destruction (Schmid, 2005). These developments inevitably require constantly changing measures to counteract such unpredictable threats.

What complicates the fight against terrorism is that the perception of terrorism – within states and between states remains quite limited. Some have even argued that it is impossible to define terrorism in a way that can cover all its varieties (see Laqueur, 1987); indeed, others have argued that it is fruitless even to attempt such a comprehensive definition (see Schmid et al., 1988). All the same, it is necessary to distinguish terrorism from other types of violence and from other types of political acts if we are to analyse whether measures taken to prevent terrorism have proven relevant, necessary and sufficient (Duyvesteyn, 2004; Schmid, 2004).

One – often used – definition of terrorism is offered by Hoffman (1998) in which he suggests that terrorism can be defined as the ‘deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change’ (Hoffman, 1998: 43). Louise Richardson (2006) emphasizes one additional characteristic – that terrorism is carried out by sub-state groups, not states (Richardson, 2006). These definitions/characteristics exclude some terrorist acts, for instance, attacks made by individuals with or without a political agenda. Success or failure in the fight against terrorism is reliant upon how the actors responsible for fighting terrorism – in the case of Olympics, the host nations – define the terrorist threat. Too much emphasis on violent sub-state groups and less on often deranged individuals can make the Olympics more vulnerable to attacks made by such individuals. On the other hand, if host nations label all kinds of groups as terrorists the counter-measures can be used to repress different kinds of individuals and groups normally not defined as terrorists.

In an analysis of terrorism and Olympic Games we can also make a distinction between counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism. Counter-terrorism can be defined as active operations intended to pre-empt, neutralize, or destroy terrorists and their organizations – they are offensive measures. Anti-terrorism, by contrast, comprises defensive measures taken at, for example, borders, ports and airports, designed to detect and stop terrorists in their tracks (Hoffman and Morrison-Taw, 2002; Naftali, 2005). This is an often debated distinction. Some analysts say it is difficult or even unnecessary to make a distinction between defensive and offensive measures. Intelligence is often the basis for anti-terrorist measures, making it hard to draw a line between defensive and offensive measures. What we should look for is what kind of measures are specifically undertaken at the Games in question.

There is an asymmetry between the terrorist and the anti-terrorist (Juergensmeyer, 2000; Richardson, 2006). While terrorists can scarcely get enough attention, ‘anti-terrorists’ have to balance their presence in the media and that ‘on the ground’. Too much in the way of visible security measures can prove counterproductive, creating fear rather than assurance among those to be protected (Romarheim, 2005). Moreover, if the organizers of the Olympic Games spread fear, then the terrorists can abstain from making threats to succeed in their goals. In that case we could conclude that it is always easier for terrorists to succeed in their programme of disruption than the organizers of the Olympics in staging an incident-free tournament.

We can identify different measures to prevent and suppress terrorism. Based on the Toolbox of Measures to Prevent and Suppress Terrorism developed by the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna we can identify: 1) politics and governance measures; 2) economic and social measures; 3) psychological-communicational-educational measures; 4) military measures; 5) judicial and legal measures; 6) police and prison system measures; and 7) intelligence and secret service measures (Schmid, 2005). In this analysis I will concentrate on military, police and intelligence measures.

The information for this analysis is primarily gained through access to secondary literature. To find out how and why the different cooperation structures were established we need to interview stakeholders and persons central to the organization of Olympic security. Further, this is not an analysis of the development of the IOC’s anti-terrorism policies or the influence of the IOC upon the security planning of the Olympic Games. Instead, the concentration is upon the organizing committees of the host states, their security policies and anti-terrorism measures.

From regional to national anti-terrorist organizations – Munich 1972

Modern international terrorism emerged for the first time in July 1968, when three armed Palestinian terrorists hijacked an Israeli El Al flight en route from Rome to Tel Aviv. This hijacking differed from previous hijackings in three ways. First, the flight was selected with the aim of achieving a trade: exchanging the hijacked passengers for Palestinian terrorists imprisoned in Israel (as well as German terrorists imprisoned in Germany). Second, the nationality of the flight was deliberately chosen, to force Israel to communicate directly with the hijackers. Third, the terrorists managed to transform the hijacking into an international media event thereby directing the focus upon the political claims of the Palestinians (Hoffman, 1998).

The organizers of the Munich Olympics were not fully cognizant of the latest developments within (international) terrorism. It seems they were more interested in providing a favourable contrast between the 1972 Olympics and the 1936 Nazi Olympics in Berlin, than in focusing on effective anti-terrorist measures. The organizers, through claiming to organize the most secure Olympics ever, sent out security personnel who were casually dressed, unarmed and who generally adopted a relaxed style to their duties. It is hard to say to what extent this relaxed approach to security was to blame for the events that occurred during the Games, when eight heavily armed members of the Palestinian Black September organization made their way into the Israeli Olympic team’s accommodation block. However, the desire to present an image of friendly informality devoid of any traces of association with 1936 proved incompatible with the security requirements of the day. These low-key security arrangements undoubtedly helped the Black September group enter the Olympic Village without any great difficulty (Taylor, 2004). ⁵

The poor security arrangements during the Olympics in 1972 could have been a motivation in itself for the terrorists to attack the Olympic Village. However, the main motive was triggered by the power of modern international terrorism: enormous media attention following ‘spectacular’ and daring terrorist operations (Hoffman, 1998: 71). ⁶ The Munich terrorist action began on 5 September 1972, when eight terrorists entered the Israeli section of the Olympic Village, immediately killing two athletes and taking nine others hostage. They offered to exchange the hostages for 236 Palestinians imprisoned in Israel and five other terrorists being held in Germany; and they required a guarantee of safe passage to any Arab country (except Lebanon and Jordan). They also threatened to kill one hostage every two hours if their demands were not met. The rescue operation was conducted by the Bavarian police – not the German federal police – and without any involvement of foreign police or anti-terrorist units. After several rounds of negotiations, the result was the deaths of all the hostages and five of the terrorists, although the three remaining terrorists subsequently surrendered.

Clearly, the Bavarian authorities’ handling of the situation was a dismal fiasco. The failure to save hostages provided stark proof of what a serious threat international terrorism had become, and how inadequate West German (and European) counter-terrorist capabilities were (Hoffman, 1998; Taylor, 2004). From this acknowledgement came the establishment of special anti-terrorist units in several European countries. West Germany established a detachment of its border police, Grenzschutzgruppe Neun (GSG–9). In France, the Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN) was created within the Gendarmerie Nationale. In Britain, the elite Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) was given permission to establish a Counter Revolutionary Warfare detachment with a specific anti-terrorism mission. The establishment of these units proved to be an overwhelming success. Five years later, the GSG–9 commandos successfully released all 86 hostages on board a Lufthansa flight that had been hijacked en route from Mallorca by a mixed team of Palestinian and West German terrorists, without harm to any of the hostages (Hoffman, 1998; Wilkinson, 1986). In 1980, Britain’s SAS units successfully resolved the six-day siege at the Iranian embassy in London, rescuing 19 of the 21 hostages and killing five of the six terrorists (Hoffman, 1998).

By contrast, the USA decided not to follow the example set by its European allies, and established no special, elite counter-terrorist unit of its own. However, the terms ‘counter-terrorism’ and ‘international terrorism’ entered the vocabulary of the Washington administration in 1972, as the government instigated its first groups to manage the problem. The State Department established two departmental committees to deal with terrorism: one to stimulate and coordinate international action against terrorism, the other to protect foreign persons and property in the USA. Furthermore, it set up an ad hoc interagency group to coordinate intelligence data regarding terrorist organizations and their activities, and to improve exchanges of such information with other governments. Meanwhile, the CIA began systematic reporting on international terrorism. The agency quickly created a team of mid-level analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence, to gather what they could on terrorist organizations around the world (Naftali, 2005). One reason why the USA handled the situation differently could be that, at the time, it viewed terrorism as a primarily European phenomenon, due to the frequent terrorist attacks carried out by IRA, ETA and the Red Brigade – all in Europe.

The organizers of the 1972 Olympics were not able to protect the Games from exploiting fear through violence in the pursuit of political change, so in that respect the Games were a failure for the organizers. In the long run, however, the drama in Munich instigated a process towards the creation of new units to combat terrorism in several European countries, as well as in the USA. The European units, trained to solve Munich-type scenarios, succeeded in handling similar situations some years later. In other words, the failures of Munich helped national authorities in Europe to see the necessity for national anti-terrorist units to combat terrorism. Moreover, the 1972 Games fostered a new premise concerning the organization of the Olympic Games. It had become reasonable to anticipate that without effective anti-terrorist measures in relation to future Olympic Games, they would be a perfect target for future terrorist attacks as well.

New inter-institutional cooperation on anti-terrorism – Atlanta 1996

Federal authorities in the USA feared that Atlanta, Georgia, would become a prime target for terrorists during the 1996 Summer Olympics. There were several reasons for this. The bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building and the use of poison gas in the Tokyo subway system in 1995, as well as the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993, had created anxiety about threats from unconventional weapons. ⁷ Moreover, in the wake of four suicide bombings in Israel in March 1996, killing 62 people, the federal authorities feared Iranian-sponsored terrorism against the USA. ⁸ The suicide bombings triggered the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) to establish a team to examine what Iran might do and how the USA could move to deter and prevent attacks from Iran. ⁹ As a result of this examination, five serious security gaps were uncovered only four months before the Games in Atlanta (Clarke, 2004). First, in the Olympic Village there was a nuclear reactor with spent fuel on site, but preparations for the Games had included no extra security measures to protect the site. Second, some of the trains passing underneath the Olympic Stadium carried explosive and other hazardous materials, yet there were no search plans for these trains. Third, there existed no plans for responding to chemical, biological or radiation incidents. Fourth, there were no plans around searching for guns, or setting up stationary walk-through magnetometers. Five, no extra measures were taken to prevent hijacking of aircraft, to detect hijacking or to deter hijacked aircraft from passing over the Olympic Stadium.

As a result, the Atlanta organizers and the CGS took immediate measures to reduce vulnerability. They engaged the US Customs Service to provide flying radar platforms and to place Secret Service snipers on board Blackhawk helicopters to warn off, or take out, planes threatening the Games. The Defence Department agreed to set up a joint air coordination post with the Federal Air Administration (FAA) and to place radar on a hill outside Atlanta, and also agreed to have National Guard fighter planes on alert. A response team for dealing with chemical, biological, or nuclear incidents was created. Special medical stocks were established, as were decontamination units, together with thousands of protective suits and hundreds of detection and diagnostic packages. Personnel from the Energy Department’s nuclear labs, the Health and Human Services Department, the Army’s chemical weapons command, and the Defence Department’s Joint Special Operations Command commandos worked together as part of a task force at an air base outside the city, where an interagency command post was created. The Secret Service also began to survey every Olympics venue for vulnerabilities, and developed a plan for searching everyone entering them. Hundreds of Secret Service personnel were moved to Atlanta and hundreds of FBI agents were also added, patrolling the streets in undercover clothing and locating themselves in key ‘flash points’ with rapid-response SWAT teams. The Transportation Department persuaded the railroads to reroute dangerous material cargos and to allow additional railroad police to check the trains. Flights into Atlanta were accorded special passenger screening; the Energy Department ordered a temporary shutdown of the nuclear reactor, and the removal of nuclear waste (Clarke, 2004).

Despite these security measures, the Atlanta organizers failed to stop a lone bomber from striking. One individual managed to detonate a small bomb in a public square, killing two persons and injuring 111. Even if this cannot be categorized as a ‘terrorist attack’ according to our definition of terrorism, it revealed a major failure in security. However, in the long run the measures taken before and during the Games, later called the Atlanta Rules, marked the start of a successful anti-terrorism cooperation among various authorities, and the Atlanta Rules were used to create ‘National Security Special Events’. In the following years, the CSG designated several occasions as being National Security Special Events – including Republican and Democratic National Conventions, Presidential Inaugurations, the United Nations General Assembly, the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah, and Super Bowl, the State of the Union Address, and G8 summits. ¹⁰ In the preparation and conduct of such National Security Special Events, the FBI, CIA, Secret Service, NSA, Customs, Immigration, Diplomatic Security, Coast Guard, and Defence Department cooperate to detect and prevent terrorism (Clarke, 2004; Jones, 2005).

This development shows that federal and local authorities managed to prevent terrorist organizations from using the Olympic Games as an arena for terrorism. However, they failed to prevent a lethal bomb from being detonated at a public arrangement outside the venues. Some have blamed the organizers; it has also been pointed out that the USA operated the security aspect of the Games privately, being financed and organized primarily by the private sector, a combination that made the security arrangements comparatively defective. ¹¹ Nevertheless, the lesson learned from the anti-terrorist campaign before, during and after the 1996 Games instigated a new way of thinking around terrorist prevention and a new way of organizing anti-terrorism in the USA. The Atlanta Games encouraged the USA to think differently about mega events security and, subsequently, the Atlanta Rules were the basis for the security arrangements put in place after 9/11 and during the Winter Games in Salt Lake City (Atkinson and Young, 2002).

The internationalization of anti-terrorism cooperation – Athens 2004

The Athens Olympics were the first Summer Games to be staged since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 on the USA during the fall of 2001. Alleged al-Qaeda links to the November 2003 bombings in Istanbul and the 11 March 2004 bombings of commuter trains in Madrid heightened awareness amongst the organizers of the Athens Games around a possible international terrorist threat, although al-Qaeda had made no specific or known threat against the Greece Olympics (Migdalovitz, 2004). Moreover, the US State Department had stated in August 2003 that there was no information to substantiate a verifiable al-Qaeda presence in Greece. However, on 15 April 2004, Osama bin Laden offered Europeans a ‘peace treaty’ if they would withdraw their troops from Muslim countries within three months. Since the Games were to be held just weeks after this deadline would expire, it intensified concerns that they might be intended as a symbolic European target for al-Qaeda.

Other factors contributed to the fear of terrorist attacks. Historically, Greece had a poor record of dealing with terrorism, and has been home to ideological terrorist organizations that have assassinated businessmen and state officials as well as US and British diplomats and intelligence operatives (Kassimeris, 2004). Following the convictions in 2003 of 19 members of the November 17 group, blamed for 23 killings and dozens of other attacks since 1975, the Greek authorities claimed they had crippled the most dangerous domestic terrorist threat. However, three bombs that went off just 100 days prior to the Games in 2004 fostered insecurity among the organizers, even though some analysts saw the bombs as less an intimation of things to come and more as an act of political provocation aimed at embarrassing the government. ¹² The controversies over the war in Iraq were also an obvious source of concern, and many observers considered the nationals from countries participating in and supporting the US-led war in Iraq (‘the coalition of the willing’) to be at high risk during the Olympics. The vulnerability of the Games was compounded by the huge number of possible entries into Greece and its weak border and passport controls. Greece has thousands of islands in the Aegean, Ionian and Mediterranean Seas, and is located close to a number of Middle Eastern and Balkan so-called ‘hot spots’.

Partly because of this security context (and partly because of poor national organization of the Games at all levels), the Greek authorities recognized at an early stage in the planning process that they could use all the help they could get. Security agreements were signed with 22 countries, many of them previous Olympic hosts. Heading the security efforts was an international committee chaired by Greece and supported by the USA, Britain, Australia, Israel, Spain, France and Germany. They shared information on terrorism threats, security and protection. In addition, Greece hired terrorism security experts who brought in their own teams to conduct risk assessments of all Olympic venues and other potential targets. Law enforcement and intelligence agents from the USA, Israel, Germany and Britain were among those who came to Athens to instruct in anti-terrorism measures, including how to prevent or respond to a chemical or biological attack. Others were trained in VIP protection, in evasive driving techniques and in hostage rescue. One sophisticated and technologically advanced command and control centre (provided by Science Applications International Corporation, SAIC) was also used; it involved infrastructure to secure several locations including sporting venues, the athletes’ village, and ports where cruise visitors would be staying. SAIC also provided various security command centre, including the central command facility. Many of the systems provided were the same as those used at the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics. ¹³ The European Union also permitted Greece to enforce stricter immigration controls than otherwise allowed under the Schengen Agreement on free movement of EU citizens.

In addition to all these measures, the Greek authorities requested military assistance from NATO, resulting in the launch of the NATO operational activities titled Distinguished Games. This assistance was supplementary to Greek national operations and was intended to demonstrate Allied solidarity in contributing to security for NATO members. NATO’s support to Greek authorities included the deployment of AWACS aircraft for airspace surveillance of airspace, as well as maritime surveillance through NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour (OAE). ¹⁴ The mission of the operation was to conduct naval operations in the Mediterranean. OAE is one of the measures resulting from NATO’s decision to implement Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which allows expansion of the options available in the campaign against terrorism. ¹⁵ Third, there was the deployment of elements of the NATO Multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Battalion (MN CBRN Def BN). Fourth, was enhanced intelligence sharing. ¹⁶ The main areas included exchange of information about terrorism, extremism, crime and corruption, weapons of mass destruction, weapons smuggling, and tracking vessels carrying suspected terrorists and persons with extremist and criminal ties. ¹⁷

Thus we can say that the Athens Games, in the short term, proved a success as far as anti-terrorism was concerned. At least terrorists did not succeed in deliberately creating and exploiting fear through violence in the pursuit of political change. One central question however is whether too many resources and too much emphasis was placed on the Olympic Games, thereby leaving other aspects of Greek security vulnerable.

The Olympic Stress Syndrome – Beijing 2008

Never before in Olympic history had the definition of security and security-threats been wider or contained as many perceived threats as was the case during the Summer Games of 2008 staged in Beijing, China. The Chinese government and local organizing committee particularly focused on the threat of domestic terrorism and those seeking to disrupt the Games from within the boundaries of the state. In contrast, countries participating in the Beijing Olympics were concerned with international terrorism, the security of their participants and visiting nationals.

Before the Beijing Games the Ministry of Public Security identified a broad range of possible threats, concentrating specifically on four categories of foreign and domestic threats. The foreign threats included: 1) organizations wanting to bring an end to China’s religious restrictions; 2) activists wanting China to end its engagement in Sudan; 3) environmental organizations concerned about climate change; 4) and militant Islamic groups, including al-Qaeda. The domestic sources of threats were: 1) Tibetans seeking independence; 2) Falungong followers; 3) farmer groups protesting against land confiscation; and 4) non-government organizations (NGOs) wanting to address the human rights record of China (Pandey, 2008).

China’s domestic security challenges stem from complex social, economic and political factors that had less to do with the international security environment. In this context international experts provided limited expertise through collaboration and information sharing. However, since the Games attracted heads of state, VIPs and athletes, Olympic security preparation required extensive international coordination. The Chinese organizers therefore actively engaged foreign agencies and governments from 2006 (Thompson, 2008). The engagement of international partners reflected a new mix of inter-agency networks in China.

Beijing Olympic Security Command Center (BOSCC) was formally established in June 2005 and was responsible for organizing all security operations around the Beijing Games. In 2007 the Ministry of Public Security issued a general nationwide order, requiring examinations be carried out on people both resident in China and those from abroad wishing to visit China during the Olympic. They included members of the Olympic Committee, athletes, media and sponsors. Further, the Ministry of Public Security also provided a list of 43 types of people in 11 categories to be prevented from attending the Olympic Games under any circumstances.

Various Chinese Agencies were involved in the security planning and intelligence services. The Ministry of State Security (MSS) was responsible for the domestic intelligence, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) was responsible for the foreign intelligence and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was responsible for the military intelligence. They were responsible for feeding the Beijing Olympic Security Command Center (BOSCC) with all kinds of threats. The New China News Agency (NCNA) supplemented and complemented these agencies. In addition, the International Liaison Center, operating under the command and control of BOSCC since January 2008 was connected to foreign intelligence agencies. The BOSCC also received information inputs from the previous Olympic host countries.

Under the Command and Control of the General Staff Department (GSD), the General Political Department (GPD), the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) coordinated their work to meet security threats to the host city and venues of the Games. In a series of joint meetings, officials of the Second Department under the General Staff Department, International Liaison Department and China Association of International Friend’s Contacts under General Political Department, the Sixth Research Institute under the People’s Liberation Army Air Force and the People’s Liberation Army and naval intelligence exchanged information with their counterparts in the Ministry of Public Security (Pandey, 2008; Raman, 2007; Wang and Cao, 2008).

Much of the preparation work for the 2008 Games was informed by planning for the 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin, the Games in Athens, and Melbourne’s hosting of the Commonwealth Games (Hinds and Vlachou, 2007). However, a number of features specific to China played a substantive role in shaping and propelling the Olympic Security strategy. What separates Beijing redevelopment experience from the preceding Games was the particular co-existence of global and national processes unfolding at the same time. Beijing’s strategy was facilitated by the state’s immense power to mobilize security. Almost simultaneously, the Chinese government relaxed its restrictions around the importation of security infrastructure and machinery from abroad (Fussey, 2011). After being awarded the Games, the Chinese authorities accelerated their acquisition of high tech apparatus. This enabled the deployment of technologically advanced surveillance measures during the Games, including the use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags placed inside tickets in order to monitor the activities of ticket holders. The biggest development, however, was around developing CCTV networks. It is estimated that Beijing now hosts more than 300,000 public CCTV cameras due to this development. China’s recent trend towards hosting international mega events has further driven the deployment of surveillance cameras across a number of other cities, including Shanghai (for the Expo 2010) and Guanzhou (for the 2010 Asian Games).

This international cooperation and coordination was historic in many ways. The Olympic security command centre created a coordinating committee open to countries participating in the Olympics and to the 73 countries with embassies in Beijing. Interpol had already close cooperation with Chinese authorities, with its Beijing branch located within the Ministry of Public Security’s international cooperation department. But the cooperation was extended to other countries and police departments. Interpol agreed to provide access to its databases and deploy a ‘Major Event Support Team’. Interpol’s database included key information on high-risk individuals including names, fingerprints, photos and more. The Interpol system permitted automated screening of thousands of individuals against Interpol’s global criminal databases at the time of their visa application. This provided China with the most advanced early detection system of false travel documents and criminals available at that time. Further, Interpol provided the Chinese government with 24-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week Command and Coordination Centre and a Criminal Data Processing unit based at Interpol Headquarters, giving the highest priority to information relevant to the security of the Beijing Games that passes through the 186-member country network of Interpol National Central Bureaus, and the Analytical Unit generated strategic and terrorist specific reports tailored to the needs of the Chinese police authorities. ¹⁸ It was not only the cooperation with Interpol that had historic dimensions. In addition, the cooperation the Chinese authorities enjoyed with the US Nuclear Emergency Support team was of special nature. Ahead of the Beijing 2008 Olympics, the US sent its Nuclear Emergency Support team to provide assistance in response to concern over radiological threats, despite the absence of previous defence collaboration between the US and Chinese governments (Jennings, 2011).

In addition to Interpol and US, China worked closely with multilateral organizations for Olympic security preparations. In 2005, China signed a declaration with ASEAN countries plus Japan and South Korea to boost cooperation for the Olympics. In 2007, six member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) staged a joint anti-terror military exercise in Russia, followed by further exercises in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region and Russia’s Chelyabinsk. Furthermore, the SCO member states agreed to share security intelligence related to the Olympics (Thompson, 2008).

Criticism of Beijing’s security strategies has largely concentrated on ethical considerations. The Olympics did not only make governments – probably – overreact but also made Western companies, particularly US technology companies, perform a key role in ensuring much of its technological surveillance apparatus was available to China. These include General Electrics’ Visiowave system, which allows security officers simultaneous control of thousands of cameras, a Honeywell system to automatically analyse feeds from cameras deployed at Olympic sites and a similar IBM system to analyse and catalogue behaviour (Fussey, 2011).

Also Google, Yahoo, Microsoft and Cisco Systems cooperated with the Chinese government on technology. This caused members of the US Congress to protest against what some considered to be an unwelcome move in the direction of state censorship. These corporations were accused of colluding with China’s secret police and those who wished to control propaganda during the Games. In a hearing of the House of Representatives’ international relations subcommittee, Yahoo!, Cisco Systems, Microsoft and Google were accused of collusion with an oppressive regime and of forgoing the principles of democracy and free speech in favour of profit, by bowing to China’s demands to censor web content and monitor email. ¹⁹

Despite all these measures and national and international cooperation China was hit by several attacks in the run up to the Games, and one American tourist was killed on the opening day at the Olympics. ²⁰ On 4 August 2008 – just four days before the opening of the Games – 16 Chinese policemen were killed in the Western province of Xinjiang. The attack also injured a further 16 policemen. The incident took place in Kashgar and was the latest in a series of suspicious and violent events that occurred in the run-up to the Games. ²¹

These incidents happened despite increased emphasis on security measures, domestic and international cooperation. It is hard to evaluate if the violent incidents in different parts of China in the run up to the Games can be classified as terrorism. The stabbing of the American tourist was clearly not an act of terrorism, according to our definition. All in all, it looks like the security efforts by the Chinese organizers and the foreign counterpart helped to secure the Games from severe terrorist attacks. On the other hand, the violent acts referred to show that the measures were not entirely failsafe. With the vast Chinese security arrangements and its innovative new partnerships with many international partners and agencies it is tempting to label this phenomenon as the new Olympic Stress Syndrome. A syndrome that makes all partners involved in this process only focus on the output of the operation – a good cooperation structure and with a special eye on international terrorism – and less or little on the outcome – cooperation leading, in this case China, to provide all kinds of equipment and security networks not available to them before the Games for the improvement of the control systems used against their own citizens. This stress syndrome was not created in Beijing but it is undoubtedly the legacy of the development of security measures since Munich.

Conclusions

Typically researchers claim that conflicts and developments in sports reflect conflicts and developments taking place within society at large (see for example, Beacom, 2000; Boniface, 1998; Galtung, 1982; Lapchick, 1986; Värynen, 1982). However, analysis of anti-terrorist preparedness before, during and after the Olympic Games in Munich 1972, in Atlanta 1996, in Athens 2004 and Beijing 2008 shows that the national and international anti-terrorism measures undertaken before, during and after the Olympic Games have evolved and improved following these events. In this article I have demonstrated that the anti-terrorism measures undertaken in relation to the 1972 Munich Games, the 1996 Atlanta Games, the 2004 Athens Games and the 2008 Beijing Games triggered the establishment of four completely new organizational structures – nationally and globally – in the fight against terrorism:

In 1972, terrorism was seen as a matter of national concern, handled by local police and paramilitary units. In 1996 terrorism was of international concern, but handled by national security units, whereas by 2004 terrorism had become an issue of global concern, to be dealt with globally. Finally, Beijing fostered a completely new cooperation structure between democratic and authoritarian states and between communist China and private Western companies.

A study of the anti-terrorism measures in relation to these four Olympic Games makes clear the concrete results of the anti-terrorism work conducted in relation to these Games, while also illustrating the differing security environments and differing security logics of four separate eras: the Cold War era (Munich); the post-Cold War era (Atlanta), the post-9/11 era (Athens), and the emergence of developing countries within international politics (Beijing).

The anti-terrorism measures undertaken before, during and after the Olympic Games since 1972 have gone from failure to success. The development of anti-terrorism measures has resulted in Olympic Games that have been held without terrorist attacks aimed at political change. Failures in previous Games have been evaluated and have served to promote new developments in the fight against terrorism in later Games. The Munich disaster alerted everyone to the importance of Olympic security; since then, the Olympic Games have become the standard-bearer for national organization and international cooperation on anti-terrorism within society generally. What we witnessed in Beijing was that the Olympic Stress Syndrome probably helped the Chinese government not only to secure the event, but also to tighten the grip on minorities and dissidents in China. This was probably not in the minds of the Western countries and companies helping to secure the Games – at least not initially.

Security problems and terrorist threats have remained much the same as before, but we can note a greater willingness to invest more in security and access control. However, an ever-increasing investments spiral in international cooperation on intelligence, military cooperation and international policing may prove counterproductive as a defensive anti-terrorist strategy, for several reasons. First, rather than creating the feeling of a safe environment, it can lead to a climate of fear among the people to be protected. Second, it can lead to an exaggerated focus on one specific arrangement (the Olympic Games), with a parallel under-focus on other possible targets: terrorists can stay away from the Olympics and concentrate on other unprotected or under-focused targets. Maybe it was that we saw in the run up to the Beijing Olympics in the violent incidents outside Beijing? Third, the rising costs may act to deter bidders for the Games: the security costs may be beyond the means of many potential host countries. In other words: we can never be too secure, but we can spend too much on security. ²²

The future will show if the increasing focus on security does result in a fortification of the Olympics and in a prohibitively expensive Games. Central to the future organizers of the Olympic Games will be the costs of securing such events, as well as the willingness of spectators and athletes to participate in a sporting event where there is an ever-increasing focus on security and terrorism. Perhaps this heightened focus on security will make the Olympics less interesting – not only for participants and organizers, but also for terrorists? The tensions in the area of Sochi, where the Winter Olympics will be in 2014, will probably be a litmus test on this issue. Signals from the Russian government are that the security arrangements will be very tight. The 2014 Games can be a watershed in the history of securing the Winter Olympic Games since this probably will be the most securitized sporting event ever staged in the modern history of organized competition.