‘Bhora Mugedhi versus Bhora musango’ : The interface between football discourse and Zimbabwean politics

Introduction

Zimbabwe attained independence on 18 April 1980 after a protracted struggle against Ian Smith’s minority white rule in what had been until then Southern Rhodesia (Bhebe, 1999; Sithole, 1999). From 1980 the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF), under the leadership of Robert Gabriel Mugabe, dominated the political landscape. The only sustained resistance to the ZANU PF hegemony during the first decade of independence came from the Zimbabwe African Patriotic Union Front (PF ZAPU) led by the late vice president of Zimbabwe, Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo.

It is argued that conflict emerged between the two nationalist parties ZANU PF and ZAPU just after Zimbabwe had attained independence. Alexander et al. (2000) contended that, around 1982, Zimbabwe experienced huge security problems, especially in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces. ZAPU had been blamed for masterminding ‘dissident’ activities in an attempt to overthrow Mugabe and ZANU PF leadership (Alexander et al., 2000). To deal with the problem, government deployed a ‘North Korean trained brigade in Matabeleland province and in the process more than 20,000 civilians were killed while others were beaten, raped and lost their property’ (Alexander et al., 2000; Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1997: 1). ‘A unity accord signed between the two nationalist parties in 1987 effectively neutralised ZAPU’s resistance’ (Waldahl, 2004). Mugabe and ZANU PF were now essentially in total control of the state apparatus, a situation lasting until the emergence of a strong political opposition in around 2000 (Hammar and Raftopolous, 2003). With loyal support from the media, ZANU PF managed to manipulate the process of public opinion formation in the country (Saunders, 1999; Zaffiro, 2002).

In early 2000 the ZANU PF government embarked on a fast track land reform programme. The intention seems to have been genuinely to redress land ownership imbalances which were historically skewed in favour of the white minority while also, at the same time, entrenching themselves in power against the emerging Trade Union and urban-areas based opposition. Zimbabwe’s land reform process resulted in international controversy, the legacy of which still exists today (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; Ranger, 2004). Land reform also coincided with the emergence and rise of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), formed in late 1999 (Hammar and Raftopolous, 2003). This period also experienced a failing economy, characterised by hyperinflation, rising unemployment, social discontent and disillusionment.

The MDC presented arguably the first major threat to ZANU PF’s monopoly on political power. For instance in 2000, the MDC mobilised against the ZANU PF-sponsored constitutional referendum in 2000, urging a successful ‘No’ vote. Several successful mass ‘stay-aways’ and boycotts were also staged at the instigation of the MDC, culminating in the closely contested 2000 parliamentary elections. Consequently, ZANU PF responded by using state institutions to demonise the MDC as ‘Western imperialist agents’ or ‘running dogs of imperialists’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). Not surprisingly, this labelling fuelled hostility between the two parties. However, the MDC split in 2005, with the main wing of the party, under founding leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, rebranding itself as MDC-T; while the smaller faction retained the name MDC, under leadership of Arthur Mutambara and, later, Welshman Ncube (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009).

In March 2008 Zimbabwe held its historic harmonised ¹ plebiscite. The presidential race pitted Robert Mugabe of ZANU PF, Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC-T and former ZANU PF Politburo member Simba Makoni, who now headed a new political party, Mavambo, against each other. After a protracted ballot counting process that took over two months and amid speculation relating to vote rigging, the election results were announced without a clear winner. The MDC-T’s Morgan Tsvangirai was ahead with 47% with ZANU PF’s Robert Mugabe trailing with 43% (ZESN, 2008). These results meant that Tsvangirai had, for the first time, beaten Mugabe at the ballot. They also ended ZANU PF’s ruling party status, further debunking the myth that Mugabe was unbeatable. Finally, the figures meant that Tsvangirai, though ahead, had to garner the required 50% plus one vote needed for him to be declared winner. This stalemate resulted in the run-off, set for 27 June 2008, which never happened. Morgan Tsvangirai withdrew from the race in the face of alleged and documented violence, intimidation, murder, torture and arrests perpetrated on his supporters by a combination ZANU PF militia and state security organs (Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010). However, following negotiations mediated by former South African president Thabo Mbeki, Mugabe, Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara (leader of the smaller MDC faction which split in 2005) signed the Global Political Agreement ² on 15 September 2008.

This study on the interface between football discourse and contemporary Zimbabwean politics arises from observations of how Zimbabwe’s mainstream political parties, specifically ZANU PF and MDC-T, and to some extent even ‘ordinary’ Zimbabweans, appropriated football metaphors, symbols and discourses during the campaign period prior to and just after the July 2013 elections. The study forms part of the author’s Doctoral thesis at the Centre for Communication Media and Society, University of KwaZulu-Natal. This thesis explores how football relates to discourses of power, identity and development in modern-day Zimbabwe. The academic study of the discourse of popular sports such as football is still emerging on the African continent (Pannenborg, 2010) and Zimbabwe is no exception. Important beginnings have been made by Stuart and Wagg (1995), Giulianotti (2004), Alegi (2010), Bloomfield (2010), Muponde and Muchemwa (2011), Zenenga (2012) and Willems (2013). This study therefore seeks to complement the already existing work providing an insight on the centrality of popular sport in Zimbabwean politics.

Methodological issues

This study is qualitative in nature and utilises the interpretive approach (Bryman, 2004; Corner, 1996; Ruddock, 2001) in gathering, presenting and discussing findings of the study. The study uses ethnographic methods such as observation to make a qualitative ‘thick description’ of the relationship between football discourse and contemporary Zimbabwean politics particularly focusing on the 31 July 2013 Zimbabwean elections. It also employs critical discourse analysis on purposively selected political campaign speeches at rallies, political advertisements, songs by politicians, and comments posted and circulated by ‘ordinary’ Zimbabweans during and immediately after the election period on social media such as Facebook and Whatsapp.

Football and politics: the past mirrors the present

Sport in general, and football in particular, has enjoyed an intimate relationship with politics seemingly since time immemorial. Crucially, it has been argued that if ever there was a ‘perfect marriage’, one would be hard pressed to find a more compatible couple than sport and politics (Lin et al., 2008: 1). Chomsky (1988) observes that sport is one of the main instruments of hegemony. He argues that the ruling classes are able to subjugate the minds of the citizens through the use of popular sports discourse (Chomsky, 1988). Today, in an even more direct and overt fashion in many countries, sport is used as a form of political propaganda to gain prestige and support for the regime in power and its particular social system (Lin et al., 2008). It can be argued that from this view football is seen as an instrument of controlling the masses by those in power.

However, the neo-Gramscian approach rejects the perspective which views popular culture (including sport) as a site where only governing authorities exercise their dominance. According to Storey (1999), the introduction of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony into the field of cultural studies in the early 1970s brought about a rethinking of the politics of popular culture. It has been argued that popular culture was, and up to date is seen as a site for the production and reproduction of hegemony (Hall, 1978). As argued by Storey, ‘Popular culture is a field of struggle and negotiation between the interests of dominant groups and interests of subordinate groups: between imposition of dominant interests and the resistance of subordinate interests’ (Storey, 1999: 149). Cases have been cited around the globe where football has been manipulated by authorities to win hegemony. For instance, in the 1930s General Franco used Real Madrid football club to spread his ideologies, albeit his hegemony was constantly challenged using the same discourse of football (Barcelona football club) by people from the Catalonia region (Foer, 2004). The military dictators of Brazil in the 1960s and in Argentina used the World Cup successes of their national teams to assert political authority over the citizens. Similarly the Communist government in Bulgaria also utilised football as a public opinion management tool for some 40 years (Kortzanov, 2012).

In Africa the story of football shows that it is not just a game but is in fact encoded with complexities of Africa’s colonial experience (Alegi, 2010). Football scholars attribute the origins and development of football in Africa to the imperialist project on the continent (Alegi, 2004, 2010; Darby, 2000; Stapleton, 2001). As argued by Hikabwa Chipande, Europe in the nineteenth century exported not only its imperial politics, goods, ideas, and social norms but also its sport to the rest of the world (Chipande, 2009). The first documented game of football on the African continent was played in South Africa in 1862, a year before soccer’s official rules were codified (Alegi, 2010). The British military, traders and the missionaries played in this first recorded football match in Africa. These emissaries of the empire also popularised the game at their outposts throughout Africa. It has been argued that inasmuch as the colonisers enjoyed football for their own entertainment, they also saw it as pivotal tool in the European ‘civilising mission’ in Africa (Alegi, 2010: 1). Seen through a Gramscian lens, sport or football was meant to pave the way for political domination (Walvin, 1975). This is so because the Gramscian theory of hegemony proposes that cultural domination paves the way for political domination (Gramsci, 1971; Strinati, 1995). The development of football in Southern Rhodesia, the colonial predecessor to modern Zimbabwe, followed the same trajectory as that of the other colonial hegemony projects in Africa (Alegi, 2010; Ranger, 2010; Stapleton, 2001). Giulianotti (2004) states that the first players of football in Zimbabwe were the Pioneer Column, the small group of Europeans who entered what is now Zimbabwe in 1890. The Pioneer Column occupied and set in motion the colonisation of Zimbabwe under the sponsorship and expansionist policy of Cecil John Rhodes’s British South Africa Company (BSAC) in 1890 (Phimister, 1988). By the end of 1900 there were several sports clubs that had been funded in emerging towns as a result of establishing competitions in football and other team sports such as cricket and rugby (Giulianotti, 2004). It could be argued that this was a manifestation of the brutal nature of the colonial system, erasing African games while imposing imported ones such as football.

Interestingly, football, a discourse deployed by the colonial powers to protect their hegemony and win consensual rule of the majority Africans, ended up as an alternative public sphere that provided for counter-hegemonic forces against colonial rule (Alegi, 2010). Due to the political and economic conditions, which remained oppressive in colonial Africa, the established sports clubs and soccer teams originally envisaged as a mechanism of social control soon became the focus for political confrontation (Darby, 2002). As Alegi puts it, ‘while European colonisers intended for sport to prop up their self proclaimed “civilising mission” in Africa, they unwittingly created new opportunities for various forms of African resistance, not only against social inequalities within African communities’ (Alegi, 2010: 22; Zenenga, 2012). Africans chanted protest songs and used symbols and gestures to mock colonial authority in football stadiums (Muponde and Muchemwa, 2011). As Stuart, in Darby (2002: 19) says, ‘from the post war periods onwards, soccer at different times became an embodiment of the political aspirations of the African people’. For instance, football clubs such as Dynamos and Highlanders have been singled out for supporting ZANU PF and ZAPU nationalist movements (Stuart, 1995; Zenenga, 2012). Football therefore became more than just a sport: it became a conduit for African nationalist discourses of resistance.

This supports the argument by Michel Foucault, the French philosopher, that discourse can both be an instrument of and an effect of power, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy (Foucault, 1980). Football provided an entry point for African resistance regardless of the fact that it had been meant to preserve the interests of the colonial power. In other words, while for the colonisers football was part of the controlling mechanisms, for the African it was a platform where discourses of resistance could be articulated. This explains why football historian Peter Alegi contends that football, or sport in general, played an important role in the liberation of Africa, a view which until recently academic historians have apparently tended to ignore (Alegi, 2010).

The relationship between football and political authority went on to reproduce itself in post-colonial Africa. For instance, it has been argued that former Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah used the country’s national football team, The Black Stars, as a vehicle through which to spread nationalistic and Pan Africanist ideologies worldwide. The triumph of the team at the 1963 and 1965 Africa Cup of Nations finals was in fact linked to Nkrumah’s presence and support, while its dismal performances afterwards were attributed by some to the coup that deposed him in 1966 (Alegi, 2010; Pannenborg, 2010). This close relationship between football and political power was also reproduced in post-independence Zimbabwe.

It has been argued that ZANU PF and ZAPU, two nationalist parties that challenged colonial authority through the use of football, ironically joined hands and appropriated football to control the masses after independence (Zenenga, 2012). This was done in subtle ways, by using the game as a major feature of commemorating important national days in Zimbabwe’s calendar such as Heroes Day, Independence Day and Unity Day (Willems, 2013; Zenenga, 2012). ³ The study (Zenenga, 2012) also argues that events such as Heroes Day have largely been ignored by the MDC-T and urban populations who, coincidentally, are the backbone of the MDC-T support. In an effort to attract people to such gatherings, Zimbabwe’s most popular football clubs, Dynamos and Highlanders, are selected to play matches as part of the celebrations. The participation of such popular football teams therefore draws huge crowds, which works in favour of the politicians.

Despite the efforts to win the support of the masses through football, ZANU PF also finds itself in the predicament of being challenged through football, a platform it once successfully used to subvert colonialism. In this scenario, ZANU PF’s main political rival since 1980, MDC-T, appropriated football symbols, metaphors and images such as whistles and the red card to mock the Mugabe leadership. As Zenenga (2012: 254) notes, ‘the use of whistles and open palm signals, red cards and yellow cards by political parties such as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in Zimbabwe, constitute subversive political discourse’. Such a phenomenon supports the neo-Gramscian contention that popular culture is a site of ideological struggle (Hall, 1997) where dominant groups battle to exercise authority while subaltern groups resist domination.

Contesting the direction of the ‘ball’: Bhora mugedhi versus Bhora musango

Football discourse remains dominant in the current Zimbabwean politics, as testified by what transpired prior to the harmonised elections in Zimbabwe on 31 July 2013. On 5 July 2013, ZANU PF’s presidential candidate, Robert Gabriel Mugabe, launched his election manifesto at Zimbabwe Grounds in Highfield, Harare. The campaign ran under a theme ‘Team ZANU PF Bhora mugedhe/Bhola egedini’ (Maodza, 2013). The Shona phrase Bhora mugedhi (or Bhola egedini in Ndebele) (score the ball) clearly showed the zeal ZANU PF had used to score political victory over its main rivals, the MDC-T. ⁴

The nationalist party appropriated football discourse and built its campaign around the image of the football in an effort to make its brand appealing to the majority of Zimbabweans. The party rebranded itself as ‘Team ZANU PF’ during this election, emphasising the importance of unity and solidarity to win the election. The present study argues that ZANU PF’s appropriation of sport can be discerned as part of the attempt to give an ‘identity’ to Zimbabwean voters in particular. Soccer is a game where the discourses of ‘us’ and ‘them’ are rife. Interestingly, the MDC-T similarly referred to itself as ‘MDC-T team’. So the ‘team’ concept readily became a focus of the contest. This helped to create an impression of a countdown to a big soccer match. These discourses of equating the political parties to football teams did not just emerge during the campaign period. For the MDC-T, the concept can be traced back to early 2000: for ZANU PF, the team discourse dates back to colonial days, when the party identified with football teams such as Dynamos and Mashonaland United to endear itself to the masses (Stuart, 1995).

However, this phenomenon was popularised in 2011 by the Mbare Chimurenga choir which released a song ‘Team’. According to Ngoshi and Mutekwa (2013) the choir is one among a number of nationalist musician groups to grace the Zimbabwean cultural and political stage in recent times, to serve the ZANU PF nationalist narrative. In the song the pro-ZANU PF choir announces a team which features only three players: President Mugabe, Vice President Joice Mujuru and Vice President (now late) John Landa Nkomo. The song goes on to say Chimbomirai makadaro (remain like that for a moment). Given that the essentially propagandist song was released during a period when Zimbabwe was under a coalition government, it can be argued that the song was designed to undermine Tsvangirai and Mutambara, who were Mugabe’s partners in the coalition government. In spite of Tsvangirai and Mutambara’s presence in the hierarchy of power, the announced ‘team line-up’ excludes them. This could be interpreted as ZANU PF hegemony which attempted to ‘naturalise’ that Mugabe is the ‘legitimate’ leader of Zimbabwe giving an impression that people like Tsvangirai are pretenders. Ngoshi and Mutekwa (2013) further argue that the visuals accompanying the song ‘Team’ exploit the iconography of the Zimbabwean national football team – ‘an iconography which invests the three leaders referred to in the song with the vitality, energy and youthfulness associated with soccer players’ (Ngoshi and Mutekwa, 2013: 243). Moreover, these authors further submit that the song implies the existence of an opposing team which is viewed as ‘foreign’, clearly pointing to ZANU PF’s usual attack on the MDC-T as a ‘running dog of the Western imperialists’. So, the legitimate and powerful Zimbabwean national team named in the song has a duty to beat the ‘foreign’ opponents in the match to safeguard Zimbabwean pride. It can be argued that this discourse of assailing the MDC-T party as a foreign party is part of ZANU PF’s strategy to discredit the MDC-T in the eyes of the electorate, having realised that the ZANU PF hegemony was under threat (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009).

To strengthen their Bhora mugedhi ideology, ZANU PF sponsored a number of music groups to record songs which emphasised the concept. One such group is Blessed Chari and the Conscious People, who recorded a nine-track album Bhora mugedhi. On the album the title song Bhora mugedhi has lyrics thus:

Stand up ZANU PF team; let’s go forward with the ball. Let’s score boys. Kicking the ball out of play and not scoring will result in a replay. This time it is going to be a white wash, we will clobber them. Stick to the game plan suggested by the Coach, Gushungo (Mugabe). Don’t allow them into your own half. Kick the ball upfront boys. There is no place for individualism. Gushungo said everyone must score.

Simukai veZanu bhora mberi. Bhora mugedhi vakomana. Bhora musango rinokonzera replay. This time tinozora butter chete. This time tinovawachisa. Rovai game plan yamapiwa naCoach Gushungo, Musabvume kuti vapinde muarea menyu. Bhora Mberi vakomana. Humbimbindoga taramba. Hanzi naGushungo bhora mugedhi every party bhora mugedhi

On the same song there is a soccer commentary which says, ‘I can see the opponents are dressing in red, red for danger but let’s see what happens. It’s Emmerson Mnangagwa, he passes it on to Obert Mpofu (Obiza), he puts it forward to Simon SK Moyo, to Gushungo and it’s a gooooooooal… You might be in Kariba, Mutare, Hwange or Masvingo, we have done it again. Gushungo has managed to rise to the occasion again…’

A number of issues can be raised from the lyrics of the Bhora mugedhi song. The ‘commentator’ claims that opponents playing against team ZANU PF are putting on red regalia. Although the opponent’s name is not announced, the red colour discourse implies that it is MDC-T since red is this party’s official colour. This is also supported by the fact that at ZANU PF rallies Mugabe only attacked MDC-T and Tsvangirai, despite the fact that there were other political opponents in the election. Moreover, the song discourages Team ZANU PF from adopting the Bhora musango style. ⁵ Bhora musango (‘kick the ball into the bush’) is a tactic used in soccer whereby players of the leading team in a game of football randomly kick the ball out of the pitch as a delaying tactic. Former Zimbabwe Warriors defender Dumisani Mpofu was well known for this and occasionally fans would shout ‘rasha Dumi’ or ‘Bhora musango Dumi (kick the ball out of play Dumisani)’, encouraging him to do so. This discourse now has a special place in contemporary Zimbabwe politics, especially in ZANU PF and MDC-T. From Chari’s song Bhora mugedhi there is concern that this type of play is far from being safe. There is fear that the opponents ‘MDC-T’ could get a chance and equalize, resulting in a replay; a replay in this context is an election run-off, which usually occurs after an election stalemate. Such a scenario took place during Zimbabwe’s 2008 harmonised elections because the first round of the election failed to produce an outright winner, resulting in Mugabe and Tsvangirai engaging in a presidential election re-run.

The Bhora musango play is attributed as having cost ZANU PF, and Mugabe in particular, during the 2008 harmonised elections. Prior to the 2008 election, there was anxiety that ZANU PF needed another leader to replace Mugabe because of worries about his age. The 2007 annual ZANU PF conference, which was expected to resolve the issue, went on to endorse Mugabe’s candidature for the 2008 election in a move which resulted in discontent in the party. ZANU PF Politburo member Simba Makoni, despite being touted as the ‘Prince’ or possible heir to Mugabe by some sections of the media in Zimbabwe, pulled out of ZANU PF to contest Mugabe for the presidency. Political analysts (for example, Sachikonye, 2011) have argued that Makoni withdrawing from ZANU PF must have caused Mugabe’s defeat because it robbed him, Mugabe, of the ‘electoral initiative’. It is argued that this also put Mugabe’s legitimacy in both quandary and doubt, providing ammunition for the anti-Mugabe critics.

It is perhaps acceptable to argue that the Bhora mugedhi/Bhola egedini discourse was used during the 2013 election to counter the subversive 2008 Bhora musango discourse. It is also interesting to note that in Chari’s song Bhora mugedhi, Mugabe has two roles: team coach; and chief striker, who scores the winning goal which defeats the team in red (MDC-T). Mugabe is also hailed as a strategist well versed with winning formations, because the lyrics of the song say, ‘Stick to Gushungo’s game plan please’. This might have arisen as a way to counter discourses which had been questioning Mugabe’s health and ability to lead the nation, considering that he turned 89 in February 2013. Importantly, reference to Mugabe as both a coach and the team’s chief striker rebranded and presented him as a young, energetic and visionary team player.

Moreover, the soccer commentary in the song mentions Obert Mpofu, Simon Khaya, Emmerson Mnangagwa and Mugabe. Those mentioned occupy the top positions in ZANU PF’s hierarchy. Moyo is the party’s national chairman, while Mnangagwa is the party’s Secretary for Legal Affairs and Mugabe is the party’s first secretary and president, positions he has occupied since 1963 and 1977 respectively (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). In fact, the names symbolise stars or key players in a football team. The manner in which the commentary is made imitates that of Zimbabwe’s veteran television and radio football commentator, Charles Mabika. The discourse ‘You might be in Kariba, Mutare, Hwange or Masvingo, we have done it again… has managed to rise to the occasion again…’ is usually found in Mabika’s football commentaries. Considering Mabika’s popularity, it can be argued that the musicians also appropriated the discourse to make team ZANU PF acceptable in the people’s eyes.

This need for Team ZANU PF to score more goals was also emphasised by Robert Mugabe at his star rallies across the country. For instance, at a rally in Gweru on 26 July 2013, Mugabe had this to say:

…This time we must score goals, we need strong defenders like John Barnes who can pack powerful shots from the back straight into the nets…we also need good midfielders who can square good passes to our strikers and the strikers must be sharp to score as many goals as they can so that we win the match….

…gwendo guno toda bhora mughedhe, toda mafurubheki akasimba sana John Barnes vanorova bhora kubva kumasure richinopinda mugedhi, uye tinodawo mamidfielders anogona kupa mastrikers mabhora akanaka… iwo mastrikers aya vanofanira kugowesa zvibodzwa zvakawanda tobva tangohwina mutambo…

It can be argued that the iconography of John Barnes is not accidental in Mugabe’s statement. Barnes is a Jamaican-born English player who was a hero at Liverpool Football Club in England, largely because of his ability to control the ball and score goals. Importantly, Barnes is respected in football circles because of his strong character. This Black English player managed to withstand the racial abuse that was the order of the day at Anfield (Liverpool’s home ground) and other stadiums in the UK (Horne, 1995). So, when Mugabe said ‘we need strong defenders like Barnes’, he meant strength both literally and metaphorically. In fact, Mugabe encouraged people to endure MDC-T hostility in order to achieve Team ZANU PF victory. A strong character is critical for winning football matches and the same can be said about politics. Mugabe also emphasised the need for ZANU PF to avoid conceding ‘silly’ goals. It might be apt to argue that Mugabe did not want to give his main opponents MDC-T an opportunity to score at all, an argument possibly supported by his remarks at another ZANU PF rally in Norton, where he stated ‘We don’t want people who behave like the Zimbabwe Warriors goalkeeper who let down the team by conceding silly goals (Hatidi vanhu vanoita sagoalkeeper wemaWarriors, anongorega mabhora asina basa achimwa)’. Mugabe’s remarks came just after Zimbabwe Warriors had lost by two goals to nil to the Zambia national team in a COSAFA Cup final match on 20 July 2013. Maxwell Nyamupanedengu, the Warriors’ goalkeeper’ was blamed for the defeat. Such utterances can signify how football discourse occupied a special place in Zimbabwean politics.

The need for ZANU PF to work as a team was also emphasised by other ZANU PF candidates at rallies. For instance, Christopher Nharo Gwatidzo, the ZANU PF candidate for the Gweru Urban constituency, often emphasised the importance of ‘team ZANU PF’ scoring as many goals as they could to overcome opponents – MDC-T. He often declared, ‘Team ZANU PF plays Samba football…we don’t deny our opponents to score but what is important is at the end of the day score more goals than they have scored’. ‘Samba’ football is an attacking and entertaining type of football play credited to the Brazilians: the Brazilian national football team is regarded as ‘The Samba Boys’ and the team has managed to charm huge followers across the globe, including in Zimbabwe, largely because of its success and entertaining style of play. The majority of Zimbabweans want to associate with this global successful football brand.

Football commentaries also became common at ZANU PF rallies to capture the people’s attention. In particular Gwatidzo’s ‘commentaries’, as in Chari’s song Bhora mugedhi, readily reminded Zimbabweans of Charles Mabika, one of Zimbabwe’s popular football commentators. On 13 July 2013, addressing a ZANU PF rally in Mtapa, Gweru’s oldest high-density residential suburb, Gwatidzo in his football-cum-political commentary remarked:

…the ball has been thrown to the councillor … and the councillor dribbles past an MDC-T opponent … and he squares a pass to the Gweru Urban constituency MP Christopher Nharo Gwatidzo … Gwatidzo skilfully controls the ball and dribbles past Chimombe and Zvidzai both from MDC-T and leaves them sprawling on the ground … Gwatidzo then stands on top of the ball looking for the next opponent to dribble and mock … much to the delight of the multitude of ZANU PF fans who shout ‘where is the ball?’ mocking MDC opponents … Gwatidzo then sends a beautiful through pass to the team captain Robert Mugabe, who then works his way past an ugly defender called Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC-T party … Mugabe then unleashes a powerful shot which settles into the nets … and it’s a goal … Team ZANU PF wins the derby match.

The commentary demonstrates how the so-called ‘beautiful’ game (football) has become part of a sloganeering culture in contemporary Zimbabwean politics. In Team ZANU PF, Mugabe is the team ‘captain’ while House of Assembly candidates are the midfielders or playmakers where a hub of creativity takes place. The electorate becomes the football fans who cheer and rally the team to outmanoeuvre its opponents. It is the view of some that football matches are mainly won in the midfield, a factor which probably explains why, in the commentary above, Gwatidzo – the aspiring Gweru Urban constituency MP – is said to be the playmaker. Crucially, the concept of stepping and standing on the ball in Zimbabwe’s football history is associated with the former Dynamos football club and Zimbabwe national football team legend Moses Chunga, popularly known as ‘Razorman’ or ‘Bambo’.

During his playing days Chunga controlled the midfield with expertise. He would often stand on top of the ball as a way of provoking a standing ovation from the terraces. In this case, the ZANU PF campaign sought to achieve a positive response – that is, votes from the electorate – in the same manner Chunga used to get applause from the fans. It can be argued further that the importation of the Chunga iconography into politics was also necessitated by the fact that Gweru Urban is a football-loving community, largely comprising Dynamos football club fans who hero worship Chunga. Popular culture sites such as music, religion and football today remain critical sites for politicking. This is so because the elites tend to view this form of popular culture as a possible platform for controlling the people, although the same people view it as a site where they can resist dominance. The dominant classes in society have co-opted popular culture as part of their mechanism of social control, having realised that it has been a successful site of resistance by the dominated groups (Dimitrova, 2005; Dolby, 2006; Thram, 2006).

However, inasmuch as Team ZANU PF reiterated the discourse of scoring many goals to win the match, just like in 2008, a counter discourse – Bhora musango – also ran parallel to the Bhora mugedhi discourse. ZANU PF also faced another discourse of resistance, Bhora ngariponjeswe (deflate the ball). Fundamentally, in a football match, once the ball has been deflated it becomes impossible for the match to proceed. Football metaphors thus became a feature and location of power struggles during Zimbabwe’s election. While football discourse was meant to protect power, at the same time some groups seized it and exposed power.

Zimbabwe: a microcosm and reflection of a soccer stadium

The intimate relationship between football discourse and politics in Zimbabwean society could be interpreted as having equated this society to a soccer stadium, where Zimbabwe’s two biggest ‘football teams’, Team ZANU PF and MDC-T Team, battled to score points. Although other teams were present in the league – for instance ZAPU and the smaller MDC faction led by Weshman Ncube – it became clear that the major contest was between ZANU PF and MDC-T teams. This is confirmed by Chari’s commentary in the song Bhora mugedhi where he says Team ZANU PF is playing an opponent in ‘red’ which automatically symbolises MDC-T, perceived as a major threat to ZANU PF dominance. What is also crucial to note is that during the build-up to the match both ‘teams’ often announced their lethal ‘players’ which they thought would contribute significantly to their side’s victory. For instance, in Team ZANU PF Mugabe was portrayed as the hub of creativity flanked by figures such as Mnangagwa, Moyo and Mpofu. In contrast, the MDC-T team boasted of ‘prolific’ players such as Tsvangirai, Roy Bennet, Nelson Chamisa, Tendai Biti and Lovemore Moyo. So, the 2013 election reduced Zimbabwe to a football stadium and the anxiety of a big match fever gripped the nation during the countdown to the election date. Interestingly, Team ZANU PF made no secret of its determination to ‘score the ball’. They were optimistic about countering the threat posed by the MDC-T team philosophies of Bhora musango and Bhora ngariponjeswe.

The MDC-T team appropriated football symbols, metaphors and rituals aimed at undermining their rivals Team ZANU PF and Mugabe’s image in particular. Symbols such as whistles and the red card could be seen at MDC rallies: as a result, one could perhaps be pardoned for interpreting MDC-T rallies as football matches due the presence of whistles and red cards. For instance, on MDC-T campaign posters there are images of a hand raising a red card (imitating what happens in a football match where the referee sends off a player who has transgressed rules of the game). On that red card a phrase was inscribed ‘Let’s finish it’. Moreover, at MDC-T rallies Tsvangirai and his supporters waved and dramatised this expected ‘sending off’ of Mugabe from the political field of play. It can be argued that the referee metaphor represents the voters. In this case the referee/voters were in charge of the match proceedings with a red card in the pocket and whistle in the mouth.

MDC-T party published an advertisement in the Daily News on 30 July 2013 which explicitly used football discourse which implied that Mugabe and Tsvangirai were footballers. The former was set to be forced into retirement by the latter. The advert had a headline ‘Football Facts’ and it had three subheadings: ‘Player’, ‘Country’ and ‘Played’ (the latter measured in years). The first listed player was Banda, from Malawi, in his nineties, who according to the Facts played for 33 years before his career came to an end. Another profiled player in Banda’s age group was Mugabe of Zimbabwe who also played for 33 years and his playing career would also end in the impending elections. The facts supplied pointed out further that Mugabe, at the age of 57, became Prime Minister of Zimbabwe. Tsvangirai, another player, also became Prime Minister of Zimbabwe at the age of 57, just like Mugabe. Moreover, Mugabe at 61 became president of Zimbabwe. The Facts go on to make a prediction that since Tsvangirai was then 61, he would automatically become president of Zimbabwe, as did Mugabe. The advert also has a phrase ‘It’s time for Zimbabwe’s Team to win’. Importantly, on the advert there is a match referee with his whistle in his mouth and a red card flashed to Mugabe. Referees are often unpopular in the world of soccer, specifically among fans, players and even coaches, and hence they symbolise opposition. Referees have power to expel players who violate match rules (the red card) and at times referees can influence the outcome of matches because in most cases their decisions are accepted as ‘final’ despite the possibility that they might be interpreted as being ‘unfair’.

From the MDC-T advertisement it is clear that the party adopted the style of the countdown to a major football match. In most cases before high profile matches, sports reports revisit football facts to enlighten the fans about how the teams performed in previous matches. Key players in each team are also profiled, with certain facts being emphasised as part and parcel of the media’s role to create big-match ‘hype’. It can be argued that appropriation of football iconography by MDC-T was aimed mainly at boosting confidence in MDC-T sympathisers and at undermining confidence in the ZANU PF community. The use of Banda the Malawian player (former president) was done to underline what has become a cliché today, the phrase, ‘history repeats itself’. What is also worth noting on the MDC-T advertisement is the phrase ‘It’s time for Zimbabwe’s Team to win’ (Daily News 30 July 2013: 4). Just like their main rival, Team ZANU PF which claims to be the ‘real’ Zimbabwean team (probably the Warriors), MDCT-T team also makes the same claim to be Zimbabwe’s team (the Warriors). So, the discourse of representing the nation became tightly contested during the election period.

It is also important to note that the MDC-T talked of the elections not being a ‘fair game’ but a manipulation of figures. This arose because Mugabe had always been accused about his lack of transparency and openness regarding the manner in which elections were held in the country. Violence and intimidation have been cited as some of the tactics employed by ZANU PF to retain their waning hegemony in contemporary Zimbabwe (Hamar and Raftopolous, 2003; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). Thus the MDC-T team appealed to the referee to stamp his authority by red-carding the ‘rogue’ players, especially Mugabe the team captain, in order to allow fair play to prevail. Muponde and Muchemwa (2011) submit that the red card and the referee’s whistle are the central tokens for the desired change and the tools for managing and enforcing political change in Zimbabwe. They become a way of punishing Mugabe and his allies for lack of sportsmanship (Muponde and Muchemwa, 2011). What is also worth noting is the shifting role of the people in this game. To the MDC-T team the people symbolised a referee in possession of a crucial weapon – the red card – which was expected to discipline Mugabe and his Team ZANU PF. However, to ZANU PF team, the people are viewed as fans or spectators. Importantly, to ZANU PF the only scorer is Mugabe because there was a fear that many players would ‘kick the ball out of play’.

It can also be argued that football stadiums remain crucial sites for African politics. Stadiums are not limited to hosting football contests; they also provide an arena in which political contests can take place. As Alegi (2010) argues, most African governments and politicians usually use football stadiums to hold political rallies and for celebrating other key events in the nation state. This relationship between football stadiums and political rallies was evident as the political parties, ZANU PF, MDC-T, MDC and ZAPU, made use of stadiums for their campaign star rallies. In cities like Harare Rufaro, Gwanzura Stadium and Highfield Grounds became crucial sites for both ZANU PF and MDC-T rallies. In Bulawayo, White City Stadium was also used for political rallies. Mugabe launched his campaign rally at Zimbabwe Grounds, Highfield, and held his last campaign rally on 28 July 2013 at the National Sports Stadium in Harare, home ground to Zimbabwe’s national football teams. At this event a mini football match was organised to demonstrate the Bhora mugedhi/Bhola egedini concept. The ZANU PF ‘team’ was wearing green and gold colours, the official colours for Zimbabwe’s national football teams. So, in this context, Team ZANU PF represented the Warriors. The goalkeeper of the rival team wore red, which implied the MDC-T.

The same situation prevailed with the MDC-T party. Tsvangirai launched his campaign for the 2013 election at Rudhaka Stadium in Marondera. The rally was dubbed ‘Game Over rally’ as the MDC-T leader claimed that the election would mark the end of Team ZANU PF and in particular Mugabe’s participation in the ‘match’-politics. At this rally, Tsvangirai came with a ball which he kicked into the crowd, demonstrating the ‘game over’ concept (Kwaramba, 2013). This supports the argument that the election was more of a football game. Even Welshman Ncube, leader of the smaller MDC faction, appropriated football discourse at his final rally on the same day that Mugabe held his. Ncube’s rally at White City Stadium in Bulawayo was dubbed ‘Siyinqaba’ (We are Conquerors): the Siyinqaba slogan belongs to Highlanders football club. Given the popularity of Highlanders in Bulawayo and Zimbabwe at large, it seems that Ncube was eager to win the attention of Highlanders fans, who are the majority in Matabeleland provinces. It can be argued that the rallies resembled football matches. Politicians in most cases sat at the centre of the pitch, performing the role of football players, while the ‘ordinary’ people occupied the terraces where fans sit during a football match.

The use of football iconography and its meanings also occurred among the ordinary Zimbabweans – the electorate – through jokes circulated on social network sites such as Whatsapp and Facebook. For instance, on voting day (31 July 2013) one of the jokes mocking Team ZANU PF’s ‘score the ball’ philosophy said, ‘I looked for the ball on the ballot papers and couldn’t see it. Looked for the goal posts and could not see them again. I therefore had to choose goalkeepers’ gloves which I found. The team has been beaten’. This could be interpreted as a subversive discourse aimed at undermining Team ZANU PF’s ‘score the ball philosophy’ concept. Mbembe (2001) warns that not only must humour be taken as a form of crude and primitive culture but also that it demonstrates power struggles in societies. Just like Mbembe (2001), Willems (2010) is in agreement that popular simple everyday life activities may be meant to challenge the dominant discourse or even seize it. This is so because popular culture is one of the sites where struggle for and against a culture of the powerful is engaged. As Hall says, ‘It is an arena for consent and resistance, where hegemony arises and can be secured’ (Hall, 1981: 239).

Discourses hostile to Team ZANU PF Bhora mugedhi ideology also faced resistance from pro-ZANU PF discourses which were also circulated on the social sites on voting day. For example, one of the jokes said that, ‘If the ball is deflated we will mend the puncture and inflate it. If kicked out of play, we will throw it back into play … whatever the situation we are going to score the goals …Victory is certain comrades’. In football matches, kicking the ball out of play and deflating the ball are some of the delaying, dirty tactics intended to frustrate opponents. As happens on a big match day, where fans engage in psychological warfare, this was reflected by the political situation. It can be argued that the fact that ‘ordinary’ people resorted to soccer metaphors to critique power shows how closed the Zimbabwean society was and remains.

Scoring goals beyond the football pitch

Other than the appropriation of football discourses and metaphors into politics, the 2013 elections witnessed a number of football administrators contesting parliamentary and senatorial seats. Such a move seemingly revealed what had been the original intentions of these individuals when they chose careers in football administration.

Football administrators who contested the July 2013 elections include Leo Mugabe (President Mugabe’s nephew), a former ZIFA President; Henrietta Rushwaya, former ZIFA Chief Executive Officer; Retired army colonel Tshinga Dube, chairperson of the ZIFA Football Trust and former Highlanders football club administrator; Tapiwa Matangaidze, former chairperson of the Premier Soccer league; Mavis Gumbo, chairperson of the Women’s Premier Soccer league; Kenny Mubaiwa, Dynamos football club chairman; Ray Kazembe, former Dynamos football club Secretary-General; Themba Mliswa, a former Dynamos chairperson; Tongesai Mudambo, former Black Aces player and administrator; Arnold Tsunga, director of Mutare United football club; Musa Gwasira, a former Lengthens football club official cum-ex fixtures secretary of the PSL; Morgan Femai, a former official of the Dynamos Supporters Association; and Ziyambi Ziyambi, a former treasurer of Caps United football club. It is important to note that of these individuals who exploited their football fame to seek political office, all but one (Arnold Tsunga of MDC-T party) are ZANU PF politicians.

There were also media reports that ZANU PF persuaded Zimbabwe football legend Peter Ndlovu to contest for the Makokoba parliamentary seat in Bulawayo on a ZANU PF ticket. Ndlovu, however, reportedly snubbed ZANU PF (Tshuma, 2013). Since 1980 ZANU PF had been losing parliamentary seats to opposition parties in Matebeleland. At first it was ZAPU which dominated the provinces, but from early 2000 the MDC has ruled the roost in the province. This probably explains why the party wanted to ride on the back of Ndlovu’s legendary status in the Zimbabwean society, to restore its battered pride in the province. The unpopularity of ZANU PF in Matabeleland provinces largely emanates from the conflict of the 1980s which resulted in thousands of people in the region dying as victims of state-sponsored violence (Alexander et al., 2000).

This phenomenon of football administrators turning to politics is not something which emerged only during Zimbabwe’s 2013 elections. It seems that Zimbabwe’s football landscape is largely administered by politicians who masquerade as football administrators. For instance, Leo Mugabe, the nephew of President Robert Mugabe, was chairman of the Zimbabwe Football Association (ZIFA) from 1993 to 2003. However, soon after he had unceremoniously departed from football administration, Leo Mugabe went on to contest elections on a ZANU PF ticket in Zvimba during Zimbabwe’s 2005 parliamentary elections; and from that time up to the time of writing Mugabe has been representing Zvimba constituency in the House of Assembly. It is irrefutable that Mugabe used football, the most popular sport in Zimbabwe, to score his political goals. Football was just a stepping stone which was used to achieve the actual destination – politics. The same can be said about former ZIFA Chief Executive Officer Henrietta Rushwaya. In 2008 she attempted to run for the Gutu parliamentary seat but lost to Shuvai Mahofa.

A number of politicians mostly from ZANU PF have featured and continue to feature in the administration of Zimbabwean football. For instance, the late Vice President of Zimbabwe Joseph Msika was the patron of the Zimbabwe football national team. His successor, John Landa Nkomo (now late), also assumed the same post. Webster Shamu, the current minister of Information and Communication Technologies, who is also ZANU PF’s political commissar, is the patron of Zimbabwe’s most successful football club, Dynamos. In Bulawayo, Obert Mpofu, the Minister of Transport and Infrastructure Development is affiliated to Highlanders, Zimbabwe’s oldest and second most successful football club. The same scenario prevails with the women’s senior national football team – The Mighty Warriors. President Robert Mugabe is the team’s patron.

It is also important to emphasise that the trend of politicians manipulating football popularity to gain political capital is not restricted to Zimbabwe. Pannenborg (2010) asserts that in post-colonial Africa football has become an important platform for politicians who want to succeed in politics. Bloomfield (2010) concurs and cites the case of Kenneth Matiba, Chairman of the Kenyan Football Federation (KFF), who used football in the 1970s to become a prominent politician, standing against Daniel Arap Moi in the 1992 elections. Even a number of Member of Parliament representatives elected in 1992 elections in Kenya had also been deeply involved in football administration, using sport as a support base to further their political ambitions (Bloomfield, 2010). Most recently George Weah, in Liberia, arguably the greatest football player to emerge from that country, went on to contest the presidency in elections in 2005 (Bloomfield, 2010).

Conclusions

This study is in agreement with the neo-Gramscian perspective which views popular culture as a terrain of ideological struggle between the dominant and subordinate classes. Football in particular should not just be treated as a form of recreation or leisure but as a place where power and political struggles are fought. As supported by findings of this study, during the July 2013 elections football became a site of ideological struggle mainly between Zimbabwe’s mainstream political parties ZANU PF and MDC-T. Both political parties appropriated football metaphors and symbols in their struggle for hegemony. Interestingly, as asserted by the neo-Gramscian perspective that ‘ordinary’ people are not just manipulated by authorities, ‘ordinary’ Zimbabweans also challenged the dominant discourse, using the same discourse of sport during the Zimbabwe elections in July 2013. Although previous Zimbabwean elections have been associated with violence, contemporary Zimbabwean politics appears to have adopted the cultural institutions of football.