Abstract
The issue of fracking highlights the variability of trade union approaches to the environment in the UK energy sector, as reflected in their narratives and strategic organising orientations. Stories alone cannot change the material interests underlying complex societal conflicts, yet transformative policies on the climate crisis cannot emerge without a coherent story about the environmental crises and possible solutions. This article uses unions’ positions on fracking as a proxy for opposing/supporting/hedging against climate action to see how divergent positions amongst the UK’s three biggest unions in the energy sector (UNISON, Unite and GMB) and the TUC are reinforced or challenged by internal union narratives and strategic foci. Drawing on four in-depth expert interviews and 148 union documents, the main union narratives and strategies are analysed and clustered. The article’s key insight is that unions’ specific narratives differ depending on a union’s orientation. Pro-fracking unions address the short-term immediate financial and material concerns of members and hence promote business partnerships, while anti-fracking unions develop broad-based grass-roots alliances to address the climate crisis. The key entry point for transformative coalitions lies in promoting a coherent and positive narrative about transformative change, in line with scientific evidence.
Introduction
‘The mere placing of a new “green” lens on the existing orthodox growth model will not suffice: paradigm shift, not reform, is urgently required […] Failure to achieve sufficient absolute decoupling implies that de-growth remains the only sustainable strategy for planetary survival.’
Given the necessary lowering of resource and energy consumption in the global North, it is of key importance to social justice whether societies start to transform by design or disaster; this is especially crucial to their most vulnerable members, those unable to buy themselves out of the crises (Victor, 2018). As the European Environmental Agency recently admitted, current levels of production, economic growth and thus also employment are not sustainable in the long term (EEA, 2021). Despite technological optimism, decoupling at the necessary scale and speed has not been observed, and is now considered impossible, meaning that simply greening current production methods is also impossible (Wiedenhofer et al., 2020). How work is organised and what work is performed thus have key implications for both human welfare and the (un)sustainability of societies, since work forms the key mediating link between humans and the environment (Biesecker and Hofmeister, 2010). A socio-ecological transformation to a fundamentally new sustainable system, with reduced production and work, focusing on human well-being and with reduced material throughput, is required (Brand and Wissen, 2017). Historically, workers’ movements have been the main social forces to regulate capitalism, standing up for the common good and societal welfare – however they are now finding themselves caught between a rock and a hard place where short-term member interests have come into conflict with environmental sustainability. New broad alliances for a socio-ecological transformation are considered key for transformational change – however, for this to happen, social movement unionism must once again emerge as the primary strategy and union focus (Barca and Leonardi, 2018; Hampton, 2015). Although some unions have taken up the mantle of the long history of workers’ struggles for better societal outcomes, others have sided with business and the short-term interests of members against societal interests.
While the environmental crises are increasingly on the agenda of trade unions and workers’ organisations (e.g. ITUC, 2017; Stevis and Felli, 2016), unions have arguably so far failed adequately to consider the complex relationship between work and environmental outcomes (Clarke and Lipsig-Mummé, 2020). Occupational positionality suggests that unions in more fossil-intensive and environmentally harmful industries find it harder to put environmental concerns before sectoral interests (Price, 2019). This is true to some extent. Some unions have chosen to align their policies with ‘status quo’ business interests and fossil industries, favouring outcomes that protect workers’ material interests in the short term but are harmful to their health and the environment, and not tenable in the long term (Barca and Leonardi, 2018; Hampton, 2015). Other unions, even in fossil sectors, have focused on strategies of grass-roots mobilisation and social unionism, aligning their goals with environmental movements. Sectoral interests, external factors (political context, governance, public debates) as well as internal factors (including internally contested union identities) are arguably key for explaining these differences in union engagement (Kalt, 2021b). Since underlying policy narratives and stories frame the possible policy actions of institutions as well as union identities (Roe, 1994), which narratives do union policies on fracking and their strategic foci draw on? To understand why some unions support action on climate change and have a strategic focus on social movement unionism, while others oppose and delay efforts to decarbonise and focus on business collaboration, union narratives provide a fertile and rich source of information.
Looking at the case study of the UK energy sector, this article analyses the internal narratives and strategies of different pro- and anti-fracking unions (UNISON, GMB, Unite and TUC) to see how internal stories frame divergent action and policy outcomes (on fracking), as well as union strategies, in a conflicted terrain. Using narrative policy analysis as the framework, this article draws on 148 union documents. Four in-depth expert interviews with policy officers working in the field of energy constitute the basis for analysing union strategies. Important aspects concerning the four analysed unions are summarised in Table 1.
Summary of the trade union attributes.
In the next section (Section 2), a short review of relevant literature introduces the reader to the key publications in the field of environmental labour studies relevant for this article. Section 3 goes on to explain the research design and methods. The subsequent section (Section 4) then elaborates the framework for analysis. The empirical findings are discussed and situated within previous research findings in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 provides some conclusions and tentative policy advice, as well as avenues for further research.
Literature review
Although unionists have started to respond to the need for environmental engagement, industrial relations research (with the notable exception of environmental labour studies – ELS) has failed to adequately engage with the topic (Clarke and Lipsig-Mummé, 2020). The small field of ELS on the fringes of labour research has drawn attention to the important linkages between workers’ movements and the environment, as well as its contradictions. What differentiates ELS from other strands of research focusing on trade unions and workers' movements in both critical/Marxist fields, or business-focused management approaches, is its explicit focus on the ecological limits of production and work, as well as their effects on welfare (Räthzel and Uzzell, 2011). To date, research in this field has largely been published in books, journals and among academic communities focusing on politics or the environment. 1 Looking through all back copies of Transfer, just 35 articles mention ‘climate change’, of which only three 2 discuss the problem in greater detail (including the brilliant article on Australian environmental unionism by Snell and Fairbrother (2010)). 3 Meagre results in other comparable journals highlight the urgent need for more engagement with this topic.
Researchers in the field of, or adjacent to, ELS have approached the question of union environmental engagement from different vantage points to nuancedly explain the variations in union engagement within and between countries. Räthzel and Uzzell (2011) classify international trade union discourses of climate change, based on a short- or long-term vision and the extent to which social context is included, into four categories: ‘technological fix’, ‘social transformation’, ‘mutual interests’, and ‘social movement’ framings. Based on Hyman’s (2001) original classification of unions as oriented towards the ‘market’, ‘state’, or ‘class’ (as ideal types), Hampton (2015) grafts union climate politics onto the same triad as ‘neoliberal’ (oriented towards the market), ‘ecological modernisation’ (state), and ‘Marxist political economy’ (class) climate approaches. Hampton (2015) situates the approaches of UK unions within this triad, finding that some approach climate change as a market issue, mirroring the concerns of their employers as per the neoliberal discourse (competitiveness, employment, profitability, carbon leakage to other countries) and essentially solidarising with employers. Other unions take up an ecological modernisation/state framing, looking for win-win solutions and co-benefits (low-carbon technologies, green jobs), solidarising with states and focusing on social partnership. Fewer unions take a class or critical climate change position, including highlighting the failure of current climate policies and the role of business and state in this failure, aligning with other environmental and social movements for change, envisioning new alternative structures, and acting in international solidarity (even if state-bound). Hampton’s ‘market/neoliberal’ ideal type overlaps with the ‘technological fix’ discourse found by Räthzel and Uzzell (2011), while the ‘state/ecological modernisation’ framing has elements of the ‘technological fix’, ‘social transformation’ and ‘mutual interest’ framings. The ‘Marxist/class’ orientation is most akin to the ‘social movement’ framing. The authors of both works thus highlight the prevalence of ‘ecological modernisation’ framings in union orientations towards the challenge of the environmental crises – including their strategies and discourses on the climate crisis. The problem of the ecological modernisation framing and how unions approach the climate crisis are also highlighted by other authors, including Barca and Leonardi (2018). Importantly, market, state or class orientations also imply different union organising strategies (Hampton, 2015). Turner (2004: 7) notes the large variety of strategies employed by UK unions, with some focusing on partnerships with business or the government (despite government hostility), others on broader societal mobilisation, as per their idealised strategic market/state/class orientation – with the TUC struggling to ‘maintain its umbrella over all of the contending parties’.
Thomas and Doerflinger (2020) classify European union policy objectives vis-à-vis the environmental crises: unions either oppose (outrightly reject emissions-reducing action), hedge (seek to delay or minimise regulation, solely backing marginal/incremental action), or proactively support action on climate change, as ideal types – which exist in a continuum. Using Hyman’s (2001) typology of union orientations, Thomas and Doerflinger state that unions oriented towards business unionism are more likely to oppose or hedge, while class-oriented or social movement unions are less likely to hedge, seeing their role as challenging employer opposition or hedging against decarbonisation. At the same time, job concerns are likely to prevail over environmental ones, as sectoral interests still determine union policies (Thomas and Doerflinger, 2020).
Researchers are also looking at the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of union strategies on decarbonisation and just transitions. Kalt (2021b) finds that these are first and foremost influenced by sectoral interests, while both external factors (political, societal, governance, policy and public discourse) and internal factors (union identity, organisational structure and coalition partners) play a role in whether unions support the status quo (business unionism) or transformation (social movement unionism). This is reflected by Galgóczi (2020), who also suggests that, while some unions may act in terms of business unionism at plant level, they can simultaneously act as social unions at a higher level/institutionally. Different union orientations to decarbonisation in different energy and automotive sectors in Europe play out in different ‘just transition’ approaches – whether conflictual or cooperative, affirmative or transformative – due to differences in the aforementioned external and internal factors, including a robust welfare state. Opening up the black box of internal identity-making, Price (2019) finds that differences between union bureaucracy and membership orientations can play out in changing union policy in the fossil fuel sector. Grass-roots member-organised mobilising, promoting an environmental justice narrative in the union, was influential in changing Unite’s policy towards opposing fracking, against the more pro-business union bureaucracy (Price, 2019). Overall, all unions struggle with the strategic orientation between business unionism and social movement unionism, as labour ‘lives within the tension between survival and [broader working class] solidarity’ (Price, 2019: 170).
It is clear that workers’ material interests in different sectors are key to understanding union support for or opposition to climate policies (Price, 2019; Räthzel and Uzzell, 2011), yet this does not fully explain the variability of climate engagement (Galgóczi, 2020; Kalt, 2021a, 2021b). All unions live with, and within, the tension of short-term material interests and long-term societal interests. Yet even within the same country and with the same external factors (government, public discourse, existence of welfare state) – yet slightly varied sectoral positions –, internal union factors play a key role in determining union orientation (towards market/class), policy outcomes (support for, opposition to or hedging against climate action, i.e., fracking), as well as strategic action (focus on business or social movement unionism). To understand the drivers of divergent union orientations requires us to consider and analyse underlying union narratives, from which different positions emerge and develop. This article aims to bring together research on discourses, policy outcomes and organising strategies to analyse the case study of UK trade unions in the energy sector. Tradition as well as the stories and narratives of different players struggle for prominence in creating union identities, which then lead to the everyday practices, policies and actions of these institutions (Rhodes, 2018; Roe, 1994). Climate change and the other social-ecological crises are an issue involving extremely high uncertainty, complexity, and polarisation, making narrative policy analysis (a variant of discourse analysis) an appropriate method for opening up the box of ‘internal factors’ to union orientation and strategies. The next section explains this framework and the methods in greater depth.
Approach and method
Among the many different approaches to narrative policy analysis, the method used in this case study is based on Roe’s (1994, 2007) poststructuralist methodology for the use of narratives in policy controversies. This approach has four steps: 1) the texts and transcribed interviews are coded for dominant stories around the topic of energy, fracking and climate change; 2) the texts are scanned for counter-stories (narratives going against the dominant policy narratives); 3) the stories and counter-stories are compared to find a broader metanarrative; 4) this metanarrative is analysed to understand whether it recasts the stories, nonstories and counter-stories in a way that makes them more responsive to policy change (a metanarrative here refers to an overarching storyline trying to bring conflicts into focus, finding new ways of explaining policy gridlocks and helping to move action forward) (Roe, 1994, 2007).
Narratives can be understood as stories that ‘describe a problem, lay out its consequences and suggest (simple) solutions’ (Hermwille, 2016: 238). Stories are fundamental to who we are, how we make sense of the world, and how we communicate with each other. They are the basis of human cognition and communication, allowing individuals to sharpen certain elements of reality and blur or ignore others, in order to create a persuasive and coherent view of themselves and the world around them (Jones and McBeth, 2010; Lejano et al., 2019). Discourse and narrative approaches to analysing policies assume that language actively shapes our understanding of the world, instead of just mirroring an objective reality which exists outside our cognition (Bridgman and Barry, 2002). In narrative policy analysis, the policy-making process is considered a terrain with conflicting stories about highly complex and uncertain policy problems. The approach aims to find asymmetries and conflicting stories in policy situations, and is particularly suited for studying institutional policy and policy-making (Isoaho and Karhunmaa, 2019: 931).
The three unions with the most members in the UK energy sector – GMB, Unite and UNISON – were chosen as subjects of this study, together with the Trades Union Congress (TUC), the umbrella organisation of UK trade unions and a key player in the field of union energy and environmental policy.
To collect the empirical data for the narrative policy analysis, our study followed a qualitative research design based on document analysis. A total of 148 union documents were used to analyse official union narratives and stories. Including union reports and articles, they were collected from the unions’ online databases (through member access in the case of Unite and GMB) using ‘energy’, ‘environment’, ‘climate change’ and ‘fracking’ as search terms. Of the 208 documents initially found, many were discarded due to lack of relevance. The remaining documents were coded for narratives in multiple coding rounds using NVivo. The over 40 different policy narratives were later grouped into four combined strands – ‘slowing environmental action’, ‘climate justice now’, ‘social security’ and ‘ecological modernisation’ – to make sense of the data.
Semi-structured ‘expert’ interviews were used to understand union strategies on the environmental crises and union renewal. Providing the basis for the analysis of strategies, four interviews were conducted with high-level policy officers responsible for, or connected to, the energy and fossil fuel industries in each of the unions/TUC. The interviews were conducted in London in June 2017, in the offices of the respective organisations, in a semi-structured format based on a guideline document (available on request) (Harvey, 2011; Trinczek, 2009). The interviews were coded for strategies in NVivo based on a simple text analysis.
Conceptual framework
The three unions (GMB, Unite and UNISON) and the TUC provide an interesting point of analysis because of their divergent policies on fracking (hydraulic fracturing). Fracking is a critical area for discussion and climate action in the UK, where the contradiction between short-term socio-economic goals (well-paid and unionised employment, economic prosperity, energy and fuel security) and short- and long-term environmental goals (greenhouse gas emissions, water pollution, earthquakes, negative health effects on workers, delaying sustainable energy solutions) come head-to-head (Price, 2019). A union’s policy on fracking can be considered a key aspect of its support for, hedging against, or opposition to decarbonisation policies (Thomas and Doerflinger, 2020). The issue has substantially divided the labour movement in the UK, with certain unions in the energy sector, notably the GMB, aligning with business to support fracking and oppose environmental action. The GMB has called on ‘Police and judges [to] take a firm line with anti-fracking protests against shale gas suppliers’ (Hayhurst, 2017), pitting the union against a burgeoning civil society movement. Other unions, including UNISON, have notably opposed fracking, with members organising anti-fracking protests. Unite members have voted to oppose fracking against the wishes of union bureaucracy. Because of the divided nature of union policies on fracking, the TUC has taken a neutral position on the topic, hedging against the question of sustainability, a position for which it has also been criticised (Price, 2019).
Union policies on fracking thus provide both a point of departure and the endpoint for our analysis of environmental orientation and strategies. Opening up the box of ‘internal factors’ (Kalt, 2021b), it is interesting to note how union policies on fracking are tied to, justified or disputed by internal narratives around climate change, as well as a union’s strategic orientations towards social movement/business unionism. An analysis of union narratives provides insight into how different policy outcomes emerge. While narratives alone do not change the external factors, unions’ structural positions or the material needs of workers, a coherent and logical narrative about the environmental crises must emerge before action can be taken or policies changed (Roe, 2007), a necessary prerequisite for more transformative social movement unionism and broad societal coalitions for change. In the following, the four combined emergent narrative strands are examined in detail and with reference to the prior research in this area discussed in previous sections.
The ‘slowing environmental action’ strand is the overarching narrative of opposition to climate action (Thomas and Doerflinger, 2020), a market-focused or neoliberal climate discourse strand (Hampton, 2015; Hyman, 2001). It mirrors the concerns of employers over competitiveness, profitability and carbon leakage, and most of all the importance of jobs over climate action, or support for policies harmful to the environment (Hampton, 2015). Pro-gas, pro-fracking and pro-nuclear narratives were included in this strand due to the high life-cycle environmental impacts of all three (e.g. in the case of nuclear through plant construction, operation, uranium mining and milling, and plant decommissioning (Sovacool, 2008)). This is visible in many statements of the GMB – the union most aligned with these narratives – highlighting national business competitiveness or the fear of international competition with other countries as reasons for backing fracking: ‘Our manufacturing industries must compete in global markets, yet the fact is that they are struggling to remain competitive, and a significant factor in that is energy prices in Britain.’ (GMB, 2015) ‘Two thirds (68%) of people are worried about the UK becoming too dependent on energy from other countries.’ (GMB, 2019)
The combined narrative strand ‘climate justice now’ is a grouping of narratives in support of environmental action (Thomas and Doerflinger, 2020). This strand can be considered as part of the class-focused, Marxist political economy, or social movement unionist discourse on climate change (Hampton, 2015; Hyman, 2001; Räthzel and Uzzell, 2011). The strand includes statements about the seriousness of the environmental crises, the need to act now and narratives supporting environmental science, environmental movements, as well as calls for a radical green (just) transition and cooperation between movements. The following excerpts from a TUC and UNISON document exemplify this strand: ‘But it is not just the climate-critical sectors. The scale of the transition means it will affect workers across the whole economy. Workers across all sectors will be affected by changes and will be part of the efforts to decarbonise and move […] to a more sustainable, zero-waste, circular economy. And trade union members have the knowledge and ideas to help deliver the changes needed.’ (TUC, 2020a) ‘Our whole world is facing an existential crisis – climate change. Unless action is taken to reduce emissions, drastic and permanent damage will be done to our planet with a disastrous impact on future generations. This is the greatest single threat humanity faces. It’s time to stop talking and take real action.’ (UNISON, 2019)
The ‘social justice first’ strand largely focuses on narratives demanding welfare and well-being. Not always having an environmental dimension, when seen in a wider context they hedge against climate action (Thomas and Doerflinger, 2020), for example by highlighting short-term social needs and problems such as fuel poverty and general societal inequality. While not always directly opposing climate action, these narratives provide a counter-narrative to the need for transformative action on the environment. While the strand is somewhat similar to the ‘slowing environmental action’ one, it is different in focus – social goals, not profitability and competitiveness – and more outspoken in its criticism of government. The following excerpts from a GMB members’ conference and Unite highlight the huge pressure that unions are under to help members of society and workers in a neoliberal climate and shrinking workfare state: ‘[We] support a campaign against the Government who continue and even step up their attacks on the poor and vulnerable in society. Unemployed, disabled, low-paid workers and those on zero-hour contracts have borne the brunt of Tory cuts which must be opposed and campaigned against.’ (GMB, 2016) ‘People still want a better future for themselves and their children. Decent secure jobs with an end to the scandalous abuse of agency labour.’ (Unite, 2019)
The ‘ecological modernisation’ strand merges all the storylines claiming that an easy solution to the climate and environmental crises is possible, without changing underlying social or economic structures. This is considered a narrative of hedging against real climate action. Ecological modernisation was born as a narrative ‘fudging’ (Quilley, 2017) the reality of environmental and material limits to economic production, suggesting that technological innovation and green growth would be able to overcome limits through the absolute decoupling of emissions and/or resource use from economic growth. 4 This suggests that no major changes are required to current environment-economy-society relations, past certain tweaks. ‘Technological optimist’ ecological modernisation discourses have been branded as a discourse of climate delay (or hedging) by environmental scientists (Lamb et al., 2020). In the analysed text, the ‘ecological modernisation’ narrative supports solutions through technological fixes, marginal changes not challenging the real causes of environmental crises, greening brown industry through state investment, and green finance, like the ‘technological fix’ strand in Räthzel and Uzzell’s analysis (2011), or the ‘state/ecological modernisation’ typology (Hampton, 2015). This narrative is exemplified most of all in TUC discussions, such as the following: ‘The TUC believes that sustainable industry and green technology could be one of the key planks in delivering new manufacturing jobs. We also believe that productivity improvements from artificial intelligence can be directed towards the creation of manufacturing and high-tech employment.’ (TUC, 2018) ‘Covid recovery plans must prioritise green growth to boost jobs and the economy while protecting our climate […]’ (TUC, 2020b).
This narrative categorisation includes a certain level of personal choice since some of the narratives (i.e., on hydrogen gas) could belong to both the ‘ecological modernisation’ and ‘slowing environmental action’ strands (in the case at hand, the narrative was coded into both strands). Apart from a degree of individual preference in the narrative strand categorisation, the research also shares other limitations with qualitative methods. Since narratives are constantly evolving, research outcomes can only ever be indicative of certain prevailing trends in unions at the time of the research – it is possible that narratives have already changed. Similarly, narratives alone do not change the underlying material interests and conflicts, meaning that meaningful action will not necessarily be an outcome, such as a union’s (changed) position on fracking or organising strategies.
NVivo was also used to code and categorise the strategies employed by unions, as expressed by their environment or energy policy officers, according to Turner’s (2004) classification of union revitalisation strategies. In the more business-focused GMB, these tended towards labour-management partnership: ‘You know we seek to work with the industries, so the gas industry and whatever it is, so in some respects you almost have this recognition that […] we have a clear policy which is that this stuff should be state owned but it’s not, and the companies exist to make money, and that’s the reality of why companies exist. And then […] well that’s your part opposite, the polar position […] meanwhile in the big grey area in the middle we have to get on with business. Well, their job is to make money, to keep the lights on, and our job is to organise that and to make sure that the people that work in that industry are safe and well-paid.’ (GMB representative, interview)
A focus on coalition-building and grass-roots political organising was visible in the case of UNISON: ‘There are lots of third-sector organisations out there that are after similar things to what we are […] we’ve got good connections with Friends of the Earth. We work with them a lot.’ (UNISON representative, interview). Anti-environmental social movement organising sentiments were expressed by both Unite and GMB representatives, while Unite was more open to social movement organising with non-environmental movements: ‘I seem to always find myself head-to-head with somebody from Greenpeace or whatever, where I will just be trying to talk facts and they will just say we need to build more turbines.’ (GMB representative, interview) ‘Well, our members wouldn’t want us to do that [work with environmental movements] […] don’t forget Greenpeace. On top of one of the steps at Ferrybridge power station a few years ago. Our members […] thought it was the daftest thing they ever did.’ (Unite representative, interview) The TUC referent highlighted the strategy of working with the government: ‘We spoke to government at the time about industrial strategy […] And since then we’ve talked about the need for a worker voice in industry, that’s probably the key thing we’ve talked about […]’ (TUC representative, interview).
Empirical findings
The empirical analysis summarised in Table 2 shows the differences in the prevalence of certain narratives amongst the unions in the analysed documents. In the case of the TUC, ‘climate justice’ narratives are the strongest, with ‘ecological modernisation’ close behind and ‘social security first’ and ‘slowing environmental action’ less prominent. The GMB, the more business-focused or market-oriented (Hyman, 2001) and pro-fracking union, has a strong narrative for ‘slowing environmental action’, while there are also ‘climate justice’ and ‘social security first’ narratives present, showing the diversity of views vying for dominance. ‘Climate justice’ narratives are slightly more prevalent than ‘slowing environmental action’ ones within UNISON. The ‘social security first’ narrative is strongest in Unite, with the less prevalent climate narratives (‘slowing environmental action’, ‘climate justice’, ‘ecological modernisation’) about equally present in the scanned trade union documents.
Combined narrative strands per union as % of overall union specific narratives (document analysis).
The prevalence of narratives on the strategies employed by unions, as discussed in the expert interviews, can be found in Table 3. While there are differences in the importance of certain strategies, most unions follow multiple strategies (if not all). A focus on working with business can be seen in the case of the GMB. While all unions of course have to use this strategy as part of their role in representing workers, they vary in their orientations towards assimilating business interests, as becomes apparent in the narrative analysis of different unions. Similarly, working with the government is clearly a strategy pursued by all, as the state is a key terrain for decision-making. This makes even more sense in the case of the TUC as it represents the trade union movement as a whole. A focus on grass-roots organising and a positive experience of collaborating with environmental movements sets UNISON strategies apart from that of the GMB, highlighting a more social movement or class-oriented strategy (Hampton, 2015). The Unite officials expressed more negative experiences when it came to building coalitions with environmental groups than the GMB official, while both unions were negative about this strategy and experiences. A strong focus on coalition-building within Unite (but with social, i.e., LGBTQIA, housing, not environmental groups) suggests that the union nevertheless tends towards the social movement or class orientation, despite being against environmental mobilisation. This adds nuance to Turner’s (2004) view that unions in the UK largely tend towards either a government/business orientation (market/state) or mobilisation (coalition-building and grass-roots mobilisation), as they can be further divided by their environmental orientation. According to the official, Unite has a strong strategic focus on cooperating with institutions outside the UK. Interestingly, the GMB also has quite a strong international orientation as a strategy, including previously at the EU level. This would be expected more from the TUC, as the representative of the UK trade union movement.
Strategies employed by unions, by prevalence in interview, as % of all strategies mentioned by union official (expert interviews).
The results indicate that the pro-fracking union (GMB) addresses the conflict between short- and long-term goals by focusing on the immediate financial and material concerns of its members, hence promoting business and labour management partnerships, while one anti-fracking union (UNISON) is developing broad-based grass-roots alliances to address the climate crisis. Although the GMB and UNISON are somewhat ideal types in this regard, the diversity of narratives in both unions suggests that this outcome is not fixed. Unite, the other anti-fracking union, is the ‘piggy-in-the-middle’, averse to environmental movement organising, yet still focused on social outcomes. The TUC has a more state-focused position both in terms of the narratives (‘ecological modernisation’) as well as with regard to its strategic orientation. All unions thus apply different organising strategies under the difficult conditions of organising workers under increasingly insecure societal conditions.
Discussion and conclusions
The contradictory constraints of short-term production/work processes and longer-term environmental sustainability, coupled with the current societal organisation of welfare through paid labour, puts workers and the unions representing them in a very difficult position. Which crises are to be faced: the short-term crises of workers’ material well-being or the long-term crises of societal collapse due to environmental effects? This conflict is especially sharp in the energy and fossil fuel sector with its direct impacts on long-term sustainability. A socio-ecological transformation of society and the economy to a new sustainable pathway is needed, yet the required transformative progressive coalitions – between unions, social movements and environmentalists – are difficult. To accelerate decarbonisation efforts, we need to go beyond the jobs-versus-the-environment dualism. But this process is set to be a rough road, wrought with political struggle and conflict (Kalt, 2021a). In this article we have looked into how this conflict plays out between different unions and their strategies, either focusing on the immediate financial and material needs of their members, siding with business and against environmental and social movements, or choosing to side with social movements, possibly against the interests of some members. All these different positions come with internal and political conflict, as unions are places of contestation. Union identities, histories and strategic orientations shape union responses to the environmental crises. Within unions, different narratives and stories around complex societal problems clash, based on material interests, including on the topic of the environment. These policy narratives also frame possible action.
The central question of the article was whether and how the policy outcomes of support for/opposition to/avoidance of fracking, as opposition to/support for/hedging against climate action (Thomas and Doerflinger, 2020) could be explained by union policy narratives on climate change, as well as how these different underlying stories and narratives coincided with different strategies for union organising. As the results in the previous section show, different narratives vie for hegemony within all trade union discourses on climate, irrespective of a union’s position on fracking or its officials’ preferred strategies of action. While stories alone might not signal intent or action, even in the pro-fracking GMB, pro-environmental and anti-fracking narratives could be heard, going against the official union position. With that in mind, overall pro- and anti-fracking positions, as well as strategic orientations towards business unionism or social movement unionism also coincided with the importance of different underlying climate narratives. The GMB can be said to promote a business-focused approach both in its pro-fracking and ‘slowing climate action’ narrative strand; UNISON represents the closest answer to a climate-organising approach; Unite can be said to represent a ‘social security first’ societal-organising, environmental-action-sceptic hedging approach; the TUC the diplomatic ‘ecological modernisation’ hedging position.
Different solutions (‘ecological modernisation’, ‘slowing climate action’, ‘social security first’) offer attractive narratives, which seemingly help solve multiple, or the more urgent, societal crises, or allow the institution to stay neutral without upsetting government or business interests without creating conflict. Political conflict will be unavoidable and necessary for a just social-ecological transformation and these narrative storylines might delay necessary action. Even in the more social movement or class-oriented UNISON (Hampton, 2015; Hyman, 2001), the more transformative environmental justice narratives are barely more prevalent than alternative narratives. This poses a barrier to the emergence of more transformative claims and is largely in line with the claim that ‘a coherent transformative vision is missing’ in union discourses, despite agreements that there are ‘no jobs on a dead planet’ (Kalt, 2021a: 14). The lack of a positive vision of a sustainable future within planetary boundaries, which could provide a ‘metanarrative’ bridging the gap towards closer cooperation (Roe, 1994), is also partially the failure of social and environmental movements to promote a socially just and secure narrative of welfare within planetary boundaries. It also shows the crises of wider culture and societal/ideological discourse over what constitutes a good life (Eversberg, 2019). The key entry point for transformative coalitions therefore lies in promoting a shared, coherent, and positive narrative about transformative change, in line with scientific evidence, a storyline which must bridge current divisions and reframe the crises in a new way. The European Trade Union Institute’s new concept of a ‘Social-Ecological Contract’ (ETUI, 2021) is a promising innovative development in this regard and could constitute the basis for a new metanarrative able to overcome previous gridlocks. Based on scientific research into the limits to further economic growth and production, it importantly promotes transformative change, security, shared welfare, and a positive new future of sufficiency.
Finally, social movements and organisations fighting for a social-ecological transformation might find it easiest to work together with environmentally aligned unions such as UNISON, as well as the diplomatic TUC, which are not as strongly ‘occupationally positioned’ against environmental action. However, focusing on a narrative of social issues emanating from the climate crisis, affecting members and society at large, could be an avenue for cooperation with unions occupationally positioned against environmental movements and which may have historical reasons for mistrusting such movements. As mentioned above, the strong metanarrative of positive future member welfare could be an avenue for environmental organising with unions stoutly opposed to environmental action, as well as supporting individual pro-environment agents and members within the unions, emphasising narratives of a different, positive ‘good life’ within planetary boundaries. This is clearly an important entry point for stronger environmental-union coalitions.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and the Editors of the journal for their insightful comments, guidance and suggestions, which greatly improved the quality and contribution of the article. Further thanks go to the brave union officials, who agreed to be interviewed, as well as Katha Keil, Felix Maile, Stefanie Gerold, Gillian Foster, Philipp Gehren, colleagues at the Ecological Economics Institute for their help and encouragement in various stages of the paper writing process, as well as the Vienna Chamber of Labour - especially Michael Soder and Florian Wukovitsch - for their support and financial help in undertaking the research.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.