POLITICAL ACTION VERSUS VOLUNTARISM IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS AND AID FOR THE NEEDY

Abstract

Concerned citizens have two responses to situations that require sacrifice for the greater good, such as social dilemmas or provision of aid for the needy. One is voluntary sacrifice. The other is to take political action, in order to change the rules so that others will sacrifice in the same way. For a somewhat selfish and rational utilitarian, under specified assumptions, I show that political action is sometimes worthwhile and superior to voluntarism. This situation is more likely to obtain when the actor is moderately selfish (as opposed to being totally selfish or unselfish), and when: cost of political action is low; cost of cooperation is high; the situation involves aid for the needy and the proportion of potential beneficiaries is large; variability in willingness to cooperate is low; some people are already cooperating, but not too many; or the benefit/cost ratio of contributing increases with the number of contributors.

Keywords

altruism cooperation utilitarianism voting

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