Rationality and Society

In this paper we seek to provide an explanation of three widely documented empirical phenomena. These are: (i) increasing educational participation rates; (ii) little change in class differentials in these rates; and (iii) a recent and very rapid erosion of gender differentials in educational attainment levels. We develop a formal mathematical model, using a rational action approach and drawing on earlier work that seeks to explain these three trends as the product of individual decisions made in the light of the resources available to, and the constraints facing, individual pupils and their families. The model represents children and their families as acting rationally, i.e. as choosing among the different educational options available to them on the basis of evaluations of their costs and benefits and of the perceived probabilities of more or less successful outcomes. It then accounts for stability, or change, in the educational differentials that ensue by reference to a quite limited range of situational features. So, both class and gender differences in patterns of educational decisions are explained as the consequence of differences in resources and constraints. We do not, therefore, invoke `cultural' or `normative' differences between classes or genders to account for why they differ in their typical educational decisions (though we have something to say about the role of norms in such an account). Because the model is presented mathematically, testable corollaries are easy to derive as are other implications of our model for patterns of relevant behaviour.

Concerned citizens have two responses to situations that require sacrifice for the greater good, such as social dilemmas or provision of aid for the needy. One is voluntary sacrifice. The other is to take political action, in order to change the rules so that others will sacrifice in the same way. For a somewhat selfish and rational utilitarian, under specified assumptions, I show that political action is sometimes worthwhile and superior to voluntarism. This situation is more likely to obtain when the actor is moderately selfish (as opposed to being totally selfish or unselfish), and when: cost of political action is low; cost of cooperation is high; the situation involves aid for the needy and the proportion of potential beneficiaries is large; variability in willingness to cooperate is low; some people are already cooperating, but not too many; or the benefit/cost ratio of contributing increases with the number of contributors.

This is an attempt to evaluate the consequences of revolutions. In our view, revolutions do not contribute to the promotion of liberty, they merely generate a new ruling class or oligarchy, stronger armed forces and more war-involvement. Whether evaluated by economic growth rates, income inequality, or quality of life, the economic performance of postrevolutionary regimes looks unconvincing. Certainly, it cannot compensate for the extraordinary loss of life resulting from 20th century revolutions. This negative balance sheet of revolutions may be explained by a rational choice approach. If public interests or collective goods for the people determined the course of revolutionary events, then the balance should look much better than it does. If revolutionaries are motivated by lust for power and greed, however, then revolutions are human and social capital wasting exercises on a grand scale.

In this paper it is argued that the assumptions of the neoclassical and wage efficiency models do not adequately explain the governance structure of employment relationships. Trust may be a constituent element of at least some employment relationships, e.g. those of child minders. According to the tradition of research in social science, trust is established by gifts. It is argued that in employment relationships in which both employer and employee have a gain and damage potential, gifts will be used to establish a trust relationship. This argument helps to produce new hypotheses about wages and allocation in employment relationships. The model is elaborated for the employment relationships of child minders. It is shown that it is not only job and human capital characteristics that determine wages, but also the financial resources of the parents (or employers). In addition, more personal means of exchange are used to establish trust relationships. It is concluded that the trust argument helps to explain different governance structures in employment relationships.