Ritualistic Rape in Sociological Perspective

Abstract

The current article examines rape as a form of sexual violence, drawing upon comparative research to describe and then proffer a tentative explanation of one specific type, referred to as ritualistic rape. Several cross-cultural examples and selected national data are referenced to examine three different forms of ritualistic rape: forced marriages or abductions, ritual defloration, and wife-lending. The evidence indicates that such “normative” or socially condoned rapes appear quite commonly in one form or another in nearly every society. The last section offers a general theory of ritualistic rape rooted in D. Black’s pure sociology perspective by identifying the confluence of several underlying structural features that purport to explain the conditions under which ritualistic rapes tend to thrive.

Keywords

ritualistic rape cross-cultural research sexual violence pure sociology sociological theory

Introduction

At the international level, rape has long been recognized as an illicit form of sexual violence. By the early 1990s, many countries had developed legal prohibitions against marital rape as well (Archampong & Sampson, 2010; Easteal, 1994; Kaganas, 1990; cf. Mandal, 2014). While clearly unacceptable by conventional standards, several analysts have noted further that rape has different layers of meaning and complexity (Blackman, 1985; Chasteen, 2001; Lira, Koss, & Russo, 1999). The contested nature of the concept implies that just as not all homicides are equal before the law or in the social reactions elicited, neither are all rapes exactly the same (Reitan, 2001).

From a cultural standpoint, there are still many contexts within which women struggle with the definition of what constitutes sexual violence or whether they even label specific nonconsensual sexual experiences as rape (Z. Peterson & Muehlenhard, 2011; Saffioti, 1994; Touray, 2006). For example, the comparative research indicates that women are less likely to report to the police sexual assaults or rapes by their partners compared with those involving strangers (Felson & Paré, 2005; Ilkkaracan, 1998; Myhill & Allen, 2002; Russell, 1990).¹ Furthermore, if cases are processed and convictions obtained, the courts tend to pass lighter sentences for rapes involving intimate partners (Fayard & Rocheron, 2011; Rumney, 1999; Steketee & Austin, 1989).

The lack of clarity regarding consent confuses not only the issue of whether or not a rape occurred but as well the degree to which victims might assume some responsibility for what may have transpired (Gunby, Carline, & Beynon, 2013; Lazar, 2010; see K. A. Black & McCloskey, 2013). Yet even if a consensus existed regarding the documentation of rape cases, one could argue that there may still be different types of rape, similar to the notion that there are different types of intimate partner violence, assaults, and homicides. In essence, rape as sexual violence logically falls within the broader sociological discussion of the multifaceted nature of violence.

The current article examines rape as a complex form of sexual violence, drawing upon comparative research to describe and then proffer a tentative explanation of one specific subtype: ritualistic rape. The evidence indicates that such “normative” (Rozée, 1993) or socially condoned rapes have assumed many different forms in certain sociohistorical contexts and, indeed, have been somewhat commonplace across cultures.² The last section of the article examines the confluence of several underlying structural features that purport to explain the conditions under which ritualistic rapes are more likely to occur.

Defining Rape

In the first place, rape constitutes a specific type of “violence.” While there are many ways to conceptualize violence, the most common legal and sociological definitions stress violence as “the use of physical force against people or property, including threats and attempts” (D. Black, 2004, p. 146). Mainstream views of violence in general and rape in particular emphasize their predatory nature, or the use of force in “the exploitation of the person or property of another” (Cooney & Phillips, 2002, p. 81). Consistent with feminist literature, rape typically represents a form of social predation involving sexual exploitation (MacKinnon, 1993). While the term rape has varying connotations across cultures (see Palmer, 1989), Thornhill and Thornhill (1983) have argued that the common definitional element always includes the forced, nonconsensual nature of the sexual contact.

In addition, while rape can involve different combinations of individuals with varying statuses (including intragender rape), much of the scholarly focus has been on men’s sexual coercion of women against their will (Brownmiller, 1975; Herman, 1984; see E. K. Martin, Taft, & Resick, 2007). Rozée (1993) used the term nonnormative to describe those rapes involving “illicit, uncondoned genital contact that is both against the will of the woman and in violation of social norms for expected behaviors” (p. 504). Similarly, Tjaden and Thoennes (2006) noted that for the National Violence Against Women Survey, the researchers defined rape “as an event that occurred without the victim’s consent that involved the use or threat of force in vaginal, anal, or oral intercourse” (p. 3).³ The dominant definitions, therefore, correspond to the common-sense interpretation of rape as social predation: the illegal or otherwise socially condemned exploitation of another human being through the unilateral seizure of sexual contact.⁴

To simplify, the article uses Mills’s (1991) definition of rape as “forced sexual violation” (p. 205).⁵ The adjective “forced” acknowledges the unilateral nature of rape, with perpetrators initiating action against victims. By definition, the victim does not willingly provide consent or engage in any bilateral exchange or negotiation regarding sexual intimacy. The concept implies the use of either physical aggression or disabling strategies to acquire such intimacy against the will of the victim (Tuttle, 1986). As such, rape represents one subtype of violence, while the “sexual violation” aspect of the definition highlights the nature of the specific resource in question: access to genital contact or penetration (vaginal, oral, or anal) of the embodied “other.”

Previous Theoretical Arguments and Typologies

The most common approaches to explaining rape typically focus on rapists’ motivations, personalities, and background characteristics. For example, in regard to individual-level typologies, scholars have focused primarily on the different motivations and, to a limited degree, rapists’ targets as central to their conceptual distinctions (Simon, 2009). Groth, Burgess, and Holmstrom (1977) proposed one of the earliest models, with an explicit focus on the psychodynamic characteristics of rapists to distinguish among anger-retaliatory, power-assertive, and sadistic-hedonistic rapists. Knight and Prentky (1987, 1990) developed the Massachusetts Treatment Center (MTC) typology to argue that rapists tended to be motivated primarily by displaced aggression, sexual sadism, a compensatory mechanism (or power-reassurance), or impulsivity and opportunism. Hall and Hirschman (1991) offered a quadripartite model of sexual aggression as well to distinguish among physiologically, cognitively, affectively, and personality-driven rapists. Greenall and West (2007) have developed a typology to classify rapes as motivated by sexual (nonsadistic) gratification, sexual sadism, opportunism, vindictiveness, and pervasive anger. Finally, Miller (2014) has argued recently that rapists are motivated by anger, power, eroticized cruelty, and opportunistic mating, while subsequently acknowledging that no single set of cognitive, psychological, or neuropsychological factors can be isolated as determinants due to the heterogeneity of the offending population.

Consistent with routine activity theory, a small number of analysts have focused on rapists’ targets and possible opportunities (Felson & Boba, 2010; Rebocho & Silva, 2014). With respect to targets, for instance, Stevens’s (1994a) research generated three main categories to describe “easy prey” (vulnerable victims), personal characteristics (e.g., appearance), and random or opportunistic conditions where the rapist simply happened upon someone by chance. Silverman, Kalick, Bowie, and Edbril (1988) applied a dichotomous approach to examine the differences between “blitz rapes” involving a sudden, surprise attack and “confidence rapes” where rapist and victim have had previous nonviolent interactions. The dichotomy parallels in large measure the common distinction between stranger- and acquaintance rapes (Pazzani, 2007).

The emphasis upon rapists’ motivations and their targets, however, assumes a certain continuity to rape behavior that the comparative evidence does not warrant. In effect, the aforementioned typologies and associated theoretical perspectives project rape as an exclusively predatory form of behavior (Horvath & Brown, 2007; Stevens, 1994b). Such a viewpoint directs the analytic attention in search of possible “predators” and the predictive characteristics associated with such individuals (Beauregard, Rebocho, & Rossmo, 2010; Beauregard, Rossmo, & Proulx, 2007). The sociocultural contexts of forced sexual violations of various kinds are considered only occasionally in these analyses or ignored altogether. From a sociological perspective, such typologies exclude almost entirely the most pertinent social and cultural information relevant to explanations of rape to focus on the psychological profiles and motivations of individual rapists who prey upon their victims. The evidence will show, however, that the social contexts of rapes vary dramatically and that much forced sexual violation involves perpetrators—and quite often even observers—who do not interpret certain types of forced sexual violations as rape in the first place. A more meaningful typology of rape, then, would focus on the variegated social contexts that help distinguish among different types of rape behaviors.

Sociologizing Rape Typologies: A Blackian Perspective

The social circumstances linked to forced sexual violations can vary in rather compelling ways. What do sexual assaults of Tutsi women by Hutu men, Tantric priests’ ritual defloration of prepubescent girls in ancient Khmer, and a U.S. man who forces his partner to have sex in response to her infidelity share in common? These are vastly different behaviors, apart from the fact that each involves “a woman or girl compelled to have sex against her will” (Smith, 2001, p. 2). Hence, analysts would benefit from a degree of conceptual and typological refinement to examine the multifarious contexts within which rape occurs. Some argue, for example, that violence in general does not constitute a single entity and, as such, have proposed typologies to help further their explanatory efforts (Block & Block, 1991; Cooney & Phillips, 2002; Harford, Hsiao-ye, & Freeman, 2012). The approach has been extended to debates about the gendered aspects of violence, or the different types of perpetrators and the situational nature of much violence (Holtzworth-Munroe & Meehan, 2004; Howard, Howells, Jinks, & McMurran, 2009; Johnson, 2008).

Cooney and Phillips (2002) supported D. Black’s (1983) typological distinction between predatory violence and moralistic violence as potentially enhancing the analyst’s ability “to explain violence more powerfully (to) achieve a higher coefficient of explained variance” (p. 85). Predatory violence by definition occurs in a unilateral fashion via force, often unexpected by the victim(s). Most rapes in Western societies tend to be viewed similarly as a form of social predation (Stevens, 1994a). Yet, sometimes violence may be a strategy for handling grievances. D. Black (1983) has argued that many crimes, beyond simple forms of deviance or lawbreaking, may constitute social control. Thus, moralistic violence represents a different type of violence used to seek justice or exact revenge for having been wronged. In some cases, therefore, rape might be considered a means through which the aggressor punishes someone for various transgressions, perceived or otherwise. Some men might justify the rape of their intimate partners or even “child rape,” for instance, by arguing that she “deserved” what happened or that the rape represented a form of punishment (Bergen, 1996; Jewkes, Penn-Kekana, & Rose-Junius, 2005).

Other examples of rape, however, do not fall neatly into either of those two categories. Rather, there are social contexts in which rape has ritualistic qualities, or what might be defined as “ceremonial rape” (Rozée, 1993). Prominent examples include the “ritual defloration” that young women endure (Reminick, 1976), various tests of virginity (Schneider, 1971), specific rites of passage or initiation ceremonies (Kamlongera, 2007; Knox, 2004), and “exchange rapes” where sexual access to women may be granted to certain men as an expression of goodwill or enhancing solidarity (Collier & Rosaldo, 1981; see Long, 2004). These examples, while socially approved to a degree in certain cultural settings, nevertheless involve forced sexual violations or rape. The current article focuses exclusively upon these latter instances or rape as a socially condoned ritual within certain subcultural contexts.

The notion that rape could be condoned departs radically from Western views of appropriate sexual behavior (Zondi, 2007). Rozée (1993) defined such normative rape as “rape that is against the will of the woman but does not violate the social norms for acceptable behavior” (p. 505). She included a diverse array of rapes, though, under that definition: marital rape, exchange rape, punitive rape, theft rape, ceremonial rape, and status rape. Many of these rapes actually refer to various forms of predation or social control (Cooney & Phillips, 2002). Furthermore, distinct types of rape may occur even within the same culture, which may or may not be condoned. For example, the Gusii of southwestern Kenya, described by LeVine in the 1950s, advocated the forced consummation of a marriage requiring that women sexually satisfy their husbands indefinitely, thereby engaging in coital relations against their will. Yet even among the Gusii, some types of forced sexual relationships occurred “under circumstances that are not legitimate (and) could be termed rape” (LeVine, 1959, p. 971).

There are many cases of forced sexual violation, however, that actually do occur in the context of culturally sanctioned practices. Hence, for the present purposes, ritualistic rape refers to any instance of forced sexual violation for socially approved purposes. Such rapes are prescribed as established rites, proceedings, or services often linked to ceremonial occasions. These forms of forced sexual violations nearly always clash with mainstream Western values, as well as international human rights and laws (Amado, 2004; Banwell, 2014; Dauer, 2001; Omeje, 2001). Certain practices might be accepted at a societal level, or might be practiced and condoned only within a subculture, such as in the context of gang rapes in fraternities (Boswell & Spade, 1996).⁶ What explains the presence of ritualistic rape, that is, under what conditions might one expect such practices to prevail? Donald Black’s (1979, 1995) paradigm of “pure sociology” offers an insightful strategy for examining the structural conditions conducive to such violence.

The Logic of the Pure Sociology Paradigm

The pure sociology paradigm explains all forms of human conduct as a by-product of the “social geometry” of human relationships (D. Black, 1995). The idea of the social implies human interactions and behavioral outcomes, while the notion of geometry implicates the structural conditions that underlie or set the stage for these interactions. Each individual’s actions can only be understood in relation to other individuals, based upon their locations in social space and the social statuses that each occupies (see Manning, 2012; Michalski, 2003). For example, those who are more intimate with each other typically respond quite differently to various slights or insults as compared with those who are more distant or even strangers to one another. All forms of social behavior, by definition, do not occur in a vacuum; one must consider the situational context within which people interact with each other. And people behave differently depending upon the configuration of statuses that they occupy relative to each other in “social space.” What are the key dimensions of social space?

The analysts who work within the paradigm agree that social space as currently conceptualized has five dimensions: vertical, horizontal, symbolic, organizational, and normative (D. Black, 1979, 1995; Cooney, 2009; Jacques & Wright, 2008; Michalski, 2003). The vertical dimension refers to the distribution of resources or social stratification. The horizontal dimension refers to social morphology, or the relative distributions and patterns of social interaction along the radial plane. The symbolic dimension refers to the cultural aspects of social life, indicated by all aesthetic, intellectual, and moral evaluations. The corporate dimension refers to the degree of organization, or capacity for collective action and the development of alliances. The normative dimension refers to the degree to which actors have been subjected to social control, that is, the parallel of respectability or reputational status. Each dimension has several subdimensions that together constitute the social geometry underlying the complexity of human social interactions. The statuses may be intercorrelated along each dimension, but need not be; one could have considerable wealth relative to others, for instance, and yet be relatively isolated in terms of daily interactions or group memberships. These dimensions cumulatively produce the “social geometry” of each encounter via a combination of actors’ statuses relative to each other, which includes the social distances, directions, and locations of all those involved (Black, 2002). As Campbell (2009) has elaborated,

(P)ure sociology explains human behavior with its location and direction in social space. Known variously as the shape of social space, social structure, or social geometry, this consists of the social characteristics of everyone involved in any instance of human behavior (Black 1995:853). Social geometry, then, is not a characteristic of a society, group, organization, or person, but of human behavior itself. (p. 158)

At the empirical level, for example, D. Black (1976) has shown that within societies, law varies directly with relational distance: Conflicts between strangers are more likely to induce a legal response than those among intimates. Yet just as law constitutes one form of social control in response to conflict and most conflicts are handled without law, rape represents one form of sexual intimacy from among many possibilities. While rape refers to forced sexual violations or sexual intimacy against the will of participants, most sexual intimacy involves a bilateral exchange between consenting participants. Unless one argues that all sexual encounters reflect power differentials designed to subordinate women, the vast majority of encounters constitute “nonrape.”

Yet, even instances of rape can vary in terms of their underlying logics, reflecting the fundamentally different types of forced sexual violations outlined previously. Similar to previous discussions of violence, a Blackian approach acknowledges three fundamentally different forms of rape: predatory rape, moralistic rape, and ritualistic rape (D. Black, 2004; Cooney & Phillips, 2002). To reiterate, predatory rape in the purest sense refers to the sexual exploitation of another through coercive force. Such rapes reflect the most common understanding of rape in the North American context and throughout most industrial and advanced industrial societies. Far less commonly acknowledged are cases of moralistic rape, whereby perpetrators of sexual violence utilize rape as a way of dealing with grievances, or as a form of punishment or social control. While there may be some degree of overlap, these two forms of rape are nevertheless analytically distinct. Finally, ritualistic rape refers to forced sexual violations linked to socially approved ceremonial occasions. The current article proffers a general theory of ritualistic rape, or the confluence of the specific conditions most conducive to the occurrence of such behaviors. Stated in pure sociology terms, the explanation of ritualistic rape (or any other form of rape or types of violence) requires that one identify its social geometry: What are the underlying conditions that help to explain and predict the likelihood of socially sanctioned or approved forms of rape? To answer that question, consider first the evidence available that depicts some of the different forms of ritualistic rape.

Ritualistic Rape in Comparative Perspective

While there are many forms of ritualistic rape, the current article focuses on three specific types of sexual violations of females that are “culturally legitimate practices within their societies” (Candib, 1999, p. 186): forced marriages and abductions, ritual defloration, and wife-sharing or wife-lending.⁷ The evidence stems from a broad examination of the comparative literature, drawing upon a combination of primary sources from the eHRAF World Cultures database, ethnographic accounts, and national and international survey data. The diverse range of information from cultures around the world serves as the analytic foundation to formulate a Blackian theory of socially approved forms of forced sexual violations against females.⁸ The following analysis, then, serves as an exercise in theory development rather than theory testing. The article concludes with a discussion of the explanatory implications of theory and suggestions for more formal testing.

Forced Marriages and Abductions

The first type of socially approved rape occurs through forced marriages or abductions, which vary in their prevalence across cultures. The notion of the forced marriage (in contrast to either an “arranged marriage” or those freely chosen) by definition suggests a lack of full and free consent—and usually requires some compelling form of persuasion under duress. As Rafferty (2013) explained, “In many parts of the world, young girls (sometimes as young as age six) are forced into early marriage . . . by their families and communities, often justified by religious beliefs or tradition” (p. 5). According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (2014a), as many as 700 million females worldwide are “child brides” or married before the age of 18. These young women must leave their parents’ homes to assume wifely duties, with the majority living in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. More than one in five girls are married by the age of 15 in Bangladesh, Central African Republic, Chad, Guinea, and Niger, along with an estimated 18% in India and Sierra Leone (United Nations Children’s Fund, 2014b).

While cultural standards of acceptable marriageable age obviously vary, the sexual intercourse that typically occurs through forced marriages can be considered a form of marital rape (Chantler, 2012; see Bunting, 2012). The young and sometimes even prepubescent females cannot competently or freely consent to sexual intercourse, at least in accordance with most legal codes, due to their immaturity and inferior status. Yet, the young females are expected to fulfill their “wifely duties” in accordance with cultural expectations of being newly wedded.⁹ There are many non-Western contexts in particular where such cultural practices prevail (see Douglas, 2005). One example involves the Fisi (adult male) sleeping with young female initiates to mark the end of certain initiation ceremonies in Malawi (Kamlongera, 2007). The intertribal marriages of the Gusii of southwestern Kenya traditionally required the women of an exogamous tribe to submit to the union following the exchange of the appropriate bridewealth cattle. As many of the women displayed reluctance, the clansmen of the groom assisted as follows:

(T)wo immediately find the girl and post themselves at her side to prevent her escape, while the others receive the final permission of her parents. When it has been granted, the bride holds onto the house posts and must be dragged outside. Finally she goes, crying and with her hands on her head. (LeVine, 1959, p. 968)

In South Africa, the term ukuthwala refers to the traditional practice of a young man, often with third-party assistance, forcibly abducting a female to be his wife (Koyana & Bekker, 2007). Whether reluctant to join him or not, she engaged in a form of “ritual screaming” to protest her capture and to display that she possessed a certain dignity (Bekker, 1989). Hence, one must acknowledge, as in most Western contexts, that the issues of consent and the actual instances of “rape” are not always as clear as one might prefer, or reducible to the preferred binary of “rape” or “nonrape.” A more accurate assessment of ritualistic rape, in particular, requires a more nuanced assessment of the circumstances surrounding forced marriages and abductions. For younger women who are not yet adults, for example, one would consider all instances as “ritualistic rape” because of the lack of consent. For women of adult age, however, there might be a range of responses or a continuum upon which to situate which cases might be termed rape or not based on each woman’s personal or individual interpretation.

In some cases, then, the cross-cultural evidence reveals that the female in question truly does not consent; negotiations must occur between the families involved. In recent years, ukuthwala practices have evolved such that younger women, many of whom are orphans or from economically destitute families (sometimes as young as 10 years of age), are forcibly married to older men (Monyane, 2013). Similarly, Safadi, Swigart, Hamdan-Mansour, Banimustafa, and Constantino (2013) reported that in rural Jordan, some young women from poorer families are considered an economic burden and forced into marriage with older and often abusive men.

However, the fact that a bride price or dowry obligations might exist does not always imply a forced marriage. The historical evidence reveals that in many cases the females, often through consultation and with the blessings of their parents, quite willingly or perhaps even proudly participated if she could secure substantial wealth for her family of origin (Herskovits, 1926). Consider the case of traditional Pokot culture of Kenya that anthropologists described in the 20th century:

(A) father will seek as a husband for his daughter the man who can pay the highest bridewealth. If the ability to pay bridewealth is equal among several suitors, a father may prefer to send his daughter to a young man as a first wife rather than to an older man as a second or third wife. But, in general, his decision is based upon receiving the largest possible bridewealth in return for his daughter. (Edgerton & Conant, 1964, p. 412)

In sum, the comparative evidence confirms that the practice of forcible marriage occurs across many cultures. Analysts have examined in great detail other cultural contexts where such practices have been commonplace, such as among the Manobo of Eastern Mindanao (Garvan, 1927), in parts of Cambodia (Ye, 2011), and more recently among the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda (Baines, 2014).¹⁰ The women involved generally have an inferior status, as the cultures tend to be predominantly patriarchal in nature. Forced sexual contact often occurs, regardless of the women’s preferences—and sometimes in the context of ritualistic practices of “defloration.”

Ritual Defloration

A second form of ritualistic rape involves involuntary genital contact that occurs for ceremonial purposes, such as the defloration of young women or new brides in certain cultures. Reminick’s (1976) account of ritual defloration among the Amhara of Ethiopia, for example, linked their cultural practices of forced intercourse to the patriarchal authority structure of the society. The violent encounters allegedly represented masculinity and honor, as well as a form of social control over their newly anointed women (see La Fontaine, 1972). The ritual defloration symbolized the young man’s virility, his attainment of warrior status, and his capacity to secure alliances. Reminick (1976) offered the following dramatic account:

As one guest at a marriage feast said, “That last drink is taken in the way of a man who is about to kill his enemy!” Here we find quite direct relationships expressed between women and enemies, on the one hand, and intercourse and killing, on the other. The metaphors of defloration express the strain of wresting the woman/enemy from one patriarchal domain, through an act which is irreparable and incontrovertible, and of establishing the woman/enemy in a new status within a new legitimate domain. (p. 760)

Another compelling historical example dates back to Zhou’s 13th-century observations of Cambodian society and the ritualistic defloration of young girls:

Daughters of rich parents, from seven to nine years of age . . . are handed over to a Buddhist or Taoist priest for deflowering, a ceremony known as chen-t’an . . . Every family with a daughter ripe for chen-t’an then notifies the authorities . . . At nightfall on the proper day the candle is lighted, and when it burns down to the mark the moment for chen-t’an has come . . . I have been told that at a given moment the priest enters the maiden’s pavilion and deflowers her with his hand, dropping the first fruits into a vessel of wine. (Zhou, 2007, p. 34)

A similar tradition appears in India, historically linked to the devadasi system. The original focus concerned religion, whereby young women devoted their lives in symbolic union with a deity, dancing and engaging in activities at their specific temples (Torri, 2009). According to Shankar (1994), young girls from the 6th century were dedicated to temples in lieu of human sacrifice to ensure that the gods would bestow blessings upon their communities, or the land’s fertility. The devadasi system, however, evolved over the centuries, replaced by androcentric forms of worship and the emergence of sexual service as symbols of divine sexuality for Indian elites, royalty, and wealthy donors. Torri (2009) explained,

Girls are generally dedicated with an official ceremony at a young age, between the ages of eight to ten. This dedication ceremony is more or less similar to a marriage ceremony. As the dedicated girl attains puberty, another ceremony (Uditumbuvadu) is conducted, which effectively completes the process of her dedication. In this second ceremony, the priest “marries” the girl, dressed as a bride in a ceremonial red sari, to the deity. After the ceremony the young virgin is forced to spend her “wedding” night with a village elder who invariably belongs to a higher caste, and thereafter she cannot refuse sexual services to any member of the village. (p. 40)

Kamlongera (2007) offered an account of the ritual defloration that young girls in Malawi must endure that involves sexual intercourse as an integral part of the Fisi custom. She described that ordeal through the experience of Nagama, an 11-year-old Malawian girl forced to participate:

In the Fisi practice, the man sleeps with girls that at most times are below the age of 14. Authorities within the ceremony convince the girls that it is indeed necessary to sleep with the Fisi to mark the end of the Chinamwali. In Nagama’s narration of her ordeal her feelings towards the practice might not be clear, but what is clear is the determination that she will never allow her daughter to go through it. “I swore that the Fisi will never see my daughter.” (Kamlongera, 2007, p. 84)

Ritual defloration often has occurred through forced marriages or as a consequence of the bride price exchange. For example, in the 1980s, Lambek (1983) described the transfer of legal rights among the Mayotte via mahary, a token form of a bride price. Once the proper payment had been exchanged, the groom would be escorted to consummate the union with a small cloth placed underneath during intercourse to gather the female’s blood as proof of her virginity. The presence of elderly women in an adjacent room helped to ensure that the evidence had not been falsely manufactured: “The groom’s grandmother is normally responsible for supervising the cloth . . . (G)randmothers may encourage a nervous groom, or coax or force a bride frightened by the anticipated pain” (Lambek, 1983, p. 268).

In Morocco, the practice of ritual defloration might unfold in even more dramatic fashion, as the bridegroom would enter dressed as the monarch. As such, the male was empowered to remind his bride of his power and authority over her. Combs-Schilling (1991) has described the ordeal in the following terms:

Ideally the bride arrives at the nuptial chamber with her hymen unbroken so that he—ruler and head of household—can break it. With dramatic thrust of finger or phallus, he pierces her, rupturing and causing to bleed the thin membrane that previously had lain across the birth canal. (p. 675)

Among the Kanuri people in the 1950s, Cohen (1960) described the successful deflowering of the new bride as becoming public via a procession through the village of women from both families (Cohen, 1960). The practice of displaying hymenal blood has extended to a diverse range of other cultures as well, such as in historic Turkey (Pelin, 1999; see Olson, 1981), in rural Mexico (Fagetti, 2002), among the Arunta of Australia (B. Spencer & Gillen, 1927), and among the Yoruba of southwestern Nigeria (Bascom, 1969). In regard to the aforementioned Gusii, the process of the initial sexual intercourse between the groom and his bride historically occurred the first night and would be assisted by the groom’s supporters if necessary:

The bride usually refuses to get onto the bed; if she did not resist the groom’s advances she would be thought sexually promiscuous. At this point some of the young men may forcibly disrobe her and put her on the bed . . . As he proceeds toward sexual intercourse she continues to resist and he must force her into position. Ordinarily she performs the practice ogotega, allowing him between her thighs but keeping the vaginal muscles so tense that penetration is impossible. If the groom is young, the young men intervene, reprimand the bride, and hold her in position so that penetration can be achieved on the first night. (LeVine, 1959, p. 968)

The man then copulated with the bride for as long as possible to achieve a maximum number of orgasms, with only minimal concern for the welfare of the new bride. As LeVine (1959) explained,

The explicit object of such prodigious feats is to hurt the bride. When a bride is unable to walk on the day following the wedding night, the young men consider the groom “a real man” and he is able to boast of his exploits, particularly the fact that he made her cry. (p. 969)

In short, these examples demonstrate that ritualistic defloration certainly might involve considerable pain. The practices have amplified and reinforced the inferior status positions that females have occupied (materially and symbolically) across a diverse range of cultures.

Wife-Lending or Wife-Sharing

The practice of wife-lending or wife-sharing has appeared in many ethnographic accounts over the years. For example, Broude and Greene (1976) conducted an early cross-cultural coding of various sexual attitudes and attitudes based on Murdock and White’s (1969) Standard Cross-Cultural Sample. Their research revealed that of the 110 cultures for which data were available, about three in five did not allow for wife-lending or the exchange of wives under any normal circumstances. However, more than one third engaged in various types of wife-lending, especially for purposes that might include hospitality, forging alliances, or other ceremonial occasions (13 societies), such as among the Aranda of Australia, Fijians, and the Hurons of North America.

Some analysts have argued that the practice of wife-sharing helps to forge alliances or extend economic cooperation beyond the immediacy of one’s local family (Murdock, 1936; Rubel, 1961). Among the Aleut and “Eskimo” (Inuit) peoples studied, the historical evidence largely coincides with such an interpretation (Hawkes, 1916, p. 116; see Chance, 1960). Saladin d’Anglure (1993) has reported that the Inuit celebrate the winter solstice Tijavuut festival in part through ritual spousal exchanges in which high-status males identify their preferences to the shaman for the most sexually desirable females, who must acquiesce. By the same token, the shaman would always have the privilege of being rewarded for his services:

(I)t was not unusual for him to ask for payment in the form of sexual services from one of the women of the family which had called him in, whether the wife or the daughter of the man of the house. (p. 85)

Serpenti (1965) argued that the Kimam in the 1960s engaged in wife-sharing to forge stronger relationships of mutual obligations to help in times of need. B. Spencer and Gillen (1927) observed in the early 20th century that the Arunta man might lend his wife to a stranger as a matter of hospitality. Moreover, wife-sharing often reflects an institutionalized exchange with specific family or clan members, as Broude and Greene (1976) documented for 11 societies in their sample. Murdock (1936) observed, for example, that the Haida permitted sexual relations with the clansman of a spouse. Among the Maasai, “each husband is expected to fulfill his obligations as host scrupulously. When an age mate visits him overnight, the husband should sleep elsewhere” (P. Spencer, 1988, p. 189). In sum, while accurate estimates of the extent of wife-lending practices or the degree of female consent to such practices likely can never be determined, the cross-cultural evidence reveals that dozens of cultures at least occasionally have endorsed some forms of ritualistic exchange of betrothed women.

Explaining Ritualistic Rape Sociologically

The various practices presented, while distinct in some ways, involve some degree of socially approved forced sexual violation, that is, ritualistic rape. The comparative evidence indicates that while societies universally condemn certain forms of rape, many societies concurrently condone at least some type of “normative rape” (Rozée, 1993): rituals involving unilateral seizures of sexual contact against the will of females of various statuses. Just as one must consider the social context surrounding different instances of killing or murder, one must assess the sociocultural conditions that inform why different types of rape may be acceptable or unacceptable across cultures.¹¹

From an analytic standpoint, many forms of marital abduction and rape (e.g., wedding night rituals among the Gusii), specific types of exchange rape (e.g., “woman-lending” as tribesmen share women with others as per local customs), and, by definition, all ceremonial customs involving the penetration and defilement of the female body fall within the category of ritualistic rape. One could argue further that despite the cultural variations in these diverse practices, certain underlying structural features appear commonly across the myriad cases considered. From a “pure sociology” perspective, several conditions converge to produce the social geometry conducive to or at least enhancing the likelihood of ritualistic rape occurring (see D. Black, 1979, 1995).

Gender Inequality and Patrilocality

Perhaps the most common undercurrent of rape everywhere involves gender inequality, whereby women occupy inferior economic and social status positions relative to men (R. D. Peterson & Bailey, 1992; Schwendinger & Schwendinger, 1985). Several cultures are predicated upon gender-based forms of inequality and, by extension, often engage in sexually aggressive behaviors. The Yanomamö have participated in raids to capture women (Chagnon, 1968), the Turkanoan have engaged in bride captures and metaphorical gang rapes (Jackson, 1992), and various cultures have ceremonial rapes linked to marriage, virginity testing, and maintaining family honor (e.g., Huong, 2013; Parla, 2001).¹² In some cultures, such as among the Hmong of Northern Thailand, the exchange costs associated with the “bride price” reinforce the extreme forms of gender inequality that persist: “The bride-price payment . . . ties a woman to her husband and his lineage, giving them the rights to her labor, sexuality and reproduction” (Symonds, 2004, pp. 41-42). In addition, as Torri (2009) has explained in regard to certain areas within India, “Women are raped as part of caste custom or village tradition . . . (L)ower caste girls are often forced to have sex with the village landowner (zaminder)” (p. 38).

Building upon the theme of inequality, ritualistic rape seems to occur most often in patrilocal (and usually patrilineal) societies, wherein households are situated among or near the man’s family or clan, such as among the Gusii (LeVine, 1959), the Bangu (Omeje, 2001), and the Igbo of Nigeria (Odimegwu & Okemgbo, 2003). Men usually exercise greater power and have more resources compared with women in these societies (see King, 2008; Michaelson & Goldschmidt, 1971). Women’s inferior status increases their risk for being violated via culturally specific rituals that recognize and reinforce extant gender inequality. As one man stated in the Zulu context, “We do everything for them including buying them luxuries. They must comply with our wishes in return” (Zondi, 2007, p. 27). Indeed, the statement implies that female inferiority borders on dependency, wherein women have less control over material or decision-making resources in more highly patriarchal contexts. Ritualistic rape might be viewed in some respects as the quintessential expression of patriarchy, wherein the culture or subculture in question fosters and condones the use of force leading to sexual violation. Among the Igbo, for example, a great many women studied experienced forced sexual contact in the context of their marital relationships—a reflection of a remarkable imbalance of power:

(W)omen do not have and cannot hold title to land which is an exclusive preserve of males and is in turn inherited by the male children in the family . . . Female children are expected to marry from the time they started menstruating and have no choice with respect to the men they married . . . The family authority structure clearly favour the men who take the major decisions affecting the household without reference to the women. (Odimegwu & Okemgbo, 2003, p. 225)

Cultural Homogeneity and Relational Intimacy

The victims in ritualistic rapes tend to be culturally homogeneous among themselves, which includes the cultural similarity of the females targeted. For example, the women usually belong to the same ethnic group or local community (see Armstrong, Hamilton, & Sweeney, 2006). Unlike predatory rape, which often involves strangers or socially distant contacts, ritualistic rapes appear to involve high levels of intimacy in socially sanctioned contexts such as marriages. Women are subjugated to their husbands in typically patrilineal societies such as among the Zulus of South Africa (Zondi, 2007; see Jewkes & Abrahams, 2002) or among the previously mentioned Igbo in Nigeria (Odimegwu & Okemgbo, 2003). Women occupy an inferior status and, as such, the culture or subculture in question either condones her “objectification” (P. Y. Martin & Hummer, 1989), or otherwise might accept that certain forced sexual practices should be endured as common rituals endemic to the society in question. These might include the ancient Khmer deflowering ritual of young girls conducted by Tantric priests (Zhou, 2007), virginity testing (Leclerc-Madlala, 2003; Wadesango, Rembe, & Chabaya, 2011), or forced marriages among children, such as the “ukuthwala” practice in South Africa (Monyane, 2013). Under these conditions, different forms of forced sexual violations or rapes may be normatively sanctioned to help ensure the cultural sanctity or even purity of those involved.

As a result, whereas predatory forms of rape usually involve victims who are more relationally distant or even strangers, ritualistic rape typically involves those who are highly involved in each other’s lives. The intimacy factor, highlighted in other contexts as a precondition of domestic violence (Grandin & Lupri, 1997), appears relevant to explaining ritualistic rapes as well. Unlike most forms of social predation, ritualistic rapes tend to occur in social settings where the participants have some level of cross-cutting ties or overlap in their social networks, such as a shared lineage or community. The families involved might even condone the behaviors in certain circumstances (Monyane, 2013), or there may be other forms of normative support provided by the dominant group or by others who cooperate to ensure the proper rituals will be enacted in specific cultural contexts.¹³

Public Contexts and Corporate Support

Ritualistic rapes, moreover, differ significantly from predatory rapes through their relative lack of social isolation. The participants involved commit their rapes in culturally approved contexts, indicating high levels of sociocultural integration, as opposed to the privacy that accompanies most forms of social predation. Ceremonial rapes thus have a public or quasi-public nature, reflecting the manifest and latent functions of ritualistic rapes. Whereas social predators typically intend to hide their activities or carry out their violations in private, ritualistic rapes usually entail some type of public recognition or even celebration.

At times, though, the practices may contradict dominant cultural norms and thus the quasi-public nature of such rapes prevails. For example, some U.S. fraternities endorse various forms of “gang rape” as pseudoinitiation rituals, a form of “male bonding,” and a mechanism for building solidarity, but these activities are clearly unacceptable and illegal. P. Y. Martin and Hummer’s (1989) research determined that the fraternity brotherhood often encouraged the use of sexual violence as fundamental to the social construction of masculinity, as an important initiation ritual to establish trust, and as contributing to the commodification of women. Sanday (2007) observed that sometimes even sororities may be complicit as well, assigning the role of “stripper” or “hoe” to new pledges (p. 203). The cumulative evidence regarding athletic participation and fraternity membership highlights the importance of patriarchal or “hypermasculine” attitudes as correlates of rape-supportive views and even self-reported sexual aggression (Murnen & Kohlman, 2007).

From a structural standpoint, the corporate aspect of ritualistic rape must be acknowledged. Such behavior by definition involves at least a subcultural group who condone, if not actually participate, in the various forms of forced sexual violation. Indeed, a degree of organizational asymmetry appears to accompany such rapes, as several men are often involved or at least supportive of ritualistic rapes such as among the Mundurucu (Murphy, 1959). Dundas (1913) described the classic case of the Wawanga of East Africa a century ago, who would require a payment to the father or nearest male relative of a woman he wished to marry:

After these preliminary payments the bridegroom proceeds with at least four of his kinsmen to the bride’s village and there seizes her by force. The girl at once commences screaming for help, and in answer to her cries the women of the village come running up. The bridegroom beats and drives them off with a stick. The girl is then carried away to the village. In the evening the bride’s girl friends and relatives proceed to the bridegroom’s hut, where they are witnesses to the consummation of the marriage and the bride’s virginity. (p. 39)

Dundas (1913) further reported that if actual rapes occurred, the typical response would be compensation in the form of one bull to the husband or father. Garvan (1927) described a similar pattern among the Manobo of the Philippines in the early part of the 20th century, as yet another example of the many patriarchal cultures that required bride prices and sometimes involved bride captures. The patrilineal Kutubu of Papua considered rape an affront to a woman’s owner, who must be compensated: “Generally speaking a woman’s sexual favors, whether to be enjoyed or disposed of, belong to the man or men who own her, and sexual offenses amount therefore to an infringement of their rights” (Williams, 1941, p. 533).

The purest or most extreme form of ritualistic violence relates to various forms of human sacrifice or female subjugation. The designation of selected girls for sexual exploitation on behalf of the community typically occurs among highly unequal patriarchal societies, preindustrial, and often slave societies:

The custom of “marrying” girls to a deity, thereby depriving them of the right to ordinary marriage and assigning them to sexual exploitation by the deity’s priests or devotees, existed in many ancient cultures, including in Europe, the Middle East, West Africa and South Asia. (M. Black, 2009, p. 180)

Conclusions: An Integrated Theory of Ritualistic Rape

In summation, the current article has attempted to demonstrate the breadth of cultural practices associated with many different forms of ritualistic rape, that is, forced sexual violation for socially approved purposes. The myriad examples drawn from the cross-cultural literature help illustrate the general patterns that appear more commonly, which have been summarized with the aim of developing a more comprehensive theory of ritualistic rape. From a more “emic” perspective, one can plausibly argue that ritualistic rape expresses various symbolic aspects of specific cultures, typically in the context of highly patriarchal societies, involving sexual exploitation for the alleged benefit of specific subgroups or even entire communities. The purest form, then, occurs in socially sanctioned contexts, whereby the group endorses the pattern based on their belief systems, usually at the expense of vulnerable or marginalized young females in their midst (see M. Black, 2009).¹⁴

Even more compelling, the conventional view of rape as a form of social predation arguably captures only a portion of the expansive range of forced sexual violations that occur cross-culturally. The current article supports Rozée’s (1993) assertion that socially condoned or “normative rapes” exist across many societies and may even be more pervasive in terms of prevalence and incidence rates than predatory rapes in some non-Western or preindustrial societies in particular. While certainly not every female has been subjected to either predatory, moralistic, or ritualistic forms of rape, nearly every known culture has at least one of these dominant types or a specific subtype (Palmer, 1989; Rozée, 1993). The tentative theory proposed here predicts that ritualistic rapes generally will thrive at the intersection of the several structural dimensions discussed.

Consistent with D. Black’s (1979, 1995) pure sociology perspective, the argument suggests that no one factor determines the behavior of rape, although gender inequality and patriarchy appear to be necessary causes underlying all forms of rape. In addition, the key facets that facilitate such rape seem to include a certain degree of relational intimacy and cultural homogamy, which imply a type of cultural interdependency conducive to sustaining extant forms of social relations valued across distinct societies throughout the world. The cross-cutting ties across lineages offer yet another characteristic that reinforces the shared purposes and values that different societies embrace. The fact that such rapes occur routinely in more public or semi-public spaces (as opposed to the privacy or social isolation associated with most forms of predatory rape) and with the support of key groups of individuals within various cultural settings demonstrates that some forms of forced sexual violations are socially approved. As a Weberian “ideal type,” the theory specifies that the “optimal” conditions for ritualistic rapes to occur reflect a distinctive social geometry: high levels of gender inequality and patriarchal structures, patrilocal living arrangements, the presence of more homogeneous societal relations, high levels of relational intimacy, a measurable degree of cross-cutting ties, functional interdependence, and organizational asymmetry between the perpetrators and victims. Many of these conditions (e.g., gender inequality and patriarchy) coalesce to produce other types of rape, but the intersection of these many different dimensions yields a distinct social geometry that enhances the likelihood of ritualistic rape occurring.

Yet despite the prevalence of different forms of ritualistic rape outlined in the cross-cultural literature, one should not conclude that such practices are universal in nature. The theory outlined here implies that the relative absence or significant variations from the aforementioned structural conditions should be associated with a commensurate absence of ritualistic rape. For example, the theory predicts a relative absence of such rape in those societies characterized by high levels of gender equality, matrilocality, and where a certain integration of gender-based labor (functional unity or interdependence) exists as underlying features of social organization. The relative absence of both asymmetrical relations and public support for such rapes should similarly dampen the enthusiasm for such rapes. In short, the theory can be evaluated more carefully by examining the full range of societies exhibiting different confluences of the structural features delineated in the current article. The likely result will be that while many societies exhibit conditions most conducive to ritualistic rape, others will likely exhibit a great tendency toward predatory or moralistic rape or even a relative absence of rape altogether.¹⁵ These are open-ended, empirical questions.

As the article has drawn selectively from the available cross-cultural evidence, the theory requires a more formal rigorous test. To conduct such a test, analysts should delve more deeply into the anthropological and historical literature to document more rigorously what happens at the case level of rape, or which combination of social factors are present, rather than simply examine rape at the societal level (e.g., Otterbein, 1979). There may be counterexamples of ritualistic rapes that occur wherein a different constellation of factors exists, which might then support the modification of the theory. The optimal test would be to select a random set of societies from the eHRAF World Cultures database, for example, to examine documented cases of ritualistic rape and then evaluate the degree to which the aforementioned structural features prevail.

If intent upon studying rape within a specific society, researchers should operationalize rape in a manner consistent with the present definition and ideally study the prevailing social geometry of a random sample of rape cases. Of equal interest, though, would be innovative strategies for studying nonrape scenarios, or a type of negative case comparison to test for the conditions where rape does not appear. Without question, though, peering more broadly and systematically across the social universe enhances our understanding of rape as a multifaceted reality that appears more commonly in rituals cross-culturally than the standard narrative of rape as a form of social predation in Western societies.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author Biography

Joseph H. Michalski is an associate professor of sociology at King’s University College at Western University. He received his PhD in sociology from the University of Virginia. His research focuses on comparative studies of violence in general and especially family violence, as well as conflict management, crime, poverty, and social inequality.

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