Contextuality,Commensurability,and Comparability in Comparative Research

Introduction

In recent years, the importance of comparative research has reached a new high. Whereas globalization and increasing exchanges among academic communities are instrumental to this unprecedented growth, two equally, if not more, important factors are its changing goals and approaches. In communications, as in other fields of study, comparative research is now expected to “explain” and to “predict,” rather than describe differences and similarities as seen in most cross-national surveys in the 1950s and 1960s (e.g., Farace & Donohew, 1965; D. Lerner, 1958; Schramm, 1964). As a “contrast to naïve universalism” (Esser, 2013), comparative research has become indispensable in determining the validity and generality of concepts and theories beyond their home territory (Esser & Hanitzsch, 2012, p. 4; Kohn, 1989, p. 77), hence is “scientifically essential” (Livingstone, 2012).

Despite this increasing importance, there seems to be a general consensus that comparative communication research has yet to reach “adulthood”—in fact, only a couple of areas have managed to reach “late adolescence” from their infancy in the mid-1970s (Esser, 2013, p. 115; Esser & Hanitzsch, 2012, p. 3; Gurevitch & Blumler, 2004). Just as “late adolescence” in life, this one is “a period of tumultuous development” (Mancini & Hallin, 2012). Once a researcher ventures into hypothesis testing with more than one system, culture, or nation in the sample, he or she is confronted with the issue of “comparability.” To ward off the many pitfalls of uninformed comparisons, a researcher is advised to consider the multiple dimensions and layers of analyses that are involved when going across space, time, and system; assure the functional equivalence of the objects being compared and the categories used; examine the adequacy of the measurement instruments; and stay alert to extraneous forces and influences. In brief, he or she must stay context sensitive throughout the study. “[T]heorizing the role of context is precisely what comparative analysis is about,” as Mancini and Hallin (2012, p. 515) pointed out. Contextual influences determine whether concepts and theories can be generalized across cultural and national boundaries; they also lay out the conditions under which validity can be upheld (Esser, 2013).

Contextualization as the Solution and the Problem

All the above are essential if comparative research is to reach its goals of explaining and predicting; yet there is more to be aware of than just taking such precautions. Contextualization may be the key to success in comparative studies, it is however also a central methodological problem (Mancini & Hallin, 2012). To put theories and concepts to robust test, comparisons need to be made across different, rather than similar, systems and cultures. But greater diversity most likely requires more sophisticated contextual analyses, thicker interpretations, and more conditions for generalizations to hold, thus risks eroding the basis of comparison.

Many share the concern that a “least-common denominator” theoretical framework may be so impoverished that it either becomes descriptive or does little to advance comparative analysis (Mancini & Hallin, 2012, p. 515). On this issue, Blumler and Gurevitch (1975) had two suggestions: controlling extraneous forces by conducting research in countries and systems that are closely similar or building them into the research design, for example, treating them as mediating variables so that they can be compared. Whereas the first option to some extent defeats the purpose of comparative research, the second one has been mainly an ideal. As Blumler and Gurevitch (1975) noted, “[w]e are still a long way . . . from knowing how in practical detail to handle any such difficulty when it arises” (p. 168). Some 40 years later, we may have become more “context-sensitive,” but are we fully prepared to “handle the difficulty when it arises”?

The above discussion leads us to two more questions. First, is it paradoxical to expect scientific research to be fully contextualized while advancing generality? Second, can contextualization at the methodological level solve the problem of “uninformed comparisons”? If history, culture, and local context—often the sources of extraneous factors in social scientific studies—are about uniqueness and particularity, then what comparative research is expected to accomplish with contextualization? To put it in a different way, are we to achieve generality with particularity fully incorporated in research? In essence, this presents the same paradox that geocultural theories face today: Whereas geocultural theories aim to generalize particularity (G. Wang, 2014), contextualization seeks to particularize generality. Both aims are problematic, as the scientific paradigm that underlies most social scientific research, universality, and particularity is locked in the two extremes of an “either-or” dualistic model. Despite rounds of philosophical debates in the past centuries, we are still a long way from going beyond the limitations of the universality/particularity model (Paty, 1999; G. Wang, 2014)—a model that is central to the dialectic paradigm.

The paradigm issue partly answered the second question regarding the “least common denominator” problem in constructing theoretical framework for comparative studies. Until this point, the discussion on contextualization has focused on methodological issues, with little attention paid to the theories involved. Whereas the very purpose of comparative research is to test the validity of theories in different contexts, the significance of this endeavor is hampered if the very basis for comparison is culture centric (G. Wang, 2011, 2014; Willnat & Aw, 2009), ¹ and thus may be irrelevant in other social and cultural contexts. ² They may be irrelevant not only because theories are contextual themselves, reflecting the needs, values, aspirations, and worldviews of their “home culture” but also because they are based on preconditions and philosophical assumptions that may not be shared across borders and boundaries (Kluver, 2004; G. Wang, 2011, 2014; Willnat & Aw, 2009). In other words, comparative research not only involves different contexts but may also cover different cultural traditions and knowledge paradigms; from this perspective, contextualization at the methodological level alone will not solve the problem. Unfortunately in academic research, incommensurabilities (G. Wang, 2011)—whether they be cultural, conceptual, or structural—are often overlooked when concepts and theories travel beyond their home territory. In addressing the many questions arising from theory application across cultures and the calls for “Asia- and Afro-centric communication theories,” G. Wang (2011, 2014) has proposed an incommensurability/commensurability framework (the I/C framework) to facilitate theoretical discourse across cultures and paradigms. Borrowing from the Kuhnian concept of incommensurability (Kuhn, 1962; Kuhn et al., 2000), the hermeneutic notion of interpretation, and the Chinese yin/yang worldview, the I/C framework allows researchers to establish theoretical dialogue across cultural traditions and knowledge paradigms by way of explaining and interpreting “irreconcilable differences.” In other words, “irreconcilable differences” may not be “translatable,” but with sufficient effort they can be learned and explained, thus making comparisons possible (Kuhn et al., 2000; G. Wang, 2011). On the basis of shared concerns, similar experiences, and terms and phrases of equivalent meaning, the task of interpreting incommensurability becomes instrumental to laying the groundwork for commensurability and comparability. As contextual particularity and generality are released from the dualistic “either-or” model and deemed symbiotic, cultural and conceptual incommensurabilities are no longer impediments, but resources that researchers may utilize to deepen and expand theoretical knowledge.

In this article, we seek to respond to the contextualization issues by using research on Chinese relationships as an example to show how the I/C framework as proposed by G. Wang (2011, 2014) can be useful in dealing with the problems involved. It shows how a thorough examination of the unique and the incommensurably different has revealed commensurable similarities that can pave the way to theory advancement.

Research on Chinese Relationships: A Fully Contextualized First Step

China is home to 56 ethnic groups, and of these the Han Chinese is generally considered as the “mainstream” ³ for its size and overwhelming influence. In the literature, distinct features of the Han culture are often understood as representative of the Chinese culture, and this article makes no exception.

The Chinese relationship is a typical example of conceptual and cultural incommensurability; even the term in Chinese is “succinctly much broader” than its equivalent in English, with meaning built around deep-seated cultural and Confucian values (Y. H. Huang, 2004). In other words, “relationship” in English only conveys a small part of the meaning of “relationship” in Chinese. Research on Chinese relationships makes a particularly interesting case to our discussion, as prior to the 1990s, studies on the topic strictly focused on the aspects of relationships that were found only in Chinese culture. The long-term effort, however, has led academics not to attest to the uniqueness, but rather to question the “Chineseness” of the Chinese relationship concept. The dramatic turn is telling evidence of the symbiotic relationship between incommensurability and commensurability, and contextual differences and comparable similarities.

In China, relationships have long been recognized as a core element in understanding social behavior (G. M. Chen & Chung, 1994; Hwang, 1987; King, 1985; Liang, 1949/1987). The incommensurability involved in the Chinese versus the Western way in understanding relationships, however, did not attract much attention from the international community until individualism/collectivism became a popular criterion for organizing cultural differences into overarching patterns (Gudykunst et al., 1996; Hofstede, 1980; M. S. Kim et al., 1996; M. S. Kim, Smith, & Gu, 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Triandis, 1989). Although empirical findings did generate evidence to the differentiation between Western and East Asian/Chinese samples (e.g., Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede & McCrae, 2004; Rinne, Steel, & Fairweather, 2012), the often conflicting results pointed to underlying incommensurabilities besides problems of conceptual faults and biases (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Y. H. Huang, 2004; Y. H. Huang & Bedford, 2014; Hwang, 2003; Morling & Lamoureaux, 2008; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Triandis et al., 1988), and measurement flaws (Bond, 1994, 2002; Brett, Tinsley, Janssens, Barsness, & Lytle, 1997; Brewer & Chen, 2007; Fiske, 2002; Kitayama, 2002; Morling & Lamoureaux, 2008; Oyserman et al., 2002; G. Wang & Liu, 2010). For example, the “collective” as originally defined by the model as a well-defined, cohesive group maintained through obligations of its members was found to be nearly non-existent in Chinese culture and in Confucian thought. Even family, the most important, tightly knit primary group in the Chinese culture, has great elasticity for expansion and contraction (X. T. Fei, 1993; King, 1992; Yu, 1987). Social interactions and relationships are governed by a set of normative rules mapped out by Confucianism, the “collective” thus formed is however fluid and open, due to a strong emphasis on reciprocity. The rules of differentiation pave the road for initial interactions, but the rules of reciprocity determine the nature and the kind of relationship that is developed. The obligation of the Self to its Others is hence neither unilinear nor unconditional but constantly reassessed and revised (Barnes, 1998; Jacobs, 1979; King, 1992; G. Wang & Liu, 2010; Yu, 1987).

Unlike individualism that celebrates the sovereignty of the individual, the Chinese Self is interdependent (Tu, 1985; C. F. Yang, 1991). According to Confucian teachings, the Self is to be committed to internal cultivation—a development process that seeks to internalize ethical values such as humanity, justice, trustworthiness, and persistence, rather than pursuing self-actualization and accentuating external inclination (Yu, 1987). Self-cultivation is the key to maintaining social order and harmony, as its ultimate goal is the unity of man and nature (Tu, 1985; C. F. Yang, 1991). In other words, there is no need to distinguish between individual goals and social objectives as they are ultimately the same. Although self-interest in the individualist sense is given little room in Confucianism, the Chinese Self is considered the center of personal networks and the driving force of internal cultivation and actions—far from being suppressed, de-emphasized, or submissive (X. T. Fei, 1993). This strong presence of personal initiative has put it in direct opposition to the emblematic characteristic of a collectivistic Self (U. Kim, 1994; Kitayama, Duffy, & Uchida, 2007).

Regarding Confucianism as the sole influence on Chinese culture would be a serious oversight of its complex development in the Song (960-1279) and the Ming (1368-1644) dynasties, as well as contesting influences from Taoism and Buddhism, and in the past century in particular, European modernity. But today Confucianism remains a significant part of school education in Chinese societies, and in the literature is often recognized as the major source of influence on the way Chinese Self relates to its Others (e.g., Ames, 2013; Hwang, 2012, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c; U. Kim, 1994; Weber, 1920/1964). In acknowledging the gap between Confucianism and collectivism, Triandis (1995) once noted that, “When reading Confucius . . . one is struck by the extent to which some of his statements urged people to be individualists” (p. 21). Confucian ethics have not turned Chinese people into collectivists, but they do not make people individualists, either; both are on a different track altogether. These inadequacies of depicting the way Chinese Self relates to its Others in terms of individualism/collectivism have prompted researchers to look for answers in cultural values (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Y. H. Huang, 2004; G. Wang & Liu, 2010)—an endeavor that often leads to their proposing the incorporation of “relationship” in the existing framework.

Relationship, as mentioned earlier in this article, was seen as a major factor that distinguished Chinese from the non-Chinese, and was the focus of Chinese sociological studies since the 1940s—the country’s heyday of social science research. Although both Fei Xiao-tong and Liang Su-ming, the two most influential scholars in early relation studies, were known for their comparative perspectives in research, their works on Chinese relationships, for example, Chaxugeju (H. T. Fei, 1948; X. T. Fei, 1993)—a “system of differentiation” (or “different mode of association”) and (Confucian) ethics-based society (Liang, 1949/1987) illustrated a preoccupation with the unique and the particular in Chinese culture. This focus of attention reflected the concerns of many intellectuals at the time, a sense of urgency in reaffirming cultural particularities when China was still shattered by the impact of the May Fourth Movement that embraced Westernization with open arms while demanding the eradication of traditional values.

Research on relationships in China discontinued after the civil war ended in 1949. But three decades later, it re-emerged in Taiwan’s psychology literature as a response to calls for indigenizing social scientific research. Although these studies had shifted from a sociological to a psychological perspective, the focus remained on what was perceived to be the “uniquely Chinese” features, for example, “face,” “renqing” (人情), and “fate” (緣分) (Hwang, 1987; K. S. Yang, 1981, 1992; C. F. Yang, 2001a, 2001b). The aspiration was to construct geocultural theories, that is, theories that were strictly “Chinese”; hence like their predecessors in the 1940s, researchers made little effort to either understand the nature, scale, and scope of differences that might cause barriers, or to explore similarities that would allow for comparisons to be made across cultures. Research on Chinese relationships had therefore thrived, rather than withered, on “incommensurability.” At this stage, perceived incomparability has become a queer bedfellow of uniqueness, even authenticity—held closely and dearly when cultural identity or academic subjectivity is seen at risk.

In contrast to indigenous research in the 1940s and 1970s, studies on Chinese relationships after the 1990s are marked with major changes in approach and emphasis.

In response to the rising importance of comparative research and also the failure of collectivism in distinguishing cultural differences, greater efforts have been made to incorporate both the unique and the shared features of human relations in building general concepts and theories. Relational orientation (Ho, 1998; Hwang, 2000; K. S. Yang, 1992; Yuki, 2003), for example, has been suggested as a potentially viable dimension of collectivism, and the term “relationalism” has been used to denote either a third dimension to the individualism/collectivism model (G. Wang & Liu, 2010), or a general theory (Hwang, 2005a, 2005b) of relationships.

A second development that has encouraged local researchers to move away from culture-specific issues is the blurring of distinctions between the mainstream and the indigenous; this has resulted, at least in part, from the growing need to make comparisons across cultures. Increasingly the factors considered “extraneous” in mainstream literature have been incorporated in research designs to enhance the explanatory power of concepts and theories. A notable example is the addition of long-term versus short-term orientation (also known as “Confucian dynamism”) to Hofstede’s theory of cultural dimensions. Another example is the concept of self-construal (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), which recognizes “interdependent self” as one of the two major dimensions in delineating the way individuals in different cultures look at their relationships with the others.

Gradually the cultural basis on which theories and concepts are developed seems to have expanded. This development is crucial to achieving generality across cultures, and also long-term growth of the field. It is, however, difficult to tell whether incorporating new elements or modifying dimensions as we have seen above is indeed the best way to reaching the goal. After an investigation of the 30-year research on cultural dimensions, for example, Maleki and de Jong (2014) concluded that “the status quo of theoretical and methodological development in this field can now be qualified by two words: enriched and messy” (p. 108). Despite heuristic richness, there also appeared the disadvantages of ambiguity, incompatibility, and inconsistency among dimensions. Organizing major cultural dimensions into clusters may be an urgent task for those who are interested to research the topic, but the greatest challenge to comparative researchers is to avoid making the same mistakes—especially when different knowledge paradigms are involved. What purpose would it serve to incorporate individualism, collectivism, and relationalism into a single framework, if they are not, as pointed out earlier in this article, on the same “conceptual track”? If Confucian ethics-based relationships are so different from individualism and collectivism to justify a separate dimension/category, can we comfortably take other types of interdependent relationships as collectivistic or add more dimensions as we see fit? The many different definitions of collectivism that we see in the literature are but the tip of iceberg. When quick parallels were drawn or diverse terms and ideas mixed together to form analytical frameworks, underlying values, preconditions, and preconceptions were easily glossed over.

Failures of the many studies of cultural dimensions have demonstrated that generality and universality of a conceptual model cannot be enhanced by expediently adding culturally diverse elements in the formula: The sum of particulars—let alone some particulars—is not the universal. In recent years, the problem of Eurocentrism in social science theories has attracted attention from those concerned with the indigenization issue, and efforts to develop more effective ways in transcending cultural boundaries were made. Among the most frequently discussed is the etic approach that describes and analyzes belief, behavior, or social phenomenon in terms of conceptual schemes or categories that are scientifically meaningful and thus deemed applicable across cultures (Lett, 1990). Prompted by the urgent need to produce concepts and theories that are indigenous in origin but apply cross-culturally, the derived etic approach has progressed further to conceptualize cultural characteristics as psychological syndromes, develop measurement scales for empirical investigations (Hwang, 2015b), and build culture-inclusive theories. Noteworthy examples are the Mandala Model of Self (Hwang, 2011a, 2011b) and the Face and Favour Model by Hwang (1987, 2012, 2015a, 2015c). By treating cultures as systems, these theories purport to reflect “the universal deep structure of the human mind” as well as “the specific mentalities of people in a given culture” (Hwang, 2012, p. 10; Hwang, 2015b, p. 17), as both are part of human nature (Shweder et al., 1998).

The commensurability framework as proposed by G. Wang (2011, 2014) also requests that the universal and the particular be released from the dichotomous extremes of an “either-or model,” and that the task to incorporate both in a proposition must be based on solid philosophical grounds. But as an analytical framework, the I/C framework has put greater emphasis on the “how” issue. To achieve meaningful academic exchanges across cultures and knowledge paradigms, one must begin with the explorations of cultural and conceptual incommensurabilities, and in this light, the Dual Factor Relational Framework (DFRF) is worthy of our special attention.

Rather than adding new dimensions to the collectivism/individualism model or to reorganize them to enhance its generality, the DFRF attempts to capture the full meaning of the Chinese relationship (Y. H. Huang & Bedford, 2014) in analyzing the concept. Because understanding of the word “relationship” in Chinese is based on Confucian teachings, the DFRF represents as well an attempt to embrace its incommensurabilities with equivalent terms in the English language. In this sense, the comprehensiveness of the DFRF becomes critical, as incommensurabilities are key to revealing commensurabilities.

In comparison with many earlier relationship studies that adopted either a sociological perspective in focusing on the structural aspect of Chinese relationship, or a psychological approach in aiming at the agentic aspect, the DFRF has broadened the scope by emphasizing both the external or structural, and internal or rational determinants of relationships. The structural elements reflect Confucian rules of ethics that shape an individual’s position in the social network. The rational factor, ⁴ however, depicts an individual’s orientation to exchange aspects of relationships. The structural factor does not preclude agentic behavior (Y. H. Huang & Bedford, 2014; Mizruchi, 1994). Together they address the concern that structural models neglect agency but rational models neglect external factors. The framework reflects Chinese relationships as depicted in the indigenous literature, in which individuals are both structurally and functionally interdependent through the exchange of tangible and intangible forms, such as face and favors (renqing) (Y. H. Huang, 2011). The Self is expressed through social structures in which both interaction and self-interested action take place. The rational component therefore is seen as important as the structural component (Zuo, 2002), because the latter overlooks self-interest in relationships and thus fails to reflect the significance of human agency (Y. H. Huang & Bedford, 2014).

Data generated from a survey of university students in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China using the DFRF (G. Wang & Y. H. Huang, 2015) lent support to its effectiveness in examining relationships in today’s Chinese societies. Despite some group differences that indicated the influence of socializing experiences and political movements, both the structural and the rational factors were regarded as highly important to respondents’ relationships, and there was no evidence showing that the two factors were dichotomous. Development of the DFRF may be in the preliminary stage, but the results were important to our discussion because of the scope of the framework, and also because they gave us a current account of the way Confucianism is professed in relationships in modern day Chinese societies. Without due respect to the dynamics of change, the task of interpreting incommensurability runs the risk of fossilizing traditions and ignoring diversity from within. Interpretation, therefore, does not end with putting incommensurability back to the historical and cultural context; in fact, it would be oversimplifying the matter if we assume that findings from studying Chinese relationships were always coherent.

From as early as 134 B.C., Confucianism retained its central position in Chinese culture mostly through the national examination system, but this necessary condition disappeared with the end of the system in 1904. As mentioned earlier in this article, since then, Westernization, modernization, colonization, and political movements such as the Cultural Revolution have all left their imprint on Chinese relationships. Changes, however, have hardly been unilinear, consistent, or revolutionary, and these characteristics have been reflected in empirical findings over the years. Relatively lower ratings on hierarchical order across regions in the DFRF survey (G. Wang & Y. H. Huang, 2015) were indicative of the influence of modern values such as equality. A similar decline of Confucian influence on family was found when fewer respondents in Taiwan gave it priority in making personal decisions (K. S. Yang, 1996). The traditional concept of family, however, was seen permeating modern institutions, when relationships in present-day firms in Taiwan and China were found to be patterned after that of a family (Lin, 2011). In other cases, the importance of traditional values was found to be rising or falling in survey results with political campaigns. ⁵ For example, “harmony,” another core value in Confucian teaching, was barely endorsed in China after the Cultural Revolution (Chu & Ju, 1993). In 2004, it was made the country’s strategic development, and in the DFRF survey (G. Wang & Y. H. Huang, 2015) in China, harmony came back as the most important structural element in relationships.

Despite signs of change and differences among Chinese societies, speaking overall, the results of empirical studies have left little room for us to suspect the existence of incommensurability between the concept of Chinese relationship and collectivism. As the next challenge for comparative researchers is to find a way to make effective comparisons, the following paragraphs will utilize the above findings to guide our effort in unlocking commensurability and locating the “cultural meeting points” that can help us to develop comparative frameworks in relationship research.

Self, Its Others, and How They Relate to Each Other: From Incommensurability to Commensurability and Comparability

The task of interpreting incommensurability in the Chinese relationship needs to begin with explaining Confucianism, as Confucianism clearly is not easily “translatable.” Dictionary definitions of Confucianism include ethical or philosophical systems, or ethical teachings; whereas in the relationship literature, it is more frequently understood as a set of “normative rules” or code of ethics that governs “the system of differentiations” (X. T. Fei, 1993). “Rules,” therefore, is the closest equivalence in the English language to denote the core meaning of Confucianism in terms of relationships.

In mainstream research, the term “relationship” has yet to become an area of investigation in its own right; there is however a growing body of literature on concepts and theories that border the many aspects of Chinese relationships. These include the theory of social distance, reciprocity (Chang, 2010; Sahlins, 1972), and social networks (Barnes, 1954; Malinowski, 1913) in social anthropology; social exchange (Emerson, 1981) and justice motive (Kayser & Schwinger, 1982; M. J. Lerner, 1981) in social psychology; analyses on social relations (Greenberg & Cohen, 1982) in psychology; and the structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) in sociology. Thanks to the quick rise of the Internet (Wasserman & Faust, 1994) and more recently, social media, personal ties, and virtual networks have also become a popular topic of research in information science, organization studies, communication research, and social psychology. This converging research interest has significantly facilitated the task of interpreting incommensurability, as similar sets of terminologies were often employed to discuss shared concerns and like observations.

In the theory of structuration, for example, rule is the key to understanding social positioning and social relations. According to Giddens (1984), social relations concern the “positioning” (p. 89) of individuals in a social space of categories and ties, and this positioning has to do with rules that specify rights and obligations of persons having particular social identity or belonging in a particular social category. Positioning thereby contextualizes social interactions and relationships.

The primary concern of the structuration theory is social change, not social relations; but Giddens’ argument shows that it is possible not only to understand Confucianism as a set of rules but also to find a common ground to share and exchange ideas and observations across the East–West boundary. Rather than using the individualism/collectivism scale on Chinese respondents or testing Confucian ethics on U.S. samples, it is now conceivable to compare aspects of relationships across societies that are governed by different types of normative rules and principles. This allows us to ask questions such as the nature and characteristics of such rules, the way they map out social positioning, to what extent they govern the way Self relates to its Others, and the nature of relationships they produce. Comparisons on such common ground can help bring a different perspective to an otherwise culture-centric observation. For example, relationalism, individualism, and collectivism all designate ways that individuals organize their priorities in relating to others, but in the literature, the binding influence of rules and norms is seldom mentioned in relation to individualist cultures. The freedom that individuals in an individualist culture enjoy in managing relationships does not, however, indicate the absence of rules or their binding influence. To the contrary, this freedom is defined, protected but also limited by the civic codes of ethics. Respect for privacy, for example, is part of the normative rules that set out boundaries that even those in the closest of relationships are not to trespass. Normative rules in a system or culture, therefore, may cover aspects of relationships that are not covered by another set of rules, and cast an influence over social positioning that is not matched elsewhere, but human relationships are inherently governed by rules, thus making it possible for us to compare differences and similarities across borders and boundaries. As relationships are typically governed by more than one set of normative rules, for example, civic, religious, institutional, and traditional codes of ethics, the use of such a conceptual axis also allows us to discuss crucial issues arising from changes and exchanges in this increasingly global world.

In addition to a conceptual axis of comparisons, meeting points can be identified at the paradigmatic level. The importance of both the structure and agency in explaining social interactions and relationships—a major feature of the conceptualization of Chinese relationships as reflected in DFRF (Huang & Bedford, 2014)—is also mirrored in the structuration theory (Giddens, 1984; Granovetter, 1985; Y. H. Huang, 2011; Mizruchi, 1992, 1994; Zuo, 2002). Critical of the deeply entrenched dualism in social theory, Giddens has sought to overcome the dichotomy of subject and object, statics and dynamics (Archer, 2010), but most of all, structure and agency in the structuration theory (Bernstein, 1989). Rather than dwelling on the primacy of either structure or agency over the other, in structuration theory, “individual” and “society” are reconceptualized as the duality of agency and structure (Giddens, 1984, p. 162). Structure, in this definition, is not external to individuals; it is in a sense more internal than exterior to their activities, as memory traces, and as instantiated in social practices (Giddens, 1984). ⁶

The structuration theory represents a major attempt to reconcile the long-standing debate over the primacy of either structure or agency over the other in social change. Giddens is however not the first one to be critical of the dualistic approach (Archer, 2010; Bernstein, 1989; Blau, 1976; Blau & Merton, 1981; Cohen, 1968); he is not the only one to try reunite the two, either. ⁷ In fact, the arguments against the oscillation between an obsession with isolated agents and a fascination with dissolving agents into structures (Bernstein, 1989) reflect a paradigm issue—one that is rooted in not only dualist thinking but also the dialectics tradition of Western discourse. The Chinese relationship, however, has its root in the yinyang worldview that sees the ultimate reunion of man and nature, and individuals and society. From this perspective, the Chinese individual/agent is not the same as the Euro-American individual/agent; this does not however undercut the significance of the convergence of structuration theory and DFRF on the importance of both the structure and agency. For the purpose of our discussion, the most important point to be learned from this example is not that there exist similar observations in different knowledge paradigms, but that it is possible to formulate a basis for dialogues and comparisons with the help of vocabularies with equivalent meaning, common experiences, and shared concerns and observations. Conceptual commensurability, therefore, is achieved through a thorough investigation of the incommensurable, rather than ignoring it. It is on such ground that the indigenous features of the DFRF can conceivably turn the framework into a gateway to general analyses.

Another interesting example of such “cultural meeting points” is the recent debate on the “Chineseness” of guanxi. Unlike earlier research on Chinese relationships, those who took first and keenest interest in guanxi were not Chinese academics, but business consultants and representatives of transnationals scrambling to get a foothold in the lucrative Chinese market when China was reopened to the world after the Cultural Revolution. The choice of using a transliteration to denote something so similar to “Chinese relationship” ⁸ shows that there was an intention to underscore a strictly “Chinese” feature, a particular dynamic of personal networks that is incommensurable and not translatable to other languages. This background also explains the reason why guanxi research has focused on the instrumental value of present-day Chinese relationships ⁹ and the way it works as a valuable resource in Chinese business organizations. In a number of studies, guanxi has even been used to unlock the mystery behind the entrepreneurial energy of Chinese capitalism (Gold et al., 2002).

Despite this “culture-specific” nature of guanxi research, the “cultural identity” of guanxi has recently been questioned: Can it claim to be uniquely Chinese, or not much more than the Chinese version of social capital (Dunning & Kim, 2007; Gold et al., 2002; G. Wang & Liu, 2010)? The question was raised in view of the close resemblance between the core ideas of social capital: “social networks have value” (Putnam, 2001) and the focal attention on “relationships as tradable resources” in guanxi research. Similarities between the two however end here. With background in social participation and civic engagement, the theory of social capital is often discussed in relation to democracy, trust in public institutions, and productivity (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Putnam, 2001; Schultz, 2002). Although it is something that actors pursue and attempt to accumulate, it is not a characteristic of individual agents, but “inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors” (McLean, Schultz, & Steger, 2002, p. 6). As a public good or the aggregate of resources linked to a network of relationships, it provides the backing for the collectivity-owned capital. Unlike guanxi, it is something that people may utilize “even when they are not well connected themselves” (Gold, Guthrie, & Wank, 2002; McLean, Schultz, & Steger, 2002, p. 6). Guanxi, as is understood today, reflects mistrust rather than trust of public institutions; emphasizes the implicit, personal benefit versus the explicit social good that social networks may bring; and aspires to instrumental purposes rather than achieving social goals.

From the above discussion, “relationships as resources” has emerged as another viable conceptual axis that can be useful for comparing relationships across cultures. However, the incommensurable differences between the two concepts—for example, the nature of the value attached to relationships and the ways and circumstances under which social networks are utilized—also shed light on areas that are overlooked by one concept versus the other, and help expand our theoretical knowledge. In other words, when given a proper place in the analysis, incommensurable differences can be the very reason why comparative research should “open our eyes to new perspectives and enrich our theoretical knowledge” (Blumler, McLeod, & Rosengren, 1992, p. 8).

The intertwining differences and similarities between guanxi and social capital are evidence for the intricacies and complexities involved in the way incommensurability and commensurability are connected. There can be no simple answer to the question of “Chineseness” of guanxi; there are differences in similarities, just as there are similarities in differences. A viable comparative framework, therefore, must go beyond a particular cultural context to find the key “meeting point(s)” of those being compared.

Conclusion

By using research on Chinese relationships as an example, this study has demonstrated how it is possible to arrive at commensurable grounds through thorough investigations of the unique and the incommensurable. The case shows how “cultural meeting points” and conceptual axes for comparisons emerge from the process of interpreting incommensurable differences. The task may look daunting, as in the present-day world of academia, it is inconceivable for any single individual or even a group of researchers to think of accomplishing what took Chinese researchers decades of collective efforts to achieve in relationship research. The scale and scope of the task are not however the concern; called for here, are awareness of the existence of incommensurabilities underlying concepts and theories and new ways to conceptualize generality and particularity.

The contextuality of concepts and theories, therefore, does not need to become an obstacle to advancing comparative research across cultures, unless their presence is ignored. A major problem with the current practice of theory testing across cultures is that underlying incommensurability, notably the preconditions and preconceptions that contextualize concepts and theories, does not enter the process of hypothesis testing, but in actuality is an important part of the “package.” When hypotheses are supported, the underlying preconditions and preconceptions are assumed to hold true in the other social and cultural systems when in fact they may not be. When hypotheses are not supported, researchers often attribute failures to the execution of the study, or as is more frequently seen in theory testing in third world nations, to the development stage of the society (G. Wang, 2014), thus leaving underlying incommensurabilities intact.

A second factor that has kept conceptual contextuality locked in Pandora’s box is the dualistic paradigm that scientific research tends to follow. As mentioned earlier in this article, once incommensurability and commensurability, differences and similarity, particularity and generality are locked in the two extremes of an either-or model, the paired concepts will necessarily compete against one another in theoretical discussions. However, as was shown by our analyses of Chinese relationship research, when these contrasting concepts are released from the dualistic model, it is both conceptually viable and in actual practice possible to develop a basis for meaningful comparison by combing through the incommensurable. Understanding of the complexities involved in the way similarities are connected with differences decides whether we can “take full advantage of the new perspective and sources of raw materials that comparative research brings” to expand and deepen our theoretical knowledge—also an important objective of comparative research (Blumler, McLeod, & Rosengren, 1992, p. 7).

To achieve the goals of scientific inquiries in comparative research, therefore, requires not only contextual sensitivity at the methodological level but also sensitivity at the conceptual level. Although more evidence will help further develop the I/C framework, the implications of such an approach to comparative research are difficult to ignore—especially when a viable solution to the paradoxes of particularizing generality is called for.