Abstract
This study explores the experiences of marital violence within the context of microfinance participation among a sample of women living in poverty in Bangladesh. Status inconsistency theory suggests that the higher incomes and female independence that may occur with microfinance participation may threaten or destabilize marital norms in Bangladesh, and have implications in terms of increased violence. We use qualitative data from in-depth interviews with 30 women residing in a slum in Dhaka, Bangladesh, to assess the circumstances in which there may be an association between microfinance participation and marital violence and elucidate the context in which this interaction occurs.
Microfinance programs provide small loans to poor women to operate self-owned businesses, among other services. Microfinance participation has dramatically altered access of poor households to pools of capital and credit in Bangladesh (Roodman, 2013). Traditionally, poor households were a group that failed to utilize credit options for a host of reasons: high costs, high risks, low saving propensities, and lack of capital to put up as collateral. The advent of microfinance changed that in Bangladesh; the program is now accessed by 30 million low-income women (Kabeer, 2005; Lachman, 2011; Hashemi, Schuler, & Riley, 1996). Microfinance loans in Bangladesh are primarily available to women; pilot program research found that women were more likely than men to spend their added income on their children and on meeting basic household needs (Pitt & Khandker, 1998; Pitt, Khandker, & Cartwright, 2006). In addition to its anti-poverty goal, microfinance programs also aim to promote gender equality and social and economic empowerment of women (Yunus, 2003).
Bangladesh is a country in which patriarchal norms and traditional gender roles are strong. Most marriages are arranged by parents or extended family, and women are typically solely responsible for children, cooking, and housework (Amin, 1996; Amin, Becker, & Bayes, 1998; Amin, Rai, & Topa, 2003; Kabeer, 2005). Rates of domestic and marital violence in the country are very high; a range of studies using quantitative and qualitative methods have provided estimates of women ever experiencing physical violence, emotional violence, and sexual violence as ranging from 32-72%, with an average of 50% (Bates, Schuler, Islam, & Islam, 2004; Chin, 2012; Garcia-Moreno, Jansen, Ellsberg, Heise, & Watts, 2006; Hadi, 2000; M. E. Khan, Rob, & Hossain, 2001; Koenig, Ahmed, Hossain, & Mozumder, 2003; Murshid, Akincigil, & Zippay, 2016; Pitt et al., 2006; M. Rahman, Hoque, & Makinoda, 2011; Sambisa, Angeles, Lance, Naved, & Thornton, 2011; Schuler, Hashemi, Riley, & Akhter, 1996; Schuler & Islam, 2008; Steele, Amin, & Naved, 1998).
Microfinance participation in Bangladesh—by its nature—increases women’s autonomy to various degrees as they choose a business model, operate the enterprise, and generate self-earned income through enterprises such as seamstresses, tea stalls, and fruit vending. There has long been speculation regarding how microfinance participation might affect marital power relations and violence and whether the changed status and increased independence of women who participate in microfinance pose a threat within a marital relationship that exacerbates violence (Chin, 2012; Gomez & Santor, 2001; Kabeer, 2001; Kabeer, 2005; Karim, 2008). Several studies, most using non-representative samples, have yielded mixed results: Some find that microfinance participation is associated with higher levels of violence, some find a decrease, and some indicate no change (Ahmed, 2005; Bates et al., 2004; Chin, 2012; Goetz & Sen Gupta, 1996; Hussain, 1996; Kabeer, 2001; M. R. Khan, Ahmed, Bhuiya, & Chowdhury, 1998; Koenig et al., 2003; Naved & Persson, 2005; A. Rahman, 1999; Hashemi, Schuler, & Riley, 1996). A recent analysis of the nationally representative Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey (BDHS) 2007 found no association between microfinance participation and marital violence for the overall sample, but did find an association between marital violence and microfinance participation among poor women who had higher levels of material assets (Murshid et al., 2016).
We have little understanding of the “why” behind the numbers in these inconsistent findings, and in-depth qualitative studies present an opportunity to add to this knowledge base to generate hypotheses and suggest areas for further study. This article reports the results of in-depth interviews with 30 microfinance participants in Dhaka, Bangladesh, to explore with them their experiences of microfinance participation and marital violence. Microfinance programs are a cornerstone of anti-poverty efforts in Bangladesh and other developing countries; examining the relational—in addition to economic—effects of a program that is accessed by millions of women is critical to understanding the ramifications of the program on the health and well-being of families.
Theoretical Framework
Status inconsistency theory is used to understand the ways in which microfinance participation and access to capital and business enterprises might involve status changes among recipients, with varied consequences, particularly within the marital dyad (Goode, 1960; Hornung, 1977; Lenski, 1956; Yick, 2001). This theory suggests that status differentials lead to dysfunctional behavior when an individual who expects to have higher status in a relationship is threatened by the increase in status of another. It is suggested that individuals may face an imbalance when they have high status on one dimension and low status on another dimension. This imbalance may occur within an individual, as, for example, when a person has educational attainment that is not commensurate with their job status. These imbalances may also occur within a relationship, as, for example, when one partner has considerably higher earned income than the other (Brandon, 1965; Choi & Ting, 2008; Geschwender, 1968; Goffman, 1957; Hartman, 1974; Jackson, 1962; Lenski, 1956; Meile & Haese, 1969; Stryker & Macke, 1978). An assumption of status inconsistency theory is that both subjective and objective measures of status inconsistency can be used, so that both perceived inconsistency and actual inconsistency are taken into account. For status inconsistency to have an effect on behaviors, there must be discomfort associated with the imbalanced status (Baer, Eitzen, Duprey, Thompson, & Cole, 1976). Status inconsistencies arise due to achievable socioeconomic variables such as occupation, education, and income, as well as ascribed status variables such as race, ethnicity, and religion. Status differentials have been measured as differences in age, income, occupation, education, and prestige by scholars who have applied the theory to a variety of situations including marital functioning (Gong, 2007; Heames, Harvey, & Treadway, 2006; Hope, 1975; Hornung, 1977; Qian, 1998; Qian & Preston, 1993). In the current study, the status differential, that is, status characteristics, is assessed in terms of microfinance participation (women have access to microfinance, their husbands do not). An assumption of the theory is that statuses that are delineated as inconsistent are “psychologically stressful” and may result in a “stress reducing behavioral or attitudinal response” (Hornung, 1977, p. 624; Murshid et al., 2016; Pearlin, 1975). In the context of this study, we explore whether women who become business owners via microfinance participation experience marital tension or violence associated with that increase in economic status, as indicated in quantitative studies (Murshid et al., 2016).
Method
The study was conducted using in-depth interviews with 30 women from Dhaka, Bangladesh, who were participants in microfinance programs. The process of data collection involved eliciting the personal narratives of microfinance participants to gain understanding of the context of microfinance participation, and how it affected their personal and familial lives, their relationships with their husbands, and their experiences of marital violence.
Sample, Sampling Strategy, and Recruitment
The sample pool included ever-married women aged 18-45 years who resided in a particularly dense high poverty—or slum—area in Dhaka, purposefully selected because it is one of the largest slums in the city. Purposeful sampling methods were employed to select respondents who accessed microfinance. Sample recruitment was facilitated through a non-profit organization—Shabab Murshid Development Foundation—that works with schools in high poverty slum neighborhoods. Their director identified a schoolteacher who was well connected in a particularly dense slum area. He knew parents of the children of the slum school in which he taught and was able to identify community members who accessed microfinance. Using a “known sponsor” approach (Patton, 2002), the teacher, on behalf of the study Principal Investigator (PI), communicated with women in the community, asking them if they would agree to be an interview participant. Upon their verbal consent, they were asked to meet the research team at a time of their choice at the school, where the PI obtained consent and conducted the interviews. The school was chosen as a meeting place so that the setting of the interview was familiar to the respondents (Glaser & Strauss, 1999; Patton, 2002).
All of the women were currently married. None was ever divorced, and all of them had children, though of varying ages ranging from 5-30 years.
Data collection
The PI and a research assistant met each respondent at the school, described the study, and gained their oral consent to participate. The protocol involved gaining oral consent because it was expected that most of the study participants would not be able to read. Upon consent, most of the respondents agreed to sit for the interview at the time of oral consent. For those who did not, a time convenient to the participant was scheduled to conduct the interview at the school at a later date. All individuals who were contacted and asked to be part of the study gave consent, yielding a response rate of 100%. The interviews were conducted in July and August 2012, which coincided with the Arabic month of Ramadan. The PI who conducted the interviews is originally from Dhaka, and fluent in Bengali, the language in which the interviews were conducted.
The interviews took, on average, 90 minutes to conduct. Each interview was conducted by the PI in the Bengali language and recorded in Bengali by a research assistant. The PI typed notes in English on a laptop computer to account for body language, presence of others (such as their children), and paraphrasing details of the interview. The interview protocol was approved by Rutgers University Institutional Review Board (IRB). As per IRB regulations, the PI had an address of a legal organization that provides shelter for women experiencing violence, the Bangladesh National Women Lawyers Association (BNWLA), to provide to the respondents if needed or requested. To protect the identity of the respondents, we changed the names of the respondents when reporting results.
Questionnaire
An open-ended, semi-structured format of questioning was used to elicit personal experiences with microfinance participation, family and marital relationships, and marital violence. The interview guide consisted of 10 broad questions, with probes. Additional probes were used as needed to elicit rich descriptions. Open-ended questions were used to gather information on how the women in the study sample came about accessing microfinance; the projects in which they invested their money; their experiences of gaining financial leverage; the reasons for which they accessed microfinance; the effect it had on their relationship with their husbands, their family members, friends, and the lending group to which they belonged; and how they dealt with the changes. Respondents were asked about their experiences with marital violence, its association with microfinance participation, and their status in the household as a result of their access to credit. Questions were asked about status inconsistencies between themselves and their husbands, and how that affects their lives.
Data analysis structure
Each interview was transcribed by the PI from Bengali to English and the transcripts were analyzed using a mix of case analysis and cross-case analysis. The interviews were first analyzed as individual case studies and served as the reference point; the transcripts were then compared and contrasted for commonalities and differences between respondents using cross-case analysis. The initial process involved analyzing individual stories or cases to begin to conceptualize and understand the ways in which they were interlinked; then, based on sensitizing concepts, the cross-case analysis involved discovering and noting the similarities and differences in each domain: microfinance participation, marital relations, and marital violence. The analysis was conducted using a hybrid form of thematic analysis that utilized both a data-driven inductive approach and an a priori deductive approach of identifying themes. The questions on the semi-structured survey served as initial sensitizing concepts, and then the concepts that arose inductively from the interviews were coded. In other words, the sensitizing concepts guided the initial coding of the data, and subsequent coding followed an inductive process. The qualitative data analysis software, Atlas.ti, was used to manage and code the data.
The first step of data analysis involved developing a code manual based on sensitizing concepts by creating codes based on the a priori research questions that categorized the data according to the main concepts of microfinance participation, marital violence, marital and family relations, and perceived ramifications of microfinance participation on marital violence, among others. Subsequently, we open coded the textual data to identify other concepts that emerged unanticipated from the data (e.g., issues related to children including education and child care; and experiences with poverty and inadequate food, clothing, and shelter). A third step involved axial coding and identification of conceptual linkages by noting emerging sub-categories and the connections among other coded categories and domains. For example, we examined subgroups of women who reported that their microfinance participation was associated with an increase in marital violence, a decrease in violence, and no difference, and the various contextual factors and rationales associated with these reports. The women’s responses to questions about their experience with microfinance are presented in this article in their translated (not transliterated) form. The probes used to elicit rich descriptions and details have been omitted for clarity and space. All respondent names used in this article are pseudonyms.
Results
The Setting: Dhaka “Bosti”
From a distance, it looks like a very cramped campground, where people have set up tents right next to each other. On approach, one is in the midst of a pulsating ambience—a din of voices and myriad activities; vibrant visual assaults of colors of billboards; assorted food stalls with vendors peddling their fares, an open-air bazaar; a surge of people of all ages, flowing endlessly in and around the dwellings, going about their work or chores. But, as one gets closer to the grounds, the chimera of the “campground atmosphere” gives way to dirty paths, with makeshift tents made from used jute and plastic bags, polythene covers, old vinyl billboard wrappers, bamboo mats, and all kinds of recyclable semi-durable materials, hanging precariously from bamboo frames that create dwelling “rooms.” An average of five people dwell in these rooms: typically, a husband and his wife with their family, sometimes a grandparent, or maybe another relative who has come from a village. Many, about a 100, such tents crammed next to one another form a “bosti,” as slums are called in Bangladesh. The average room rental is BDT 2,000 (US$25) a month.
It is in these tents that the respondents of this qualitative study live and from which they operate their micro businesses. Each of the 30 enterprising individuals that we met, in a school in the slum where the interviews were conducted, shared a part of their lives with the interviewers. We had envisioned conducting the interviews at their residences, but that was not feasible, not just because of lack of space, but due to lack of privacy. Even if we were to talk alone in the rooms, the conversations would carry to the neighbors given the close proximity of the hovels.
The people who live in the slum are all poor, even though there are within-group differences in levels of income and material goods; some own television sets, radio sets, bicycles, beds, and shoes, while others do not. Similarly, there are within-group differences in the types of residences in which they live—some have mud floors and ceilings made of bamboo mats, while others have discarded plastic billboards as roofs and floors. This disparity, which is seemingly marginal, is in reality the difference between families that are considered to be better off economically (with more visible material assets) and those who are the most poor, within that group.
All of the women in the sample were married, and they ranged in age from 18-45. All of them had children, and the children ranged in age from 5-30 years.
Microfinance Businesses
The 30 women operated a variety of small enterprises with their microfinance loans: snack shops, tea stalls, vegetable and fruit vending, and garment makers. Some of the women ran the businesses jointly with their husbands; one woman purchased a rickshaw with her loan, which her husband operated. The income from these small businesses did not lift the families of these women out of poverty. Rather, it typically eased the depth of their poverty, and provided extra money for food, clothing, and household items. A large majority of the respondents, such as Samina, reported a positive change in the basic standard of living: Now . . . I can provide my family with food on a daily basis. I am not working the streets as a beggar. I am not going crazy trying to fend for my children and myself during bad weather. I can send my children to school; I am not dependent on the income they bring in as beggars. I am able to clothe them. I can live a normal life . . .
Running their businesses also meant that the women were more likely to be out of the house and making their own decisions regarding the operations of their businesses, and potentially have more self-earned income at their disposal. It was that evolving status that led us to inquire whether they perceived that their participation in microfinance had changed the nature of the dynamics within their household, given traditions of patriarchy.
Experiences of Marital Violence
Every one of the 30 women interviewed reported experiences with verbal and/or physical marital violence, of different levels, and in varying contexts. In describing this violence, they volunteered a wide range of reasons and justifications—both internal and external to their family and household—for verbal and physical assaults. For example, Asha, one of the women who reported comparatively low levels of violence, said, He brings his problems with the world to me, I get to see his anger, and he takes it out on me. But, that is more verbal. He hits me only when he feels I am neglecting the children. For example, my son got sick, and he said it was my fault because I fed him in front of other people who gave him the “evil eye.”
This 26-year-old woman with a cosmetic microfinance business was the only one who reported not having an “arranged marriage,” that is, a marriage orchestrated by parents and relatives. However, it seemed that with this came pressure to remain in a marriage that she had fought for, even when their relationship had started to go awry.
We got married because we fell in love. It was not arranged by my family . . . I chose my own husband. So, I try to be understanding of his anger when he gets mad at me, because if things go wrong, as in if he leaves [me], they will say it’s my fault. They [my family] would say I should not have married someone of my own choice.
The notion that she had to accept the violence in her life because she chose to marry her husband was not only imposed on her, it was what she took upon herself as her own responsibility.
Others echoed similar notions of life stressors that had violent manifestations in the household. Often, chronic poverty seemed to be the source: There was a time when he wasn’t working. So he took money from someone, BDT 200 [US$2.25]. He was in debt. And the creditor wanted the money back. Then he got mad. And, he came home and hit me. Hit my head. Usually it is just that—he takes out other people’s anger on me. We live in poverty so there are problems related to that. Today, for example, I was complaining about how my husband doesn’t do anything and I am raising the kids, and I said I want a bed. He got upset and hit me because we don’t have enough money to buy that.
Among the respondents who reported high levels of violence was a woman named Fatima, who blamed her mother-in-law for the violence in her life.
He [my husband] beats me almost every day. My mother-in-law causes a lot of problems for me by instigating him against me, telling him that I am not a good wife, that I ignore her or don’t feed her well enough, and he gets mad at me for “treating her badly” and “misbehaving” with her and beats me up. I understand she is his mother and he is protective of her, and when he thinks I am starving her on purpose he gets mad. Truth is, we don’t always have enough food for everyone.
Fatima alluded to issues that often come with living in a joint-family structure (which used to be the norm but is quickly becoming less common) amid poverty and scarcity. In this structure, children are seen as “social security” who are expected to grow up to take care of the parents, which often entails everyone living together in close quarters. And in that environment, violence is sometimes justified by family members as a tool of reprimand, although the presence of family members in joint-family structures may also mitigate extreme forms violence (S. Amin, 1998).
Laila, a vegetable vendor, said her husband had the right to beat her if she did anything wrong, suggesting that there was a considerable amount of “justified” violence taking place in her life. However, she also identified times when it was not justified: Violence is not always justified. For example, my husband hit me when my daughter had typhoid as if it was my fault that she got typhoid. He didn’t allow me to take her to the doctor and as a result she is handicapped [unable to walk]. How is that my fault? But he says it is, and so does his family members.
Others, such as Tara, suggested that it was because of the different expectations they had from each other that they got into fights, which sometimes turned violent.
We have differences in terms of what we want in life. He just wants to have fun. For example, he frequently sleeps around with other women. In addition, he has very archaic ideas about educating our daughters. In fact, he himself never went to school. On the other hand, I want the kids to learn new things, be educated. Because there are so many points of disagreement, we fight and sometimes he slaps me during those fights.
One of the older respondents suggested that her age was related to diminished abuse over time, saying, “We’re old now, we don’t fight, there is no violence.” As for reasons as to why older women were less likely to be abused, respondents suggested that women’s status increased as they aged. As one said, As an older woman I am seen as wise, I garner more respect, [younger men and women in the community] look up to me. And no one hits a respected woman, including my husband. As I grew older, my husband gave me more respect as well, thought my opinions mattered more as I had seen more of the world.
Others said this was particularly true if they birthed male children.
When I was older, and became a mother of a boy, my respect in the family increased. My husband and his parents rewarded me by not beating me, I guess, for bearing a male child, someone to carry their genes, bongshoporompora.
Still others claimed it was their husbands’ disinterest in them that led to reduced violence: Maybe he got bored of me. He used to hit me after we got married, because he would be jealous of other men, and he wanted all of my attention. Now, it’s not that way anymore. He doesn’t get jealous, nor does he beat me.
Across these in-person interviews, marital violence was found to be a complex problem that manifested itself in many different ways within the sample. The women reported various types, levels, and rationales for violence. It appeared that many regarded the violence as normative to various degrees, as evidenced by their spoken words, facial reactions, body language, and inflections—which were often resigned rather than angry or defiant. Many women talked about the violence in their lives as causing pain on one hand, but something that they have accepted as fate, on the other. Phrases such as “just a slap” and “he beats me only once in a while” were commonplace, even when some of their eyes welled up with tears while talking about it. Most of the women conveyed through their comments that violence was an expected facet of marriage, and some accepted self-blame. Sharifa commented on its normative nature, “He slaps me once in a while, it’s no big deal. These things happen in marriages.”
An example of someone who blamed herself for the violence was Lamia. She said, “If we neglect household chores, [we] will get beaten up. If we ignore those chores knowing that we will get beaten up, it is really our fault.”
Microfinance Participation and Marital Violence
We asked women directly if their participation in microfinance had an impact on their marital relationship, and on violence within the relationship. About a third reported that the violence was exacerbated by their participation in microfinance, about a third said that the violence decreased after they got involved in microfinance, and about a third said there was no difference.
Among those who reported an increase was Amena. She said, “I think my husband has been more violent towards me in the recent past than he was before. He accuses me of not wanting to spend time with him, and hits me when I argue that he’s wrong.” It appeared that the time she spent away from the home made him angry, which was a big change from when she used to be a homemaker and was readily available at all times. “It [operating my business] means I’m not always there to make him food, or be there for him when he wants me to, and maybe that’s what upsets him,” said Amena.
Faiza had a similar observation: Staying away from home and working allows me and my family to have more income but it means I have little time for household chores which means I have to do everything in a short period of time and am unable to do it as well as I used to when I had all day to do it. This makes my husband angry who complains about the quality of my household chores . . . like his shirt not being clean enough or the food not tasting as good.
About another third reported that violence decreased after microfinance was accessed. Sarah was one of those who reported reduced violence. “I have no real complaints anymore about the violence. He doesn’t try to hurt me anymore. I think it’s because he thinks I don’t deserve to be beaten up because I work so hard!”
In other families, more time away from home was given as the reason that violence decreased, because of the practical reality that the spouses did not see each other as frequently. For example, Sheuli said, “I am away from the house more often as a result of my business outside the house, so maybe that contributes to less violence—I did not spend enough time at home to have as many interactions.”
Others saw a decline in violence in their lives when their husbands were more appreciative of their abilities. Yet, others such as Sarah suggested that improvements in her own status gave her more “power” to assert herself: “I am able to stand up for myself when he hits me—I can say that this is wrong and you can’t beat me,” she said. But she alluded that this assertion often increased the intensity of the violence in those particular moments, but she believed it worked to reduce the frequency of violence.
Shaila, another woman who noted a decrease in violence, also described a change in the way she responded to her husband, “I feel I am better able to represent myself and my thoughts, I am more confident of my own ideas and my worth as a person. I can tell him what I really think without fear of retribution.” This ability to assert herself did not result in violence being perpetrated against Shaila, as status inconsistency theory might suggest, but, according to Shaila, earned her respect because she was an income earning individual; with increased respect, the violence perpetrated against her decreased. “I think it is because he thinks—what will happen to us financially if I stop working?—that he hits me less. Who knows?” she said.
Others, such as Amiya, suggested that the levels of violence had not changed, but that the reasons for its perpetration shifted as different issues came into play.
Now it’s a lot more shouting, a lot of verbal attacks about my jobs and my business. He even accuses me of having liaisons with other men at work or at my place of business. I don’t think he actually thinks it, but he likes making me feel bad. He also tries to guilt me with statements like, “You don’t give me much time anymore.” I am doing what I am doing for the family. I am making sure I can repay the loan. I am making sure there is food on the table. But sometimes, he just seems to forget all about that.
We asked the respondents if they sought microfinance loans as a way to escape or cope with violent marital relationships. The question was usually met with puzzlement by the respondents, or deflected with references to poverty. Their responses indicated that violence was normalized, and leaving the abuse did not form a conscious part of their decision-making process. “I took the loans to fight poverty, nothing else. I didn’t have food to eat. My family was starving. I couldn’t get a job in this economy. I took the loan to feed our starving bodies,” said Lamia. Farah was more specific: The violence had nothing to do with me trying to get a loan. I didn’t like getting beaten up, that’s true. But these things happen in marriages. I had bigger problems. By leaving, I would only increase the number of problems in my life. Where would I go? Starting fresh on your own isn’t easy when you’re a pauper.
Other women echoed what emerged as the primary motivation of pursuing microfinance loans: increasing income to meet basic needs, and to better the lives of their children.
I had enough of being poor, trying to make ends meet on nothing. We moved from the village to Dhaka for a better life but there were no jobs for us. And that is when I thought about taking a loan and starting a business. He used to hit me after we got married. He wanted dowry and complained that we didn’t get anything from my parents that were worth a lot [of money]. I was not very educated. I wasn’t pretty. He stopped beating me later, when my daughter was born sick. When they told us she was sick, he stopped beating me. I accessed microfinance around that time; I had to find ways to look after my daughter.
Intersections of Poverty, Microfinance Participation, and Marital Violence
As reflected in many of the comments cited above, our conversations with the women from Dhaka indicated that the topics of microfinance participation, poverty, and marital violence were often interwoven throughout the responses to our inquiries; they were seldom discussed as separate topics. The account of Zara, one the respondents, is provided below, as it captures vividly the ways in which these issues intersected in their narratives.
Zara’s story
My husband beat me, not to death, but to the point when I thought I was going to die. Why did he beat you up like this? What did you do? Those are the questions that my family and friends asked. They wanted to know what instigated the beating, what the other side of the story was. The other side of the story is perhaps that we are very, very poor. But that doesn’t mean we don’t have wants and needs. I asked for a new sari because the one I was wearing everyday had become torn and tattered, I felt embarrassed to be seen by other people. Phokirni [beggar] people called me. So, when I wanted a new sari he hit me. He accused me of not earning an income, relying on him, being a dependence cow. He bad-mouthed my parents for not giving him enough dowry. I was lucky that I looked good, he said, because if I weren’t good looking, he would have left me a long time ago. All because of a sari? Someone asked me. That made me upset. And then my next door neighbor who is like an aunt to me told me to have patience, and told me about microfinance. It’s not the sari, she said, it’s “obhaaber shongshar” [scarcity of resources in the family] that is the problem. She said, “he [my husband] feels bad that he can’t provide for you and take care of you and reacts with violence because of that.” Her words were wise, and I took her advice, and went to Worldvision for a loan.
This is Zara’s account of the structural context in which violence occurred in her life. She had a difficult, poverty-stricken childhood, growing up with four siblings, “four other mouths to feed,” as she had put it. They never had enough to eat, nor did they go to school. They worked as beggars; sometimes they were rented off to other people by their parents to help them with manual work, such as breaking bricks or carrying suitcases at train stations. Her life did not change much when her parents married her off at the age of 16 to someone who was considerably older. It was supposed to bring joy and happiness to her life, she said. Instead, she felt like she was “stuck in hell.” She explained, At least at my father’s house, I could do as I wished. In my newly married life, I was sometimes treated like a child and sometimes an adult, whichever suited them in different situations, “them” being my husband and my in-laws, with whom we lived.
It was years later that Zara’s neighbor suggested that she access microfinance to help out with the family’s finances. She had agreed readily, she recalled, dreaming about a future that would be in her own hands. It is that dream that helped her, Zara claimed, because she could take steps to reach that goal of escaping poverty, being independent, doing things that she deemed important for herself and her family.
When I went to Worldvision, I was a little scared. Actually, very scared. What if they turn me down? I made a plan that I thought would work, I told them that I want to sell vegetables and that my husband would be a part of that business. My husband was excited too. But I could access the loan, not him, so I had to go alone. They listened to me, asked questions about the business operations, and then approved my loan! It was a great day for us. I was worthy of being given money. My idea was worth investing in. I felt really good. It gave me hope, and it gave me strength, and it gave me a sense of belief in myself.
In Zara’s case, the violence abated after she started operating her business. “Maybe because we were too busy,” she had laughed during the interview. But it did not completely dissipate; there were a few incidents a month that she could recall that included violence. In such situations, she said she left the slum and gave him time to cool off. She would come back later and they would both pretend it did not happen.
Multiple Sources of Income
About one third of the women that we interviewed had multiple sources of income, which came from employment in addition to owning a microfinance business. They worked, for example, as domestic help at someone’s house, or at a garment factory, or at schools as maids, or they accessed multiple loans. Women with multiple sources of income reported the highest income in the sample of 30 women. As such, they had more material assets such as bicycles, televisions, and slum rooms made of mud. Many of these women worked for cash income before accessing microfinance, and started a micro business to earn additional income. Once they started their businesses, most of them retained their previous jobs in some capacity.
I used to work at the garments factory, and it paid well enough, but I wanted to spend more time at home while earning additional income. So, I acquired a loan that would help me run a tailoring business from my own home. So now, I sew clothes not only part-time at the garments factory but also at home as a tailor.
Notably, about three quarters of the respondents with higher income reported that they experienced increased violence when they accessed microfinance.
I think the violence increased in my case because I was more independent. He liked the additional income but accused me of going out to have fun when I was going to work and that often would result in physical violence.
Alia also noted that violence was provoked by increased time away from home: He gets more upset these days because I am away a lot, he accuses me of neglecting the children, not making him his favorite meals and all that. I don’t have the time, what can I do. He hits me when he gets upset like that. It’s not bad, really. It hurts for a little while and then goes away.
It was also evident from the interviews that the reasons for which violence was perpetrated against the women were sometimes different based on their experiences with earned income that was associated with their autonomy and independence. For microfinance recipients who had other sources of income, microfinance was an additional resource; they were already independent to some degree (because of their employment) even before they became businesswomen. In essence, microfinance participation served to enhance the level of freedom they already had, and perhaps that extra step was beyond the threshold that the husbands accepted, which resulted in perpetration of violence. “He doesn’t understand why I need to be a businesswoman now. Doesn’t he give me enough? He asks me. Can anyone ever have everything they want? I respond. Those arguments never go well and he ends up hitting me.” It, as such, appeared as if there was an “optimal” level of freedom, above which women were at risk of being abused. As Shala said, He used to hit me when I was a worker at a garments factory, but he liked the income I brought in. With microfinance, I bring in additional income, and he likes that too. But now he also hates me. I feel he thinks I think too much of myself now that I’m a businesswoman. And he hits me because of it.
Others indicated that even though microfinance participation created problems between them and their husbands in the beginning, things smoothed over in the long run when the husbands were made part of the businesses, and they saw the benefits that microfinance participation brought to their families.
My husband is usually supportive, but when I wanted to access microfinance, he wanted to know if I was doing it because all my friends were, or because I wanted to spend more time away from home, because we don’t really need it to meet basic needs. I tried to explain that it would increase our choices, give us more comfort, but he held on to the idea that money makes people corrupt. Now he is better, understands that the additional income is not a bad idea, but that’s because he also runs the business. He was violent in the beginning when I was talking about the loan, but once we started running the business together, it was fine.
However, those with lower income often had other, more basic battles to fight: food on the table, clothes to wear, taking care of the children. As such, the sets of problems were often different among women with varying levels of income. When women were extremely poor, the qualitative data suggested, the omnipresent problems were about survival, not gender differences and expectations between partners. As Seema said, We are too poor to fight with each other; our fight is against poverty. There’s nothing to be gained by quarreling with each other, I think we both know that. When you starve, other things are not important. When he snaps at me, I know it’s probably because he’s hungry, not because he’s trying to show me that he is more powerful than I.
This also indicated that sometimes the “reasons” for which violence was exerted changed after microfinance was accessed. As Asha said, “Before he used to hit me because I was useless, a burden, another mouth to feed. Now he hits me saying things like, ‘Who do you think you are?’ It’s like neither works for him. Everything makes him mad.”
Discussion
Our interviews with microfinance participants living in a Dhaka “bosti” indicated that marital violence among this sample was pervasive, and often perceived by these women as a normal, expected aspect of marriage. They indicated that their access to microfinance loans and subsequent status as small business owners and income earners had varying effects on their martial relationships and violence: about equal proportions reported an increase, decrease, or no change in marital violence. The reasons cited varied: Their increased earnings, time away from home, and independence reportedly fueled anger and resentment among some husbands; for others, the wives’ hard work and added income appeared to garner some level of respect. Some men were reported to be more tempered in their interactions with their wives because they did not want to jeopardize the relationship and the earnings that their wives could generate. Several women indicated that time spent running a business meant fewer interactions with their spouses, and fewer opportunities for conflict. And a few women who shared with their husbands the loan monies and business responsibilities reported more status-equalizing partnerships.
None of the women interviewed said that they accessed microfinance loans as a way to leave a violent relationship, in part because these dynamics were so customary within marriages that few thought it was something they could or should do, and because of the difficult economic and social consequences of leaving a marriage. All of the women lived in poverty; all said that they sought microfinance loans as a way to meet basic needs for food and clothing, improve their living standards, or provide a better life for their children.
This research was undertaken, in part, to enhance understanding of widely varying findings from a wide range of quantitative and qualitative studies conducted over the past few decades regarding microfinance participation and marital violence. These studies variously concluded that microfinance participation is associated with increased, decreased, or no change in violence. The findings from this qualitative research echoed the variations in those studies, and provided a context for reports of violence that was fueled, diminished, or unchanged in the wake of microfinance participation. In exploring that context, we applied the theoretical framework of status inconsistency as a lens through which to possibly explain or describe these dynamics. In some instances, this lens did provide insight. The objective increases in wives’ earnings and their new roles and responsibilities as business owners did appear to provoke violence in some men who resented the increase in their wives’ status. For others, however, the heightened standing of women resulting from microfinance participation seemed to reduce perceptions of status inconsistency among some (as earnings became more comparable with those of the men), and was cited by some women as a reason for diminished violence. In another twist, women in this sample with multiple income sources and more visible material assets were more apt to report increased violence following microfinance participation, a finding that echoed quantitative results from a representative national sample (Murshid et al., 2016). Perhaps their increased income and material assets provided a more visible increase in status, with heightened resentments in their spouse. Clearly, however, microfinance participation was just one of many complex and nuanced factors in their context-bound violence within a culture of long-held patriarchal norms. The women in the sample cited everything from requesting a new sari, to meddling in-laws, to an illness-stricken child as catalysts for violence, interwoven with near constant references to the strains brought on by poverty and want.
Our study of martial violence within the context of microfinance participation explores the possible relational ramifications of women’s increased access to income and their enhanced independence as business owners in a program whose goals include female empowerment and the promotion of gender equality in addition to enhanced economic well-being. The widespread use of microfinance programs for alleviation of poverty makes this topic one of importance for policy makers and providers involved in the development, assessment, and implementation of microfinance programs. The personal and relational ramifications of a program used by 30 million women (Lachman, 2011)—including possible consequences of status inconsistency—need to be recognized and explored. This study is a step in that exploration and suggests areas for future research, with implications for policy and practice.
Women who participate in microfinance in Bangladesh have regular contact with financial loan officers and program personnel as they apply for the loan, and as they receive the money, get instruction in the terms of use, and make payments. Many of these organizations also offer non-financial services for microfinance participants that include health, education, legal literacy, and social development programs (Kabeer, 2005; Westley, 2007). These extant structures provide channels for communicating with 30 million poor women and their families who are microfinance recipients. The empirical evidence regarding high rates of marital violence in Bangladesh is unequivocal; the non-financial services provided by these institutions to microfinance recipients could include education, support services, and legal literacy regarding marital violence. Recognition by these program officers and providers that microfinance participation may trigger—among some spouses—threats of “status inconsistency” that may increase martial violence could shape conversations and counseling regarding family dynamics and expectations with microfinance participants and their husbands. Further research could examine how and if these issues are particularly salient in families in which the women are generating higher income and visible material assets.
Clearly, such service efforts must be situated within the context of larger cultural, legal, and institutional initiatives aimed at the norms that sanction violence against women. Ironically, microfinance programs are conceived as large-scale, institutional anti-poverty efforts that also promote gender equality. Those program goals underscore the importance of research that explores the nuances of various relational ramifications of a program that aims to promote household economic mobility and female empowerment.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledge the respondents of the study for sharing their experiences with them. They also convey their sincere gratitude to SMDF, Bangladesh, for research assistance in the field.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
