Agenda Setting for the 20% Mandatory Subcontracting Policy in Zambia’s Construction Sector: The Multiple-Streams Framework

Abstract

Agenda setting is critical to public policy due to impacts on subsequent policy processes. On July 25, 2012, the Zambian Government issued a policy pronouncement directing the Road Development Agency to apply a 20% mandatory subcontracting to all road contracts valued above ZMW30 million. The policy directive aimed to improve the capacity of local contractors, create jobs and address concerns of declining local participation due to the dominance of foreign contractors. This pronouncement triggered the implementation of a policy initiative based on road subsector guidelines, but several studies have reported implementation challenges. Applying the multiple-streams framework, this study identifies both the failure of agenda setting to lead to policy formulation and the fragmentation of the construction sector policy community as initial sources of implementation challenges. The study recommends revisiting agenda setting and conducting research on defragmenting the construction policy community.

Keywords

agenda setting policy formulation multiple streams framework policy community subcontracting

Introduction

Public policy remains a critical tool employed by governments worldwide when presiding over political and socioeconomic affairs of state. Several definitions of public policy exist, but the concept broadly denotes government actions and the intentions governing these actions (Birkland, 2020). Public policy is derived from a series of sequential steps, collectively referred to as the public policy process. Although some scholars argue that this process is not sequential, agenda setting is generally recognized as the opening phase of the public policy process. Adapted from Lasswell’s seven-stage model, the five-stage policy model comprising agenda setting, formulation, decision-making, implementation, and evaluation has become the conventional chronology of the policy process in the modern era (Fischer & Miller, 2007, p. 43). Scholars, such as Birkland (2020, p. 210), have defined agenda setting as the process by which problems and alternative solutions gain or lose public and elite attention. Therefore, studying agenda setting remains crucial for understanding the emergence of public issues and their associated solutions in the policy process. Among several policy-making theoretical frameworks in existence, Kingdon’s multiple-streams framework remains a prominent theory exclusively framed for agenda setting (Kingdon, 1995).

This study applies the multiple-streams framework to aid in understanding agenda setting for the 20% mandatory subcontracting policy in Zambia’s construction sector. The policy mandated that the Road Development Agency (RDA), a quasi-governmental institution responsible for the development and maintenance of road assets in Zambia, apply a 20% mandatory subcontracting on all road projects above ZMK30 million in contract value. The policy was primarily a response to local contractor capacity deficiencies and limited local participation in public contracts due to the dominance of foreign contractors. Capacity deficiency largely consisted of limited managerial and technical skills, limited equipment, limited financial and material resources and limited access to public contracts. As stated by the European Union (EU) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2016), subcontracting can facilitate the access of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to public procurement. Therefore, in conformity to this policy, the main contractors were required to allocate 20% of their public works contract value to local contractors, most of which are SMEs. The RDA (2015, p. 2) outlines the specific objectives of the policy as follows:

Create sustainable capacity in the local contracting industry by targeting contractors in grades 1 (the highest grade) to 6 (the lowest grade) through skills and knowledge transfer.

Create more than 20,000 job opportunities for Zambian citizens in the road construction industry before 2017.

Increase the number of local contractors in the grade 1 category.

Provide a sustainable growth pattern for contractors in grades 6–1 in the road category.

Nine years has passed since the policy initiative was adopted; however, several studies have reported the failure of the government to achieve policy objectives. Several studies have revealed implementation challenges for this policy; these studies have largely associated these challenges with low compliance levels and have recommended that the policy be revised (Cheelo & Liebenthal, 2018; Copperbelt University et al., 2018; Mambwe, Mwanaumo, Phiri, & Chabota, 2020; Phiri, 2016). In particular, Copperbelt University et al. (2018, p. 77) recommended that all causes and sources of compliance failures be identified before enacting legislation for the policy. This recommendation necessitated the current study, whose main aim is to provide insight into the initial 20% mandatory subcontracting policy process embedded within agenda setting.

Objectives of the Study

The main objective of this study is to apply the multiple-streams framework to describe agenda setting for the 20% mandatory subcontracting policy in Zambia’s construction sector. In doing so, this study intends to reveal early sources of policy implementation challenges originating from agenda setting. In particular, this study describes how the problem of local contractor capacity deficiency gained government attention, thus, leading to the adoption of the subcontracting policy initiative in July 2012. The rationale of this study is that understanding agenda setting illuminates or highlights the early sources of challenges encountered during implementation of the policy pronouncement. Evidence availed by past studies suggests that the origins of poor policy implementation can be traced to agenda setting. However, no study has critically examined the preliminary policy process embedded within agenda setting. Past studies have focused largely on reviewing technical issues that arose during the policy implementation and evaluation phases.

In view of the set objective, this study is expected to contribute to filling the knowledge gap regarding agenda setting and the influence of agenda-setting outcomes on post-agenda-setting policy phases, particularly policy implementation. This contribution will help decision- and policy-makers focus on realizing a technically feasible and holistically acceptable agenda-setting outcome for the success of subsequent policy phases in future policy processes. In addition, the study uncovers the limitations of applying multiple-streams frameworks in the construction sector policy process.

Agenda Setting and Kingdon’s Multiple-Streams Framework

Birkland (2020) describes agenda setting as the process by which problems and alternative solutions gain or lose public and elite attention or the activities of various actors and groups cause issues to gain attention or prevent them from gaining attention. The initial phase in the policy process is the identification of the issue or problem and its alternative solutions, and these issues are placed on government agendas for consideration by policy-makers. Agenda setting involves the recognition of problem existence and the value of government intervention. Kingdon (1995) distinguishes the government agenda (which constitutes the list of subjects receiving attention) from the decision agenda (which comprises a sublist of those subjects that are ripe for active decision-making). Thus, the governmental agenda poses a long list of items competing for government attention, but only those issues that successfully penetrate the decision agenda will be acted upon. Kingdon’s contribution to the study of public policy through his multiple-streams framework is primarily anchored on agenda setting, which is the preliminary but crucial phase of the policy process. An agenda may include a list of bills before a legislature or a set of beliefs about the nature and magnitude of issues and how government or decision-makers within and across institutions can resolve these issues (Fischer & Miller, 2007). Agenda setting is shaped by the explicit priorities of policy-makers. Therefore, subject to their importance, only a proportion of problems that reach the government agenda are passed on to the decision agenda for adoption.

Kingdon viewed agenda setting as comprising three process streams independently flowing through the system: problems, policies and politics (Kingdon, 1995). The problem stream constitutes severe conditions that have been identified through indicators, feedback and focusing events, which indicate to policy-makers that these problems require their attention, particularly these problems that manifest in the form of disruptions or public discontent. The policy stream comprises several ideas and proposals proposed by various actors and competing for acceptability and adoption by policy-makers. The politics stream consists of the national mood, elections, pressure-group campaigns and administrative turnover.

These three independent streams converge at specific critical moments, thus, enabling solutions in the policy stream to be attached to problems and then enabling these solutions and problems to join with favorable political forces in the politics stream (Béland & Howlett, 2016). Kingdon labels such critical moments as “policy windows” and defines them as brief opportunities for proposal advocates, also known as policy entrepreneurs, to push their pet solutions (Mu, 2018; Linh, Ha, Aung, Nhung, & Lim, 2017). Each stream develops according to its dynamics and rules, but meaningful policy change occurs only when the three streams are coupled (joined) at critical junctures (Kingdon, 1995). Therefore, policy entrepreneurs must be observant of changes in the political stream to couple the three process streams when the conditions are ripe. Policy entrepreneurs take advantage of disruptions in the political system or of emerging problems to couple the streams, and when these streams are coupled, a policy window that may facilitate policy change opens (Beeson & Stone, 2013). Accordingly, Kingdon’s model creatively blends actors, challenges and approaches with policy developers leveraging opportunity windows, as demonstrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Conceptual model of the multiple-streams framework.

Materials and Methods

Case Study Design

The selection of a case study design is guided by the overall study purpose, and thus, the case needs to be a descriptive, explorative or comparative case (Baxter & Jack, 2008). In this descriptive case study, the purpose is to understand the agenda setting for a 20% mandatory subcontracting policy. According to Yin (2009), a descriptive case study is used to describe an intervention or phenomenon and the real-life context in which the intervention or phenomenon occurred. Gerring (2017) points out that many case studies are primarily descriptive, as they are not organized around a central overarching causal hypothesis. These selection criteria follow from the minimal goals of descriptive analysis, where the goal is to describe a phenomenon without worrying about the complex causal influence on a question of interest. Therefore, this case study’s primary objective is not to establish the cause-effect relationship but to illuminate developments in the initial policy process. The case context and boundaries are set as the agenda-setting phase with the intent of uncovering empirical evidence for coupling the problem, policy and politics streams and illuminating the initial sources of subsequent policy implementation challenges. More importantly, a single-case design is justified by its ability to provide an in-depth understanding of agenda setting in the construction sector.

In this theory testing study, case selection was preceded by theory selection, and therefore, the multiple-streams framework was selected in this study. In theory testing studies, the researcher uses case studies to provide empirical evidence for the explanatory relevance or relative strength of one theoretical approach in comparison to others (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 144). This approach borrows from congruence analysis, which can be applied to a single case with the main objective of explaining a particular event or phenomenon of interest to the researcher (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). Consequently, the crucial case method was applied to select a specific case that can best be explained by the multiple-streams framework, wherein a crucial case is the most likely case that can be perfectly explained by a particular theory. The case is crucial in the strongest sense when it can be explained precisely by a theory, no other theory can explain the facts of that case, and the theory is invariant/constant (Gerring, 2007, p. 232).

Data Collection and Analysis

In this study, data collection and analysis are guided by the selected theoretical frameworks and their subsequent theoretical expectations. Therefore, before data collection, the concepts, theoretical expectations or propositions to be compared with empirical evidence must be specified. The investigator must identify and define specific concepts, relate them to the study objectives and define operational measures that match the concepts (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). Since data collection is based on concepts derived from theory, this technique keeps the analysis and selected theories close to the data (Howlett, 1998). In accordance with the multiple-streams framework, the problem stream, policy stream, politics stream and policy entrepreneurship constituted the main concepts under observation, as presented in Table 1.

Table 1.

Definition of Study Concepts.

S/N	Concept	Operational Definition	Operational Measures	Theoretical Expectations
1	Problem Stream	Identified conditions that require the intervention of decision-/policy-makers	Precise problem identification and scope definition	Problems identified through indicators, focusing events and feedback. Holistic problem scoping and definition
2	Policy Stream	Policy actors with valuable ideas and alternatives competing to win acceptance by policy-makers	Consensus building around competing ideas	Popular solution advanced to decision agenda
3	Politics Stream	Policy adoption arising from changes in national mood through elections, media, pressure-group campaigns	Windows of opportunity opened by changes in the political stream	Policy proposal receptivity and adoption by decision-makers
4	Policy Entrepreneurs	Promoters of ideas for placement on the decision agenda and subsequent adoption by decision-makers	Ability to couple the three streams and capitalize on the open opportunity window to push for policy change	Evidence of streams coupling and opportunity window opening

This study utilizes documented evidence obtained from research reports, journal articles, online news articles, acts of parliament and institutional reports. In addition, verification questionnaires were administered to key informants in the RDA, National Road Fund Agency (NRFA), Department of Public Infrastructure and the National Council for Construction (NCC), with all but the last providing responses. Theoretical sampling, a purposive sampling technique, was employed in the selection of data units. Such a process is guided by the investigators’ field findings and the subsequent improvement of the initial data categories and dimensions based on the discovery of new datasets (Howlett, 1998). The initial data collected were coded in NVivo to accurately organize and group related evidence for easier analysis. In this qualitative method, data collection and analysis progress simultaneously until all potential evidence is exhausted or no further insights are gained by collecting additional data (Corbin & Strauss, 1990).

Borrowed from congruence analysis, the following study outcome decision rules propagated by Blatter and Haverland (2012) are applied in this study: (i) the observations accord with expectations; (ii) the observations contradict expectations; or (iii) the observations do not accord with but do not directly contradict expectations; instead, the observations lie outside the set of expectations that can be linked to theory.

Whereas findings in quantitative research are generalized to a specific population based on the outcome of the causal hypothesis test, in this qualitative study, generalization is based on theory, henceforth referred to as theoretical generalization. Blatter and Haverland (2012) identify two major applications of findings in theory-based analysis: (i) the results of empirical evidence as weapons in the struggle for dominance between competing theories and (ii) findings as arguments for the adequacy of new or marginalized theories or new combinations of theories. This study concentrates on the adequacy of multiple-streams theory in explaining construction sector policy agenda setting. Construct validity is employed in this case study. Yin (2009) defined construct validity as the identification of correct operational measures for the concepts being studied. The validity of the findings is ensured through the definition and application of standard concepts drawn from the multiple-streams framework. The use of multiple sources of data incorporates a broader range of opinions and facilitates the triangulation of data sources to reveal as much depth as possible, thereby enhancing the credibility of the study results (Blatter & Haverland, 2012).

Results

Problem Stream

Indicators and feedback: Poor execution of construction work

In his conception of the multiple-streams framework, Kingdon (1995) argues that, aside from political pressure or feedback channels, problems may gain the attention of policy-makers through indicators. Considering Kingdon’s perspective, the failure by local contractors to effectively execute construction works was a clear indication of capacity deficiencies in Zambia’s construction sector. Contractor limitations could be observed through the numerous concerns raised by the government, industry actors, and the general public regarding the poor performance of local contractors. The NCC (2004) reported that the few opportunities that were awarded to local contractors resulted in complaints concerning the quality of final deliverables due to limited contractor capacity. Local contractors were faced with limited managerial and technical competences, financial constraints, and a lack of construction equipment. Correspondingly, Kaoma and Muya (2016) attributed poor workmanship trends among local contractors to inadequate skills. Poor execution of construction work and the desertion of work sites by local contractors were prevalent in Zambia. The failure of local contractors to meet contractual obligations demonstrated a lack of capacity and raised concerns not only in the RDA but also in the government and general public (Syampeyo, 2015).

Chilongo and Mbetwa (2017) reveal that many projects undertaken by local contractors fail in time, cost and quality performance, thereby impacting the competitiveness of the local construction industry. Ngomi (2017) adds that over 60% of local contractors were considered to be unreliable, with a high tendency to abandon works or divert project funds, and displayed high incompetence, inexperience and lack of managerial skills. As stated by Chilongo and Mbetwa (2017), limited skills and technical and financial capacity arising from the absence of incentives to stimulate the growth of local capacity was evident in Zambia’s construction sector. These conditions were visible throughout the entire construction sector, as observed through indicators, stakeholder feedback and industry study reports. In interviews, these observations were attested to in supporting statements made by key informants (KIs) in both the road and building subsectors:

The capacity of local contractors could be evidenced in the quality of the work output, which, in most cases, left much to be desired. Roads KI

Low capacity of local contractors was evidenced in terms of machinery, equipment and the contractors' NCC grade, as most of them only qualified for grades 5 and 6. Buildings KI

Focusing events and problem definition: Foreign contractor dominance

Kingdon (1995, p. 94) further argues that problems do not often become self-evident through the indicators; rather, problems often need a push to receive attention from people in and around government. Focusing events may provide such a push. Kingdon cites crises as constituting peculiar conditions that can attract the attention of decision-makers. Accordingly, the dominance of foreign contractors in Zambia’s construction industry bred unfavorable competition that infuriated local players in the industry. Contractors in Zambia were classified and registered into six categories, with grades 1 and 6 being the highest and lowest, respectively, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2.

Contractor grading and ownership by nationality.

Despite being few, foreign contractors dominated grades 1 and 2, in which high-value public work contracts were awarded. The industry was monopolized by foreign contractors, who constituted less than 20% of the total registered contractors in the country but held a market share exceeding 80% of the contract value (Mambwe et al., 2020). A survey by the NCC and the Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR) revealed that 87.9% of the firms in Zambia’s construction sector were registered in the lower grades of 4–6, while firms in grades 1–3 accounted for 12.1% (Cheelo & Liebenthal, 2018). The dominance of foreign contractors and artisan skill gaps were not peculiar to Zambia but instead were evident in much of Southern Africa. In particular, skill shortages in Southern Africa dated back several decades. For example, Standish and Krafchik (1991) state that artisan shortages were not a new phenomenon in South Africa, as they had been reported over the years in South Africa’s building industry.

Zambia was among the five countries assessed; 90% of its construction industry market share was controlled by foreign contractors, thus, creating a crisis by limiting local participation to the meager remaining 10%, as shown in Table 2. Evidence of the shrinking market share held by Zambian contractors was therefore a source of concern for industry actors and government.

Table 2.

Subcontracting Market Shares in Southern Africa.

	Malawi	Swaziland	Tanzania	South Africa	Zambia
Local (%)	23	35	20	85	10
Foreign (%)	77	65	80	15	90

Source: Copperbelt University et al. (2018).

The dominance of foreign contractors was largely attributed to capacity deficiencies among local contractors, thus, resulting in most of the works and service contracts being awarded to foreign firms (Chilongo & Mbetwa, 2017). Correspondingly, the Parliamentary Committee on Communications, Transport, Works and Supply cited collateral requirements; high interest rates; limited technical and managerial skills; and lack of access to affordable finance, plant and equipment, and project document preparation skills as major challenges faced by local contractors (Copperbelt University et al., 2018). These problems were worsened by overreliance on government contracts, thus, making local contractors high-risk borrowers. This status was attributed to delayed disbursement of contract payments by the government; this delay resulted in banks being hesitant to provide any form of credit to local contractors for fear of default (Ngomi, 2017).

Consequently, a crisis was created in the industry: local contractors failed to win high-value construction tenders, thus, impacting the contractors’ business sustainability. In an interview, a key informant in the roads subsector expressed the following:

Most of all major construction works were taken over by foreign contractors at the expense of local contractors, and this eventually led to a situation wherein the local contracting industry was on the verge of extinction, especially for local contractors in grades 1 and 2 of the roads category.

This observation suggested a rapid market exit among local contractors in grades 1 to 3 due to foreign contractor dominance. For instance, only 12% of the principal contractors for the Link Zambia 8000 road project implemented by the RDA were local contractors, and the participation of local contractors in other road projects was estimated at 1% (GRZ, 2014, p. 5). Consequently, local contractors began voicing their concerns about the lack of parity in the construction sector, thus, leading to the formation of interest groups to lobby government over sector grievances, as revealed by a key informant.

Problem definition

Problem definition is a critical component of agenda setting, as problem definition transforms a condition into a problem and determines the policy direction to be followed by policy-makers. According to Kingdon (1995, p. 110), there are high political stakes in problem definition because, depending on how the problem is defined, the process benefits some, while others may be harmed. This challenge is echoed by Fischer and Miller (2007), who argue that even when a problem is on the agenda, there may be considerable debate and rivalry about how to solve the problem; for example, there may be disagreement about the causes of the problem and the policies that will most likely lead to a solution. The problem of local contractor capacity deficiency was visible in both the road and building construction subsectors. Therefore, a broad-based sector problem definition was vital for realizing a holistic construction sector policy solution. Such a solution can be guaranteed by a process driven by key sector actors and policy entrepreneurs in the roads and buildings subsectors.

An inclusive policy process requires the oversight and guidance of a neutral policy broker, preferably the sector regulator; in the case of Zambia, this neutral policy broker was the NCC. However, available evidence reveals that the road subsector initiated and drove the policy process with the RDA emerging dominant while assuming the role of sector player and policy entrepreneur. In contrast, the role of the construction sector regulator, namely, the NCC as an ideal and neutral policy broker, was less visible in the initial policy process. In addition, energy, water and telecommunication installations, as critical subsectors in the construction industry, were not brought on board during agenda setting. The roads subsector dominance can be attributed to vested interest by the political elite in the Patriotic Front Party as the governing party; upon forming the government, the Patriotic Front Party is purported to have moved the supervision of the RDA to State House. Mike Mulongoti, the former Minister of Works and Supply in the government that was led in the immediate past by the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), is reported to have expressed concern over the transfer of the RDA from the Ministry of Works and Supply to State House by President Sata and insisted that the move was illegal and unconstitutional and that the move should have been reversed to protect the office of the president from corruption allegations (Daily Nation, 2012). He further argued that it would be hard for the government to reduce corruption in the road sector, as auditors and law enforcement agencies would face challenges in addressing corrupt activities in which the Republican president would be directly involved.

Therefore, it was evident that the construction sector had been highly politicized with the roads subsector seemingly undergoing political capture. This could further be observed from sentiments issued by advocacy groups, parliamentarians, and politicians and sentiments among several stakeholders. For instance, Mr. Ambrose Lufuma, an opposition member of Parliament, was reported to have expressed his displeasure with the developments in the roads subsector by stating the following:

The Road Development Agency (RDA) must be moved back to its correct Ministry where it can be accessed by everyone, and the State House could provide only supervision instead of taking it over to avoid corruption (National Assembly of Zambia, 2017).

Similar sentiments were issued by Mr. Hakainde Hichilema, president of the opposition United Party for National Development (UPND); he argued that the transfer of RDA to State House was likely to breed corruption, nepotism, and favoritism, as the tender process was likely to be influenced by the presidential decree (Lusakatimes, 2012). Nevertheless, the Republican vice president objected to such concerns and informed the National Assembly that the Road Development Agency (RDA) did not operate from State House but under the Ministry of Housing and Infrastructure Development and that the president was not involved in the awarding of contracts (National Assembly of Zambia, 2017).

To address challenges facing local contractors, the government issued a 20% subcontracting policy statement in 2012 for the road subsector, and the statement was championed by the RDA and local road authorities (Copperbelt University et al., 2018, p. 23). Key informants interviewed stated that the problem was more visible in the road subsector due to the high unit costs of road construction. According to a study commissioned by the African Development Bank (AfDB), the median unit rate for constructing and upgrading paved roads in Africa was estimated at USD 228,000/lane km and USD 147,000 for small and large projects, respectively (Mubila, Moolman, Van Zyl, Kokil, & Lufumpa, 2014). In October 2010, President Rupiah Banda stated that the average cost for constructing a tarred road in Zambia was estimated at ZMK 5 billion per kilometer, with the cost of the Mongu–Kalabo road project estimated at ZMK 60 billion per kilometer due to the complicated terrain (Raballand & Whitworth, 2012). In addition, the lack of parity was evident in the road subsector, as local contractors had lost their market share to foreign contractors. Therefore, as the problem scope definition became skewed toward the road sector, the policy direction followed suit. Cheelo and Liebenthal (2018, p. 9) affirm that the policy statement covered only the road subsector and was silent on other salient subsectors, such as building and energy installations.

Policy Stream

Cohesion in the construction policy community

Policy communities are composed of policy area specialists (such as in health, transport, housing, and education) who are concerned with a particular area of a policy problem (Kingdon, 1995). These specialists are located within and outside the government and advance a shortlist of ideas acceptable to decision-makers. Despite sharing common interests, specialists may differ depending on how strongly linked or fragmented their policy community is. This study observes wide fragmentation in the construction sector policy community. In particular, the building subsector showed extensive internal fragmentations among specialists in education, health, agriculture, housing, recreational, trade, aviation, maritime, trade infrastructure, etc. In addition to its state of fragmentation, the building subsector lacked comprehensive policy, legal and institutional frameworks. Although the construction sector underwent substantial transformation, the National Policy on Construction Industry, which guided the construction sector, remained unrevised since its launch in 1996. Chilongo and Mbetwa (2017) attributed poor performance in the building construction subsector to government failure to establish a coherent institutional and policy framework.

In contrast, the road subsector had a robust legal and institutional framework that delivered a firmly structured policy subcommunity guaranteeing consensus on sector policy agendas. The National Transport Policy of 2002, the Public Roads Act of 2002, the Road Traffic Act of 2002 and the National Road Fund Act of 2002 provided a comprehensive legal and institutional framework for the road subsector. The three acts established the RDA, the NRFA and the Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA), which are responsible for road construction and maintenance, financing, and safety engineering and management, respectively (GRZ, 2012). Furthermore, the Road Maintenance Initiative (RMI), introduced under the Road Sector Investment Programme, which was supported by the World Bank and enshrined in the Public Roads Act, strengthened internal collaboration, especially in subsector financing. Through its scheduled monthly meetings, the RMI was crucial in generating input for policy decisions in the policy subcommunity. Therefore, collaboration and consensus building were more feasible in the tightly knit road policy subcommunity than in the highly fragmented building subcommunity.

Flotation of policy ideas and decision agenda

In the policy stream, members of the policy community float a diverse range of ideas, with some fading and others gaining prominence in what Kingdon referred to as the policy primeval soup. Solutions are always available in the soup, and new solutions are introduced, while existing solutions are modified. Therefore, solutions are selected from the policy soup when needed; the selection is subject to fluctuations within the politics and problems streams. Kingdon (1995) states that before a subject can obtain a solid position for a decision agenda, a viable alternative should be available for decision-makers to consider. Accordingly, technical feasibility, value acceptability and resource adequacy are considered criteria for the survival of policy proposals within the policy soup (Lovell, 2016). Before a floating idea is included on the decision agenda, the implementation feasibility of the idea is scrutinized, and consensus is realized in the policy community, as the resistance of specialists and critics may weaken and they come to embrace the idea.

Before the adoption of the 20% mandatory subcontracting policy proposal, several ideas were floated, mainly centering on enhancing the skills and financial capabilities of local contractors. The floated proposals included the establishment of a construction bank, a credit scheme under the Development Bank of Zambia, the Construction Finance Initiative (CFI) and joint ventures with foreign contractors in the road subsector. The study reveals that joint ventures had been a success in the mining sector and thus would be an effective approach to enhancing local contractor capacity in the road and building subsectors. For instance, the Mopani Copper Mining PLC had been promoting joint ventures between international world class contractors and local Zambian contractors to enhance local contractor capacity through the introduction of expert skills and financial and material resources (ZCCM-IH, 2014). However, despite several government pronouncements, little has been achieved in establishing joint ventures in the road and building subsectors.

Despite being progressive, with the exception of the CFI, which was implemented by the RDA, the ideas remained unimplemented. This situation conforms to the argument presented by Ridde (2009) that, without coupling, policy change cannot emerge and problems remain unresolved; solutions may exist or be promoted by stakeholders, but the national mood remains unreceptive, and current ideas cannot be capitalized upon.

However, following a change in government in 2011, the new leadership of the Ministry of Transport, Works, Supply and Communications (MTWSC), which was created under Government Gazette Notice No. 183 of 2012, was more receptive to citizen empowerment initiatives in the construction sector (MTWSC, 2014). This shift in attitude was complemented by the infrastructure development program prioritized by the newly elected Patriotic Front in its party manifesto (Patriotic Front, 2011). The 20% subcontracting concept envisioned by the RDA was subsequently mentioned in the National Road Sector Framework (GRZ, 2012). Therefore, the prevailing political will toward investment in infrastructure development provided an impetus for the RDA to advance the subcontracting policy to the decision agenda.

Politics Stream

The national mood: 2011 general elections

Kingdon incorporates institutional windows, such as elections, policy monopoly breakdowns or regular rotations in governing bodies, into his framework to prove that shifts in the political stream can converge the problem stream and the policy stream (Tandoh, 2010). Two principal types of windows exist, namely, the problem and politics windows, which open due to political stream changes influenced by changes in administration, a power shift in partisanship or ideology or a shift in national mood (Howlett, 1998). Kingdon (1995, p. 198) views developments in the political sphere as powerful agenda setters and argues that a new administration changes existing agendas by highlighting and prioritizing conceptions of problems and proposals according to a new partisan or ideological perspective.

The 2011 general elections presented a predicable politics window conducive to the adoption of citizen empowerment policies in Zambia. In the buildup to the 2011 general election, the Patriotic Front (PF), as the main opposition political party, campaigned on populist ideologies with the slogan “lower taxes and more money in your pockets.” Accordingly, Jepson and Henderson (2016, p. 20) argue that PF policies seemed to follow their “more jobs, lower taxes and more money in your pocket” slogan. The party’s campaign message was anchored to the empowerment of indigenous citizens through access to financial capital, skills, technical know-how and job creation. The construction sector, which constitutes labor-intensive industries, in particular, road and building construction industries, was a potential vehicle for realizing the citizen empowerment objectives prioritized in the party manifesto. The construction and upgrading of road infrastructure were recognized as a means for improving connectivity and ultimately stimulating economic growth. Therefore, the PF manifesto provided for the establishment of microcredit financing schemes for small-scale contractors and securing compensatory measures to level the playing field between foreign and local contractors (Patriotic Front, 2011, p. 29).

Correspondingly, the ruling party, namely, the MMD, attempted to use infrastructure development as a campaign tool. Raballand and Whitworth (2012, p. 7) disclose that, in addition to announcing a drastic increase in budgeted road financing in 2011, the government announced a USD 170 million program to rehabilitate urban roads that had been initially unplanned in the run-up to the September 2011 elections. This announcement resulted in some works being executed without proper engineering designs or bills of quantity because of political pressure to fast-track roadworks under the project dubbed “Formula One.” However, a change in the national mood was visible in the public discontent toward MMD policies, which were perceived to favor foreign businesses. The PF, as the main opposition party, capitalized on citizen discontent to launch rhetorical campaigns targeting the removal of foreign investors, particularly Chinese investors, who dominated the formal and informal sectors (Jepson & Henderson, 2016).

Consequently, the ruling MMD suffered defeat from the PF, which campaigned on populist ideologies. The PF government recognized the lack of investment in infrastructure development due to a focus on maintaining the fiscal and monetary policies of the predecessor government (Cheelo & Liebenthal, 2018). The PF-formed government apparently enjoyed resource and policy independence to implement its development agenda (Jepson & Henderson, 2016). The new government began with the review and realignment of the Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) to the PF Manifesto. The Revised Sixth National Development Plan (R-SNDP) incorporated an ambitious infrastructure development agenda for accelerating economic diversification and industrialization, especially in labor-intensive sectors, such as agriculture, tourism, manufacturing, and construction (MoNDP, 2017; The World Bank, 2017). The infrastructure program was initiated to stimulate economic growth through the transformation of Zambia into a land-linked country and ultimately fulfill campaign promises of citizen empowerment. As alluded to by Cheelo and Liebenthal (2018, p. 3), when the PF came to power, the party’s manifesto locked the country into an ambitious infrastructure development path that persists today. Similarly, a key informant echoed that “the change in government coincided with the boom in the construction industry.”

Road infrastructure budget expansion

Based on the R-SNDP, which incorporated infrastructure priorities enshrined in the PF Manifesto, the government rolled out several infrastructure projects nationwide. In addition to rehabilitating and upgrading the existing road network, the PF-led government committed to constructing additional interprovincial and interdistrict roads to open up the country (Patriotic Front, 2011, p. 28). In 2012, the government formulated the Road Sector Framework (RSF), which incorporated major road projects, with Link Zambia 8000 estimated at S$5.9 billion, Pave Zambia 2000 at US$1.6 billion and Lusaka 400 at US$340 million (The World Bank, 2017). These projects triggered an increase in road financing, which averaged 20% of the total government nonfinancial asset budget between 2011 and 2017, as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3.

Public expenditures on physical assets.

Domestic financing for road projects increased from USD 100.8 million in 2010 to USD 215 million in 2011, with the combined domestic and external road budget rising from USD 243.5 million to USD 650 million in the same period and reaching USD 863 million in 2012 (Raballand & Whitworth, 2012). According to Cheelo and Liebenthal (2018), in the period 2013–2017, Zambia’s political commitment to development through infrastructure expansion remained consistently strong, as evidenced by the sustained increase in budget allocations to road infrastructure in particular. Raballand and Whitworth (2012) may explain this trend, as they argue that political considerations usually dominate resource allocation decisions and that road investments were invariably popular throughout Africa because these investments were one of the most visible ways for governments to demonstrate that they were doing something about development. Therefore, the prevailing political environment was conducive to the adoption of citizen empowerment policies among not only industry actors but also politicians and government technocrats.

Coupling and Opportunity Windows

Embedded within the multiple-streams framework are policy entrepreneurs, that is, individuals or corporate actors attempting to couple the three streams, who can attach their solutions and find politicians receptive to their ideas (Sharmin, 2018). These policy entrepreneurs leverage disruptions in the political system or emerging problems to merge the streams and effect policy change (Beeson & Stone, 2013). Therefore, only in critical moments when an open policy window is present can the three process streams couple together to affect meaningful policy change (Palmer, 2015). Strong political attention to the conditions in the problem stream and a good fit of policy solutions to the considered problems are required preconditions for the creation of a policy window (Mu, 2018, p. 5).

However, policy windows alone do not induce policy change; rather, policy entrepreneurs must exploit them by coupling the three streams together (Copeland & James, 2014, p. 8). According to Kingdon (1995, p. 104), it takes time, effort, the mobilization of many actors and the expenditure of political resources to keep an item prominent on the agenda. Facilitated by the politics stream, the prevailing political will was ripe for the RDA to merge the problem, policy and politics streams and subsequently open the window of opportunity. The RDA acquired the political and financial capital required to advance a policy solution responsive to the citizen empowerment agenda embedded in the PF Manifesto and the R-SNDP. In addition, new roads had a high potential for publicizing the development achievements of the PF government. As argued by Raballand and Whitworth (2012, p. 7), cutting ribbons on upgraded roads attracted much better publicity for politicians than simply maintaining roads in their current state did.

Therefore, acknowledging the importance of the local subcontracting proposal, on July 25, 2012, the Minister of Transport, Works, Supply, and Communication issued a policy pronouncement anchored on the Citizen Economic Empowerment Act of No. 9 of 2006; this pronouncement directed the RDA to apply 20% mandatory subcontracting to all road contracts valued over ZMK30 million (RDA, 2015). Contracts below the ZMW30 million threshold would be reserved for citizen-owned, influenced and empowered companies in line with the Citizen Economic Empowerment (Preferential Procurement) Regulations of 2011 (Copperbelt University et al., 2018, p. 13). The policy objectives were set to empower local contractors through skills transfer, creation of jobs for Zambian citizens, creation of sustainable local contracting capacity, and upgrade of local contractors from the lower grades to higher grades in road construction as prescribed by the NCC. The ministerial pronouncement marked the commencement of policy implementation based on road subsector subcontracting guidelines issued in 2012 and revised in 2015. The category of works covered by the adopted policy proposal included culvert construction, bridge construction, earthworks, construction of diversions, pavement layer works, surfacing, weighbridges, toll plazas, provision of road furniture, construction of drains, installation of street lights, construction of walkways, clearing and grubbing, and ancillary works (RDA, 2015). The coupling of the three streams and opening of the window of opportunity are summarized in Figure 4.

Figure 4.

Multiple streams and the window of opportunity as described in this study.

Conclusion and Discussion

The study observations accord with the theoretical expectations embedded within the multiple-streams framework. Therefore, Kingdon’s framework is relevant to the study of agenda setting and its implications on subsequent policy processes in the construction sector. Despite its relevance in describing the agenda setting of the 20 percent mandatory subcontracting policy in Zambia’s construction sector, Kingdon’s multiple-streams framework has its own shortcomings. The major weakness brought out by the study is the failure by Kingdon to explicitly acknowledge in his framework that problem definition or policy decisions may not always be rational or optimal undertakings. There were several factors that could affect agenda setting, especially in developing countries. These included policy capture, corruption, nepotism, political opportunism, influence of self-interested groups, political connections and kickbacks, as revealed by the study. Professor Saasa, a renowned academician and researcher at the University of Zambia, stated that the policy initiative failed to achieve its objectives, including technology transfer and skills development, as RDA nominated political cadres with no qualifications and knowledge in construction usually traded off the 20% awarded to them with Chinese contractors (Cheelo & Liebenthal, 2018).

Furthermore, other than addressing poor work culture, abandoning works, inexperience, lack of managerial skills and failure to meet contractual obligations, other factors not captured by the multiple-streams framework could help improve the capacity of local contractors. These factors may include enhancing political governance, strengthening implementation and regulatory frameworks and institutions, and providing checks and balances at the institutional level. These suggested measures should be accompanied by a culture of high excellence and expectations, no tolerance for poor performance, the availability of capacity-building-oriented policy entrepreneurs and continuous learning and capacity-building efforts among local contractors outside those mentioned in the multiple-streams framework. Merely awarding more contracts to the local contractors would not directly translate into improved performance. Many are the cases revealed by the study that most local contractors could not perform satisfactorily despite being awarded even small contracts, thus, forcing the government to turn to foreign contractors.

The study reveals that agenda setting for the 20% mandatory subcontracting policy in Zambia’s construction sector did not lead to policy formulation. The end of agenda setting marked the commencement of the implementation of this policy initiative based on the government statement of July 25, 2012 and road subsector guidelines issued in 2012 and revised in 2015. As shown in Chapter One, the sequential cycle of the policy process comprises agenda setting, policy formulation, legitimization, implementation, and evaluation. Here, the policy process skipped formulation, a crucial stage. During formulation, the proposed policy objectives are refined, and appropriate policy measures and implementation arrangements are assigned. The legal and institutional frameworks that constitute key components of a policy reform are also framed during the formulation stage.

Therefore, the failure of agenda setting to lead to this crucial stage (formulation) explains the challenges in the implementation of the policy initiative. It may suffice to say there was no policy to implement, as the policy statement was not translated into a formally written policy document. The statement was implemented without formally adopted policy measures, targets, or performance indicators, among other implementation requirements. The study reveals that the failure to proceed to policy formulation could have been caused by the eagerness of the political elite from the ruling parties to fast-track infrastructure development before and after the 2011 general elections. For instance, President Rupiah Banda emphasized the government’s commitment to fast-tracking infrastructure development to develop the country (ICA, 2009). Similarly, in 2011, when the PF came to power, the party’s manifesto locked the country into an ambitious infrastructure development path (Cheelo and Liebenthal, 2018, p. 3). During his address to Parliament, President Edgar C. Lungu also stated that his government was in a hurry to complete road projects (GRZ, 2015)

Therefore, the rush to fast-track road projects partly explains the reasons technocrats could not convene to translate the policy pronouncement into a legitimately formulated policy document. As stated by Cheelo and Liebenthal (2018, p. 9), the policy did not have any measures or implementation framework defining how its objectives would be achieved. Correspondingly, Mambwe et al. (2020) stated that the 20% subcontracting policy lacked clear implementation guidelines and was not legally supported. Additionally, a study by Copperbelt University on selected road projects revealed compliance levels below government expectations; the study cited only one in six projects studied as being compliant with the policy statement (Copperbelt University et al., 2018). Consequently, the study views the ministerial pronouncement as a statement of intent that was not fully translated into policy. This view is shared by Cheelo and Liebenthal (2018, p. 9), who present an argument that the 20% subcontracting initiative was neither policy nor law.

Furthermore, despite being adopted for implementation in the road subsector, the policy statement was sporadically applied in the building subsector without specific guidelines. As such, Chilongo and Mbetwa (2017) attribute the poor performance of the construction sector to the absence of a coherent institutional and policy framework. Similarly, Cheelo and Liebenthal (2018, p. 9) argue that it would be difficult to grow the capacity of local contractors by using the policy because of a limited and weak implementation framework and the restriction of the policy statement to only the road subsector while being silent on the other salient subsectors, such as building and energy installation construction. The policy initiative had the potential to grow local contractor capacity in the building subsector, as demand for office accommodations, housing, education, health, agriculture, trade, sports, airports and communication infrastructure increased following the increase in the number of districts from 72 in 2011 to 108 in 2017 (Cheelo & Liebenthal, 2018).

However, due to its vast and fragmented nature, sustaining cohesion and consensus was more challenging in the building subcommunity than in the tightly knit road policy subcommunity. Consequently, the study traces limitations in the agenda setting for the 20% subcontracting policy process to the fragmented nature of the construction policy community. Fragmentation had the potential to breed policy monopolies in the construction sector, as witnessed in the road policy subcommunity and its 20% subcontracting policy solution. In a highly fragmented policy community, the dominant subcommunity is more likely to influence policy direction. Therefore, the construction sector policy process could have been enhanced by defragmenting the sector policy community, for example, by establishing strong networks and coalitions among sector specialists to ensure that common values are promoted and embraced by the entire membership in the policy community. Such networks and coalitions could be formed on the basis of shared beliefs among actors or institutions with the mediation of policy brokers over conflicting strategies (Stich & Miller, 2008). Accordingly, the study recommends that the NCC be the sector regulator assigned the role of policy broker in the construction sector policy process. Furthermore, a study applying the multiple-streams framework, issue networks framework and advocacy coalition framework to defragment the construction sector policy community is recommended. The formation of policy networks and coalitions is assumed to enhance cohesion in policy subcommunities and eventually build cohesion in the main policy community. According to Stich and Miller (2008), changes external to the subsystem lead to policy-oriented learning and realignments within larger policy systems.

Finally, this study views the subcontracting initiative as highly progressive, thus, noting that the initiative could yield meaningful results if fully formulated and implemented. The policy could be replicated in other economic spheres, such as tourism, agriculture, energy, rail and maritime projects, information and communications technology (ICT) and mining. Therefore, the government could consider returning the subcontracting initiative to the agenda-setting phase to ensure that it is technically feasible and conforms to the values of participants in the construction sector policy community. As stated by Kingdon (1995, p. 131), “many a good idea is sent back to the drawing board, not because it isn’t a good idea, but because it isn’t ready, or, all worked out.” Therefore, based on decision agenda outcomes, the revised policy proposal should proceed to formulation to ensure sector-wide policy objectives and measures, and legal, institutional and implementation frameworks should be put in place before implementation. In the long run, this study recommends a review of the National Policy on Construction Industry of 1996 to incorporate new developments in the industry and the subcontracting policy initiative.

This study has several limitations. In particular, the COVID-19 pandemic posed the main limitation to the study. In the initial methodology, face to face in-depth key informant interviews were planned. However, due to the COVID-19 travel restrictions, interview surveys were mailed and some key informant interviews held virtually. This made the study more dependent on secondary data in addition to the limited primary data obtained through mailed interview surveys and virtual interviews with some key informants. Furthermore, the views of the foreign contractors on the general subcontracting policy were not obtained due to time constraints and COVID-19 travel restrictions. Although not critical to the focus of our study, this could have been ideal for generating primary data on the views of foreign contractors regarding the application of the 20% mandatory subcontracting policy in Zambia. Lastly, being a case study, the findings cannot be generalized to the entire policy process in the construction sector due to its high degree of fragmentation. However, the findings are critical to understanding the effect of agenda setting on the subsequent policy processes of policy formulation, legitimization, implementation, and evaluation.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Seunghoo Lim

Author Biographies

Sydney Tembo is a principal communication officer in the Zambian Ministry of Technology and Science and a former JICA-ABE scholar in the Graduate School of International Relations at the International University of Japan. His main areas of interest include public management, case analysis, strategic planning, public policy process, monitoring and evaluation, and performance management.

Seunghoo Lim is a professor of public policy in the Graduate School of International Relations at the International University of Japan. His main areas of interest include public policy processes, public budgeting and finance, and public management. His research has appeared in refereed journals, including Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Public Performance & Management Review, Public Administration & Development, and Public Personnel Management.

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