Different Cultural Understandings of Honor That Inspire Killing

Abstract

Though there is substantial literature on different cultural understandings of honor and shame that inspire violence, little has been written from the point of view of the defendants who have committed and have been found guilty of murder committed in the name of honor. To gain a better understanding of the different cultural perspectives of honor and shame that inspire honor killing, it is necessary to interrogate the accounts of these defendants and their understanding of actions as honorable and dishonorable. This article attempts to make a start in supplying this missing focus and argues that the concept of honor, here, is different from other honor-related homicides that other commentators and the relevant literature reflect.

Keywords

honor honor killing honor killing in Turkey the defendant’s perspective family homicide

Introduction

Though there is substantial literature on different cultural understandings of honor and shame that inspire violence,¹ little has been written from the point of view of the defendants who have committed and have been found guilty of murder committed in the name of honor.² Their perspectives on the concept of honor have been overlooked or never been interrogated.

As this article argues, in communities where honor killings tend to occur, the concept of honor has a different and very powerful meaning, and there is a shared belief that honor is the most fundamental value in life. This understanding equates life with honor, and equates loss of honor with loss of life. In such communities, people are surrounded by those for whom the loss of honor requires killing or violence in return. As a result of interaction over time with these people, the individual, depending on the frequency, duration, and intensity of his association with these views (Sutherland, 1947), comes to accept and to learn that killing, though itself criminal, is the correct response.

So, to gain a better understanding of the different cultural perspectives of honor and shame that inspire violence, it is necessary to evaluate whether it is possible to find a common ground in the accounts of honor killing defendants, in terms of their understanding of actions as honorable or dishonorable, and examine their attitude to the culturally imposed obligation and duty that may have been part of the context of the murder. This helps to understand better the defendants’ attitude toward their victim, and to their offense and also helps to establish the cultural dynamics behind a sample of honor killings. Thus, this article attempts to make a start in supplying this missing focus.

In this article, in light of available published data, the author first discusses different interpretations of honor killings and the concept of different cultural understandings of honor and shame that inspire violence. Then, from the point of view of prisoners who have committed murder in the name of honor (namus),³ and been serving their sentences in Turkish prisons, the author compares similarities or discrepancies between available published data and what the actual defendants think about the concept of honor (namus) that inspires violence. To meet these goals and purposes, permission was requested from the Turkish Ministry of Justice to conduct semistructured qualitative interviews with prisoners who have been found guilty of murder committed in the name of honor. Permission was obtained to visit 65 prisons in Turkey. As will be explained later, by asking open-ended questions concerning the concept of honor (namus), the characteristics of an honorable (namuslu) man/woman, the characteristics of a dishonorable (namussuz) man/woman, and finally questions concerning what factors the defendant takes into account or how they decide whether a woman’s/man’s behavior is honorable or dishonorable, the personal views of the defendant were questioned and interrogated.

In light of these interviews, this article demonstrates that current conceptualizations of defendants who are violent toward their female partners provide only a very partial fit to the honor killing defendants. I also argue that the concept of honor and the nature of the relationship between the defendants and the victims that led to honor killings in Turkey are empirically different from other honor-related homicides that other commentators and the relevant literature reflect.⁴

Literature Review

Different Interpretations of Honor Killings

Violence can better be understood in the context of gender inequality by looking at violence broadly. Indeed, a substantial scientific literature exists describing the role of gender inequality and patriarchy in violence,⁵ and a substantial review of such literature is beyond the scope of this article. This article, however, looks at the narrower but the worst form of violence from the defendants’ perspective. To understand the whole dynamic behind honor killings and explain better the scope and aim of this article, it is useful to distinguish different interpretations of honor killings including the feminist one and establish whether such interpretations fail to grasp the concept of honor killings.

In light of available published data, there are three different interpretations of honor killings: notably, the particularistic or individualistic interpretation, the universal interpretation—a specifically feminist argument with the emphasis on patriarchy, (Begikhani, 2005, p. 219; Pimentel, Pandjiarjian, & Belloque, 2005; Sev’er & Yurdakul, 2001; Siddiqui, 2005), and finally the cultural interpretation (Kressel, 1981; Kurkiala, 2003). In the particularistic or individualistic interpretation, there is a reluctance to explain the concept of honor killings in terms of cultural dimensions. Protagonists of the particularistic interpretation contend that killings have nothing to do with the culture within which they take place, but rather should be explained in psychological terms such as “temporary insanity,” or the “murderer was crazy” or the killing was committed in the “heat of passion.” This view is often echoed by community leaders, as happened in the case of Fadime Sahindal, a 26-year-old Kurdish–Swedish woman shot dead by her father to restore family honor (Kurkiala, 2003) and in the case of Mr. Arash Ghorbani Zarin, an Iranian student at Oxford Brookes University.⁶

Under the universal interpretation, honor killing is regarded as a form of masculine homicide or “patriarchal killing” (Sev’er & Yurdakul, 2001, pp. 964, 994). It is argued that there is “a hidden machinery of oppression” (Kevorkian, 2003, p. 582) against women in which women are regarded as subordinate to men. Females, therefore, should obey the males and the males should have the right to make them obedient. A mere suspicion that any female relative has defied the accepted social norms, by being disobedient and behaving improperly, will provide strong grounds for punishing, or even killing, them.

In the cultural interpretation, the concept of honor killing is explained in terms of cultural dimensions (Kressel, 1981; Kurkiala, 2003; Safilios-Rothschild, 1969) and it is argued that the concept of honor killing is qualitatively different from other kinds of murders because it is governed by “the specific logic of an honour culture” (Kurkiala, 2003, p. 6). According to this logic,

If a woman refused to comply with the rules set down by her cultural community, her “immoral behaviuor” contaminated the whole family. If other strategies to make the women comply failed, the only remedy was for her male relatives to kill her in order to protect the family honour. Thus, the murders were culturally sanctioned and designed to uphold a specific moral order. (Kurkiala, 2003, p. 7)

In the view of this author, both the particularistic and the universal interpretations fail to grasp the concept of honor killing and the whole dynamics behind honor killings. The author can give two reasons for this. First, honor killings may be the result of women’s active or passive resistance to comply with, or in Kandiyoti’s (1998) terms, “bargaining” with patriarchal rules regulating their sexuality and gender relations. However, patriarchy alone cannot explain the concept of honor killing, especially honor killing cases where the victim is a male,⁷ or gay,⁸ and cases where the defendant is a female. In such cases, the violence does not result from patriarchal attempts to control women’s sexual behavior.⁹ As will be explained below, the violence, here, results from broader values and cultural norms that govern a different cultural understanding for the honor of a man and that of a woman.

There are, however, other commentators (Anderson, 2008; Kersten, 1996) who have linked the victimization of males and females in honor killings to performing masculinity. With the emphasis on the concept of hegemonic masculinity rather than patriarchy, it has been argued that in any society different forms of masculine identities coexist in a pattern of hierarchies according to the value that the society accords them. Therefore, the hegemonic masculinity that is a dominant and culturally exalted form of masculinity, and that describes the characteristics of an ideal man, subordinates all femininities and other masculinities, such as homosexual masculinity, which are less valued. Where norms of masculinity prescribe the use of violence as an expression of domination, performing masculinity can manifest in acts of violence against women and homosexual men. However, those who claim that performing masculinity should be seen as a crucial factor behind violence do not deny the role of broader cultural norms and accept that expression of power and domination vary according to the norms of masculinity in each sociocultural context (Anderson, 2008; Kersten, 1996). Nonetheless, the concept of hegemonic masculinity, in the view of this author, suggests a holistic understanding of gender hierarchy that imposes somehow vague or false unity.¹⁰ It also does not give due weight to the community’s role in honor killings, and how the concept of honor and shame traditionally operate in a community. That is why honor killings can in part be explained with reference to patriarchy.¹¹ The community’s role in honor killings and how the concept of honor and shame traditionally operate in a community can better be understood in the context of the defendant’s set of values that are at the core of this article.

Second, both the particularistic and the universal interpretations are based on the perception that “honor is a personal and private attribute of one individual” (Pimentel et al., 2005, p. 254) and that a man is not dishonored because of immoral activity of his female relatives (Pimentel et al., 2005, pp. 259-260). This is because, in the English-speaking West, the locus of honor has shifted from the traditional extended family to the individual man and has been isolated from the larger societal context, which helps to explain the community’s role in honor killings, and how the concept of honor and shame traditionally operate (Baker, Gregware, & Cassidy, 1999). However, the concept of honor, here, has a different meaning than this new individual honor system, reputation or prestige. Here, the concept of honor is not necessarily associated with rank or social status and it cannot be gained through personal action. It can only be maintained, or lost.

In the context of honor that inspires violence, a person’s honor is believed to be a sacred value, and something more precious to him than even his life (Peristiany & Pitt-Rivers, 1992; Van Eck, 2003), and the loss of honor is equated with the loss of life. A person can go to extremes in defense of this sacred honor by violating other sacred values and committing a grave sin, such as is killing (Baroja, 1992). In other words, “honra” (honor) finds its social expression in what is known as “fame,” which is equated with life; “deshonra” (dishonor) finds its social expression in “infamy,” which is equated with death (Baroja, 1966, p. 85). Thus, to emphasize and differentiate these two different concepts, two different words are used in many languages. For instance, in Turkish, “onur”, “gurur”, “nam” and “şan” are gender-neutral words used to refer to prestige and respect, while the word namus is a gender-specific term used to refer to certain different qualities and standards that an honorable woman or man should have.¹²

So, we have two different concepts of honor. The first is a less problematic and gender-neutral concept, and the second is a gender-specific concept. Below, different aspects of this gender-specific concept are discussed in more detail.

Different Cultural Understandings of Honor and Shame

According to Baroja (1966), in classical Latin, the word “honor”—honos, honoris—“is associated with the ideas of respect, esteem and prestige, and connected with the existence of public dignities and offices” (p. 83). Seen from this perspective, the word “honor” has a gender-neutral meaning that is to do with reputation or prestige, and is not compatible with violence or killing. However, the concept of honor that inspires violent conduct has a different meaning than that of reputation and prestige. The concept of honor that inspires violence has a collective aspect, shaped and constructed by a gender-specific formula.

In this context, actions and behaviors are characteristically described as masculine or feminine. Therefore, certain behavior and attitudes are appropriate to a certain sex and should be shown only by that sex. In this gender-specific conceptualization, men’s honor and the collective honor of the group is dependent on the proper behavior of female relatives and, therefore, on the control of female sexuality. In other words, controlling female sexuality is a prerequisite for a man’s honor. To maintain family honor, men should constantly supervise their female relatives and take all necessary measures to restrict their mobility as every movement outside the house might risk a meeting with men, leading to improper behavior of the female relative and the potential threat of dishonor. A mere suspicion that their daughters, wives or sisters have defied the accepted social norms by behaving improperly will provide strong grounds for punishing or even killing them.

As men have assumed the responsibility of protecting the honor of female relatives, the men are in a difficult and fragile position that requires them always to be strong and prepared to respond to any attack that violates family honor.¹³ The fragile quality that honor possesses is so great that a person can feel himself to be dishonored even if the dishonorable act is not generally known. The reason behind feeling dishonored rests upon the suspicion or fear that the community, sooner or later, is going to learn that he has been dishonored and he will be forced to recognize that he has been dishonored. So, if there is a way to escape from the publicity of dishonorable conduct, there may still be an alternative to restore honor without seeking violence. However, the concept of shame, that is closely associated with the concept of honor, and that makes a person “sensitive to the judgements of others” (Campbell, 1992, p. 131), does not always permit a person to restore honor without seeking violence, even if the dishonorable act is not generally known or is based on a mere suspicion.

Of course, this gender-specific conceptualization of honor has created an environment conducive to men sustaining patriarchal values and constructing their masculine identities through the practice of violence (Anderson & Umberson, 2001; Levitt, Swanger, & Butler, 2008). Indeed, this perception and conceptualization of honor has resulted in such cultural norms for women as confining women to the four walls of the house, a harem mentality that regulates social life in accordance with sexual segregation, and finally the necessity for a woman to be escorted by a male or a menopausal female chaperon who has stopped menstruating (Abu-Lughod, 1988; Delaney, 1991; Minai, 1981; Van Eck, 2003). Through such cultural norms, men have on one hand attempted to prevent the potential threat of dishonor outside the house and, on the other hand, they have sustained the values of patriarchal ideology.

Theoretical Framework

Up to this point in the discussion, by taking its certain characteristics into account, the author has tried to show that in communities where honor killings tend to occur, the concept of honor has a different and very powerful meaning. The system of values differentiating what is honorable from what is not is part of the deep and long-held understanding of people in such communities.

In communities where honor killings tend to occur, people are surrounded by those for whom the loss of honor requires killing or violence in return. As argued by subcultural theorists, “human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them” (Vold & Bernard, 1986, p. 211), and the meaning of any social phenomenon is derived from, or arises out of, the interactions that one has with one’s fellows. As a result of interaction over time with those for whom the loss of honor requires killing or violence in return, the individual, as argued by Sutherland (1947), depending on the frequency, duration, and intensity of his association with these views, comes to accept and to learn that killing, though itself criminal, is the correct response. The process of subculturalization or internalization of such norms in a particular subculture starts at a very early age (Cohen, 1969). As the internalization starts very early, the expectations of what the individual should do when he witnesses a dishonorable or shameful act are determined in accordance with cultural values shaped by subcultural norms rather than by legal norms of the dominant culture. Those ideas in the subculture may have arisen in the past for specific historical reasons, but they have been transmitted from generation to generation, with a new rationale, even after those original social conditions had ameliorated or disappeared. For so long as the norms endure, and as long as the communities transmit the concept of honor that inspires violence from generation to generation, honor killing will tend to occur, despite other cross-cultural social interactions, communications, and exchanges among people in a multicultural society.¹⁴

Under these circumstances, a defendant may, after committing a homicide, as Kornhauser (1978) and Sutherland (1947) have argued, tend to regard his criminal behavior in much the same way as religious persons value their traditional and deeply held religious practices. Or, as Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1981) have argued, he may not necessarily champion his behavior, but may well believe that he has done what was expected, or what he was supposed to do.

However, as argued by Radosh (2002), events, cultural factors, and structures that precede crime are far more significant than the act of crime itself. Similarly, the understanding of what precedes before honor killing, or, in other words, the understanding of the concept of honor and shame, is far more significant than the act of killing itself. Here, killing is a reflection of a larger and deeper concept of honor and shame. This concept and how it traditionally operates in a community can be explained better with the defendant’s set of values. This helps us understand better the defendant’s attitude toward their victim and to their offense, and also helps establish the cultural dynamics behind a sample of honor killings.

By supplying this missing focus, this article has much to offer to the understanding of violence and honor killings. Thus, the following sections reflect this concept of honor from the point of view of the defendants. Here, the author compares similarities or discrepancies between available published data and what the actual defendants think about the concept of honor (namus) that inspires violence.

Method

The findings reflected here are based on fieldwork for which the author visited 65 prisons in Turkey and conducted interviews with prisoners who have committed and have been found guilty of murder committed in the name of honor. Special permission was obtained from the Turkish Ministry of Justice to visit 65 prisons in Turkey. The interviews took place in Turkey from June 2008 to November 2008. The 65 prisons that were visited during the research were in 37 different cities and 11 different towns,¹⁵ inhabited by people coming from a variety of ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds.¹⁶

According to the statistics of the Turkish Ministry of Justice¹⁷ in Turkey, on November 1, 2008, there were 43,157 convicted prisoners serving their sentences in 384 Turkish prisons. Of these, 40,617 prisoners were convicted of a nonpolitical crime and the remaining 2,540 were convicted of a political crime. These figures do not cover prisoners awaiting trial, verdict, or the outcome of appeal, and so are out of the scope of this study. Bearing in mind the number of convicted prisoners serving their sentences in the visited prisons,¹⁸ the population of the cities and towns¹⁹ for which the visited prisons provide prison and detention facilities, it is suggested that the fieldwork covers sufficient participants and data to use as a sample for a limited statistical analysis, to make general observations, and to draw tentative conclusions.

Participants were selected because their personal file in the prison had a reference that showed that he had committed a murder in the name of honor. To do that, the author first went through all murder cases in each visited prison and read all court rulings and personal records in all murder files. The author invited 92 prisoners, 82 male and 10 female, to take part in the research. Sixty-one prisoners, 54 male and seven female, took part in the research by signing the consent form, but 31 prisoners (28 male and three female) declined to participate. In some cases, what at first appeared as murder cases committed in the name of honor, after conducting in-depth interviews the author found that some participants did not commit a murder in the name of honor, and honor was not their motive at all. It was jealousy, pride, domestic and financial conflicts, and disagreements between the deceased and the defendant, or the suspicions of the defendants that were the main reasons behind the murder. So, the author left 22 interviews out of the analysis. Therefore, the findings of the fieldwork here reflect 39 different cases and the views of 39 prisoners, 34 male and five female.

Before giving the details of the structure of the interview, there is one point that needs to be clarified in terms of how this article approached gender differences in the perception of honor and dishonor. Although the empirical research in this article and the author’s fieldwork is mainly concerned with male offenders and female victims, fortunately the author was able to reach and approach 10 female prisoners during the fieldwork, and analyzed the account of five female prisoners. Unfortunately, the account of these five defendants did not yield interesting or fruitful results to make general claims or reach tentative conclusions in terms of gender differences.

First of all, as happened in the case of some male interviewees, when asked “what does the concept of honor (namus) mean to you?” three female interviewee could not see this question as separate from their own personal case. They used this question as an opportunity to review their own cases, and then to justify their action. It seems as if they thought their response had to be consistent with the conduct that they had regarded as dishonorable and which led them to kill. For example, a female interviewee who became pregnant out of wedlock and killed her own child for honor said, “honor means not having sexual intercourse out of wedlock and keeping virginity before marriage.” By this answer it seems that she had reviewed her own case, found that her behavior had been dishonorable, and that the child who was the product of this dishonorable conduct was dishonorable, too. By killing the child she believed that she had washed away the shame, and this was how she justified her action. Similarly, another female interviewee who killed her former employer to save herself from his harassment and the rumors that she was an adulteress said, “honor means not being an adulteress.” Finally, one female interviewee who killed her rapist for her honor and the honor of her husband said, “honor means love and loving your spouse.” These responses were clearly given by the defendants to be consistent with themselves and their own actions. Though two remaining female defendants gave more general responses not tied to their personal situations, their responses showed consistency with the accounts of male interviewees. Therefore, in this article, it was not worth discussing and analyzing separately gender differences in the perception of honor and dishonor.

The interview was designed to be semistructured and each interview took 2 hr or slightly longer. The interview was divided into three parts: (a) questions related to personal information, (b) questions related to the offense, and (c) questions related to the concept of honor (namus). The second part of the interview began with the question “Can you tell me the story of the crime for which you are serving this prison sentence?” and then continued with another two open-ended questions that give more freedom to the defendant to talk about the attitude of people toward the defendant and the defendant’s own feelings.

However, for the purposes and scope of this article, the author is mainly going to reflect his findings related to the third and final part of the interview. The third and final part of the interview began with open questions such as what does the concept of honor (namus) mean to you? What would you say are the characteristics of an honorable (namuslu) man/woman? What would you say are the characteristics of a dishonorable (namussuz) man/woman? What factors do you take into account or how do you decide whether a woman’s/man’s behavior is honorable (namuslu) or dishonorable (namussuz)? By asking these questions, the author sought out the personal views of the defendant concerning the concept of honor, and characteristics of an honorable/dishonorable man and woman. Later, the interview was concluded with questionnaire style questions to probe whether defendants tend to have similar perceptions about the concept of honor. However, due to the length of this article, the author is not going to discuss the defendants’ responses to questionnaire style questions and will leave it for future study.

Findings

The Concept of Honor (namus)

As to the concept of honor, five different groups of responses emerged from the interviews with the defendants, apart from three defendants who did not comment on this issue. In the first group, when asked, “what does the concept of honor (namus) mean to you?” six male interviewees could not see this question as separate from their own personal case, as some female interviewees did. They used this question as an opportunity to review their own cases and then to justify their action. So, one male interviewee, who had regarded his sister-in-law’s infidelity as a betrayal of his brother, said, “honor means not betraying other people.” Similarly, another male interviewee who killed his wife because of her infidelity said, “honor means your wife’s fidelity and loyalty to you and your family.” These responses were clearly given by the defendants to be consistent with themselves and their own actions. When asked “what would you say are the characteristics of an honorable (namuslu) man or woman?” the same defendants still felt the need to review their personal situation and so gave responses that they thought consistent with what they had done.

In other groups, however, defendants gave more general responses, not tied to their personal situations. Thus in the second group, nine male defendants made their responses about the concept of honor in accordance with ideal standards that they thought essential for an honorable man and woman. In this context, being fair and leading an honest life, protecting yourself, your family, and property against every threat, not stealing, telling the truth, being responsible for the women, knowing how to behave in public, and not committing rape were among the general responses given by the defendants to describe the concept of honor (namus).

In the third, fourth, and fifth groups, defendants described some of the main characteristics of honor that the author has discussed in this article. In the third (and largest) group, 14 defendants (11 male and three female) emphasized those characteristics of honor that can inspire violence that the author has discussed in this article. In this group, the defendants said that honor (namus) is something sacred, and more precious to them than even their life. It is an essential element of life. For them, the loss of honor is equal to loss of life and an ideal man lives for his honor. For instance, two interviewees voiced their opinions about the concept of honor as follows:

A person lives for his honor and his dignity. Honor is something that holds the family and people together. It enables people to have a decent life and you live for your honor. (Male, age 26)²⁰

People live for their honor. Your honor is your pride, your glory and praise. You can be without water or food. You can live on without water or food but you cannot live on without honor. (Male, age 43)

Similarly, in other cases defendants said,

Honor is the most precious thing in this world and in the eyes of God. It is priceless. The reward of maintaining honor is also given by God. (Male, age 63)

Honor is a person’s pride and praise. It means everything for a person. Without it nothing can happen, nothing has a meaning. It would be better for a person to die rather than being dishonored. Without honor death would be better than life. Other people may think differently. But this is what I think about honor. (Male, age 47)

Honor is a source of life for a family and it is an essential responsibility for a family. (Male, age 30)

Six male and two female interviewees also said, “people live for honor (namus).” This equates life with honor, and equates loss of honor with loss of life. For instance, the female interviewee, who was raped and then killed the rapist, said,

After the rape, I did not think of anything. Everything was finished for me there. I neither thought of whether my husband would divorce me or whether my three sons would believe that I was raped. I considered myself a dead person. It would have been better for me, if he had killed me after the rape . . .

You think that everything will be the same after this incident don’t you? Look, if a glass is broken, it cannot be full again. After this incident I feel that some part of my body is missing. I am not the same person. After this, how can I look again at the faces of my sons and daughter-in-law? It is not easy. It would have been better for me, if he had killed me. I wish he had killed me . . . (Female, age 44)

The belief that honor is the most fundamental value in life, and the system of values to differentiate what is honorable from what is not is a deep and long-held understanding of these defendants. For instance, an interviewee said,

For me, honor is above all things. That is what I have been taught since my childhood. My family used to say “if you are not involved in any conduct that makes others point a finger at your honor that is enough to have a decent life.” So, I was brought up like that. (Male, age 40)

Similarly, another interviewee said,

In my childhood, I grew up with the idea of honor, respect and reputation. My family used to say “if somebody tries to steal your bread, or points a finger at your honor, kill him.” I was brought up like that. Therefore, for me, suffering from a wound caused by being labeled as dishonorable is more painful than a gunshot wound. (Male, age 43)

In the fourth group, two male defendants emphasized both the fragile quality of honor (namus) and the heavy burden and duties imposed by it. As discussed before, the honor of a man obliges him to defend his honor and the honor of his family. As the responsibility of protecting the honor of female relatives has been delegated to men, and female relatives remain the men’s own responsibility, men are in a difficult and fragile position. This characteristic of honor (namus) was voiced as follows:

Honor is not something light and easy. It is like a heavy burden. It is too heavy to carry. But, it has to be carried. (Male, age 43)

Dishonor is a great stain for anybody to live with. In order to describe anybody as dishonorable, s/he must have made a big mistake. So you cannot describe anybody as dishonorable easily. (Male, age 33)

Finally, in the fifth group, five male defendants explained honor (namus) differently, by emphasizing its gender-neutral meaning, saying that it is equal to reputation, respect, or prestige and that it is generally not compatible with violence or killing. They said,

Honor is reputation and pride of people, their family, their personality. (Male, age 20)

Honor is glory of a family and a man. It is your reputation, respect, and personality. (Male, age 37)

It is the most fundamental and essential value for a human being; it is a person’s reputation and prestige. (Male, age 31)

Honor means being respected by others, knowing how to behave and speak in public, taking care of your children and your family. (Male, age 23)

Honor means being trusted by people. It is not only related to the women, it is your pride and reputation. (Male, age 38)

The Characteristics of an Honorable (namuslu) Man and Woman

Concerning the characteristics of an honorable man (namuslu adam), it appears that as the majority of the defendants (62%) were married, the participants gave their opinions by mainly thinking what should be characteristics of a married honorable man. The responses of the participants can be categorized in three groups.

In the first group consisting of 20 male and two female defendants, the ideal honorable (namuslu) man is a man who takes care of his children, wife, and family by putting a roof over their heads, having the means, and earning money in a morally approved way. An honorable man minds his own business and stays out of other people’s business. So, as long as a man meets the basic needs of his family, he meets the ideal standards. Therefore, he should be respected and obeyed by his wife and children. Any sign of disrespect and disobedience against such a man is condemned and not approved. If a man does not meet his family’s needs by working, even though he is physically strong and there is work to do, he is undesirable.

For instance an interviewee who killed his half-sister because he believed that she brought shame and stain on his family by being abandoned by her husband and because of rumors about her involvement in prostitution said,

My sister was behaving in a way as if she was not married. She started to hang around with people who were known as tarts; rumors went round that my sister was a tart too. People started to treat and stare at me as if I was encouraging her to be a tart . . . Then her husband left her and went back to his first wife . . . I hoped that she would change her behavior, but she did not. Her husband used to meet her needs. She had a roof over her head, and she was not hungry. If he did not meet her needs, I would say “she is right to behave like that.” But her husband met her needs. (Male, age 37)

Apart from taking care of his children and family by earning money, it is desirable for an honorable (namuslu) man to behave in a certain manner and to have certain characteristics. For instance, an honorable man does not gamble, spread rumors, or drink heavily.²¹ He tells the truth and always keeps his promises.²² He does not steal²³ or use deceitful methods; he does his job properly and does not overcharge.²⁴ An honorable man is not a snob; he is modest²⁵ and never stabs anybody in the back.²⁶ He respects different values and ideas.²⁷ An honorable man should be always strong, and be prepared to respond to any attack or threats against his family and female relatives.²⁸ An honorable man is a strong and dignified man²⁹ and earns his wages a morally and religiously approved way³⁰ and he knows how to behave and speak in public.³¹

In the second group, the defendants gave their definition of an ideal honorable (namuslu) man by saying that a man obeys ideal norms that regulate the relationships between men and women by controlling sexual desires that are not approved and that threaten social order. In this perception, an honorable man is good, honest, sexually modest, and innocent, a man who does not look at somebody else’s wife or daughter, a man who lowers his eyes when he sees a woman. So, this perception reconstructs the concept of honor (namus) and reduces it to women, their bodies and sexuality, and women symbolize and represent honor. Any undesirable conduct against women who are wives, daughters, or mothers of somebody, and therefore represent somebody else’s honor (namus), is regarded as dishonorable. In this context, an honorable man does not wink at women; he does not betray his wife, and he is not an adulterer.³² An honorable man is not chasing after women, and he does not cast covetous eyes on somebody else’s wife, mother, or daughter (namus).³³

In the third group, the defendants gave some general characteristics in their definition of an honorable man without emphasis on earning wages in a way that is morally and religiously approved [halal], or obeying the norms that regulate sexuality and relationship with women. For this group, an honorable man is an honest and trustworthy man.³⁴ He prays five times in a day,³⁵ and pays his taxes.³⁶ He does not pimp;³⁷ he always supports his wife and never leaves her.³⁸

From these explanations, it appears that in the mind of the defendants, the concept of honor (namus) is mainly equated with two essential elements. The first is associated with the ideal women as daughter, wife, and mother, and the second is earning money in a way that is morally approved, to meet the basic needs of these women and to maintain and protect them. Earning money in a way that is morally approved, and the women symbolize the concept of honor, which is equated with the concept of life, and an honorable man lives only for them, which is actually above all his life and what he wants to maintain most. Therefore, any attack against these symbols, or any behavior that might cast a shadow on the value of these symbols or stain them is retaliated with violence, strong condemnation, or disapproval. When it comes to the characteristics of an honorable woman (namuslu kadın), it appears that as the majority of the defendants were married, the participants again gave their views by mainly thinking what should be characteristics of a married honorable woman. In this context, for the majority of male and female defendants, the ideal honorable woman is an obedient and loyal woman who takes care of her children. She is modest in her behavior and so she is not on the lips of men.

Apart from taking care of her children and being modest in her behavior, it is desirable for an honorable woman to behave in a certain manner and to have certain characteristics. An honorable woman says her prayers every day,³⁹ she does not go out without permission from her husband, she does not let unrelated people enter her house,⁴⁰ and she always keeps her husband’s head held high among people and relatives.⁴¹ An honorable woman is modest in her dress.⁴² She is not cheeky, or impertinent, or flirtatious. She is an honest,⁴³ respectful, and dignified woman. A dignified woman is like a heavy stone so that nobody attempts to move it. It is heavy and strong so that makes people admire and respect her.⁴⁴ She respects her husband and cooks for him.⁴⁵ She shares her problems with her husband and she is devoted to her children. She is a reasonable woman who accepts whatever her husband provides for her without any complaint.⁴⁶ For an unmarried honorable woman, the participants especially mentioned that being respectful, obedient, and modest in behavior and keeping virginity before marriage is essential.

The Characteristics of a Dishonorable (namussuz) Man and Woman

The responses of the participants concerning the characteristics of a dishonorable man (namussuz adam) can again be categorized into three groups. In this context, the characteristics that the participants mentioned for a dishonorable man mirror the characteristics given for an honorable (namuslu) man. Thus, in the first group, for the majority of the participants, a dishonorable man is a man who does not take care of his children, wife, and family, or places them in a needy situation by spending the housekeeping money on gambling and drinking (14 male interviewees).

In the second group, seven male and three female interviewees said, “a dishonorable man is a man who is chasing after women and casts covetous eyes on somebody else’s wife, mother or daughter (namus).” In the third group, a dishonorable man is a man who pimps an unrelated or related woman (six male and one female interviewees).

Apart from the characteristics mentioned in these three main groups, for the participants a dishonorable man is a man who is dishonest and uses deceitful methods.⁴⁷ He rapes women,⁴⁸ tells lies,⁴⁹ steals,⁵⁰ or gossips and spreads rumor.⁵¹ A dishonorable man does not have a sense of pride and self-respect at all.⁵²

When it comes to the characteristics of a dishonorable woman (namussuz kadın), the participants give their definition by assessing whether a woman conforms to cultural norms that determine the proprieties of women’s sexual and non-sexual behavior and their social status. For the participants who emphasized the importance of conforming to norms determining the proprieties of sexual behavior, a sexually immodest, flirtatious, cheeky, or impertinent woman is dishonorable (namussuz). An adulterous woman is also dishonorable (namussuz). For the participants who emphasized the importance of conforming to norms determining the proprieties of women’s non-sexual behavior and social status, the dishonorable woman is an unfaithful, disrespectful, and disobedient woman who does not take care of her children and her husband, who leaves the house without permission,⁵³ and tells a lie to her husband. However, the idea of the dishonorable woman was not consistent in the minds of all defendants. For some participants, there are no dishonorable women; there are just dishonorable men who make women dishonorable.⁵⁴ For these defendants, the concept of dishonor (namussuzluk) cannot be explained separately from women’s sexuality, and dishonorable conduct mainly appears in forms of sexual intercourse or physical relationship short of sexual intercourse, which always requires involvement of a male as a partner or accomplice. On this view, if there is dishonorable conduct (namussuzluk), there is always a male who takes part as a partner or accomplice and it is he who should be blamed. Nevertheless, this perception does not always prevent the family from retaliating against the woman.

Before concluding his analysis, the author will discuss what factors the defendants take into account and how they decide whether a woman’s behavior is honorable (namuslu) or dishonorable (namussuz). When asked, “what factors do you take into account, or how do you decide whether a woman’s behavior is honorable (namuslu) or dishonorable (namussuz)?” three male participants said, “the words and thoughts of my parents and grandparents have an impact on my decision.” Four male participants said, “I take my religion into account.” Finally two male and one female participant said “my culture and mores has an impact on my decision.” However, the majority of the participants who responded (22 male and four female) explained that “first I need to be sure whether she did it or not. Then, I decide by taking my own conscience and values into account. I do not believe in anything that I did not see with my own eyes.” This approach was consistent in the story of the defendants. Indeed, in the majority of cases, the fieldwork shows that before killing, defendants want to be sure about their suspicions and they try to be sure that rumors about dishonorable conduct are true.

Discussion

In light of these findings, in honor killings it seems that it is the power of the ideas themselves, rather than poverty or other particular social conditions that leads to personal violence. Thus, Wolfgang (1958), in his famous study of homicide in Philadelphia, found that a significant number of honor-related homicides that occurred among lower-class people resulted from very trivial events that took on great importance because of mutually held expectations in the group about how people should behave. Thus, a male is expected to defend his honor and his mother’s honor and a quick resort to physical combat, as a measure of daring and courage, is the proper cultural expression, especially for the lower socioeconomic class.

Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1981) made similar observations. In their study, they described the underlying conflicts of values between the dominant culture and the subculture of violence. They pointed out that people in the subculture of violence tend to value honor much more highly and to value human life less highly than those in the dominant culture. Those ideas in the subculture may have arisen in the past for specific historical reasons, but they have been transmitted from generation to generation, even after those original social conditions had ameliorated or disappeared. For so long as the norms endure and as long as the communities transmit the concept of honor, which inspires violence, from generation to generation, there will be a normative conflict, and honor killing will tend to occur, despite other cross-cultural social interactions, communications, and exchanges among people in a multicultural society. However, as the rest of this article argues, the concept of honor and the nature of the relationship between the defendants and the victims that led to killing in the context of these confrontational homicides are different from the concept of honor, the victim-defendant relationship and the dynamics behind the honor killing cases that this article reflects.

First of all, in the classic form of confrontational homicide, or the homicide that is described by Polk (1999) as an “honor contest,” the killing mainly takes place between two males or a group of males who are strangers or acquaintances, in a public arena, in front of a social audience whose presence would be apparent to the defendant and the victim. The whole violent incident occurs within a matter of minutes and is one in which the combatants did not anticipate at the onset that a death would result. Their intent as they enter into the exchange of words or insults is to defend their honor by means of the fight (Alder & Polk, 1996, p. 401; Polk, 1994a, p. 60; Tomsen, 2002). Given that there is masculine willingness to lay down a challenge, and a readiness to engage in physical violence in response to such challenge, what may appear to be a trivial challenge becomes a life-threatening matter when the honor or reputation of a male is challenged (Polk, 1994b, pp. 169-170). The use of alcohol is often a contributing factor in the aggression, and the mix of masculinity and alcohol is the combination that leads to murder (Polk, 1994a, p. 68; Tomsen, 2002). In these cases, as long as the defendant is not member of a gang or an identifiable group, the challenge is against the masculine honor of the defendant, which is a “personal and private attribute of one individual” (Pimentel et al., 2005, p. 254). This is quite different from the honor phenomenon that the author has discussed, which is sacred, and has a collective and gender-specific aspect represented by the proper behavior of female relatives. True, there is a resemblance in terms of the fragile quality of honor, which forces males to respond in a violent way. However, in such cases males react to challenge directed personally against them, rather than to conduct or a situation such as rape or infidelity, which necessarily involves the nonconsensual or consensual involvement of a female relative.

Even in the cases described by Polk (1994b, pp. 173-174) where the male responds to protect the honor of his female companion, the masculine quality of honor has no sacred aspect at all, and has nothing to do with the honor of the group or the family, requiring the male to respond. The violence described by Polk (1994a, 1994b) involved strangers, friends, or acquaintances, rather than close blood relatives, such as father and daughter, husband and wife, or son and mother. Though in the confrontational homicide cases the saving or maintaining of “face” or reputation is a central matter (Polk, 1994a, p. 88), the sense of shame is nothing like as closely associated with the concept of honor as it is in honor killing cases.

It seems that masculinity and the lower social class position of the defendant tend to be the main reasons behind confrontational violence, suggesting that for men constrained by the structures of power or labor, physical aggression and violence are acceptable ways of proving masculinity and maintaining reputation and honor (Gilmore, 1990). If this is correct, physical aggression is no longer necessary for the economically advantaged male to assure his reputation or honor (Polk, 1994b, pp. 185-187). In contrast, honor killings can be found not only among defendants from lower social classes, the economically advantaged male may also commit honor killing,⁵⁵ which strongly suggests that it is the power of the ideas themselves, rather than class, or poverty, that causes killing in honor killing cases.

However, though the author accepts that the gender-specific conceptualization of the honor phenomenon has created an environment conducive for men to construct their masculine identities and sustain patriarchal values through the practice of violence, current conceptualizations of defendants who are violent toward their female partners⁵⁶ provide only a very partial fit to honor killing defendants. In the research studies, men’s violence toward women is mainly conceptualized as an instrumental strategy of control, or as a means of reinforcing masculine identity (Anderson, 2008; Gadd, 2000; Hearn, 1998; Messerschmidt, 1999).⁵⁷ In the context of sexual intimacy involving women as victims and men as offenders, either because of masculine identity or with the aim of controlling women’s behavior, it is reported that the single most important motive for murder is the inability of the male offender to accept the termination of a relationship. The separation, or the threat of separation, and the feelings of jealousy and rivalry aroused by such a separation, prompt the violence and killing. So, a man claiming exclusive rights over his intimate partner was the defining characteristic of these cases.⁵⁸

In these cases, however, the nature of the relationship between the defendant and the victim that led up to killing was not shaped by the specific logic of honor culture that is sacred, and which equates the concept of life with the concept of honor. Second, in the cases analyzed by Polk, in the context of sexual intimacy (Polk, 1994a, pp. 27-57), there was no reference in the narratives to suggest that the defendant himself felt shame due to the conduct of his partner. When these defendants in their stories expressed a degree of shame or embarrassment, they said they felt ashamed of doing violence to women (DeShong, 2010; Gadd, 2003, p. 349; Hearn, 1998, p. 138; Hearn,2012, p. 602; Jefferson, 2002, p. 71). This is quite different from honor killing defendants, where the defendant felt ashamed at the conduct of the female relative.

All this suggests strongly that the cases of defendants who are violent toward their female partners are generally prompted by different motives and dynamics than the concept of honor the author has discussed. Though men indeed may choose violence against women as a means of reinforcing their masculine identity (Messerschmidt, 1999), or to control female behavior (Hearn, 1998), these explanations provide only a very partial fit to the honor phenomenon that inspires honor killing. These conceptualizations fail to accord with all the aspects of the honor phenomenon that inspires honor killing that the author has discussed in this article.

The concept of honor, combined with the concept of shame, makes a person “sensitive to the judgements of others” (Campbell, 1992, p. 131), and leaves very little freedom of choice for the situations that it regulates. Therefore, it is unthinkable to deal with the issue of dishonor in a way other than that suggested or designed by that society. That is why many defendants in their interviews with the author made oblique reference to such social determinants by using expressions such as “I had no choice,” “it was not in my hands,” “there was no other remedy,” and “this problem could only be solved like that.” By using these words in their stories, on one hand, they tried to reflect the pressure that they had experienced, and on the other hand, they neutralized the killing that they have committed by appealing to higher loyalties (Sykes & Matza, 1957). Therefore, in the author’s sample cases, a common way of neutralizing the killing was an appeal to higher loyalties that referred to the defendant’s cultural norms (Sykes & Matza, 1957, p. 669). Interviewees reflected this point in their interviews by saying,

I sacrificed myself for my family, and I would do it again if I met the same situation. (Male, age 43)

But for me, even if I go to the USA and have a master’s degree, my view does not change. You cannot live without honor. So, if I met the same situation again, I would kill again. (Male, age 31)

As explained by Sykes and Matza (1957) in the context of juvenile delinquency, denying the existence of the victim by transforming him or her into a person deserving injury is another example of neutralization. In honor killings, by denying the existence of the victim or by transforming her into a wrongdoer, the defendant also neutralizes and justifies his conduct. However, this way of neutralization causes the pattern of behavior, in which the defendants felt alienated from the victim or the victim became increasingly alien to them that can be seen either implicitly or explicitly in the words of the defendants. For instance, during the interview, an interviewee who killed his mother and sister after hearing that they were involved in prostitution used the word “this” or “that” many times when he referred to his mother, and when he referred to both his sister and mother together, he used the word “these” or “these two.” Similarly, another interviewee who killed his mother and half-brother because they had an affair avoided using the word “mother” or “brother.” He described the affair between his mother and half-brother as “a shame of blood that always follows you.”⁵⁹

Another technique of neutralizing the killing in the author’s sample of cases appeared to involve “a condemnation of the condemners” or “a rejection of the rejectors” (Sykes & Matza, 1957, p. 668) where the defendant shifts the focus of attention from his own deviant acts to the motives and behavior of those who disapprove of his violations. Rejectors may be described as lacking in honor or manliness, or dismissed as a “pimp,” or “cuckold and tramp.” For instance, when the author persistently asked why he did not try harder to divorce, or at least to be a little more patient, the interviewee who killed his wife because of infidelity explicitly rejected the author’s suggestion and condemned him, saying that he did not understand the concept of honor. He said,

What would you do if you were in my position. This is honor that we are talking about, nothing else. The murder I committed is not the same as other murders. It is different. (Male, age 47)

The neutralization techniques described here, which must be set against the relationship between the defendant and the victim that led to the killing, are culturally shaped, and therefore different from the neutralization techniques described in recent criminological literature on violent men. This important issue is discussed further next.

First of all, in other studies such as those by Hearn (1998); Dobash and Dobash (1998); Anderson and Umberson (2001); Catlett, Toews, and Walilko (2010); and Gadd (2003), when men talk about their violence against women, men typically minimize, excuse, deny, or justify the use of violence. They may also seek to exclude certain behavior from the definition of violence. In this context, men mainly seek to neutralize their violence by minimizing its effect and degree, saying “it was only a little bit of bruise” (Gadd, 2003, p. 347), “I just hit her” or “it was only a slap” (Catlett et al., 2010, p. 113), or by removing their violent self and violent intention, suggesting that acting violently should be seen as out of character, and exceptional as a one-off event (Hearn, 1998). This is done literally by saying that “I am not a violent person” or “I am not a violent type” (Catlett et al., 2010, p. 116; Hearn, 1998, pp. 110, 111; Hearn, 2012, p. 599). Men also seek to place responsibility elsewhere by claiming to have been sexually abused in school or by parents (Hearn, 1998, p. 122). When they use justification in terms of their violent act, men’s justifications are constructed mainly as a response to something that has not been done by the woman (Catlett et al., 2010, p. 113), such as housework, child care, or not maintaining her appearance. Justification is not used as a response to something that has been done by the woman, such as “nagging” (Hearn, 1998, p. 126).

However, in the context of honor killing, the neutralization techniques described above are culturally shaped and therefore different from the neutralization techniques described in recent criminological literature on violent men. In the interviews the defendants did not reject legal and religious norms that establish that killing is wrong. Indeed, they accepted that killing was wrong and a sin, but they asserted strongly that the killing was the only option in their circumstances. By putting themselves in a position to say that what they did was the right thing to do in their circumstances, they tried to cope with the possible condemnation. This also enabled them to feel good about themselves, when somebody asked them to define their actions in moral terms or when somebody defined their actions for them in such terms.

However, trying to cope with the possible condemnation by relying on the concept of honor that is sacred has a profound impact on the psychological well-being of the defendants. In this context, it is reported that the psychological well-being of men in cultures of honor might be particularly tenuous (Baker et al., 1999, p. 175; Osterman & Brown, 2011, p. 1612; Polk, 1994a). Indeed, in the author’s sample, some of the behavior shown by defendants soon after the killing might be regarded as a sign of poor mental health, or the behavior pattern of a person who is not master of his mind or in control of his behavior. This may reflect what the defendants have experienced and lived through until the time of killing. Such behavior might also indicate that the defendant had a disturbed mind at the time of killing. For instance, after killing his wife and her lover, one interviewee said that he walked at least 100 m with his gun in his hand before he realized it and put it under his shirt. He got in his car and went to his house. Another interviewee, who killed his wife and her lover together with a hunting rifle and Kalashnikov in front of a stable, could not think of carrying the corpses inside the stable and waiting there, despite the fact that the weather was freezing and the village was buried under snow. Instead, he waited outside until morning when the gendarmerie arrived. In five cases, three male and two female, the defendants experienced a significant gap in their memory or perhaps temporary unconsciousness. As to other behavior patterns shown by the defendants, 24 defendants mentioned that they cried during or soon after the crime, or they cried in the police station or in the prison.

Men in cultures of honor may also have a unique vulnerability for suicide (Osterman & Brown, 2011). The fieldwork shows that one female and two male defendants tried to commit suicide after the murder but they were prevented and one male defendant tried to commit suicide before the murder. But they still could not find peace. They almost beg for someone credible to say, “You are right, you had to kill her” (Onal, 2008, pp. 236, 237).

Moreover, in such an environment, men might feel unable to discuss or seek help for any distress caused by the dishonorable conduct (Osterman & Brown, 2011). Thus, the author’s research shows that in only 13 cases the defendant mentioned that they dared to speak with somebody or somebody dared to speak with them to ask them to stay away from the idea of killing and to act wisely. Those wise people in 7 cases were friends, in 1 case an eldest daughter, the defendant’s mother and father in 2 cases where the victim was a wife, in 1 case the defendant’s mother and sister, in 1 case the defendant’s mother, and finally, in 1 case a villager. In the remaining cases, the defendants did not talk with anybody else or nobody dared to talk with them about acting wisely. People in the community do not want to intervene or to break silence. They keep their nose out of the problem, as it is a family’s business.

Conclusion

The concept of honor that inspires honor killings has a collective aspect, shaped and constructed by a gender-specific formula. To a large extent, it is shaped by the perception that a man’s honor is dependent on the proper behavior of female relatives. This perception is not only common in Muslim and Arab societies but is also found in Western societies such as Spain, Greece, and Italy.⁶⁰ To claim that “honour is a personal and private attribute of one individual” (Pimentel et al., 2005, p. 254) and that a man is not dishonored because of immoral activity of his female relatives (Pimentel et al., 2005, pp. 259-260) is erroneous, and fails to grasp the collective aspect of honor that inspires honor killings in different geographical contexts.

In communities where honor killings tend to occur and in Turkey where this study has focused empirically, the concept of honor can be said to have a different and very powerful meaning and there is a shared belief that honor is the most fundamental value in life. This understanding equates life with honor, and equates loss of honor with loss of life. Because of this understanding, current conceptualizations of defendants who are violent toward their female partners provide only a very partial fit to the honor killing defendants.

In communities where honor killings tend to occur, the individual exists only through the community, and it is therefore almost impossible to withdraw from that community. In these communities, people are surrounded by those for whom the loss of honor requires killing or violence in return. Therefore, many defendants interviewed by the author during the fieldwork said that leaving their community or neighborhood could have been one way to prevent the murder. They said that the murder could have been prevented if only they had been able to move to another place. Therefore, the local authorities should be able to support any person who is at risk of committing such a crime by providing financial aid to move to another place and make the funds available until they settle down in their new environment. Attempts should be made to decentralize mainstream services, especially services providing safer housing and safer housing alternatives.

It is hoped that the discussion of the unique interview material on the perceptions of honor killing defendants has demonstrated conceptual cultural forces at play in the case of Turkey, and thus made an original contribution to the literature on current conceptualizations of defendants who are violent toward their female partners. Due to racial, ethnic, and geographical variations, it would be implausible to claim that all honor killing defendants have the same perceptions about the concept of honor. In light of these interview materials, however, we may claim that in cultural communities where honor killings occur, the defendants tend to have perceptions that are similar to what this article has reflected. It can therefore be predicted that, as long as these cultural norms, which regard violation of law as appropriate and necessary in certain situations, continue to survive, honor killings will continue to be committed in Turkey and other parts of the world. Addressing the issue of honor killing requires devising a variety of methods and developing a multi-agency response. Much more primary and qualitative research is required on the perpetrators’ experience and perspectives to develop methods to address men’s violence that need to be carried out together with the provision of women-centered services.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Professor Martin Wasik from Keele University for his valuable comments on early versions of this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author Biography

Recep Doğan graduated from Ankara University, Department and School of Law, in 1997. After getting his LLM in child law degree from Keele University, he received his PhD in November 2010 from Keele University with his thesis “Honour Killings in Turkey: Culture, Subjectivism, and Provocation” that is the largest body of the research so far that reflects the voice of the defendants who committed murder in the name of honor and discusses the recent changes in the English law of provocation put into force by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. He is interested in gender sexuality and law studies, violence studies, social work law, child rights, criminal law, criminal justice, and qualitative studies.

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