Can Honor Killings Be Explained With the Concept of Social Death? Reinterpreting Social Psychological Evidence

Abstract

This article uses the concept of social death to explore the experiences and motivations of perpetrators of honor killings in light of social psychological evidence. This analysis then seeks an explanation for some honor killing cases where ostracism or extreme social exclusion of the perpetrator has preceded the murder. I argue that in some honor killing cases, extreme rejection and exclusion may lead the individual to feel that he or she has no choice but to seek validation or approval through killing to be re-included and recognized by the community and family.

Keywords

honor killings honor killings in Turkey social death social psychological evidence perpetrator’s perspective

Introduction

In communities or societies where honor killings tend to occur, the concept of honor that inspires violent conduct has a very different meaning than that of reputation and prestige. In this context, a person’s honor is believed to be a sacred value, and the loss of honor is equated with the loss of life (Bourdieu, 1966; Doğan, 2014a, 2016; Pitt-Rivers, 1966). In such communities or societies, people are surrounded by those for whom the loss of honor requires killing or violence in return, and there is an explicit or implicit pressure on the perpetrator from the community, or extended family members, to restore family honor. Indeed, as happened in the case of Alican Yılmaz, who was killed by the family of his sister’s husband, because he did not kill his sister for family honor, the degree of pressure and threat might amount to a form of duress, in which the perpetrator has to make a choice—either he kills the female relative to restore honor or he is killed.¹

As a result of interaction over time with those for whom the loss of honor requires killing or violence in return, the individual comes to accept and to learn that killing, though itself criminal, is the correct response. This perception of honor provides an environment conducive for the perpetrators to perceive that the loss of honor is equal to loss of life; and that the person who lost his or her own honor is indeed worthless. He or she should be regarded as dead (Husseini, 2009; Van Eck, 2003), until he or she restores honor by killing or seeking violence. The question then arises whether honor killings can be explained with the social-psychological concept of social death.

Social death reflects elements of ostracism and stigma, and it occurs as a result of rejection, maltreatment, the withdrawal of community support, or the support of those who had close and continuous relationship with the individual in question (Biehl, 2004; Borgstrom, 2015; Caswell & O’Connor, 2015; Králová, 2015; Mulkay & Ernst, 1991; Williams, 2007). It is defined as a process or state in which an individual is gradually removed from mainstream society and ceases to be an active participant in the social worlds of others (Caswell & O’Connor, 2015; Mulkay & Ernst, 1991). This particular process of exclusion makes the person who has experienced this consider himself or herself as dead.

Although available published data underline the important role of pressure and exclusion in honor killings (Hoyek, Sıdawi, & Mrad, 2005; Husseini, 2009; Onal, 2008; Sev’er & Yurdakul, 2001; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; Yirmibesoglu, 2007) and suggest that the psychological well-being of men in cultures of honor might be particularly weak (Baker, Gregware, & Cassidy, 1999; Cihangir, 2012; Osterman & Brown, 2011; Polk, 1994), a thorough search of the relevant literature shows that a very few studies have specifically addressed the issue of whether honor killings can be explained with the concept of social death (Alkhatib, 2012; Ermers, 2018; Ermers, Goedee, Albrecht, & De Jong, 2010; Shah, 2016). Social death occurs when the value of a person in his own eyes and in the eyes of the other is profoundly lost. Or it occurs when a person ceases to exist for other people, and at the same time it ceases to exist for themselves, despite the fact he or she is physically alive. Similarly, as far as the loss of honor and honor killing is concerned, there is an intimate relationship between honor and the existence. The person who has lost his honor no longer exists. He ceases to exist for other people, and at the same time he ceases to exist for himself (Bourdieu, 1966). Seen from this perspective, the concept of social death seems to have a potential to provide an explanation for some honor killing cases. Thus, the need to integrate the social psychology of rejection and of emotion with the study of honor has been underscored by other scholars (Rodriguez Mosquera, 2013). Therefore, this article discusses whether the concept of social death has a potential to provide an explanation for some honor killing cases. These are cases in particular where the exclusion and pressure on the perpetrators eclipses and even nullifies their prior social roles and connections and thus overwhelms their identities in the process. I argue that in such cases, as a result of the perceived loss of honor that caused social exclusion, maltreatment, and the withdrawal of community support, some perpetrators experience a loss of social identity, role, networks, and connections at a profound level. Thus, the experience of such perpetrators in such honor killings can in a number of specific ways be better understood through the social-psychological concept of social death, as the criteria for social death is met.

The explanation that I attempt to provide here is based on a reinterpretation of what other commentators suggest in the context of social death and what empirical findings from social psychology illustrate about the experiences of rejection and exclusion. By using the concept of social death and exploring in as much detail as possible what was experienced by those found guilty of murder committed in the name of honor (namus)² and serving their sentences in Turkish prisons, I seek to offer an explanation for some honor killing cases. I argue that in such honor killing cases, as is sometimes the case in other forms of violence and aggression (MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001), an extreme form of rejection or exclusion may lead the individual to feel that he or she has no choice and seek recognition or re-inclusion (Williams, 2007) in the family and community through violence.

Theoretical Framework

All societies have their own specific forms of honor and shame, and they are used as ideal standards to evaluate conduct in each particular society and construct what it means to be an ideal man or an ideal woman. Whoever is found conformist by these standards is regarded to have a personality that represents and sets an example for a certain society. Whoever is not found conformist or wanting is regarded as a person who is deficient in representing and exemplifying a certain society. This means that no person is acceptable, whatever his position and achievements, if he lacks the components of honor (Peristiany, 1966b). In this perception, the loss of honor is equated with the loss of life, and the status of honor is equated with the concept of a meaningful social life.

In this understanding, there is an intimate relationship between honor and the physical person. In this relationship, the existence of the individual or his individuality and his own worth is symbolized and expressed through an analogy with the head (Pitt-Rivers, 1966). Giving your head for your fellows or country, by refusing to collaborate with the enemy, is regarded as an honorable conduct. The defilement of the head (Campbell, 1992) and cutting of hair (Van Eck, 2003) are regarded as rituals by which an affair of dishonor is settled.

As seen, the concept of honor, here, has a very different meaning than that of reputation and prestige. The concept of honor that inspires violence has a collective aspect, shaped and constructed by a gender-specific formula. To a large extent it is shaped by the perception that a man’s honor not only depends on his own conduct but is also dependent on the proper behavior of his female relatives and the members of his family or group (Doğan, 2014a). In this gender-specific conceptualization, the honor of a man obliges a man to defend his honor and the honor of his family, and the honor of a woman obliges a woman to maintain and protect her purity. In other words, the collective honor of the group is dependent on the control of female sexuality, and controlling female sexuality is a prerequisite for a man’s honor (Anderson & Umberson, 2001; Begikhani, 2005; Husseini, 2009; Jafri, 2008; Levitt, Swanger, & Butler, 2008; Pimentel, Pandjiarjian, & Belloque, 2005; Sev’er & Yurdakul, 2001).

In this understanding, the duty of reclaiming or restoring honor is generally imposed on men (Baroja, 1966; Campbell, 1992; Cihangir, 2012; Jafri, 2008; Peristiany, 1966b; Peristiany & Pitt-Rivers, 1992; Pitt-Rivers, 1966; Van Eck, 2003). It is men’s duty to restore honor, and retaliation against dishonorable conduct is the ideal and is a prerequisite for men. Failing to respond or retaliate against dishonorable conduct is interpreted as a sign of dishonor and may cause a loss of social support, identity, and a loss of a man’s all personal values in the eyes of others. Other scholars have also made similar observations (Ermers, 2018; Spierenburg, 1998) and explained that though the degree of application differs greatly from society to society, settling or redeeming an affair of dishonor through violence has a long tradition.

As I argued somewhere else (Doğan, 2013b) though honor killing is widely associated with Muslim communities, it can also be observed in other religious and cultural communities. In such communities, the received cultural norms govern the different understanding of honor and shame that inspires violence, equates loss of honor with loss of life. Certain characteristics of these communities, like endogamy, create the environment conducive to the transmission of the values and ideas that inspire violence and equate loss of honor with loss of life from generation to generation. It is these characteristics that introduce obstacle to internalizing new cultural norms and cultural change and sustain subcultures where honor killings tend to occur. Indeed, in the communities where honor killings tend to occur, the impact of technology and of inevitable cross-cultural social interactions, communications, and exchanges among people on the perception of honor and related concepts is very limited. That is why in such communities, there are superficial social changes rather than deeper cultural changes. In other words, when it comes to the concept of marriage, family values, or women’s sexuality, these communities can change, but only if the change can be accommodated and internalized with their perceived cultural norms.

Moreover, in honor killing cases, there might be an explicit or implicit pressure on the perpetrator from the community, or extended family members, to restore family honor (Doğan, 2013a, 2016; Hoyek et al., 2005; Husseini, 2009; Onal, 2008; Sev’er & Yurdakul, 2001; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; Yirmibesoglu, 2007). In this context, many expressions, words, and threats can be used explicitly to state that killing a woman is easy, and her death would be a good solution which sets an example and teaches a lesson to others (Shah, 2016). In the eyes of the community, the person who lost his or her own honor is indeed worthless, and should be regarded as dead until he or she restores the honor (Husseini, 2009; Van Eck, 2003). That is why the members of the community may tend to disassociate themselves from the perpetrator and deny his or her very existence. Thus, as will be discussed later in this article, they stop greeting (Interviewee 34) and visiting the perpetrator (Interviewee 30), deny giving a lift (Interviewee 7), or job (Interviewees 16 and 34), stop talking as they used to, and tend not to be seen together (Interviewees 7, 12, and female Interviewee 36).

When this perception of honor which equates the loss of honor with the loss of life is combined with an explicit or implicit pressure on the perpetrator from the community or extended family members to restore family honor, it may lead the perpetrator to feel that he or she has no choice and seek recognition or re-inclusion (Williams, 2007) in the family and community through violence. In the following section by explaining underlying notions of the concept of social death, I will argue that such experience of the perpetrators and their involvements in some honor killings can in a number of specific ways be better understood through the social-psychological concept of social death.

The Concept of Social Death

Although the concept of social death has empirical support both in the sociological and social-psychological literature (Bauman, 1992; Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; Glaser & Strauss, 1965; Goffman, 1959; Guenther, 2013; MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Patterson, 1982; Sudnow, 1967; Twenge et al., 2001; Williams, 2001, 2007), all possible facets of this multifaceted phenomenon have not been fully identified yet, and there is a considerable debate and variation about what the term means (Borgstrom, 2015). It has been used in different contexts to explain how people are unable to sustain identity and a sense of meaning, due to social, sometimes physical, isolation (Jonsson, 2015).

However, the social death concept is generally used when a person/group has experienced extreme and profound loss, such as loss of social identity, role, networks, and connections (Králová, 2015). For instance, death studies and gerontology (Borgstrom, 2015; Kellehear, 2007; Seale, 1998; Sudnow, 1967) focus on loss of role, of social identity, and of social networks, and how an individual who is close to clinical death is often treated as if already dead by health care staff, his family, and friends. Refugee studies examine displacement, social exclusion, and loss of citizenship (Králová, 2015). In these contexts, studies of social death mainly reveal three underlying notions: a loss of social identity, a loss of social connectedness, and losses associated with disintegration of the body (Králová, 2015).

It is proposed that to meet the criteria for social death, most or all of a person’s social roles, identities, and connections need to cease to exist, or nearly cease to exist as a result of social exclusion, maltreatment, the withdrawal of legal protection, the withdrawal of community support, or the support of those who had close and continuous relationship with the person in question (Biehl, 2004; Králová, 2015). In this context, social death is a process or state in which an individual is gradually removed from mainstream society and ceases to be an active participant in the social worlds of others (Borgstrom, 2015; Caswell & O’Connor, 2015; Mulkay & Ernst, 1991).

This suggests that social death occurs when the value of a person in his own eyes and in the eyes of the other is profoundly lost. Or it occurs when a person ceases to exist for other people, and at the same time it ceases to exist for themselves, despite the fact he or she is physically alive. In all of these situations, losing social identity, personal value, or withdrawing from the community is not voluntary and does not result from the personal autonomy or choice. It results from alienation, social exclusion, and disapproval that the person in question or any person does not want to experience at all. Such ostracism³ makes the person consider himself or herself as dead or that “when I die, no one will cry” (Hecht, 1998, p. 145, cited in Králová, 2015, p. 238) or “no one [will] miss me” (Caswell & O’Connor, 2015, p. 255).

Needless to say, such profound loss has adverse impacts on the person who has experienced it. He or she may experience depression and attempt suicide (Williams, 2007).

As a result of such loss, “fundamental needs of belonging, self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence are thwarted; sadness and anger increase” (Williams, 2007, p. 236). Thus, “the opposite of social death is commonly understood to be a social existence, a social or meaningful/worthy life” (Králová, 2015, p. 244). As argued by Ermers (2018), in the communities or societies where honor killings tend to occur if the status of honor is equated with the concept of a meaningful social life and related notions such as reputation, prestige, morality, integrity, and trustworthiness, then its counterpart—the concept and experience of dishonor—must be connected to opposite notions, such as social death, stigmatization, and alienation. Seen from this perspective, the concept seems to be relevant and has a potential to provide a meaningful explanation for some honor killing cases.

In the next section, without in any way seeking to justify what they did, I will summarize and analyze the underlying characteristics of the concept of social death that emerge from the accounts of prisoners who have committed murder in the name of honor (namus), and who have been serving their sentences in Turkish prisons. Then, in light of my findings, I will discuss how most of the perpetrators’ social roles, identities, and connections nearly cease to exist as a result of social exclusion. This in turn makes the perpetrators more desperate, and may well spur them to killing to seek recognition or re-inclusion. However, before doing this, I will describe the methodology followed for the purposes of this research.

Method

Data and Research Site

This article is based on the same dataset (Doğan, 2010) that I used in my previous articles (Doğan, 2013a, 2014a, 2014b, 2016, 2018). So, the findings reflected here are based on 39 interviews conducted with 34 male and five female prisoners who have been found guilty of murder committed in the name of honor (namus) and serving their sentences in 65 visited Turkish prisons. A special permission was obtained from the Turkish Ministry of Justice to access prison files and conduct semistructured qualitative interviews with prisoners. The interviews took place from June 2008 to November 2008.

The 65 prisons visited during the research were in 37 different cities and 11 different towns, inhabited by people coming from a variety of ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds and where the incidence of honor killings tended to be high. There are 81 cities in Turkey, and according to the Turkish Statistical Institute’s official population census, the population of Turkey on 31 December 2000 was 67,803,927. The number of people living only in these 37 cities was 44,716,701. Therefore by mutual agreement between the author and the Ministry of Justice, these 65 prisons were specifically chosen to raise the representation of targeted samples within the research profile.

According to the statistics of the Turkish Ministry of Justice⁴ in Turkey, on November 01, 2008, there were 43,157 convicted prisoners serving their sentences in 384 Turkish prisons. These figures do not cover prisoners awaiting their trial, verdict, or the outcome of appeal, and so are out of the scope of this study. Bearing in mind the number of convicted prisoners serving their sentences in the visited prisons,⁵ and the population of the cities and towns for which the visited prisons provide prison and detention facilities, it is suggested that the research covers sufficient participants and data to make general observations and to draw tentative conclusions. However, as will be explained later, this study has its own limitations.

The Selection Process

Participants were selected because their personal file in the prison had a reference which showed that the defendant had committed a murder in the name of honor. To do that, I first went through all murder cases in each visited prison and thoroughly read all court rulings and personal records in all murder files. This allowed capturing of cases in which the defendant had identified the motive of honor as lying behind the murder, or where the defendant made reference to honor in the defense or, finally, whether the court itself established that honor was the main motive behind the murder.

In this context, words or expression used either in the defense such as “I did it for my honor” or “I could not live with this shame,” “I could not walk with my head held high among people,” and “I could not look at the face of the people” or in court rulings such as “the defendant claimed that the deceased’s behavior was provocative and brought a shame on honor” were regarded as key indicators for the selection process. So, the final arbiter about the selection process was either the defendant’s description about the motive behind the murder or court ruling rather than personal opinion or knowledge of the author. In order not to jeopardize any ongoing trials, any prisoner whose trial was pending or who was arrested because of their alleged involvement in honor killing but not convicted were left outside the scope of the research.

By using the selection method explained above, I found a total of 88 cases committed by a total of 97 prisoners, 86 were male and 11 female. In six cases more than one perpetrator was involved in the murder so the number of the perpetrators and potential interviewees was more than the number of the committed honor killing cases. I invited a total of 92 available prisoners to take part in the research. Sixty-one prisoners, 54 male and seven female, took part in the research by signing the consent form, but 31 prisoners, 28 male and three female, declined to participate. However, further screening process took place during the analysis, and this resulted in reducing the number of analyzed cases even further. In spite of my meticulous approach, after conducting interviews in depth I found that some participants taking part in the research did not commit a murder in the name of honor, and honor was not their motive at all. It was jealousy, pride, domestic and financial conflicts, and disagreements between the deceased and the defendant, or the suspicions of the defendants which were the main reasons behind the murder. These participants in their interviews did not make any reference to the concept of honor and did not speak about honor when telling their stories. So, I was compelled to leave the accounts of 20 male and two female interviewees out of the analysis after conducting interviews in depth.

Therefore, the findings of the research reflect 39 different cases and the views of 39 prisoners, 34 male and five female. However, for the purposes and scope of this article, I am mainly going to reflect my findings related to 16 cases where there is an explicit or implicit pressure on the perpetrator to restore family honor. As explained above, bearing in mind the number of convicted prisoners serving their sentences in the visited prisons, the population of the cities and towns for which the visited prisons provide prison and detention facilities, it is suggested that the research covers sufficient participants and data to make general observations. Given that it is very rare to encounter such perpetrators,⁶ it is suggested that there is scope within these samples to extrapolate a number of general claims, observations, and to draw tentative conclusions. However, this article makes no claims that its limited samples provide a statistically valid representation of all perpetrators of honor killings.

The Structure and Characteristics of the Interview

As I wanted to give the prisoners an opportunity to be “the speaker of the text” (Harding & Norberg, 2005, p. 2011), the interview was designed to be semistructured and began with the question “Can you tell me the story of the crime for which you are serving this prison sentence?” Then the interview continued with another four open-ended questions, which gave more freedom to the prisoner to talk about the attitude of people toward the prisoner and the prisoner’s own feelings. These questions were “What has been the attitude towards you of people in your community before and after the offence? Tell me about your relationship with the victim over time, and in the period which led up to the killing? Can you explain how you felt about committing the offence? Were there any remedies other than killing?”

Each interview took 2 hr or slightly longer. Given that I was not granted permission to record either the voice or image of the prisoner, I took detailed notes during the interview. To reflect the accounts of the participants accurately and guard against possible biases, all interview notes were processed and converted into “write ups” by typing immediately after the interview. Therefore, normally only one interview was undertaken each day.

All the interviews were conducted in Turkish by the author and then translated into English for analysis. At each prison, the interview was carried out in a private room, and each prisoner had ample opportunity to have explained to them the nature of the interview process. The participant information sheet and informed consent form for participation in the research that explains fully the rights of the prisoner, informs the prisoner about the concept and aim of the research, and seeks his or her consent for participation were designed. These documents were designed, after seeking advice from the Ethics Committee, to deal with the ethical research issues.

I used NVivo 8 software program for the analysis and management of qualitative data. A close thematic analysis method was used for the categorization and analysis of the accounts of the perpetrators (Kvale & Brinkman, 2008). This initially entailed reading every interview transcript and coding it by using the “node” function of NVivo 8. Then, by using “the constant comparison method” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and asking when, why, and under what conditions these themes occur in the text, I developed these categories into more general analytic frameworks. In this context, codes were initially constructed around the following major themes: exclusion and loss of social identity, the withdrawal of community support and loss of connection, attitude after the murder and re-inclusion, the fragile and sacred quality of honor, and feeling dead. All these major themes are reflected and discussed below.

Findings

My findings show that, in 16 cases out of a total of 39, perpetrators mentioned that they had experienced explicit or implicit pressure from the community or extended family members to restore the family honor. In the remaining cases, in 11 cases, the defendants did not experience any pressure and the defendant’s own perception of honor mainly affected his or her decision about how to act and when to act. In four cases there was a quarrel between the victim and the defendant before the killing, which was described as “push comes to shove,” and in six cases there was a particular triggering event, such as seeing a text message (Interviewee 11), seeing the victim kissing her boyfriend in front of a stable (Interviewee 22), over hearing a phone call from a boyfriend (Interviewee 1), witnessing his child being maltreated and abused (Interviewee 15), hearing from the mother a confession of involvement in prostitution (Interviewee 23), or witnessing that the mother had sexual intercourse with a man and later hearing compliments and kind words from the mother about the same man and expressing a desire to return to the village where the man lives (Interviewee 3). In these cases, the murder was committed immediately after these triggering events despite the fact that the defendants did not experience any pressure, the defendant’s own perception of honor mainly affected his or her decision about how to act and when to act. Finally, in two cases, female Interviewee 35, who committed infanticide for cause of honor, and Interviewee 28, who killed his mother and half-brother because they had an affair, committed murder because they believed that killing was the only way to solve their problem.

Without in any way seeking to justify or excuse what they did, I will now summarize what the perpetrators told about their experience before the murder, and will reflect on some of their narratives in accordance with their own words. As reflected below, the perceived loss of honor causes social exclusion, maltreatment, and the withdrawal of community support, and as a result of these, many perpetrators experience a loss of social identity, role, networks, and connections at a profound level.

After taking my half-sister-in-law to my house, as none of her relatives in her birth family accepted her, everybody started to say “if I were you, I would not accept her, she is immoral.” (Interviewee 12, male, age 43)⁷

My daughter used to run away. I used to spend most of my time to look for my daughter and bring her back. I used to go to the train station at night, where youngsters hung around, to look for my daughter. But many people, including my own brothers, did not believe me. They were accusing me of forcing my daughters into prostitution. They used to say “you found a way to earn easy money, soon you will be a patron.” When my daughter was at home early this time they would say “today, shift is over early. If it goes like that you will set up your own business.” At nights, even after midnight, they would shout “you are running a house, you are doing this business; you are dishonorable.” (Interviewee 16, male, age 55)

When I returned to my village, my daughter told me that a villager raped her and she was pregnant. How was I going to find him? What was I going to do? I could not find the answers of these questions. So, I attempted to commit suicide by taking some pills. I do not remember how it happened, but my wife and one of my neighbors took me to the hospital. In my village there were sixty houses and after my unsuccessful attempt to commit suicide, only two individuals came to my home to check on me. In such situation as an illness or an operation, villagers usually visit each other and check on those who are ill or do not feel well. But, as the villagers knew what was going on in my home, they did not visit me. Even my wife kept telling me that we did not have any right to go out and look at people’s faces. (Interviewee 30, male, age 43)

As he (victim) continued to sexually harass me, people started to treat me differently and they started to treat me as if I was a tart and infidel to my husband; and it was me who should be blamed for what had happened. People did not believe that I was raped. I felt as if I was excluded. (Interviewee 36, female, age 23)

My husband was an irresponsible person. He was a sort of alcoholic and not brave at all. My former employer was always after me . . . I had to deal with that man all on my own for a long time. We even thought to move from our town, because of that man. But there was no way to save ourselves from people’s gossip that I had an affair with him. Because of his continuous harassment, my mother-in-law sometimes was staying with me to protect me. I could not sleep during a year before killing him. I always prayed to God both to kill me, or him, that would save me, and I always kept a box of rat poison at my home. If he touched me, I was going to commit suicide. (Interviewee 38, female, age 43)

In light of my findings, it seems Interviewees 34 and 7 to be those who felt pressure and exclusion the most. In the case of Interviewee 34, the perpetrator’s sisters ran away to two men and got married, but the perpetrator found one of his sisters and later killed her. In the interview he said,

Ten months passed between my sisters’ elopements and the killing. During this period, many things happened to me and my family . . . People began to stop greeting me. Then, I started to go out secretly. I used to check the corner of every street whether there was anybody that I knew. What I felt most was shame. I still feel shame . . . I was having difficulty to find a permanent job as a concrete worker because of the shame brought by my sisters. So, we sold our house in the city and moved to a town. On one occasion, I remember there was a fight between me and one of my cousins in a construction site where we worked. After the fight I was told that he said “he cannot dare to use his strength against his sisters, but he is using it against me.” If he had said such words at my face during our fight, I would have killed him there. People here do not pay attention to what they say, especially during a fight. If they feel that they can question your honor, or your honor is in question, they try to take advantage of this point to find support among people. They say “Look! He did not do anything to his sisters and he thinks that he is a man! No way. Go save your honor first.” (Interviewee 34, male, age 35)

Similarly Interviewee 7 who killed his mother who was involved in prostitution reflected upon what he felt and experienced as follows:

There were rumors about my mother. Everybody was telling me different things about my mother . . . Especially my cousins and half-brothers were doing that. I talked with them and said “what do you want me to do? Do you want me to kill her or kill myself?” This time they said “no, just ask your father to divorce her.” But, then they said “those days were in the past. You cannot find any more such brave men who kill their relatives if they behave like that.” One day I came back again from Istanbul to my village. My cousins were going to take me from the main road and give a lift into the village. They used to do that. The road from main road to the village takes two to three hours on foot. I got off the bus. But, nobody was waiting for me there. It was summer and I had a huge amount of luggage. My three cousins passed on the main road in their cars; but, they acted as if they did not see me. Other people from our village did not give me a lift either. Just because of my mother, they did not give me a lift. I walked the whole road on foot. On that road, I thought that I was the most dishonorable person around and I decided. I was going to do something. (Interviewee 7, male, age 23)

Exclusion and Loss of Social Identity

From what outlined above one may conclude that due to dishonorable conduct, the members of the community tend to disassociate themselves from the perpetrator and deny his or her very existence. Indeed, as a mark of dishonor they stop greeting (Interviewee 34) and visiting the perpetrator (Interviewee 30), deny giving a lift (Interviewee 7), or job (Interviewee 34), stop talking as they used to, and tend not to be seen together (Interviewees 7, 12, and female Interviewee 36). The distant relatives or family members of the perpetrator may insult the perpetrator or question his honor if he is reluctant to retaliate with violence against dishonorable conduct (Interviewees 7, 16, and 34). As happened in the case of Interviewee 7, the relatives of the perpetrator may explicitly state and suggest that killing the woman in question would be a good solution and a brave action to restore the honor. In these cases, due to such explicit and implicit pressure from the community, or extended family members, the perpetrator, as happened in the case of social death, was gradually removed from mainstream society which led the perpetrator to feel that he or she had no choice and sought recognition or re-inclusion (Williams, 2007) in the family and community through violence. Thus, as reflected above, for Interviewee 7 being denied for a lift was the last straw at which he decided that he could not take it anymore and killed to be re-included and recognized by the community and family.

In this context, killing is a metaphor designed and suggested as the best method of dealing such cases. In Sharma’s words killing is an auto-suggestion of the community that has an important influence upon the mental and physical condition of the perpetrator (Sharma, 1968, p. 388-389). If a person has previously been subjected to a powerful behavior pattern and mind-set suggesting how to act in specific situations, conditions, or circumstances, he or she will act or think in accordance with this pattern in such situations without judging the propriety or justifiability of the suggestion.

However, this does not necessarily mean that all individuals who are engrossed in the way of thinking that the right to claim honor requires killing, and who experience the same or similar pressure are bound to commit honor killings. As I illustrated before in detail (Doğan, 2016), as long as there is a way to escape from the publicity of dishonorable conduct, there may still be an alternative to restore honor without seeking violence.

The Withdrawal of Community Support and Loss of Connection

In such an environment, it is very difficult for anybody to act as an intermediary, and to intervene to prevent the commission of the offense. People in the community do not want to intervene or to break silence. They keep their nose out of the problem, as it is a family’s business (Doğan, 2016).

In some cases, the silence of the community and people is so obvious that it is impossible not to notice. For instance, Interviewee 30 was left alone and his fellow villagers disassociated themselves from him and his family. Interviewee 7 was pressurized by his cousins and half-brothers, and by almost all the village, and his sisters were bullied when they went to out of the village to work as seasonal farm workers. Only one villager wisely advised him that he had to take his mother and leave the village. Otherwise, this would end up a tragic event that they witnessed before. After taking his wife’s half-sister to his house, as nobody from her birth family would accept her, Interviewee 12 was warned by his wife, as if she knew that inevitably he would have to take the responsibility of her half-sister, and be pressurized to kill her.

Attitude after the Murder and Re-Inclusion

When it comes to people’s attitude toward the perpetrators in their community after the murder, 16 perpetrators mentioned in the interview that they experienced an affirmative attitude from the community or extended family members, and their behavior either in the form of words or actions was supported by them after the offense.

In this context, Interviewees 11, 14, 18, and 25 said that, after the offense, people condoned their behavior by saying “you need to be so brave to act like that; not everybody can kill for his honor.” Some perpetrators said that people from their hometown or the community supported them in prison by sending money and visiting them, or asking how they were (Interviewees 2, 7, 16, and 28). Some perpetrators said that their visitors mentioned that they had done what was required, and had cleansed their honor (Interviewees 1, 12, 17, 22, 24, 26, and 37). Finally, Interviewee 23 said that after the murder he was treated well with privileges by inmates in prison. His inmates helped him a lot, and they offered him cigarettes, tea, and so on. Interviewee 7 who killed his mother who was involved in prostitution said,

Everybody in my village was expecting the murder; they knew that it was going to happen. After the offence, they started to write me letters and send money and visit me. Later, when I was granted permission to visit my village, even people that I do not know approached me and said “well done, you did right thing.” But, two or three years later everything stopped. Everything was smooth, as if nothing had happened; now there is no talk about me or my mother. (Interviewee 7, male, age 23)

In three cases, the perpetrators (Interviewees 6, 27, and 31) said that after the murder people did not approve of their behavior and said that killing had not been the right thing to do. Finally, in three cases, the perpetrators (Interviewees 19, 29, and 34) said that people expressed mixed opinions, some of them supporting what the perpetrator did and some of them condemning it. In the remaining cases, the participants said that they did not experience either affirmative or negative attitude from the community or extended family members after the offense.

Up to this point in the discussion, I have explained what the perpetrators felt and experienced before the offense, and people’s attitude toward them in their community before and after the offense. We now examine the fragile and sacred quality of honor and feeling dead.

The Fragile and Sacred Quality of Honor and Feeling Dead

My findings suggest that some perpetrators of honor killings consider themselves as dead, as they cease to exist in the eyes of the others, due to the experience of loss of honor. As summarized above and explained in detail somewhere else (Doğan, 2014a), for the perpetrators of honor killings, a person’s honor is believed to be a sacred value, and the loss of honor is equal to the loss of life. For them, the person who lost his or her own honor is indeed worthless, and should be regarded as dead (Husseini, 2009; Van Eck, 2003), until he or she restores honor by killing or seeking violence. For many perpetrators (11 male and three female), it is unthinkable to deal with the issue of dishonor in a way other than that suggested or designed by the community, which requires killing. That is why in their interviews they made oblique reference to such social determinants by using expressions such as “I had no choice,” “it was not in my hands,” “there was no other remedy,” and “this problem could only be solved like that.” By using these words in their interviews, on one hand, they tried to reflect the pressure that they had experienced and, on the other hand, they neutralized the killing that they have committed by appealing to higher loyalties (Sykes & Matza, 1957) that were their perceived cultural norms.

Thus in my sample cases, 14 perpetrators (11 male and three female) also emphasized the sacred quality of honor phenomenon that equates loss of honor with loss of life and inspires violence. They said that honor (namus) is something sacred, and more precious to them than even their life. It is an essential element of life, and an ideal man lives for his honor.

For instance, two interviewees voiced their opinions about the concept of honor as follows:

A person lives for his honor and his dignity. Honor is something that holds the family and people together. It enables people to have a decent life and you live for your honor. (Interviewee 26, male, age 26)

People live for their honor. Your honor is your pride, your glory and praise. You can be without water or food. You can live on without water or food but you cannot live on without honor. (Interviewee 30, male, age 43)

Similarly, in other cases perpetrators said,

Honor is a person’s pride and praise. It means everything for a person. Without it nothing can happen, nothing has a meaning. It would be better for a person to die rather than being dishonored. Without honor death would be better than life. (Interviewee 21, male, age 47)

Honor is a source of life for a family and it is an essential responsibility for a family. (Interviewee 28, male, age 30)

These perpetrators, who hold the belief that honor is the most fundamental value in life, suggest that the pain in case of the loss of honor that lead to exclusion may be more aversive than the pain of physical injury. Indeed, this reasoning which suggests that the pain of social exclusion may be more aversive than the physical pain in many instances was observed before by Williams (1997) who found that many people would prefer to be hit than ostracized. For instance, an interviewee said,

In my childhood, I grew up with the idea of honor, respect and reputation. My family used to say “if somebody tries to steal your bread, or points a finger at your honor, kill him.” I was brought up like that. Therefore, for me, suffering from a wound caused by being labeled as dishonorable is more painful than a gunshot wound. (Interviewee 13, male, age 43)

Some perpetrators also emphasized both the fragile quality of honor (namus) and the heavy burden and duties imposed by it. This characteristic of honor (namus) was voiced as follows:

Honor is not something light and easy. It is like a heavy burden. It is too heavy to carry. But, it has to be carried. (Interviewee 12, male, age 43)

Dishonor is a great stain for anybody to live with. In order to describe anybody as dishonorable, s/he must have made a big mistake. So you cannot describe anybody as dishonorable easily. (Interviewee 29, male, age 33)

Finally, some perpetrators strongly emphasized the intimate relationship between honor and the physical person which lead them consider themselves as dead or almost dead. In terms of discourse and reasoning, the case of female Interviewee 39 who was raped by a distant relative and killed the rapist soon after the rape perfectly represents a typical example of this phenomenon. Although the lapse of time between the rape and the murder is not long enough to cause a gradual exclusion or removal from the community, by using the analogy of glass, she emphasized fragile quality of honor and asserted strongly that

Look, if a glass is broken, it cannot be full again. After this incident I feel that some part of my body is missing. I am not the same person. After this, how can I look again at the faces of my sons and daughter-in-law? It is not easy. After the rape, I did not think of anything. Everything was finished for me there. I neither thought of whether my husband would divorce me or whether my three sons would believe that I was raped. I considered myself a dead person. It would have been better for me, if he had killed me after the rape. I wish he had killed me. (Interviewee 39, female, age 44)

Similarly another interviewee said,

After learning that my daughter ran away, I wandered aimlessly and walked like a wild goose during five days. Neither my wife nor I could sleep. It sounded as if I was having a heart attack. (Interviewee 10, male, age 74)

In these cases, as a true follower of normative principles of a particular honor culture, these perpetrators are so much concerned with upholding their reputations as a norm follower. That is why they considered themselves as dead and preferred to die rather than being dishonored. Thus, Interviewee 39 considered herself as dead after the rape and for the same reason, she still holds the belief that death would be better for her than life.

Nonetheless, by using such arguments and techniques, the perpetrators also seek to excuse their actions by placing responsibility on their personal circumstances, community values, and pressure. In their understanding, what we, as outsiders, would expect them to do has no meaning, and killing was the only solution to their problem. Therefore, when explaining or defining their conducts, they shift the focus of attention from rational choices to choices designed by conduct norms for such situations and perceived to be appropriate by the perpetrator. As argued by Elster (1990), “whenever a norm is invoked in explaining an action, one can turn the account into a rational-choice explanation by saying that the agent is concerned with upholding his self-image and reputation as a norm follower” (p. 872).

Discussion

First of all, this study has its own limitations and it would be implausible to claim that in all honor killings committed in Turkey, the perpetrators experience the same or similar dynamics that this article reflects. Similarly, the arguments reflected in this article are in no way intended to interpret, encourage, or support the assumption that in all countries and cultures within which honor killings tend to occur, the perpetrators tend to experience the same or similar dynamics that this article reflects. In other words, this article has no intention to claim that all individuals who are engrossed in the way of thinking that the right to claim honor requires killing, and who experience common features of the concept of social death are bound to commit honor killings.

As observed by Bourdieu (1966), Peristiany (1966a), and Pitt-Rivers (1966) in the context of values of Mediterranean society and by Van Eck (2003) in Turkish communities of the Netherlands, the concept of honor that equates the loss of honor with the loss of life can endure and exist mainly in such societies or communities where the individual constantly uses the concept of honor and shame to assess his own conduct and that of his fellows, and face to face personal, as opposed to anonymous, relations are the main type of relationships among members of the society. Therefore, the arguments reflected in this article seem to be valid and applied to such communities or societies where face to face personal relations are the main type of relationships among members of the society.

Nevertheless, with the caveat that this article has no intention to suggest that its limited samples provide a statistically valid representation of all perpetrators of honor killings and each perpetrator’s experience is unique, a number of general claims can be induced. With these caveats, this article makes a contribution to the literature in terms of increasing its variety and explanatory capacity.

In this context, this study shows that as a result of the perceived loss of honor that caused social exclusion, maltreatment, and the withdrawal of community support, many perpetrators experience a loss of social identity, role, networks, and connections at a profound level. Thus, honor killings can in a number of specific ways be better understood through the social-psychological concept of social death. This approach then also exemplifies the two-sidedness of the concept. As Guenther (2013) and Jonsson (2015) argue, the concept of social death is on one hand about how people are perceived and treated, and on the other hand it is about the subjective experience of those perceived and treated in certain ways. Thus, in the context of honor killings, first the perpetrator is perceived to be a dishonorable person and treated with disrespect and exclusion by the community and the members of the family, later such treatment and exclusion is perceived as a mark of dishonor by the perpetrator. In the end, as a result of repeated cycles of treatment and perception, action and reaction, the perpetrator gradually moves from mainstream society to the margins (Borgstrom, 2015; Caswell & O’Connor, 2015; Mulkay & Ernst, 1991) and can feel a social pain that is not different from physical pain (Williams, 2007).

Thus, research studies show that the experience of psychological pains arising from intense loneliness, rejection, social exclusion, and the sudden loss of social support shares a common neuroanatomical basis with the experience of physical pain (Eisenberger et al., 2003; MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Williams, 2007). Similarly, Williams (2001, 2007) argues that even the most minimal forms of ostracism (to be excluded and ignored) generate pain and distress, and it results in detrimental effects on four human needs: belonging, self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence. These detrimental effects, however, may be more pronounced, or more prolonged, in particular individuals such as those who are socially anxious (Zadro, Boland, & Richardson, 2006).

Nevertheless, at the end of this socially painful process, the individual feels that he or she ceases to exist for other people, and at the same time it ceases to exist for himself or herself, despite the fact he or she is physically alive. But, individual reaction to such perceived exclusion or rejection does not always result in aggressive behavior. According to Williams (2007), subsequent behavioral responses to ostracism or rejection may vary depending on “which need or needs the individual is attempting to fortify. These needs can lead the individual to strive toward inclusion and acceptance, or to exact revenge and control over others” (p. 237). However, the common response or the dominant tendency would be to correct behaviors to be re-included by the ostracizing group or a new group (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Williams, 2007). Thus, there is substantial social-psychological evidence that ostracized (excluded or ignored) individuals are more likely to conform, comply, work harder for the group, and ingratiate themselves into others’ favor (Williams, 2007, p. 241-242). This means that extreme forms of rejection or exclusion are more likely to lead to aggression (MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Twenge et al., 2001) and the individual may seek approval through violence depending on the individual differences and the assessment of who ostracizes and why (Williams, 2007).

Aggression is more likely to occur when higher degrees of rejection or relational devaluation are perceived and the individual feels trapped in a painful situation with no escape route or other choice (MacDonald & Leary, 2005). In other words, when individuals feel trapped, “they may resort to aggression as a means to fortify control and recognition, without concern for future consequences” (Williams, 2007, p. 243).

The questions then arises “what would be possible subsequent responses to extreme forms of exclusion if the norms of the ostracizing group required killing or violence in return to be re-included by the group?” Or, if phrased differently, what would be possible subsequent responses to extreme forms of exclusion if the reason behind exclusion or rejection itself emanated from the personal resistance of the individual to follow subcultural norms which regarded killing as the expected, normal, and appropriate way to behave in certain situations?

As far as honor killings are concerned, for such situations, as I previously discussed (Doğan, 2016) my findings suggest that whether or not an individual manages not to seek approval through violence is dependent on the frequency, duration, and intensity of his association with the perceived norms and discourses of honor killing. It is also dependent on whether there is a way to escape from the publicity of dishonorable conduct. Thus, as MacDonald and Leary (2005) argue, the perception that a social threat cannot be avoided—that there is no escape route—is a crucial factor in explaining why some individuals aggress in response to rejection while others pursue other courses of behavior.

As seen, my findings are not so different from what other commentators suggest in the context of social death or what empirical findings of social psychology research illustrate (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Twenge et al., 2001; Williams, 2007; Zadro et al., 2006). Indeed, we both suggest, in the case of social rejection or social death, violence is more likely to occur when the individual feels trapped in a painful situation by believing that he or she has no choice or escape route. In such situations, therefore, depending on the individual differences and the assessment of who ostracizes and why, the individual may seek approval through violence to be re-included and recognized by the community, family, or ostracizing group. Moreover, all these similarities between my findings and what other commentators have found in the context of social death and social psychology support what subcultural theorists (Cohen, 1969; Cressey, 1968; Sellin, 1938; Sutherland, 1947; Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1981) previously argued, with which I have also expressed my agreement previously (Doğan, 2016).

Subcultural theorists argue that “human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them” (Vold & Bernard, 1986, p. 211), and the meaning of any social phenomenon or conduct norms is derived from, or arises out of, the interactions that one has with one’s fellows. People who do not wish to follow the norms are criticized, ridiculed, condemned, or excluded by the community, and those who follow them are admired and respected. So depending on the frequency, duration, and intensity of his association, each individual differently internalizes the normative system and values of his or her community. As the people differently define the concept of honor and perceive the appropriate way to behave in case of dishonorable conduct, their responses differ on the basis of the meanings that the concept of honor and shame have for them.

In light of all these discussions, it seems that the concept of social death which occurs as a result of social exclusion or rejection has a potential to provide a meaningful explanation for the theoretical conceptualization of some honor killings where the perpetrators hold the belief that the loss of honor is equal to loss of life, and where ostracism or extreme social exclusion of the perpetrator has preceded the murder. In such cases, research studies on social death and empirical findings of social psychology research illustrate that when the individual feels trapped in a painful situation by believing that there is no other choice apart from seeking violence, he or she may seek approval through violence (MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Williams, 2001, 2007).

Conclusion

Through using the concept of social death and exploring in as much detail as possible what was experienced by the perpetrators in honor killing cases, this article seeks to offer an explanation for the theoretical conceptualization of some honor killing cases where ostracism or extreme social exclusion of the perpetrator has preceded the murder. The explanation that I have attempted to provide here is based on a reinterpretation of what other commentators suggest in the context of social death or what empirical findings of social psychology research illustrate in the context of the social psychology of rejection and exclusion.

By underlying characteristics of the concept of social death that emerge from the accounts of prisoners who have been found guilty of murder committed in the name of honor (namus) and serving their sentences in 65 visited Turkish prisons, I have sought to provide an answer to the question of “what would be possible subsequent responses to extreme forms of exclusion, rejection or ostracism, if the suggested conduct norm of the ostracizing group required killing or violence in return to be re-included by the group?”

For the answer of this question, my findings suggest that in such situations where the perpetrator’s dependency on the community is clear, and when there was no available support in the community and nowhere else to turn, the perpetrator feels more desperate and trapped that may well tip the perpetrator over into killing. Especially in cases, where the perpetrators’ social roles, identities, and connections nearly cease to exist due to social exclusion and pressure, killing is perceived to be a necessary course of action to be a re-included, recognized, and remembered person. In other words, killing was used as somewhat survival strategy to be an active participant in the social worlds of others and have a social or meaningful/worthy life back which is commonly understood to be the opposite of social death (Králová, 2015).

Here, killing seemed to be used to overcome the effects of social death which caused the loss of most of the perpetrators’ social roles, identities, and connections. However, this does not necessarily mean that all individuals who are engrossed in the way of thinking that the right to claim honor requires killing, and who experience common features of the concept of social death are bound to commit honor killings. People have choice and agency in whatever culture or communities they are brought up. Even in communities where honor killings tend to occur, people still have a choice. But in order to know which choices were available, we need to know the particular circumstances, context and factors that precede before honor killing and that are far more significant than the act of killing itself.

In light of all these discussions, it seems that the concept of social death which occurs as a result of social exclusion or rejection has a potential to provide a meaningful explanation for the theoretical conceptualization of some honor killings where the perpetrators hold the belief that the loss of honor is equal to loss of life, and they have no choice apart from killing to restore their social or meaningful worthy life. Especially in cases where ostracism or extreme social exclusion of the perpetrator has preceded the murder, empirical findings of social psychology research (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Twenge et al., 2001; Williams, 2007; Zadro et al., 2006) and my findings illustrate that when the individual feels trapped in a painful situation by believing that there is no other choice apart from seeking violence, he or she may seek approval through violence (MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Williams, 2001, 2007).

As shown, through ostracism or extreme forms of exclusion that gradually force the perpetrator to the margins of their society, the perpetrator comes to regard the eventual victim as the cause of all the perpetrator’s problems. At this stage, depending on the individual differences and the perpetrator’s assessment of who ostracized them and why—and if the perpetrator’s need of control, belonging, and recognition is intensifying—the perpetrator is likely “resort to aggression as a means to fortify control and recognition, without concern for future consequences” (Williams, 2007, p. 243).

As I explained above, this study has its own limitations and each perpetrator’s experience is unique. Of course, there are honor killing cases where the perpetrators did not experience any pressure and have been content with what they did and committed the murder in cold blood without hesitation. Seen from this perspective, the perpetrator’s action to seek approval or re-inclusion through killing may become more explainable, but clearly not right, excusable, or justifiable. Because, the perspective that this article has attempted to provide, to a certain extent, allows us to explain the dynamics of some honor killings without stigmatizing the whole societies where honor killings tend to occur as “backward and barbaric” (Doğan, 2013b, 2014a, 2016).

This article intends to make a start integrating the social psychology of rejection and of emotion with the study of honor killing which is qualitatively different from other kinds of homicides. Likewise, this article is in no way intended to exonerate or excuse those who killed for honor. It is hoped that the discussion of the unique interview materials on the experience and perceptions of perpetrators has demonstrated that in the context of honor killing, extreme forms of rejection or exclusion may lead the individual to seek approval through killing to be re-included and recognized by the community or family. These findings and analysis in turn make an original contribution to the literature on honor killings, social psychology of rejection, and on the concept of social death.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

This publication has been produced during my scholarship period at Uppsala University Hugo Valentin Centrum thanks to a Swedish Institute scholarship. I wish to thank Martin Wasik, Emeritus Professor of law at Keele University, for his valuable comments on early versions of this article. This article also greatly benefited from thoughtful comments of Emeritus Professor Andrew Ashworth from Oxford University, and Dr. Jim Porter from Uppsala University Hugo Valentin Centrum. I wish to specifically thank Dr. Robert J. Ermers from Radboud University Nijmegen for introducing me to the concept of social death.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author Biography

Recep Doğan graduated from Ankara University, Department and School of Law, in 1997. After getting his LLM in child law degree from Keele University, he received his PhD in 2010 from Keele University with his thesis “Honour Killings in Turkey: Culture, Subjectivism, and Provocation” that is the largest body of the research so far that reflects the voice of the perpetrators who committed murder in the name of honor and discusses the recent changes in the English law of provocation put into force by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. He is interested in gender sexuality and law studies, violence studies, social work law, child rights, criminal law, criminal justice, and qualitative criminological research.

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