Enhancing Crime Control Partnerships Across Government

Abstract

This article discusses the importance of trust in furthering crime control partnerships among government agencies. Drawing upon fieldwork undertaken on American and Australian waterfronts, evidence is presented showing that trust played an integral role in shaping interagency partnerships at both sites. In abundance, trust was shown to help build social capital and promote harmonious relationships, whereas when lacking, collaborative activity was stunted. This article examines the successes and failures of partnerships in each case study, and concludes by identifying a range of factors that have been shown to promote trust, build social capital, and enable interagency partnerships to flourish.

Keywords

interagency partnerships networked-policing collaboration trust social capital

Introduction

Scholars, policy makers, and practitioners have increasingly recognized that whole of government approaches can greatly enhance crime control capabilities, as the police cannot effectively control crime alone. The body of literature devoted to exploring partnerships between government authorities is both rich and established, and has thoroughly documented the evolution of interagency collaboration in a policing context (e.g., Crawford, 1997, 2006; Fleming, 2006; Hughes & McLaughlin, 2002). Some scholars have even gone so far as to explore the configuration and mechanics of said partnerships, measuring the extent to which various state actors link together to form “security networks” (e.g., Dupont, 2004; Gerspacher & Dupont, 2007). However, while these studies have aptly illustrated the relevance and serviceability of said relationships, very little research has sought to fully elucidate the relational properties that actually drive these actors together (or in some cases apart) within these security networks. While some policing scholars have speculated that successful (and conflicting) partnerships are characterized as relating to the trust between interagency partners (see Stewart, 2011), few have methodically examined this connection. This article addresses this gap in the scholarship, and examines the trust that underscores these relationships, builds social capital, and furthers interagency partnerships on the waterfront. In particular, it argues that cultivating trusting relationships, and building one’s stock of social capital goes a long way toward enhancing crime control partnerships across government—serving to unite what may otherwise be disparate actors, and enabling efficacious and cooperative interagency partnerships.

This article begins by exploring the nature of crime on the waterfront, its control, and the demand for “networked-policing” and interagency partnership. Next it canvasses some of the scholarly debates surrounding policing partnerships, and emphasizes the increasing importance of interagency collaboration for authorities serious about crime control. The findings from the two case study ports (in metropolitan Los Angeles and Melbourne) are then discussed. They illustrate how crucial trust is to interagency collaboration, encouraging cooperation when in abundance, or preventing collective activity when lacking. In concluding, this article considers the implications of these findings, and suggests that bolstering trust, eschewing conflict, and building social capital requires a careful reinvention of several structural processes and cultural factors.

Controlling Crime on the Waterfront: The Demand for Partnership

The waterfront is considered by many to be vulnerable to criminal activity and exploitation for unlawful purposes (e.g., Baker & McKenzie, 2012; Morton & Robinson, 2010). While the overwhelming majority of business, commerce, and people that flow through ports do so legitimately, a proportion of this traffic is known to be illicit (Australian Crime Commission, 2009; Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, 2009; Australian Federal Police, 2009). Previous commentary on organized crime and trafficking networks has shown that illicit traders, such as those moving drugs, weapons, protected wildlife, humans, or other illegitimate goods frequently make use of international shipping lines by concealing contraband in cargo as a way of moving it across borders—using the port as the “gateway” (Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, 2009; Australian Crime Commission, 2009; Australian Federal Police, 2009; Sher & Marsden, 2003; United Nations, 2009, 2010). Other vulnerabilities include the threat of terrorism; where unprecedented growth of the maritime transport industry has rendered it susceptible to exploitation by militant groups. An act of terrorism in the maritime domain could have serious consequences for the world economy, as a substantial disruption to cargo flows would likely bring international trade to its knees (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2003). The risks themselves are numerous, and are not limited to the integrity of cargo or the supply chain, but could also entail the loss of human life and physical assets such as vessels, facilities, and equipment.

Recognizing these threats, many governments have taken steps to safeguard waterfront environments from such illicit activity. In the United States and Australia (as well as in in other Western nations) governments have engaged in a new form of networked-policing (see Loader, 2000), comprising an elaborate mix of both law enforcement and regulatory approaches to address these perceived threats. The first of these two approaches (law enforcement), is one that revolves around traditional conceptions of “what the police do”, where authorities are empowered to undertake routine investigatory and/or patrol responsibilities within specific jurisdictional boundaries. In broad terms, police may be involved at a national level (with respect to intelligence gathering or operations of national significance), or at a local level (undertaking landside/waterside patrols, responding to incidents etc.). As both of these governments have become more aware of the threats associated with transnational organized crime and terrorism (especially in the wake of September 11, 2001), local and federal law enforcement agencies have increasingly been endowed with additional funds, resources and opportunities to expand their capabilities. In addition, the implementation of specialized units and task forces with specific counterterrorism or maritime security mandates (e.g., water patrols, dive teams, underwater surveillance) have also become commonplace.

This new form of networked-policing on American and Australian waterfronts, however, do not rest solely with law enforcement, but also incorporate the regulatory activities of a host of “other” emergent government agencies (independent of law enforcement). There currently exists a raft of international treaties, comparable domestic laws, and regulations that have been implemented for the express purpose of building these regulatory approaches, while also tackling the security risks inherent in the waterfront environment. Following 9/11 in particular, many preexisting regulatory authorities (such as the United States Customs Service, and Australian Customs Service) were renamed and found their traditional “missions” (whose heritage duties included tax and duty collection) redefined to include security related functions. In addition, the emergence of terrorism as a major security threat also prompted these governments to create a new brand of regulatory authority (e.g., the Transportation Security Administration in the United States, and the Office of Transport Security in Australia) to administer new security regulations that redefined screening (passenger/cargo), access control, critical infrastructure protection, and border security.

Although there is considerable divergence with respect to the primary functions undertaken by the myriad of law enforcement and regulatory organizations involved in policing the waterfront in both countries, it is important to stress that these two distinct approaches do not operate in isolation of one another in either case. Rather, in both instances they have, over time, been rolled out to complement one another, thus enabling law enforcement and regulators to seamlessly collect/disseminate intelligence, undertake joint operations, and draw upon the assets, resources, manpower, skills, and expertise of one another as part of a broader security strategy—one where no single agency fights crime alone.

Some Theoretical Reflections on Interagency Partnership

Over the past three decades, a palpable shift has occurred across modern states, whereby government institutions have favored decentralization, and embraced more collaborative forms of governance. This shift is one that has dramatically affected criminal justice systems, and significantly changed the way in which policing agencies view crime problems and ultimately seek to address criminogenic conditions—moving from a crime control paradigm that espoused agency “independence” to one characterized by robust “cooperation,” “coordination,” and “partnership” (Bayley & Shearing, 2001; Hughes & McLaughlin, 2002). A growing body of opinion across both government and academia has suggested that this new paradigm shows tremendous promise, and have praised the crime control benefits of a coordinated effort in policy formation, information sharing, and service delivery. Some scholars have, however, noted that initializing and maintaining interagency partnerships can present their own set of challenges, because responses from partnering authorities always run the risk of becoming disparate and dysfunctional (instead of coordinated), lacking in “coherence,” “overall rationale,” and “systematization” (Young, 1992). Moreover, Crawford (1997) suggests that problems may arise in that agencies could become embroiled in conflict and caught up in “politics,” rather than being mutually supportive. Such scenarios can stymie active collaboration and the delivery of core services, and ultimately propagate “partnerships [that] are in name only,” which are at best “temporary working arrangements” (Roth et al., 2000, p. 20). To overcome these challenges, Crawford (1997, p. 56) contends that practitioners must be “urged to form horizontal ‘partnerships’ which cut across vertical bureaucratic imperatives” that may serve to promote conflict.

Given the paradoxical nature of interagency collaboration (i.e., potential benefits versus potential conflict), the move towards partnership must arguably be approached with caution. While on one hand, partnerships should promote consensus, communication, the sharing of knowledge, values, and mutually shared goals; on the other, “the reality of competition, conflict, and organizational autonomy remain essential characteristics of criminal justice” (Crawford, 1997, p. 60). Given this contradiction, how might such a dramatic shift in policy rhetoric—from “independence” to “partnership”—adversely impact upon the manner in which these institutions come together and deliver services? More importantly, the question remains as to whether contemporary policing institutions are capable of overcoming social constraints and conflict, and actually work together to meet the demands of interagency partnerships. This article seeks to answer these questions—and in particular, examines the extent to which trust plays a role in this balancing act, and builds the social capital necessary among authorities to allow “horizontal” partnerships to cut across “vertical” bureaucratic imperatives (and eschew conflict).

The Trust-Social Capital-Partnership Nexus

The concepts of trust and trustworthiness have been widely debated across the social sciences, and have often been framed as being a social “lubricant” (e.g., Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 2000); greasing the wheels of both economic and social transactions that may otherwise have proved too costly or time consuming. As such, trust is seen as playing a complementary role in facilitating network access to resources, and therefore features prominently in studies of social capital (Field, 2003). In fact, many scholars (e.g., Coleman, 1988; Fukuyama, 1995; 2002; Putnam, 2000) go so far as to advocate the significance of trust as a requisite element of creating social capital. In broad terms, they maintain that the degree of trust between actors across social networks is a precursor to the creation of social capital, or put another way, social capital is construed as a capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a social environment.

For Fukuyama (1995), trust is considered to be the basis of social order. He believes that communal action requires an abundance of social capital (which is very much dependent on mutual trust), and that such action cannot occur spontaneously without it. Moreover, he theorizes that actors who engage with other actors across high-trust environments have greater access to resources, with greater ease, and at a lesser cost than those who engage in low-trust environments. He believes this is the case because the trust inherent in the social context ensures that the actors across a given social environment operate according to a common, mutually agreed set of norms. Effective collaboration in this sense is regarded as an outcome of trust—operating as a social lubricant that encourages cooperation, particularly in the absence of sanctions or rewards (Winter, 2000). Further, Fukuyama (1995) anticipates that cooperation among actors who seek to engage in low-trust environments will be far more burdensome. He suggests that under such circumstances where social capital lacks, cooperation can only occur when trust is substituted with systems of strict formal rules and regulations, which can be negotiated or imposed, disputed and litigated, with decisions being enforced by authorities—using whatever coercive or other measures are available.

In the field of criminology, the significance of trust and related concepts such as social capital and collective efficacy have been widely documented (see Dupont, 2006; Hawdon, 2008; Pino, 2001; Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). Much of the theoretical work has regarded these concepts as being a catalyst for collective engagement, and useful in terms of studying and evaluating collaborative crime control activities—as a measure of success, failure, and effectiveness in cutting across such cooperative endeavors.

This article draws upon the theorizations discussed above, and argues that social capital born of trusting interagency relations is key to enabling efficacious cooperative partnership between policing agencies (law enforcement and regulators) on the waterfront. This argument is developed in the two case studies (United States and Australia), where the results clearly showed that cooperation was very much reliant upon trust, and when lacking, collaboration was stunted. Therefore, these interrelated concepts of social capital and trust should lie at the heart of the discourse on interagency collaboration. Partnerships characterized by conditions rich in social capital are better equipped and more amenable to fostering meaningful cooperative engagement.

Method

This article evaluates the nature, and extent of the trust that permeates relational ties among interagency partners on the waterfront. In doing so, it draws upon qualitative data derived from semi-structured interviews conducted in 2009 and 2010 with government agents/employees/officers. Interviews were undertaken in numerous locations (depending upon where participants were situated), although most took place in metropolitan Los Angeles (at the Los Angeles/Long Beach Port Complex) and Melbourne (the Port of Melbourne). The data gathered during these interviews revealed the nature of the interagency partnerships at these sites (i.e., degree of involvement/engagement), and the extent to which these relationships were trusting.

Population and Sampling Procedures

The impracticalities of interviewing hundreds (if not thousands) of individuals involved in networked-policing at the ports of Melbourne and Los Angeles/Long Beach led to the consideration of larger units of analysis for this study: the government agencies with whom these individuals were affiliated. Of specific interest to this research were those “networked” agencies that have a hand in the authorization and/or delivery of security services at these ports. In identifying this population, such a “hand” was circumscribed as having legal/regulatory obligations for providing, overseeing, supplementing, or exercising power in relation to matters pertaining to criminal activity, law enforcement, or security on the waterfront. Accordingly, organizations surveyed were enforcement agencies involved in policing and intelligence gathering, as well as regulators that have a stake in maritime security, border protection, critical infrastructure protection and/or emergency services (see Table 1 for a complete list).

Table 1.

Public Organizations Involved in the Authorization/Delivery of Security.

Category	Delineation	Units of analysis Melbourne, Australia	Units of analysis port complex, United States
Law enforcement and intelligence agencies	Federal agencies	Australian Crime Commission (ACC) Australian Federal Police (AFP) Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC)	Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) United States Citizenship and Immigration (USCI)
	State police	Victoria Police (VICPOL)	California Highway Patrol (CHP)
	Municipal/local area police	N/A*	LA County Sherriff’s Department (LASD) LA Police Department (LAPD) LA Port Police Department (LAPP) Long Beach Police Department (LBPD)
Regulatory authorities	Coast guard	N/A†	US Coast Guard (USCG)
	Customs authority	Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBP)	US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
	Other federal regulators	Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) Attorney Generals Department (AGD) Office of Transport Security (OTS)	Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Maritime Administration (MARAD) Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
	State regulators	Victoria Department of Transport (VDOT) Victoria Department of Primary Industries (VDPI)	California Office of Homeland Security (COHS) California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA)

Notes.

Australian police forces operate at the state and federal level only. Unlike the United States, Australian municipalities do not finance/maintain their own dedicated police forces, as these routine operational services are provided at a state level.

†

Australia does not have a Coast Guard operating in the same capacity as the United States. In Australia, the comparable duties undertaken by the USCG have been delineated across various other government portfolios. For instance, in Melbourne, the public waterfront security mandate is overseen by ACBP, OTS, and VICPOL.

In order to tap these units of analysis, this research relied on representatives from the above organizations as the units of observation. Accordingly, these representatives were identified and selected using a purposive technique known as key informant sampling, where highly knowledgeable “elite” individuals were approached to discuss the actions undertaken by their respective organizations and the individuals therein. This common qualitative sampling method was appropriate given the aims and nature of this research—enabling the canvassing of officials hailing from a wide spectrum of public security partners, while at the same time providing detailed illumination of the complex social issues driving interagency partnerships on the waterfront (see Marshall, 1996 for an insightful discussion of the appropriateness of using such purposive sampling approaches in qualitative research).

Informants in this study were identified through an Internet search and by word of mouth, and included police chiefs and their officers, customs officials and investigators, as well as policymakers, compliance inspectors, and other regulatory officials. In all, interviews were carried out with 29 participants in Australia (12) and the United States (17). Further reference to specific organizations and/or names is not appropriate due to ethical considerations to preserve anonymity and respect the confidentiality of participants. Although the range of participants was extensive, it was not possible to interview a representative from every single group identified in Table 1. It was nevertheless possible to glean sufficient insight into these unobserved organizations by asking every participant in-depth questions about the exchange relationships between their organizations and all others (observed and unobserved). The abundance of interviews and the wide cross section of organizations surveyed, made possible the incidental triangulation of information, and generated a database of transcripts that yielded sufficient information to offer insight into the trust norms that drive interagency partnerships among all authorities operating on the waterfront.

Measuring Trust Among Interagency Partners

In order to methodically assess the degree of trust among interagency partners, this study used the transcript data to ascertain the extent to which respondents found their counterparts trustworthy. In doing so, responses were manually coded to identify respondents’ reported commitment/adherence to specific sets of “trust norms,” namely communal trust norms and exchange trust norms, which scholars in the field argue serve as the basis for individual appraisals of trustworthiness (see Braithwaite & Wenzel, 2008; Clark, 1986; Williamson & Clark, 1989). The first of these two coded sets (communal trust norms) reflect a perceived need to further a harmonious coexistence with others. Braithwaite (1998, p. 49) defines these norms as the shared beliefs that individuals/institutions are trustworthy if they conduct themselves in a manner that shows a genuine concern for the well-being of others, appreciate their needs, anticipate their difficulties, hold similar/related aspirations, and show respect and dignity. Exchange trust norms, on the other hand, relate to the preservation of self-interest, and performance assessments of others. As such, this second set of norms can be understood as shared beliefs that individuals and/or institutions are trustworthy if they conduct themselves in ways that are consistent, predictable, competent, orderly, and also fulfill commitments in a timely/efficient manner. By evaluating both of these sets of trust norms in tandem, it was possible to garner a fuller understanding of the pervasiveness of trust across relational ties, and just as importantly, flesh out the specific sources of trust driving interagency partnerships on the waterfront.

Limitations

The findings presented in the coming pages should be considered with caution due to a number of limitations. While the sampling methodology used in this study has led to a relatively small sample of “key informants” (n = 29), one can reasonably assume reliance on the qualitative data derived from these informants to draw formative conclusions regarding the current state-of-play of policing, security, and trust on the Melbourne, Los Angeles, and Long Beach waterfronts. After all, these individuals are, by all accounts, the ones whose duties include: attendance at meetings, formulating policy, making decisions about enforcement operations, documenting security plans, addressing misconduct issues, and allocating resources to security.

The professional orientation of key informants, certain institutional biases, and a lack of detailed knowledge of strictly personal information, may prejudice responses (Heckathorn, 1997). However, the approach is not inherently flawed, as highly relevant information can still be gleaned from these key informants, particularly when one considers that these officials may have a wider breadth of knowledge than the average frontline worker when it comes to partnerships (as they often are the ones coordinating with other agencies).

Lastly, these results may also not necessarily be generalizable to other interagency partnerships in other contexts. The organizational setup, institutional histories, and relationships that have developed between and among waterfront actors in Melbourne and Los Angeles/Long Beach may be unique to those locales, and the results are therefore not necessarily reflective of broader partnerships. However, given that many (if not most) of the authorities on the waterfront also work together in other settings, one may draw grander regional inferences.

Trust and Partnership Among Agencies on the Waterfront: Empirical Findings

This section details the empirical findings of this research. It begins with a discussion of the results from the Los Angeles/Long Beach (Port Complex) case study, before moving on to report on the Melbourne case study.

Interagency Collaboration and Trust at the Port Complex

In Los Angeles there exists a labyrinthine network of actors (listed in Table 1) that come together to form interagency partnerships through a variety of arrangements on the waterfront. These include permanent ongoing bodies (e.g., task forces and fusion centers), temporary joint operations to combat specific crimes for a specified length of time, committees, and consultations between agencies formalized through legally binding MOUs, as well as informal ad hoc communications. The interview data showed that interagency partnerships were extremely flexible, typified by deeply engrained mentalities of understanding, sharing, openness, and exchange. In fact, virtually every government respondent questioned in relation to this research praised the accurate lines of communication and the interdependence between agencies. As one senior police official suggested:

US-16: I would have to say that southern California especially would have the best communication system—and I’m not talking radios, I’m talking men and women at an executive level, let alone the street cop level, talking to each other and sharing information . . . Everybody puts their egos aside, everybody sets their ranks aside and it is just important to get the job done. This does not mean you should lose your individuality, or does it mean that you lose the specialty of the agency you belong to, but you realize that at the end of the day you truly need each other, and the fact of the matter is that if an incident happens, the next guy in the next city or county or whatever, or across the street in a different uniform, hurts in the same way you do and bleeds the same color blood. It is a strange cultural concept.

The resiliency of these relational ties can be explained by the presence of strong trust norms and an abundance of social capital. These norms were shown to promote a willingness on the part of involved parties to assume certain risks based on a confidence that others would share similar goals, be mutually supportive of one another, and reciprocate goodwill. To understand the source of this goodwill and the extent to which trust and social capital imbue interagency relations on the waterfront, it is necessary to assess the pervasiveness of, and adherence to, both exchange trust norms and communal trust norms.

Exchange Trust Norms in Los Angeles

Exchange trust norms played a significant role in affirming the social ties between interagency partners at the Port Complex. Government respondents were found to rely regularly upon performance-based judgments of their peer agencies, and placed substantial weight on such norms as competence, predictability, reliability, authority/control, resourcefulness, effectiveness, orderliness, and timeliness. As an example, numerous respondents emphasized the importance of “status” in determining the credibility, competence, and reliability of their partners. Judgment of other organizations was frequently based upon the adequacy of their training, their powers, authority, and access to resources. Generally, there appeared to be recognition that partner agencies were sufficiently accredited and justified in their positions (US-13; US-14; US-16).

Other exchange trust norms relating to efficiency, effectiveness, and resourcefulness were also invoked by government authorities to substantiate appraisals of the trustworthiness of peers. These appraisals were generally quite positive, with the vast majority of respondents supporting a common view that interagency partners could be trusted and relied upon in a support capacity, through the coordination and supply of assets and equipment (US-10; US-16), by offering unique specialized skills and expertise (US-11; US-12), by providing additional power and authority over a particular location or situation (US-12; US-16), and by providing additional personnel should the situation warrant (US-04; US-16). Elaborating on this point, one senior police officer refers to an institutionalized “code” of exchange at the Port Complex, where there is an expectation among authorities that other agencies are committed to lending support without hesitation. He suggests for example that:

US-16: [They] will back us up, and we will back them up on some of their radio calls, on traffic stops—if [their] cars have stopped someone and the occupants seemed to be questionable or the officer that makes a stop does not seem to have the upper hand, our units will stop and assist the officer until he or she says everything is [okay] and everybody goes on their way.

Authorities have even gone so far as to enshrine exchange trust norms in shared operational models. One such model, known as the Incident Command Structure (ICS), provides a standardized framework for which multiple responding agencies have all agreed to defer control to the first responder, thus theoretically eschewing institutional posturing and individual egos, and instead install a model of control whereby agencies can have confidence that other agencies will conduct themselves in a manner that is orderly, predictable, and efficient (US-13; US-14; US-16). Given the diversity of responsibility across the 17 authorities observed at the Port Complex, trust in shared operational processes (such as the ICS) goes a long way towards reducing the potential for tension and conflict. The ICS is not however, the only mechanism for promoting exchange. The proliferation of task forces among law enforcement authorities over the past decade has also served an important role in building exchange trust norms. Task forces such as the ICE-led Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST), the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), the LA County Sherriff-led CARGO-CATS, and Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC) offer opportunities for authorities to work together in an orderly and constructive fashion, and where they are able, through joint ventures, come to rely upon other organizations to assist with their operational responsibilities. This research found that task force participants generally lauded the success of these ventures in terms of tangible benefits such as intelligence gathering and operational capabilities. These gains not only led to gains in effectiveness, but also resulted in favorable impressions of the other agencies involved (US-11; US-12; US-13; US-15; US-16).

Communal Trust Norms in Los Angeles

As with exchange trust norms, there was evidence to suggest that communal trust norms also substantially contributed to the building of social capital and the relational ties at the Port Complex. Government respondents routinely cited an appreciation for such norms, reporting their interagency partners to be trustworthy because (a) they operated in ways that exhibited a genuine concern for the well-being of their partners, (b) they appreciated and understood the needs of others, (c) they held similar goals and aspirations, and (d) they showed respect and dignity toward others. For most respondents, the trust that strengthened interagency partnerships was not merely a product of the exchange norms built through predefined agreements like MoUs and the ICS, but was augmented to include this overarching communal element.

The apparent ubiquity of shared values among authorities at the Port Complex, and the commitment towards communal trust norms as articulated above has been a relatively recent development. Virtually every government respondent interviewed during the course of this research identified the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States as the watershed in the evolution of the relational ties connecting interagency partners at the Port Complex. For most, 9/11 was seen to be “a wake-up call” (US-22) and led to a complete reshaping of the security landscape in terms of opening the lines of communication and information exchange. In a new operating environment when “there is too much at stake” (US-13), agencies that may have previously found themselves isolated from one another (e.g. federal agencies such as the FBI, ATF, DEA pitted against local players such as the LAPD, LAPP, LASD and LBPD) were expected to come together, forgo their traditional reliance upon exchange values, and adopt a far more harmonious (and communal) modus operandi. This approach was largely successful, with government respondents advocating and promoting collective engagement, common goals, and a shared understanding of issues, threats, and operations (US-09; US-11; US-13; US-16). Importantly, this shift fostered a sense of inclusiveness at the Port Complex—reinforced by the notion that “everybody [was] a critical element of getting the bad guy off the street, stopping a terrorist incident, or protecting the community” (US-16).

As another example of communal acceptance, federal authorities have sought to become far more engaged with their local partners through mechanisms like task forces (such as BEST and JTTF), planning sessions, port security committees (and subcommittees), and other joint operations (such as multiagency road blocks, where officers combine their unique resources and authority to undertake “comprehensive” vehicle checks, in addition to numerous other security related activities). Such practices have effectively eschewed the traditional, purely “nationalistic” focus of federal authorities, who have become far more amenable to working with, and understanding local partners and local issues (US-15). As one federal agent recounts, 9/11 sparked a dramatic internal shift in attitudes towards federal and local engagement:

US-11: In the past we always had the mentality “what information can’t we share with other organizations?”, whereas now we push a mentality that stresses “why shouldn’t we be sharing this information?”. It’s a complete switch.

This shift is one that has radically reshaped the policing landscape at the Port Complex, culminating in stronger ties between federal and local authorities. One police officer described the reconfiguration as a “closing of the gap” between federal and local authorities, attributable to a new-found commitment to communal trust norms through a convergence of “goals, values, and mandates” between agencies (US-13).

Despite the positive outlook described above, not all social ties were perceived to be as strong as they could have been. Respondents revealed that at times, adherence to exchange and communal trust norms waned, thus damaging trust and disrupting the relational ties between authorities. For example, one police officer conceded that all was not perfect, given the multiple agencies and personnel, the enormity of implementing the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), and the individual personalities involved in the network, there were (and continue to be) situations where personal differences impeded progress, where communication broke down, where continuity was lost, where promises were broken, and where social ties failed (US-16). Such failures, albeit an “infrequent occurrence,” were most prevalent among those relationships between federal e.g., USCG, CBP, FBI) and local authorities (e.g., LAPP, LBPD, LASD, LAPD)—particularly surrounding the issue of continuity. The mandatory rotation requirements for FBI agents and USCG officers require that they (for better or for worse) regularly rotate in and out of positions. For example, the highest ranked USCG official at the Port Complex (the Captain of the Port) holds his/her position for a maximum term of 2 years, at which point a new individual is appointed. With each new face comes a clean slate with many uncertainties from which exchange and communal trust norms must be rebuilt. Ongoing personnel changes certainly generate some positives (e.g., new ideas and perspectives), but they also provide pause for other network players to step back and reexamine the credibility of the person/agency and to reevaluate prior appraisals of trustworthiness.

Looking beyond the Port Complex for a moment, it is necessary to acknowledge the fact that interagency coordination and cooperation across the Los Angeles metropolitan region (and indeed throughout the United States) has historically not been particularly good. At times, relational ties have been known to suffer from substantial (and highly publicized) breakdowns and institutional tensions. By way of example,

During the Los Angeles riots of 1992, [LAPD] Chief Darryl Gates requested National Guard support from the Governor’s Office—which took three days to arrive—rather than call the [LASD] for additional manpower, which could have arrived in one hour. A 2002 shooting inside LAX drew a relatively fast and overwhelming response (some 425 officers from ten different agencies arrived on the scene), but tensions between agencies ran high and it was unclear who had command of either crisis management or emergency response. In May 2004, when a faulty transponder mistakenly signaled the hijacking on a Singapore Airlines flight, federal officials failed to relay the false alarm to local authorities. As a result, LAX Airport Police stormed the plane—with live ammunition. Once again, several agencies subsequently argued about who should have been in charge, with the FBI and [LAPD] agreeing that Airport Police had violated protocols, and the Airport Police and [TSA] insisting that appropriate action had been taken (Zegart, Hipp, & Jacobson, 2005, p. 186).

Although none of these examples pertain directly to the Port Complex, most of the authorities involved in the LA riots, or at LAX also share important responsibilities on the waterfront. It would perhaps be naive to suggest that the social ties between authorities at the Port Complex were completely uninfluenced by the same institutional tensions that likely characterized the abovementioned failures.

Nevertheless, respondents interviewed for this study did not regard these factors as completely detrimental to these intergovernmental social ties. Although undeniably a source of strain between authorities, the attitudes of most involved tended to suggest that the Port Complex was a tightly knit network that was mostly isolated from the “politics” that have historically beleaguered policing in the region (and elsewhere across the United States). Relationships at the Port Complex might bend, but preexisting trust norms prevented them from breaking (US-11; US-16). Notwithstanding these challenges, the commitment to both exchange and communal trust norms appeared to resonate strongly across the ties connecting waterfront authorities together, allowing for relationships to thrive, and for social capital to be built and partnerships to prosper.

Interagency Collaboration and Trust at the Port Of Melbourne

As was the case in the United States, interagency partnerships in Melbourne also coalesced around permanent ongoing bodies, temporary joint operations, committees, and consultations between agencies (although their specific configurations varied). However, unlike their American counterparts, Australian waterfront officials were not convinced that trust and social capital was widespread. Rather, the narratives depicted relations among interagency partners that were somewhat languishing, with concerns frequently being raised over the quality of engagement. For example, two locally based officers lamented the nature of exchange on Melbourne’s waterfront:

AU-21: [The effectiveness of intelligence sharing] depends on who you’re talking to, and when you’re talking to them. In reality, there are liaison officers and they attend the Port Intelligence Committee, but [it was a] personal friendship [with] one of the analysts from the AFP which is how that exchange started and they did really give information—but only after the fact. Customs gave us a lot more, and ASIO was quite happy to hand over everybody else’s information, but not their own . . . From my perspective, the AFP under-utilized [our organization] in the fact that there is a lot of information that we have got that they don’t bother using and cracks form because of it. Competing or not competing—they should use us as an asset as far as that’s concerned, and they won’t tell us anything.

AU-20: In the case of any major, major hugely significant thing, there’s going to be involvement at different levels. But for everyday security, everyday service officers, [it is] not going to happen. It would be a significant operation for them to get in and seek involvement from [us].

The lack of prosperous exchange reported above was arguably due to a scantness of trust lubricating relational ties between authorities. This case study produced little in the way of evidence to indicate widespread trust. Instead, it suggested that the norms that did exist (and there were some), only occasionally produced positive outcomes for government—and certainly not to the extent that promoted a generalizable willingness and commitment among authorities to blindly assume risks. Moreover, it was found that as a result of ineffectual bonding, agencies often proclaimed independence from one another, and had a tendency to undertake their operations in isolation. This is not to say that interagency partnerships on Melbourne’s waterfront were entirely devoid of trust, and that authorities always acted independently. As discussed below, the evidence suggests that most agencies did work together in some manner. However many (if not most) of these ties were not typically eased by an abundance of social capital, but were instead made possible through a system of formal processes. The following paragraphs reveal the nature of trust among waterfront participants, and the extent to which communal and exchange trust norms impacted upon the availability of social capital, and ultimately the functionality of interagency partnerships in Melbourne.

Exchange Trust Norms in Melbourne

Exchange trust norms were absolutely paramount in shaping the interagency relations on Melbourne’s waterfront. Australian government respondents, like their American counterparts, were also found to rely heavily upon performance-oriented judgments of their peer agencies, and placed considerable reliance on such norms as competency, orderliness, predictability, resourcefulness, reliability, and efficiency. However, as much as the perceptions of these norms among Australian authorities led to the building of interagency trust, they also, unlike the American case, led to a subsequent unraveling of some of these partnerships.

In particular, the norms of predictability and orderliness proved, above all else, to be highly desirable. The connections between interagency partners (particularly around communication, information exchange, joint operations, and resource sharing) were often cited as being highly process-oriented, and based upon formalized codes of conduct dictated through legislation, MoUs, and other legal mechanisms (AU-01; AU-02; AU-17; AU-18; AU-19; AU-23). For example, one senior federal regulator describes the basis of his agency’s relationship with the state police, stating that:

AU-02: I have got a peer in the Victorian Water Police, the Superintendent down there, who I liaise with regularly. We have a broad memorandum of understanding between the two organizations, which . . . provides a framework for the sort of activity that we will undertake. Who will take the . . . lead role in particular types of activities depending on the nature [of the incident], and just agreements around cost-sharing and how we might go [about] doing media approaches. So [it is] just a broad framework around general activities.

Moreover, within these established processes there also lay several preconceptions around the notions of status and credentialing, where, like in the United States, agencies (and the people within them) were deemed to be credible based upon their status as a law enforcement organization, and the clearance levels that they held (e.g., highly protected, classified, top secret). Numerous respondents were clearly willing to place considerable trust and faith in these status mechanisms, in the belief that other agencies would in turn abide by, and conform to the rules and expectations of this system of exchange (AU-17; AU-18; AU-19). Moreover, this trust in the process (and thus other organizations) was not confined to information exchange, but also extended to operations:

AU-18: On an operational level, once again . . . we’ve got memorandums of understanding. It just takes a phone call and they [Customs] say that they may need to go on board a vessel for a particular reason, and they [may] not tell us what the reason is, and we respect that because as an investigative agency they have got that right. As a risk mitigation we just need to know what sort of risks are associated with doing the job.

In the same way that policing and intelligence gathering agencies like VICPOL, the ACC and the AFP draw upon the abovementioned processes as a basis for trust in others, these authorities also demonstrated a conscious commitment towards these very same processes and principles, championing their status as being both credible and reliable agencies in order to engender the trust and continued support of others (AU-01; AU-17; AU-18; AU-23). This point was articulated eloquently by another senior police official, who stated:

AU-17: Why should other [agencies] trust us? It is because every member of my group has a high-level security clearance. So [others] know that we have the ability, that we have the professionalism to maintain their classified material. We have got a proven track record and are able to maintain that trust.

However, the strong commitment to these norms also served as a notable source of strain and frustration between some interagency partners. This was particularly the case when these preconceived expectations of orderliness were not met between state and federal authorities:

AU-17: One of the largest hindrances is the flow of information between VICPOL and the federal government due to the classification of information in that these agencies are reluctant to let go of information, and if something is classified you need to get permission from the person who has made that classification before it can be sent, and that is a problem for sharing security information. As a result, it is all just too hard and that information does not actually get passed along.

In fact, this scenario often resulted in respondents perceiving their “partners” actions as being ineffectual and unpredictable, where the flow of information was not seen to be orderly, and where relations were, as a result, deemed to be unreliable. This situation was one that reportedly arose between some of the major policing stakeholders on Melbourne’s waterfront (especially between the AFP and VICPOL), with officers close to the source questioning the efficacy of sharing processes (particularly ad hoc arrangements), citing “interagency tensions” and “competitiveness” as representing substantial relational blockages among the policing and intelligence gathering agencies operating in the state of Victoria (AU-02; AU-20; AU-21; AU-23). As is common among Australian police practitioners (see Hufnagel, 2011), concerns over state/federal politics on the waterfront led officers to, advocate for a restructuring of the rules governing information exchange and interoperability, to include more formal processes and legal frameworks that might further ease said tensions (AU-20; AU-21; AU-23). While there was no evidence to suggest that these exchange norm blockages rendered interagency relations untenable, or completely devoid of trust, the prevalence of such views across the core policing agencies clearly had some negative implications for the overall efficacy of crime control activities on the waterfront.

Communal Trust Norms in Melbourne

In addition to the exchange trust norms that have been described above as being paramount to shaping the relational ties bonding the various government authorities in Melbourne, communal trust norms also affected agency relations. However, unlike in the United States, where adherence to trust norms was regarded as a boon to interagency relations, assessments of communal norms in Australia often only served to stunt collaboration. Before addressing this latter assertion however, it would be misleading not to point out that most (if not all) of the representatives of each of the agencies interviewed professed to having an unwavering respect for their fellow agencies, and a genuine overarching concern for their peers to “do well” and achieve positive and successful outcomes (AU-02; AU-03; AU-13; AU-17; AU-18). In turn, these agencies also took solace in the fact that their peers were “on their side” and too had an interest in their success. As one police officer stated, “you don’t want somebody else to fail. You don’t want them to fall off the perch if they are struggling” (AU-19).

Despite the good intentions reflected in these comments, there was little evidence of adherence to communal norms in a day-to-day sense. From an operational perspective, Australian respondents rarely articulated that they believed their partners appreciated their own distinct needs, or that they held similar or overlapping goals and aspirations. Rather, there was a remarkable disconnect between agencies that culminated in a distinct “division of labor”. The interview data very much supported a tendency among agencies to principally operate within their prescribed mandates, and were quick to delineate their specific responsibilities and obligations from other organizations. By way of example, one federal official offered a clear distinction of some of these discrete roles, stating that:

AU-02: One thing we need to clarify is that Customs and Border Protection does not have a specific port security responsibility. That is the responsibility of the OTS which oversees that, the port operators and people that operate in that environment who have responsibilities specifically for port security. [Customs] role . . . is best highlighted by [the] recent name change around border protection . . . [it] links into port security, but in a day-to-day sense [it does not] have a role for policing . . . or security in the port. It’s very much the movement of goods, people and vessels across the border.

Such views were common amongst other authorities as well. There was a Federal police force tasked with enforcing ‘crimes against the Commonwealth’, a state police force concerned with state laws and public safety, other federal agencies such as the ACC and ASIO that were primarily concerned with intelligence gathering, state bodies like VDOT with concerns over emergency management, and other regulators like the OTS whose ambit of responsibility was precisely defined in its enabling legislation - the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act (AU-23; AU-18; AU-19; AU-13).

The desire for cohesion and interoperability that was observed to be so engrained among American authorities in Los Angeles/Long Beach was less apparent in Melbourne. Rather, agencies were far more likely to be regarded as pigeonholed within their own distinct areas, and would sometimes be perceived as “on a different page,” and of limited use to others outside their own domain. To this end, these results overlapped considerably with research undertaken on Australian policing partnerships by Fleming (2006, p. 90), who argued that “inter-organizational activity [was] not a major focus or commitment for management or operational personnel generally”. There was evidence of a certain degree of “tunnel vision” taking place on Melbourne’s waterfront, with nearly every actor annunciating the clear distinctions (i.e., roles, responsibilities, and duties) between one agency and the next. Such views served to widen the gaps and create barriers between authorities; exemplified by one local officer who declared that:

AU-20: You can’t depend on the likes of the OTS, because they are a regulating body [and] not an enforcement body. Customs [also] have a particular role, but they don’t have roles like us, like a policing organization.

While there have certainly been numerous success stories of interagency partnership in Melbourne over the past decade, substantial blockages persist. One such blockage revolves around what one senior police official described “disjointed”, “duplicated”, and “overlapping” legislation, complaining in particular, that the same concepts (e.g., the definition of the term “critical infrastructure”) were often defined differently among and between federal and state statutes. These inconsistencies were reported to have given rise to confusion over the provision of regulatory responsibility and oversight, and adversely affected the manner in which the various authorities were able to carry out their duties both efficiently and effectively (AU-17). A second, and far more deep-seated blockage evident in the interviews was the perceived organizational tensions between the agencies operating on Melbourne’s waterfront—in particular, between the AFP and VICPOL. Such tensions were found to be relatively widespread across the network, with observations being made by officers of an element of “competitiveness”, “historical rivalry”, and a degree of “turf protection” among these agencies (AU-02; AU-21; AU-20; among others). While these reflections are no doubt of a personal nature, and are not necessarily reflective of entire organizations, it is worth noting that such ingrained tensions between state and federal agencies (and especially the AFP and VICPOL) have been documented elsewhere in Australian policing literature (e.g., Hufnagel, 2010).

These partnerships were unlike the shared model described in the previous case study where interagency collaboration was highly coordinated and systematized through a diverse range of activity-oriented task forces (e.g., BEST for border enforcement, JTTF for terrorism, CARGO-CATS for container theft, etc.). By contrast, Australian agencies were perceived to be somewhat parochial, operating in line with their own clearly defined spheres of influence (e.g., AFP with Commonwealth offences, VICPOL with state offences, OTS with regulatory oversight, ACBP with border enforcement, etc.). It is worth noting that some of these issues have not gone unnoticed, and have, at least in some Australian jurisdictions, begun to be addressed. For example, the New South Wales Crime Commission has alongside its partners in the AFP, NSW Police, the ACC and ACBP, recently formed the POLARIS task force to investigate criminal activity at Sydney’s Port Botany. This task force, like the JTTF or BEST at the Port Complex, was established to enable a far more coordinated and effective joint approach toward such investigations; one which would help to eschew some of the historical tensions between authorities. As one observer close to POLARIS suggested:

AU-23: Relationships between agencies [are crucial] when you’re working within that joint environment . . . We obviously want to be successful in what we do, and we took the view at the start that we didn’t want any interagency disharmony if it could be avoided. One way to do that is to have members from the different agencies working alongside each other, being responsible for the investigations whether they’ve got Commonwealth aspects or State aspects. Not trying to say, ‘okay, well this particular target in this job is a state offence so therefore the New South Wales police should be in charge of looking at that’. That just wouldn’t work; investigations are too fluid to be that prescriptive about who you’re going to put on a particular person.

While making substantial headway in Sydney, attitudes such as these, which advocate shared values and promote communal norms have not, to date, seen widespread acceptance among authorities on Melbourne’s waterfront. However, hoping to mimic some of the successes realized in Sydney, the Australian Federal Government has announced that a similar task force, dubbed “TRIDENT,” will be assembled in Melbourne during the second half of 2012 and will include participants from both federal and state authorities (Minister for Home Affairs, 2012).

In spite of the apparent lack of communal norms (and the blockages that hindered efficacious relations), interagency partnerships on Melbourne’s waterfront were nevertheless serviceable. This was largely due to the fact that most respondents were able to place faith in their evaluations of exchange trust norms, and the reciprocal ties derived therefrom. This allowed for enough social capital to be created to enable workable relational ties, and ensured that they could be activated if necessary. This point was aptly summed up by one police officer who suggested that despite the potential blockages, and problems, the connections formed between agencies boil down to the personal relations forged:

AU-19: They ring [us] up and say “can you help us out?” If we ring and say “hey, can you help us out?”, I’ve got no doubt that because of everything we’ve ever offered [them] that you would never get any problems.

The Importance of Trust and Social Capital for Controlling Crime in Two Waterfront Communities

The findings reported in the case studies showed that strong trust norms served to build social capital and drive prosperous interagency engagement in the crime control space. In the first case, American authorities enjoyed a wide range of positive and trusting relationships that built a substantial stock of social capital, lubricated social transactions, and helped mobilize collaborative crime control efforts. These prosperous and thriving ties were propagated by strong sets of trust norms that not only affirmed positive performance-based judgments of governmental peers (i.e., adherence to exchange trust norms), but also seemingly ubiquitous altruistic attitudes that championed shared goals, values, and visions (i.e., communal trust norms). This last point was significant in that agencies that may have previously found themselves isolated from one another (i.e., prior to 9/11), successfully came together, put aside their historical preconceptions of one another, and adopted a harmonious (and communal) modus operandi. This shift was one that increased the availability of social capital at the Port Complex, fostered stronger, more prosperous ties between authorities, and substantially reshaped the policing landscape for all involved parties.

The situation in Melbourne on the other hand, provided an illustrative counterpoint. There was evidence to suggest that the stock of social capital available to authorities was limited, and that interagency partnerships there were impaired by a lack of trust. In particular, the trust norms that defined interagency ties only occasionally enabled intergovernmental activities, and instead often served to stunt collaboration. As a result, this ineffectual bonding compelled agencies to operate in a parochial fashion: often undertaking operations in isolation, and harboring views that reflect a certain degree of “tunnel vision”, with nearly every authority annunciating clear distinctions (e.g., roles, responsibilities, values, goals, and aspirations) between their organization and the next. In addition, this parochialism was underscored, and perhaps even exacerbated by what some observers perceived as organizational tensions between agencies, marked by a degree of “competitiveness”, “historical rivalry”, and “turf protection”. However, in spite of these issues, agencies were still able to work past these obstacles, and mobilize their interagency ties in situations where cooperation was necessary. That said, such interagency mobilization was not always eased by an abundance of trust or the limited social capital available (as was observed in the American case), but rather made actionable through a system of formal processes and agreements that could sometimes (and sometimes not) be relied upon to deliver.

Lessons Learned From LA: Using Trust and Social Capital to Cut Across Vertical Bureaucratic Imperatives

The comparison presented above shows how crucial trust is for lubricating social ties and fostering harmonious collaborative action. From these case studies, we can learn a great deal about how agencies trust one another, build social capital, and go about cutting across “vertical bureaucratic imperatives” that may otherwise cause conflict. The principal difference between the two cases (and the differences in success) seemed to lie with perceptions of adherence to communal trust norms. The Americans in particular, showed great success in adhering to said norms, and unlike their Australian counterparts, were not likely to rely solely upon exchange trust norms, nor formalized, or legalistic frameworks (although they still existed). The formation of such widespread altruism and adherence to these trust norms at the Port Complex was neither instantaneous, nor a simple achievement, instead effecting numerous slow-moving structural and cultural changes that served to promote an inclusive mindset.

On a structural level, agencies appeared to make an effort to blur their operational lines, and include others (be they federal or local agencies) in all aspects of crime control. These ranged from daily-planning meetings (US-10), to coordinated operations (e.g., multiagency roadblocks); (US-12), from joint intelligence gathering (e.g., through JRIC); (US-13; US-14), to joint investigations/enforcement operations (e.g., through task forces such as BEST and the JTTF); (US-07; US-16). Such activities have, as Phillips (1999) suggests, effectively “consolidated” organizational (and operational) lines, and led to a convergence of goals, values, and mandates between agencies. This has promoted an attitudinal and cultural change among all those parties involved in partnerships and has substantially “closed the gaps” that had previously dogged relational ties. The American state of play, while very encouraging, does, however, fall short with respect to certain bureaucratic processes. The mandatory rotation requirements of some federal agencies for example, recurrently create the potential for the weakening of social ties among agencies. As such, the utility of such practices must be reexamined to ascertain whether the prospective benefits outweigh the downside risks.

Building trust and achieving such success in Australia will require similar slow-moving revisions that also seek cultural change through the intermingling of goals, values, and organizational mandates. As reported above, some positive outcomes are already being realized. Such strategies as effecting attitudinal shifts among agencies at Port Botany as a result of the POLARIS task force are illustrative. However, should the bulk of participant agencies on Melbourne’s waterfront wish to realize any of the benefits of efficacious interagency partnerships on a grander scale, then much work is to be done. The recent announcement and standing-up of multiagency waterfront task forces in Melbourne, Perth, and Brisbane will, judging from the successes observed in America, certainly go a long way toward building trust and overcoming many of the barriers identified in the above discussion. That said, it will also be necessary for Australian agencies to continue to expand/adopt new ways of undertaking their core functions—by encouraging coordinated daily-planning exercises, by collecting intelligence jointly, and by continuing to engage with one another in an ongoing operational/investigatory capacity through the likes of permanent task forces. Only by adopting such practices will it be possible to overcome the many “vertical bureaucratic imperatives” that hinder cooperation in Melbourne, and effect a culture change that will allow strong, trusting bonds to grow and flourish among interagency partners.

Conclusion

This article has explored the role of trust in building social capital, and furthering interagency partnerships in a waterfront environment. Data collected from the two sites in the Los Angeles and Melbourne metropolitan areas highlighted how crucial trust and social capital were to effective interagency collaboration. Trusting partnerships that promoted relational ties rich with social capital (as was the case at the Port Complex) were better equipped and more amenable to meaningful engagement. As a consequence, interagency collaboration flourished. Conversely, partnerships that lacked the trust and social capital needed to ease social transactions (as was the case in Melbourne) were at a distinct disadvantage when it came to engaging in collaborative crime control activities. The lessons learned from the Americans in terms of building trust and social capital offer valuable insight into how future partnerships (in Australia or elsewhere) might move to overcome historical conflicts and close gaps, through structural and cultural changes, and further enhance crime control partnerships across government.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Peter Grabosky, Saskia Hufnagel, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article; as well as to all of the interview participants who kindly donated their time. I am also most grateful to the Regulatory Institutions Network, and the ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security for their generous funding contributions.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Regulatory Institutions Network, the Australian National University; and the ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security.

Author Biography

Russell Brewer, when conducting the research for this article, Russell was a Research Fellow at the ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security based at Griffith University. In 2013, he joined the Flinders University Law School as a Lecturer in its Criminal Justice Programme. Russell holds a Ph.D in Law from the Australian National University, and is presently a Departmental Visitor at that institution. His current research examines the convergence of public and private actors in providing policing and security services.

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