Epistemic (un)certainty in times of crisis: The role of coherence as a social convention in the European Neighbourhood Policy after the Arab Spring

Abstract

Academic wisdom assumes that crises precipitate institutional and policy changes in domestic and international politics. However, the relation between crises and policy outcomes is under-theorised. This article conceptualises epistemic coherence as a factor that links crises and their consequences through policy continuity. Crises expose contradictions and inconsistencies, which create uncertainty. Therefore, actors seek to recover the epistemic certainty provided by coherence, which tacitly informs, structures and simplifies actors’ interpretation of reality, even during crisis. For this reason, the role of coherence in policy ideas and institutional rules remains essential to understanding policy continuity. This article illustrates the role of coherence in the policy continuity of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the context of the Arab Spring and the changes in the institutional architecture of European Union foreign policy during 2010–2011.

Keywords

Coherence crisis epistemology European Neighbourhood Policy European Union institutions

Introduction

Crises are an immanent feature of economic, political and social history. Crises can be described as: singular or recurrent; momentary or enduring; linear or cyclical; destructive or creative; inevitable or contingent; pathological or regenerative; and systematic or episodic (Hay, 1999: 318). The notion of crises plays a fundamental role in International Relations (IR) theory and the practice of international politics. Crises attract public attention and are a fundamental part of the everyday doings of diplomats, soldiers and bureaucrats in national, transnational and international settings.

The IR discipline considers crises as an intermediate state of affairs between peace and war (Allison and Zelikow, 1999 [1971]; Carr, 2001). Crises in international politics are situations characterised by the perception of threats, the expectation of possible violence, time constraints and incomplete information in decision-making (Brecher, 2008). Therefore, crises are consistently associated with the notion of uncertainty with respect to the balance of power and security dilemmas (Herz, 1950; Morgenthau, 1948).

This understanding of international crises as precursors to international conflicts is considerably different from crises in domestic politics, conceived as exogenous shocks leading to unexpected outcomes (Ikenberry, 1988: 233–235; Krasner, 1984). By means of focusing on the outcomes, the new institutionalism literature defines crises in terms of institutional and policy changes originating from the disruption of institutional reproduction (Hay, 1996, 1999; Widmaier et al., 2007). Understanding crisis in terms of change excludes the possibility that crisis does not determine, and can even obstruct, change (Boin et al., 2008; De Vries, 2004). However, the global economic and financial crisis of 2008 initially created expectations for change in international economic policies, especially when it was compared to the Great Depression in the 1930s, which precipitated fundamental shifts in international politics. Despite this expectation, neoliberal policies continued to dominate the global economy after 2008 (Blyth, 2013). Similarly, although the European Union (EU) was severely affected by the economic crisis, leading to speculation about the disintegration of the Eurozone, the economic crisis eventually reinforced previous policy developments (De Ville and Orbie, 2014; Wigger and Buch-Hansen, 2014).

To avoid deterministic approaches to the outcomes of crises conceived in terms of policy change, the present article considers why crises may lead to policy continuity. To this end, the study addresses the following question: how can a policy continue despite an acknowledged crisis situation? The article scrutinises the epistemic aspects of crises by opening the ‘black box’ of crises’ features, reviewing how shocks are interpreted in terms of existing ideational frames (Legro, 2000a: 263–266). In contrast to the conventional view of crises as exogenous events that unexpectedly affect the established political order, crises can be conceived, following constructivist approaches, as endogenous to institutions and policies.

Drawing on the literature on epistemic (un)certainty in the social sciences, the article conceptualises epistemic coherence as a factor that links crisis and policy change or continuity. Epistemic coherence tacitly informs, structures and simplifies actors’ interpretations of reality, even in times of crisis. Despite the fact that cognitive uncertainty can trigger innovation (Bicchi, 2007), this article specifies how epistemic coherence can sometimes limit its effects to policy continuity. Building upon constructivist and historical varieties of the new institutionalism literature on the endogenous sources of institutional change and continuity (Blyth, 2002; Hay, 1999; Mahoney and Thelen, 2009; Schmidt, 2000, 2010; Streeck and Thelen, 2005), the article studies how during times of crisis, actors often seek to (re)define coherence in ideas to explain perceived phenomena and how coherence embedded in institutional rules defines the scope for deliberation and agency.

A particularly suitable illustration of the role of epistemic coherence is EU foreign policy. This is a viable field for analysis as coherence itself has long constituted the most often recurring concern in EU foreign policy (Gebhard, 2011; Nuttall, 2005). Although studies lack clear evidence of the assumed correlation between greater coherence as a precondition of effective policy action (Barbé, 2012; Smith, 2010) and criticise the search for coherence in institutional practice as nearing obsession (Mayer, 2013), it is widely taken for granted as an ideal for EU foreign policy. By interpreting coherence as an epistemic social convention, this article argues that this notion limits political controversies, thus facilitating the continuity of policies by fixing interpretations of events and consensus-seeking institutional rules.

In the context of EU foreign policy, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2004 by the EU to advance relations with Eastern European and Southern Mediterranean neighbouring countries, is a historically prioritised and deeply institutionalised area of activities consistently attracting EU attention. The analysis of the ENP is particularly relevant for two reasons. First, since its inception, this policy has been criticised as incoherent due to: the divergence between EU institutions; contradictions between the domains constituting this policy; the gap between the rhetorical expectations and the capacities of the EU to deliver on its commitments (Tulmets, 2008); a lack of legal coherence (Van Vooren, 2011); contradictory objectives of democratisation and stability in the neighbourhood (Börzel and Van Hüllen, 2014); and inconsistency between ‘words and deeds’. This incoherence has ultimately hampered policy effectiveness and credibility (Schumacher, 2012).

Second, the existing architecture of the ENP suffered a critical series of events during 2010–2011: the Arab Spring; institutional changes in EU foreign policy after the Treaty of Lisbon; and the economic crisis. Despite the widespread expectation for policy change and a widely declared necessity for reform, many analyses stressed that the approach of the EU towards neighbouring countries continued largely unaltered (Pace, 2014; Schumacher, 2012; Teti, 2012). As this article will show, the explanation for this state of affairs can be found in how coherence in ideas framed events in the EU neighbourhood and legitimised ENP Review in a continuity-prone way, and in how coherence embedded in institutional rules restricted the margin for policy entrepreneurs to promote alternative policy ideas and framed policy deliberation in terms of continuity.

This article begins by introducing the concept of epistemic coherence, and then specifies the role of coherence in policy ideas and in institutional rules as a guarantee of policy continuity in times of crisis. The article further presents the striking continuity of policy assumptions, objectives and instruments in the ENP after the process of apparent reform undertaken in the critical period from 2010 to 2011. It then illustrates how the conventional appeal to coherence in policy ideas and coherence embedded in institutional rules maintains institutional equilibrium, which, in turn, guarantees ENP continuity. Finally, the findings are summarised and their relevance is discussed.

Epistemic coherence in times of uncertainty

A crisis is a large alteration in institutions and policy sectors when the dominant set of ideas and policy assumptions, as well as the organisation of the policymaking process and established patterns of working, are at stake (Alink et al., 2001: 290–291). Crises can also affect entire political orders and call their existence and viability into question by challenging their interests, institutions, values and rules (Ikenberry, 2008: 3). Crises emerge due to the inevitable exposure of inherent contradictions in apparently unified social orders (Habermas, 1988; Streeck, 2011), and, consequently, their resolution is a decisive intervention aimed at overcoming the identified contradictions through reunification into another order (Hay, 1996, 1999).

The core of crises is thus the uncertainty created by exposed inconsistencies, contradictions and conflicts (Blyth, 2002). Uncertainty is when ‘agents cannot anticipate the outcome of a decision and cannot assign probabilities to the outcome’ (Beckert, 1996: 804). For different strands of IR theory, uncertainty originates from ambiguity or lack of available information, or the misinterpretation thereof (Rathbun, 2007). The scope of knowledge of social phenomena leaves room for indeterminacy, contingency and epistemic fragility (Best, 2008; Katzenstein and Nelson, 2013). Epistemic uncertainty is a human condition driving the constant desire for its reduction by contingent processes of sense-making through discourses and categorisations (Kessler, 2011).

Different epistemic tools for ordering and simplifying information can be employed to limit uncertainty. This is achieved by an epistemic social convention of constituting classificatory schemes on the world to organise actions in a predictable way (Nelson and Katzenstein, 2014: 362–363). Such epistemic devices can comprehend metaphors or narratives (Bougher, 2014), legal texts (Bertea, 2005), or complex econometric models (Nelson and Katzenstein, 2014), which meaningfully order information when different elements create a semblance of unity. The common feature of epistemic tools is that they are employed in practices of knowledge production aimed at representing a coherent whole (Bueger, 2015).

Coherence is therefore an epistemic category that tacitly informs and structures actors’ interpretations of reality. This category is associated with order, simplicity and comprehensiveness. However, how to measure coherence is not predetermined since ‘whether something is understood as consistent or inconsistent depends on the social situation and on the individual’ (Philips and Jorgensen, 2002: 99). Therefore, from the ontological perspective, the sense of coherence is individual/subjective, as well as social/intersubjective. Social psychology and IR literatures on knowledge production suggest that coherence as an epistemic category organises individual and collective epistemic practices.

From a social psychology perspective, coherence is seen as a fundamental principle in human cognition that shapes the processing of information (Gawronski and Strack, 2012; Turner, 2006). From a subjective perspective, coherence is associated with ordered simplicity, which reduces the paralysing anxiety of uncertainty. As in ontological security (Mitzen, 2006), actors seek coherence that ensures a subjective feeling of certainty, stability of beliefs and a sense of continuity. In their ambition to achieve epistemic certainty, actors pursue ‘reflective equilibrium’ by adjusting and testing ideas against each other to increase their coherence as a prerequisite for their justification (Rawls, 1971). Agents are more secure when they know how to justify their positions by referring to a consistent system of categories since it is assumed that coherence between different units of an epistemic structure reinforces the credibility of individuals’ statements.

In spite of seeking coherence, agents frequently suffer from cognitive dissonance when two beliefs cannot be reconciled, creating dilemmas and forcing their reconsideration (Festinger, 1957). A habitual disposition to avoid negative emotions drives actors’ search for coherence. Actors tend to cope with dissonance by adjusting their beliefs or behaviour to recover cognitive consonance (Lupovici, 2012: 816–818). They may also try to avoid cognitive dissonance by reinterpreting potentially disturbing knowledge to fit existing categories (Giddens, 1991: 188). Often complex and unrelated events can thus be perceived as coherent in the pursuit of epistemic simplification (Jervis, 1976: 319). As a result, agents instinctively perform as if their system of beliefs were coherent.

The habitual disposition to coherence is also inherently social since knowledge is produced in the framework of social relationships and is influenced by them (Adler, 2005: 19). Epistemic communities (Davis Cross, 2013) or communities of practice (Adler, 2008; Pouliot, 2010) emphasise the role of knowledge and learning in the process of group institutionalisation. Similarly, a key function of international institutions is to reduce uncertainty by providing information and institutionalising knowledge production practices (Rathbun, 2007). As a result, the sense of having a common set of epistemic practices of acquiring, validating and institutionalising knowledge integrates communities (Bicchi, 2011: 1118).

Since knowledge production is social, coherence is also socially constructed and interpreted in institutions.¹ Given that international institutions structure and diffuse knowledge by fixing classifications, categories and meanings (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999), they also diffuse the epistemic tools and standards conducive to constructing them (Nay, 2014). Coherence can be regarded as an intersubjective standard for assessing epistemic validity in a given institutional context constructed in opposition to other possible epistemic dispositions, which can emphasise, for example, contradiction or differentiation. Through institutional diffusion and internalisation by different actors, the disposition to measure coherence becomes objectified as a natural way of judging the validity of epistemic claims and can be collectively sanctioned as an institutionalised disposition, bounded to a specific social field.

In sum, crises are attributed to uncertainty when existing legitimate categories of meaning are challenged by contradictions and inconsistencies. In this sense, crisis resolution can be understood as a political struggle over the representation of a coherent vision of crisis episodes and ways of overcoming the contradictions that they reveal. The coherent vision represented by individuals’ ideas in times of uncertainty also needs to be recognised as meeting the collective standard of epistemic validity. The next section shows how this dialectic conceptualisation of epistemic coherence contributes to the current debates in the new institutionalism literature about policy continuity in times of crisis.

Analysing coherence in ideas and institutional rules in times of crisis

The recent ‘new institutionalism’ literature emphasises endogenous origins of change, attributing them, however, to different dynamics. Constructivist institutionalism emphasises the role of agency in promoting policy ideas, while some contributions within historical institutionalism stress structural factors regulating the policy process and the role of agency (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). These two approaches are analytically distinct, but operate in a mutually constitutive relationship conducive to policy change or continuity (Bell, 2011: 899; Hay and Wincott, 1998). In this way, the difference between the constructivist and historical institutionalisms is ‘one of emphasis’ (Hay, 2007: 62). Both perspectives would concede that epistemic coherence can contribute to making sense of a situation, even in times of crisis. The first approach stresses that coherence legitimises ideas as explanations of perceived phenomena and guides actors’ actions in response to crises. The second perspective suggests that coherence as a collective standard of knowledge validation is embedded in institutional rules structuring the deliberation process. In light of the division of approaches, this section discusses coherence in policy ideas from agents’ perspective and coherence embedded in institutional rules structuring deliberation, respectively. It also reflects on dialectic interactions between agents promoting structuring epistemic standards of coherence, which, in turn, often limit the scope of agency.

Crisis and coherence in ideas

Most of the recent ‘new institutionalism’ research conceptualised incremental transformative mechanisms of institutional change, attributing them to endogenous structural dynamics (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Crises as exogenous shocks seem to be neglected as a trigger of change. Nonetheless, constructivist institutionalism stresses the notion of crisis as a cause of institutional change, but emphasises that crisis episodes must be interpreted and mediated discursively since ‘even exogenous shocks must be endogenously interpreted’ (Widmaier et al., 2007: 749). As a result, crises are ‘constituted in and through narrative’ (Hay, 1996: 254), which endeavours to be portrayed as inherently coherent since the discursive construction of crisis involves ‘the mapping together of a great variety of disparate events unified through the identification of some common essence’ (Hay, 1996: 266). Crisis is a process of abstraction and narration of individual episodes ‘brought together in a unified, and deeply politicised, crisis discourse’ (Hay, 1999: 333). These narratives ‘must recruit the contradictions and failures of the system as “symptom”-atic of a more general condition of crisis’ (Hay, 1996: 254). The narrative construction of crisis determines whether and how it is perceived, defined and addressed (Blyth, 2007). Moreover, ‘a genealogy of any particular crisis would identify alternative understandings of the crisis, and with them alternative policy programmes, but alternatives that have been silenced by the noise of the successful interpretation’ (Croft, 2006: 8). Therefore, the capacity to influence the narratives of crisis can also define the way in which crisis is managed and solved (’t Hart, 1993: 41). The effects of crisis can be conceived in terms of decisive intervention in the process of institutional change when a new trajectory of institutional development is set in motion based on a renegotiated discursive order (Hay, 1999: 331–332). In a nutshell, crises are characterised by discursively exposed incoherencies and their resolution requires a renewed sense of coherence.

Discursive narratives of crisis contain policy ideas. Ideas influence the trajectory of institutional development and determine policy choices since they shape agendas, foster assumptions about alternatives and mobilise actors (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 193–197). Given that ‘ideas do not float freely’ (Risse-Kappen, 1994), policy alternatives need to be supported by policy entrepreneurs mobilising policy change (Cortell and Peterson, 1999; Walsh, 2006). If there are no policy entrepreneurs, these alternatives will not appear on the political agenda since ‘ideas without agency cannot be effective, but agency without ideas cannot provide any direction to change’ (Peters et al., 2005: 1296). Therefore, the representation of crisis also depends on actors’ competence in persuasive argumentation in a given institutional context of deliberation, including the ability to mobilise the standard of epistemic coherence in order to establish a common understanding of the situation (Hay, 1996, 1999; Risse, 2000; Schmidt, 2000: 288). Actors seek to normalise inconsistencies by interpreting crises through a system of ideas believed to be more coherent. Ideas shaping the understanding of crises are more persuasive when they are more coherent and represent a plausible understanding of crisis. As per Schmidt (2000: 283):

For the success of a discourse in times of crisis, in fact, a lot depends upon how coherent it is across related policy issues or, put another way, how well it can deal with the inevitable contradictions in cognitive and/or normative aspects of the discourse.

The most coherent, and hence persuasive, discourses are based on ideologies presenting a relatively closed system of ideas offering a vision and policy prescriptions (Schmidt, 2000: 284). The coherence between policy ideas and underlying values enhances the normative function of legitimising discourse (Schmidt, 2000: 279–281). The recognition of coherence in ideas enhances the fit between the accurate identification of problems, solutions and generalising validation. However, the renewed sense of coherence in discourse can precipitate either policy continuity or change. Policy actors can defend policy continuity if they narrate crisis episodes coherently with reference to existing ideational structures. They can also promote policy change if they narrate crisis episodes by appealing to different ideational structures.

The coherence of a discourse decreases uncertainty when different policy alternatives are available, but competing policy ideas need to gain consideration as more coherent in terms of explaining and prescribing policy options of continuity or change (Blyth, 2002; Hall, 1993; Legro, 2000b; Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 201; Walsh, 2006). Therefore, crises can even also be attributed to the interference of alternative policy ideas and the lack of coherence in existing policy. Then, the reconsideration of policy in the context of core orthodox ideas can be represented in terms of ideational coherence increasing epistemic certainty. Consequentially, the struggle for the coherence of narratives can lead to the perpetuation of existing ideas if alternative ideas are delegitimised as incoherent. As a result, policy continuity can be expected when the narrated episodes of crisis are coherent with the existing ideational structures legitimising policies. Conversely, policy change is more probable when narrated episodes of crisis are not accommodated within the existing ideational structures due to irreconcilable contradictions and incoherencies with lived experiences (Schmidt, 2000: 284–285). Then, the ideational vacuum facilitates a search for ideational alternatives giving more coherent meaning to crisis experiences.

Crisis and coherence in institutional rules

Actors diffuse policy ideas in the context of existing institutions. Different crisis narratives can alter the institutional equilibrium by framing the causes of events in order to claim political accountability for a state of affairs (Boin et al., 2008; De Vries, 2004;’t Hart, 1993). Therefore, as emphasised by constructivist institutionalism (Blyth, 2002; Hay, 1996; Schmidt, 2000), agents promoting policy ideas face institutions conceived as ‘relatively enduring features of political and social life (rules, norms, procedures) that structure behaviour’ (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009: 4; see also Olsen, 2009). Institutions create a space for policy deliberation; however, they are selective, not deterministic, since they interact with agents mediating and actualising institutions (Bell, 2011: 900–901; Hay and Wincott, 1998: 954–956). Crisis deliberation depends on institutional conditions established by rules governing the behaviour of political actors (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 197–200). Institutional settings influence crisis construction and subsequent policy development since they shape actors’ capacity to act. The ability of actors to capitalise on a crisis depends on their institutional positions, expected roles, identification with policy ideas and degree of political autonomy (Cortell and Peterson, 1999; Widmaier, 2007). As a result, the narrative of crisis episodes and policy prescriptions is a dialectical relation between the institutional context, which creates opportunities and constraints for policymakers, and the purposive strategic actors who determine their policy actions in their institutional environment (Cortell and Peterson, 1999: 180).

Epistemic coherence can also be conceived as an institutional feature that creates opportunities and constraints for actors during policy deliberation. Epistemic coherence can be institutionalised in rules structuring actors’ behaviour and procedures framing the scope for deliberation. As a result, policy ideas characterised by an individual sense of coherence still need to be recognised by involved actors and affected audiences as meeting the collective standard of coherence.

This collective standard of coherence can be institutionalised, but it can still lead to either policy continuity or change. On the one hand, a gap between the definition and enactment of a rule stipulating expected behaviour motivating institutional change (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 12–16) emerges from an epistemic sense of coherence. When existing procedures cannot address incoherencies, ‘change follows from efforts to reduce inconsistency and generate a more coherent interpretation of existing difficulties’ (Olsen, 2009: 15). The search for coherence can mobilise actors to close the gap between different interpretations, unexpected consequences and the ambiguity of institutional rules. On the other hand, policy continuity follows from the recognition that crises fit with dominant social expectations and even policy failures fit with policy prescriptions (Legro, 2000b). Hence, the meaning of the institutionalised rule of coherence is contingent and open to contestation in any given context.

The collective standard of coherence can lead to policy reproduction in organisationally fragmented milieu by shaping the scope and dynamics of institutional deliberations with respect to available policy alternatives. More specifically, whether coherence embedded in institutional rules will lead to policy continuity rather than change during institutional debates depends on two features of institutional structures: the specification and formalisation of rules reflecting their social recognition; and the recognised authority and ability of specific actors to interpret the meaning of contested rules and implement them.

The degree of formalisation of the standard of coherence is reflected in the general norms framing the scope of actions codified in legal texts and further specified in institutional procedural regulations. When different actors routinely invoke formalised rules justifying their actions, they also reflect their social recognition (Olsen, 2009). This can especially be the case when institutional diversity increases the possibility of competitively promoting new policy ideas and many autonomous policy arenas increase the possibility of policy change by representing a plurality of ideas (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991; Lieberman, 2002). Within these institutions, actors can internalise the search for policy consensus by referring to a common set of rules linking fragmented policy arenas in the common framework of interactions. Even the contestation of rules in policy processes shows that actors adhere to such rules since they attempt to give them meaning in practice (Wiener, 2004). Therefore, the standard of coherence formalised in institutional rules facilitates the criticism of alternative policy options when they disrupt codified precedence.

Institutional structures can also constrain policy change by the uneven distribution of authority (Risse-Kappen, 1994). Since the meaning of rules is context-dependent and may be contested by engaged actors, institutions may empower an arbiter to provide an authoritative interpretation of contested rules (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Institutions can also empower specific actors to facilitate the implementation of rules (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009), especially when institutional fragmentation can result in diffused authority and deadlock. The organisational structure of an institution may support processes conducive to policy consensus when actors empowered to represent the authoritative interpretation of contested rules have the prescription of guaranteeing consensus inscribed in their institutional roles.

ENP continuity in times of upheaval

The ENP was launched in 2004 as a flagship policy initiative of EU foreign policy to strengthen the EU’s relations with its eastern and southern neighbouring countries and to address those countries’ security, policy, economic and social problems. In the summer of 2010, the EU launched a review of the ENP, which was finalised with the May 2011 Communication by the European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (European Commission and High Representative, 2011a).² This period of revision was critical to the development of the ENP since both policy assumptions and the organisation of the policymaking process were at stake in view of international developments and intra-EU institutional changes. Nevertheless, even after this critical juncture, the ENP maintained striking continuity.

The ENP Review encouraged different institutional stakeholders (EU member states, neighbouring countries, civil society organisations and experts) to contribute their positions on three points: their vision for the ENP over the next 10–15 years; their immediate objectives for a five-year span; and instruments and resources to be employed. There were no apparent limitations to the possibility of reformulating the policy through the deliberative process of consultation.

Meanwhile, developments in the neighbouring countries frequently challenged the EU’s approach. The situation in most eastern neighbouring countries deteriorated and the path of reforms was uneven. The unexpected eruption of popular uprisings in the southern neighbourhood constituted a major disruption of the traditional EU assumptions about stability versus democratisation in the Mediterranean countries (Haddadi, 2006). Regime changes in Tunisia and Egypt, and civil wars in Libya and Syria, created expectations for democratisation in the Arab world, but also contributed to the spread of armed conflicts and regional instability.

The continuity of decision-making in EU foreign policy was also at stake throughout the review period. The shift in the institutional distribution of power after the enforcement of the Treaty of Lisbon and reformulation of interactions between different actors challenged every aspect of decision-making (Helwig et al., 2013). The extended responsibilities of the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) and the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) constituted a major innovation in the organisational logic of EU foreign policy. The EEAS, in an attempt to become an organ of transnational diplomacy, created uncertainty regarding its operation in practice (Missiroli, 2010). Moreover, the roles of the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU, the European Commission and the European Parliament required numerous adaptations. Therefore, it could be expected that the changes in the institutional balance of power would be reflected in policy through emphasising the ideas of the newly empowered actors.

In spite of the aforementioned challenges, the revised ENP publicised by EU representatives as an innovative policy did not change its assumptions, objectives or instruments. There was puzzling continuity in four key respects.

First, the EU approach continued to be based on the assumption of mutually reinforcing relations between democratic transformation and liberal market economy reforms sustained by asymmetric conditionality and incentives. The ENP implicitly highlighted the dominance of economy as conducive to political freedoms and democracy. The new rhetoric of social justice, respect, dignity, deep democracy, bottom-up involvement and more political sensitivity towards the realities on the ground did not cause a shift away from the liberal blueprint for democratic and economic transformation (Kurki, 2012; Teti, 2012). Support for democratisation and engagement with civil society, economic development, trade liberalisation, selected mobility, sectoral integration and regional dimensions was embedded in the ENP. For example, the apparently innovative promotion of ‘deep and sustainable democracy’ merely renames existing practices (EEAS interview, Brussels, 21 October 2013). Initiatives such as the Support for Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) Programme, Erasmus Mundus, and the Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility (NCSF), which were allegedly developed to support new priorities, hardly constitute a U-turn. The main concern of the NCSF was how this instrument ‘could be made consistent with the current operations’ (Quintet-Füle, 2010: 2) and, as said by an EU official, was not ‘just “more of the same”, but “much more of the same”’ (Rattenbury, 2011: 2, emphasis in original). Society continued as a passive beneficiary of reforms, while the involvement of civil society organisations remained subsidiary to the overall political and economic approach. As a result, the EU continued to neglect the fundamental dilemmas of the relation between political and economic freedoms (Kurki, 2014).

Second, the potential for an alternative structure of relations based on respect for equality and reciprocity remained poorly defined in the ENP Review, as can be observed in the persisting aim of externalising EU norms and rules. Since the inception of the ENP, the neighbourhood was represented as an area of conflicts, instability and poverty, which required fundamental reforms in line with the EU. Enhanced cooperation with the EU through the approximation of EU standards was seen as the recipe for stability, security and prosperity (European Commission, 2004). After the ENP Review, the underlying assumptions continued to be reformist, ‘which will entail a greater degree of alignment with EU policies and rules leading progressively to economic integration in the EU Internal Market’ (European Commission and High Representative, 2011a: 2). Consequently, the offer of concluding Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) leading to economic integration included the assumption that ‘through progressive approximation of EU rules and practices, DCFTAs require a high degree of commitment to complex and broad-ranging reforms’ (European Commission and High Representative, 2011a: 8).

Third, the employment of available diplomatic and financial instruments resulted in a continuous technocratic approach to the process of reforms. The emphasised concepts of ‘conditionality’, ‘more for more’ and ‘differentiation’ were well-established in the ENP (Füle, 2010a: 10). The label ‘the 3 Ms’ (‘money, markets and mobility’) stressed the dominant role of incentives offered by the EU to stimulate domestic reforms. The special emphasis on funding for neighbouring countries reinforced the conditionality mechanism. Even the emphasis on ‘partnership with societies’ is related to financial resources and instruments supporting civil society organisations.

Finally, the renewed ENP, conducted in the shadow of civil wars in Arab countries, retained its geographical scope and continued as a framework for long-term conflict transformation rather than conflict management. For example, despite the fact that the international intervention in Libya in 2011 is a case of the effective implementation of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine based on United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions (1970 and 1973), the EU remained reluctant to engage in a military intervention, even for humanitarian purposes (Dembinski and Reinold, 2011).

The search for coherence and ENP paralysis

Following the argument that ENP continuity originates from the interpretative schemes professed by the EU (Pace, 2014), it is argued that the conventional appeal to coherence created the conditions for policy continuity during the ENP Review. The first part scrutinises how coherence was employed to legitimise the policy ideas of individual actors. The second part shows how epistemic coherence institutionalised in rules and procedures framed policy deliberation in terms of continuity.

Coherence in ideas: There is no alternative for the ENP

The ENP Review, initiated as an ordinary institutional process and justified by the Treaty of Lisbon, was also motivated by new leaders of EU foreign policy desiring to make their mark on the policy (EEAS interview, Brussels, 21 October 2013). When the Review was launched, the ENP was considered ‘a success story with many examples of concrete achievements on the ground’ (Ashton, 2010a: 1). Consequently, there was no crisis narrative that systematically emphasised policy contradictions. Even the context of economic crisis served to justify continuing the policy of promoting economic reforms in neighbouring countries (Füle, 2010b). As a result, discussions suggested broad support for continuity based on ‘as close as possible’ political cooperation and ‘as deep as possible’ economic integration, legislative approximation and regulatory convergence (European Commission, 2011a). Beyond this rhetoric, however, the standard of coherence motivated the aspiration to close the ‘expectations gap’ and offer more ‘clarity’ in the policy approach to find, for example, an adequate balance between incentives and conditionality (Füle, 2010c, 2011a).

The crisis narrative emerged in EU institutions with the outbreak of the Arab Spring in January 2011, framing this event as a unique and volatile situation with unpredictable economic and social consequences (European Commission, 2011b: 12–14; Van Rompuy, 2011a). EU leaders and institutions displayed a sense of urgency and uncertainty when they recognised the lack of reliable information on the situation in Libya with respect to Gaddafi’s military actions against rebels. Against this background, they recognised that the divorce between ‘words and deeds’ defined the EU’s contradictory approach towards its neighbouring countries (Ashton, 2011a: 4; Cameron, 2011; Füle 2010c: 2). With self-criticism, the EU engaged in a crisis narrative featuring contradictions; for example, Commissioner Füle emphasised that the Arab Spring:

offered us a mirror … for asking important questions, such as … how long we should make compromises here and there and associate stability with autocracy, accepting that we have not always had the values in the same place as our interests. (Füle, quoted in European Parliament, 2011a)

In addition, the European Parliament noted that ‘the quest for stability has often overshadowed the values of democracy, social justice and human rights in the EU’s relations with its southern neighbours’ (European Parliament, 2011b: point G).

In view of the Arab Spring’s uncertainty, policy contradictions and recognition of failures, public calls for a ‘paradigm change’ (Durao Barroso, 2011: 3) and a ‘new strategy’ (Ashton, 2011b) framed the final stage of the ENP Review process. However, despite the fact that:

there was a large consensus among the member states that the EU needs to do something as a reaction to the revolutions unfolding in the Arab world, the member states did not have a clear understanding what that something should be. (Kostanyan, 2013)

In practice, these calls for change resulted in continuity following the lines of ‘deeper economic integration, broader market access and closer political cooperation’ (European Council, 2011a: 9).

The underlying reason for policy continuity was the lack of alternative policy ideas in the public discourse that would have facilitated different interpretative perspectives. Individual contributions to the debate recognised the existing approach as still valid and insisted on providing greater clarity and coherence in connecting different ideas to enhance the effects of policy prescriptions. The position of different member states presented during the debates about the Arab Spring confirmed support for democratic reforms and conditionality, and the relevance of financial support (Alliot et al., 2011; Frattini, 2011; Sikorski and Bildt, 2010). Consensus spread beyond the restricted circle of policymakers and bureaucrats. With few notable exceptions (Balfour, 2012), experts of leading European think tanks broadly supported conditionality and incentives, as well as a differentiation approach (Fischer and Lannon, 2011). Similarly, civil society organisations lobbying for human rights, environmental or social policies supported a more decisive implementation of the existing conditionality approach and the externalisation of EU norms. For example, a Memorandum of Brussels-based non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on the ENP starts with the bold statement that ‘the EU underuses its political conditionality’ (Quintet Group, 2010: 1).

In the context of the ENP Review, instead of different voices, there was a widely shared belief in an overall match between ideational expectations and observed policy results. The epistemic schemes of coherence legitimised the ideational hegemony and policy continuity in two ways.

First, EU representatives argued that the highly volatile situation was actually in line with policy objectives. Epistemic coherence framed the events to limit the exposure of policy gaps and contradictions. For example, Van Rompuy (2011b: 6) stressed that the Arab Spring stood for the universal aspirations of freedom and justice, which ‘are exactly the European values we want to defend’. Although the Arab Spring was represented in terms of a crisis narrative as ‘the most momentous geopolitical shock since the end of the Cold War’, it fit in ‘the long-term expansion of the area of democracy’ (Van Rompuy, 2011c: 4). The possibility of explaining developments consistently with ideas reinforced actors’ epistemic certainty. As stressed by Ashton (2011c: 2):

in a fluid situation such as this, our actions should be rooted in our core values and interests. We have every reason to back the changes now underway. Tunisians, Egyptians, Libyans and others are demanding respect for those values that are at the heart of the European ideal.

Second, the appeal to coherence framed policy failures as a result of deficiencies in orthodox policy implementation. For example, the gap between the expectations of partners and EU offers justified a more principled implementation of the existing policy (Füle, 2010c: 2). To avoid further contradictions, the renewed EU approach towards its southern neighbours should have been ‘rooted unambiguously in a joint commitment to our common values: democracy, human rights, social justice, good governance and the rule of law’ (Füle, 2011b: 3). To legitimise the results of the ENP Review, EU representatives insisted that ‘there is today much less tension between our interests and values’ (Füle, 2012: 2).

Besides these two features of coherence legitimising policy ideas, the debate concerning military intervention in Libya exemplifies how the epistemic coherence justified the continuity of the EU’s stance regarding the Responsibility to Protect doctrine contrary to policy entrepreneurs promoting a new strategy, including the no-fly zone and eventual military intervention. The humanitarian situation in Libya led France and the UK to advocate an offensive approach towards the Libyan regime as early as February 2011. President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Cameron justified the military action by seeking to avoid past errors. Both leaders drew analogies between the Libyan situation and the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995 and the Rwandan genocide. Similarly, Sarkozy justified the recognition of the National Transitional Council (NTC) before the European Council by the desire to ‘avoid a risk of “Somalisation”’ — a lack of a political interlocutor in the country once Gaddafi was called to leave (Sarkozy, 2011: 1).

Member states appealed to epistemic coherence, arguing against creating a precedent. A reluctant German chancellor emphasised that the priority was ‘to send a signal of unity, because a “divide and conquer” approach would merely serve Gaddafi’s purposes’ (Malhère and Lemoine, 2011: 10). Merkel was also reported as having asked ‘why should we intervene in Libya when we don’t intervene elsewhere?’ (Tisdall, 2011). The Polish prime minister justified his reluctant position by the need to respond to human rights violations ‘according to the same set of standards’ in order to avoid ‘ambiguity at all costs’ (Tusk, 2011). The recognition of the NTC by France as a ‘legitimate representative’ was criticised by a Dutch representative as contradicting ‘diplomatic practice’; Spain emphasised that ‘recognition must be the result of agreement among all of the countries of the European Union’; and Italy stressed the need for ‘a European decision that everyone shares unanimously’ (BBC News, 2011).

In view of these divergences, the case of the no-fly zone and the recognition of the NTC were watered down in the European Council. Instead of referencing the possibility of the use of force and the no-fly zone, the member states committed to examine, if the Libyan regime were to intensify its attack on civilians, ‘all necessary options, provided that there is a demonstrable need, a clear legal basis and support from the region’, and recognised the NTC merely as a ‘political interlocutor’ (European Council, 2011b). The ambiguity of the agreement on a no-fly zone allowed for a unitary position where all actors could see their own position reflected. However, based on the fact that the unitary character met the standard of coherence, both Sarkozy (2011) and Cameron (2011) recognised the legitimacy of EU policy continuity.

Coherence in institutional rules: No place for disagreement about the ENP

The ENP Review evolved in a conciliatory inter-institutional process steered by the European Commission consulting EU member states, the European Parliament, neighbouring countries, civil society and experts. The consultations in the autumn of 2010 reflected broad agreement on the main parameters of the policy. All actors converged around the existing policy objectives and instruments, emphasising the need for strengthening political consultations, deeper economic integration, easier mobility and increased financial cooperation. It was recognised that any changes made would need to overcome the reluctance of some EU member states, especially concerning mobility and trade (European Commission, 2011a). However, even within the context of the Arab Spring, inter-institutional relations continued to be cooperative, and, in the end, EU member states endorsed the Joint Communication presented by HR/VP and the Commission. In this context, coherence as an institutionalised rule facilitated the search for institutional complementarities and the division of responsibilities, and served to prevent policy conflicts.

In general, EU institutions understood coherence as a constant process of overcoming divergences between actors (European Commission and High Representative, 2011a: 5). Expectations related to the Treaty of Lisbon were framed in terms of increasing consistency and better coordination of different instruments and actors of EU foreign policy. European leaders internalised the rule of coherence and the ENP Review was expected to ‘make our policy more coherent’ (Füle, 2010d: 5) and to ‘follow a more holistic approach to the promotion of European Union values and interests’ (Füle, 2010e: 7). The appeal to coherence facilitated the inter-institutional operation during the transition towards the new organisational basis of EU foreign policy. In the relations between the Commission and EEAS, the notion of coherence constituted the background for the division of tasks and responsibilities enhancing institutional interdependencies (Ashton, 2010b). Under the direction of Commissioner Füle, the European Commission took charge of the ENP Review, and the Commissioner’s mandate was to be executed in close cooperation with the HR/VP. After the creation of the EEAS, the Commission retained responsibility for the ENP Review, though always with the assistance of the EEAS.

As a result, despite the highly fragmented organisational milieu of EU foreign policy, the standard of coherence embedded in institutional rules encouraged complementary input from different organs in the realm of the ENP. On the one hand, there was a recognised division of responsibilities between the general policy orientation provided by member states and the technical responsibilities delegated to the Commission and the EEAS. Although the Council recognised the leading role of the Commission and HR/VP, it framed the future of the ENP in terms of continuity by acknowledging the satisfaction with the policy presented in a progress report in May 2010 (Council of the European Union, 2010). Moreover, the Commission and the EEAS, when dealing with sensitive issues (i.e. migration or enlargement perspectives), expected orientating positions to be adopted by member states. Council declarations on the situation in Mediterranean countries framed the political response of the EU in terms of ‘new partnership’ and the support for democratic transitions, but delegated policy proposals to the HR/VP and the Commission. Correspondingly, the Commission understood that it was important ‘to have consensus with the Parliament and the Council in order to ensure that our proposals can be implemented’ (Füle, 2011c: 2).

On the other hand, there was also a recognised division of expertise and responsibilities between technical units of the Commission and the EEAS. This created a mutually reinforcing dynamic wherein the EEAS was in the service of Füle, who reciprocally provided input from the Commission to the EEAS (Helwig et al., 2013: 45–48). Thus, ENP Review documents were discussed and approved by the College of Commissioners, where Ashton contributed to their elaboration by framing the political message and Füle coordinated the technical contents of the documents. Although there was some back and forth during the drafting, they proceeded in a consensus-seeking dynamic since all actors endeavoured to preserve a sense of unity with respect to EU foreign policy (EEAS interviews, Brussels, 17 and 21 October 2013). A March 2011 first joint communication by the HR/VP and European Commission ‘guaranteed an integrated response from the European Union and was the right way to work in the context of the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon’ (European Commission, 2011c: 15).

The search for consensus driven by institutional rules constrained the emergence of policy debates. The drive to preserve policy coherence justified an extraordinary meeting of the European Council since, in the context of the Southern Mediterranean upheavals, ‘it [was] crucial to act and to react together, as a Union, today, and in the weeks and months ahead’ (Van Rompuy, 2011d). As recognised among Commissioners, there was ‘some puzzlement’ about the joint statement issued by five member states on Egypt in February 2011, but the discussion stressed ‘the need for a coordinated approach by the EU’, while the Arab Spring ‘should be seized in order to strengthen coordination and cooperation on a more solid and visible neighbourhood policy’ (European Commission, 2011b: 14). Even though different actors issued many declarations during the Arab Spring, it was not perceived as a problem as long as policy consistency was preserved. As highlighted by Van Rompuy (2011e: 1), ‘in virtually all cases, the message was identical: support to the urge for freedom and for fundamental reform of the whole political system’.

In this context, the outbreak of the Arab Spring highlighted differences concerning the ENP’s geographical policy priorities. Six EU Mediterranean countries presented proposals for the reconsideration and reinforcement of different measures towards Mediterranean countries, emphasising the need for financial resources. They stressed that although the unity of the ENP was an ‘essential element’, that did not mean ‘uniformity’ (Alliot et al., 2011), implicitly questioning coherence. Although most of the proposals were hardly controversial in view of later adopted measures, widespread references to the differentiation of financial assistance between southern and eastern regions led to immediate opposition from other EU member states. Different actors stressed consistency between democratic conditionality and financial incentives, calling for avoiding competition between neighbours (Ananicz, 2011). This stance was supported by institutional voices on ‘the importance of consistent policy, particularly in terms of its geographical elements in the South and East’ and ‘the wish to see the EU and its Member States acting effectively, coherently and in a concerted manner’ (European Commission, 2011d: 15, 17). The European Parliament, frequently critical of EU foreign policy, also supported the outcomes of the ENP Review and defended the values of coherence and unity of the two ENP dimensions (European Parliament, 2011a, 2011c, 2011d).

With regard to Libya, strict adherence to coherence in institutional rules resulted in policy deadlock concerning the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Coherence became the critical focal point of the EU’s performance in Libya. Many Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and diplomats criticised the split among EU member states on the UNSC 1973 Resolution authorising a no-fly zone in Libya (and the associated de facto military operation). To mitigate this criticism, Ashton argued that the standard of coherence does not apply to military action, where member states preserve sovereign rights of decision (Euronews, 2011). However, the UNSC 1973 Resolution mandated the use of military means to protect civilians in line with the conditions for military engagement agreed upon by the European Council, which included legal basis, regional support and demonstrable need. Therefore, although the EU and member states expressed differences, they were determined ‘to act collectively’ in its implementation (Council of the European Union, 2011: 8). The EU resolved to meet its military commitments and approved the launch of a CSDP mission. However, the desire to be coherent with previous commitments adopted by the European Council resulted in an idiosyncratic mandate of a ‘EUFOR Libya’ mission, which was never implemented. The military mission was supposed to have a humanitarian assistance/civil protection character and some member states, claiming coherence with this mandate, included an unusual condition for its launch: a request on the part of the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA). The UN OCHA refused to ask for EU support in order to avoid blurring the frontiers between humanitarian and military actions in a zone of conflict (Philips, 2011). As a result, the search for coherence between EU military presence and the humanitarian engagement in Libya eventually blocked the EU CSDP action in the Southern Mediterranean.

Conclusion

This article has examined the mechanisms of policy continuity during times of crisis. Most of the literature argues that acknowledged crises precipitate institutional changes, but seems to neglect the possibility of continuity in exceptional critical conditions. Conceptualising the role of coherence as a social convention providing epistemic certainty and drawing on constructivist approaches to crisis analysis, this article has illustrated that crises do not necessarily precipitate policy change. Cognitive uncertainty does not lead to policy innovation when the interpretation of unexpected episodes can still be framed around existing epistemic schemes of coherence. It has been argued that while crisis episodes are represented by narratives of contradictions, gaps and inconsistencies, actors often seek to avoid epistemic uncertainty by reconstructing a sense of coherence. The search for policy coherence and its elusive attainment create the space for struggles over the political definition of its meaning. As a result, coherence becomes an epistemic social convention allowing the establishment of categories of meaning around which a sense of order can be negotiated and (re-)established. Epistemic coherence legitimises individual policy ideas since it is also a recognised institutional epistemic standard shared by a community. Therefore, the analysis of policy change and continuity through the lens of epistemic coherence brings together agent-centred and structural varieties of new institutionalism by focusing on the complementary perspectives of individual policy actors and institutional structures. It shows that the match between the aim of coherence by individual actors and the high institutionalisation of coherence considerably limits the room for policy innovation.

This article has illustrated this theoretical argument through the analysis of the continuity of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the crisis created by the Arab Spring and the process of institutional changes in the EU foreign policy system. The appeal to coherence during the ENP Review precluded policy change at the level of ideas and institutional decision-making. Continuity of the ENP can be associated with the search for fixing existing policy aspects at the level of objectives, as well as perceived phenomena, through categorising them as coherent. Moreover, the institutional setting of EU foreign policy is strongly integrated into the notion of coherence, which considerably limits the space for policy contestation and deliberation. The convergence between institutions follows the prescription of coherence and constrains the emergence of agents of change within the institutional system of EU foreign policy. As a result, pre-existing policy has persisted because actors involved in the debate on policy change irreflexively limited their scope for alternatives by thinking in terms of coherence. Despite acknowledged critical episodes in the European neighbourhood, as well as the institutional shape of EU foreign policy, actors did not appeal to arguments on interests or strategic alternatives exceeding the framework established by the existing policy architecture. Therefore, previous policy choices were legitimised by the internalised understanding of coherence.

The focus on epistemic aspects of crises and social conventions employed to deal with uncertainty has broader implications for the study of international politics and institutions. It explains endogenous factors that create resistance to change, even if external observers would intuitively expect reconsideration of development paths. Epistemic aspects of crisis that allow policy continuity raise further theoretical questions about the conditions of policy change in the context of epistemic uncertainty and the appeal to coherence in times of crisis. Future research on policy change needs to take into account whether and under what conditions the appeal to coherence can also legitimise new policy ideas and policy changes. Moreover, these lines of research can be extended to other institutional fields where the appeal to coherence is less obvious and institutionalised.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

This article falls within the ‘EU in an Unsettled International System: Crisis, Polarity and Multilateralism’ (EU-IANUS) project implemented by the Observatory of European Foreign Policy Research Group at the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. For insightful comments on earlier versions, I am grateful to Anna Herranz-Surrallés and two anonymous reviewers. I am also grateful to my colleagues from the European Neighbourhood Policy Chair at the College of Europe for their support and enriching conversations during the writing of this article.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

Author biography

Michal Natorski is Marie Curie Research Fellow at the Department of Political Science (Centre for International Relations Studies) at the University of Liège, Belgium. His research interests include the political sociology of the foreign policy of the European Union, social recognition in international politics and state–society relations in Eastern Europe.

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