China’s peripheral diplomacy: Repeating Europe’s errors in dealing with the neighbourhood

Abstract

The European Union (EU) and China are on a quest to establish themselves as global actors. Still, both powers first need to create a stable neighbourhood that will not threaten their interests. Consequently, in 2004 the EU launched the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), while in 2013 China’s Peripheral Diplomacy (CPD) was introduced. Against this background, this article aims to conduct a comparative analysis of both initiatives. Specifically, as there is a wide agreement that the ENP has failed to generate any impact on the EU’s periphery, the research question is: To what extent could the CPD transcend the problems of its European counterpart? The article posits that both policies are rather similar in their inability to strike the right balance between protecting core interests and acknowledging the neighbours’ needs. Thus, it is likely that the CPD, just like the ENP, will remain a policy with big potential but without effective results.

Keywords

China’s foreign policy European Neighbourhood Policy European Union peripheral diplomacy

Introduction

I want to see a ‘ring of friends’ surrounding the Union. (Prodi, 2002: 4)

Close neighbours are better than distant relatives. (Chinese proverb)

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its President, Xi Jinping, highlighted the increased importance of peripheral diplomacy in a series of events and public speeches conducted between 2013 and 2014. Prominent among these was the Work Forum on Peripheral Diplomacy held by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on 24–25 October 2013.¹ Notably, the Work Forum was the first high-level meeting focusing on China’s neighbourhood since the establishment of the PRC in 1949. The key objectives of the Forum were to ‘identify the strategic goals, fundamental policies, and general arrangements of China’s diplomatic work with neighbouring countries…and clarify the thinking and execution plans for major issues facing China’s diplomacy with neighbouring countries’ (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013).

Essentially, there are various factors that motivated China to pay more attention to its neighbourhood. Fist, the CPD seeks to balance between the establishment of a secure and prosperous environment that accommodates China’s development and protecting ‘China’s national sovereignty, security and development interests’ (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). Thus, the CPD aims to develop ‘closer ties with neighbouring countries, with more friendly political relations, stronger economic bonds, deeper security cooperation and closer people-to-people contacts’ (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). Importantly, according to President Xi, ‘doing well in the diplomatic work with neighbouring countries is out of the need to realize the two “centenary goals”² and achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013).

Specifically, the CPD endeavours to serve two overarching goals. In geopolitical terms, a stable and supportive neighbourhood is of vital importance to China’s security and development. Therefore, the CPD aspires to realize various objectives, including: diffusing tensions over territorial disputes; alleviating fear among neighbours of China’s assertiveness; preventing the formation of regional/international coalitions that could counterbalance Chinese influence in the region; preventing regional conflicts that would increase the involvement of other great powers in the region; and socializing the neighbourhood to accept China’s rise and strategic interests (Callahan, 2016; Fravel, 2014; Glaser and Pal, 2013; Heath, 2013).

In geoeconomics terms, given China’s slowing economy, Chinese decision-makers came to realize that there was a need to establish a prosperous environment that would facilitate China’s economic development. Consequently, through strong economic links with its immediate and broader neighbourhoods, China aims to accomplish various goals, including: finding new markets; securing energy resources; developing, diversifying and securing maritime and inland transport networks; and promoting the internationalization of the Chinese economy (Cai, 2017; Ferdinand, 2016; Szczudlik-Tatar, 2015).

To achieve the above interlinked objectives, China significantly increased its engagement with the neighbourhood by promoting and upgrading bilateral and multilateral partnerships, as well as strengthening existing multilateral economic and security institutions.³ Yet, the most aspiring projects under the CPD framework are undoubtedly its grandiose economic plans.

Involving more than 60 countries, the overarching aim of the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) is to build vast networks and improve political, economic and cultural relations between China and its immediate and wider periphery. Principally, the BRI consists of two projects. First, the Silk Road Economic Belt’s objective is building a network of roads and railways, energy pipelines and power grids that will connect China with Central and West Asia, the Middle East and ultimately Europe. Second, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, as a complementary project, seeks to construct a network of ports (and other coastal infrastructure) that will link China with Europe through the South China Sea, the South Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean (Chinese State Council, 2015).

In the context of finance, launched as a Chinese initiative, with 57 members and capital of over US$90 billion (China contributed almost US$30 billion), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) aims to offer financial support for projects in a broad range of areas such as energy and power, transportation and telecommunications, rural infrastructure and agriculture development, environmental protection, urban development and logistics (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 2017).

Importantly, the PRC is not the only emerging power that attempts to shape its periphery through an ambitious foreign policy initiative. In fact, already in 2004 the European Union introduced its own version of the CPD, namely the European Neighbourhood Policy. However, whereas the CPD might be considered as a policy ‘in progress’, the jury is already in on the efficacy of the ENP. Put differently, there is a broad agreement that the policy has so far failed to generate any significant impact on EU’s periphery. As such, the ENP has faced searing criticism from scholars and policy-makers alike.

Against this background, this article aims to conduct a comparative analysis between both neighbourhood policies. In so doing, the article seeks to advance our understanding of the implications, calculations and challenges associated with the attempts of emerging powers to influence their geopolitical environment. What is more, given the EU’s difficulties in implementing the ENP, the study’s research question is: To what extent could the CPD transcend the problems of its European counterpart?

Following this introduction, the article is structured as follows. The next part offers a brief overview of the ENP. The third part examines the differences and similarities between both policies, while the fourth part discusses the ENP and CPD’s problems and challenges. Finally, the article offers some concluding remarks.

A crash course on the European Neighbourhood Policy

In May 2004, the EU introduced a new foreign policy towards its periphery – the ENP. The policy’s geographical scope covers 16 countries from North Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus,⁴ and its aspiring vision ‘involves a ring of countries, sharing the EU’s fundamental values and objectives [and] going beyond co-operation to involve a significant measure of economic and political integration’ (European Commission, 2004: 5).

Principally, there are three intertwining reasons for the establishment of the ENP. First, the ENP aims to protect the Union from external instability. As such, the ENP relies on the European Security Strategy, which emphasizes the need for more EU engagement with its periphery by stating that ‘it is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed’ (Solana, 2003: 7). Second, the acceptance of 10 new Member States (MS) into the EU following the 2004 enlargement drastically changed the external borders of the Union. Consequently, the EU had to re-examine its capacities and its interests towards old and new neighbours. Thus, ‘the ENP is designed to give new impetus to cooperation with the EU’s neighbours following enlargement’ (European Commission, 2004: 6). Third, by formulating its geographical scope, the ENP actually defines the future borders of the EU. In the words of the European Commission President, Romano Prodi (2002: 3): ‘We cannot go on enlarging forever. We cannot water down the European political project and turn the European Union into just a free trade area on a continental scale’.

The ENP Action Plans (APs) serve as a key instrument in the ENP. They are political roadmaps (i.e. with no legal obligations) for policy implementation and are signed between the EU and partner countries. The APs cover various fields of cooperation (e.g. political dialogue, security policy, the internal market and the environment), and are based on three principles:

Joint ownership – the APs are not determined by the EU but negotiated between the EU and the partners. Thus, a stronger commitment to the ENP is established.

Differentiation – the APs are tailor-made and designed to meet the specific situation and needs of every ENP partner.

Positive conditionality – the EU rewards partners that perform well.

Simplifying considerably, one could say that at the heart of the ENP there is an offer and a price. On the one hand, the EU offers the ENP partners incentives in the form of closer integration (the biggest ‘carrot’ is economic integration). On the other, in return, the EU expects partners to implement political, economic and social reforms.

Yet, since its establishment, the ENP has faced strong criticism. Lack of strategic objectives, insufficient incentives, inconsistent implementation and problematic geographical scope are some of the problems cited in the literature to explain why the ENP is ineffective (e.g. Baracani, 2005; Kelly, 2006; Smith, 2005). Against this backdrop, there were various attempts throughout the ENP evolution to redesign and rebrand the policy.

For example, in order to better engage with its diverse neighbourhood, the EU created regional sub-policies, namely the Union for the Mediterranean (towards the Southern neighbourhood) and the Eastern Partnership (towards the Eastern neighbourhood). Furthermore, in response to the refugee crisis and the growing instability in EU’s periphery, the EU abandoned its objective of transforming the neighbourhood and shifted its focus towards security and stabilization (European Commission and the High Representative, 2015).

Still, changes in the ENP have failed to make their mark. What is more, many ENP countries are in a worse situation than when the policy was created. As such, ENP analysts seem to be more critical than ever (e.g. Bicchi, 2014; Blockmans, 2017; Schumacher, 2016).

The ENP and the CPD: Separated at birth?

At first sight, one might argue that the ENP and CPD are rather distinct. After all, not only is there a fundamental difference between Europe and China’s political systems, but there are also various differences regarding the policies themselves, and the geopolitical environment in which they operate.

For instance, whereas the European neighbourhood is by no means a peaceful region (e.g. the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Syrian civil war) and could pose a threat to the EU’s security and stability (e.g. the refugee crisis), China’s periphery could be considered more challenging (especially in terms of regional security). In the words of Zhang (2016: 835): ‘Few countries in the world have such complex and complicated neighbourhood relations as China’. After all, its neighbourhood consists of the world’s major (and nuclear) powers like Russia, India, Pakistan and North Korea. Moreover, China has more complicated (and fragile) relations with its neighbours due to previous armed conflicts and numerous territorial disputes, some of which still exist to this day (e.g. those with Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam and Japan). Finally, there are also numerous regional flashpoints that could destabilize the whole region (South Korea-North Korea, India-Pakistan, Afghanistan, to name a few).

A comparison between both neighbourhood policies also reveals significant differences. For example, the ENP is a highly institutionalized (and technocratic) policy. As such, it identifies, a priori, the ENP’s geographical scope, the APs’ time-frame and the working procedures concerning policy implementation and monitoring of progress (European Commission, 2003, 2004). In contrast, the CPD could be considered as more of a loose framework that is supported by several initiatives. Consequently, the CPD (and the BRI) are rather flexible concerning rules, standards and selection criteria. According to Kaczmarski (2016: 18), this flexibility does not only exist due to China’s general contempt of institutionalization, but also since rules might ‘limit Beijing’s room for manoeuvre’ (see also Yu, 2017).

Moreover, whereas the CPD’s immense plans are to establish stronger links between neighbours, the ENP’s vision is more ambitious as it aspires to transform partner countries’ political, economic and social systems. In this context, China’s attitude towards its neighbours is significantly different as for decades (since the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference at Bandung in 1955) its foreign policy has been based on the principle of ‘mutual non-interference’ in internal affairs. Finally, concerning finance, the financial resources of China are far greater than those allocated for EU foreign policy. In fact, China’s expected US$1 trillion investment in the BRI ( Economist, 2015) dwarfs the ENP’s €15.4 billion budget (European External Action Service, 2018).

Notwithstanding the aforementioned, a closer examination reveals that there is actually a striking resemblance between the two neighbourhood policies. Simplifying considerably, it could be said that since instability in their periphery might threaten their economic, political and security interests, China and the EU share the same vision, that is, creating a zone of peace, stability and prosperity in the neighbourhood.

Furthermore, both policies are not entirely novel creations. In the European case, while the most comprehensive policy towards ENP countries was the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP),⁵ the ENP is largely based on enlargement policy. Among the similar instruments and methodologies, one could draw attention to the conditionality principle, the content of the APs and the monitoring procedures (Kelly, 2006). In the Chinese context, Chung (2009: 108) posits that the origins of China’s ‘good neighbour’ policies could be traced back to 1955 when China proposed the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ (see also Zhang, 2016). Yet, China has become more active towards its periphery since the 1990s. In fact, already in 1993, Chinese Premier Li Peng argued that ‘active development of beneficial and friendly relations with neighbouring states, in striving for a peaceful and tranquil surrounding environment is an important aspect of our country’s foreign affairs work’ (quoted in Chung, 2009: 110–111; see also Chambers, 2005; Shambaugh, 2003).

That said, the ENP and CPD clearly represent a change in orientation. In the European case, the EU, for the first time, explicitly associated its own security and stability with the political, security and economic situation in its periphery. Moreover, the ENP could be seen as an innovative development in the EU’s foreign policy. For instance, with the ENP, the EU attempts to implement enlargement instruments and methodologies in non-candidate countries (i.e. a high level of integration without EU membership). Also, the EU introduced some innovative elements with the ENP that, to a great extent, aim to solve problems that were identified in the EMP (Baracani, 2005; Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005; Pace, 2007). For example, whereas the EMP treated all neighbours in the same way as a part of ‘one size fits all’ approach, the ENP is based on the differentiation principle.

Similarly, under the Xi administration, China shifted its foreign policy direction from the ‘Hide and Bide’ approach⁶ (introduced by Deng Xiaoping in the 1990s) to a more active strategy, that is, the ‘strive for achievement’ paradigm. Based on this new approach, China would be more assertive in its foreign policy as it would explicitly articulate and forcefully defend its core interests (Callahan, 2016; Chang-Liao, 2016; Sørensen, 2015).

Moreover, it is worthwhile to mention four adjustments in China’s foreign policy. First, it seems that with the introduction of the CPD, China has changed its priorities from focusing on great powers (e.g. the US) to advancing its cooperation with neighbouring countries (Bondaz, 2015; Da and Sun, 2015; Tiezzi, 2015).⁷ Second, while in the past China focused on using diplomacy for ensuring its economic prosperity, the CPD signifies a change since nowadays economic cooperation aspires to serve broader political and security objectives (Chang-Liao, 2016; Godement, 2015). Third, China’s relations with neighbouring countries will now be based on reciprocity. Put differently, ‘China will decisively favor those who side with it with economic benefits and even security protections. On the contrary, those who are hostile to China will face much more sustained policies of sanctions and isolation’ (Yan, 2014; see also Sørensen, 2015). Finally, as Glaser and Pal (2013) posit, the shift in policy direction also stems from the understanding among Chinese policy-makers that ‘China’s policy has been ineffective at best, and at worst, only succeeded in pushing its neighbors in to the arms of the US’ (see also Callahan, 2016; Wang, 2013).

Against this backdrop, we could see that both policies are not only motivated by internal and external considerations, but also share the same vision for their ‘problematic’ neighbourhoods. Moreover, the ENP and CPD represent a shift in foreign policy orientation. Still, a careful examination exposes additional resemblances.

Notably, given their economic might and lack of ability and/or will to use coercive measures, the EU and China try to attract neighbours by using economic incentives. As such, both neighbourhood policies follow the same functional rationale that closer economic links and cooperation (i.e. low politics) would not only decrease the chance of conflict, but also eventually lead (or spill-over in functionalist terms) to more political cooperation (i.e. high politics).

Moreover, by developing shared beliefs, norms and values, the ENP (Kelly, 2006) and CPD (Heath, 2013) attempt to shape their surroundings through a socialization process. In so doing, the EU and China utilize the same kind of rhetoric towards their neighbours. For example, they not only emphasize the need (i.e. ‘mutual interests’) to maintain good neighbourly relations but also underline that closer relations would result in a ‘win-win’ situation (i.e. ‘mutual benefit’).

The ENP and CPD: Challenges and unresolved questions

Now, given the strong resemblance between the ENP and CPD, it comes as no surprise that they have faced similar challenges, and were met with little enthusiasm.

For instance, various commentators call attention to the fact that both initiatives lack clarity regarding their overall strategic objective and finalité and are vague in the context of benchmarks and performance criteria. Referring to the ENP, one problem identified in the literature is that the policy is rather ambiguous concerning the level of integration it aims to achieve. Thus, not only is it unclear what the end-game of the ENP is, but also ‘without a clear finalité…the ENP risks undermining the value of its own most innovative resources’ (Tassinari, 2005: 8; see also Pace, 2007; Stroß, 2011). Furthermore, the ENP lacks clear benchmarks, and does not offer a clear connection between obligations and benefits or sufficient details as to how progress would be assessed and monitored. Therefore, ‘the ENP remains trapped in the logic of vagueness, hindering the prospects of effective conditionality’ (Colombo and Tocci, 2012: 91; see also Smith, 2005).

By the same token, analysts identify similar problems with the CPD in general and with the BRI project in particular. For example, De Jonquieres (2015) maintains that the BRI ‘is longer on sweeping vision than on nuts-and-bolts practicalities’, whereas Gabuev (2017) states that the BRI ‘lacks a clearly stated goal’ (see also Pesek, 2014). More specifically, there are growing concerns among stakeholders (mainly outside of China) regarding the lack bureaucratic framework that includes: (1) the selection criteria of BRI projects; (2) a clear timeframe; and (3) performance indicators (Gabuev, 2017; Yu, 2017).

Furthermore, because both policies are comprehensive in scope, there is a need for a high level of cooperation between a vast number of internal and external actors, including: domestic ministries; other political entities on national and regional levels; neighbouring countries; and regional and international organizations. Still, as different actors often have different interests, there is a high probability for political and bureaucratic struggles to occur and policy incoherence to emerge. To muddy the water even more, as both policies do not have a legal basis (i.e. no legal obligations to cooperate), there is a chance that some actors could become free-riders.

In the European case, it is evident that bureaucratic conflicts (e.g. between the European Commission, the European External Action Service and the MS) have severely hindered the successful implementation of the policy. Primarily, these conflicts were caused by unclear distribution of competences, and the fact that EU institutions do not have the legal competences to enforce MS’ compliance or establish a unified front among MS to support the ENP and APs’ objectives (Maurer and Simao, 2013; Stroß, 2011; Thépaut, 2011). Evidently, the lack of legal obligations creates a situation where both MS and ENP countries decided to be somewhat selective in their implementation of the ENP. For example, while the MS try to focus on security and disregard promises related to market access and free movement of people, ENP partners attempt to limit the scope of political reforms while pushing for more economic cooperation.

In the case of the CPD, China is not only facing challenges in ensuring a smooth cooperation between all external stake-holders involved in its various initiatives (especially the BRI), but as Raftrey (2017) points out: ‘Coordinating China’s 10 million cadres, who are embedded within thousands of central, provincial, autonomous prefecture, municipality, and county government ministries, commissions, and departments, is an administrative Gordian knot’. What is more, given the vast number of domestic players involved with the CPD and BRI, it is rather unclear who is responsible for what and which actor plays the role of a policy coordinator (Yu, 2017).

Another challenge is linked to the financial resources needed for the successful implementation of the policies. The problem of resources is particularly evident in the ENP as it is almost unrealistic to assume that the policy’s objectives could be achieved given its scarce financial resources. Thus, Tulmets (2006: 46) argues that ‘if the aim of the ENP is…to support the harmonisation of all possible sectors with EU laws, then the offer is far from generous’, while Kochenov (2009: 23) posits that ‘the actual moneys available for the implementation of the ENP still fall short of the policy’s needs’ (see also Grant, 2006).

To a lesser extent, a lack of resources might also pose problems in the CPD’s case. Indeed, China’s enormous economic power and US$3 trillion foreign currency reserves enable it to heavily invest in the CPD. Yet, the ongoing economic slowdown in China (as well as CPD partners’ inability to repay the loans for BRI projects) casts serious doubts about whether China would be able to secure the sufficient flow of financial resources needed to ensure the successful implementation of the CPD’s long-term economic projects (Callahan, 2016: 238; see also Cai, 2017; De Jonquieres, 2015). What is more, Pesek (2014) argues that at the end of the day, ‘[g]enuine affection comes from acting in partnership with Asian neighbors, not buying their loyalty with the odd multi-billion-dollar dam, bridge, road or power grid’ (see also Li, 2016).

This brings us to the ENP and CPD’s key problem, that is, despite the grand initiatives and innovative principles, both initiatives are built on shaky foundations. Take for example key catchphrases like ENP’s ‘ring of friends’, the CPD’s ‘community of shared destiny’ or founding principles such as ‘mutual interests’, ‘mutual benefits’, ‘joint ownership’ and ‘equality’. All these principles aim to generate a sense of a ‘joint venture’ in creating an area of peace, stability and prosperity for all.

Nonetheless, there is nothing equal in the relationship between the EU/China and their neighbours. Not only because the ENP and CPD are Euro/Sino-centric in nature, but also due to the asymmetric power relations, the EU and China seek to use economic leverage to influence their surroundings. Furthermore, the rhetoric concerning ‘shared values’ and ‘shared norms’ can also be questioned, as neighbours are expected to align their values to those of China and the EU. In this context, a similar argument could be made in the case of the ‘conditionality’ principle. After all, how can a sense of partnership be created among neighbours whilst their relationship with the EU and China is conditional? In regards to the CPD, one should also mention China’s non-interference principle. Essentially, the non-interference principle has been one of the most important aspects of China’s foreign policy in the last decades. However, due to China’s growing involvement in regional and global affairs, China has become much more selective in the implementation of this principle. Evidently, China’s intervention in Myanmar and Malaysia could be considered as a case in point (Duchâtel et al., 2014; Kurlantzick, 2015).

Therefore, it can be concluded that the ENP and CPD are unilateral policies towards neighbours and not with neighbours. As such, they serve, first and foremost, the interests of the EU and China. What is more, since the EU and China have yet to establish the right balance between being normative actors and protecting their interests, their neighbourhood initiatives are full of contradictions that cast serious doubts on the intentions of both powers to help their neighbours.

Against this backdrop, students of European and Chinese foreign policy are rather critical in their analysis of the ENP and CPD. For example, Hyde-Price (2008: 31) emphasizes that the methods the EU is using to fulfil its objectives are far away from the values it is supposed to cherish, while Johansson-Nogués (2007: 187) argues that rather than being a normative actor, the EU in the ENP region is ‘nothing but a “normal” political force’ (see also Pace, 2007). Alternatively, Shi and Tweed (2016) posit that the problem with China’s neighbourhood policy is that ‘it hasn’t been very neighbourly’, whereas Rigby and Brendan (2015: 60–61) argue that ‘it is difficult to recall a period…where there has been such a substantial gap between Beijing’s public rhetoric and what it has been doing in practice’. In fact, Saunders (2014) goes as far as saying that ‘China’s regional diplomacy has a schizophrenic quality’ (see also Berkofsky, 2016; Kaczmarski, 2016; Zhang, 2015).

In the specific case of the CPD, the situation has become aggravated by China’s rhetoric and actions towards its neighbours, as well as its persistence to forcefully protect its core interests. In this context, it is worthwhile to mention the ‘bottom-line thinking’ advocated by the Xi administration. In essence, the bottom-line thinking means that China will follow the path of peaceful development as long as this path does not collide with its strategic interests (Heath, 2013; Sørensen, 2015). Thus, in 2013, President Xi stated in a speech that no country ‘should expect us [i.e. China] to swallow the bitter fruit that undermines our sovereignty, security, and development interests’ (quoted in Zhang, 2015: 9), while in 2014 he stressed that ‘while we pursue peaceful development, we will never relinquish our legitimate rights and interests, or allow China’s core interests to be undermined’ (quoted in Callahan, 2016: 234). Indeed, several scholars (e.g. Fravel, 2014; Zhang, 2015) note that in the wake of the 2012 political transition at the Politburo and due to domestic political pressure and public expectations, Chinese decision-makers seek to appear to be taking a strong stand concerning issues of territorial dispute (Fravel, 2014; Zhang, 2015). Evidently, the strong rhetoric continued in 2017 as President Xi, in a speech delivered at the 19th National Congress, stressed that ‘China will never pursue development at the expense of others’ interests, but nor will China ever give up its legitimate rights and interests’ ( China Daily, 2017; see further analysis in Esteban, 2017; Swaine, 2018).

Consequently, the strong rhetoric was followed by strong actions. For instance, in November 2013, just a month after President Xi introduced the CPD at the Work Forum, China declared an Air-Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea which covers the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (claimed by both China and Japan); thus increasing tensions in the region and triggering negative and concerned reactions from various neighbours such as Japan, South Korea and Australia, as well as from the US (Haenle, 2014; Kim and Kim, 2018; Szczudlik-Tatar, 2015).

Furthermore, tensions between China and its neighbours (Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei) over other territorial disputes in the South China Sea such as the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal were mounting rather than diffused (Berkofsky, 2016; Haenle, 2014; Huang, 2016). A prominent example in this regard is that following Philippines’ arbitration case against China over disputed territories in the South China Sea, China blocked fruit imports from the Philippines and introduced a safety ban that prevented Chinese tourists from travelling to the archipelago (Gitter, 2014). Finally, China’s increased militarization and defence budget spending and the fact that Beijing plans to build an overseas military base in Pakistan arguably did not help reduce the growing worries among neighbouring countries (and other international actors, such as the US) regarding its intentions and aspirations (Almond, 2017; Gertz, 2018; Godement, 2015).

As a result, not only did China’s rhetoric and actions fail to reduce tensions in the region, they also proved to be counterproductive, as various neighbours have attempted to create a regional (Japan-India) or international (Vietnam-US) security umbrella in order to balance against Beijing (Fravel, 2014; Haenle, 2014; Pant, 2017).

Notwithstanding the aforesaid, it is important to highlight at this point that while the EU and China have experienced serious difficulties in balancing between their normative aspirations and core interests, there are two key differences that might prove to be crucial in the continuous effort to realize the ENP and CPD’s objectives.

First of all, while a failure to achieve the ENP’s objectives could cause serious problems to the EU (as we have seen with the refugee crisis), an ineffective ENP cannot (at least for now) threaten the existence of the European project or the stability of European democracies. Arguably, this cannot be said in the case of China and its CPD, where a failure could seriously hinder China’s rise and its aspirations to become a regional (and eventually global) economic, security and normative actor. Even more, a failed CPD might create domestic instability and even threaten the security of the Communist regime (Berkofsky, 2016; see also De Jonquieres, 2015; Whalen, 2017).

Second, it appears that the EU is rather troubled with the dilemma of choosing between values and interests. As such, throughout the development of the ENP, the EU has tried to re-design the policy and introduce various mechanisms that would ensure the right balance. Moreover, while facing accusations concerning its failure to promote democratic values during the Arab Spring, the EU responded in a humble manner; in the words of Štefan Füle (2011), the European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy: ‘Europe was not vocal enough in defending human rights and local democratic forces in the region. Too many of us fell prey to the assumption that authoritarian regimes were a guarantee of stability in the region’.

In contrast, it seems that China’s leadership does not feel that there is any contradiction in seeking good neighbourly relations and acting assertively as to protect national interests. In other words, ‘a rising China believes it can assert strongly its claims even if it causes frictions because ultimately, China’s economic lure will force countries to relent’ (Haenle, 2014). In this context, Saunders (2014: 1) clarifies that from a Chinese standpoint, this contradiction ‘is a tension to be managed, not an imperative to choose between conflicting goals’ (see also Berkofsky, 2016; Boon, 2017; Callahan, 2016).

Concluding remarks

The European Neighbourhood Policy is problematic and doomed to fail. This is, in essence, the central theme of the majority of contributions that examine the ENP. In comparison to the ENP, China’s Peripheral Diplomacy is a rather recent development and can be considered as a ‘work in progress’. Still, five years have passed since the Xi administration has highlighted the growing importance of peripheral diplomacy within China’s foreign policy. Thus, the main objective of the article was to compare between the two initiatives while examining to what extent the CPD could transcend the problems of its European counterpart.

A comparative analysis between the ENP and CPD revealed that whereas there are some differences between both policies, they also share numerous similarities. The overarching objectives, the ‘problematic’ neighbours, the focus on economic initiatives, the principle of conditionality and the rhetoric towards neighbours are just a few examples that demonstrate the striking resemblance between the two initiatives. As such, it is little wonder that Brussels and Beijing have also faced similar challenges in implementing their policies.

Specifically, the article argues that one key challenge is finding the right balance between normative and realist aspirations. However, while it seems that the EU tries, to some extent, to solve the dilemma between values and interests, the Chinese regime does not see any contradiction in being a normative and supportive actor in the region while assertively protecting its core interests. Against this background, it could be concluded that whereas the ENP still has a (even if small) chance to succeed, it is probable that China’s relations with its neighbours under the framework of the CPD will continue to deteriorate.

Based on this study, there are several lines of inquiry that deserve further analysis. First of all, given the various challenges China is facing in the implementation of the CPD, it would be worthwhile to examine whether it will attempt to alter some aspects in the CPD framework. Second, while the comparison between the European and Chinese neighbourhood policies was based on empirical analysis, there is still a need for further research that compares the two initiatives in theoretical terms.

Finally, an interesting path of inquiry might involve a comparative analysis between China’s Peripheral Diplomacy Initiative and other neighbourhood policies. One promising option would be to compare between China and Russia’s initiatives towards their neighbourhood. As authoritarian regimes (with communist roots), led by ‘strong men’ and nationalistic in nature, Russia and China not only share the same neighbourhood, but also have global and regional aspirations to become great powers and challenge Western dominance in international affairs. Thus, a theory-orientated comparison between the CPD and Russia’s neighbourhood policy may prove to be a very fruitful avenue for future research.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Mor Sobol

Notes

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