The role of projective identification in constructing the “Other”: Why do Westerners want to “liberate” Muslim women?

Abstract

This commentary offers a cultural psychological understanding of the traditionally psychoanalytic notion of projective identification to explore the ironic way that majority and minority cultures can influence each other. In the target paper (Wagner, Sen, Permanadeli, & Howarth, 2012), the Western gaze operates ironically by constructing minority Muslim women as needing liberation. This leads to their resistance, through increased religious observance, which requires giving up their individual freedom. Understood as a circular and monological process of projective-identification designed to protect off-limit areas of meaning making, dialogue requires each culture to take ownership of these areas.

Keywords

Cultural psychology duality of meaning projective identification

“There is a need for dialogue” (p. 534) emphatically states a female Indian Muslim participating in Wagner, Sen, Permanadeli, and Howarth’s (2012) study on the role of veiling in the construction of Muslim women’s identity. This call for dialogue stems from the history of the Western gaze viewing the veiling practices of Muslim women in a monological or homogenous fashion (pp. 522–524; also Breu & Marchese, 2000; Shadid & Von Koningsveld, 2005, p. 43–48; Wiles, 2007). Specifically, Wagner et al. (2012) claims that regardless of nationality and level of religious practice, when a minority, veiled Muslim women are seen as oppressed, backward, illiterate, and uneducated and thus in need of liberation (Duits & van Zoonen, 2006, p. 109–111). Westerners in the words of another research participant “see only a hijab and talk to a hijab” (Wagner et al., 2012, p. 536). More drastically, the veil has become a homogenous symbol, standing for religious fundamentalism, human rights violations, and even terrorism (Liederman, 2000). As a result, the multitude of meanings that veiling has amongst different Muslim populations and countries are overlooked (Dwyer, 1999; Mandel, 1989), resulting in an atmosphere where ironically the West becomes as intolerant as the Islamic world often is claimed to be.

If dialogue is indeed the necessary tonic for homogenization and stereotyping, then Wagner et al. (2012) provide an excellent step in this direction. Interesting and timely, the authors discuss a sensitive issue in a fair and balanced fashion. They have elicited and analyzed an impressive amount of data, providing an in-depth view of the complexities embedded within head coverings. Specifically, they focus on how meanings emerge from the relationship between majority and minority cultures. By analyzing semi-structured qualitative interview transcripts from two separate Muslim populations; one in Jakarta, Indonesia, where Muslims and head coverings are considered a majority group, and the other where Muslims in Mumbai, India, are in the minority, they are able to identify themes and differences between the two groups.

Within the Muslim-dominated group in Jakarta, veiling takes on reasonably consistent and non-controversial meanings. Women reported wearing a veil to conveniently keep their hair out of their face and as a way of fitting into mainstream culture (Wagner et al., 2012, pp. 521–541). As a reasonably uncontested and unproblematic form of dressing, veiling is not seen as risky or provocative (though perhaps not veiling would be, which is not discussed). Furthermore, veiling offers a practical way of uniting the ambiguous domains of religious and cultural identities. For instance, some Muslims wear colorful and attractive veils, whereas others combine their veils with more contemporary fashions, such as low-cut jeans (Wagner et al., 2012, pp. 521–541). Broadly speaking, as members of a religious majority, veiling appeared less tied to the mainly religious functions it has within more conservative settings.

Alternatively, Muslims in Mumbai, India, who chose to wear veils, could not imagine combining them with tight jeans (Wagner et al., 2012, pp. 521–541). Rather, veiling takes on a number of different meanings linked to expressing one’s identity (Wagner et al., 2012, pp. 521–541). With regards to sexuality, while veiling de-sexualized the body in Indonesia, it was more prevalent and marked in India, intended on preventing men from being victims of a women’s sexuality (Wagner et al., 2012, pp. 521–541). The traditional meaning of veiling here reflects the movement of minority Muslim women towards viewing the veil as a politically charged symbolic expression of their positive Muslims identity (Dwyer, 1999; Mandel, 1989). Veiling acts as a powerful form of active resistance to being stereotyped as backwards and illiterate. At the same time, it serves to create a positive Muslim female identity. As an identity marker in Mumbai, veiling enables women to achieve a feeling of security that comes with being part of a group (Wagner et al., 2012, pp. 521–541).

Two areas of irony in identity construction

In locating the different meanings that veiling has for Muslim women of majority and minority cultures, Wagner et al. (2012) argue for the mutual constitution of majority and minority groups. In other words, the dialogical or dialectical relationship that exists between the two groups influences their construction of self and other. They state: “Identity is always produced through and against the views of others, and so a minority’s identity construction is always a response to how they have been stereotyped by the majority” (Wagner et al., 2012, p. 524). They suggest that the reason the veil has taken on an increased number of meanings for minority Muslim women, is that the gaze of “Other” has forced them to adapt religious identities to feel more secure in their minority status, while also rebelling from being stereotyped. This highlights the ironic feature of the Western gaze, which although ostensibly intended on liberating women, has in fact led them further along a path of possible fundamentalism.

In other words, the authors claim that for Muslims in Mumbai, donning a veil as part of a process of becoming more religious may be an act of rebellion. Choosing to adopt an exaggerated religious attitude combats the Western gaze that considers Muslim women as needing liberation. Interestingly, by rebelling in this fashion, Muslim women appear willing to give up some of their own individual freedoms – or the possibility of them – to achieve security, belonging, and an identity. While the authors view this positively, in many ways the veiling practice in Mumbai appeared less “free” to exist alongside other meanings than where Muslim women are in the majority. Indeed, in Jakarta veiling reportedly thrived alongside more traditional Western values such as blue jeans and the expression of self. In this setting, veiling appears to exist alongside other markers of identity.

This wholesale rejection of the Western gaze also entails irony, as in order to express independence these women have to give up some of their own individual freedoms. Through doing so one must wonder whether they may be giving up more than they are getting. Practically, by establishing their identity via rejection of a gaze, do they in fact wind up having fewer individual rights and less freedoms of expression? While difficult to assess, how does this impact their quality of life? In turn, this act likely perpetuates the view from the West that these are women in need of liberation. After all, they are choosing to give up their pursuit of individual rights. Simultaneously, for minority Muslim women, it likely maintains and further develops a sense of alienation and of not being understood by outsiders (Moruzzi, 1994).

Consequentially, neither majority nor minority group move closer to achieving actual dialogue. Instead both continue to construct the other without owning their role in the rejection of each other. The West projects a view of backwardness onto Muslim women, while these women likely project a view of Western culture as intolerant and overly individualistic. The process underlying this back and forth relationship can be understood as a complex example of the psychoanalytic concept of projective identification.

Projective identification

Historical foundation

Melanie Klein (1975) introduced the controversial theory of projective identification as a defensive process, which young infants unconsciously utilize to deal with the threat of the death instinct and their fears of annihilation due to their helpless state. Klein thought that the infant unconsciously splits their experience of themselves into two states: all good and all bad. In their fantasy world, the all-bad feeling, considered threatening due to possibly invoking the wrath of the “Other”, is projected into that “Other”, so that the infant remains all good and deserving of love and security (Ogden, 1979; Mitchell, 1995). Remaining in the realm of fantasy the infant imagines interactions where the “Other” acts in accordance with these projections necessitating further splitting and so on.

Since, for Klein, this process only occurs within the patient’s mind, the analyst finds out about it through the patient’s associations. Accordingly, an initial a criticism of projective identification focused mainly on Klein’s rather fantastic metapsychology (Pantone, 1994). Indeed, Klein who was very concerned with Freud’s death instinct (Mitchell, 1995; Orange, 2003) describes projective identification as a necessary defense for the child to survive powerful fantasies about death and fear of their own destruction. As a result many considered it a remnant of Freud’s mechanistic views of the individual and concerned with a monadic model of therapy and the individual (Mitchell, 1995; Orange, 2003).

Interpersonalizing projective identification

Later analysts, notably Wilfred Bion (1959) and Thomas Ogden (1979) updated the concept to include a greater focus on the actual interpersonal relationship. According to Stephen Mitchell (1995), “with the interpersonalization of the concept of projective identification, the contents of the patient’s mind were now often to be found in the analysts experience” (Mitchell, 1995, p. 78). Here, the process becomes elaborated into a two-step interpersonal event. In this version, the individual still unconsciously projects threatening and unwanted thoughts and feelings into the “Other”, basically placing them into that person. However, this happens within an actual lived relationship and not in solely in fantasy and may also be a result of real aspects of that person and not just fantasized ones (Levenson, 1983/2005).

In the first step, the projector unconsciously forces the “Other” to experience feelings similar to what they are feeling. This may result in a second step that involves the unconscious identification by the “Other”, who acts in accordance with the projections that have been placed into them. Clinically, when projective-identifications occur, they are often not noticed until later sessions, sometimes much later, when the therapist can recognize acting differently than they typically do. As such, projective identification has become a clinically useful tool for understanding both intra-psychic and inter-psychic dynamics.

For example, projective identification can be seen in the section on de-sexualizing (Wagner et al., 2012 pp. 521–541). Here, women discuss how their “duty is to be chaste while men are absolved as victims [emphasis added] of female seduction” (Wagner et al., 2012, p. 530). A woman’s beauty, such as her hair, is so powerfully stimulating that when not covered or rolled up (such as in a purdah) that a man will lose control leading to almost certain sin, either in fantasy or in actuality. As a result, a women’s “essentially provocative” (Wagner et al., 2012, p. 530) nature must be covered up and transformed into an “expensive ornament… a very expensive thing” (Wagner et al., 2012, p. 531). As a de-sexualized object, a woman keeps herself, and more importantly, men, safe.

According to the theory of projective identification, women are not seen as being in control of their “essentially provocative nature” and are thus at risk of projecting their sinful nature into men. Since these sexual feelings are projected into them, they are outside of their conscious awareness and control, resulting in sexual thoughts, feelings, fantasies, or behaviors. In other words, men identify with the sexual nature of women and are apparently not seen as having their own sexual nature. Through this process, women are considered responsible for a man’s sexual feelings and actions, necessitating that they take steps to limit their potency. Clearly, what seems to be left out of this example is the defensive motivation of men for locating the entirety of their sexuality in women. The black and white/all or none-thinking in this example characterizes the projective identification process. The aspects of ambiguity or shades of grey that are not included highlight areas of potential anxiety. So the need to locate all of sexuality within women indicates intense anxiety about masculine sexuality, and perhaps also sexuality in general.

Accordingly, the process of projective identification entails a relationship between two fields of meaning: the underdeveloped field considered threatening and anxiety provoking and the (over)developed field, which protects against these feelings (for a discussion on how dressing acts as an over-determined marker of identity, see Dwyer, 1999). This dynamic tension makes projective identification a clinically useful way of elaborating fields of unconscious meaning. In this respect, the contemporary view of projective identification entails a complicated interpersonal process. Notably, not all projective identifications occur in fantasy – they can also occur in real interpersonal relationships where an actual threat from the other person does exist. The emphasis on a duality of meaning makes it a concept well suited for further elaboration from a cultural perspective.

A cultural perspective of projective identification

A mediated view of reality

A cultural perspective emphasizes that reality cannot be experienced directly, but instead requires mediation through signs. Language, gestures, objects, dress, and even biological regulatory processes (Chandler, 2002; Sebeok, 2001) are all signs continuously interpreted along a variety of unconscious, preconscious, conscious, or self-conscious levels. In more contemporary language, experience and interpretation of reality happens via multiple pathways; quickly and outside of awareness, as well as and more slowly, guided by awareness and conscious intent (Kahneman, 2011).

Signs as fields

As noted by Wagner et al. (2012), cultural and societal norms guide the meanings of conventional signs, including the implications of dress. They state: “Majority groups in most societies define what is ‘normal’ social practice in the domains of religion, language use, dress and other sectors of public life” (Wagner et al., 2012, p. 524). The establishment of a normal range of conduct simultaneously establishes boundaries in which other forms of practice can lie outside of the norm. A dynamic relationship always exists between these two fields (Valsiner, 2007). Societal norms and pressures direct experience towards areas and meanings that fit within majority boundaries, limiting development of meaning making in other areas. Social norms are important parts of developing the necessary conditions for human relating and communicating, as well as functioning in society (Moghaddam, 2000 pp. 292–293). They foster expectable behaviors, creating the secure space for interaction and societal growth in directions dictated by the majority (Moghaddam, 2000). By dictating dress, for example an acceptable skirt length, a dialogue ensues between conformity and self-expression, which dynamically interact and shape individual development.

The importance of taboo fields

The need to influence behavior across contexts leads to the abstraction of social norms into more general fields such as individual rights, duties, and taboos (Moghaddam, Slocum, Finkel, Mor, & Harre, 2000) across a variety of contexts. Normative and counter-normative behaviors exist together, with the former creating the space for the latter to provide alternative ways of looking at specific situations (Ramanujan, 1991). Strong restrictions can be established to prevent these counter-narratives by constructing them as taboos. Motivation to establish taboos works much like the splitting described in projective identification – as a means of maintaining a feeling of goodness and not having to deal with potentially upsetting and anxiety provoking feelings (Moghaddam, 2000; Moghaddam & Kavulich, 2007). Moreover, as will be demonstrated in the following section, they provide a way to identify and remove potential threats to their existing power structure (Moghaddam & Kavulich, 2007).

Taboos serve the important function of establishing the vector of counter-narratives and the arena where conflicts play out. From this perspective, it is not surprising that the female body has become the location of the ongoing conflict surrounding veiling. Both Western and Muslim cultures have a normative view of the female body and female identity that entails a related counter-normative or taboo view. The differences are symbolic of the larger group differences and of an existing power struggle (see Maghaddam & Kavulich, 2007, on how this struggle can be cast narratively). In this respect, the normative behaviors for each group are continuously being constructed (Sherif, 1936) in response to the behaviors of the other group. Thus, it is forgotten that women in the West only recently achieved greater equality with men, reflecting a relatively new social norm.

The discourse on the body demonstrates how norms and counter-norms develop together. For Westerners, the current norm emphasizes freedom of expression through clothing choice. Restricting what can be worn exists as a counter-norm and has even been labeled taboo. While for Muslims in Mumbai, “rolling up” expresses one’s modesty, enabling other characteristics such as intelligence and skills to be seen rather than the body (Shadid & Van Koningsveld, 2005, p. 37).

Regulation of meaning fields

The relationship between accepted–non-accepted fields requires continual regulation to prevent the development of the other fields of meaning. Context plays an important role. Thus, there are situations when the non-accepted meanings become accepted – for instance, needing to be “tip-top” when alone with one’s husband (or see the ongoing discussions of whether veiling is acceptable in school contexts in France, England, Holland, and so forth). However, other mechanisms are used to ensure that taboo fields are not developed. Projection acts as one such method of regulation, by which unacceptable meanings are unconsciously dealt with by removing them entirely from the field of meaning making and locating them in an “Other”.

(Weak) projection in normal communication

It is possible to differentiate between two types of projection. In a weaker sense, all communication requires some amount of projection. For instance, the semiotician Charles S. Peirce felt that signs exist not just for the speaker but also in a very real way within the listener as well. He stated:

When I communicate my thought and my sentiments to a friend with whom I am in fully sympathy, so that my feelings pass into him and I am conscious of what he feels, do I not live in his brain as well as my own – most literally? (quoted in Lincourt & Olczak, 1974, p. 82)

Peirce reasons that as members of a shared community, the consensual meanings of signs are learned through interpersonal experience. For Peirce, when we communicate these signs echo within the mind of the other creating a shared context. In this way, both the speaker and the listener constrain the wide range of potential meanings that can be made from specific signs, facilitating understanding. Projection of meaning serves to maintain the accepted areas of meaning making while limiting the possibility of developing non-accepted and taboo fields. Notably, while both parties can make additional meaning of accepted or non-accepted fields, the projection limits the likelihood of developing the non-accepted field.

(Strong) projection leading to identification

In its more defensive or stronger function, however, projection not only creates a sign for both parties, but also unconsciously coerces the interlocutor to have an experience almost identical to that of projector. The need to strongly defend the self from non-accepted fields, such as those that are taboo, requires the use of verbal and non-verbal (such as, emotion) signs that constrict the field and prevent the projector form experiencing taboo meanings. However, as the taboo non-accepted field always exists in relationship to the desired and accepted field it remains a part of the communication. The listener receives the projection of both accepted and non-accepted meaning to such an extent that they find themselves unable to have their own thoughts and associations. In this sense, the listeners meaning making system becomes co-opted by the strong projection of the speaker generating the black and white polarity typical in projection.

The strong projection sets the ground for identification. The listener, whose meaning making system has been hijacked by the constraints of the projector, unconsciously experiences both accepted and non-accepted fields of meaning. Within that situation they may unconsciously identify with the non-accepted and taboo field, developing it and then acting differently than they usually do. By acting in accordance with the projection of the taboo field, the listener in effect returns it to the projector. This serves two functions; first it confirms the projectors unconscious knowledge that certain fields of meaning should not be developed. Second it perhaps enables the listener to reset – or regain control over – his or her own meaning making systems such that the process can be recognized. Indeed, identification with the taboo field can perhaps be thought of as a form of resistance to the projection on part of the listener. However, when only the former occurs the relationship becomes circular. This makes it difficult for either side to take ownership of the experience. Notably, the possibility of recognizing difference (error in Peirce’s language) makes projective identification a potentially useful tool for identifying the fields of meaning that are being protected.

Returning to the example of de-sexualizing, as stated earlier, for the most part men do not take responsibility over their own sexuality. Seen as victims of women’s seduction, their lack of ownership or responsibility of their experience speaks directly to the existence of a non-accepted field of meaning that has been regulated through defensive projection. As a result, Muslim women in Mumbai take responsibility of both their own sexuality (accepted) and men’s sexuality (non-accepted/taboo). This projection is culturally facilitated. Problematically, the lack of acknowledgment of male sexuality leads to a situation where the women become responsibility for the actions of the men. This may seem to place them in a position of power over men via their seductive bodies; however, it is not clear that this is the case at all. Instead, identification with their bodies as taboo returns the projection in an unaltered form reifying the idea that there is in fact something wrong, when there may not be. Accordingly, responsibility and ownership remains split off to such a degree that women can be seen as culpable for crimes against them (Duits & van Zoonen, 2006, p. 106).

The role of the minority in the construction of the majority

This elaborated concept of projective identification can be applied to the majority–minority relationships described by Wagner et al. (2012). When looking at the relationship between minority Muslims in Mumbai and their majority counterpart, evidence of a complicated feedback system becomes apparent. The circular relationship can be understood between fields of accepted and normative meanings and fields that are off limit and taboo.

To begin, the role of the majority or Western “Other,” constructs the dominant and acceptable fields of meaning within a given situation. The influence of capitalism on Western culture has led to prioritizing the individual’s independence and their rights. As noted by Moghaddam et al. (2000), the West has endorsed the idea that we have a duty to ourselves (p. 276). Moreover, spreading these rights has also become part of this “duty”. At the same time, ideas that put the community ahead of the individual – or that suggest giving up independence – have become something of a taboo field marked with anxiety (though note the recent emergence of super Church’s and a religious return to family values and community).

Not surprisingly, the foreign or different nature of Muslim culture where gender and independence are constructed differently fit into this taboo field. Simultaneously, the realities and fears of terrorism and fundamentalism threaten Western values. Thus, when faced with difference and the possible elaboration of meanings not normatively accepted within Western culture, a split occurs to maintain a positive sense of identity (Moghaddam & Kavulich, 2007, p. 579). In this regard, veiling becomes a sign of oppression and generates suspicion – leading to a view that Muslim women need liberation and of Western duty and superiority. Very neatly, the threatening taboo fields are dealt with through projection, preserving the sense of goodness.

Problematically, this projection (re)creates the very sense of oppression that these women are seen as experiencing. Essentially, their way of living generates anxiety within the current acceptable Western ideology. This anxiety becomes split off and projected through a false dialogue (liberation) that generates stereotypes rather than understanding. For this reason, rebellion and resistance take the form of moving further towards fundamental religious group identification. In other words, an unconscious identification with the Western taboo of giving up duty to the self in order to further a group occurs.

On the other side, the adoption of minority beliefs appears to entail choosing a known patriarchal and pedagogical system over an unknown one. Not only are Western taboos (being less independent, prioritizing community, etc.) elaborated into duties, but also, the idea of being independent becomes further developed as its own taboo field. In this respect, part of Muslim duty may be to reject the West. Just as Western culture has difficulty adopting Muslim ideas, it appears that for the interviewed minority Muslim women, nothing of the “Other” can be taken in as well.

In reaction to the Western gaze, Muslim minorities constitute the “Other” as being untrustworthy, guarding against potentially anxiety provoking meanings. While not elaborated in the current article, this view appears to maintain an idea that the West cannot understand Muslim culture (though this paper itself may be taken as evidence against that) and thus requires resistance. In turn, the Western recipient appears to further identify with the (re)projection of the taboo of individuality, interpreting the minority decision to rebel as evidence of oppression. Projecting the West as a perpetrator and a threat preserves community and security becoming a rallying narrative of victimization. This process turns the projective identification wheel, as the minority has now constructed the majority to be as uninterested in making meaning of veiling as they are of independence.

How to move towards dialogue

Through this complicated inter-cultural process, majority and minority continually construct each other through a series of defensively oriented projections and identifications. Dialogue appears both tantalizing easy and remarkably difficult. In its most simplistic form, it would involve moving beyond the projections towards examining meanings and meaning making processes. However, the article hints at some of the difficulties of giving up the defensive utilization of projection. Fears of vulnerability and of losing identity/culture make it easier to seek and find blame than to work towards making meaningful connection and elaboration. In this respect, dialogue requires both parties to be willing to take ownership of the projection of non-accepted areas of meaning onto the other and to work towards making these experiences less taboo. In other words, they have to recognize the real aspects of their relationship that necessitate such defensive actions.

Acknowledging the unity in opposites is one step towards dialogue. Through this process, finding similarity with the “Other” becomes possible. While each side appears fundamentally different, they are in fact related through the duality of meaning between normative and counter-normative behaviors. Identifying the similar process used to construct difference in each other may help each side recognize their shared aspects of humanity. In this respect, the interpersonal psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan has remarked: “In most general terms, we are all much more simply human than otherwise” (1953, p. 16). Exploring the two-sided constructions that occur during defensive projective identifications helps to bring out the imperfections of both sets of meaning and the possibility that each side can learn something of humanity of and from each other.

Footnotes

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not for profit sectors.

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