Abstract
Reorganising Crime is focused on the concept of resilience and answering the questions of how and why organized crime groups are more or less able to resist attack via state policy, adapting as they do to changing socio-economic circumstances. Georgia is used as the case study to examine this, largely as a result of the very specific circumstances of the Georgian mafia and the way in which state policy has been applied. The discussion is not widened beyond these organized crime groups.
Following an introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the history of Soviet thievery in the context of parallel political and socio-economic changes. This chapter also defines the terms used throughout the book, the key theoretical concept of trust networks (Tilly, 2005), as well as the data and methods adopted in the research. Tilly (2005) outlines four key variables that comprise viability of trust networks in the face of state predation: (1) supply of resources; (2) external relations; (3) internal relations; and (4) the maintenance of social and symbolic boundaries. In Chapter 3, Slade discusses resources through the legitimate and illegitimate markets in which the thieves-in-law operate and the roles undertaken in these markets. His overall claim is that the prevailing socio-economic conditions in Georgia have provided diverse demand and opportunities for organized crime groups. Chapter 4 focuses on external relations between the thieves-in-law and the state, drawing even further on Tilly (2005) in detailing the strategies by which trust networks interact with the state. In reviewing this relationship, Slade identifies three notable periods of interaction type; firstly, a period of toleration and repression during the later Soviet period (1980–1991); secondly, an interlude of toleration and facilitation during the post-Soviet period (1992–2003); and, finally, the period following the Rose Revolution (2003–2012), which encompassed repression and wholesale state attacks on organized crime. Slade discusses the internal relations, structure and organization of the thieves-in-law groups in Chapter 5 and issues of recruitment in Chapter 6. In the latter, there is a particular emphasis on the role of prisons in widening the thieves-in-law networks. Chapter 7 outlines the way in which social and symbolic boundaries are maintained through the costs of commitment to, and exit from, the thieves-in-law, and how changes to the nature of commitment to the group eroded internal legitimacy thereby contributing to their resilience. Finally, for the substantive discussion, Chapter 8 outlines the shifts in social attitudes towards the thieves-in-law on the basis of the state’s anti-mafia campaign. Chapter 9 draws the book to a conclusion, indicating how the findings from this research can inform the resilience of other organized crime groups and policies aimed at tackling them.
Slade effectively argues that the leading explanation of the demise of the Georgian thieves-in-law on the basis of effective policy is too simplistic. This account of the impact of policy developments and internal factors which impact on the resilience of the Georgian mafia is engaging and accessible. It contextualizes both the development of the thieves-in-law and their demise within the history and socio-economic changes taking place in post-Soviet Georgia. Slade’s main argument is that mafias exist in ‘uncertain, high-risk and volatile environments’ (p. 10); in this context, the Georgian thieves-in-law were unable to adapt or to achieve any kind of sustained resistance.
Slade clearly provides explanations of his terminology, including the adoption of ‘mafia’ in a narrow construction which ensures that the term has an effective meaning for the purposes of this discussion. In so doing, he dispels prevailing myths about the thieves-in-law and the effectiveness of the policy in this case. The Georgian anti-mafia campaign was launched in 2005 and included legislative measures to seize property acquired through legal means, holding members of the criminal fraternity under separate and very harsh prison conditions, and a commitment to flush out the corrupt elements of law enforcement. Yet, the apparent success of these efforts to tackle Georgian organized crime comes with a high cost, and Slade raises questions about the operation of state crime in the fight against organized crime, and particularly the extent to which the draconian measures used justify the successes achieved.
As noted, Slade draws on a theoretical framework primarily drawn from Tilly’s (2005) trust networks in order to outline the concept of resilience. The key variables relevant for the survival and viability of trust networks are used as the basis for the majority of the book. This provides a central focus of resilience around which Slade presents aspects of the thieves-in-law rules, activities and reputation. In so doing, he also provides details of operational processes in both legitimate and illegitimate market-based case studies allowing a solid foundation onto which the more conceptual discussion can be mapped.
In accordance with much research in the area of organized crime, there are limitations with the data, although these are duly acknowledged by Slade. As a result, sections of the discussion are based on the analysis of a small sample. However, the use of a broader range of data sources, including interviews, court cases, police files and archives, allows additional evidence to verify these points. In addition, Slade undertook a broad approach to data types in order to provide multiple layers of evidence in attempting to validate or falsify official accounts. He also undertook social network analysis as part of his examination of the available data, thereby developing some interesting commentary on the relative positioning of individuals in the criminal network. The social networks analysis (p. 105) presents a fascinating summary, and it would prove interesting to read more about the density and cohesion of these networks.
In making his observations, Slade reminds us that, ‘the attack on the mafia did not need to take into account legal niceties, human rights protections and civil liberties’ (p. 78). The speed with which the policy changes were adopted led to the thieves-in-law being unable to adapt to the new legal and social environment. However, the harsh nature of the policy reforms and the very specific circumstances surrounding both the rise and fall of the thieves-in-law means that it would not be desirable—or even possible—for these reforms to be replicated elsewhere. In his conclusion, Slade suggests some tentative general strategies that can be used as the basis for the development of theory regarding the resilience in mafias. Understanding the nature of resilience provides a key insight into the points of vulnerability in mafias which may be exploited in other policy approaches to mafia-type organized crime. In the context of ongoing debates about defining organized crime—as well as the efficacy of including small and disorganized groups within this remit—this case study provides an important reminder of the ability of organized crime groups to develop and infiltrate (albeit on an individual rather than systemic basis) government agencies and to control large sections of social and economic life.
Slade alludes to recent changes in Georgian politics and the potential impact that this may have on future development for the thieves-in-law. This book accordingly presents a stimulating case study of the relationships between policy and organized crime groups within complex and shifting socio-political circumstances. I will be interested in following Slade’s contribution to the future research agenda, which will no doubt continue to illuminate this hidden world.