Ensuring a political space for conflict by applying Chantal Mouffe to post-war reconstruction and development

I Introduction: The linking of post-war reconstruction and development

Post-war reconstruction and development are no longer viewed as separate conceptual or practical domains. As an ‘evolving concept’ (Kotzé, 2010: 213), they are seen by some as symbiotic with democratization, good governance, economic prosperity and social equality (and thus necessary for achieving conflict resolution and peace), whilst conflict resolution and peace are seen as vital to the achievement of sustainable development. Research suggests that, at the same time as there is no confirmed positive causal relationship between post-war reconstruction and development, an academic and policy consensus linking the two is increasing in strength (Mac Ginty and Hamieh, 2010). Such agreement is made possible by two key mechanisms that are said to link post-war reconstruction with development: first, that poverty and underdevelopment may be causal or enabling factors of conflict; and second, that armed conflict and its fallout can have a negative and long-lasting impact on development (Duthie, 2009). Indeed, a post-war context has been argued to be one in which development has been limited due to destruction of infrastructure and disrupted social programmes, meaning that development ‘failures’ tend to be those countries which have experienced widespread or lengthy wars (Simon, 1999: 22). There is thus an impetus from both the post-war reconstruction lens and the development lens to connect the two domains closely together.

Post-war reconstruction and development have been linked together through a growing body of literature that traces the impact of each on the other. Violence is said to reduce social capital vital for development (Francis, 2002; Moore, 2000), to lead to the loss of (productive, economic) life, to the destruction of infrastructure, the disruption of trade and the reduction of overall resources due to the costs of war. From the other direction, development interventions which do not adequately take into account conflict dynamics have been identified as reinforcing tensions and power inequalities which may lead to violence (Bornstein, 2008). Accordingly, it is possible to argue that the right kind of development and the right kind of post-war reconstruction have the potential to strengthen and consolidate each other (McCandless and Abu-Nimer, 2009).

What we have thus seen since the 1990s is an increased intertwining of the fields of development and peacebuilding, with organizations focused on employing experts in both areas and with the conceptual and practical fields of each expanding to incorporate aspects of the other (Jantzi and Jantzi, 2009). No longer can one argue that development is only concerned with poverty alleviation as interventions increasingly include democratization and human rights issues (Kotzé, 2010). No longer can one argue that peacebuilding concerns itself only with conflict resolution as it increasingly includes economic development strategies (Ogata, 2003). Such developments have brought with them a series of critiques to which this article speaks: that there is a misunderstanding of violence as an absence of democracy and development – notably that external intervention based on universalized norms should determine the path towards peace and development and that there is a normative value in establishing consensus as to the nature of political community, social behaviour and civic duty.

The argument presented here will build on these critiques and apply a framework offered by Chantal Mouffe. Her theory of agonism addresses conflict, consensus, democracy and politics together in a way that has the potential not only to critique reconstruction and development, but also to point towards ways in which we can re-think their conceptualization and practice. In the following section, the nature of post-war reconstruction and development will be outlined along with critiques of their key assumptions. This provides the background and context for the application of Mouffe’s political theory. The article will then go on to look at her theoretical contribution to understanding post-war reconstruction and development policies. It concludes with a discussion of the ‘right’ kind of conflict and where Mouffe’s theoretical contribution can take scholarship and practice on post-war reconstruction and development.

II Post-war reconstruction and development: Claims and critiques

The linking together of post-war reconstruction and development is not merely a consequence of the end of the Cold War, of the changing nature of security threats in the contemporary world and of the changing dynamics of conflict. First, it is not any kind of post-war reconstruction and any kind of development that are connected in all interventions. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, there was a prioritization of economic growth anchored in fiscal and price stability rather than a focus on inequality, social exclusion, employment and social welfare (Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2009). Interventions are therefore frequently positioned within the liberal peace paradigm that emphasizes democratization, rule of law and market economics as fundamental to achieving a sustainable peace. Moreover, it is a liberal democracy which is promoted, based on the assumption that certain kinds of liberal societies are more likely to be peaceful than their illiberal counterparts (Newman et al., 2009). What we are talking about when we refer to the linking of post-war reconstruction with development is thus a set of policies that promote economic liberalization and democratization. These policies are underpinned by a series of assumptions related to three key issues – the transformation of violence, the role of external actors and a liberal democratic consensus.

In terms of the first area, post-war reconstruction and development practice is informed by an assumption that violence is the result of an absence of democracy and of development, resulting in a bias towards assimilation as a solution. Such an understanding of violence posits development as the mechanism for a reductionist teleological progression from a state of abnormal and transitory violence to its abolition (Duffield, 1998). This is made possible only because violence in the contemporary new wars era (Kaldor, 1998) is viewed as a failure of modernity and thus places of conflict are seen as possessing traits of barbarity, excess and irrationality (Duffield, 2002). According to Escobar (1997), this is a problem inherent in development orthodoxy more generally, which tends to produce abnormalities in its pursuit of a specific vision of modernity and normal relations of politics, society and economics. Post-war reconstruction and development are embedded within such orthodox approaches, evident in their casting of violence as an abnormality which development can eradicate. The order, security and fundamental social change that are promised by development and its ‘will to govern’ are proposed as the solution most appropriate for the transformation from violence and abnormality to peace. Thus development has been reinvented, according to Duffield (2002: 1049), as a strategic tool of conflict resolution and social reconstruction.

The policies which stem from this accordingly focus on institution building, the reform of governance structures and fostering of democratic norms; all of which approach post-war reconstruction and development as a technical rather than a political exercise. According to Jabri (2010: 41), this type of transformation is ‘distinctly institutional’ and a question of ‘design’, or put more accurately redesign, of entire social formations so that they are indeed transformed into ‘liberal’ societies. The result is that interventions construct and target societies experiencing war as spaces that require policing, rather than as distinct political entities. What this neglects is the substance of the social contract required to fill the institutional shell of the state. It also misses a proper understanding of political agency and the everyday needs and experiences of people living in the society that is a target of such transformations. This emphasis on hardware rather than software means that reconstruction and development policies are unable to incorporate an understanding of the complex political, social and cultural contexts in which their interventions take place (Kotzé, 2010: 227).

Second, Hettne has observed that the post-Cold War context of intra-state wars has rendered security a key concern for development interventions, meaning that

Development aid has in this context been reduced to a civil form of humanitarian intervention, and the major reason for intervention is violent conflict; to prevent it, to manage it, or to reconstruct societies in post-conflict situations. Post-conflict reconstruction is a new development experience of massive social engineering. (Hettne, 2009: 101)

Interventionism has been given a new lease of life in the contemporary world as national sovereignty is increasingly trumped by adherence to international norms of human rights (Zaum, 2007). The role of intervention is a contested topic within development, and the increasing interconnection between development intervention and international security concerns casts it in an ever-sharper light (Hettne, 2005: 40). In Mac Ginty and Hamieh’s (2010: 57) analysis of indigenous responses to development and post-war reconstruction in Lebanon they argue that, despite the politicization of interventions, both internal and external actors have an ability to improve lives and deliver assistance in cost-effective and appropriate ways. However, the emphasis in post-war reconstruction and development is towards the external, the universalizable and the liberal democratic at the expense of local people and voices that are more marginal. This can take the form of states themselves being marginalized in terms of their own sovereignty, which is increasingly seen as being contingent on international norms that are arbitrated by external power holders (Zaum, 2007), and on the content of interventions being determined by those outside a given society. As different scholars have contended, policies can thus be both inappropriate and ineffective in post-war societies (Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2009; Mohamed Salih, 2009). In this way, we can hear echoes of modernization theory in post-war reconstruction and development, whereby external intervention is promoted as the solution to knowledge transfer from the global north to the global south, leading to less-developed countries being able to join the club of normal market economics (Cooper and Packard, 1996: 2).

Third, assuming that conflict and violence are due to the absence of modernity, the post-war reconstruction and development framework seeks the creation of a particular kind of state and a particular kind of society: a liberal democracy complete with elections, rule of law, market economics and a population which performs civic and consumerist duties. As Pugh (2009: 85) has termed it, to ‘democratize the unruly’. O’Gorman (2011: 128) refers to this as a social contract model of post-conflict development in which the state provides core services such as security and the rule of law and a body of active citizens and civil society organizations hold the government to account.

For Hettne, discourses of development are moving towards a new idea of global development in which ‘standards applied in most (non-failed) domestic systems are increasingly taken as norms in the international system as well’ (Hettne, 2005: 41). Positioned within a liberal peace agenda, post-war reconstruction emphasizes a ‘liberal–democratic free market framework, human rights and the rule of law, and development models’ (Richmond, 2010a: 23). The requirement of a consensus over the boundary and content of social and political communities casts that which falls outside the purview of modernity as illiberal, deviant, barbarous and irrational. However, the politics of the conflicts which may be part of post-war life (for example religious identities, resource distribution in a context of scarcity and the division of political power) may impact upon the ability of reconstruction and development interventions to achieve their goals. Moreover, these conflicts may raise questions about the nature of the goals themselves and illuminate contesting visions of co-existence. Scholars such as Richmond (2010b) and Pugh (2009) suggest that what is needed are viable alternatives, the recognition of local agency, and an emphasis on the local and everyday context.

The three core sets of issues described in this section highlight the main assumptions of post-war reconstruction and development, in the way in which they both conceive of violence influences the intervention industry that has developed in the last 20 to 30 years. Critiques force a re-thinking of the assumptions that underpin the strengthening link between development and peacebuilding. They also, importantly, alert scholars and practitioners to the instrumental and conceptual dangers of tool kit approaches that seek to homogenize and order societies that have experienced violence, war and repressive regimes. In doing so, these critiques point towards the agency of those living in post-war societies and the participation of different actors in processes of reconstruction and development in ways which shape how policies are experienced and enacted on the ground. It is important to look for ways in which it is possible to incorporate local agency, the importance of context, and the possibilities of challenges to dominant modes of organizing social and political community.

In the following section, this article will outline the theoretical contribution which Chantal Mouffe’s political philosophy can make to the discussion so far, a discussion which has focused primarily on a statement of the problem and the outlining of critiques. In summary, Chantal Mouffe’s political theory is able to offer a vision for post-war democratic life that responds in a combined way to the critiques outlined earlier. To the issue of transformation as a technical exercise, Mouffe responds with a conceptualization of politics and political agency that opposes teleological and apolitical interventionism. In reference to the role of external actors, Mouffe provides us with a coherent and compelling vision of domestically produced and negotiated political decision-making. Finally, when it comes to assumptions of the universal applicability of a certain type of liberal democracy Mouffe reminds us of the dangers of consensus and the benefits of contestation over how certain values should be realised and enacted. Although her work does not directly engage with post-war societies, her theory of agonism does make claims as to the role of conflict in democratic life, the ways in which those who are most marginalized can be brought back in and thus offers an opportunity to provide an alternative that enables us both to deconstruct post-war interventions and to reconstruct an alternative.

III Applying Chantal Mouffe to post-war reconstruction and development

Chantal Moufffe argues for the virtues of agonistic pluralism as a model for democracy. In contrast to consociational democracy based on elite consensus, and deliberative democracy based on rational deliberation, agonistic pluralism sees the potentially positive aspects of certain forms of political conflict. It is based on a deep respect and concern for the other, and questions the assumptions and ideals of harmony and consensus seeking. According to Mouffe, the stuff of democratic politics is conflict with a respectful, and respected, other. It is the argument of this article that her work, particularly her division between politics and the political, can be usefully applied to post-war reconstruction and development policy. As discussed earlier, this seeks a teleological eradication of the abnormality of violence, conceiving of its own role as a tool in a transformative project of social and political engineering. Thus the policies which follow are based on institutional reform aimed at peace through design. Mouffe’s theory of agonism conceptualizes political agency and community in a way which speaks to the same problematic as post-war reconstruction and development but which identifies a very different solution.

She asks a key question of pluralist democracies, one which is of core concern for post-war reconstruction and development interventions: ‘how to make our belonging to different communities of values, language, culture, and others compatible with our common belonging to the political community’ (Mouffe, 1995: 100). For Mouffe, the answer lies in agonism as opposed to antagonism, and conflict with a respectful and respected other. Whilst antagonism is defined by Mouffe as a friend/enemy distinction where there is no common ground and the enemy is perceived as threatening the other, agonism is where the we/they relationship rests on an acknowledgement that there is no rational solution to the conflict and that one’s opponent is legitimate. An enemy is thus transformed from being an other which one wishes to destroy, to being an adversary whose existence is considered legitimate at the same time as conflict exists between them (Mouffe, 2005: 20).

Conflict exists between such adversaries over the ranking and interpretation of the values of democratic life (Mouffe, 1995: 107). For Mouffe, it is imperative to acknowledge the presence of such conflict rather than to conceive of democracy and political community in ways which fail to ‘elaborate the democratic project on an anthropology which acknowledges the ambivalent character of human sociability and the fact that reciprocity and hostility cannot be dissociated’ (Mouffe, 2005: 3). The aim of democratic politics is thus ‘to transform potential antagonism into agonism’ (Mouffe, 2002: 9). One aspect of this theory of agonistic pluralism is of particular interest here: that of the division between politics and the political, which Mouffe defines in a particular way:

…by ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies, while by ‘politics’ I mean the set of practices and institutions through which an order is created, organizing human coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the political. (Mouffe, 2005: 9)

As a practical manifesto this means that:

Instead of trying to design the institutions which, through supposedly ‘impartial’ procedures, would reconcile all conflicting interests and values, the task for democratic theorists and politicians should be to envisage the creation of a vibrant ‘agonistic’ public sphere of contestation where different hegemonic political projects can be confronted. (Mouffe, 2005: 3)

Thus Mouffe understands democracy as an open-ended process perpetually amenable to disruption and renewal, and as a moment marking the practice of politics itself rather than a form of government or a set of institutions (Lloyd and Little, 2009: 3). In this sense, the complete realization of democracy and the final achievement of the right political community must be seen as impossible in the face of a definition of democracy formation as a never-ending process of contestation (Mouffe, 1992: 238). This stands in stark contrast to the technical and institution-building approach of post-war reconstruction and development that views democracy as a teleological end point which can be reached by design.

The result of such an instrumentalization of democracy is that it prioritizes particular forms of government and institutions and requires a potentially stifling consensus and blindness to the workings of politics interacting with the political. Little (2009: 181) addresses the case of Northern Ireland and perceptions of stalemate and political impasse that, he suggests, may in fact be more normal the further it moves away from the ideal type of the Belfast Agreement. Mouffe’s work suggests a move away from the tendency to view democracy in terms of political institutions and procedures – and judging the level of democracy in societies accordingly – and towards a paradigm in which there can be a range of arguments and institutional arrangements (Little, 2009: 184). Instead of declaring a stalling of politics, or political deadlocks, as is often heard in relation to post-war contexts from Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Ivory Coast, we can see the workings of the political and the ‘normal’ situation of the conflictual workings out of the political community.

In post-war reconstruction and development there is a central and important role reserved for external actors who are responsible for the transfer of knowledge from the safe and civilized global north to the dangerous and deviant global south. This interventionism hinges on the contemporary importance placed on international norms of human rights and of current discourses of security and development. To use Mouffe’s terminology, the politics of post-war reconstruction and development seeks to order the dangerous parts of the world where an absence of modernity and a presence of underdevelopment have led to conflict and violence. However, as we can learn from Mouffe, the conflicts inherent in human life (that is, the political) will continue throughout and beyond the transition from war to peace, a dynamic which post-war reconstruction and development policy does not recognise, and one which in fact it frequently works against. If we use Mouffe’s theory, then what is required is not a technical intervention of external actors based on perhaps external principles of politics, but rather a political space based on the possibility of other forms of interaction.

In applying Mouffe’s work to the context of post-war Bosnia and the role of civil society, Jeffrey argues that:

…this form of intervention has sought to construct associative life that merely reflects a neoliberal vision for Bosnia. It could therefore be argued that the priority for consensus has led to a lack of democratic political struggles with which to identify and other forms of identification, primarily based on ethno-national identity, have taken their place. (Jeffrey, 2008: 743)

By giving importance to the political and its unique, but ever present, manifestation in different societies, Mouffe’s work questions an assumed role for external interventions which promote only one form of politics. Concerned with ensuring that an active liberal democratic civic life can promote a type of citizenship which overcomes divisions associated with violence, post-war reconstruction and development interventions may fail to see the relevance and value of difference, as well as the potentially fluid and contingent nature of identity. For Mouffe (2005: 18), these can never be fixed and essentialized, but are rather formed as a result of processes of identification. Masaki (2009) has used this to criticize development interventions’ simplistic views of oppression and marginalization in the context of Nepal. The author (Jones, 2009) similarly makes visible the ‘axes of differentiation’ (Theidon, 2003) which complicate ethnic versus multi-ethnic logics applied by external actors in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Here, we see a fear of violence conflated with a fear of conflict that is avoided through the categorization of those who are right and wrong when compared to democratic norms. However, according to Mouffe, democracy cannot be designed as a technical project that requires only the right actors and the right consensus; instead, it must emerge from the context of the political and reflect an unending project of community building.

The application of Mouffe’s political philosophy brings us to the question of a consensus over the terms of democratic procedures and institutions. For Mouffe, this

…is needed on the institutions constitutive of democracy and on the ‘ethico-political’ values informing the political association – liberty and equality for all – but there will always be disagreement concerning their meaning and the way they should be implemented. In a pluralist democracy such disagreements are not only legitimate but also necessary. They provide the stuff of democratic politics. (Mouffe, 2005: 31)

Mouffe thus sees consensus as an obstacle to democratic progress, as excluding oppositional voices to the dominant perspective and concealing the fact that democracy cannot eradicate conflict (Little, 2009: 185–86). Post-war reconstruction and development, on the other hand, promote democracy as a tool for resolving conflicts, rather than allowing a legitimate space for them. According to Schaap, agonism allows us to retrieve ‘the concept of reconciliation from a state-sanctioned project of nation-building for a democratic politics centred on the possibilities of self-determination and solidarity among citizens divided by a history of state violence’ (Schaap, 2006: 255). Like Mouffe, Schaap questions whether social conflict is reconcilable, and suggests that instead of prioritizing the kind of consensus based state and nation-building often found in post-war interventions, actors should focus on making available

…a space for politics within which citizens divided by the moments of past wrongs debate and contest the terms of their political association. Instead of looking to politics to secure a common identity, reconciliation would depend on founding and sustaining a space for politics within which the emergence of a common identity is an ever present possibility. (Schaap, 2004: 538)

Importantly, the ever present possibility of the emergence of a common identity coexists with the ever-present possibility of a change in the organizing principle of the politics over the political. The non-arrival at an end-point of unity and consensus is in itself the value of this form of democracy which does not pre-suppose that consensus over liberal democratic principles is the only and necessary way of securing peace and development.

The theoretical tradition of which Mouffe is a part challenges the over determination of signifiers of liberal democracy such as liberty, rights and the rule of law, preferring to view democracy as an unfinished project and not the means through which to eradicate conflict and violence (Little, 2009: 181–83). Instead of a model that recognizes conflict as deviant, thereby excluding those who seek to oppose the terms of association, Mouffe’s vision allows room for conflict and division which may in fact be more pertinent for the everyday experiences of people living in post-war societies. It will no longer be appropriate or feasible to judge societies against democracy indicators, or to define politics as at a stalemate or deadlock. Instead, it would be possible to acknowledge the political and how it is seeking to contest and re-shape the politics of post-war society. This allows more voices to be heard, greater possibilities for processes of identification, and agency for those who wish to alter the interpretation of the institutions and procedures of democracy. This could potentially allow more ideas for how to order society to come to the fore, and for a greater sense of ownership and identification of the people with the polity. As Mouffe warns:

When democratic politics can no longer shape the discussion about how we should organize our common life, when it is limited to securing the necessary conditions for the smooth functioning of the market: in these circumstances the conditions are ripe for talented demagogues to articulate popular frustration. (Mouffe, 2002: 13)

IV Conclusion: The possibilities of a political space for conflict

In post-war societies the nature of the citizenry (that is, the boundaries and content of the political community) is often a matter for dispute (Gibney, 2006: 1). At the same time, countless state and nation-building interventions seek to manage plural ethnic, religious, racial and other divisions in a way which is consensual and non-violent (see, for example, Buckley-Zistel, 2006). Alongside this democratic recipe, social and economic development are seen as jointly necessary for establishing successful transitions from warring to peaceful, developed societies. Mouffe’s political philosophy speaks directly and indirectly to critiques of these approaches and references conflict, order, the will to govern, democracy, the other, difference, division and respect. It also provides us with a model for reconceptualizing and developing alternative forms of post-war reconstruction and development.

Mouffe’s distinction between politics and the political provides a framework in which the ordering of post-war societies can be understood in relation to an inevitable disjuncture with the inherent antagonisms of human life, exacerbated by experiences of violence. In addition, it points to the ways in which political agency can be used to contest dominant paradigms of democracy though ongoing and unfinished conflicts which must form part of democratic life. If we apply Mouffe’s political theory we can move away from the modernization/assimilation approach of categorizations such as failed states (Jantzi and Jantzi, 2009: 69) towards ideas of liberation or broader change. The critiques of liberal blueprints or models being imposed by external actors (see, for example, Jeffrey, 2008; Richmond, 2010a) are answered with a theoretical framework which emphasizes the possibilities of agency, civil society and mobilization. It explains why the imposition of one set of institutions and procedures as the right ones will not be able to eradicate conflict and why such notions should necessarily be contested.

Like post-war reconstruction and development, Mouffe’s political theory is concerned with reducing the presence of violence and of a friend/enemy distinction. However, instead of addressing this issue with an emphasis on consensus, casting conflict and dissent as deviant, many more perspectives on the terms of association are permitted. This leaves space for multiple processes and forms of identification and is a fuller account of the different ways in which it might be possible to order a given post-war society. In addition, unlike post-war reconstruction and development’s valorization of the moral and the judicial for determining the ordering of society, Mouffe’s political theory leaves room for contextually salient social and political forms of mobilization which may more accurately reflect the agency and desires of those who live in post-war societies and are, after all, the targets and agents of transitions from war to peace. Mouffe herself does not write specifically of post-war contexts and, in fact, highlights the potential limitations of agonism in the country contexts in which post-war reconstruction and development interventions most often take place:

…the more unstable the social relations, the less successful will be any definite system of differences and the more the points of antagonisms will proliferate…in the countries of the Third World, imperialist exploitation and the predominance of brutal and centralized forms of domination tend from the beginning to endow the popular struggle with a centre, with a single and clearly defined enemy…the diversity of democratic struggles is more reduced. (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 131)

However, this article is concerned not simply with contexts in which there are unstable social relations, but where a transition to democracy is underway. In this sense, the question becomes how to order the political in a context of an agreed set of democratic values even if the terms of association and ordering of these values is much contested. Mouffe’s cautions are well received, but recent research on post-war contexts suggests that a reduced political space for conflict is inappropriate and potentially damaging to the aims of post-war reconstruction and development. Mouffe’s agonism can be used to good effect in systematically critiquing post-war reconstruction and development and in providing one solution to the question of what type of democratic political space will allow a transition to democracy to occur at the same time as an ongoing contestation over the terms of association.

It is not the claim of this paper that an application of Mouffe will illuminate all policy aspects, nor that it renders the project of post-war reconstruction entirely de-legitimate. However, it does provide a useful theoretical framework for understanding how the ordering of post-war societies can occur and why it is inevitable and in fact necessary that conflicts remain. Mouffe’s political theory differs from the liberal democracy promoted by post-war reconstruction and development in its vision of a necessarily incomplete democratic project and a central role for conflict. This allows for the complexity of post-war societies to be taken into account when understanding how politics unfolds and how the political may shape the design and outcomes of particular interventions. It also highlights a ‘credibility gap’ between development practice, in which modernization projects still command the bulk of development funding, and development literature, which is increasingly critical of modernization models (Jantzi and Jantzi, 2009: 77). The application of theory such as that of Mouffe’s to post-war reconstruction and development can clearly address this gap by exposing problematic assumptions in both theory and practice, and by adding to an ongoing debate over alternative models.