From fringe to front? Assessing the voting influence of the radical right in the European Parliament

Abstract

Scholars have long believed that the influence of radical right parties in the European Parliament was indirect due to their internal heterogeneity, limited involvement in parliamentary activities, and the existence of a cordon sanitaire. However, the consolidation of these parties, marked by the Identity and Democracy group becoming the fourth largest group in 2019, raises concerns about their impact on European Union decision-making. This article seeks to understand the extent and conditions under which the radical right group in the European Parliament can influence policymaking. By analysing roll-call votes from the 9^th term (2019 to 2024), we introduce a measure of voting influence, operationalised as the ability of a party group to sway the outcome of a vote in plenary. Our analysis reveals that while the radical right group frequently joins winning majorities in the European Parliament, its voting influence remains limited because of the low levels of conflict in plenary.

Keywords

European Parliament Euroscepticism radical right roll-call votes voting influence

Introduction

The consolidation of Eurosceptic radical right parties,¹ combined with the increased fragmentation of the European Parliament (EP), raises concerns about the impact of these parties on European Union (EU) decision-making (Börzel et al., 2023; Kantola and Miller, 2021). For a long time, scholars assumed that the influence of radical right parties in the EP was limited due to several factors. Firstly, the main pro-EU political groups, the European People's Party group (EPP), the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), and Renew, often form a grand coalition that excludes radical groups (Costa and Marié, 2023). This exclusion is further reinforced by the ‘cordon sanitaire’, which prevents the radical right from obtaining powerful positions in the EP. Secondly, the radical right struggles with transnational cooperation which leads to lower internal cohesion in the EP (Brack and Startin, 2016; McDonnell and Werner, 2018), thus diminishing their potential policy influence. Lastly, radical right groups have historically been less involved in parliamentary activities, which further hinders their potential policy impact (Behm and Brack, 2019). These actors are rarely allocated committee reports and have a limited role in trialogues (Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003; Ripoll Servent and Panning, 2019). Their influence is deemed at best indirect.

With the radical right Identity and Democracy (ID) group becoming the 4^th largest group in the EP in 2019² and the increased level of involvement of these actors in parliamentary activities (Brack and Behm, 2022), the EP faces a new situation where ‘we can likely expect more attempts [from Eurosceptics] to influence policy outcomes’ (Elomäki et al., 2022: 270). Although radical right actors are here to stay and it is essential to understand their potential impact on the functioning of the EP (Salvati, 2022), our understanding of their policy influence remains limited.

This article examines the voting influence of the radical right in the EP, focusing on whether and when they play a pivotal role in voting. We propose a new approach for assessing their potential influence, focusing on the final stage of decision-making in the EP: plenary voting. We introduce a measure of voting influence and define it as the ability of a party group to sway the outcome of a vote. Our analysis relies on roll-call votes (RCVs) from the 9^th term (2019 to 2024) and focuses on the ID party group, which is in a particular position in the EP and constitutes a least likely case for finding voting influence. On the one hand, contrarily to the Conservative and Reformist group (ECR), the ID group is facing significant constraints due to the cordon sanitaire. Because of its radical ideology, it is the only group which is consistently excluded from key positions, files, committee work, and formal alliances.³ On the other hand, it has doubled its seat count between the 8^th (2014 to 2019) and the 9^th term (2019 to 2024), growing from 36 to 73 seats (76 seats following the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the EU).

The analysis reveals, contrarily to previous studies, that the radical right group often joins winning coalitions, especially on legislative files and even with the Grand coalition. But it also shows that it does not mean that the group is influential as its influence requires a minimum level of conflict in plenary and ID needs to be cohesive. However, although the group's influence is limited, it has become a crucial partner of the EPP in some cases.

Voting influence in the EP plenary

With the growing electoral success of radical right parties in Europe and their recent involvement in national governments (Akkerman et al., 2016), there has been a growing scholarly interest in their impact. Some researchers focus on the influence of these parties in the electoral arena (Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2020), while others examine their contagion effects (Van Spanje, 2010) and potential shifts to the right by mainstream parties (Han, 2015; Minkenberg et al., 2021). However, as noted by Schwalbach (2023), there is a gap in research regarding the radical right's influence in parliaments (for a recent exception on Germany, see Esguerra et al., 2023). This article aims to fill this gap by studying the voting influence of the radical right in the EP.

The influence of political actors is a classic subject in political science (Seeberg, 2023). However, it is also a complex one because it can be defined, operationalised, and measured in various ways (Hall, 1992; Lukes and Haglund, 2005). Some studies measure influence as who initiates a bill or overtly attempts to influence it, while others focus on who wins a vote or who has the ability to change voting outcomes or overcome the resistance of others (Barry, 1980; Dahl, 1957, 1961; Schneider et al., 2010). There is a wide body of literature on legislators’ activities and performance, as well as on the impact of institutional rules (Wegmann, 2022). However, regarding the EP, research on the influence of party groups remains relative scarce.

In EU studies, a substantial literature exists on voting power in the EP and the Council, examining the capacity of political actors to impact voting outcomes. These studies see influence as the power to destroy winning coalitions by withdrawing from them (Raunio and Wiberg, 2002). This is operationalised through voting power indices, which measure the extent to which actors are decisive for the success of winning coalitions (Hosli, 1997).

Voting power indices face important empirical challenges. Firstly, these indices assume a high degree of cohesion within party groups, which is not always the case (Faas et al., 2004). Secondly, they overlook the empirical probability of different coalition configurations (Schneider et al., 2010), assuming that all coalitions are equally probable (Mielcová, 2016). In reality, coalition-formation in the EP is driven by ideological proximity, institutional constraints, and legislative strategies, making some coalitions – like the grand coalition – more likely than others (Costa and Marié, 2023; Lane and Maeland, 2007). Additionally, the probability of coalitions involving radical groups is lower because of their exclusion from negotiations and their limited policy congruence with pro-EU groups (Brack et al., 2023; Chiru and Stoian, 2019; Ripoll Servent and Panning, 2019). Lastly, the probability of a coalition depends on contextual factors, such as procedure, the type of vote, and the policy field (Høyland, 2010; Kreppel and Hix, 2003).

Regarding radical right actors in the EP, it is assumed that their influence is limited due to factors like lack of cohesion, limited involvement in legislative activities, and the cordon sanitaire. However, as highlighted by Vestergaard (2021: 333), the extent of their influence on the legislative process remains understudied. Existing research has mainly focused on their strategies, their internal cohesion, or their contagion effect. One notable exception is the work of Börzel et al. (2023), which explores the contestation by Eurosceptics in the EP and its potential impact on legislative outputs. The authors introduce two indicators: Eurosceptic dissent, measuring the divergence of Eurosceptics from the Europhile plurality in plenary votes, and integration polarisation, assessing the degree to which Europhiles and Eurosceptics face-off as cohesive camps. Regarding legislative impact, the authors argue that Eurosceptics can potentially influence legislative outputs when the Europhile camp is divided. However, their article does not empirically measure this potential influence and, as the authors themselves acknowledge ‘neither dissent nor integration polarisation per se is a good indicator of a legislative influence over policy’ (Börzel et al., 2023: 14).

Our article builds upon the rationale of voting power indices to analyse the voting influence of the radical right in the EP plenary. Similar to voting power indices, we conceptualise influence as the capability held by a party group to alter the voting outcome. In this sense, we view influence not in terms of who initiates a bill (Dahl, 1961) or who wins a vote but, instead, in terms of who is essential, or pivotal, for a policy proposal to pass or be rejected (Morriss, 1972). However, unlike voting power indices, our measure relies on real-world voting data, thereby accounting for the actual frequency of coalition configurations and party group cohesion. Our article aims at measuring whether the radical right was pivotal in the EP plenary, that is, whether it held the power to change voting outcomes.

Our operationalisation echoes the works of Barry (1980) and Holler (1982) that define political power as the ability of an actor to change the outcome of the decision-making process. Similarly, we consider influence as being a crucial actor for the adoption or rejection of a policy proposal. However, our approach has some limitations that need to be acknowledged. First, our approach does not capture the ability of actors to directly impact outcomes through overt or coercive actions (Lukes, 2004). Indeed, we do not observe the actions or strategy of political actors before a vote and their direct impact on outcomes and, thus, cannot distinguish between ‘luck’ and ‘decisiveness’ (Barry, 1980; Holler, 1982). For example, a group may frequently join winning majorities and be essential for the success of these majorities without actively attempting to change legislation or engaging in negotiations with other groups. Second, our approach does not track the evolution of legislative texts or of actors’ preferences and cannot assess whether the policy outcome is closer to the preferences of the radical right. Nonetheless, we consider that, for a group, being pivotal is a form of influence given that, without that group's support during a vote, a legislation or an amendment would not have been adopted or rejected.

Research strategy and hypotheses

To investigate the voting influence of the radical right in the EP, this study will follow a three-step approach. The first step will assess the extent to which the ID group joins winning coalitions. In a parliament where no single group can reach a majority on its own to win a vote, a winning coalition comprises all groups aligning with the winning side which either adopted or rejected a final text or an amendment. Because voting influence is defined as the ability for a group to be pivotal for turning a minority into a majority, we can only determine whether a group’s support was essential when it votes with the winning side.

Drawing on previous studies (Vestergaard, 2021), we expect that ID will join winning majorities less often than other groups (H1). This expectation stems from the consensus-driven nature of EP voting, dominated by pro-EU groups, with radical actors being marginalised (Novak et al., 2021). Moreover, assuming Members of the EP (MEPs) and groups act strategically when deciding to join coalitions, the radical right faces significant costs of joining pro-EU winning majorities (being perceived as cooperating with pro-EU groups) compared to relatively low benefits (limited opportunities to advance their agenda and unlikely to receive benefits for their support). Lastly, we do not expect ID to frequently join winning coalitions due to their (self) exclusion from decision-making (Brack, 2018; Brack et al., 2023; Ripoll Servent and Panning, 2019).

Under what circumstances is ID more likely to join winning coalitions in the EP? First, we expect the type of coalitions to matter, with the ID group being less inclined to join winning majorities with the grand coalition (H2A). Given that the pro-/anti-EU cleavage is a key dimension structuring EP politics (Hix et al., 2019; Otjes and Van Der Veer, 2016; Roger et al., 2017) and because of the right-wing position of ID, the radical right group is less likely to vote with the grand coalition, which is composed of pro-EU groups (Börzel et al., 2023), and should be more likely to join alternative right-wing coalitions led by the EPP. With the hypothesis, we expect the ID group to vote with coalitions matching their ideological preferences (Vestergaard, 2021: 334).

Second, the participation of ID should vary depending on the procedure and type of vote, two factors impacting coalition-building in the EP (Costa and Marié, 2023; Høyland, 2010; Kreppel and Hix, 2003). Our analysis distinguishes two procedures (legislative vs. non-legislative) and two types of votes (votes on final reports vs. votes on amendments or paragraphs). We expect the radical right to join winning majorities less frequently in legislative and final votes, while being more inclined to participate in lower-profile votes (non-legislative votes and non-final votes) (H2B). This hypothesis is based on two considerations. Firstly, final votes and votes on legislative reports carry greater inter-institutional implications, leading pro-EU groups to often form grand coalitions (Kreppel, 2001). As these reports often reflect a compromise between centrist groups, the radical right, due to its more radical position, is likely to be ideologically incongruent with this coalition on final legislative reports and should oppose it. Secondly, regarding strategic motives, Eurosceptic and radical actors should reject the compromise made by the grand coalition to signal their opposition to the legislative power of the EU (Vestergaard, 2021). Given the higher visibility of these legislative and final votes, it is reasonable to expect ID to abstain from aligning with the grand coalition, instead using these votes to signal their opposition to EU decisions.

Lastly, the involvement of ID in winning majorities should vary across policy fields. Previous studies have shown that coalition-building and the strategies adopted by Eurosceptics is not uniform across all issues (Börzel et al., 2023; Hix and Høyland, 2013; Vestergaard, 2021). We expect ID to join winning majorities less frequently on topics related to EU integration, international affairs, and socio-cultural matters (H2C), due to a lower ideological proximity between the radical right and other groups in these areas. Conversely, the radical right should join winning majorities more frequently on socio-economic matters, where greater ideological alignment exists with other right-wing groups (EPP and ECR).

This first step focuses on whether and when ID joins winning coalitions. However, mere participation in winning coalitions does not guarantee voting influence, especially if the radical right group only joins oversized coalitions, where its involvement is not essential. Therefore, the second step of our analysis investigates, for all votes where the radical right group aligned with the winning side, the conditions where this participation is essential. We argue that, when a group joins a winning majority, voting influence depends on two factors: the level of conflict in plenary and the internal cohesion of the group.

Firstly, conflict should be crucial in explaining voting influence (Bowler and McElroy, 2015; Börzel et al., 2023). In contested votes adopted by a small majority, the support of fringe groups, including the radical right, becomes essential for victory. Consequently, as conflict increases, the radical right group should have a greater chance of holding voting influence (H3). Conflict should have both a threshold and a relative effect. First, when there is no conflict in plenary, it is mathematically impossible for any group to be pivotal. Therefore, there is a minimum threshold below which a group cannot hold voting influence. Second, when conflict reaches a minimum level where a group could potentially be pivotal, there is an additional relative effect of conflict: higher conflict levels are expected to be positively related to voting influence.

Secondly, the level of internal cohesion is also expected to significantly impact voting influence (Hix and Noury, 2009). Börzel and Hartlapp (2022: 98) suggest that Eurosceptics may only secure concessions if they are united. We believe there is a positive association between group cohesion and voting influence (H4). The ID group is more likely to have the capacity to sway the voting outcome when a substantial number of its MEPs align with the winning side. At the same time, the effect of cohesion may depend on the overall level of conflict in plenary. When there is conflict, the percentage of ID MEPs voting with the winning side should not be as relevant: whether the group is united or divided, it is likely to be pivotal. Conversely, when there is less conflict, with a wider margin between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ votes, the radical right group needs to be cohesive to be pivotal. Therefore, we expect an interaction effect between conflict and the group's cohesion.

The third and final step assesses, in absolute terms, the extent to which the radical right group joins winning coalitions on votes where it has the potential to influence the voting outcome. While the first two steps focused on critical conditions for voting influence, when considered individually, they do not offer a complete understanding of the radical right's level of voting influence in plenary. Indeed, it is possible that ID only joins winning coalitions on RCVs where they have no chance to be pivotal. Thus, in this final step, we combine our findings on when the ID group joins winning coalitions and on the factors of voting influence to determine whether the group is participating in votes where it could genuinely be pivotal. This final section will provide a more comprehensive evaluation of the absolute level of voting influence held by ID during the 9^th term and will give concrete examples of votes.

Data and measurement

To study the voting influence of the radical right in the EP, we use RCVs data from the 9^th term (2019 to 2024)⁴ which we extracted from the EP's Public Register of Documents and from the Legislative Observatory website.⁵ In EP plenary sessions, RCVs are automatically required for final votes on legislative reports (Rule 188 of the EP's Rules of Procedure) and, for other votes, can be requested by a group or by at least one-twentieth of MEPs (Rule 19).

While RCVs have been widely used in legislative studies, they have some limitations (Thierse, 2016). Indeed, there is a risk that RCVs, constituting around 71% of all plenary votes during the 9^th EP term (Broniecki and Høyland, 2023), may not be a fully representative sample of all votes. Furthermore, since RCVs can be requested strategically by party groups, there is a risk of selection bias (Trumm, 2015). Finally, the changes observed during the Covid-19 crisis, when most votes were RCVs, may have further influenced MEPs’ behaviour (Broniecki and Høyland, 2023). Yet, studying the voting influence of ID using RCVs is valuable for several reasons. First, recent scholarship suggests that selection biases have recently become less significant (Yordanova and Mühlböck, 2015). Secondly, our analysis will control for contextual factors such as the procedure, type of vote, policy issue, and the Covid-19 voting method to mitigate representativeness biases. Thirdly, the variation in legislative behaviour between RCVs and other votes does not diminish the relevance of using RCVs to examine whether the radical right is sometimes pivotal on RCVs. While our findings cannot be generalised to all votes, RCVs remain empirically relevant because they involve the adoption of EU legislation and of non-legislative reports.

Our first step investigates whether the radical right group joins winning majorities. We have developed a variable considering both successful and unsuccessful votes. Successful votes are those in which the radical right group (ID) was part of the coalition that secure the adoption of a report or amendment. Conversely, unsuccessful votes are those where the ID group was part of the coalition that rejected a report or amendment. The variable is binary and is coded ‘1’ if the plurality (relative majority) of MEPs from the ID group held the same position as the winning side, and ‘0’ otherwise. This variable does not consider internal division (we do not distinguish between cases where 90% or only 55% of ID MEPs voted with the winning side). This step focuses only on assessing the extent to which the majority of ID MEPs vote with the winning side, with internal divisions to be considered in the second step.

We will test our hypotheses on the ID group's involvement in winning majorities using four independent variables. The categorical COALITION variable captures whether an RCV was won by the grand coalition (the EPP and S&D groups voting together), by the S&D group without the EPP (S&D-led coalition), or by the EPP without the S&D (EPP-led coalition). LEGISLATIVE, the second variable, is coded ‘1’ for RCVs on legislative reports (that fall under the ordinary legislative procedure, the consultation procedure) and ‘0’ for non-legislative reports (i.e. own initiative reports and non-legislative resolutions). Excluding RCVs from other procedures, our dataset comprises 13,258 RCVs, representing 78.4% of all RCVs. The FINAL VOTE concept distinguishes between final votes (final reports) and non-final votes (e.g. on amendments). Lastly, ISSUE specifies whether the vote was on (a) ‘EU-integration issues’ such as institutional and constitutional affairs on which radical right parties are united in their clear opposition; (b) ‘international affairs issues’ such as trade agreements, foreign affairs and defence (Falkner and Plattner, 2020); (c) ‘socio-economic issues’, ranging from the internal market to agriculture and social affairs and which is a secondary feature for radical right parties (Cavallaro et al., 2018; Mudde, 2007: 119); and (d) ‘socio-cultural issues’, such as migration, law and order and anti-discrimination measures, which constitute the core issues of these parties (Zaslove, 2009). This classification is based on the committee that was responsible for drafting the report (Costa and Marié, 2023; Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999). The Online appendix provides more information about the operationalisation.

In the second step, we examine the conditions under which the radical right group holds voting influence, that is, be pivotal. A group holds voting influence when its support was essential to the success of a winning majority. For each RCV, we simulate what would have happened if the MEPs from ID who joined the winning side had voted against it. For each vote, our binary variable INFLUENCE takes the value ‘1’ if the group was pivotal, and ‘0’ otherwise.

H3 and H4 will be tested with the following variables. First, conflict will be captured by the margin of victory, which is the absolute difference between the number of votes cast for the winning side and those cast for the losing side. For each vote, a smaller margin (close to 0) indicates a higher level of conflict and polarisation within the EP. Second, the group's cohesion is measured with an agreement index (Hix et al., 2007: 91). For each vote i, this index is calculated as follows:

\frac{\begin{matrix} max (Y_{i}, N_{i}, A_{i}) - \frac{1}{2} [(Y_{i} + N_{i} + A_{i}) - m a x (Y_{i}, N_{i}, A_{i})] \end{matrix}}{Y_{i} + N_{i} + A_{i}}

where

Y_{i}

is the number of Yes votes,

N_{i}

the number of No votes, and

A_{i}

the number of abstentions. The max() function is used to determine the maximum value among these three variables (

Y_{i}, N_{i}, A_{i}

). A higher score indicates a greater level of internal cohesion within the ID group.

Our models consider two elements related to Covid-19. Firstly, a dummy variable will control for texts regarding the EU's response to the pandemic. The crisis context likely incentivised all groups to increase cooperation to quickly adopt legislation addressing the consequences of the pandemic. Second, the repercussions of the lockdown in terms of remote voting may also have influenced how legislative actors cast their votes (Broniecki and Høyland, 2023). We will include a dummy variable to account for RCVs that occurred during the remote voting procedure (May 2020 to March 2022).

Analysis

During the 9^th term, the EP has been composed of seven political groups as well as non-attached members. As of February 2020 (after the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the EU), the largest groups were the EPP, with 187 MEPs⁶ (27%) and the S&D, with 146 MEPs (21%). These two groups, because of their pro-EU positions, have long cooperated closely in the grand coalition. The third largest group was Renew, with 98 MEPs (14%). Because of its pro-EU and centrist positions, this liberal group has often served as a crucial partner for the EPP and S&D in the grand coalition. The fourth largest group was ID, with 76 MEPs (11%), which is the focus of this article. The ID group was home to many radical right parties, including the Rassemblement national (France), Alternative Für Deutschland (Germany), and Lega Nord (Italy). These groups were followed by the Greens-European Free Alliance (Greens-EFA), with 68 MEPs (10%), which is composed of Green and regionalist parties. Other groups have a more ambivalent position on EU integration. The ECR group, with 62 MEPs (9%), includes conservative parties with soft Eurosceptic positions (Stevens and Szczerbiak, 2023). Finally, the Left in the European Parliament group (Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left – GUE/NGL) consisted of radical left-wing and communist parties (39 MEPs, 6%).

Can the ID group be pivotal? Overall, it had the lowest frequency of holding voting influence during the 9^th term. Out of all RCVs in the dataset, the group was in a pivotal position in 6% of cases, in stark contrast to the EPP (20%) and S&D (19%) groups. These different levels of influence can be attributed to group size: the larger number of MEPs in the EPP and S&D groups increases their chances of pivotal roles. However, group size is not the sole determinant explaining voting influence. In fact, the ID group's voting influence is weaker compared to other groups with similar or fewer MEPs, like GUE/NGL (39 MEPs, probability of influence of 6%) and ECR (62 MEPS, probability of influence of 6%). Other factors should play a role. In what follows, we first examine whether and when ID joins winning coalitions, then the factors facilitating voting influence when joining winning coalitions, and finally, the extent of ID's pivotal role during the 9^th term.

The participation of ID in winning coalitions

First, we expect the radical right group to join winning majorities less frequently than other party groups (H1). This is confirmed by Figure 1: during the 9^th term, ID joined winning coalitions significantly less frequently than other groups. However, it is intriguing that the radical right still aligns with winning majorities in 40% of RCVs, which is significant. Despite their Eurosceptic stance and previous reluctance towards parliamentary work (Brack and Behm, 2022; McDonnell and Werner, 2020), the ID group seems to be more willing to frequently engage in policymaking and support winning coalitions, even those led by the grand coalition. Figure 1 also shows that the three largest pro-EU groups (EPP, S&D, and Renew) secured victories in almost all RCVs, illustrating the dominance of the grand coalition in plenary voting.

Figure 1.

Percentage of times the different groups were on the winning side during the 9^th term.

To test our hypotheses regarding when does the radical right joins winning coalitions, we use logistic models predicting the likelihood of the ID group joining a winning coalition (Table 1). The first model includes the type of coalition (H2A), the procedure (legislative vs. non-legislative) and the type of vote (final vs. non-final) (H2B). Because not all RCVs have a policy issue associated with them (resolutions are not drafted in committees), we only add the ISSUE variable in a second model. In this second model, we also omit files that followed the joint committee procedure, which accounted for 4.5% of the RCVs with available committee information. This is done because such votes could not be assigned to a particular individual committee. Finally, a third model introduces an interaction effect between the type of vote and the procedure. This is necessary because the impact of one factor on the involvement of the radical right group may depend on the value of the other factor.

Table 1.

Logistic regression models predicting the Identity and Democracy group being on the winning side.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Coalition (Ref: Grand coalition)
Coalition (S&D)	−0.70***	−0.71***	−0.71***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Coalition (EPP)	1.67***	1.78***	1.79***
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Legislative	0.41***	0.41***	0.37***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Final vote	0.22***	0.24***	0.08
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Covid-19 text	−0.06	0.06	0.05
	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Issue (Ref: EU integration)
Issue (International)		0.06	0.05
		(0.11)	(0.11)
Issue (Socio-cultural)		−0.05	−0.05
		(0.11)	(0.11)
Issue (Socio-economic)		0.52***	0.52***
		(0.10)	(0.10)
Remove voting	0.21***	0.17***	0.17***
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Legislative * final vote			0.32**
			(0.16)
Constant	−0.76***	−1.02***	−1.00***
	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.11)
N	13,106	8927	8927
Log Likelihood	−8240.70	−5443.21	−5441.07

Note: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.

EU: European Union; EPP: European People's Party group; S&D: Socialists and Democrats.

First, the results confirm that ID's participation depends on coalition type. Specifically, the positive coefficient associated with EPP-led coalitions suggests that the group is more inclined to join EPP-led coalitions than the grand coalition or S&D-led coalitions. This confirms our hypothesis and underlines the significance of ideological proximity in coalition formation, as noted by previous studies (Axelrod, 1970; De Swaan, 1973; Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999; Lane and Maeland, 2007; Vestergaard, 2021). Moreover, while voting more often with EPP-led coalitions, we also find that ID can sometimes vote with the grand coalition (in 38% of the times, and 47% when it comes to legislative votes). This suggests that although ideology matters, many RCVs are adopted by an oversized coalition involving all groups, including the radical right.

Second, we expect the radical right group to join winning majorities more frequently on non-legislative and non-final votes. However, the results from the models 1 and 2 do not support this hypothesis. In fact, we find that ID more often joins winning coalitions on legislative and on final RCVs, which suggests a more pronounced involvement of the radical on votes with higher interinstitutional and political implications. The predicted probabilities of the third model, which includes an interaction effect between the type of vote and the procedure, are plotted in Figure 2. They confirm that the group is more likely to join winning coalitions on legislative reports and, more specifically, on final legislative votes.

Figure 2.

Predicted values of Identity and Democrary being on the winning side.

Finally, the participation of the radical right also varies by policy area, confirming previous studies showing that policy issue matters. The coefficients in Model 3 indicate that ID is more likely to join winning coalitions on socio-economic issues compared to other issues, therefore supporting our hypothesis. Because socio-economic policies tend to be less polarised and are not strictly about EU integration and institutions, it is easier for the radical right to align with pro-EU groups. This finding on economic files can also be explained by the important number of legislative reports during the 9^th term on the EU's response to Covid-19 and the post-Brexit situation, where the radical right group has often voted with the grand coalition. Nevertheless, the ID group has also joined the grand coalition in various other economic legislative files, including the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) 2014 to 2020 (file 2019/0180(COD)), the directive on minimum level of taxation for multinational groups (file 2021/0433(CNS)), and the digital markets act (file 2020/0374(COD)).

The conditions under which ID holds voting influence

We now turn our attention to voting influence. Specifically, we explore the extent to which and the conditions under which the ID group was pivotal when voting with the winning coalition. We begin by presenting descriptive statistics. Figure 3 plots the percentage of times different groups were essential in determining voting outcomes when participating in winning coalitions. For instance, when the radical right group voted with the winning majority, its participation was essential in 14% of cases. The three largest groups (EPP, S&D and Renew) are the most influential, being pivotal in approximately 20% of cases. However, their relatively low level of influence also suggests that most RCVs are adopted by an oversized majority reducing their voting influence. Conversely, smaller groups (GUE/NGL, ECR, ID, and Greens-EFA) are less often pivotal.

Figure 3.

Voting influence of the different party groups.

We now analyse the factors explaining the voting influence when the radical right group joins a winning coalition. We have hypothesised that it should have more influence when there is conflict in plenary (H3) and when the group is internally cohesive (H4).

We begin by exploring conflict, expecting more voting influence for ID in a divided parliament. We operationalise conflict by using the margin of victory: more conflict in plenary means smaller margins of victory (a smaller difference between the number of votes in favour and against). First, conflict has a threshold effect since it is mathematically impossible for any group to change the voting outcome below a certain level of margin of victory. This threshold margin of victory, above which a group cannot be pivotal, is two times its number of MEPs which, for the ID group, amounts to 152. In the Online appendix, we offer two fictional examples where 76 ID MEPs voted in favour of a text and ended up on the winning side. When the margin of victory is greater than 152 (e.g. 153), the voting outcome would remain the same if these MEPs had voted against. In contrast, if the margin of victory falls below 152 (e.g. 151), the ID group could have altered the voting outcome if it had voted against, thereby holding voting influence.

Conflict in plenary also has a relative effect, meaning that, for those RCVs characterised by a conflict level below the threshold, a higher degree of conflict is positively related to the probability for being pivotal. Descriptive statistics confirms that for RCVs with a margin of victory below 152, the mean margin is significantly lower for RCVs where ID was pivotal (margin = 58) compared to votes where it did not (119). Thus, the radical right is more likely to find itself in a position where it can change voting outcomes when there is conflict and polarisation in the EP plenary, supporting H3.

The second factor affecting voting influence is the group's cohesion. To be able to change a voting outcome, a group must have a significant number of MEPs voting with the winning side. Descriptive statistics confirm that expectation (H4): for RCVs where ID was pivotal, its mean agreement index was 0.79. By contrast, the group was significantly more divided (0.56) on RCVs where it lacked voting influence.

The effects of conflict and group cohesion on ID's voting influence are confirmed by a logistic regression analysis. This analysis exclusively examines RCVs where (1) the radical right group joined the winning coalition, and (2) the level of conflict fell below a margin of victory of 152. Model 1 predicts the likelihood of ID holding voting influence depending on the margin of victory in plenary and on the ID's group cohesion. We hypothesise these two variables significantly impact the potential for the radical right group to be pivotal. Model 2 adds an interaction term between conflict and group cohesion. Our expectation is that these two variables will interact: cohesion is important when conflict is low, whereas its significance diminishes when the level of conflict increases. Detailed results are presented in the Online appendix.

The regression analysis confirms that both conflict and cohesion are significant factors in explaining voting influence. Specifically, the results from Model 1 show that the ID group is more likely to be pivotal in RCVs marked by high conflict (i.e. narrower margins of victory) and high internal cohesion. These findings align with the research of Börzel et al. (2023), who demonstrated the importance of these two factors to understand the room for manoeuvre of Eurosceptics. Model 2, which includes an interaction term between conflict and cohesion, suggests that both variables are related in explaining the likelihood of being pivotal. This interaction effect is best illustrated by predicted probabilities (Figure 4). When there is conflict in plenary (lower margins of victory), cohesion plays a minor role: under these circumstances, regardless of whether ID is strongly or moderately united, it frequently has the potential to change voting outcomes. However, in situations with less conflict, cohesion emerges as a critical factor, with unity becoming crucial if the radical right group wants to be able to weigh on the voting outcome. Finally, Figure 4 shows that a high level of cohesion helps the ID group to be pivotal across a broader spectrum of RCVs, extending beyond those characterised by extremely high degrees of conflict and polarisation.

Figure 4.

Predicted probability of voting influence.

The radical right's voting influence in absolute terms

In the previous two sections, we have provided evidence that (a) the radical right frequently joins winning majorities and (b) can be in a position to alter voting outcomes under some circumstances. However, these findings do not provide a comprehensive assessment of the radical right's overall voting influence. It is plausible that ID only joins winning majorities on unanimous votes, where the capacity to be pivotal is inexistent. By combining our findings both on participation and on the factors of voting influence, this last section aims at better understanding whether the radical right group actually joins winning coalitions on RCVs where it can hold voting influence.

We begin by examining votes for which the conditions of high conflict and party cohesion are met. We conducted two linear regression analyses predicting the level of conflict in plenary and the cohesion of the ID group. These models consider the following contextual factors: procedure, type of vote, and policy area. Detailed results can be found in the Online appendix.

First, this regression analysis reveals that conflict is substantially lower on final votes and international issues. Moreover, the results of a model that includes an interaction effect between the procedure and the type of vote suggest that conflict is even lower for final legislative votes. These votes are generally adopted in the EP plenary by oversized coalitions, which comprise most pro-EU groups. Because of reduced conflict on these RCVs, the ID group is less likely to be pivotal when joining winning coalitions. Conversely, we observe higher levels of conflict in plenary on non-final votes, as well as on socio-cultural and socio-economic issues, offering the radical right more opportunities to be pivotal in such cases. Second, the regression analysis shows that the ID group is more cohesive on legislative files, non-final votes, as well as on EU integration and socio-cultural matters. Therefore, we can expect ID to be more pivotal on these specific RCVs when aligning with the winning majority.

In summary, our results on conflict and cohesion suggest that the radical right group is more likely to hold voting influence when joining winning coalitions on non-final votes and socio-cultural issues, which are characterised by higher levels of conflict in the EP and increased cohesion within the ID group. By contrast, the radical right group is expected to have a lower likelihood of exerting voting influence on final legislative votes and international issues due to significantly lower levels of conflict in the EP plenary on these issues. Descriptive data from the 9^th term support these expectations. When joining winning coalitions, ID is more likely to hold voting influence on non-final votes (15%) compared to final votes (1.2%). The frequency to hold voting influence is even lower for final legislative votes (0.9%). Similarly, ID is more frequently pivotal on socio-cultural issues (19.3%) and EU integration matters (18.1%) than on socio-economic (13.4%) and international issues (9.6%).

If we combine our findings so far, there is a discrepancy. On the one hand, we found that the radical right is more likely to be pivotal when joining winning coalition on non-final and socio-cultural votes. On the other hand, in the first empirical section, we demonstrated that these are the votes on which they are less likely to join winning coalitions. In other words, the radical right group joins more frequently winning coalitions on RCVs (e.g. final legislative votes) that offer limited opportunities for being pivotal.

To illustrate these patterns, we now present data about the absolute level of voting influence for final legislative votes and non-final non-legislative votes. We focus on these types for two reasons. First, final legislative votes are worth analysing because ID joins winning coalitions more often in these cases. Secondly, non-final non-legislative votes are the most polarised votes in plenary, providing the radical right with more opportunities be pivotal when joining the winning side.

Regarding final legislative votes, the ID group was on the winning side in 51.3% of the 437 RCVs. However, this participation does not translate into voting influence because of a high level of consensus in plenary. Figure 5 plots the total number of final legislative votes, the number of votes for which ID was on the winning side, and the number of votes for which it was pivotal. Although the radical right group frequently joins winning majorities on final legislative votes, it lacks the capacity to influence voting outcomes because of the dominance of the grand coalition and, thus, the low level of conflict. This situation is consistent across policy areas, as nearly all legislative texts are adopted by the grand coalition. An exception occurred in the vote on the Revision of the EU Emissions Trading System on 8 June 2022. The final negotiation mandate of the EP was rejected by 340 votes against 265, with only the EPP and Renew groups voting in favour. The S&D-led winning coalition comprised left-wing groups rejecting the report for being too weak and conservative and radical right groups voting against because it was too ambiguous (Simon, 2022). The position of ID was pivotal: had it voted in favour, the vote would have passed. This rare case shows how a polarised parliament in final legislative votes can grant smaller groups, including the radical right, some influence over outcomes.

Figure 5.

Analysis of final legislative votes during the 9^th term.

Concerning non-final non-legislative votes, we expect the radical right group to hold more voting influence due to higher conflict levels in plenary. At the same time, the group is less frequently part of winning majorities on these RCVs (37%) compared to final legislative votes (51.3%). Figure 6 confirms the higher level of conflict, with alternative EPP-led or S&D-led coalitions winning many RCVs. This should give the radical right more opportunities to be pivotal when joining these (smaller) alternative coalitions. This is confirmed by the data. When a non-final non-legislative vote is won by an EPP-led coalition, ID is often joining it and finds itself in a pivotal position. Overall, out of the 529 non-legislative non-final votes won by an EPP-led coalition, ID was on board in 398 votes (75%) and was pivotal in 211 votes (40%). However, the impact of the radical right remains limited for two main reasons: (1) we find that the grand coalition remains important even for non-final non-legislative RCVs and (2) when the EPP and S&D groups fail to cooperate, the S&D group had a greater chance of victory compared to the EPP during the 9^th term.

Figure 6.

Analysis of non-final non-legislative votes during the 9^th term.

In our dataset, the ID group played a pivotal role in 261 non-legislative non-final votes. Due to space limitations, we offer a condensed overview.⁷ First, the group was pivotal on many environmental amendments to economic resolutions. For instance, in a report about the EU strategy for critical raw materials, the radical right was determining for the formation of EPP-led coalitions blocking amendments for stricter sustainability criteria in the mining sector. Second, in non-environmental socio-cultural files, ID MEPs were essential in helping the EPP and Conservatives to include elements related to the protection of Christians in human rights resolutions, and concerning migration, they prevented calls to forbid EU countries from blocking rescue boats from entering their territorial waters. Third, regarding EU-integration resolutions, the radical right was essential to block proposals such as creating a joint European constituency, introducing gender quotas in EP committees and ending unanimity on tax matters in the Council. Finally, in international matters, the ID group found itself in a pivotal position when it came amendments advocating for stricter regulation on arms exports.

These examples show that ID is frequently in a pivotal position regarding non-legislative amendments. This is especially the case when there is polarisation and a strong left-right divide in the plenary. In many of the votes described above, the EPP-led winning coalition included the EPP, ECR and ID groups, along with some Renew MEPs. Our analysis reveals that, when the EPP forms a right-wing coalition in a very polarised environment, the radical right is pivotal when the liberal Renew group is internally divided. In such cases, as the EPP cannot rely on full support from Renew, the support of ID MEPs becomes indispensable for securing victories.

Conclusion

With the success of radical right parties in Europe, concerns are rising about their impact on policymaking. Existing research has examined their contagion effects, agenda-setting power, and behaviour in office. However, there remains a significant gap in our understanding of the extent of their influence in parliaments, particularly at the EU level. This article aims to address this gap by introducing a new measure of voting influence, thereby contributing to the existing literature on the impact of radical right parties.

Using a RCVs dataset from the 9^th term (2019 to 2024), our analysis shows that the radical right ID group in the EP joins winning majorities in plenary sessions more frequently than expected. Even more surprisingly, this participation occurs with the grand coalition and on legislative files, contradicting previous studies suggesting that these actors tend to signal their opposition to EU legislation (Vestergaard, 2021). This finding sheds some light on the strategy of the radical right in the EP. Despite their anti-EU positions and previous limited engagement in legislative work (Brack, 2018; Brack and Behm, 2022), the radical right does not hesitate to align with pro-EU groups in oversized and consensual coalitions to facilitate the adoption of EU regulation. Our research also shows that joining a winning majority does not automatically guarantee a pivotal role. For the radical right group to hold voting influence, there must be a minimum level of polarisation in plenary, and the group itself must be internally cohesive. Finally, we find that the overall voting influence of the radical right remains limited in absolute terms. In most cases, the ID group joins winning coalitions where its likelihood of being pivotal is limited, such as during final legislative votes. However, our findings also suggest that, in a small number of cases where the grand coalition is not brought into play, the radical right becomes a crucial partner for the EPP.

Our analysis has some caveats. Firstly, our study only assesses whether the ID group holds voting influence and does not capture their proactive involvement in shaping the decision-making process. Secondly, our focus on plenary voting does not allow for an assessment of the radical right's participation and influence in other aspects of the legislative process, such as agenda-setting, negotiations in plenary committees, or trialogue meetings. Finally, it is beyond the scope of this paper to determine the reasons why the radical right frequently joins winning coalitions. This trend could signify a strategic shift by the radical right to appear more responsible, especially since some of its national parties are part of governments or aim to join one. Moreover, some radical right parties have tried over the last decade to appear more respectable to attract a broader range of voters, which may be reflected in their strategy in the EP (McDonnell and Werner, 2018). However, this trend could also result from other party groups moving closer to the ID group, making it easier for them to join winning coalitions. Future research should investigate these trends. A longitudinal analysis could examine whether the ID group has indeed changed its strategy and/or whether the ideological positions of other groups have moved rightwards. Additionally, adopting a qualitative research design could provide valuable insights into how MEPs and party groups, including mainstream ones, perceive and apply the concept of ‘cordon sanitaire’ in practice.

Despite these limitations, our findings carry important implications for both national and European politics. For national politics, while our study focuses on the EP, our measure of voting influence could be applied in settings where radical right parties are increasingly gaining representation in national parliaments. By doing so, we can better assess whether these parties are becoming pivotal actors and, therefore, wielding influence over the policy-making process. Such an approach would greatly enrich the existing body of literature on the radical right, which has so far primarily focused on the contagion effect of these parties or their impacts once in power.

Our findings also carry implications for European politics. Our analysis reveals that the EPP often relies on the radical right when building alternative coalitions. If the 10^th EP term (2024 to 2029) is characterised by a further consolidation of nationalist and radical right parties, the frequency of EPP-led coalitions could increase, potentially impacting both EU politics and public policies. On the one hand, closer cooperation between the EPP and radical right groups could lead to a reconfiguration within the EPP family, as some of its national members may not be comfortable with such an alliance, and to a change in the strategy of the liberal Renew group. On the other hand, in terms of public policy, a move towards the right could impact the EU's economic orientations and its ambitions in fighting climate change. Such a move was already observed in November 2023, when coalitions of right-wing and radical right parties managed to water down some elements of the Green Deal, notably the report on the sustainable use of plant protection products (Brzeziński, 2023). As Europe faces the normalisation of the radical right and their growing presence in some national governments (and hence, in the Council), a rightward shift in the EP could further increase their influence on a wide range of policies and on the EU's ability to tackle challenges, such as democratic backsliding, conflict at its borders, and the effects of climate change.

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sj-docx-3-eup-10.1177_14651165241268127 - Supplemental material for From fringe to front? Assessing the voting influence of the radical right in the European Parliament

Supplemental material, sj-docx-3-eup-10.1177_14651165241268127 for From fringe to front? Assessing the voting influence of the radical right in the European Parliament by Nathalie Brack and Awenig Marié in European Union Politics

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the three reviewers and the editor for their constructive comments which helped us improve the article. A special thanks as well to Ramona Coman and Emilie van Haute for their comments on a previous version of the article. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the EPSA 13th Annual Conference in Glasgow (June 2023) and at the CES 27th International Conference (June 2021). We wish to thank all participants in these panels, including Marie-Eve Bélanger, Agni Poullikka, Philipp Broniecki, and Gail McElroy, for their valuable feedback.

Author contributions

The authors contributed equally to the article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Nathalie Brack

Awenig Marié

Data availability statement

All data generated or analyzed during this study are included in this published article and its supplementary information files.

Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

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