The politics of the individual: Luhmann reading Durkheim

The problem of social order in modern societies

According to Luhmann, Durkheim’s social theory provides a sociological conceptualization of the individual. This first means that Durkheim accounted for a social evolution characterized by a decrease in social control. He therefore aimed to highlight the social conditions of individuality, as he tried to analyze the emergence of the modern individual. Luhmann quite clearly points out this first aspect of Durkheim’s conceptualization of the individual in his introduction to the German translation of The Division of Labour in Society. Why does Luhmann focus on this? According to him, Durkheim did not just concentrate on the emergence of the modern individual – this analysis was closely intertwined with an examination of the foundations of social order in modern societies. The German sociologist thus claims that his own social theory is indebted to Durkheim’s for his approach to the problem of social order.

In this text, Luhmann indeed points out the very particular way Durkheim approached that problem. Durkheim did not simply intend to highlight the foundations of social order in general. More specifically, The Division of Labour in Society can be viewed as an attempt at setting out the foundations of the modern social order. This focus on the specificity of modern societies and their order is closely related to an analysis of the emergence of the modern individual. As Luhmann puts it, Durkheim’s problem of social order can be formulated as follows: “How do persons acting autonomously (selbständing agierende Personen) and capable of decision-making constitute a social relationship or a social system? In other words, how is social order possible, even though persons choose their actions for themselves?” ⁶ (Luhmann, 1982: IV, 10, translation modified). What Luhmann means here is that Durkheim, in his description of modern societies, took account of a decrease in social control. First, Luhmann’s introduction to this book focuses on the social evolution it aims to account for. Second, what he refers to as “persons” is characterized through his or her ability to “act autonomously” precisely because modern societies exert less pressure on their members and their behaviors. In his introduction (section 4), Luhmann thus stresses Durkheim’s analysis of the “evolutionary individualization increase” (evolutionär zunehmende Individualiserung; Luhmann, 1982: 11, translation modified). This will be made clearer, in the next section, by referring to Durkheim’s theory.

Durkheim’s thinking on social evolution

Let us determine which elements of Durkheim’s text can be brought to support Luhmann’s reading of this text. In The Division of Labour in Society, Durkheim points to a phenomenon of differentiation that he sees as characteristic of modern societies.

In societies that he describes as “primitive” or “inferior,” social order is based on “social likenesses,” or a “community of beliefs and sentiments” (Durkheim, 2013: 216). Such similarities are the source of social solidarity, a solidarity Durkheim therefore describes as “solidarity through likeness.” By “solidarity,” Durkheim refers to the ways in which man “take[s] account of other people” and “regulate[s] his actions by something other than the promptings of his own egoism” (Durkheim, 2013: conclusion, 311). In a nutshell, “solidarity” means the “tendency to sociability” (Durkheim, 2013: 54). ⁷ The social order of primitive societies thus derives from the “totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average members” of such societies, which Durkheim designates as their “collective consciousness.” Social order of primitive societies is possible insofar as their members realize in themselves the “features of th[is] collective type” (Durkheim, 2013: conclusion, I, 309). In this kind of society, “the individual personality is absorbed into the collective personality” (Durkheim, 2013: 102). This means that human behavior is entirely determined by society.

His analysis of social evolution supports this study of primitive societies. Durkheim contends that such evolution is characterized by a steady multiplication of individual differentiations in the “functions” or “roles” ⁸ fulfilled by the members of society. According to him, the model of the “division of labour” offers some insights into this phenomenon, at least if its use extends beyond the economic field, that is, if it is then raised, as Luhmann (1982) puts it, to “the conceptual level of a theory of society” (II, p. 6). Indeed, each member of society fulfills a specific function that differs from those of other members. Society can thus be seen as “a system of different and special functions united by definite relationships” (Durkheim, 2013: 101). Such an evolution is only possible because the behaviors, beliefs and feelings of individual members are less and less determined by the collective consciousness. Indeed, for these differences to appear, as Durkheim (2013) states, “the collective consciousness must leave uncovered a part of the individual consciousness, so that there may be established in it those special functions that it cannot regulate” (p. 102). In other words, from his analysis of social evolution depicted as a process of differentiation of roles or functions, Durkheim concludes that “social consciousness,” which is characterized by homogeneity, to be more precise, by its homogenizing effects, comes to determine human behavior less and less. The concept of “individual” is useful for depicting this social evolution, this decreasing social control, as such an evolution is conducive to a process of differentiation, that is, of individualization. As a consequence, members of society have henceforth “a strong inclination to think and act for [themselves]”; they have “actions on their own” (Durkheim, 2013: 101). Here, Durkheim makes explicit use of the term “autonomy” and stresses that modern societies leave “more room for the free play of our initiative” (Durkheim, 2013: 102, my emphasis).

As Luhmann argues in his introduction, the upshot of Durkheim’s study was the need to formulate the problem of social order in accordance with the specificity of modern societies; the social control exerted by the collective consciousness could no longer be considered an essential basis for this order, as in “primitive” societies.

Finally, let us note that this reading strongly and explicitly differs from that of Talcott Parsons. In the very first notes of his introduction to the German translation of The Division of Labour in Society, Luhmann mentions Parsons’ article, “Durkheim’s Contribution to the Theory of Integration of Social Systems” (Parsons, 1960). This article stresses the forms of individualized social control that Durkheim, according to Parsons, aimed to account for, rather than any concerns with a decrease in social control.

In what sense does Luhmann view himself as a follower of Durkheim?

Luhmann stresses in his introductory essay that Durkheim thus defined a theoretical research program. In this respect, this text offers thoughts on what makes a classic still “relevant” (aktuell) to our time. By “classic,” Luhmann means a “classical author” or a “classical text.” Note that, in his view, raising the question of the “actuality” of a classic is no less than examining what precisely makes a text a classic. According to Luhmann, we can still learn from Durkheim because the problems he dealt with are still relevant. A “classical text” can in this respect be considered a “reference text” – an expression that must be understood in a technical sense; Durkheim provided a “theoretical frame of reference” that later social scientists could utilize and benefit from.

Along this line, Luhmann claimed to adopt a Durkheimian conception of the individual and, accordingly, the formulation of the problem of social order that the French sociologist offered. This assertion should not be considered merely incidental. Luhmann’s introduction was published in 1977. Almost 30 years later, in his article “Die gesellschaftliche Differenzierung und das Individuum,” Luhmann (1995b) reaffirms his commitment to the Durkheimian approach. Moreover in the same article, he contends that the differentiation of roles is one of the most striking features of modern societies and is closely related to the emergence of what he refers to as the “individual” (Luhmann, 1995b: 131). In Luhmann’s (1995b) view, this amounts to saying that the “genesis of individuality” is connected to an “evolution in the structure of society” (p. 138).

But he also draws attention, in the same text, to the distinguishing traits that separate his conception of the differentiation of roles from Durkheim’s. ⁹ First, the Luhmannian notion of role is not the same as the Durkheimian one. In Luhmann’s theory, “role” no longer means what it meant for Durkheim, that is, the particular way each member of society contributes to maintaining the social whole, with the individual roles or functions dependent on each other. By “role,” Luhmann instead means a bundle of behaviour expectations (2004: 104, 251) or an “expectational nexus” (1995a: 315). ¹⁰ Second, Luhmann adopts a different approach to the differentiation of roles characterizing modern societies. As will be shown, his study rests ultimately on a competing conception of social differentiation. Durkheim’s understanding of social differentiation is based on the division of labor model borrowed from economics. In this view, each member of society can be described as fulfilling a specific role or function. Luhmann claims that Durkheim’s accounting for social differentiation is incomplete, highlighting what he terms “functional differentiation” (Luhmann, 1995b: 138; 1977) or “differentiation of functional subsystems.” For Luhmann, the notion of “function” that his approach to social differentiation refers to is closely interwoven with that of “problem”; the various subsystems characterizing modern societies (the economic system, political system, educational system, and so on.) differ from each other according to the problems each of them deals with (Luhmann, 2012-2013: II, 4, VIII). ¹¹ In modern societies, each human being participates in several subsystems structured by behavior expectations specific to each subsystem. Accordingly, each human being adopts several roles or, more precisely, is a contact point for several roles, that is, he has several contradictory bundles of expectations directed at him. This “constellation” of roles (Luhmann, 1995b: 132) that modern humans have to manage and their multiple participation in functional subsystems implies, in Luhmann’s view, not only (as for Durkheim) a mere decrease in social control, but its extinction. Indeed, this multiplicity of roles implies that human beings can escape the determining pressure that these expectations in their normative aspect might otherwise (through the expression of disapproval) exert, precisely because they are subject to multiple and contradictory expectations. ¹² Along these lines, Luhmann (1995c) went on to argue that his social theory must be seen as “radically individualist,” (III, p. 165), and he defended a “radical individualism” (Luhmann, 2004: 257).

Whatever the differences between their concepts of role differentiation and ultimately their analyses of social differentiation, Luhmann claimed to carry out an analysis of the modern individual previously undertaken by Durkheim, by accounting for a decrease in social control. Accordingly, he claimed to implement a Durkheimian research program on the grounds of modern social order to account for the social conditions of modern individuality and to examine how modern societies solve or might solve the problem of social order specific to these societies. ¹³ Let us point out that our examination of Luhmann’s reading of Durkheim helps reveal one crucial aspect of Luhmann’s theory of social systems that often goes unnoticed. In Einführung in die Systemtheorie, he draws attention to the misunderstanding of his statement that human beings are “in the environment of society” (Luhmann, 2004: 256), which, he says, might have given rise to the impression that he did not care about the human being and in fact forgot it. Note that this is undoubtedly one of the reasons he dedicated the last volume of Soziologische Aufklärung to the study of the individual.

Durkheim’s critique

The work of Durkheim Luhmann presumably has in mind when referring to what he calls “individualism” is Durkheim’s critical assessment of Spencer’s thought ¹⁴ in The Division of Labour in Society, especially the chapter entirely dedicated to it: “Organic Solidarity and Contractual Solidarity.” Against Spencer, Durkheim (2013) argues that, without “social action, properly so termed” (p. 160), no social order is possible. On the one hand, Durkheim highlights similarities between his analysis of modern societies and Spencer’s examination of “industrial societies,” both of which stress the differentiation of functions, or the “division of labour” that characterizes them and the corresponding decrease in homogenizing social control. On the other hand, Durkheim states that Spencer wrongly infers from this that the “social harmony” of industrial societies could rest on the unconstrained pursuit of one’s own interest, making exchange a source of order in its own right. Durkheim presents his own analysis of the conditions of social order as a different approach. In what follows, we will examine and try to clarify Spencer’s position (as seen from Durkheim’s perspective), before considering Durkheim’s criticism of it.

The form of exchange Durkheim refers to when depicting Spencer’s thought is “market exchange.” One key idea behind Spencer’s position is that this exchange is possible without its participants pursuing anything but their own interests. According to Spencer’s approach, “particular contracts” can be viewed as the “normal form of exchange” (Durkheim, 2013: 158), in that these conventions ensure that each co-contracting party will actually proceed to exchange in conformance with the terms of agreement. ¹⁵ Furthermore, this contractual form of exchange implies the possibility for the co-contracting parties not to make an exchange, if they consider that it is not in their interest to do so. Thus, market exchange can also be viewed as emerging “from the entirely free initiative of the parties concerned” (Durkheim, 2013: 160). Moreover, exchange can be viewed as an instrument for the achievement of order in modern societies. As Durkheim (2013) puts it, when depicting Spencer’s thought, “mutual interest draws men closer (l’intérêt rapproche les hommes)” (p. 160). Human beings depend on each other for success in a society characterized by a highly developed division of labor. In this respect, exchange itself can be viewed as a source of “harmony of interests,” as, through exchange, the individuals may obtain what they strive for. Exchange, and more precisely contract, is thus viewed as an instrument of harmonization of interests. As Durkheim (2013) states, “higher societies would have – or tend to have – according to Spencer as their sole basis the vast system of special contracts that link individuals with one another” (p. 160). ¹⁶

According to Durkheim (2013), Spencer is in error: from the idea that individuals, when making a contract, may pursue their own interests, he wrongly infers that social harmony could be “automatically produced by the fact that each person pursues his own interest” (p. 158). In contrast, Durkheim stresses not only the constraining regulations existing in modern societies that Spencer did not take into account but also the necessity of “social action” coming “to regulate this exchange,” as, without it, economic exchange would be a source of conflict. In this way, he highlights the “non contractual conditions” of private contracts, referring here to forms of social regulation that are “mandatory upon us” (s’imposent à nous; Durkheim, 2013: 168).

Based on these elements, we can now better understand why for Durkheim it would be erroneous to consider members of society as “self-constituting.” Durkheim stresses the existing social constraints in modern societies – that is, the limitations imposed by these societies on their members’ actions – and presents them as an essential condition of order. Accordingly, the French sociologist emphasizes the way that society “acts on” members of society and correlatively draws attention to how individual action is, at least in some respects, socially constituted, or in other words, socially determined. By this logic, human action cannot, in its non-regulated aspects, that is, the aspects proper to the individual rather than to society, be a source of order. The individual thus cannot be considered self-sufficient, since social order essentially rests on the social constraints imposed on him. Social order, conversely, cannot be accounted for without considering these “social components” of action. These components can be seen as the “social conditions” of action without which social order is impossible. From the idea that modern societies are characterized by an increased autonomy of their members, one cannot conclude, as Spencer does, that they could no longer essentially depend for their solidarity on a “social action properly so termed.”

Building on this critical discussion, the French sociologist elaborated his conception of society as having a “sui generis nature.” As Durkheim (1982) later explains in The Rules of Sociological Method, he means by this that “society is not the mere sum of individuals,” but “represents a specific reality which has its own characteristics” (p. 129). His critical analysis of the conditions of social order in The Division of Labour in Society was a first step toward developing such a conception: there Durkheim stressed that a “social action” was an essential condition of social order, thus bringing out society’s contribution toward what the individual cannot provide from his or her own resources. In support of his conception of society that he develops in the Rules of Sociological Method, Durkheim stresses the constraint exercised by society upon men. In the fifth chapter (section 4) of the work, in a passage where he examines what makes “social life” possible, Durkheim, against Spencer’s view and that of those he calls “the economists,” repeats this idea and concludes that society represents a “specific reality”; individual actions cannot, as such, be viewed as a source of social order, the constraining “social action” of society being an essential condition of it. Durkheim elaborates on this idea when he criticizes Hobbes’ and Rousseau’s theories of social contract. While both authors considered that, for “common life” to be possible, “constraint must be exercised upon” individuals (Durkheim, 1982: 142), they conceived of this constraint as the result of a general, social contract. Durkheim points out that, in this view, the constraining force necessary for social common life could be regarded as exclusively derived from individual members of society because it would be considered as intentionally produced by them. Against this hypothesis, Durkheim stresses “the complete contradiction that exists in admitting that the individual is himself the creator of a machine whose essential role is to exercise domination and constraint over him”; these theories assume that the individuals could by “an act of volition” produce an “organisation, that is designed to constrain and contain him,” which, according to Durkheim, is a contradiction in terms. Accordingly, the source of social constraint making social order possible cannot lie in individuals as such but is external to them. This external source is nothing but society itself, thus, considered to have a “sui generis” reality.

Thus, in Durkheim’s view, the modern individual is not self-sufficient. It is necessary to take notice of the “social components” of an individual’s action, these components being an essential condition of social order. Durkheim stressed for this reason what might be called the social conditions of action without which social order is impossible.

Continuity versus consistency: The role of morality, a major point of disagreement

At this stage, another aspect of Luhmann’s reading of Durkheim needs to be mentioned: the critical stance he takes toward the centrality of “morality” in Durkheim’s thought.

In Luhmann’s view, the critical assessment of Spencer’s thought we have just mentioned first reveals that the French sociologist did not take the problem of modern social order seriously. It is with this in mind that the criticism he levels in his introduction against the centrality of “morality” in Durkheim’s thought can be understood. Luhmann lays strong emphasis on the fact that, according to Durkheim, modern social order essentially rests on morality, ¹⁷ which for him is closely intertwined with “social control.” To make this clear, it should be noted that in The Division of Labour in Society, “morality” is closely linked to “norm,” more precisely with “rule” (règle; Durkheim, 2013, Book I, 7). A norm (or a “rule”) is a prescription, that is, it says what one should do, what is expected of him or her. And, for Durkheim, this notion also involves “social control.” ¹⁸ This connection is clearly visible when Durkheim (2013) gives a more detailed account of these functions or roles fulfilled by members of modern societies. Although he admits that “it is we who choose our professions, and even certain of our domestic functions” (p. 178), he says that each function is “regulated” insofar as “from the nature of the chosen task permanent duties arise” (p. 178, translation modified), duties specific to these particular functions. The notion of rule (or “regulation”) implies that of social control, in that “we have not expressly wished” for these duties; rather, they are “imposed upon us” (Durkheim, 2013: 178). ¹⁹ Such indications also highlight the specific form that the “social control” or the “social discipline” takes in modern societies; “If social intervention has no longer the effect of imposing certain uniform practices upon everybody,” it would be erroneous to think, as Herbert Spencer and others do, that social control in general loses ground in modern society (Durkheim, 2013: 161). Instead, this control takes another form and is now mainly “individualized.” Thus, there is no need to find an alternative ground for social order to that of social control, as, actually, social control takes another form in modern societies. In Durkheim’s (2013) terms, “every society is a moral society” (p. 178), in the sense that social control should be generally considered an essential condition of social order. Luhmann rejects that solution but also claims that Durkheim was actually unable to provide an adequate solution, given the “state of the discipline,” that is, of sociology, in his time (Luhmann, 1982: I, 4). For that reason, Luhmann (1982) stresses that it is preferable “to strive for continuity and not for consistency in our relation to classic texts” (I, p. 4): from Durkheim’s, “we can infer what must be achieved [examining the foundations of modern social order], but no longer how it is to be achieved” (Luhmann, 1982: I, 4, my emphasis).

But is it then even possible for Luhmann to present, in this introduction, his own social theory, if not as a mere renewal or extension, at least as a continuation of that of Durkheim? Moreover, it should be remembered that the German author aims, in his own theory, to account for a “radical individualism” that, according to him, prevails in modern societies. It should be recalled that the expression “radical individualism” refers not merely to a decrease in social control but to its extinction. But Durkheim’s criticism of the conception of the individual as a self-constituting being is based on the idea that there are social constraints imposed on the individual, without which no social order is possible. The question then arises as to how Luhmann can present, when examining the French sociologist’s thought, his own approach to the individual as a continuation of that of Durkheim.

Luhmann following Durkheim’s lead: Bringing out the social conditions that make action possible

Luhmann took a critical stance toward conceptions of the individual as “self-constituting” and, in this respect, he did claim to follow Durkheim’s lead, in particular when leveling criticism at the theories which, in Luhmann’s view, adopt such conceptions. An example of this is found in a 1985 article in the Soziologische Revue, a review of annals published between 1982 and 1985 as Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie that were intended to lay the basis of a “new political economy” (Luhmann, 1985: 115). In the very first lines of the review, Luhmann expresses his concern at the renewal and the increasing significance in the social sciences of analyses characterized by an “individualistic” approach, focusing on preference-based theories and social contract theories. In these opening lines, Luhmann describes himself as a follower of Durkheim, reminding his readers that “sociology,” especially that of Durkheim and Parsons, was founded on the assumption that “it is not the individuals who constitute society, but society that constitutes the individuals” (Luhmann, 1985: 115). Indeed, it is not the individuals as such that constitute society, as it is always necessary, for the understanding of their agency, to look at the way society constitutes them. As has been shown, this refers, in Durkheim’s thinking, to the social components of action, which cannot be deduced from the nature of the individuals themselves. Luhmann thus stresses the “sociological” approach to the individual that Durkheim elaborated.

Let us consider the Luhmannian version of this criticism. Luhmann’s analysis is, as expected, not fully in line with the Durkheimian approach. At this stage, it will be useful to take Luhmann’s reading of Parsons’ theory into account. In the same passage mentioned above, he argues that the North American sociologist, following Durkheim, stressed that “cultural or social components are always included in the constitution of action (in die Konstitution von Handlung gehe eine kulturelle und eine soziale Komponente immer schon ein).” (Luhmann, 1985: 115) ²⁰ According to Luhmann, Parsons criticized theories that tried to account for human action without considering these components. He considered such theories erroneous, insofar as they failed to look into the social conditions of action, without which human action itself is simply not possible. In the lectures on system theory that he gave during the winter semester 1991–1992 at Bielefeld University (published posthumously), Luhmann provides a more thorough account of Parsons’ theory of action. In his view, Parsons’ purpose was to “account for the conditions of possibility of action” (Luhmann, 2004: 20). This investigation stems from the problem of “double contingency” which Parsons, according to Luhmann, first formulated. From Luhmann’s point of view, this problem relates to the possibility of human action in the social world. It calls attention to the practical obstacles that could impede it, by highlighting the ways that the social world might be a source of unpredictability and accordingly of paralyzing uncertainty such that human beings, left on their own, would not be capable of acting. Based on this, in Luhmann’s view, Parsons would stress the importance of “social prescriptions” ²¹ (Luhmann, 2004: 20) that are imposed on human beings. These prescriptions constitute a “normative structure” that guarantees what Luhmann (1991) refers to as a “complementarity of behaviour expectations” (p. 88). This structure solves the problem of double contingency, that is, makes human beings predictable to each other, and thus makes human action possible.

Luhmann presents (Luhmann, 1995a) his own theory of social systems as a continuation of the Parsonian research program on the conditions of possibility of human action in the social world. The core idea of his social theory, to wit, that social systems differ from human beings to such an extent that the latter must be regarded as part of the environment of the former, directly follows from such considerations. It is insufficient to focus on human beings and their own resources when trying to account for the possibility of human action. As a consequence, there must be something besides human beings – social systems – that enable humans to act. That is certainly a reason Luhmann claims, in his introduction to the German translation of The Division of Labour in Society, to agree with Durkheim’s position regarding the ontological specificity of social phenomena and thereby, of society itself. Luhmann considers that his approach of social systems is in line with Durkheim’s conception of the social as “an autonomous world of facts (eine eigenständige Faktenwelt)” (Luhmann, 1982: 11, translation modified), which, in Durkheim’s terms, exists “outside of the individuals” and therefore has a sui generis nature.

When highlighting the social conditions of action, Luhmann focuses on the conditions without which this very action would not be possible. This allows the German sociologist to stand in the tradition of Durkheim without, however, giving up his “radical individualism.” Indeed, in his critical assessment of the conception of the individual viewed as a self-constituting agent, Luhmann thus stresses the conditions of possibility of action itself. Consequently, he can, first at an analytical level, draw a conceptual distinction between the idea of the “social condition of action” and that of the “social component of action.” In his own social theory, Luhmann will thus attempt to emphasize (against Parsons who, in his view, offered insights into such a conceptual distinction but did not implement it) the non-determining conditions of action: society is not properly “acting” on the human being, but without his social environment, he would not be able to act and consequently cannot be considered as self-constituting.

The liberty of the modern individual viewed as absence of social constraint

As already seen, Luhmann contends in his introduction to The Division of Labour in Society that Durkheim’s inquiry into modern individuality focused on a phenomenon of decrease in social control. On that ground, he presents his own inquiry into modern individuality as a continuation of that of Durkheim. But Luhmann’s interpretation tends to concentrate on texts in which Durkheim provides his first elaborated conceptualization of the individual, in particular on the first edition of The Division of Labour in Society published in 1893. Luhmann’s reading of Durkheim mainly rests on selected passages of this edition, which in themselves, may suggest that the French sociologist’s analysis of social evolution focused on a simple phenomenon of decrease in social control, and, accordingly, considered the liberty which resulted from such evolution simply as absence of social control (the liberty of the individual thus being inversely proportional to the social constraints exerted on him). When stating Durkheim’s problem of modern social order, Luhmann thus points out the freedom to choose that human beings enjoy to some extent in modern societies. But, in subsequent texts, especially in the Leçons de sociologie – translated into English under the title Professional Ethics and Civic Morals – a series of courses on political sociology given between 1890 and 1900, Durkheim further develops his analysis on the modern individual. Special attention must be paid to this subsequent study precisely because it provides a critical assessment of the conception of liberty conceived as absence of social constraint.

His investigation of modern individuality in the late 1890s shows that the problem highlighted by Luhmann’s reading is definitively not that of Durkheim any more. But, the present study also contends that the new elements provided in this study help clarify the significance of the project that Durkheim had in mind when writing The Division of Labour in Society. Let us note that, besides his first criticism aimed at the Durkheimian solution to the problem of modern social order, Luhmann further pointed out that, in fact, the French sociologist did not formulate this problem in exactly the same way as he himself does. In his view, not only did Durkheim prove unable to solve the problem of social order but also formulated it in a way that prevented him from finding a solution other than that of morality (Luhmann, 1982: IV, 10). Luhmann (1982) critically pointed out that Durkheim “formulated his basic problem in an unclear fashion” (p. IV, 10). By this logic, he strove to clarify a problem that Durkheim himself did not adequately think through. Against Luhmann’s interpretation, the present paper argues that he pays insufficient attention to Durkheim’s project and, accordingly, to its consistency.

Thinking the conditions of a “just liberty”: Toward a political conception of the modern individual

The inquiry into modern individuality carried out in Les leçons de sociologie stands in sharp contrast with the conception of the modern individual pointed out in Luhmann’s interpretation. To fully grasp this, it is necessary to attach importance to Durkheim’s analyses of the emergence of the modern individual carried out in relation to the birth and development of the modern State.

In these passages, Durkheim’s (1992) aim is to point out the conditions in which society comes to “leave […] room to [the individual’s] initiative” (V, p. 61). In this context, he stresses the role played by the “activity of the State,” which is “in its nature” “liberating to him” (Durkheim, 1992: V, 57). Durkheim criticizes the tendency to treat the size of the social group as the sole condition for individual liberty to appear. One may indeed consider that, the greater the size of a group, the weaker its control over its members can be exerted: “When it is made up of a vast number of individuals, a society cannot exercise over each a control (contrôle) as close and as vigilant and effective as when the surveillance is concentrated on a small number” (Durkheim, 1992: V, 61, translation modified). In Durkheim’s view, this reasoning encounters one major difficulty: when the size of a group increases, social subgroups tend inevitably to form. Then, “if there is nothing to counteract and neutralize their activity (si aucun contrepoids ne neutralise leur action)” (Durkheim 1992: V, 62, translation modified), each subgroup will tend to “tightly enclos[e] the individuals of which it [is] made up,” and accordingly, control their every action. “There must therefore exist above these local, domestic – in a word, secondary – powers (pouvoirs), some overall power (pouvoir) which makes the law for them all” (Durkheim 1992: V, 62, translation modified). This power referred to as an “overall power (pouvoir général)” is that vested in the State and is designated as such because it is the power of the “overall collectivity (collectivité totale).” Conversely, “if that collective force, the State, is to be the liberator of the individual, it has itself need of some counterbalance; it must be restrained by other collective forces” (Durkheim 1992: V, 63). In this respect, the individual liberty stems from a “conflict of social forces” (Durkheim 1992: V, 63), that is, it is made possible only through the limitations of control prerogatives that the overall collectivity and the secondary groups impose on each other.

It is important to note that these collectivities can make this liberty possible only inasmuch as they exercise power as counter powers. In this view, these collectivities are to be primarily considered as endowed with effective ability to constrain each other. Consequently, considering the conditions that make this individual liberty possible is not tantamount to examining the conditions in which members of social groups can (partially or fully) escape from social constraint. In other words, accounting for individual liberty is not the same as explaining how the members of social groups can have a “sphere” of action in which they would be subject to no social constraint. As the control exerted by the different social groups represents a condition for liberty, strictly speaking, it is impossible to regard social control and liberty as antinomic terms. The following question then arises: What is this liberty enjoyed by modern individuals?

When considering the conditions for individual liberty, Durkheim actually examines how the group members can be protected from the “tyranny” of the group. “Liberty” is thus contrary to “servitude,” not to “constraint.” In Durkheim’s (1992) view, examining what makes this liberty possible is tantamount to considering how “each one” can “be treated as he deserves,” “be freed from an unjust and humiliating tutelage,” and how, “in holding to his fellows and his group,” “a man [is not forced to] sacrifice his personality” (V, p. 72, translation modified) – what constitutes our personality being “that which each one of us possesses that is peculiar and characteristic, what distinguishes him from others” (Durkheim, 2013: 101). When denying it, the group is then said to be “tyrannical.” When the counterbalance mechanism mentioned above does not come into play, social groups have a tendency not to take into account the interests of the individual, that is, his own interests, and tend to be detrimental to them. According to Durkheim (2013), there is a form of “egoism” which he calls the “egoism of groups” (conclusion, p. 315) and to which each group tends to spontaneously yield. Thus, when analyzing individual liberty, Durkheim does not examine how the individual can – at least to a certain extent – escape from group constraint as such, but rather how he can be protected from tyrannical constraints, that is, constraints being detrimental to his interests. By this logic, the liberty of the modern individual consists of the

rights over his own person and over the possessions to which he has title; [when enjoying it] he also comes to form ideas about the world that seem to him most fitting and to develop his essential qualities without hindrance (développer librement sa nature individuelle). (Durkheim, 1992: V, 56)

The concept of “rights” implies that individual liberty cannot be effective if it is not protected. Liberty here refers to the effective ability of the individual to “be independent in his own behaviour (un facteur indépendant de sa propre conduite)” (Durkheim, 2013: conclusion, 314). This means that, when enjoying this individual liberty, the individual is not hindered – at least to a certain extent, according to the degree of liberty he enjoys – from acting in a way that promotes his own interests, from exploring the world in a way that helps him gain a better understanding of it, or from developing aptitudes and thus discovering new sources of pleasure, and consequently from enjoying a better life. As a consequence, when enjoying such liberty, the members of a society tend to develop personal attitudes and aptitudes, that is, a personality.

By this logic, Durkheim (2013) aims at accounting for a “just liberty” (preface to the second edition, p. 9) and its conditions of possibility – which, for him, is the only liberty which is socially effective. Liberty is not antagonistic to what he calls “the authority of rules,” (p. 9) that is, the ascendency that collective feelings (sentiments collectifs) of a group confer to precepts through which this group controls its members’ actions. What Durkheim calls in The Division of Labour in Society the “sphere of action that is peculiarly our own,” (p. 102) and which constitutes our personality thus does not refer to the “appropriate region of human liberty” (Mill, 1991: I, 16) promoted by Mill’s On Liberty, more specifically, a sphere of action in which the human being would be subject to no social constraint or control. In this view, collective constraint is necessary to counterbalance the tyrannical constraint that social groups naturally tend to exert on an individual, but also to protect him against abuses of power that other individual human beings tend to commit if no power superior to them prevents them from doing so (Durkheim, 2013: preface to the second edition, 9).

Thus, Durkheim’s sociology invites us to consider the various forms of abuses of power that the human being may face in society. Moreover, the French sociologist stresses that a definition of the individual’s rights must be left open and thus that the question of a just liberty cannot be settled once and for all. Indeed, “the rights of the individual [are] in a state of evolution: progress is always going on” (Durkheim, 1992: V, p. 68). This shows that these rights are not to be defined once for all, ²² for example, by inferring them from human nature. In this respect, Durkheim (1992) warns against “our lack of imagination” (V, p. 68), which can prevent us from considering which new rights human beings should be granted. “Everything indicates that we are becoming more alive to what touches on the human personality” (V, p. 68), but these inquiry efforts should not be discouraged nor the investigation field too limited. In Durkheim’s (1992) view, one of the burning issues of his time was, for example, that of the “moral servitude” to which those who had “nothing to live on” were subject (V, p. 68).

An interpretation that is congruent with Luhmann’s uncritical sociology

We can now identify what distinguishes the conception of modern individuality that Luhmann highlights in his reading of Durkheim from that which is clearly outlined in texts subsequent to the first edition of The Division of Labour in Society. The present study contends that Luhmann’s reading is idiosyncratic, only reflects his approach to society, which can be viewed as uncritical since, unlike Durkheim’s, his social theory does not take into account the abuses of power that the human being may face in modern societies. This reading of Durkheim’s thought, moreover, makes it possible for him to avoid the question of the conditions of individuality as raised by Durkheim. Indeed, his social theory, which, as already mentioned, is “radically individualist,” cannot properly consider the question of the conditions of the individual’s liberty addressed by Durkheim – namely, the question as to how group members can be protected from abuses of power. His theoretical framework simply makes this question obsolete: if human beings are no longer subject to social control, they cannot be properly subject to abuses of power. But, by overshadowing this question in his reading of Durkheim, Luhmann saves himself the trouble of discussing it, and accordingly, avoids putting some of the key ideas underlying his social theory to the test.

A good example of this idiosyncratic interpretation can be seen in his reading of Durkheim’s inquiry into the emergence of modern individuality in relation to the constitution of modern State. It is important to note that Luhmann knew Durkheim’s Leçons de sociologie. Indeed, he refers to the first French edition of this book published in 1950 in Rechtssoziologie (Luhmann, 2008), for example, a work of sociology of law issued for the first time in 1972, in Soziale Systeme (Luhmann, 1995a) published in 1984, and in the article on individuality mentioned above (Luhmann, 1995b). Particular attention must be paid to the latter text (especially to the second section), which explicitly refers to Durkheim’s analysis of modern individuality in relation to the formation of the modern State. In this text, Luhmann not only refers to the Leçons de sociologie but also to The Division of Labour in Society. While The Division provides insights into this relationship between modern individuality and modern State, the Leçons de sociologie pursues this subject in greater depth. In the first edition of The Division of Labour in Society, Durkheim (2013) thus contends that “there need be no contradiction in the fact that the scope of individual action (sphère de l’action individuelle) is growing at the same time as that of the state” (p. 172). In the Leçons, he states more precisely that the growth of the scope of individual action is made possible through the collective force of the State. But, in a footnote, Luhmann (1995b: II, 130) promotes the first passage from The Division of Labour in Society as the major reference-text on the subject. Furthermore, while referring in this context to Durkheim’s statement about a “strong State, capable of prevailing and preserving individual liberty” (Luhmann, 1995b: 130), Luhmann aims above all to draw attention to the problem that, in his view, should be taken into consideration. The analysis carried out by Luhmann in this passage intends to show that the development of personal individuality does not occur at the expense of social order, that is, of peaceful cohabitation. In this setting, he develops this problem in his own way. He first accounts for the conditions, which make modern individuality possible, and by making elliptical references to The Division of Labour in Society and Durkheim’s theory of social differentiation, he emphasizes the continuity between Durkheim’s approach to modern individuality and his own. Thus, Luhmann actually aims to highlight the foundation for his “radical individualism” (his theory of functional differentiation), and accordingly, to account for a phenomenon of decrease in social control leading to its extinction in modern societies. Consequently, his references to Durkheim’s thought make it difficult to grasp why and how a debate on the meaning and conditions of modern individuality should be set up, as Luhmann does not point out, and even overshadows the specificity of the Durkheimian approach to modern individuality, which, as indicated, explicitly raises the question as to how members of society can be protected from abuses of power.

Finally, let us also note that, in his reading of Durkheim, Luhmann does not provide any thorough discussion of Durkheim’s central claim that social constraint protects each member of society from the abuses of power that the others may otherwise individually exert on him. Recall that, in particular, Durkheim’s theory insists on the role played by social constraint in the prevention of this form of “tyranny” in his critical assessment of the utilitarian approach to liberty. This statement essentially rests on his anthropology of passions, ²³ which he develops in his Suicide (Durkheim, 2002: II, 5, II) and in his Moral Education (Durkheim, 1961: lesson 3). Luhmann simply does not engage in a discussion of these theoretical premises, that is, of Durkheim’s anthropology and of the role it plays in his social theory. Rather, he proposes a reading that, precisely against Durkheim’s basic intuition, does not pay much attention to the role played by social constraint in the emergence and protection of individual liberty.