Abstract
This exciting new book explores the tension between moral universalism and cultural relativism within human rights (HR) discourse and the inefficiency of the dissemination of HR in a culturally pluralist global context. By appealing to various conceptual sources, including Gadamer’s ‘fusion of horizons’ (pp. 59–61), Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge (pp. 6–7, 61–64) and Rawlsian ‘polytheistic interpretation’ (pp. 130–133), the authors propose a relational hermeneutic approach to contextualise HR discourse within particular cultural traditions. They defend a culturally sensitive ‘free-standing normative universalism’ which overcomes the universalism–relativism dilemma on the basis of a ‘cross-cultural overlapping consensus’ (pp. 34–44). In particular, Buddhism and Confucianism are explored in some detail in the search for the so-called ‘isomorphic equivalents of human rights’ (IEHR) in non-Western traditions (pp. 78–114).
One of the most original aspects of this book is the way the authors promote ‘an active learning’ pedagogy of HR, characterised by a dialectical, experiential, validating, reflective, inquiry-based approach (p. 161). This pedagogy adopts a ‘cultural toolkit’ that internalises non-Western IEHR into a constructive global dialogue and empowers HR learners who in return help shape the local socio-political reality (pp. 159–160).
With its interdisciplinary synthesis of hermeneutic and epistemological theories, this book successfully demonstrates a promising methodological development in the third generation of HR theorisation. However, while the authors draw mainly from the post-Heideggerian philosophical hermeneutics (which has arguably significantly modified hermeneutics into a sort of first philosophy or ontology), it may be puzzling to some experts in hermeneutics that Schleiermacher’s significant work on hermeneutic methodology is overlooked.
Also, their analysis of Confucian IEHR (pp. 100–113) nevertheless remains deficient, as it shuns a potential conflict between the fundamental Confucian principle of differentiation (e.g. graded concern and asymmetrical reciprocity in terms of social roles) and the principle of ‘impartiality’ – one of the authors’ ‘three intrinsic normative criteria’ of the idea of HR that ‘transcends cultural boundaries’ and renders the scope of HR universal (p. 34). In recent research, Mohism – the major pre-Qin critic of Confucian bie (discrimination), with its core doctrine jian-ai (concern for all) – is often engaged to conceive the Chinese IEHR. Finally, it would perhaps be more persuasive if the authors’ own crucial methodological development of the relational hermeneutic epistemology were informed by non-Western thought and conceived via a hermeneutic mechanism of cultural dialogue.
In brief, this innovative book should not be missed by HR researchers, policymakers and educators. It is also thought-provoking for comparative political philosophy and pedagogy in general.