Moving Away From Partisanship: Diversifying the Motives Behind Political Polarization

Introduction

The study of political polarization is in a rich period of theoretical and empirical advancement (e.g. Abramowitz and Saunders, 2006, 2008; Fiorina and Abrams, 2008; Hetherington, 2001; Iyengar et al., 2012; Levendusky and Malhotra, 2016; Mason, 2015). Although the existence of political polarization at a mass level remains an open question, current literature flourishes with theoretical accounts that explore the causal mechanisms between selective media exposure and the public’s polarized attitudes (e.g. Baldassarri and Gelman, 2008; Prior, 2013; Stroud, 2010). Many nuanced empirical studies have examined the polarizing effect on the public’s perceptions and behaviors in a variety of established and emerging democracies (e.g. Gruzd and Roy, 2014; Karlsen et al., 2017; Levendusky, 2009).

As the concept of polarization implies meanings of “incompatibility” and “dichotomy” by nature, scholarly debates on this topic have been conducted under specific ideological oppositional frameworks based on an individual’s social and political identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Partisanship is the most prominent political identity within research on the ideological motives behind polarization; as such, polarization has been investigated predominately through the lens of partisanship. Mason (2015: 129), for instance, claimed that “social polarization is theorized to be motivated by partisan sorting and partisan identity because social identities have repeatedly been shown to affect judgment, behavior, and emotion.” Levendusky (2017) also suggested that political polarization stems from the strength and centrality of partisanship to the American’s political identity. Fiorina et al. (2005) even suggested that there is no popular polarization, but simply partisan polarization. ¹

The term “partisan polarization” has been widely and frequently used to describe a polity deeply divided along partisan lines (e.g. Druckman et al., 2013; Jones, 2010; Levendusky and Malhotra, 2016). Similarly, the notion of “negative polarization,” which was put forth by Abramowitz and Webster (2018), argues that supporters of each party come to perceive supporters of the opposing party as very different from themselves in terms of social characteristics, political beliefs, and values, viewing opposing partisans with growing suspicion and hostility. Iyengar et al. (2012) proposed “affective polarization,” defining polarization as “the extent to which partisans view each other as a disliked out-group” (Iyengar et al., 2012: 1). Political communication scholarship now focuses on the way that subjectively selected digital media exposure makes it much easier for individuals to obtain cognitively consistent content, avoid dissonant information, and therefore solidify their partisan viewpoints and stances along the left–right axis (Müller et al., 2017). Furthermore, comparative studies examining mass polarization in different nations are often party-focused, adopting World Values Survey (WVS) data that calculate the level of polarization in regard to respondents who support a party in government versus supporters of opposition parties (e.g. Lindqvist and Östling, 2010; Yang et al., 2016).

In addition to conceptual perspective, the partisan-polarization nexus could also be observed in the operationalization aspect. Most current research adopts two methods to measure political polarization at the mass level: (1) relying on party identification to measure issue stances or affective distance toward others, or (2) focusing on the absolute distance between political parties that people perceive (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008; Hetherington and Roush, 2013).

Although we affirm the value of studying partisan-driven polarization, many notable exceptions and deviations that go beyond the traditional party slant are largely neglected. While partisanship is the most prominent political identity, it is certainly not the only one (Mason, 2015). Other ideological identities, such as religious and radical identities could also contribute to behavioral polarization, but have received scarce scholarly attention (Mason, 2015). Furthermore, in most authoritarian regimes, where partisanship remains at a minimum level, mass polarization may also exist but remains under-researched. Therefore, the authors of this essay contend that the common principle of the “partisan-polarization axis” needs to be supplemented with alternative conceptual explanations that take important exceptions seriously. This review essay aims to move beyond partisanship-driven polarization in order to examine other rarely addressed motives behind political polarization.

This review essay draws on and integrates a series of recent studies that address alternative ideological differences and antagonisms that may motivate social fragmentation (e.g. De la Torre and Ortiz Lemos, 2016; Enyedi, 2016; Müller et al., 2017; Silva, 2018; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2019). Some of this research considers contextual causes and clues, such as the religiosity-driven polarization in the Middle-East and North Africa (MENA) region (e.g. Borge-Holthoefer et al., 2015; Kaya and Sunar, 2015), populist-polarization dynamics in Europe and Latin America (e.g. Afonso and Papadopoulos, 2015; Müller et al., 2017; Schulz et al., 2017), as well as conflicts between regime-supported viewpoints and pro-liberal voices in China’s digital spheres (Guan and Liu, 2019; Han, 2015). Although empirical investigations have moved beyond the traditional Western scope, exploring the specific configurations of political polarization that are embedded in and have evolved with various sociopolitical contexts, a systematic reconsideration regarding the alternative motives of mass political polarization is still lacking. Through canvassing and integrating the literature addressing this issue from an interdisciplinary perspective, this review essay systematically proposes three ideological drivers that have the potential to facilitate a polarized society: (1) the out-group exclusion of populism, (2) system-justifying attitudes that legitimize and defend the existing political order and authority, and (3) state-sponsored ideologies such as religiosity and other cultural identities.

Three points should be noted at the outset. First, this review essay focuses on “social polarization” rather than “issue polarization.” While issue polarization represents people’s deeply divided stances on specific, single issues (e.g. abortion, refugee, climate change, and tax reform), social polarization affects political interactions, a person’s political psychology, his or her basic understanding of the political world, as well as the vehemence with which he or she reacts emotionally to political events (Iyengar et al., 2012; Mason, 2015). Scholars’ findings also show that “partisan-ideological sorting has increased social polarization to a greater extent than it has increased the extremity of held issue positions in the American electorate” (Mason, 2015: 129). Although the extant literature on issue polarization is revealing, they are beyond the scope of this review. Second, the three ideological drivers of polarization put forward in this article are interrelated, intertwined, and could be well integrated. For instance, the rise of some extreme right populist parties in Europe illustrates the merge of partisanship, populism, xenophobic nationalism, as well as the conflicts between national identity and European integration (Aalberg et al., 2016). Third, as little evidence from the past literature has revealed support for the all-encompassing social polarization or crystallized political camps, this study is very cautious to claim any necessary causality between the three ideological motives and social disintegration.

Motive 1: The Out-Group Exclusion of Populism

Academic investigation of populism-polarization dynamics is a relatively new field of research, and appears in parallel with the global success of populist radical right parties of the past decade, especially in Europe and Latin America. Since populist ideology contains a Manichaean-style, “black and white” or “us versus them” worldview that simplifies political and social issues into an antagonistic divide (Hameleers et al., 2018; Taggart, 2004), populism has been considered as having an inherent potential to contribute to a polarized society (e.g. Afonso and Papadopoulos, 2015; Müller et al., 2017; Schulz et al., 2017).

Although a clear-cut definition is still lacking, scholarly consensus considers populism a “thin” ideology, representing a general concept about politics and society that could be combined with other more concrete political ideas and programs (e.g. Aalberg et al., 2016; Freeden, 1996; Mudde, 2010). The core idea of populism is to divide society into opposing groups: the good, homogeneous “people,” the “corrupt, evil elite,” and out-groups that are not regarded as legitimate members of the “real” people (Mudde, 2004, 2010; Müller et al., 2017).

As populism has been an increasingly pervasive phenomenon in world politics, the way populist ideologies are disseminated through media platforms, and the potential effects of populism on society have entered research debates. Evidence from some studies suggests that the interplay of populism and the media might contribute to political polarization at the mass level (e.g. Pappas, 2014). In 2017, Müller and his colleague made a revealing claim, contending that

[t]he more messages with a populist stance are spread by the media, the more likely it seems that opinion camps on both ends of the populist attitude scale become more extreme. The more populism is present as an ideology in societal discourse, the harder it gets for an individual to have a moderate position toward this worldview (Müller et al., 2017: 986).

Simultaneously, a few nuanced empirical analyses have tested the way populist discursive representations promote a new political cleavage, increase the fragmented population, and ultimately contribute to social disintegration and increased conflict in various contexts. Some important examples include investigations on populism-driven polarization in Switzerland (Afonso and Papadopoulos, 2015), the Netherlands (Silva, 2018), Greece (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2019), Hungary (Enyedi, 2016), and Ecuador (De la Torre and Ortiz Lemos, 2016). Studies examining the polarized influence of populism on society usually take an elite-driven perspective, focusing on the way parties and governments employ populist ideology to reinforce social fragmentation and conflicts. For instance, Enyedi (2016) suggests that in Hungary, and some other emerging democracies of Eastern Europe, the dominant electoral strategy is to appeal to the conceptual/ethical gap between the righteous people and the corrupt (and foreign-minded) elites, and further to the public’s general distrust of institutions. Enyedi calls this phenomenon “populist polarization.” Similarly, through analyzing populist radical right parties in Netherlands, Silva (2018: 2) proposed a “polarizing spiral,” where “a higher polarization contributes to radicals’ success, and stronger radical parties lead to an even more polarized electorate.” Furthermore, Stavrakakis and Katsambekis (2019) argue that mass polarization along the populism/anti-populism axis in Greece has historical roots in the trauma of the 1967–1974 dictatorships, with the recent economic crisis (started from 2008) successfully reactivating this divide. As a result, in Greece’s case, the traditional left/right confrontations give way to a populism/anti-populism dichotomy.

In general, most current studies on populism-driven polarization have treated populism as a supplementary ideological difference to the left/right axis: a new societal cleavage combined with partisan difference and deepening social gaps (Müller et al., 2017) “potentially leading to a polarized electorate” (Hameleers et al., 2018: 51). Put simply, populism-polarization relations have been researched thus far within the boundaries of electoral democracy and party politics.

Discussion

This review recasts the concept of political polarization to highlight variegated, situated, and interrelated forms of ideologies that drive the phenomenon of polarization. It defies the standardized, restricted notion that polarization is simply partisan-driven, and argues for profuse possibilities of polarization beyond “red” and “blue.” In the review, we argue, above all, that polarization is rarely defined by singular, monolithic scripts of ideology—that it is not a fait accompli but an ongoing, unfolding process to be unpacked by nuanced empirical works that appreciate how comparable factors, forces, and social sensibilities may yield varying outcomes or continuous patterns of polarization between Western and non-Western, and democratic and authoritarian contexts; and further that there are parallel drivers of ideological polarization that operate both through top-down structural forces and grassroots’ varied, and often improvised responses.

Moreover, this review suggests that re-theorizing polarization as an interplay and dialectic between different ideological forces and structures that might challenge and transgress the liberal/conservative dichotomy, offers an important point of departure for appreciating the complexity and plurality of polarization. Our suggestion, though necessarily premature, strives to catalyze new research sensitivities, not only regarding the swift diversification and mutation of empirical realities, but also regarding the structure- and emotion-focused reflections of comparative polarization research agenda. Focusing solely on the different content of ideologies, it would be difficult to tell which ideological elements wield a stronger influence than others in (un)making polarization. Hence, to grasp more robustly the structural and emotive components underlying the varying forces of diverse and interrelated ideologies, language and practices in polarization are a plausible path for future research.

One of the values of our conceptualization is that it is a useful optic through which to contest and retheorize depolarization. So far, only a handful of studies have invoked elements of depolarization thinking as a supplement and addition to polarization research. The pathways toward depolarizing public opinions are theorized by a range of studies, which include the institutional remedies of partisan dilemma (Nivola and Brady, 2008); the moderating effects positively associated with low entitativity of the Other (Castano et al., 2003); attitudinal ambivalence independent of value conflict (Rudolph and Popp, 2007); the greater extent of abstract thinking (Napier and Luguri, 2016); the anxiety-facilitated, balanced information seeking that is not overdetermined by information utility (Valentino et al., 2009); and finally, the process of urbanization/modernization in general (McDonough et al., 1998; Zariski and Welch, 1975). Others have suggested that depolarization can be sought through the reconstruction of the “micro-foundation” of mass polarization (Levendusky, 2009) or by restoring a “normal” condition for deliberative situations at the collective level (Mercier and Landemore, 2012).

Building on these insights, (de)polarization can be analyzed as an everyday and gradual process of segregation, integration, and resocialization, which develops incrementally, and is entangled with various cognitive factors. The trajectories of (de)polarization can be pursued, at least intellectually, at three interrelated levels: individual motivations, in order to understand individual agency, commitments and innovation (micro-level); technologized networks that facilitate or moderate polarization, in order to grasp the socialization process and how this depends on technology-mediated virtual spaces (meso level); and the state or trans-state manipulation of power in catalyzing, altering or eliminating certain forms of social epistemologies, in order to understand how labels such as “enemy” and “evil” are (un)made by dominant powers, and how those images of the Other are locally negotiated (macro level).

Moreover, the idea of depolarization used in this article can apply to different situations in terms of varying logics of time—depolarization can be a posteriori, and can embrace anticipation logics in three ways. First, depolarization can be precautionary/preventive, that is, the decision to intervene takes place after the identification of a polarizing process and before that process produces detrimental social consequences. The development of institutional remedies for partisan dilemma is crucial to preventing the deterioration of partisan disagreement into mass polarization. Second, depolarizing actions can be preemptive in the sense that they can be carried out before the formation and identification of the determinant processes of polarization. For example, the state promotion of multicultural lifestyles that helps micro-level conversion, or programs that foster the appreciation of heterogeneous ethnic and cultural groups, are useful to readdress the conditions of formation for opinion polarization on issues like immigration. Third, depolarization measures can be developed for prompt intervention during the propagation of the effects or impacts of an event that may radically create or deteriorate political and social opposition. The development of capabilities and resiliences such as ethnic and religious reconciliation are essential to enable responses that prevent mass polarization following “high impact” events such as the September 11 attacks in the United States or the 7.5 Urumqi riot in China.

Conclusion

To summarize and conclude, this essay provided a critique of the existing literature to move beyond the conceptual straitjacket of partisanship-driven polarization. To understand the nature of the debate, we started with a two-way contextualization. On the one hand, we contextualized the dominant argument that partisanship is the prominent ideological driver of polarization by reviewing relevant studies published in leading journals of the field. On the other hand, we specified the context upon which our reformulation of the dominant view has been based: social polarization. This was set up with the aim to avoid misrepresenting the dominant standpoint that has been advanced by many scholars in polarization research. It also helps us ensure that our alternative account of polarization is grounded on a dialectic, context-sensitive reformulation of the original arguer’s opinions in the existing literature. Social polarization provides the potentialities for reformulation of the dominant view by grasping more robustly the structural and emotive components underlying the varying forces of diverse and interrelated ideologies, language, and practices in polarization. This contextualization legitimates our discussions of the alternative motives of polarization in the subsequent sections.

Through reviewing and integrating a series of recent studies addressing alternative ideological difference and antagonism that may motivate social fragmentation, this essay systematically identifies three motives of political polarization that move away from the conventional, singular motive of partisanship. Some of these potential ideological drivers are viewed as having long historical and cultural origins in given societies (e.g. religiosity and state-justifying attitudes), whereas others have emerged in recent decades (e.g. the rise of populism). However, with the advent of the digital epoch, both long-lasting and emerging ideological elements are likely to be significantly promoted among social members, and thus contribute to a polarized political landscape.

Finally, keeping hold of the more-than-partisan possibilities and processual–relational nature of (de)polarization, we may further advance critically our reflections on polarization, and ask: what if the polarized and polarizing groups always/already imply, and constitute, each other? While we are not saying that polarized groups can assimilate each other, consider the existence of attitudinal ambivalence in (de)polarization: there exist liminal zones of hybridity and intersection, whereby the ideological divide collapses from within the aporia of social realities. These polarized entities are not static, absolute facts, but malleable processes which gain meaning, identity, and coherence from each other. Hence, we advocate for future research to incorporate Lancan’s or Derrida’s mimetic theory as an addition to the identity-focused conflict theories, when further critiquing polarization, as the confronted entities may engage in intimation and adaptation for defense or aggression.