This article examines presidential proclamations on trade policy, a category of presidential unilateral power that we call delegated unilateral power that is used frequently in creating or modifying trade policy, between the period 1974 and 2006 and tests the boundaries of the explanations predicted by the unilateral powers literature. We also find that the use of proclamations on trade policy is independent of the partisan balance in Congress. The use of proclamations modifying policies was the only tactic that comported with predicted actions from the unilateral presidency. Therefore, contrary to the expectations of the unilateral presidency, presidents are not unrestrained political agents on trade policy, and although presidents have the capacity to do so, they rarely use political factors as a pretext to enact unilateral policy on trade. Ultimately, unilateral powers are not all created equal, as some allow for considerable presidential authority and some are more limited.
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