Abstract
The collective information produced by this academic pursuit supports the goal of identifying the determinants of innovation and the process of intrafirm diffusion regarding organizational innovation. The U.S. military created 111 American football “bowl” games across six continents in 18 countries and 46 host cities from 1942 to 1967. Using the historical method through an ex post facto historical institutionalism interpretive lens, this study found the U.S. Armed Forces, through the dynamic capabilities of its top officers and officials, organized “bowl” games as product innovation and used football as process innovation to manage the massive mobilization and training of men for the various war efforts of that period. Within, we discovered (a) the resolution of crisis, (b) the emergence and recruitment of leaders, (c) the creation/use of novelty, and (d) the capacity to adapt revealed the military “bowl” game phenomenon and American football existed as critical ingredients for organizational innovation and that product innovation can emerge from process innovation and vice versa to support organizational innovation. Furthermore, novelty, although identified as a product innovation, must be supported, promoted, and adapted to create and sustain the goals associated with organizational process innovation. Next, intrafirm diffusion was shown to involve and compel job specialization, imitation/emulation, forged alliances, the creation of special service positions, and the development of newsletters and other internal/external media. Finally, this work supports and recognizes the utility of the “historic turn” with respect to the ability of how history can inform and improve today’s efforts toward innovation.
The histories of the sport industry and military have been presented as superior laboratories to study the topic of organizational innovation (Chacar & Hesterley, 2004; Grissom, 2006, Hoeber & Hoeber, 2012; Mahony & Howard, 2001; Pope, 1995; Vasquez, 2012). Likely, these claims were made because the history of sport and military activities showcases them as possessing highly developed organizational climates replete with recognizable leaders. However, organizational innovation, characterized as the implementation of new ideas and/or strategies to supporting a firm’s practices, has received limited attention, and generated a call by Damanpour and Schneider (2006) to more intensely study “innovation characteristics on innovation adoption in organizations” (p. 497). Highlighted in their call and that offered by Chacar and Hesterley (2004) was the position that a lack of organizational innovation undermines the ability of the firm to sponsor and manage its activities, create high-quality products and services, and overall secure the ability of the organization to fulfill its goals and/or mission.
In this work, we were interested in studying the characteristics of successful organizational innovation through the U.S. Armed Forces and their use of American football and the creation and maintenance of “bowl” games. The U.S. Armed Forces created several bowl games and used American football across the world from 1942 to 1967 as both product innovation and a source of process innovation to manage the massive mobilization and training of men for the various war efforts of that period (Seifried & Katz, 2011). This study used an ex post facto interpretive lens to also consider how the dynamic capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces and their leaders took the path that they did. The ex post facto analysis is defined as an attempt to engage in a hypothetical reconstruction of historical information through interrogating various formal events and actors after the fact (Cummings & Worley, 2001). Dynamic capabilities address the ability of leaders or actors to recognize and take advantage of opportunities and to shape plans for the maintenance or creation of a competitive advantage (Teece, 2007). Pursuant to this analytic approach, the literature on organizational innovation and dynamic capabilities respects Barrett and Sexton’s (2006) proposition to highlight real examples focused on the pursuit of innovation and how they might be used to improve today’s process.
Schumpeter (1949/1989) advocated for the production of work that focused on “accounting” innovation and the description of the phenomenon over time. The military bowl game phenomenon and the impact of American football within the organizational life cycle of the U.S. Armed Forces offered a useful context to study organizational innovation and dynamic capabilities. However, we recognize as Kline and Rosenberg (1986) suggested, “It is a serious mistake to treat an innovation as if it were a well-defined, homogenous thing” (p. 283). Expectedly, the literature produced on innovation is diverse and presents the concept as a complex topic because it involves “change” with situation-specific activities (Damanpour, 1991; Rogers, 2003; Wolfe, 1994). Wolfe notably emphasized some paths of research for the study of organizational innovation followed by this work to address this concern. For example, this study respected the “process of innovation” which focuses on the “temporal sequence of activities” that organizations go through when developing and implementing innovations (Wolfe, 1994, p. 409). Second, this research involved the identification of organizational determinants that facilitate innovation and intrafirm diffusion. A common link between the process of innovation and the determinants of innovation concerns an applicable unit of adoption, which “can refer to an individual, a group, an organization, an industry, or the world as a whole” (Hoeber & Hoeber, 2012, p. 214). For this research effort, the unit of adoption is the various branches of the U.S. Armed Forces and its personnel.
Overall, we feel the present research makes the following contributions. First, we discovered: (a) the resolution of crisis, (b) the emergence and recruitment of leaders, (c) the creation/use of novelty, and (d) the capacity to adapt revealed the military “bowl” game phenomenon and American football existed as critical ingredients for organizational innovation and that product innovation can emerge from process innovation in organizations to support organizational innovation efforts. Next, we suggest that novelty, although identified as a product innovation, is not enough alone to create a competitive advantage or sustain organizational innovation. Novelty must be supported, promoted, and adapted to create and sustain the goals associated with organizational process innovation. Second, we demonstrate that intrafirm diffusion can involve and compel job specialization, imitation/emulation, forged alliances, the creation of special service positions, and the use of internal/external media to assist and accompany organizational innovation. Another contribution of this study highlights the importance of leaders and the influence of external factors on the production of their chosen institutional strategies. Specifically, we provide a historical review of how if an organization is flexible and able to adapt to meet the demands of a changing environment and if they can recruit recognizable leaders they can influence or shape activities to achieve organizational goals. Lastly, within these points, we add to the presence of an “historic turn” (i.e., Booth & Rowlinson, 2006; Clark & Rowlinson, 2004; Rowlinson, Hassard, & Decker, 2014; Wadhwani & Bucheli, 2014) to relate the contribution of historical study toward organizational theory.
Literature Review
A variety of scholars have called for organizations to be “more flexible, adaptive, entrepreneurial, and innovative to effectively meet the changing demands of today’s environment” (Sarros, Cooper, & Santora, 2008, p. 145). Regarding innovation, Ganter and Hecker (2013) and Gumusluoglu and Ilsev (2009) outlined innovation in three broad types of classification (i.e., process, product, and organizational), which Wong, Lee, and Foo (2007) positioned as mutually exclusive or capable of leading to another. Process innovation refers to the adoption of new or improved process(es) while product innovation involves the establishment of new or improved products and services (Damanpour & Gopalakrishnan, 2001; He & Wong, 2004; Wong et al., 2007). Product innovations emerge based on the influence of external stakeholders (e.g., customers) and are generally market-driven (Wong et al., 2007). Process innovations are focused on improving internal activities (i.e., integration of current and new knowledge with current resources) to enhance production efficiencies (Damanpour & Gopalakrishnan, 2001). The goal of process innovations is always focused on what the individual or group can do better to improve the likelihood that external stakeholders will accept or consume their product and/or service.
Organizational innovation requires the efficient use of human capital to take advantage of products, processes, and ideas created toward the realization of organizational goals (Damanpour, 1991). Six factors that should be considered as influential to organizational innovation include (a) the characteristics of the organization’s identity and mission, (b) the utility of the innovation to the organization, (c) the potential and actual involvement with other organizations, (d) the impact of the environmental context, (e) communication capability of the organization, and (f) the leadership capacity within the organization (Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981; Wolfe, 1994). Importantly, as the product of desired strategic change, organizational innovation is typically implemented by transformational leaders within a highly developed organizational climate (Damanpour & Schneider, 2006; Gumusluoglu & Ilsev, 2009; Wolfe, 1994). Bass (2008) described transformational leadership as stimulating interest among peers and followers to view their work as important, able to generate awareness in the mission of the organization, and/or capable of motivating peers and followers to accept that self-sacrifice and/or job completion that can lead to higher levels of personal and group achievement.
The ideal climate for innovation generally results from transformational leaders’ “personal and positional characteristics” and their prompts to discuss and willingly implement innovated approaches to resolve or better manage organizational problems, environmental concerns, or institutional challenges (Damanpour & Schneider, 2006, p. 220). Transformational leaders enhance organizational innovation through motivation and intellectual stimulation (Elkins & Keller, 2003; Jung, Chow, & Wu, 2003). Moreover, they promote innovation through “championing” the creativity of individuals within their organizations (Gumusluoglu & Ilsev, 2009; Howell & Higgins, 1990; Scott & Bruce, 1994; Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin, 1993). Research on institutional diffusion also suggests that such organizational leaders may exist as advocates to the potential emergence of innovation but “highly institutionalized organizations can become resistant to innovation” without recognition of this limitation (Chacar & Hesterley, 2004, p. 409). Furthermore, change may only occur to institutionalized organizations through “dramatic exogenous shocks” that reposition “the long accepted ways of doing things” as obsolete (Chacar & Hesterley, 2004, p. 409). Thus, it is important to recognize the emergence and recruitment of dynamic leaders to facilitate, adapt, and implement innovation in times of internal or external uncertainty.
Notably, some organizational scholars have proposed dynamic capabilities as a vehicle to understand this phenomenon regarding the impact of environmental uncertainty and leadership (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). Teece (2007) described dynamic capabilities as requiring an appreciation or capacity to “sense and shape opportunities and threats, to seize opportunities, and to maintain competitiveness” through efforts to enhance and/or reconfigure available resources (p. 1320). Dynamic capabilities involve adaptation through goals of trying to address changing stakeholder preferences and expectations within environmental constraints (Teece, 2007). The recognition of environmental constraints is regularly completed through organizational processes which promote the searching for ideas, technologies, and individuals (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Furthermore, this activity is dependent on the organization understanding their existing organizational structure, external environment, and internal resources. Such recognition allows organizations to identify and interpret events and which strategies to use. Finally, the nature of opportunity is regularly affected by governmental focuses, the quality of supplies, and the standards of management practices put into place (Teece, 2007). With respect to governmental focuses, laws and social inertia shape organizational practices along with the individuals in charge and their ability to make decisions about potential change (Nonaka &Toyama, 2007; Teece, 2007).
Method
The recent “historic turn” has been cited by several management scholars with respect to the opening of opportunities for historians to work with the social sciences and organizational theorists (Booth & Rowlinson, 2006; Clark & Rowlinson, 2004; Rowlinson, Hassard, & Decker, 2014; Wadhwani & Bucheli, 2014). Such acknowledgments have emphasized the idea for more history to help management educators because history is said to “matter” to the development of organizations (Rowlinson et al., 2014, Wadhwani & Bucheli, 2014; Zald, 1996). In particular, new institutionalists expressed interest in history because of their desire to better understand the place and impact of events, actors, and agency with organizational activities (Rowlinson et al., 2014; Suddaby, Foster, & Mills, 2014; Suddaby, Foster, & Trank, 2010). Additional thoughts suggest the importance of being objective through efforts to identify the place and impact of events, actors, and agency on organizations (Rowlinson et al., 2014). The steps presented below on the historical method followed those goals for objectivism and are proscribed by Booth (2005) and Seifried (2010) for scholars who work on sport-based topics.
Step 1 of the historical research method required the pursuit and acquisition of those documents and artifacts connected to this time period (Golder, 2000; Goodman & Kruger, 1988; Kraus, 2008; Mason, McKenney, & Copeland, 1997). Within reasonable limits, a wide range of primary sources and secondary sources were exploited (Kraus, 2008; Seifried, 2010). Primary documents used to support the pursuit of organizational innovation in this research endeavor included newspapers, military yearbooks, U.S. War Department reports, letters, and/or reports from military officers (Generals Douglas MacArthur, John Pershing, and Rear Admiral Thomas Hamilton, etc.), game programs, and National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) records. Secondary sources incorporated into this review included a variety of history books, academic articles, reviews of research, and newspaper articles from national media publications such as The New York Times, Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, Miami Herald, Milwaukee Sentinel, Los Angeles Times, and Boston Globe. Collectively, various online public databases and archives regarding documents on military bowl games were recruited and used for this study. National newspapers were desired and used because in some instances they provide factual accounts as a primary source would do, while in other instances they present interpretations of events after the fact similar to other secondary sources. Media publications are similarly supported because they serve as useful tools to understand comments about organizational activities as being with or against social norms (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Archive collections used for primary and secondary sources refer to “unique, non-circulating social documents” found at a particular location only by special permission (Rowlinson et al., 2014, p. 256).
Every attempt was made to collect data from those secondary sources using primary sources. Furthermore, a wide range of sources was sought out because primary and secondary accounts must remain suspect until corroborated by other sources (Booth, 2005; Seifried, 2010). We recognize that some organizational theorists may have a concern that the archives used in this project are collected and processed according to preferences of the home organization for social legitimation (Strati, 2000). However, we argue such concerns should be held for narrative texts and not for the specific documents we discovered produced for the process of running an organization (i.e., U.S. Armed Forces). In the end, the specific time frame of the military bowl game phenomenon started with 1942 and ended in 1967 based on records with the NCAA and other archives used.
During Step 2, the researchers conducted an historical criticism to test the reliability of sources and compare observations and findings. This step served to help certify the authenticity of primary and secondary sources for the preparation of accurate conclusions. Essentially, the historical criticism aided our research inquiry by demonstrating the credibility of sources both internally and externally to help avoid selection bias and use of some data to favor a specific hypothesis (Golder, 2000; Mason et al., 1997; Rowlinson et al., 2014; Seifried, 2010). Internally, we questioned the accuracy of the data provided by each source. For example, we looked for “holes” in provided explanations during the internal criticism. We also considered the author or speaker’s intended audience and their reputation as an expert or nonexpert (Golder, 2000; Kraus, 2008; Seifried, 2010). Furthermore, we used a dictionary from the time period of study, as Golder (2000) advised, to help reduce anxiety related to interpretation concerns. Externally, the researchers examined how the sources collected the information they provided. In essence, we attempted to help establish reliability and validity through asking questions like who created the source, their relationship to the information presented, and how the information was collected (Golder, 2000; Seifried, 2010). Checks for trustworthiness also occurred through examining the authenticity of documents by the date of work and the temporal arrangement of events described in letters, spreadsheets, statistics, artifacts, and biographical information (Booth, 2005; Seifried, 2010). Reliability received additional attention through looking at the time span between the event(s), which occurred and the documented expression of the information regarding the event(s). Finally, the researchers looked to see if local or national social, economic, religious, and political conditions prejudiced manuscripts or artifacts (Seifried, 2010).
Third, the researchers analyzed and interpreted the fragmentary evidence collected to establish a relationship between bowl games and a larger theme or themes found. The researchers sought to prevent a poor logical analysis through categorizing and triangulating data (Jick, 1979; Seifried, 2010; Zald, 1996). A detailed outline and timeline was prepared to identify, organize, and criticize the various interconnecting themes emerging from the topic to compare and improve results for the production of an interesting and legitimate narrative (Jick, 1979; Rowlinson et al., 2014; Seifried, 2010; Zald, 1996). Creating the timeline appeared particularly important when we consider some locations shared bowl game names. It also was important since we recognize, as many organization theorists argue, that the sequence of events in a period of time serve as “an important contingency factor” frequently ignored by those looking to examine moments of an organization’s life cycle (Haveman, 1993, p. 867). Overall, triangulation served to organize the data similar to that resulting from a coding process in a content analysis (Booth, 2005; Seifried, 2010)
The outline and timeline organization were created through a historical institutionalism-based approach. Fioretos (2011) identified historical institutionalism as a type of lens that seeks to discover the foundation of legacies, understand the consequence of new ideas (i.e., innovation) and their impact on attempts to reform the status quo. Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003) and Pierson (2004) added historical institutionalism prompts the discovery and recognition of the discrete to establish substantive themes emerging from patterns. Within this point, Pierson (1996) and Skocpol (1992) suggested that historical institutionalism requires considerable attention to the timing and sequence of events because the changing nature of constraints and opportunities imposed on institutions shapes decision making. Moreover, understanding the dynamic nature of the timing and sequence of activities is critical because the past conditions the present and future. Finally, historical institutionalism also emphasizes micro-level processes that reproduce other activities (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007; Fioretos, 2011). Thus, such behavior is a “function of preferences informed by point-to-point comparisons; that is individuals are thought to balance evaluations of the costs and benefits of adapting to new circumstances with the costs and benefits of maintaining or losing their investments in past arrangements” (Fioretos, 2011, p. 373).
Within this conception, the institution (i.e., U.S. Armed Forces) is assumed, like many other organizations, to be comprised of “more-or-less, taken-for-granted repetitive social behavior that is underpinned by normative systems and cognitive understandings that give meaning to social exchange and thus enable self-reproducing social order” (Greenwood, Oliver, Suddaby, & Sahlin-Andersson, 2008, pp. 4-5). Our view of historical institutionalism positions the Armed Forces as historically dependent on their environment and competing internal interests that seek a competitive advantage within the aggregate of individual and collective actions to create some planned outcomes (Campbell, 2004; Pierson, 2004; Scott, 2008). The individual preferences of the leadership to use football and reproduce the bowl game experience are thus viewed as resulting from constraints of the institutions, because the Armed Forces, as an institution, is embedded with rules, policies, and established norms, and a product of their environment (Pierson, 2004; Scott, 2008).
Results
Collectively, these sources provided a complete view of the military bowl games and how American football is an example of organizational innovation within the Armed Forces. From the collected data, we found 111 military bowl games across 6 continents in 18 countries and 46 host cities took place. Furthermore, participants for the various military bowl games represented all branches of the U.S. Armed Forces. Specifically, the U.S. Army was represented in 66% of the games while the Air Force participated in roughly 52% of contests. Teams representing the Marines (24%), Navy (23%), and combined military branches (11%) complete the breakdown of participants. Within, we acknowledge (a) the resolution of crisis, (b) the emergence and recruitment of leaders, (c) the creation/use of novelty, and (d) the capacity to adapt were the primary themes and ingredients for organizational innovation emerging from this study.
The Resolution of Crisis: A Foundation for American Football
During and following the conclusion of World War I, the “American people were shocked to learn of the high percentage of young men who failed to qualify physically as good soldiers” (Portal, 1941, p. 3) and about the elevated number of men that “flunked early-war enlistment and draft physicals because of [ill] health or mental conditions” (Jones, 2009, p. 43). This exogenous shock expectedly prompted the United States to seek out opportunities to build more “hard, physically fit, aggressive, courageous, and determined soldiers” for future military efforts (Portal, 1941, p. 4). Interestingly, the surprise regarding the fitness of American men was exacerbated by shared beliefs that physical combat was “born and bred in the human animal for generations” (Portal, 1941, p. 3).
Explanations for the physical deterioration of American men generally centered on education (Mrozek, 1987; Pope, 1995; Vasquez, 2012) and other “present-day conventions” that failed to evoke the innate combat instincts necessary to protect American interests abroad and at home (Lewis, 1973, p. 4). Other concerns focused on the spread of venereal diseases among troops abroad (Exner, 1917). Responding to such anxieties regarding America’s “soft” and socially “irresponsible” youth, the United States sought out strategies to unleash the competiveness within of all men. General Douglas MacArthur, as acting Superintendent of the United States Military Academy (1919-1922), “reorganized the educational curriculum to include instruction in a variety of team sports such as football [i.e., American], basketball, soccer, lacrosse, and hockey” (Seifried & Katz, 2011, pp. 154-155). Within these sports, MacArthur hoped competition would bring “out the qualities of leadership, quickness of decision, promptness of action, mental and muscular coordination, aggressiveness, and courage” necessary for future officers leading American troops (MacArthur, 1922). MacArthur also went one step further by prompting the U.S. Congress to look for gifted athletes and to send them to the U.S. Military Academy after advertising that he would award “his football stars with special privileges” and “elite status on campus” (Sperber, 1998, pp. 138-139). MacArthur’s words and actions were highly convincing as he was readily recognized as great man and capable of inspiring the best to emerge from men (Bass, 2008).
Joseph E. Raycroft, as U.S. War Department Army Training Activities Director (1917-1919), similarly supported the pursuit of competition as a building block for creating a better soldier (Seifried & Katz, 2011; Vasquez, 2012). Specifically, Raycroft advocated for more combat-like sports such as boxing, wrestling, and American football to be incorporated into all curriculums for university and college students because he believed it would improve their resolve, physical conditioning, and compliance (Fosdick, 1918; Kleeberger, 1918; Pope, 1995; Wallenfeldt, 1994). Raycroft, also Chairman of the Department of Health and Physical Education at Princeton University, was well respected and his leadership was frequently followed because of the success he enjoyed as a three-time national championship coach at the University of Chicago from 1906 to 1909.
Raymond Fosdick, Chairman on Training Camp Activities of the Army and Navy Department in 1918, also promoted sports as a necessary activity to increase courage, determination, and the maintenance of efficient military operations (Allen & Fosdick, 1918; Fosdick, 1918). Fosdick was well recognized as a man with considerable administrative talents and seen as a political leader when named special representative of the War Department by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson in 1917. Fosdick offered sport as a tool to help improve and maintain the morale of participating soldiers and team sports as specifically capable of improving personal accountability and group cohesion toward collectively set goals (Allen & Fosdick, 1918). An example of this belief in action can be seen following World War I, in 1919, with the 4th Marine Brigade and 3rd Army Brigade during their occupation of Germany. There a series of American football games emerged as a strategy for the maintenance of competitive readiness and the improvement of group cohesion (Gunn, 1992). Similarly invented football rivalries for other American Expeditionary Forces also became the preferred vehicle to entertain soldiers and to keep them out of trouble with locals if possible (Pope, 1995; Seifried & Katz, 2011). Pope (1995) provided evidence of this success by suggesting the popularity of American football was undeniable as early as 1919 when American forces produced championship games with 75,000 in France’s Colombes Stadium “with all the interest ever called forth by a . . . professional baseball World Series” (p. 452).
The military media also positioned American football as the preferred mass training sport through its support of football’s “required” organizational qualities and attractive collision-based nature (“Football Honors,” 1918). As an example, the Stars and Stripes praised football and regularly promoted the continuance of the sport in America because it was good for American troop morale in foreign lands and the compliance to authority. In particular, football-related stories were interesting and provided an opportunity to experience the “norms” offered by home within the disparity that is war. General John J. Pershing (1931), the original director of the Stars and Stripes, was an advocate of stories on football and implemented some of the first sport sections to help keep up the morale of troops. One example of this can be seen from an Editorial from Stars and Stripes regarding the Harvard–Yale game which featured enjoyment out of the “old time, blood-and-iron variety of football, played by regulars, not by informal teams” (“Editorial,” 1918, p. 4). Pershing also interestingly chose to use the Stars and Stripes to communicate important updates about the progress of World War I through the use of sport metaphors as an innovative communication device. For instance, a June 28, 1918, issue used the headline “Austria Groggy at End of Fourth” while another on May 10, 1918, declared “Kaiser Calls Bench Warmers into Play” (Wakefield, 1997, p. 17). Collectively, this strategy grew the weekly circulation from 30,000 to 526,000 between February 1918 and June 1919 (Pope, 1995). Such attention ultimately prompted The New York Times to express that “football owes more to the war in the way of the spread of the spirit of the game than it does to ten or twenty years of development in the period before the war” (“War football,” 1919, Sec. 3, p. 1). General Pershing’s leadership on American football, as a tool for the armed forces, was notable because he mentored an entire generation of U.S. generals (e.g., Omar Bradley, Dwight Eisenhower, George Marshall, and George Patton) as General of the Armies, a position only answering to the President of the United States at that time (General of the Armies, 1919).
The Resolution of Crisis: Mobilization Toward World War II
On December 8, 1941, the United States officially joined the Allied Forces participating in World War II following an attack perpetrated by the Japanese on the American territory of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Soon after the assault, President Franklin D. Roosevelt recommended military training efforts should focus on using sport to help improve “toughness, leadership, teamwork, and camaraderie” (Jones, 2009, p. 15). A nine-man advisory group representing the Navy Aeronautic V-5 Preflight Schools was provided with the opportunity to achieve this objective (Navy Department, 1942). Standing with them was John L. Griffith, Commissioner of the Big Ten Conference (1922-1944) and member of the Joint Army-Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation (JANC). Griffith was a recognized defender of intercollegiate athletics and admired for his leadership role resolving the Olympic representation dispute between the NCAA and Amateur Athletic Union in the mid-1930s (Schmidt, 2000).
In October of 1941, Griffith advised the JANC Executive Director’s Office that the U.S. Armed Services could innovatively use American sporting interests within colleges and universities to help train officers and troops like that advocated after World War I (Griffith, 1941). Navy Secretary Frank Knox also supported the use of football to train military personnel because of the “controlled conflict” nature of football was similar to what one could expect on the battleground (Rominger, 1985, p. 253). Knox, part owner and publisher of the Chicago Daily News and a 1936 Republican nominee for vice-president of the United States, also supported the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to work with institutions of higher education and to move their officer training schools (e.g., NROTC, V-5, V-7, and V-12) to American college/university campuses because they had the infrastructure (i.e., buildings and space) in place to support training activities. Atlanta Journal-Constitution sportswriter Furman Bisher famously quipped, “While football went into various degrees of retrenchment on college campuses, it broke out like the measles in some of the most unlikely places” due to its perceived ability to improve combat readiness and entertain “the more fractious” capable of finding “trouble” (Bisher, 1984, p. 1).
Others also argued a strong symbiotic relationship was forged between the U.S. armed services and American football during this period out of “both necessity and natural design” (Jones, 2009, p. 2). Multiple accounts by contemporaries of the 1940s support this statement and the idea that the use of sport could represent organizational innovation. For example, famed college football coaches Clark Shaughnessy and Harry Stuhldreher, suggested football was an appropriate choice to help troops train for war because it involved the use of strategy to overtake territory and simulated formation activities supported by the military (“Gridiron Training,” 1942; Warnecke, 2002). Other benefits recognized by Stuhldreher involved the improvement of “stamina, teamwork, and coordination of football men” to help make them more responsive and precise soldiers during the pressures of battle (“Gridiron Training,” 1942, p. 5). Naval air personnel similarly argued that the “timing and coordination” required of football participants was useful to help understand the need for tight flying formations (Kane, 1945, p. 43). Additional others outside the United States also supported such claims regarding American football. For instance, Thomas Wintringham, a British military analyst, proposed the British military examine the potential utility of American football as a training tool because it shares several “points of resemblance to war” and more so “than any other sport” (Wintringham, 1940, p. 43, 66). Highlighted within the appeals were the notions regarding the importance of respecting the authority emerging from the collective war effort.
The Emergence and Recruitment of Leaders: American Football Coaches
The search for and emergence of leaders to supervise and train American troops for World War II involved several notable individuals mentioned above (i.e., General Douglas MacArthur, General John J. Pershing, John L. Griffith, Joseph Raycroft, and Raymond Fosdick) and a variety of tactics supported by other military brass. For example, Rear Admiral Thomas J. Hamilton, advocated football as a “training must” for all naval personnel (Da Grosa & Hall, 1946, p. 20). A football letter winner at the Naval Academy in Annapolis and head coach of the Midshipmen, Hamilton (1942) argued that football was a desirable activity for military training because of the innovative physical training it supported and the accompanying psychological traits it engendered toward the acceptance of combat and respect for leadership. Hamilton further suggested football appeared the most preferred of all team sports for the V-5 training schools because it “incorporated violent aggressive collisions” and “produced courage, power, and the ability to concentrate under-pressure-filled situations” (Seifried & Katz, 2011, p. 158). The concept of performing under pressure was later supported by Huntington when he suggested the military identified social conditions as critical to control in order to manage performance within the chaos war presented (Huntington, 1957). To help engineer soldiers to respond appropriately and precisely under pressure, Hamilton (1942) and the United States Navy Bureau of Aeronautics (1944) promoted the recruitment of American football coaches as military officers and training leaders because of their ability to motivate and provide intellectual stimulation related to combat.
The social engineering of soldiers is highlighted in the proceeding statements from Hamilton and “determination and winning” were identified as two highly valuable commodities the military desired to reproduce (Seifried & Katz, 2011, p. 158). The pursuit of winning and determination under pressure prompted military officials to search for individuals (i.e., transformational leaders) capable of evoking great performances out of individuals. Again, professional and intercollegiate football coaches were recognized as individuals capable of inspiring commitment to those values and as people who would search for innovative methods to achieve victory or a competitive advantage (Navy Department, 1942, Rominger, 1985; Sullivan, 1943; Vasquez, 2012). Following Hamilton’s lead, coaches involved with professional football or the college varsity were recruited into the military ranks because they were identified as highly capable of “developing reflexive thinking” skills and understood how to improve group cooperation abilities through the tactics they employed to create their teams and schedules (Rominger, 1985, p. 259). The list of notable coaching legends recruited to the various military branches was impressive. For example, in addition to the aforementioned Shaughnessy and Stuhldreher, Cleveland Abbott, Bernie Bierman, Paul “Bear” Bryant, Alonzo Gaither, George Halas, Woodrow “Woody” Hayes, Frank Leahy, Robert Neyland, Ben Schwarzwalder, Johnny Vaught, and Charles “Bud” Wilkinson served in the Armed Forces in addition to many other College and Professional Football Hall of Fame coaches. Their “rank was delegated according to coaching responsibility and ranged from lieutenant commanders for base athletic directors down to ensign for assistant coaches” (Rominger, 1985, p. 256).
Frequently, these coaches would help with the training of troops at various domestic and foreign locations; furthermore, they worked with colleges to provide opportunities for base teams to play a competitive schedule. Overall, approximately 131 colleges supported officer training programs and multiple preflight schools to help manage the training effort required for war (Seifried & Katz, 2011). The football teams of the officer training programs and the preflight schools were expectedly competitive with the recruitment of coaches and emerged in many Associated Press media polls during the 1940s. Commenting on the schematic advantage coaches of preflight schools and officer training programs enjoyed with such large numbers of players and unlimited physical training opportunities, sportswriter Ned Cronin (1944) suggested few college teams of that era could match-up to the various military teams and “escape with a whole hide.” The Bainbridge Commodores (Maryland) serve as an exemplar of this as they finished the 1944 season with an undefeated 10-0 record and a #5 Associated Press ranking. One report following their destruction of one college team suggested, “There may be easier methods of murdering a group of youngsters such as inserting them into a gas chamber or lining them up against the wall and spraying them with machine-gun slugs” (Jones, 2009, p. 31).
Such a display was common because manpower surpluses supported at preflight schools and officer training programs “created the conditions necessary to establish multiple platoons for offensive and defensive play” (Seifried & Katz, 2011, p. 170). In essence, job specialization on the football gridiron provided opportunities for the creation of more effective and efficient players physically and mentally capable of enhanced performances. Again, following the values of winning and determination desired by the military, coaches were free to create a new type of aggressive offensive and defensive football that capitalized on highly complex communication systems, more developed physical skills, and the appreciation for situational substitutions for specific duties. In the end, these improvements in pass protection, the use of motion and multiple offensive sets to spread defenses, as well as free substitution and fluid defensive schemes developed during World War II would all fuse into the modern incarnation watched on television today. (Jones, 2009, p. 5)
They also led to innovation and improvement on the battlefield as each participating “football” soldier was better able to understand the value of precision and completing their responsibilities toward group goals and plans. Troops were also able to better appreciate the impact of technology and what efficiency meant toward outcomes. In essence, tanks, ships, flight formations, and infantry movements followed some of the techniques and strategies promoted and practiced by American football coaches (Kane, 1945; Rominger, 1985). Notably, public support for preflight schools and other military training centers emerged from the American Association of Health, Physical Education, and Recreation. Jess Feiring Williams, President of the AAHPER (1932-1933), supported a resolution favoring a partnership at the AAHPER national convention in New Orleans on April 18, 1942. Sport Journalist Arch Ward (1942) of the Chicago Tribune also suggested the “success or failure” of such programs would “determine the outcome of the war” while writer Arthur Daley (1943) of The New York Times also claimed Americans should be encouraged the “enthusiasm with which college coaches . . . discuss . . . preflight . . . demonstrates . . . its eminent correctness.”
The Emergence and Recruitment of Leaders: Military Service Officers
At international locations and military bases in American territories such as Hawaii and Alaska, another type of organizational leadership position was also created by the U.S. Armed Forces to enhance the productivity of troops and improve their morale. The pursuit of methods to keep troops in fighting shape, interested in their own military preparedness, and capable of maintaining or improving morale has always engrossed military leaders (Gunn, 1992; U.S. War Department, 1944). Furthermore, soldier morale has been previously studied and identified since World War II as an important aspect of combat motivation and solider readiness (Langkamer & Ervin, 2008; Schumm, Gade, & Bell, 2003). Enhancing morale has been a focus of the military brass because it has been recognized as necessary to improve organizational attachment to military goals (Medalia, Miller, & Delbert, 1955; Schumm & Bell, 2000; Tucker, Sinclair, & Thomas, 2005). One innovative tactic created by the U.S. military to improve morale and soldier readiness involved the recruitment and creation of Military Service Officer (MSO) positions.
Also known as Special Service Officers (SSOs) and Athletic Officers (AOs), these positions were established to help organize competitions so participating soldiers did not experience “severe boredom” (U.S. War Department, 1944). SSOs and AOs were expected “to coach, act as an athletic director or administrator, and promote or develop sport leagues” for military personnel to occupy their attention and to improve their morale (Seifried & Katz, 2011, p. 169). The execution of job duties SSOs or AOs would require of participating troops was also identified as useful to highlight the ability of the U.S. military to bring a slice of American life to foreign soil (U.S. War Department, 1944). For the Navy and Air Force, such servicemen were also called Deck Volunteer Specialists because of their work on aircraft carriers. The aforementioned Woody Hayes and Bud Wilkinson would eventually end up commanding a destroyer escort and serve aboard the Enterprise, respectively to carry out such duties (Rominger, 1985).
Master Sgt. Zeke Bonura serves as perhaps the best example of the job MSOs were asked to complete. Bonura and his large charismatic personality were recruited to begin his second stint in the U.S. Army shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack (Bedingfield, 2010). As a former Major League Baseball (MLB) player of the 1930s and 1940s, Bonura was famous and familiar with the administration of athletic activities so the Army assigned him to organize a variety of athletic contests and leagues for troops stationed in Oran, Algeria. In October of 1943, General Dwight Eisenhower notably awarded SSO Zeke Bonura with the Legion of Merit Award because of his “resourcefulness, enthusiasm, and leadership” following his creative organization of the Arab Bowl in North Africa (“Bonura Gets Award,” 1943). Interestingly, many other MSOs attempted to duplicate and use the “novelty” of the bowl experience to promote to the troops that they were still capable of participating in “an important and necessary demonstration of American life” (Wakefield, 1997, p. 89).
The Creation/Use of Novelty: The Military Bowl Game Experience
The bowl game phenomenon started in 1902 when the Tournament of Roses decided that its annual main event for that year would be a football contest between Stanford University and the University of Michigan. Reemerging in 1916 and rebranded as the Rose Bowl in 1923, the annual bowl event was established as a profitable activity capable of improving the local economy of Pasadena, California and the morale of individuals living in the Southern California region. Gate receipts from Rose Bowl games in the 1920s demonstrate this point vividly. For instance, the 1921 and 1922 contests combined to produce more than $260,000 in spending while contests of the mid to late-1930s amassed that much or more each year. Other communities throughout the West (Los Angeles and San Diego), Southwest (Dallas, Fort Worth, El Paso), and Southeast (Miami and New Orleans) also decided to create their own unique bowl games so that by the mid-1930s several bowl events existed in the United States as annual holiday season activities (i.e., Christmas and New Year’s) activities (Seifried & King, 2012).
Featured with each of those contests was the “colorful pageantry resulting from the bowl game, parade, beauty queen coronation, and other festival activities” (“Floats’ Beauties Surpass,” 1930, p. B1). The Orange Bowl contests held in Miami, Florida serve as one archetype of the organized novelty associated with bowl games. For instance, contests of the mid-1930s included coronations, parades, and a festival centered on the New Year (“Manhattan Ready,” 1933; “New Year’s Parade,” 1935; “She’s Orange Bowl Queen,” 1935). Another Orange Bowl contest, supervised by a committee for 4 months in 1938, involved the creation of 60 highly artistic floats and involved more than 30 bands, 3,000 musicians, and 600 dancers in costumes (“3000 Musicians,” 1939). Clearly, these were no simple contests.
The attractiveness of bowl games and college football did not go unnoticed by the U.S. military and MSOs like Zeke Bonura who were enticed by grand parties. Specifically, the U.S. Armed Forces used the bowl experience to enhance “troop and civilian morale on the home front and overseas by providing an uplifting, entertaining, and exciting diversion from the horrors, sacrifices, and boredom of war” (Jones, 2009, p. 23). In 1945, George L. Shiebler (1945-1972), Commissioner of the Eastern College Athletic Conference, supported this notion by suggesting, The American fighting man . . . wanted to play in a game or else be an actual spectator. Thousands of soldiers, sailors, and Marines in Europe and the Pacific war areas put on their own football bowls with uniformed teams, cheering sections, regulation officials, bands, and parades modeled after real American college football games. (Jones, 2009, p. 65)
This investigation discovered several great examples of the bowl game novelty in foreign locations as a resource for organizational innovation and will begin with Bonura’s Arab Bowl.
SSO Zeke Bonura organized the elaborate Arab Bowl to emulate those contests held in the United States during New Year’s Day. For example, Bonura exclaimed to the United Press, “There will be plenty of color” for the Arab Bowl event to be held in San Phillipe Stadium. The “color” Bonura referred to, included a variety of activities such as the pre-game camel and donkey races down main street and an ostentatious halftime show. The pre-game camel and donkey races were advertised as involving attractive Women’s Army Corp (WAC) to serve as accompanying sponsors for the various participants to boost the troop “experience” (Harrigan, 1944; “Rabchasers Win,” 1944). The elaborate halftime show involved soldiers of Algeria and U.S. servicemen who gave an exhibition using Arabian horses. Other activities required a team of army paratroopers to land on the field and the recruitment of actress Rosalind Russell to excite “interest even in the eyes of the stoic” (Harrigan, 1944, p. S1).
To further involve the local Algerians into the contest, Bonura also helped coach and train teams to participate in their own championship which preceded the Arab Bowl game. However, the contest between Army and Navy personnel was advertised as the main activity because it supported athletes of high quality, which prompted generals to shout “just as loud as the lowest G.I.” (Harrigan, 1944, p. S1). Creatively, Bonura used his past media savvy as a baseball player to recruit soldiers to participate in the contest. Furthermore, Bonura recruited and sought out former college stars in the United States to help sell and legitimize the event. Overall, the 1943 Arab Bowl contest attracted a crowd of 15,000 from a “grid-hungry” group of “generals, admirals, nurses, WACs [Women Army Corps], soldiers, and sailors, and a fair-sized sprinkling of high French and Arab dignitaries” (“The All-American Gridiron,” 1944).
It should be noted that several hundred players participating in the various military bowl games covering the timespan of this study played for professional football teams within the National Football League (NFL), MLB, and what is now known as the NCAA’s Division I (Football Bowl Subdivision). Specifically, the Pro Football Hall of Fame reported that roughly 1,000 NFL players and personnel enlisted during World War II while MLB supplied another 500 to serve the United States. Three Heisman Trophy winners (i.e., Angelo Bertelli, Doc Blanchard, and Billy Vessels) plus numerous All-Americans and All-Conference performers were also recognized “to elevate the spectacle and prestige of the military bowl game” and to highlight the possibility that the American way of life could be sustained overseas and should be embraced by others (Seifried & Katz, 2011, p. 162).
The novelty of player recruitment to stage such events should not be viewed as unusual because the various military units desired to increase real participation in organized football leagues. Evidence of this can be seen in war-torn London of 1943 and 1944 with the establishment of the various Tea Bowls. There U.S. and Canadian MSOs organized competitive football teams and a league schedule for occupying soldiers to keep up morale and more importantly keep their soldiers out of trouble. The top finishers among the Americans and Canadian groups earned the opportunity to play in the various Tea Bowls (n = 3) set in White City Stadium. The crowds of the Tea Bowl games ranged from 30,000 to 50,000 and required the circling of spitfires “over the area in case the Germans tried a sneak raid” (“U.S. Soldiers Top Canadian Eleven,” 1944). Like the Arab Bowl, the attractiveness of the Tea Bowl event prompted other activities to be included in the extravaganza. For instance, attendees enjoyed a variety of music from military bands, an exhibition of horsemanship by Cossack troops, acrobatics, and the presence of a very attractive “Varga Girls” (“London Bowl Game Set,” 1944; “Piper, Chicago, Star of London,” 1945; “Tea Bowl Game,” 1945).
The Capacity to Adapt: The Media and Bowl Game Adaptation
The U.S. Office of War Information (OWI) regularly supplied information to troops on the war, football, and bowl game activities taking place overseas. Like that offered in the Stars and Stripes of World War I, the OWI experienced a regular stream of requests related to American football “related stories and statistics from those individuals who would likely spend their weekend consuming the collegiate or professional versions, if they were back home” (Seifried & Katz, 2011, p. 169). Specifically, the OWI adapted by sending out about 7,500 words daily about football activities occurring in the United States and other areas of the world (Jones, 2009; Wakefield, 1997). Photographs, radio broadcasts, and word-of-mouth exchanges about football and military bowl games provided the opportunity for diffusion. Again, the marketability attached to the spectacle, participating athletes, and purpose of the events made them newsworthy and a frequent item on OWI products. As an example, the 1945 Poi Bowl (Hawaii) generated a crowd of 29,000 from the participating All-Americans (n = 16) and former professional players (n = 10) volunteering and drafted into the military to produce a large radio audience (“Attendance Records,” 1945; “Down the Runway, 1944; “Game Program,” 1945; “Navy Beats, AAF,” 1945).
It should be noted that the remote audiences of these events were rather large because MSOs regularly arranged for radio broadcasts of the event to be sent to local hospitals hosting the wounded and other troops stationed in the region (Seifried & Katz, 2011). The events also occurred because the military bowl game phenomenon was adaptable to the host environment and capable of helping the Armed Forces achieve several objectives. For instance, the Atom Bowl was created in Nagasaki, Japan, after the atomic bomb leveled that area in August 1945. Pursuit of the game was identified as desirable because the United States wanted to quickly develop a presence in Japan and embrace the devastated community into an American activity. The game itself featured Marine Lieutenant and former Heisman Trophy winner Angelo Bertelli along with Navy Lieutenant Bill Osmanski, a star of the Chicago Bears, as captains. MSO Paul G. Donat was responsible for arranging the contest, clearing the field near the site of a popular Catholic worshipping area, and recruiting local Japanese women to be cheerleaders and Japanese boys to serve as managers. Notably, the game was also created to help Americans deal with the devastation (“Atom Bowl,” 1945; Lukacs, 2005; “Osmanski’s Team Wins,” 1946; Watt, 1984). Major General LeRoy P. Hunt required Donat and other “special services staff to find ways to lift morale” and identified a football bowl game as the preferred method because it is associated so strongly with holiday traditions at home (Lukacs, 2005, p. G9). Highlighted within were claims that the bowl game celebrated the fortune of those still alive (i.e., both American and Japanese). To support this point, a choir of Japanese children was assembled to sing about those fortunes and to remember the fallen.
Accompanying broadcasts of that and other bowl games were used to promote American traditions to the locals. For instance, the various Rice Bowls (1946-1958) held in occupied Japan after World War II supported “Christmas ceremonies under the guidance of Lieutenant General Robert W. Burns, the commander of the United States forces in Japan,” for American personnel and the local Japanese to consume (“Airmen Beat Army,” 1958, p. A2). Elsewhere in the Pacific, military bowl games were adapted to include locals and to embrace the traditions they enjoyed and the unique environments in which those contests were played. As an example, American troops stationed in Australia created a version of football that included rules from rugby with Australian troops to entertain each other and prompt citizens of Melbourne able to attend the Melbourne Athletic Club (Gunn, 1992).
Regarding adaptation, the Mosquito Bowl, on the island of the Guadalcanal, took place on a makeshift “coral-base, dirt and gravel field, with temperature in the eighties and horrible humidity, and without helmets or shoulder pads” (Jones, 2009, p. 207). Two-hand touch was required to avoid the hard coral that might prevent the men from completing their assigned duties after the event (“817th Teams Battle,” 1942). An announced crowd of 10,000 took positions around the field to watch the participants in their sleeveless t-shirts. Included in the figure were natives, soldiers, and high-ranking commanders. Interestingly, the aforementioned Atom Bowl also supported a game of two-hand touch to avoid any physical contact with the glass that littered the landscape of Nagasaki following the atomic blast (Lukacs, 2005; “Nagaskai Gridiron, 1945; “Osmanski’s Team Wins,” 1946; Watt, 1984).
Troops stationed in Alaska during the dead of winter were also not to be denied the pageantry associated with bowl contests. From 1949 to 1952 the Ladd Air Force Base (Fairbanks, AK) scheduled contests with a team from the University of Alaska-Fairbanks for the Ice Bowl Trophy in the cold of Alaska. Temperatures regularly hovered around negative 45 degrees Fahrenheit during that time of year. Governor Ernest Gruening described the game as the “farthest north gridiron championship in the world” and as important to help display the New Year’s football tradition typical of the mainland (Cole, 2008).
Appropriately, field preparation of Griffin Stadium began several weeks before the contest. Snowplows and airplane heaters were used to help soften and clear the field for play. The Air Force Times described the playing field as modified because the snow could not be completely removed. Coal dust was used to mark the boundaries and hashes within the field of play. Expectedly, participants not only wore thick wool underwear and heavy gloves but also heavy fur shoes called mukluks to improve their traction (Seifried & Katz, 2011). Like the aforementioned Mosquito and Atom Bowls, the rules of play were also modified for the environment. For example, snowball throwing as a form of deception was banned along with wedge-based running formations. It should be noted that the 1950 contest attracted a film crew from the Associate Press. Stereotypical of their coverage, they focused their pictorial not only on snow drifts but also on the coal that uniquely marked the field. Finally, the Ice Bowl contests attracted recognition from the 38-page program that was produced and the local radio station (i.e., KFAR) that covered the event. Adaptation was a major feature of the media covering the event along with the claim that American football like the American way of life could be reproduced and consumed anywhere.
Discussion
The collective information produced by this academic pursuit supports the goal of identifying the determinants of innovation and the process of intrafirm diffusion regarding innovation previously requested by Sarros et al. (2008) through real events. Importantly, we believe the examples provided by this work highlight several organizational innovation ingredients and can help support and supplement other studies completed on the interaction between institutions and their environment to create innovation and facilitate the diffusion of innovation (e.g., Carlsson, 2006; Criscuolo & Narula, 2008; Hekkert & Negro, 2009). Specifically, this work helps see the (a) resolution of crisis, (b) the emergence and recruitment of leaders, (c) the creation/use of novelty, and (d) the capacity to adapt from environmental cues, are important ingredients which prompt organizational innovation. Furthermore, this work showed support for the six factors acknowledged as influential to organizational innovation. Again, those include (a) the characteristics of the organization’s identity and mission, (b) the utility of the innovation to the organization, (c) the potential and actual involvement with other organizations, (d) the impact of the environmental context, (e) communication capability of the organization, and (f) the leadership capacity within the organization (Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981; Wolfe, 1994). Lastly, we demonstrated that organizational innovation included both product and process innovation and one can lead to another.
Like many institutions today, the U.S. Armed Forces is an organization with a considerably strong organizational climate built toward maintaining and creating a competitive advantage. Research on diffusion shows innovations are likely to emerge when strong organizations view innovation as significant or capable of producing a gain (Rogers, 2003). American football was chosen by the U.S. Armed Forces as a pre-existing product to assist their process innovation because of its compatibility with their organizational goals. Results from this examination showed the U.S. Armed Forces used American football and created bowl games to improve their readiness (e.g., physical preparedness, timing, coordination, loyalty, and discipline), provide entertainment to the troops, integrate American ideals and customs into foreign lands, and enhance morale. The U.S. Armed Forces also embraced the novelty of the bowl game as a product innovation to assist their process innovation because of its strong culture already present in America, which Snider, Oh, and Toner (2009) suggested develops from the “past successes and from its current interactions with the environment. Meaning [i.e., about shared individual expectations among members of the group] is established through socialization to a variety of identity groups that converge in the operations of the organization” (p. 6).
Several other previously completed scholarly works support this conclusion regarding organizational innovation in reaction to dynamic environmental conditions. For instance, Schumpeter (1949/1989) acknowledged the contribution of the organization and its “team” structures as seeking to and capable of creating novel products to solve specific exogenous problems and/or address the barriers presented by social inertia. Da Silveira, Borenstein, and Fogliatto (2001); Foss (2003); and Iravani, Van Oyen, and Sims (2005) also argued novelty introduced to workplace practices was necessary to prompt innovation in a dynamic environment. However, we importantly recognize the introduction of the novelty as a product innovation is not always enough by itself to produce organizational innovation to meet organizational goals. Novelty suggests something is a temporary phenomenon; thus, interest in the novelty as an innovation must be supported, promoted, and adapted to create and maintain commitment to the goals of process innovation. Furthermore, the novelty cannot be overused and/or stay the same; otherwise it loses its effectiveness assisting process innovation. In the present study, we showed that the novelty of the bowl game was effective because it was not overused, adapted to the environment, and frequently changed with respect to the spectacle’s pageantry and purpose to help achieve organizational objectives.
Football, as tool to manage the mobilization and training of troops, also remained novel and capable to help process innovation through the recruitment of specific recognizable leaders who were provided the resources (i.e., human capital and facilities) to maintain interest toward organizational goals. To enhance adaptation and the rate of diffusion, nationally recognized football coaches were specially recruited to serve as officers for the various branches of the U.S. Armed Forces to promote and teach American football and to organize bowl games. Again, American football coaches were preferred because of their ability to lead training exercises, develop strategy for the conquering of territory, and motivate troops toward collective group goals. Within this point, intellectual stimulation was highlighted through the various offensive and defensive systems introduced and specific job assignments developed. In essence, intellectual stimulation emerged as critical for the commitment to organizational innovation and as a component transformational leadership.
Next, the U.S. Armed Forces created new service personnel positions (i.e., MSOs) to organize, promote, and adapt the products of football and bowl games within process innovation. Specifically, competitions in the form of league and bowl games were created for soldiers to occupy their attention and entertain them on domestic and foreign soils. Typically, MSO (i.e., AO, SSO, and DVS) job responsibilities required them to coach, serve as an athletic administrator, and promote or develop sporting opportunities (i.e., leagues and tournaments) for active servicemen. Within, many MSOs tried to duplicate the college bowl experience (i.e., tradition and atmosphere) on their own bases and exotic locations to provide recreation for the troops, keep them out of danger, and to engage in “an important and necessary demonstration of American life” with locals (Wakefield, 1997, p. 89). Such activity demonstrated by coaches and MSOs support Damanpour and Schneider (2006) claim that “top managers heavily influence organizational capabilities by establishing organizational culture, motivating and enabling managers and employees, and building capacity for change and innovation” (p. 220). In this instance, MSOs were used to improve organizational attachment to the U.S. Armed Forces operational goals during the World War II and early Cold War era. Furthermore, it should be noted that the leadership and committees that established those positions suggest they were visionary leaders seeking to use the familiar and novel as a way to respond to an exogenous shock. Again, they elected to train troops and improve efficiency after determining a sport strategy would be useful to build some preferred characteristics.
Regarding the mass media, the U.S. OWI and other media publications were used by top military officials to create new branches focused on sport and specifically football-related stories along with sponsoring and radio broadcasting military bowl games to troops abroad and in the United States. This work proposes that such external communication (e.g., like that offered by the OWI) or promotion is a necessary determinant to sustain process innovation and diffusion of organizational innovation. Within their communication, the Armed Forces consciously sought to cover bowl games occurring at large stadiums or spaces that hosted recruited and/or reassigned former college and professional athletes. As individual novelties, the U.S. Armed Forces actively elevated the significance of each event as necessary and often complimented them through attempts to incorporate the pageantry of American bowl events annually offered in the United States during the holiday season. Notably, this work shows product innovation imitators, such as the U.S. Armed Forces, could serve as innovators too because they sought to adapt the innovation for their organizational pursuits.
Additional evidence of support for this position comes from partnerships established with other organizations and various communities hosting American football and bowl games, noted above as a factor influential to organizational innovation and the accompanying diffusion of innovation (Rogers, 2003). The interpersonal communication between various armed forces leaders, coaches, and MSOs helped champion the use of American football and the creation of bowl games. In particular, highly recognized coaches and athletes, as a fairly homogeneous group, regularly took positions as MSOs and drilling instructors to re-invent American football and bowl games to match the resources available and the needs of the organization sponsoring their position. Highlighted in this statement is the importance of timing and sequence of resources committed to organizational activities and the recognition that this is dependent on the availability of resources and the prospects of positive returns. To achieve the aforementioned organizational goals, we also learned with respect to process innovation, that forged alliances with universities/colleges in response to a crisis were attempted to improve physical conditioning, teamwork, and respect for authority. Specifically, university and college campuses agreed to provide opportunities to host officer training programs and flight schools and/or play against military base teams as part of their schedule.
Finally, this work also showed that some organizations may be capable of changing their resources and products over short period of time to produce organizational innovation when the environment threatens their survival. Again, highlighting dynamic capabilities, this work showed the U.S. Armed Forces should not be viewed as solely that of an industry “but that of the business ‘ecosystem’—the community of organizations, institutions, and individuals that impact the enterprise and the enterprise’s customers and supplies” (Teece, 2007 p. 1325). Interestingly, Teece and Pisano (1994) and Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997) suggested learning, redesigning, coordination, and integration were the core components of dynamic capabilities to leverage and orchestrate resources toward organizational goals. Furthermore, we recognize that the past shapes current ecosystems and provided prospective opportunities to create through imitation or spin-offs that help the realization of organizational process goals. Other historical institutionalism scholars also proposed the evolution of activities as an endogenous process where contextual factors are path dependent on individual actors in an institution (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007; Fioretos, 2011; Thelen, 2004). Within this work, we showed the preferences of leadership groups (e.g., military officials and SSOs) as heavily influenced by existing and previous activities particularly when they produce positive returns and externalities. Moreover, today’s businesses could look toward the past for product and process innovations in other contexts to use for their own organizational goals when those products and accompanying process innovations support a good strategic fit.
Teece (2007) also suggested dynamic capabilities are generally sustained through decentralization. In this instance, coaches and MSOs were provided autonomy to help orchestrate soldiers toward organizational goals. Moreover, their practice routines and leagues were redesigned with flexibility and competitive responsiveness in mind. Again, strategic fit was an active goal and often embraced co-specialization toward such activities. Teece (1986) introduced co-specialization as an effort to adapt or fit strategy to structure or strategy to process within dynamic capabilities. Co-specialization involves the use of assets to compliment other assets so that end products and services can be differentiated from one another. Teece (2007) suggested “[s]pecial value can be created (and potentially appropriated by another party) through asset combinations” and argued these needed “to be part of a tightly integrated system to achieve the performance” desired (p. 1338). This work importantly recognizes organizations are not idiosyncratic and organizations possess actors and agency capable of organizing the structure necessary to improve organizational innovation. In this instance, football and bowl games were selected because they strategically fit organizational goals to assist the massive mobilization and training of men, improving morale, connecting with foreign locations, and improving military strategy.
Conclusion
Regarding innovation, this work helps see the (a) resolution of crisis, (b) the emergence and recruitment of leaders, (c) the creation/use of novelty, and (d) the capacity to adapt from environmental cues are important determinants for organizational innovation. Next, Ganter and Hecker (2013) and Gumusluoglu and Ilsev (2009) outlined innovation in three broad types of classification (i.e., process, product, and organizational), which Wong et al. (2007) positioned as mutually exclusive or capable of leading to another. In this work, we identified the existence of organizational product and process innovation and that one can lead to another to meet the goals of organizational innovation through the leadership of dynamic individuals. Furthermore, novelty, although identified as a product innovation, must be supported, promoted, and adapted to create and sustain the goals associated with organizational process innovation. Next, six factors were recognized as influential to organizational innovation: (a) the characteristics of the organization’s identity and mission, (b) the utility of the innovation to the organization, (c) the potential and actual involvement with other organizations, (d) the impact of the environmental context, (e) communication capability of the organization, and (f) the leadership capacity within the organization.
Practical Implications
Shalley, Zhou, and Oldham (2004) offered ideas developed by creative employees and those in other industries may be transferred to others for their own use and development. As others might propose, we suggest business firms and/or other types of organizations to stay abreast of their environment and seek out methods or practices to better prepare their employees for competition in the market. First, we recommend other organizations should similarly look to recruit elite talent into managerial positions and provide them with the resources (e.g., personnel and financial) and freedom to be creative with their subordinates’ training and performance expectations. Again, other research has suggested the innovation process is difficult but can be best facilitated through transformational leaders (e.g., Hoeber & Hoeber, 2012; Wolfe, Wright, & Smart, 2006). Furthermore, strategic recruiting should be emphasized because “[I]nnovative leaders have the potential to touch many areas of the organization by inspiring creativity in others and ultimately initiating innovations that can advance the organization to the next level” (McEntire & Greene-Shortridge, 2011, p. 267).
Second, identifying leaders capable of innovation is difficult as many successful, charismatic, and visionary individuals are already employed. McEntire and Greene-Shortridge (2011) highlighted such challenges for contemporary human resource departments across all industries emanating from goals for innovation. Thus, we recommend the use of industry networking, professional associations, peer consultants/referrals, or headhunting companies to help organizations identify and recruit talented leaders. Identifying the best match between a potential leader and desired organizational goals is critical in this process and for efforts to improve organizational innovation and the strategic selection of products and processes. Such person to organizational fit can be achieved through a variety of mechanisms such as behavioral or psychological assessment exams, internal sourcing, or concurrent sourcing.
Third, organizations may also want to look at those involved with service management to assist and consider using socially interesting activities as vehicles to engage or provoke organizational change or to help internal stakeholders understand how to defend the practices of the organization as legitimate. It is critical to recognize that the promoters of innovation must overcome possible negative feelings and apprehension about the innovation to facilitate organizational commitment. In this work, committee work, the recruitment of specific individuals, and the media helped provide the information necessary to justify corresponding investments and strategic partnerships to help reduce costs with universities and to communicate messages important to sustaining the innovation. Therefore, social and/or other service positions could do much for organizational attachment and commitment to organizational goals as they are connected to legitimized practices and accepted social norms (Davies, 2008).
Fourth, establishing or forging relationships with other industries are compelling outcomes of this work with practical implications. In particular, industries or firms threatened in times of economic or cultural turmoil could appear as willing participants to help others reach their organizational goals through their willingness to share resources and readjust their institutional strategy. The forged alliance presented within this work appears to be an example of a deliberate institutional strategy as outlined by Quack (2007) because the institution (i.e., university and college) purposefully modified their previously established institutional rules on athletic participation and eligibility. Specifically, the lend-lease program was established to help organize the Armed Forces toward their organizational goals through creating a relationship with universities that made use of their campus infrastructure in exchange for governmental support and enrolments necessary to keep their institution alive during World War II. As a more recent example, Muth and Boccanfuso (2014) recognized another partnership but this time between universities and industry partners to address decreases in federal and state funding for universities. Within, Muth and Boccanfuso (2014) argued the seeking out of industry support should serve as an innovation to generate revenues from product and process innovations for both public and private sectors.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.