Newspapers as tools to promote national agenda: How Chinese Communist Party newspapers frame images of the South China Sea disputes for national and international audiences

Propaganda for domestic consumption

During, and for some time after, the civil war that propelled the Communist Party of China (CPC) to power, most of the target audience for the Party’s propaganda was illiterate. Visual propaganda, particularly dance, drama and all forms of pictorial art predominated (Barnett, 1949). With the shift to universal literacy, print propaganda emerged as an equal partner to visual propaganda. During the period from the establishment of the socialist People’s Republic in 1949, the death of China’s leader, Mao Zedong, in 1976, and until the end of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1970s, China’s communist leadership deliberately isolated the country from the outside world and worked in a closed environment. In this era, internal propaganda had two specific aims: to ‘generate political loyalty to the CPC’ and to reshape the ‘everyday attitudes and habits’ of individuals to help them ‘abandon their personal desires to work in the service of the collective cause of building a new society’ (Edney, 2014: 23). Party-run newspapers during this period adopted what was described by a contemporary observer as a ‘sledge-hammer’ approach (Rogers, 1949), presenting protagonists in news stories in a stark dichotomy as either enemies of the people or supporters of socialism.

At the end of the Cultural Revolution, following a brief transition period, the officially endorsed model of socialism in China changed radically, with the new direction set out in a speech in late 1978 by Mao’s de facto successor, Deng Xiaoping. Deng announced China’s adoption of an ‘open door’ policy, including a return to a market economy and, importantly, the dismantling of the barriers to foreign investment in China and outward contact by Chinese citizens.

Propaganda policy evolved over the course of four leaders since the change to a quasi-market economy, with the primary aim shifting from the marketing of ideology to garnering support for the directions taken by the Party (Lee et al., 2006) and justifying its legitimacy (He, 2000). The process has accelerated significantly since the ascension in 2012 of President Xi Jinping, with Xi publicly and unambiguously asserting that Chinese media should speak for and protect the Party (Wong, 2016).

The foundation for the current approach has been characterized as ‘pragmatic nationalism’ (Campayo and Zhao, 2016), with the ‘pragmatic’ angle signifying practical outcomes such as territorial integrity in areas claimed by China (Zhao, 2000), as opposed to ideological nationalism based only on ephemeral national sentiments. The ‘nationalism’ element has two limbs. On the positive side, it seeks to engender national pride – citizens can take personal satisfaction from being part of what is portrayed as a successful and homogenous group, and they can bask in the reflected glory of the nation. The negative side may seek to foster nationalism built on fear or threat – outsiders jealous of a nation’s success will seek to denigrate its achievements or soil its name through false claims; unwavering support for the nation and its leaders combined with solidarity can help the country withstand any foreign threat to its well-being.

Propaganda for foreign consumption

China’s growing economic and military power in the 21st century was, as the CPC was acutely aware, matched by growing negative perceptions of China abroad (Brady, 2015). The former head of the CPC’s Central Propaganda Department described the foreign views alternatively as based on the ‘China threat theory’, the ‘resource plundering theory’ or the ‘China collapse theory’ (Liu and Hao, 2014). Negative foreign views were attributed to distorted reports of contemporary China in Western media and, determined to change its negative image, the CPC turned to a traditional tool, the press, to counter the negativity. Wide distribution abroad of the Party’s English-language paper featured as a key element of the serious investment in foreign propaganda activities (Brady, 2015).

The primary focus of internal propaganda aimed at a domestic market, building support for the government and its leaders through enhanced nationalism, is unlikely to engender support abroad for China’s positions and actions impacting on the global stage. To the contrary, a strongly nationalist message is more likely to foster concern and suspicion of China’s motives and behaviour. A different approach is needed to influence foreign observers. To evoke support or sympathy from foreign readers, newspaper propaganda stories directed at this constituency must portray China’s positions as morally and legally legitimate while making an equally persuasive case that the position of those opposed to China’s interests is morally and legally indefensible.

Selected newspapers: People’s Daily and China Daily

The study is based on an examination of articles in the two newspapers published under the auspices of the CPC: the Chinese language People’s Daily and the English language China Daily. Established during the civil war in 1946, with a current average daily circulation of more than 3.1 million, ¹ People’s Daily remains the most important print media outlet in China and the mouthpiece of the Central Committee of the CPC (Keep and Liu, 2016). China Daily inconsistently claims to have an average daily circulation ranging from 200,000 to 900,000 with between 65,000 and 600,000 distributed overseas. ² First appearing in 1981, shortly after China shifted from its strict socialist orthodoxy to its open door policy, the paper was created to provide ‘outsiders a glimpse of the country and its perspective on the world’ (Stevenson, 1994). The paper’s role evolved as China developed into a world power, providing the Party with a vehicle to support its global engagement.

The geographic and temporal focus of the study

The second element of the research involved the identification of target articles – the broad subject matter of news stories, and within that the specific issue covered in the stories, and the temporal boundaries of the newspaper coverage. The starting point for these steps was a scan of historical records to identify issues with international significance for China that received significant coverage in both target newspapers. Of the various issues identified, China’s disputed claim to sovereignty over the South China Sea emerged as the most significant controversy.

In a troubled world with many flashpoints, the South China Sea dispute stands out as the primary issue that could lead to conflict between the world powers. Competing claims that date back a century may in fact be based on genuine sovereignty claims, but it was economic competition that escalated the matter to an open dispute four decades ago and strategic competition that accounts for much of the tension in recent years.

The first open dispute over China’s claim came in January 1974 when South Vietnamese naval forces clashed with the Chinese navy over the Paracel Islands. Wary of direct engagement with China since the Korean War, the United States declined to provide assistance to its South Vietnamese allies (Trevithick, 2014); without support from the US, a South Vietnamese contingent was overwhelmed by superior Chinese forces, resulting in Chinese control of the entire Paracel group of islands (Ang, 1999) from 1974. The following year, the newly reunified Vietnamese government occupied part of the Spratly Islands, and in 1976, made a territorial claim based on principles that were later codified in the Law of the Sea Convention (Ang, 1999). Armed conflict over competing claims to the South China Sea erupted again in March 1988 when Vietnamese and Chinese troops clashed over the Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands region. Once again, Chinese forces were victorious, and China retained control of the reef, subsequently converting it through dredging to an island and large military base.

Confrontation between the Philippines and China arose in 1992, when the Chinese National People’s Congress passed a domestic law claiming sovereignty over the whole of the South China Sea. In 1994, China constructed buildings on stilts on Mischief Reef, within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone under the international Law of the Sea, a multilateral convention to which both China and the Philippines were signatories which came into effect that year. The Philippines rejected China’s argument that the structures were for use by fishermen, but did not try to stop the Chinese actions. Tension between the Philippines and China grew over the following years with Philippine naval vessels preventing Chinese ships from approaching the Scarborough Shoal in 1997 and detaining Chinese fishermen in the Philippine exclusive economic zone. The tensions between the Philippines and China ramped up in 2012 in a series of confrontations in the Scarborough Shoal, resulting in some violence including ship ramming, with actions continuing in 2013. When diplomatic approaches proved fruitless, the Philippines lodged a case with the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. China refused to take part in the Permanent Court of Arbitration proceedings and ignored the action as confrontation continued on the seas in 2014 and 2015.

Meanwhile, the dispute between Vietnam and China reignited in 2014 when China moved an oil rig into an area south of the Paracel Islands claimed by Vietnam. Press reports and footage of a Chinese vessel ramming and sinking a Vietnamese boat in the area led to demonstrations in Vietnam that escalated into riots and large-scale destruction of what the rioters thought were mainland Chinese businesses along with attacks on persons thought to be mainland Chinese.

Regional tensions, and particularly the construction of Chinese military bases on territory claimed by neighbouring countries, raised international concerns over the threat to the international shipping lanes (Thao and Amer, 2009), prompting an increased US military presence in the region, including overflights and vessel passages within waters claimed by China. In mid-2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague issued its decision on the Philippine action against China, nullifying China’s claim. China responded with a heightened campaign to discredit the process and show that its behaviour, and not the proceedings of the international court, conformed to international law.

Next, a window in which South China Sea stories dominated other international issues was identified. It became clear in the second stage of the research project that South China Sea stories peaked in a 3-year window from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2016. The period started with conflict between Vietnam and China, ended with the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration dismissing China’s claim in favour of the Philippines, and witnessed a steady stream of incidents between these two bookends.

The third stage of target identification was the identification of the most important issue covered in the broader range of stories on the South China Sea dispute. While five jurisdictions bordering the South China Sea disputed China’s territorial claims and the dispute with Vietnam led to an actual clash in 2014 and consequent riots in Vietnam targeting (often inaccurately) mainland businesses, a study of the articles on the South China Sea dispute in the target period showed the predominant issue in the stories was China’s dispute with the Philippines, and in particular the Philippines’ appeal to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. In both of the target newspapers, there were 13 times the number of references to ‘the Philippines’ than to ‘Vietnam’. ³

Two factors help to explain the print space given to this issue. First, although the official position of the Chinese government was that the proceedings and decision of the Hague tribunal had no basis in international law, the authorities were clearly concerned with the risk that the decision would undermine its position with both domestic and international readers. Concentrated coverage of the story in ways that were favourable to China’s view was clearly intended to mitigate that risk.

Second, the focus on the Philippines was directed in part at support for the Philippine claims by the United States. China understood that its chief military and strategic opponent in the South China Sea was the United States and there was a risk that the 2016 decision in The Hague could weaken its portrayal of the US as an aggressor in the region.

Content analysis

Following identification of the broad subject area, specific issue and temporal scope of the study, pinpoint search terms were tested and appropriate terms then used to refine the range of selected stories. A total of 254 topics directly on point were identified and subjected to full content analysis. A coding sheet was developed and two experienced coders were responsible for analyzing and coding each article. The inter-coder reliability was then tested to ensure accuracy. ⁴

While the ultimate objective of the qualitative content analysis of the Communist Party’s national and international newspapers was to identify which recognized propaganda techniques were being used to create images of China, additional qualitative and quantitative data were collected to evaluate the extent to which other factors might impact the tenor of an article, including article length, article type, authors of articles and quoted sources.

In broad subject terms, while stories on the dispute with the Philippines dominated other territorial disputes in both papers, there were noticeable differences in the emphasis between the two newspapers. The editors of People’s Daily devoted much more effort to discrediting the international law procedures before the arbitration panel, which explains the significantly greater number of references to ‘arbitration’ and ‘tribunal’ in that paper than in China Daily. Stories in the People’s Daily were also more likely to use the dispute as a segue to criticism of the United States’ neutrality with respect to the Philippines’ legal action and its overt defence support for the Philippines, an approach evidenced by the greater number of references to the ‘United States’ in People’s Daily, paralleling the greater volume of references to ‘tribunal’ and ‘arbitration’. One interesting difference in style emerged in the review of articles. Mirroring the practice of the Western press to use metonyms such as the capital city of a country to refer to a government, China Daily often refers to the Philippine government as ‘Manila’, a practice that is very rare in People’s Daily.

Type of story

The types of South China Sea stories in the two papers diverge significantly. News stories carry far more weight in the domestic newspaper (40% of all stories) than in the international newspaper (27% of all stories), with comment articles replacing news stories in the international paper. The weighting reflects the important role of China Daily as a vehicle for presenting a Chinese perspective on the news rather than a source of breaking news for readers. The largest single category of news items, accounting for 44 percent of total articles on the South China Sea in the international paper, is ‘commentary’, a sole-authored analytical piece that seeks to convince the reader of the validity of the author’s perspective on the story, equivalent to an op-ed piece in Western newspapers. Editorials, presenting what would obviously be an official position without actual or notionally independent thought, would be less likely to be persuasive for international readers and, accordingly, do not feature at all in China Daily news stories on the South China Sea dispute.

In contrast, the domestic paper has no commentaries. It seems the opinion of an individual, however scholarly or experienced they might appear, carries little weight with readers of the domestic press. Instead, People’s Daily devotes considerable space to editorials (16% of all items) and a type of story known as a ‘column’ (14%). A column is a jointly written piece signed off by a notional author known as ‘Zhongsheng’, a homophonic abbreviation of the ‘Voice of China’. The views conveyed in People’s Daily columns are barometers of Chinese elite politics – the ‘unquestioned representations of the will of the leadership’ (Wu, 1994: 195). Through columns, the Chinese leadership lets the population know its position, and hence the nation’s. Readers not adopting that position are thus rejecting both the leadership and their country’s position.

‘Background stories’, presented as academic information pieces untainted by the writers’ opinions, account for a notably larger proportion of the stories in the paper published for an international audience than in its counterpart catering to a domestic audience. These stories purport to set out accurate facts, reliable statistics and authoritative historical accounts, The assumption is that international readers will find reports by academic scholars who do not have official positions more genuine and trustworthy.

As interesting as the type of story used in the different papers is the subject matter of what is covered in the stories or, more significantly, what is not. The South China Sea stories in the Chinese newspapers address disputes over sovereignty at a national government level. Entirely omitted from both papers are stories on the views of the citizenry of the affected countries. There were, for example, no stories on a demonstration in the Philippines protesting China’s claims, which was reported in the Western press.

Who is writing the story?

The different source of articles in the two papers clearly reflects their divergent goals. The largest group of stories in People’s Daily are news stories and the majority (60% of all stories in the paper) are written by the paper’s own journalists. News stories account for less than one-third of the stories on the South China Sea in China Daily and the paper’s journalists write less than 40 percent of the paper’s stories. The relative weighting remains similar if dispatches from Xinhua News Agency, the government’s central news agency, representing 11 percent of the stories in People’s Daily and 7 percent of the stories in China Daily, are added to news stories by journalists since the two papers and the news agency work hand in hand to present news stories in a way that reflects official interpretations of the news.

One of the most striking differences between the papers in terms of authors is the importance of contributions by Chinese scholars – accounting for 5 percent of articles in People’s Daily and the lion’s share (40%) of articles in China Daily. Only a handful of foreign scholars contribute stories to People’s Daily, but when added to the domestic cohort, almost half the stories in China Daily are by scholars. Through columns, readers of People’s Daily are made unambiguously aware of the government’s view of the news and there is little concern over the need to legitimize the views with quasi-independent expert background information. The legitimization of China’s position is one of the main objectives of the international paper, however, which explains the dominance of commentaries and scholars in the stories in China Daily.

Who has been quoted in the stories?

Sigal (1973: 121) once observed, ‘news is not necessarily what happens, but what a news source says has happened’. There is a noticeable difference in source of articles in People’s Daily and China Daily, with four sources – spokespersons, Chinese politicians, academics and particularly foreign politicians – playing much larger roles as news sources in the domestic newspaper (15%, 17%, 37%, and 19%, respectively) than in its international counterpart (4%, 16%, 27%, and 6%, respectively). The use of statements by government spokespersons and Chinese politicians makes it clear to domestic readers what the government’s view is, while statements by academics add legitimacy and credence to the positions taken in the stories presented to international readers. The views of spokespersons and Chinese politicians are unlikely to strengthen the legitimacy of the government’s views in the eyes of foreign readers, and accordingly, China Daily makes less use of these sources.

People’s Daily made far more use of statements by foreign politicians, particularly those in the ‘old friends’ camp supportive of China’s position, than did China Daily. This approach may be useful in fostering nationalist sentiments but is unlikely to resonate with foreign readers, and foreign politicians’ statements were quoted far less frequently in China Daily.

The two newspapers took different approaches to presenting the government’s views, with People’s Daily making more use of statements by spokespersons and Chinese politicians while China Daily attributed significant statements to the country as a whole, referring to a source as ‘Beijing’ or ‘China’ in 47 percent of quotes. It is possible the editors concluded ‘spokespersons’ or ‘politicians’ would be more likely to be regarded as mouthpieces for propaganda by foreign readers than the impersonal and institutional government.

China as the righteous defender of legitimate interests

The image projected most often in both the English and Chinese language papers is China as the ‘righteous interest defender’ – the territory is undeniably Chinese and it is incumbent on the rightful owner to protect its interests. The two papers used different techniques to project this image, however. More than 70 percent of the stories in People’s Daily projecting the ‘righteous interest defender’ image relied on ‘testimonials’ by identified individuals, a technique known to increase the perceived validity and persuasiveness of a message (Tormala et al., 2006). The use of testimonials particularly ramped up following the international arbitration decision supporting the Philippines. Supportive and highly selective statements were drawn primarily from scholars and academics from Western nations, including the Netherlands, the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Spain, Thailand, Australia and South Korea. The largest set of testimonials, however, came from political supporters in the friendly countries or those with overlapping political interests, including Cambodia, Russia, Liberia, Laos, Pakistan, Czech Republic, South Africa, Uganda and Malawi.

The selective nature of the quotes is well illustrated in a report on an international forum in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The news story indicated that one leading presenter at the forum, Canadian political scientist David Welch, had accused the Western media of denigrating China with regard to the South China Sea issue by publishing stories that distorted the facts, confused the audience and demonized China (2016). Ironically, Welch was known in Western political science circles in part for his consistent view that China was legally bound by the UNCLOS arbitration hearing the claims of the Philippines, a forum China chose to ignore, with his position reaffirmed in an article published the day of the forum (Welch, 2016).

In contrast, the ‘testimonial’ technique accounted for little more than 20 percent of the stories promoting the righteous interest defender image in China Daily. The vast majority of stories adopting this technique in that paper relied on statements by academic scholars and international experts such as a former judge in the International Court of Justice (12 July 2016). Only a small number of supportive statements by sympathetic foreign politicians were used in this newspaper, evidence of the editors’ view that international readers are far less likely than domestic readers to be swayed by old friends.

The technique used most often to promote the ‘righteous interest defender’ image in China Daily was ‘card stacking’ – the selective presentation of historical facts – which accounted for 60 percent of the ‘righteous interest defender’ stories in that paper. The technique is known to be effective with some audiences (Levi, 2001; Liñán, 2010; Thomson, 1999), particularly when it is used consistently: ‘familiarity can trump rationality’ (Dreyfuss, 2017). At a point, the selective account is accepted as the full account.

While the ‘card stacking’ technique is used only sparingly in People’s Daily to develop the ‘righteous interest defender’ image of China (accounting for 7% of the stories promoting this image in that paper), stories in both papers use a similar formula. A People’s Daily account (editorial, 1 April 2014) of the South China Sea islands dispute with the Philippines provides an example:

After the end of World War II, according to the post-war provisions of a series of international documents, the Nationalist government recaptured these island reefs from Japanese invaders in 1946. For a long time after the war, it is a consented or defaulted fact among countries including the Philippines that islands in the South China Sea belong to China. It was not until the 1970s when the Philippines coveted the Spratly Islands and sent troops to invade parts of China’s islands and reefs that the peace in this area was lost.

The story omitted some key facts including the Japanese surrender in 1945 and the fact that when the Chinese Nationalist government began to establish a presence on the islands, the Philippines was not a country but rather a commonwealth colony of the United States, which was a steadfast ally of the Nationalist government for its opposition to the Communist Party in China and which had consequently adopted a policy of acquiescence in the matter (Chen, 2017).

The third technique found in stories promoting the ‘righteous interest defender’ image is the ‘assertion’ technique, proclaiming positions that are contested by opponents and often at the heart of disputes as incontrovertible facts. In the South China Sea case, the assertions mostly dealt with China’s supposedly unarguable sovereignty over islands and waters that is in fact challenged. The technique features in 20 percent of the ‘righteous interest defender’ image stories in People’s Daily and 15 percent of these stories in China Daily. While the same technique is adopted in both papers, the aim of the assertion is quite different. Stories in People’s Daily have an unmistakable fervency quality, seeking to fire national spirit and patriotic zeal by confident assertions that China’s actions are built on a foundation of undeniable moral right, as a 10 March 2016 column illustrates:

In terms of the South China Sea dispute, China’s will to maintain its national sovereignty and territorial integrity is as solid as a rock. China will not take a tiny inch of other countries’ territory, and also China will not give up a tiny bit of its own territory.

The level of confidence projected in an assertion has an impact on the likelihood of the assertion persuading an audience (Petty et al., 2002), an effect that can be reinforced if a positive assertion in favour of the presenter is combined with a negative assertion of the opponent’s behaviour or position. The technique can provide a helpful distraction from objective consideration of the merits of the initial assertion. The approach is illustrated in the following China Daily example (12 July 2016) in which the assertion establishing a ‘righteous interest defender’ image is quickly followed by a detailed list of another person’s alleged transgressions:

[US activities] will not change the fact that China holds historical claims and sovereignty over those islands and reefs in the South China Sea, nor will it shake its resolve to defend every inch of them. But still China has to stay on high alert, for the US military has been trying to turn the previously tranquil waters in the region into a sea of troubles. Three US destroyers have been patrolling near Chinese isles, and the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan and supporting vessels are also in the South China Sea in ‘a deliberate show of force’.

Similarly, an assertion of China’s ‘righteous interest protector’ image in a China Daily report of presentations at an Asia-Pacific security forum (2 June 2014):

China has never taken the first step to provoke trouble. China has only been forced to respond to the provocative actions by other parties.

is followed immediately by an assertion of a US transgression:

Washington should first abide by international laws by ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a document Beijing has ratified.

China as an innocent victim

Three techniques are used by the two papers to promote the image of China as an ‘innocent victim’ in the South China Sea dispute: ‘name-calling’ (attaching a pejorative label to the adversary), ‘false dilemma’ (reducing a complex argument to a small number of alternatives and concluding that only one option is appropriate) and ‘pinpointing the adversary’ (oversimplifying multiple causes so they conflate to a single cause).

‘Name-calling’ predominates in the ‘innocent victim’ image stories in People’s Daily, featuring in almost 75 percent of these stories. The approach is, in a sense, anti-intellectual, based on pejorative terms rather than argument. ‘Name-calling’ supplies one-sided information, with terms designed to disparage the views of rivals and foster a view that China is surrounded and threatened by enemies. The technique is common in national security propaganda, deliberately avoiding any possibility of a debate that might foster critical thinking by readers while building reflexive nationalism. Instead, one-sided information repeatedly pointing out the misconduct of enemies can cultivate collective bias.

While perceived as effective with domestic readers, the editors are clearly concerned that ‘name-calling’ may backfire with international readers and is found in just over 10 percent of ‘innocent victim’ image stories in China Daily. Where name-calling is used in China Daily, it is often a reverse ‘name-calling’ – citing examples of adversaries calling China names rather than attaching labels to the adversaries. For example, People’s Daily might refer to the Philippines as a deliberate ‘trouble maker’, but a China Daily report on the Philippines might highlight the Philippine president equating acceptance of China’s position as equal to Western European appeasement of Nazi Germany (commentary, 7 February 2014).

Reverse ‘name-calling’ can also be used as a hook to enhance China’s image in the course of dismissing the insults thrown at China. For example, an article in the People’s Daily (30 June 2015) detailed alleged verbal attacks on China by the Philippines and suggested deliberate ‘misleading and deceiving insults’ had been used as a means of fabricating history and diverting attention from the Philippines’ expansion policy in the South China Sea.

While ‘name-calling’ is the primary technique used to foster China’s ‘innocent victim’ image in People’s Daily, the ‘pinpointing the adversary’ and ‘false dilemma’ techniques predominate in China Daily as tools to promote the ‘innocent victim’ image, accounting for 52 percent and 32 percent of ‘innocent victim’ image stories, respectively, in that paper. Although information is deliberately limited and biased, the ‘false dilemma’ technique has the appearance of balance, with the apparent two-sided information having a ‘favourable impact on message acceptance’ (Hunt and Smith, 1987). In contrast to a story in People’s Daily (interview, 15 July 2016), which presents information in absolute terms – ‘a historical fact beyond any doubt’ – the English language paper story will prima facie look balanced, but in fact point to a single conclusion. An article in China Daily (background story, 11 February 2014) illustrates the phenomenon:

The book will help Western readers better understand China’s sovereignty claim because it uses a paradigm acceptable to both Chinese and Westerners. Among the disputing countries, Vietnam is said to have historical evidence of its claim. But its evidence is weaker than China’s, while the historical relations between China and Vietnam combined with France’s occupation of Vietnam have made the problem more complicated.

Citation of an academic text adds credibility to the conclusion if the content concedes there are sources which might provide a basis for the adversary’s position, but then effectively dismisses those claims as based on weaker evidence. The technique builds the straw man before dismissing it, leaving the impression that it is an impartial account.

In some cases, reference to other arguments is so cursory, the ‘false dilemma’ appears to morph into a ‘pinpointing the adversary’ technique as a China Daily commentary (10 April 2014) illustrates:

Currently, some unstable factors do exist in East Asia, the root cause of which is that some of the US’ allies in the region are attempting to redefine their territorial boundaries by counting on Washington’s power and influence.

China as an exemplar of restraint and a benign peacekeeper

The image of China as a ‘benign peacekeeper’ was a distant third behind the two predominant images in the newspapers. Two techniques were used in the papers to foster this image, ‘transfer’ (transferring positive or negative sentiments from another image to the subject matter of the propaganda) and ‘glittering generality’ (labelling persons or things favourable to your message in a complimentary manner). People’s Daily relied on ‘transfer’ as a technique to build the restraint and peacekeeper image almost 50 percent more than it used ‘glittering generality’ for this purpose. China Daily made almost equal use of the two techniques.

While the ‘transfer’ technique can use either positive or negative sentiments, both People’s Daily and China Daily made greater use of negative sentiments. For example, to undermine the US position on the South China Sea, an article in China Daily (commentary, 10 April 2014) sought to discredit the US by way of an attack on its actions in Iraq:

It is also the US that in the absence of any hard evidence and authorization of the United Nations Security Council launched a war against Iraq in 2003, which caused an unprecedented humanitarian disaster in the country. Although the US has withdrawn troops from Iraq, still there has been no apology or compensation from the US government and no one has been held accountable for the war. It is clear that what the US has done is a violation of territorial integrity and the sovereignty of a nation by force, coercion and intimidation.

‘Glittering generality’ articles in the two papers most often highlight supposed benefits to all persons in the area from activities ancillary to China’s actions in the South China Sea. In contrast to the case with many other message techniques, a similar approach is taken in both the paper aimed at a national audience and the one aimed at international readers. An article in China Daily on a new Chinese national think-tank tasked with researching South China Sea issues stresses its role in promoting ‘regional peace and development’ (news story, 24 February 2014). An article in People’s Daily (background story, 5 June 2016) on China’s construction of artificial reefs and islands focuses on civilian benefits that extend to neighbouring countries and other countries using shipping channels in the area:

The maritime areas in the South China Sea, where shipping lanes crisscross and fishing grounds scatter around, are far away from the landmass. These areas are prone to marine accidents due to the influence of typhoon and monsoon. Civilian functions and facilities will be included in the construction for ships to take shelter, and for navigation aid, search and rescue, marine meteorological observation and forecast, fishery service and administration, so as to provide services to ships of China, neighbouring countries and other countries that sail across the South China Sea.