What can government talk tell us about punitiveness? The case of Norway post 22 July 2011

Abstract

Highlighting the culturally contingent nature of state reactions to crime, the present case study uses content analysis to examine state talk issued by the Norwegian government following the 22 July 2011 terrorist attacks to illustrate how more moderate responses to horrific events are accomplished through government talk emphasizing themes thought to constrain as opposed to facilitate a more punitive response. Situating state discourse in the context of the Scandinavian welfare state, the present study argues that government talk surrounding the Breivik case reflects and reinforces Norway’s comparatively less volatile and competitive social order. Analysis of less incendiary government talk is needed to better understand the role of government rhetoric in shaping responses to crisis.

Keywords

Discourse Norway punitiveness Scandinavia terrorism

Introduction

On 22 July 2011, Anders Behring Breivik killed eight people and injured 200 more in a car bombing near a government building in Oslo. Later, on Utøya Island, Breivik gained access to a Labor Party youth camp by impersonating a police officer. Here, Breivik shot and killed an additional 69 people, many of whom were children. These attacks represent the largest act of terrorism in Norwegian history (Carle, 2013; Egge et al., 2012; Wollebæk et al., 2012). Shortly before the attacks, Breivik published a manifesto on the internet detailing his animosity toward multiculturalism, immigrants, and Muslims. Breivik claimed that the attacks were designed to punish the government for its embrace of multiculturalism. Although Breivik claimed he did not act alone and was affiliated with other right-wing anti-immigrant cells, it is believed that he carried out the attacks alone (Spaaij, 2012). The attacks shocked and horrified both Norway and the world, calling into question Norway’s image as a relatively safe and peaceful country (Christensen et al., 2013; Kellner, 2012).

One way to better understand the Norwegian response to the Breivik case is to review what agents of the government have to say. Analysis of political discourse provides a way to study the social construction of key events such as the 22 July 2011 bombing and shooting in Norway (Bonn, 2011; Mythen and Walklate, 2006). Government talk not only provides a window into how the government hopes to portray itself, it also aspires to set the tone for media discourse and public opinion (Hawdon, 2001; Roberts and Hough, 2002). This article examines government talk surrounding the attacks for factors identified in the literature that might either constrain or facilitate punitive responses.

Rather than being used to further the destruction of social bonds and supports through neoliberalization (Ajzenstadt, 2009), state discourse surrounding the Breivik case urges Norwegians to avoid the process of othering and asks them not to turn their backs on the welfare policies that allow for Norway’s comparatively egalitarian social order. Rather than stoking and exploiting social anxieties, Norwegian government talk emphasizes the importance of not succumbing to fear in light of this horrific though anomalous case. This sort of discourse, I argue, is a reflection of the larger social context. I situate this state talk in the Norwegian social and cultural context linking it to the comparatively moderate response of Norway to the 22 July attacks.

The attacks in Norway provide a unique opportunity to examine an act of terrorism that has not yet ignited a panic, exceptional measures, and/or rapid policy changes as seen elsewhere (Bonn, 2011; Rothe and Muzzatti, 2004). The present case study focuses on the culturally contingent nature of state responses to problems and the need to pay particular attention to the ways in which societies are organized. The contrasts between US and Norwegian government talk shed light on the Scandinavian Exceptionalism debate by focusing our attention on the tone and content of messages disseminated by Norwegian leaders in the aftermath of the attacks. The language used by Norwegian government officials draws upon core societal values such as trust in the government, social solidarity, and overcoming fear. This rhetorical response differs considerably from that deployed by US officials in the aftermath of 9/11 that was punitive in tone emphasizing “evil enemies” and the establishment of a “with us or against us” dichotomy.

Case studies of this nature highlight the culturally contingent nature of state reactions to crime, including atrocities. While much of this literature on the social construction of crime focuses on the incendiary nature of state and media discourse, particularly in the USA, the Norwegian case explored here provides a window into how states construct more measured accounts of tragic events. State discourse surrounding the Breivik case, drawing on core values, reflects and reinforces Norway’s comparatively less volatile and competitive social order. The question of how more equal societies justify and uphold a more egalitarian social order – even in the face of horrific events – is an important issue for criminologists.

The Scandinavian Welfare State and Norwegian Political Climate

Norway, a Scandinavian welfare state, is characterized by high employment rates, high social investment, low poverty rates, relatively low income inequality, highly ranked education, a comparatively high quality of life, and what Loader (2010: 358) terms a relatively “benign penal culture” (Barker, 2012; Lappi-Seppälä, 2007; Von Hofer, 2004). Norwegian social policy also emphasizes access to social goods such as health care, education, parental leave, and child care that benefit society as a whole. These factors speak to Norway’s more community-oriented and socially inclusive cultural orientation that underlies social and criminal justice policies alike (Carle, 2013).

Scholars note too that Scandinavian countries also rank among the lowest European nations in terms of fear of crime and the highest in terms of public trust (Amna et al., 2007; Snacken, 2010; Wollebæk et al., 2012). Speaking about fear of crime, Statistics Norway (2013) reports that in 2012 10.1 percent of Norwegians feared thefts or criminal damage recently while 7.2 percent feared violence or threats recently. Fimreite and colleagues (2013: 848), speaking about trust in the government, note that Norway has long been described as a “state friendly society”. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2013) data, Norway ranks comparatively higher in trust in the state as well as a variety of its institutions. For instance, 66 percent of Norwegians reported satisfaction with and confidence in the national government with 81 percent and 80 percent respectively reporting trust in the judicial system and local police in 2012. Relative demographic homogeneity and the historical presence of few “visible others” also likely play a role in facilitating easier passage and maintenance of liberal social policies in that homogeneity may promote and maintain a society with egalitarian values, tolerance, trust, and inclusion (Green, 2007; Lappi-Seppälä, 2007; Ugelvik, 2012). Speaking of this, former State Secretary Erik Øwre Thorshaug (2011: 2), in a speech prior to the attacks, suggests that Norway is “one of the few countries in the world where the government give[s] public support to organizations whose sole purpose is working against the government”. Statements like this illustrate Norway’s exceptional approach to dealing with violent extremism prior to the 22 July attacks.

It has also been hypothesized that trends towards penal severity may be constrained by strong feelings of social solidarity and shared responsibility to address the root causes of social problems, including crime. Looking at inter-human trust, Statistics Norway (2011) reports that on a scale of 0 (one can never be too careful) to 10 (most people can be trusted), the average rating is 7.3 suggesting strong trust in others. These strong feelings of social solidarity and responsibility are fostered and maintained by a strong welfare state and aspirations for equality (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006). Commentators also note the link between punishment and social inequality that has been taken more seriously in Norwegian policy and rhetoric than in other countries (Lappi-Seppälä, 2007; Snacken, 2010). Instead of viewing crime as largely an individual level failure, Norway has been more inclined to view crime as the result of failed integration of citizens into society (Ugelvik, 2012). This philosophy, reflective of a belief in the connection between social welfare service provision and crime, is captured in the old Scandinavian slogan “good social policy is the best criminal policy” (Lappi-Seppälä, 2007: 274). Lappi-Seppälä (2007) suggests that Scandinavian countries have been more moderate in their approach to crime for this reason. Essentially, people may be more likely to comply when levels of trust in the government and political legitimacy are high. This illustrates the relationship between government and citizens in conditioning responses to crime.

It is also important to consider how different ways of doing politics can also impact how a society addresses crime. Looking at a case of child-on-child homicide in the 1990s, Green (2007) argues that Norwegian political culture shaped the way that the crime was framed and how the boys were ultimately treated thus illustrating the importance of culturally appropriate responses. The consensus-democracy approach to government favored by Norway, which consists of multiple political parties, power sharing, and coalition forming, contributes to high levels of trust in the government, in turn, may help to moderate punitiveness in a context where there are fewer incentives to politicize crime for electoral gain (Green, 2008). Proportionally representative electoral systems embedded in social democratic coordinated market economies tend to correlate with lower levels of social inequality, the election of left of center governments, and a relatively high deference to professional bureaucracies such as penal system officials, prosecutors, and judges. As a consequence, these actors may be better insulated from political expediency and public opinion, thus paving the way for less punitive responses to crime (Lacey, 2008).

Challenges to the Scandinavian Exceptionalism Thesis

There has been considerable debate surrounding Scandinavian Exceptionalism, particularly by scholars in Scandinavia who question whether Scandinavian countries really practice a more benign and moderate way of doing criminal justice. There has been a particular emphasis in this literature on the nature and role of social solidarity in criminal justice matters as well as punishments that deviate from so-called benign moderation.

Solidarity and homogeneity, deemed key elements of the relative success of social welfare programs in Norway, have generated considerable debate. Ugelvik (2012) highlights the potentially coercive nature of solidarity by suggesting that so-called Scandinavian equality culture has served as an important social control technique that encourages homogeneity. Barker (2012), writing on the Janus-faced nature of the Scandinavian welfare state, also complicates our understanding of Scandinavian social solidarity. She argues that the organizing principal in Scandinavian societies is the individual. Ultimately, the rationale here is that a strong welfare state paves the way for the exercise of individual autonomy by liberating individuals from interference from their families and neighbors (Barker, 2012).

Furthermore, although commentators working within the Scandinavian exceptionalism framework have praised Norway’s relatively lenient criminal sentences, it is important to acknowledge instances where punishment has been hardened and/or deviates from the benign moderation account. There is evidence to suggest that sentences, policy debates, and public discourse have become harsher, a trend linked to punitiveness (Beckett and Sasson, 2005). For instance, sentences for murder have increased from eight to 12 years in Norway (Pratt, 2008). Norway has also increased the maximum sentence for drug possession from six months to 21 years (the longest sentence available) putting it on par only with murder (Mathiesen, 2012; Pratt and Eriksson, 2013).

Criticisms of Norwegian prisons as “too good” for prisoners have also arisen (Dullum and Ugelvik, 2012). Johnsen and Granheim (2012) point out that although crime rates have declined in Norway, plans are still being made to expand prison capacity, a trend also noted elsewhere (Zimring, 2001). Pratt (2008) also notes that there have been calls in Norway by the anti-immigrant Progress Party to end the “waiting list” system. In spite of calls for the end of the waiting list system, the Council of Europe (2012) reports that as of May 2012 approximately 784 people remained on the list. The present analysis of government talk considers the Scandinavian Exceptionalism literature and its critics by looking at possible constraints and facilitators of punitive responses.

Analyzing Government Talk

Given the noted importance of government talk in shaping media discourse, public opinion, and public policy (Bonn, 2011; Hawdon, 2001; Mythen and Walklate, 2006; Roberts and Hough, 2002), it is important to consider how the Norwegian government has presented itself. Commentary released by government agencies in English was specifically sought as the choice to publish in English hints at the intention to share information with audiences beyond those who speak Norwegian. These English language statements represent the image that Norway wishes to portray to the world.

An internet search was performed to locate the websites of government bodies and agencies in Norway who might have commented on the 2011 shooting and bombing in Norway. To begin, the English language version of the Norwegian government’s online portal to specific government cabinets was accessed. A search was performed using the main government portal website in an effort to locate documents. Key terms included the following: “Anders Behring Breivik”, “terrorism”, and “Utøya”. Within each individual agency website, the icons “news”, “speeches and articles”, and “press releases” were clicked to examine results organized by date. The time span from which data were drawn is July 2011 to October 2012. Searches of websites for courts, police, and corrections were also performed, although they uncovered no sources in English. A total of 52 documents resulting from the search are included in the present study. These documents represent all the documents found that explicitly referred to the attacks using the project search terms. Duplicate documents were excluded.

For the qualitative content analysis, the sample of information disseminated by government agencies through ministry websites was combed to identify key themes derived from the literature on punitiveness. Documents were examined for factors thought to act as either constraining or facilitating factors. With regards to possible constraints on punitiveness, the documents were analyzed for the following themes derived from the literature: trust and confidence in government (Snacken, 2010), social cohesion and inclusiveness indicating a “we are all in this together” approach to the attacks (Lappi-Seppälä, 2007; Simon, 2007; Ugelvik, 2012), and working to overcome fear (Snacken, 2010). Likewise, factors thought to facilitate punitiveness were also derived from the literature, including the following: distrust and lack of confidence in the government or society (Snacken, 2010), social division (Lappi-Seppälä, 2007; Ugelvik, 2012), and fear and risk (Snacken, 2010). Given the identification of Norway as a relatively benign penal system (Loader, 2010), it is important to ascertain whether or not government talk in the wake of the Breivik case shows evidence of adherence or resistance to this identity. In light of the literature on Scandinavian exceptionalism and claims by the international media that the Norwegian government has emphasized adherence to pillars of Norwegian culture, it was expected that the English language statements made by government officials would evidence a greater emphasis on constraining rather than facilitating language.

Descriptive statistics were computed to summarize the sample of documents including: who authored the document (see Table 1), and the six themes derived from the literature on punitiveness (see Table 2).

Table 1.

Government agency.

Government Agency	Frequency	Percent
Office of the Prime Minister	22	43.14
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	11	21.57
Ministry of Government Administration, Reform, and Church Affairs	4	7.84
22 July Commission	3	5.77
Ministry of Culture	2	3.85
Ministry of Justice and Public Security	2	3.85
Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development	2	3.85
Royal Family	2	3.85
Governmental Portal	1	1.92
Ministry of Labor	1	1.92
Ministry of Education and Research	1	1.92
Ministry of Defense	1	1.92

Table 2.

Themes.

Theme	Frequency	Percent
Constraints	43	82.69
Facilitators	13	25.00
Trust and confidence in government	19	36.53
Social cohesion and inclusion	39	75.00
Overcoming fear	22	42.30
Distrust and lack of confidence in government	3	5.76
Lack of cohesion	4	7.69
Fear and risk	11	21.15

Qualitative results and analysis in the next section are broken into two sections: constraints and facilitators. Constraints such as trust and confidence in the government, social cohesion and inclusiveness, and resisting fear have been linked to more moderate responses, while facilitators such as distrust and lack of confidence in the government, social division, and fear and risk have been linked to more punitive responses.

Constraints

Trust and confidence in the government, social cohesion and inclusiveness, and overcoming fear have all been identified as social attributes which might help to constrain punitive, hasty reactions to crime and tragedy. In this study, the focus is on how government talk surrounding the 22 July attacks draws upon and reinforces these constraints on punitiveness in ways that have helped to temper responses to the Breivik case.

Trust and confidence

One of the most prevalent themes in the present study is trust and confidence in the government by citizens. High levels of trust and confidence in the government have been identified as important societal attributes that may help to constrain punitive responses to crime (Amna et al., 2007, Lappi-Seppälä, 2007; Snacken, 2010). References to high levels of trust and confidence were made frequently throughout the documents by a range of actors and agencies throughout the sample. This is in line with what others have found. Fimreite and colleagues (2013: 850) draw a link between government talk and trust when they argue that “the statements and speeches of the nation’s leaders directly after the attacks and the following demonstrations helped to raise awareness in Norway that terror seeks to destroy trust”.

Looking at trust in the police both before and after 22 July, Egge and colleagues (2012) note stability in the percentage of those polled who express trust in the police ranging from 83 percent to 91 percent with a rating of 87 percent in 2012 suggesting that citizen trust in the police did not plummet in the year following the attack. These public opinion data link to claims by the Minister of Justice and Public Safety who emphasized the importance of trust in the police in the aftermath of the attacks. Using another public opinion data set, Wollebæk and colleagues (2012: 35) also found continued high ratings of trust in the police that they call “remarkable in light of … the increasingly outspoken criticism of the police during the attacks”.

A variety of statements issued by the government both drew upon and reinforced Norway’s reputation for being a “state friendly” society (Fimreite et al., 2013). For instance, Stoltenberg stated that “no one wants a terrorist to be able to change what is unique, transparent and worthwhile about this ‘little country of ours’” (Office of the Prime Minister, 2012b). The Minister of Justice and Public Safety, Knut Storberget, acknowledged the importance of trust and its role in fostering feelings of safety stating:

we are dependent on the public’s trust. Trust is essential for thriving societies, for civil and economic life. Trust in the police is essential. Such trust means that people feel there is safety for persons and property. Transparency is a key instrument in building trust in the police. (Ministry of Justice and the Police, 2011)

In an op-ed, Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre connects faith in democracy to the importance of dialogue emphasizing “that the open public square can be an impressive antidote to extremism should not be surprising … Open debate is our strongest tool in standing up to extremism” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012).

Government officials have also called upon Norwegians to resist seeing Breivik as an exception. Støre (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012), pointing to the importance of adhering to and remaining faithful to Norwegian democracy and justice, stated “it is a mistake to treat crimes committed by extremists as exceptions, subject to special processes … [H]iding suspects from public view merely dehumanizes the perpetrators.” In what appeared to be an effort to foster trust in the aftermath of the attacks, the government formed an independent 22 July Commission. The report issued by the Commission stresses the importance of respecting Breivik’s due process rights stating “the Commission has not taken a position on the question of the accused’s guilt in the criminal sense” (22. Juli-kommisjonen, 2012). Statements such as these illustrate government actors’ calls to uphold Norwegian principles such as trust in the state, adherence to due process, and resistance to exceptionalism in the face of an unprecedented tragedy.

Social cohesion and inclusiveness

The most prominent theme in the present study, social cohesion and inclusiveness, focuses on the need to share responsibility and work together to establish and maintain solidarity. Strong feelings of social solidarity, inclusion, and shared responsibility, noted as important constraints on punitiveness by scholars (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006; Lappi-Seppälä, 2007; Pratt, 2008), were all present in the documents analyzed here. Using public opinion data, Wollebæk and colleagues (2012) found that 79 percent of respondents reported a strong sense of community in the aftermath of the attacks. Norway’s strong efforts to build social cohesion and inclusion through social welfare and shared responsibility, both before and after the attacks, may help to mitigate punitive sentiments and actions.

Throughout the documents, government actors emphasized the importance of solidarity in the face of great suffering. For instance, Stoltenberg (Office of the Prime Minister, 2012a), notes that although Norwegians could have “barricaded ourselves behind a wall of mistrust”, they instead “turned to each other and built bridges of trust”. The Secretary of State Roger Ingebrigtsen (Ministry of Defense, 2011) links facilitators of solidarity identified in the Scandinavian exceptionalism literature to the Norwegian response to the Breivik case when he states the following: “Norway has certain added advantages, given its small size and cohesion … we remain a small homogenous country, counting less than 5 million people, with a common heritage and a strong sense of unity.” Stoltenberg (Office of the Prime Minister, 2012c), speaking about the ability of the welfare state to prevent terrorism, has called for work to be done to “counter radicalization and violence in a number of different arenas: in an inclusive school system, in dialogue between religions in an atmosphere of mutual trust, and in tireless efforts to prevent the marginalization of individuals in society”. These points draw upon and reinforce the importance of inclusion and solidarity in Norwegian society and also link Norway’s comparatively collective social orientation to the prevention of violence calling upon Norwegian people to “counter hatred with arguments … [and to] invite in those who have gone astray” (Stoltenberg in Office of the Prime Minister, 2011a). Further stressing the importance of collective action in violence prevention, Stoltenberg (Office of the Prime Minister, 2011a) called upon Norwegians to come together to make “an unbreakable chain of solidarity, democracy, safety, and security”.

Overcoming fear

Another key theme emerging from government talk issued by the Norwegian government is the urging of citizens to overcome fear. Calls for more democracy, openness, and refusal to fight violence with violence have been televised and praised worldwide (Andersson, 2012). As noted by Spaaij (2012: 92) a key element of Norway’s response to the attacks has been a “refusal to be terrorized”.

Shedding light on the importance of refusing to succumb to fear, Wollebæk and colleagues (2012) use public opinion data to link moderating factors identified in the present study such as confidence in the government, solidarity, and overcoming fear to government talk. In line with the present study, they highlight the importance of government talk in shaping the media response to the attacks when they observe that:

One possible explanation for these low levels of fear and for the confidence in the government’s ability to avert new attacks after Utøya can be found in the attitude taken by the Norwegian government in their media response to the attacks. In their response, the government issued a call to the population for solidarity and serenity, and this call was quickly echoed both in traditional and social media. (Wollebæk et al., 2012: 35)

Anne Holt (2011), an internationally acclaimed Norwegian author, former police officer, former Minister of Justice, and lawyer draws attention to the need to avoid hasty securitization asserting that:

A society where all these hateful people are under surveillance is a society we definitely do not want. The attacks on Norway that terrible Friday seem to be, a few days later, of a kind that probably no free democratic nation can protect itself from once a terrorist has decided to act.

Throughout the present sample, government actors called upon Norwegians to resist succumbing to fear. For instance, Stoltenberg (Office of the Prime Minister, 2011b, 2011c) stated that “we will not allow the fear of fear to silence us” and “we must never be suppressed by fear. And, terrorism must never be allowed to win over our belief in democracy.” Statements such as these stress how important it is for people to not allow fear to undermine the “open debate … respect for different opinions … democracy and humanism” which undergird Norwegian culture. Similarly, King Harald V (Royal House of Norway, 2011) called for continued faith in Norwegian democracy in the face of difficult times, arguing that “freedom is stronger than fear”. Stoltenberg connects resisting fear to maintaining Norwegian values when he states that “the bombs and bullets were intended to change Norway. The Norwegian people responded by reasserting our values” (Office of the Prime Minister, 2011c, 2012b). Government officials also drew attention to the importance of resisting fear by stating “more democracy and more openness, but never naivety” (Office of the Prime Minister, 2011c). Støre (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011) also assured the public that “Norway will be recognizable” moving forward after the attacks. Statements such as these exemplify calls to keep the attack from undermining Norwegian culture.

Interestingly, noting the fearful reactions to other terrorist attacks this century, Støre asserted that: “Osama bin Laden successfully provoked the West into using exceptional powers … this only strengthened the case of extremists, and it shows that we should try to avoid exceptionalism and instead trust in the open system we are defending” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). Such a strategy, he went on to argue, would not provide “extremists with evidence of the supposed double standards of democracy”. Statements such as these signal a desire to avoid the tendency of treating high profile cases of terrorism as exceptions to proscribed legal procedures. This represents a departure from the more punitive calls and actions of other countries that have been impacted to terrorism.

Facilitators

Although government talk analyzed in the present study emphasized possible constraints on punitive responses, there is also the need to consider inverse factors that may facilitate more incendiary, knee-jerk reactions to tragedy. Literature has drawn attention to possible facilitators such as distrust and lack of confidence in the government, social division, and an emphasis on fear and risk.

Distrust and lack of confidence

The least talked about theme in the study is distrust and lack of confidence in the government. Distrust and lack of confidence in the government could be construed as risky with regards to punitiveness given the importance attributed to its opposite, trust and confidence (Amna et al., 2007; Snacken, 2010). Furthermore, scholars have also linked punitive rhetoric and action mobilized by politicians to efforts to build and reinforce trust in government in the face of crises of legitimacy (Garland, 2001; Simon, 2007). Although relatively little was said by Norwegian officials regarding distrust and lack of confidence in the government, it is possible that the passage of time may bring to light further criticism of the handling of the situation (Wollebæk et al., 2012). Given this observation, further longitudinal analysis of public opinions and media responses is needed to track trends over time.

Although government officials largely spoke of trust in government, Stoltenberg (Office of the Prime Minister, 2012d) observed that “what went right and what went wrong … is a necessary and important debate. In order to learn [and] prevent such a tragedy [from] happening again.” This observation serves as acknowledgement that the government made missteps that need to be rectified. In a follow-up to the 22 July Commission Report, Stoltenberg (Office of the Prime Minister, 2012c) also indicated the need to “galvanize the public administration in a common effort that restores confidence” thus indicating that the attacks had undermined public trust and confidence in the government. Similarly, the Secretary of State Roger Ingebrigtsen pointed out that:

Now, more than four months after, the mood has changed. The media and political opposition have increasingly turned critical to the handling of the situation. Questions have appeared. Did the government do everything in its power to protect its citizens? (Ministry of Defense, 2011)

Quotes like this indicate the possibility that as time has passed some have become less confident in the government’s handling of the situation.

Social division

There was comparatively little talk by officials of a lack of cohesion in Norwegian society in the aftermath of the attacks. As noted elsewhere in the literature (Lacey, 2008; Lappi-Seppälä and Tonry, 2011; Pratt, 2008), homogeneity has likely facilitated the development and maintenance of Norway’s welfare state and criminal justice system. Heterogeneity (particularly the fear of heterogeneity) presents challenges to the welfare state and criminal justice system. Both the attacks and Breivik’s links to anti-immigrant, anti-multicultural views draw attention to societal tensions as Norway navigates the challenges of increased heterogeneity in a globalized world.

Looking at the attacks on 22 July, government discourse has focused primarily on Breivik as a lone wolf who does not share core Norwegian values and was motivated by animosity toward multiculturalism. The Ministry of Justice and the Police (2011) taps into the tensions underlying increasing heterogeneity in Norway describing the perpetrator as wanting “to attack those he deemed to be ‘multi-culturalists’ – the political forces that allegedly allow and facilitate for an increasingly Muslim population in Norway.” In contrast to the government portrayal of Breivik, Holt (cited in Brown, 2011), suggests that “when it comes to his opinions and his ideology, he [Breivik] is certainly not alone in Norway, and that is maybe one of the greatest tragedies of this terrorist attack”. Holt’s comments underline the tension between distancing Breivik from society and acknowledging that his views are also embedded in society.

In the current sample of government talk, social division also manifested itself in a more sociological sense with several statements pointing out how poorly integrated into Norwegian society Breivik was. For instance, Secretary of State Ingebrigtsen characterized the perpetrator as:

a 32 year old Norwegian, a Christian and a Caucasian male. Abandoned by his father and deprived of his mother’s care, his childhood [became] isolated and lonely. Although being raised in the privileged parts of Oslo, he appeared unable to bond and embark upon a clear professional path. He became a drifter frequently altering careers, turning to right wing, anti-immigrant rhetoric, ending up as a ‘lone wolf’. (Ministry of Defense, 2011)

This description links Breivik’s ill integration into society to his destructive fascination with extremism and contempt for diversity. Implicitly, the Secretary of State speaks to the premium placed on social integration and support as mechanisms of crime prevention in Norway, while highlighting the perils of social isolation and exclusion.

Fear and risk

Fear and risk, suggested correlates of punitiveness, makes reference to words or language indicating that the attack invoked anxiety, and/or uncertainty (Franko Aas, 2005; Garland, 2001). This particular theme appeared in very limited measure in government issued talk analyzed in this study. Storberget (Ministry of Justice and the Police, 2011) described the scene on Utøya Island as one of “mutilations, fear, pain, anger and desperation”. Similarly, Stoltenberg (Office of the Prime Minister, 2011c) painted a picture of “shock, fear and devastation” in the wake of the attacks. Emphasizing the impact of the attacks on children both directly and indirectly victimized, the King described a climate in which “many of our children and young people are afraid today” (Royal House of Norway, 2011). Stoltenberg also addressed the impact on youth indicating “young people have experienced things that no one should have to experience. Fear, blood, and death” (Office of the Prime Minister, 2011c). Stoltenberg (Office of the Prime Minister, 2012a), speaking to the vulnerabilities of democracy, stated “our open democratic society also leaves room for extremism. The Internet is teeming with threats.” Shifting to the vulnerability of individuals and the generalized threat of death, Stoltenberg (Office of the Prime Minister, 2012b) remarked upon the “transience of life. It can suddenly be over. None of us knows when. None of us knows who”, hinting at the anxiety and uncertainty that tragedy can breed.

Limitations and future directions

As with any study, certain limitations exist. Certainly, the reliance on English language literature has undoubtedly limited access to government commentary surrounding the terrorist attacks of 22 July 2011. This raises the possibility that state talk aimed at an international audience is, in part, reflective of the desire to project a particular depiction of Norway to international audiences. Furthermore, focusing on government issued rhetoric excludes other sources of information on constraining and facilitating indicators such as the media and public opinion.

Analysis of media commentary around the incident and public opinion surveys could also shed further light on the ramifications of 22 July. Further attention to media and political opposition’s criticism to the government’s response to the attacks is also needed to flesh out what the attacks might mean moving forward. This is particularly important since some have noted that although initial coverage was largely favorable, Norwegian language media sources became more critical over time (Christensen et al., 2013). Finally, more research is needed on how elites were able to avoid using exceptional powers in the face of the attacks. Drawing on Green (2007), one possible explanation underlying the persuasiveness of the voices of the elites may be that that they were able to tap into larger cultural themes that resonated with the Norwegian public, such as trust, inclusion and social solidarity, and political legitimacy.

Discussion

Reactions to crime are a political and social choice that speak to societal self-image. As such, it is crucial that we pay close attention to the context in which state, media, and public discourse are embedded in order to better understand variation in responses to tragedies cross-nationally (Barker, 2009). In this study, although government talk surrounding the Breivik case shows both constraints and facilitators on punitiveness, it is worth noting the prominence of language calling for restraint in the handling of the Breivik case. Scholars such as Bonn (2011) and Rothe and Muzzatti (2004) point to the importance of political tone and rhetoric in shaping public opinion and media coverage, illustrating ways that government talk can serve to escalate or de-escalate responses to high profile events. The contrasts between US and Norwegian governmental talk shed light on the Scandinavian Exceptionalism debate by drawing attention to the divergent tone and rhetoric of Norwegian leaders in the aftermath of terrorist tragedy. The language used by government officials in the Norwegian case draws upon core values such as trust in the government, social solidarity, and overcoming fear. In line with Christensen and colleagues (2013), analysis of the present sample reveals an emphasis on the importance of democratic values, social cohesion, and supporting one another by government officials, particularly the Prime Minister.

The Norwegian approach to crisis management differs considerably from the punitive tone used by US officials post-9/11, which emphasized “evil” enemies and a “with us or against us” dichotomy. Fimreite and colleagues (2013), in their analysis of the 22 July attacks, assert that crisis communication in the days following the tragedy called for more openness and democracy, noting a departure from leaders in the wake of other terrorist events in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain. Spaaij (2012), in his analysis of counter-terrorism responses, also notes that the response of Norwegian officials to the attacks has emphasized support for democracy and Norwegian values instead of criticism of the state and its agencies, most notably the police.

Constraints identified in this article such as trust and confidence in the government, emphasis on social inclusion, and efforts to resist succumbing to fear may work to moderate punitiveness. Other features of Norwegian society such as coalition governments, the continued prominence of social welfare values, and high social spending, may also help to restrain punitiveness (Green, 2007; Pratt, 2008). Furthermore, high levels of trust and a strong sense of community, coupled with relatively low levels of fear both before and after the attacks, may also help to moderate punitiveness. It is these social attributes that help to make the rhetoric used by Norwegian officials possible in the first place. Moderate government talk may also help Norwegian values and the social structure itself to survive the attacks. In essence, government talk serves as both a reflection and a reinforcement of what may be a more decent social order.

In the wake of the 22 July attacks, Norway has largely resisted treating Breivik as an exception to legal procedures, a point emphasized by the Foreign Minister who called on Norwegians to trust in the system. This call to avoid exceptionalism in the Breivik case illustrates Loader’s (2010) assertion that restraint is a key component of penal moderation in both rhetoric and practice. In the end, Breivik was sentenced to 21 years behind bars, the most severe sentence available in Norway (Husabø, 2013; Pratt, 2008).

Commenting on the response of the Norwegian people in the days after the atrocities committed by Breivik, Pratt and Eriksson (2013: 208) observe that people focused on solidarity, democracy, and unity instead of demanding “savage recrimination from the state” and the death penalty for Breivik. In response to controversy surrounding the admission of Breivik to online classes in political science at the University of Oslo, University Rector Ole Petter Ottersen (2013) published an article in the Guardian, an English language publication, explaining the decision. In essence, Ottersen (2013) proposed that by refusing to treat Breivik as an exception to policy, Norwegians are demonstrating that “our values are fundamentally different from his”. By responding in a “calm and reasoned way”, sticking to its rules, resisting the adoption of new and exceptional rules, and trusting in the system, Ottersen (2013) argues that Norway has reaffirmed its commitment to democracy, the legal system, and in the case of the University of Oslo, the education system.

At present, Norway has not responded to the terrorist attacks by treating the case as an exception or by passing laws that expand punishment or curb civil liberties (Greenwald, 2011; Ottersen, 2013). Speaking about this, the Minister of Justice and Public security in 2011 stated “it is possible to impose more strict surveillance measures and establish new physical lines of protection, but it is not a direction we want to pursue” (Ministry of Justice and the Police, 2011). Spaaij (2012: 91), emphasizing the conciliatory tone of Norwegian officials, has predicted that “although new security measures will most likely be implemented, authorities are well aware of the costs of such measures, which are deemed to fit uneasily within Norway’s existing culture of openness and trust”. This point highlights the importance of culture in moderating or exacerbating responses to crime. Ultimately, Norway’s more careful and measured response to terrorism may speak to Norway’s self-image as a leader in social welfare and penal moderation, points of national pride (Loader, 2010). Summarizing, Holt (cited in Brown, 2011) observes that “the Norwegian soul is egality, openness, and a very low security level. I think that we have lost some of our greatest values if we really have to change these things.” Similarly, Norwegian Criminologist Nils Christie (cited in Pratt and Eriksson, 2013: 208) comments “what has happened is a catastrophe that can only be met by holding on to the foundational values of Norwegian society. If we abandon those, then Breivik has achieved something.” These statements in the media echo government calls for adherence to Norwegian culture and due process illustrated by this study.

Although there are some indications that the Norwegian government has responded to the attacks in a more moderate and measured way than counterparts elsewhere, it is important to continue to monitor policy and practice developments. In the aftermath of the 22 July attacks, scholars such as Fimreite and colleagues (2013) and Husabø (2013) note that there has been talk of expanding 2004 terrorism legislation to explicitly address “lone wolf” terrorists. The Norwegian Police Service and Ministry of Justice have also proposed a variety of legal changes that would expand the focus on preparatory acts and increase surveillance (Husabø, 2013). Furthermore, a proposed increase in the maximum Norwegian prison sentence from 21 to 30 years has also been debated (Fimreite et al., 2013). Taking a more moderate approach, the 22 July Commission has emphasized improving coordination more than changing the criminal law, urging consistency between words and actions as well as caution (Fimreite et al., 2013; Husabø, 2013). Calls for alertness to signs of extremism, better preparation for terrorist attacks, increased visibility of police, and better equipment have also been made (Christensen et al., 2013).

Though the Norwegian response to the attacks perpetrated by Breivik largely evidences possible constraints on punitiveness, it is still important to acknowledge possible facilitators of punitiveness in post-Breivik rhetoric and action. For instance, despite a relatively healthy economy and praise for Stoltenberg’s leadership, the Conservative Party, headed by Erna Solberg, was voted into office in September 2013 for the first time since 1990 (Bevanger, 2013a, 2013b). Conservatives ran on a platform advocating for reduced taxes and increased privatization, two points that may undermine the welfare state (Koranyi and Fouche, 2013). In forming a centre-right coalition, the Conservative Party has aligned with the populist anti-immigrant Progress Party that Breivik was once a member of (Bevanger, 2013a). Since the attacks, the Progress Party has notably softened its anti-Islamic rhetoric in an effort to rebrand itself as a more mainstream right leaning party. In spite of initial backlash toward the Progress Party in the wake of the attacks, they have gained ground in parliament (Associated Press, 2013; Bevanger, 2013a). All parties, not wanting to be accused of exploiting the attacks for political gain, have largely avoided directly discussing the attacks (Associated Press, 2013; Holt, 2011). However, the attacks have been indirectly invoked to promote investment in roads, police, and helicopters (Associated Press, 2013). The concerted effort (at least in name) to avoid direct use of the tragedy to garner political capital speaks to the more restrained nature of Norway’s political culture and response to the attacks.

Conclusion

The present study argues for the need to study the culturally contingent nature of state reactions to tragedies. In particular we need to pay more careful attention to how underlying economic, political, and cultural factors may serve to either constrain or facilitate more punitive responses (Barker, 2009; Lacey, 2008; Loader, 2010). This is crucial in that criminologists often focus our attention on cases where panic, stoked by government talk and media coverage, erupts in the aftermath of high profile tragedy. Attentiveness to less incendiary government talk is needed to better understand the role of government rhetoric in shaping responses to crisis.

The present analysis of government talk here links the mobilization of core values such as trust in the government and solidarity to the response of the government to the attacks. Speaking about the Norwegian response to the attacks, Pratt and Eriksson (2013) end their comparison of Anglophone excess and Nordic exceptionalism with two powerful observations. The first, that when tested, core Norwegian values were not only reasserted but arguably strengthened in the aftermath of the attacks. Second, they argue that the response of politicians and citizens alike drew upon these core values highlighting divergent ways of responding to crime and considering punishment. The Norwegian case also illustrates how feelings of national pride and shame can be mobilized in ways that help to establish and/or maintain moderation and to resist securitization in the face of tragedy (Holt cited in Brown, 2011; Loader, 2010). Overwhelmingly, officials have called upon Norwegians to refuse being controlled by fear. Instead of calling for revenge and enhanced punishment in the aftermath of the attacks, the government has focused largely on the need for conciliatory responses. Both resisting fear and striving for peacemaking responses represent important counter-terrorism strategies (Spaaij, 2012). Given the important role that government talk helps to play in shaping responses to crime, it is particularly important to pay attention to cases in which more moderate talk is deployed by agents of the state and how culture and social structure make such talk possible.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I would like to sincerely thank Randy Myers, Travis Linnemann, Elizabeth-Monk Turner, Lindsey Upton, Isabel Schoultz, and the anonymous reviewers for their comments.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Author biography

Kimberlee G Waggoner is a doctoral student in the Criminology & Criminal Justice program at Old Dominion University Norfolk, VA, USA.

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