Patriotic journalism: An appeal to emotion and cognition

Abstract

Patriotic behavior in the journalistic coverage of conflicts is usually related to the coverage of wars and terrorist attacks. Such behavior is characterized in the literature by various practices which deviate from the objective or neutral model of journalism and which are more closely related to the ‘our news’ or ‘our war’ mode of coverage. This study suggests an analytical framework that classifies the indicators of patriotic journalistic coverage in two categories: appealing to public emotions, and appealing to public cognition. This framework is tested in the analysis of two related events: the killing of a terrorist by a state, and the revenge action carried out by a terrorist organization. Both types of patriotic indicator were found in both events. While the authors’ findings enhance the view that journalists take sides in national conflicts, they undermine the assertion that journalists use different practices of patriotic coverage depending on whether ‘their side’ is the aggressor or the victim in the conflict.

Keywords

patriotic journalism terrorism and journalism war coverage

Introduction

Patriotic journalism is a well-known and a widely documented worldwide phenomenon. Usually, research on the issue focuses on the journalistic coverage of crisis events, mainly violent ones, such as wars and terrorist attacks (e.g. Hallin, 1986; Liebes and Kampf, 2009; Wolfsfeld et al., 2008; Zelizer and Allan, 2002). The most significant ‘patriotic’ feature of the coverage in such events is journalists’ abandonment of the remote, neutral, and objective stance and instead their adoption of a solidary, emphatic manner towards their nation or ethnic group when reporting on such events (Schudson, 2002). With this, journalists give up their ‘professional identity’ and act according to their national, ethnic, or civil identity (Zandberg and Neiger, 2005). This last observation is one of many attempts in the research literature to point to possible explanations for the shift in the journalistic work from the traditional ‘objective model’ of reporting (e.g. Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2007; Schudson, 2001; Tuchman, 1972) to a ‘patriotic model’ in times of national crisis. Ginosar (2015b) classified the different explanations for patriotic journalism, as has been suggested in the research literature, into two types: explanations that are related to the professional aspect of journalism, and explanations that are connected more closely to the personal aspect of journalists.

Whatever the explanation for this phenomenon, patriotic journalism departs from the traditional ‘objective model’ of journalism. However, this traditional model is not universal; rather, it has been developed during the 20th century in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Schudson, 2001) and has been adopted by some other Western liberal countries. In other parts of the world, and even within the non-Western democratic world, different journalistic models can be found, some of which are far from the objective model (see, for example, Christians et al., 2009; Curran and Park, 2000; Ginosar, 2013; Hallin and Mancini, 2012). One of the main differences that distinguishes the journalistic models is the way in which each of them addresses the notion of ‘objectivity’. These different approaches to objectivity are rooted in different cultures, values, and beliefs (e.g. Berkowitz et al., 2004; Donsbach and Klett, 1993; Ginosar, 2015b). Furthermore, while in the offline world of journalism there are different attitudes towards objectivity as a professional value and practice, in the online journalism arena, objectivity is no longer seen as a precious and desirable value, in particular by amateur content providers (see, for example, Agarwal and Barthel, 2015; Carpenter, 2008; Marchi, 2012; Singer, 2008; Vobič and Milojević, 2013). Some scholars identify fairness and transparency as substitutes for objectivity as a professional value and practice (e.g. Karlsson, 2010; Phillips, 2010).

According to the objective model, patriotic journalism is seen as a deviation from ‘professional (good) journalism’, while other models of journalism and other approaches towards objectivity might consider patriotism in journalistic coverage as a natural part of professional journalistic work. In this study, we have no intention of taking sides in this controversy within the research literature, nor do we investigate the different explanations for the phenomenon, although we do present them later. Rather, we address the phenomenon of patriotic journalism as a fact of life in journalistic work, and attempt to shed light on some of its features. More specifically, while most of the research literature on patriotic journalism addresses the coverage of either conventional wars or a sporadic terrorist attack, we chose to investigate a different type of case. This study addresses the journalistic coverage of a two-phase event: the killing of an ex-prisoner Lebanese terrorist by Israel and the revenge military action carried out by the terrorist organization Hezbollah against the Israeli army. In our analysis, we employed Wolfsfeld et al.’s (2008) model of the ‘Defensive Mode of reporting’ vs the ‘Victim Mode of reporting’. From the Israeli journalists’ point of view, the former might suit the coverage of the terrorist’s killing, and the latter might suit the coverage of the revenge action. The interesting issue to which we point here is whether there was a difference in the nature of the coverage of these two phases of the event in terms of patriotic reporting. More specifically: was the coverage a more patriotic one when the journalists’ side was the victim, or when this side was the aggressor? We looked for indicators of patriotic reporting and initially analyzed the texts according to indicators suggested by Liebes (1992). Eventually, in accordance with our findings, we decided to divide Liebes’ indicators into two categories and highlight two main features that signified the patriotic approach of the journalistic coverage: an appeal to public emotions and an appeal to public cognition. These two features were found in the coverage of both events: the killing and the retaliation.

Following this, our research questions were: (a) were there any patriotic indicators in the coverage of each of the two events (the killing of the terrorist and the revenge action) and, if so, what kind(s) of patriotic indicators were there?; and (b) was there any difference between the two events regarding patriotic reporting?

The theoretical contribution of this research is two-fold: first, we investigated the journalistic coverage of two connected events: a state’s aggressive action (killing of a terrorist) and a retaliation action against this state by the terrorist’s organization. A comparison between the coverage of the two events can shed a new light on the possible differences between patriotic reporting when the journalists’ side is the aggressor compared with the case in which the journalists’ side is with the victim. The second contribution of this research is with regard to the indicators of patriotic reporting. We propose two sets of indicators rather than a single list, as has usually been presented in the literature so far. The two sets of indicators are neutral in respect of whether the journalists report purposely in a patriotic manner or behave unconsciously in such a way.

Patriotic reporting: Explanations and indicators

A major discussion in the research literature about patriotic journalism is about the distinction between journalistic coverage of ‘our war’ and ‘their war’ (Liebes, 1992). In summary, one side of the discussion describes how, when they cover events in which their own country or ethnic group is not directly involved, journalists usually employ the traditional objective model of journalism. This means that they are neutral and objective in their coverage of the story, keeping detached from events and making efforts to be balanced by addressing both sides of the controversy. However, when the journalists’ own nations or ethnic groups are directly involved in the conflict, they do not act according to these professional or ethical principles of coverage. Rather, they act according to their national identity and their personal feelings (Zandberg and Neiger, 2005), and express in their journalistic (professional) work their sympathy and solidarity with ‘their side’ of the conflict (which is ‘our war’ in Liebes’ terms). In fact, this distinction between journalistic coverage of ‘our war’ and ‘their war’ is aligned with a broader phenomenon of reporting on foreign news. Nossek (2004) argues that there is a difference between ‘our news’ and ‘their news’, meaning that the coverage of a story is affected by the national identities of the journalist and the editor.

Given these observations, two main questions arise: first, what are the explanations for the phenomenon of reporting on ‘our war’ in a patriotic manner? (Or, why does the coverage of ‘our war’ deviate from the neutral or objective mode of journalistic reporting?); and second, what are the unique indicators of the coverage of ‘our war’? (Or, how is the patriotic coverage of a national conflict – ‘our war’ – different from neutral or objective journalistic coverage?). These questions have been addressed in the research literature mostly in a descriptive manner and with regard to specific cases. In the following section, we briefly review the literature that addresses these two questions.

Explanations for patriotic reporting

We begin with the first question: explanations for the patriotic reporting of ‘our war’. Five different approaches can be found in the literature: (1) journalists behave differently in different spheres of journalistic work. Hallin (1986), following the analysis of the coverage of the Vietnam War by American journalists, suggested that when there is public consensus on an issue, journalists tend to act within the boundaries of this consensus and do not present facts and views that deviate from the consensus. However, when there is a ‘legitimate controversy’ regarding an issue, journalists act in an objective manner and present different facts and views; (2) journalists usually serve the elites of society and do the same in cases of national conflicts as well (e.g. Robinson et al., 2009). Practically, in a time of crisis, journalists enhance governmental framing of the event; they do not present alternative frames, and they do not have an independent voice; (3) journalists are caught between two identities: a professional identity and a national identity (e.g. Zandberg and Neiger, 2005). In times of conflict, the national identity dominates and drives journalists to act in a patriotic manner, while in routine reporting the professional identity directs journalists to act objectively. These first three explanations for the phenomenon of patriotic reporting can be described together as an ‘ethnocentric mode of journalism’, to use the phrase coined by Wolfsfeld et al. (2008). The other two explanations for patriotic reporting of ‘our war’ are: (4) journalists are personally affected by traumatic events and behave in their professional work under the weight of the trauma. This was the case with the September 11 attacks in the United States when American journalists acted like ordinary American citizens rather than as professional journalists (Zelizer and Allan, 2002); and (5) technology and technological developments dictate journalistic behavior not only during routine work but at times of crisis as well. Liebes and Kampf (2009) presented the shift from printed media to television and the rise of ‘performance journalism’ in which the main feature is a dramatization of the event. With this, journalists who join military forces in operations feel and act as though they are part of the force, and therefore their coverage of the operation is a patriotic one in the sense that they are identified with the military. In the same vein, when journalists penetrate the lines and join terrorist groups or interview terrorist leaders, they tend to express sympathy with those terrorists. Ginosar and Konovalov (2015), while addressing online journalism, also suggested technological development as an explanation of the rather more patriotic behavior of journalists in times of national crisis. They pointed to the interactivity feature of online journalism as an influential factor which enhances the patriotic tendency of journalists following users’ demands for such behavior through online comments on journalistic reporting. It should be mentioned that a sixth explanation for patriotic journalism can be found in the scholarly literature. However, this additional explanation comes out from a quite different approach to journalism: while the first five explanations address what can be named ‘tribal patriotism’ (Ginosar, 2015), the sixth derives from the process of globalization in general, and the globalization of the media in particular. According to this explanation, journalists should act in solidarity with mankind, and should be patriots of human society as a whole, rather than of their own nation or ethnic group (Ward, 2010).

Indicators for patriotic reporting

We can now address the second question about how patriotic reporting differs from neutral or objective reporting. One way to distinguish between the traditional ‘professional’ model of journalism and the patriotic model is by addressing the use or the lack of neutrality and objectivity in the coverage of conflicts. Referring to Hallin’s (1986) spheres of journalistic work mentioned earlier, journalists do not behave in an objective way in two of the three spheres: the ‘sphere of consensus’ and the ‘sphere of deviance’. In both cases, journalists serve the public consensus and the common narratives; they do not present opposite views or alternative narratives, and they do not have an independent voice. A second way to identify a patriotic pattern of reporting is when the media follows the formal governmental or military framing of the event or conflict and does not provide the public with alternative frames of the story (see, for example, Katz, 1992; Nohrstedt et al., 2000; Ravi, 2005). Sometimes, when the majority of the public agrees with the government’s framing, or when the government purposely follows the common public view, the above two indicators – consensual narrative and governmental framing – merge into one. A third indicator of patriotic reporting consists of various expressions and gestures of solidarity with the public, as demonstrated by journalists throughout their coverage. Schudson (2002) put it succinctly when he described this type of reporting as ‘a prose of solidarity rather than a prose of information’ (p. 41).

While the three indicators of patriotic writing mentioned above are somewhat general and descriptive, two other models of patriotic journalism are more detailed and comprehensive. The first is Liebes’ (1992) model which was used to analyze the American and Israeli media’s coverage of the Palestinian Intifada and the Gulf War. Following this analysis, she suggested six ‘framing mechanisms’ that relate to the patriotic reporting of ‘our wars’: (1) Excising – not showing the other side of the conflict (the enemy); (2) Sanitizing – avoiding showing blood, destruction, victims, etc.; (3) Equalizing – not addressing the power inequality between ‘our’ forces and the enemy’s; (4) Personalizing – portraying the humanity of the two sides asymmetrically; (5) Demonizing – describing the enemy as demonic, evil, or not human; (6) Contextualizing – minimizing the broad context of the conflict and focusing on episodes within it. One main idea of this model is that journalists who cover ‘our wars’ are not aware that they are instinctively using these six mechanisms in their coverage. The second model, proposed by Wolfsfeld et al. (2008), refers to the ‘ethnocentric flow of information’ in cases of violent conflicts. They differentiate between two types of instances: the first is when the journalists’ own citizens are the victims, and the second is when the journalists’ forces are the attackers. While in the former case, a ‘victim mode’ of reporting is employed; in the latter case a ‘defensive mode’ of reporting is used. Victim mode consists of highly prominent news stories, high levels of dramatization, the personalization of victims, ethnic solidarity stories, and demonization of the enemy. On the other hand, the defensive mode of reporting includes low prominence of news stories, an analytical perspective, depersonalization of the victims, and justification of the violence. Table 1 summarizes the above five sets of indicators for patriotic journalism.

Table 1.

Sets of indicators for patriotic journalism.

Source	The patriotic nature of coverage
Hallin (1986)	Consensual coverage; following the common narratives
Katz (1992); Nohrstedt et al. (2000); Ravi (2005)	Following the governmental and military framing of the conflict; not suggesting the public alternative framings
Schudson (2002)	Expressing solidarity with the public
Liebes (1992)	Addressing differently ‘our side’ of the conflict and the ‘other side’ (the enemy)
Wolfsfeld et al. (2008)	Ethnocentric flow of information

As can be seen, the two models of Liebes and Wolfsfeld et al. share many features. These features are connected to each other by the reality in which journalists – whether consciously or not – take a side in the conflict, their side, and their professional work is affected by this. In our study, we first analyzed the journalistic texts that reported on the two investigated events according to these shared features. Only then did we group the features into two categories: expressions which appeal to the emotion versus expressions which appeal to the cognition of the public. We believe that this classification contributes a new dimension to the analysis of patriotic journalism and provides us with a fresh point of view to the discussion about how journalists deviate from the traditional objective model of journalism when they report on a conflict in which ‘their side’ is involved. We elaborate on this approach in the methodology section and then in the discussion section (in addition, see Tables 2 and 3).

Table 2.

Classifications of patriotic journalistic expressions.

Categories	Aims	Liebes’ indicators	Explanations
Expressions appealing to emotions	Creating solidarity, empathy and a generally positive attitude	Excising	Minimizing the enemy’s presence
		Personalizing	The humanity of the two sides is asymmetrically portrayed
		Demonizing	The enemy is addressed as a demon, evil, not human
		Glorifying	Emphasizing ‘our’ strength, capabilities, and morality
Expressions appealing to cognition	Creating understanding and justification	Equalizing	Not addressing the power inequality between our forces and that of the enemy
Expressions appealing to cognition	Creating understanding and justification	Contextualizing	Minimizing the broad context of the conflict and focusing on episodes

Table 3.

Various journalistic techniques used in patriotic reporting.

Patriotic categories	Journalistic techniques
Appealing to the emotions	Quotations from our side’s victims
	Extreme expressions when referring to the other side
	Glorifying expressions when referring to our side (governmental policy and army activity)
Appealing to cognition	Elaborating on the justification of our side’s actions
	Quotations of the enemy which enhance our side’s positions/actions
	Describing the enemy as stronger than it is

Instances of patriotic coverage

Most of the research on patriotic journalism is about national conflicts, mostly wars between two nations, or terrorist attacks by a non-state organization against citizens and a state army. Yet patriotic reporting – the abandonment of objective or neutral reporting – can be found in other types of conflict as well: some within national settings, and others in supranational, international, or global settings.

Schudson (2002), when referring to American journalists, identified two other such instances besides security events: national tragedies and moments of public danger. He argued that cases such as the September 11 attacks combine these three circumstances in one event. Ginosar (2015a) presented three additional instances in which journalistic patriotic behavior might take place: the first is a military conflict in which a coalition of several countries fight against a common enemy. In such a case, the patriotic reporting can be similar in all the coalition members’ media because they all share one political and military goal. However, journalistic patriotic behavior might be different in each of the member countries of the coalition. Two examples of such cases are the Balkan War (in particular the war in Kosovo) and the Iraq War. Nohrstedt et al. (2000) and Ravi (2005), respectively, found that national variation, sentiment, values, and ideas were major features in the coverage of these conflicts by the media of each of the coalition members. In other words, in such cases there is not ‘one patriotic behavior’, in spite of the shared goal, the mutual interests, and the common enemy. Rather, journalists from each of the member states of the coalition are patriotic in their reporting, and their patriotism relates to their own country and not to the coalition. This observation enhances the notion of ethnocentric reporting mentioned earlier.

The second instance of journalistic patriotic behavior is in cases such as the ‘War on Terror’. Here, we do not refer to the coverage of sporadic terrorist attacks, but to an ongoing struggle in which several countries fight against non-state organization(s). This is a confrontation with no clear geographical or time borders, and is sometimes defined as a ‘civilization war’. All these features blur the meaning of patriotism in journalistic coverage and raise questions such as: Who is the target of the patriotic coverage – a single state, a group of states, the fight against evil? Do journalists abandon neutrality and objectivity in their reporting throughout the struggle, which can be very long, or only at specific events during this period, such as sporadic terrorist attacks? Should journalists give a voice to the other (terrorist) side of the conflict?

The third instance of journalistic patriotic behavior applies to military conflicts that do not occur during a formal war, such as the killing of a terrorist leader by a state army. The case study in our research is an example of such an event.

The case study: The story and the methodology

The story

Our case study begins in April 1979 and ends 37 years later in January 2016. The ‘star’ of the story is Samir Kuntar, a Druze who was born in Lebanon and, although he was not a Palestinian, was recruited when he was very young (the age of 15) to one of the Palestinian terrorist organizations in Lebanon. On 22 April 1979, Kuntar and three other terrorists arrived by boat through the Mediterranean to the northern city of Nahariya in Israel. They shot a policeman who was in a police vehicle near the sea shore, and then occupied the apartment of the Haran family. They took the father and the 4-year-old daughter as hostages while the mother and the 2-year-old daughter managed to hide themselves. The father and the elder daughter were taken to the beach, where the terrorists fought with the police. Kuntar shot the father in the head and killed him, and then hit the little girl on the head with his rifle and killed her too. The Israeli policemen killed two of the terrorists and captured Kuntar and the other terrorist. One policeman was killed in the fight. Meanwhile in the Haran apartment, the mother, in trying to keep her baby daughter silent, unfortunately strangled the baby, who then died.

Kuntar was sentenced by an Israeli court to life in prison. However, in 2008, he was released from prison as a part of an exchange deal between Israel and the Lebanese terrorist organization Hezbollah. After his release, he became an active member in the organization, in particular in its Syrian branch, and was involved in several actions against the Israeli army on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights. On 19 December 2015, Kuntar was killed in an aircraft attack on a building in the Syrian capital, Damascus. Although the Syrian regime did not claim that Israel was responsible for the attack, Hezbollah blamed Israel. The day after the air attack, Hezbollah shot several missiles into northern Israeli towns and villages, and on 4 January 2016, Hezbollah attacked an Israeli military vehicle on the northern border in revenge for Kuntar’s killing. There were no casualties in this attack. About three months later, Israel took responsibility for the attack on Damascus which killed Kuntar (the historical facts, detailed here, were taken from Wikipedia in Hebrew).

Methodology

We collected all the news texts (as distinct from other journalistic texts, such as opinion columns or commentaries) from two leading Israeli news websites: Ynet and Nana10. Both websites are affiliated with traditional news outlets: the former with a print national newspaper (Yediot Aharonot) which is the most circulated one among paid print newspapers in the country; the latter is owned by a national commercial television channel (Channel 10), the second one in the country in terms of rating. At the end of 2013, the committee for websites rating in Israel stopped its activity and since then there has been no reliable source of data for rating internet websites. According to the committee’s last report, Ynet had an exposure of more than 39 per cent and stood in second place among all Israeli websites, while Nana10 had an exposure of about 23.5 per cent and was the fifth website on the list (Mann and Lev-on, 2013). Some recent reports indicate that the majority of the population in Israel (over 72%) uses the internet for various purposes as, with regard to consuming online news, most Israelis use either smartphones and tablets (45%) or portable computers (32%), while only 24% reach their news through desktops (Mann and Lev-on, 2015). Therefore, it is reasonable to investigate news websites rather than traditional news platforms such as print newspapers or TV channels. Yet, we chose these two websites because of their centrality within the Israeli internet arena (among the five most popular ones) as well as because of their affiliation with traditional media outlets which might imply that they share a similar attitude towards basic journalistic values, such as objectivity.

We focused on the period starting on the day Kuntar was killed (19 December 2015) until one day after the Hezbollah attack on the military vehicle (4 January 2016). All together 17 days, from which 28 articles from Ynet and 19 articles from Nana10 were collected. We divided these 47 news texts on the relevant events into three groups: 14 texts about the killing of Kuntar; 5 texts about the revenge action by Hezbollah, and 28 texts that were published during the period between the two events and that addressed different aspects of the story, such as political and public comments on the events, factual background, etc. While analyzing the texts, these which had been included within the third group were added to one of the other two groups of texts and analyzed in the same way.

We analyzed the texts in two phases. In the first phase, we employed five out of the six indicators suggested by Liebes (1992): Excising, Equalizing, Personalizing, Demonizing, and Contextualizing. After the first reading of the texts, we decided to exclude Liebes’ sixth indicator, Sanitizing, because it was less relevant to the two events in our case study. Sanitizing refers to the avoiding of showing blood, destruction, victims’ bodies, etc. as part of the coverage. It is very relevant while covering combats during wars or terrorist attacks with many civilian casualties. Therefore it is understandable why Liebes included this indicator in her model; however, in our case study – regarding its both parts – there were no such incidents and therefore this indicator was not relevant to our analysis. However, we decided to add another indicator which we named Glorifying, which is related mainly to various expressions regarding the strength, capabilities, and morality of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Not one of Liebes’ indicators directly addresses such expressions, and because we found many such expressions and descriptions regarding the IDF while analyzing the texts, we decided to add Glorifying as a sixth indicator.

The second phase of our analysis was a result of the first one described above. During the initial analysis, we noticed that there were many cases of overlap between the indicators. For example, we found a dual attitude towards Kuntar: first, as a powerful terrorist who continued – after he was released from prison – to plan terrorist attacks against Israel, and therefore there was a justification in trying to stop him. This attitude matches the ‘Equalizing’ indicator. However, at the same time, journalists again and again described Kuntar’s brutality and cruelty in the way he killed the Haran family; this matches the ‘Demonizing’ indicator. Because of such overlaps, we decided to re-classify our findings into two groups: (a) expressions that appeal to public emotions, aimed at creating solidarity, empathy, and a generally positive attitude towards the military action. Broadly, this group includes the expressions that in the first phase of the analysis were identified according to four of the indicators: Excising, Personalizing, Demonizing, and Glorifying; and (b) expressions that appeal to public cognition, aimed at creating an understanding of, and a justification for, ‘our side’s’ motivations and activities. This group includes the expressions that in the first analysis were identified according to the two remaining indicators: Equalizing and Contextualizing. Table 2 summarizes the relationships between our classification in the second phase and Liebes’ indicators which was employed in the first phase of the analysis (the indicator ‘Glorification’ was added by us although in the table it is a part of ‘Liebes’ indicators’).

Findings

The findings are presented here according to the two events: first, the findings relating to the killing of Kuntar, and second, the findings relating to the revenge action of Hezbollah. In each set of findings, we first present expressions that appeal to the public’s emotion and then expressions that appeal to the public’s cognition.

First event: The killing of Kuntar

Four different kinds of appeal to public emotions were identified in this first event: (a) quotations from the Israeli victims and their relatives; (b) the use of extreme expressions when referring to Kuntar; (c) ignoring the enemy’s victims; and (d) expressions that glorify the Israeli military.

Three groups of quotations were most salient in the news texts: quotations taken from relatives of Kuntar’s victims and from relatives of the soldiers whose bodies were returned to Israel in exchange for Kuntar’s release from the Israeli prison; quotations taken from Israeli citizens of the northern town of Nahariya who suffered from Hezbollah’s rockets and missiles immediately after Kuntar’s killing, and quotations taken from local public figures (mayors and a local hospital manager).

Here are some examples of quotations from these three groups:

All the memories keep coming up again. It was a very difficult event [and] all of us feel this pain … it affected the second and third generations [of my family] as well. We have waited for [the killing of Kuntar] for many years.

There is no comfort in this because I will not have grandchildren from [my son] …

I feel a small amount of comfort [from Kuntar’s death]; however, it does not reduce the pain.

I asked my mother how she felt. First, she cried and said that she did not believe that she had any more tears.

Suddenly we heard sirens and I ran to the shelter. The sirens went on for several minutes and I was very scared.

It was very scary. We had expected this [retaliation] after the killing; however, it took us by surprise.

Here are some references to Kuntar in which the terrorist is presented as a demon by journalists on both websites:

Samir Kuntar has never regretted his actions.

There is no way to describe his cruelty, with his gun he broke little Einat’s head and killed her too.

Super-terrorist.

A monstrous killer and terrorist.

One of the most infamous terrorists in the Israeli memory.

The third way in which journalists appeal to the public’s emotions is by ignoring the victims of the enemy (in Liebes’ term: Excising). A salient example is in the report about the attack in which Kuntar was killed and in which another eight people were killed and others were wounded. The report on Ynet (20 December 2015) did not mention the names of the other eight people who were killed, nor did it mention how many others were wounded in the attack.

Finally, here are some examples of expressions that glorify the Israeli army:

As we demonstrated in the past, we know how to hurt all those who want to hurt us. Our enemies know that if they try to undermine our security, they will pay for it severely.

We must compliment those who got the information and verified it in real time … it is an intelligence and an operational achievement for the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] and the result of the quiet security policy of Israel.

The missiles hit the target very precisely; the southern wing of the building collapsed, while the surrounding buildings were not damaged at all.

It was a precision attack in which no Syrian citizens were hurt.

And now to the second category of expressions: appeals to the public’s cognition. Here we found two ways of reporting: (a) expressions made by journalists to justify the killing; and (b) quotations of Kuntar, of his relatives, and of other representatives of Hezbollah – all expressions that can justify Kuntar’s killing in the eyes of the Israelis.

The following quotations are some examples of expressions used by journalists in order to justify Kuntar’s killing. Some of the expressions are about the past and others relate to the future:

An historic justice has been done.

There is a sense of relief that he got what he deserved.

Our fear of Kuntar was in regard to any future terrorist attacks that he planned against Israeli targets.

Kuntar continued to build a mindset of fighting against Israel by contacting prisoners who had been released from Israeli prisons and had come back to Syria.

The IDF’s policy on killing [terrorists] has never been based on the principle of revenge, but on preventing the terrorists’ future plans.

In the last year, Kuntar turned into an independent terrorist entrepreneur, a ticking time bomb.

Not long before he was killed, Kuntar was quoted:

We will build an organization that will hurt Israel very much.

After the killing, Kuntar’s brother was quoted:

With great pride we announce the shahid [a martyr in Arabic] death of Samir Kuntar. We are proud to be joining the shahids’ families after 30 patient years during which time we were a part of the prisoner’s families.

And a formal spokesman of Hezbollah was quoted after the killing:

Hezbollah will certainly not let the shahid’s blood be in vain … the Israeli enemy will regret the assassination of Kuntar.

Second event: Hezbollah’s revenge

The second event – the revenge action of Hezbollah against the Israeli army’s vehicle, with no serious injuries – is much less dramatic than the killing of Kuntar. Therefore, the journalistic coverage of this event was less dramatic as well, in terms of the number of texts as well as with regard to the existence of patriotic indicators. Yet few indicators can be identified in either category: emotional or cognitive.

The following examples relate to the category of expressions that appeal to the public’s emotions:

Kuntar is mostly referred to as ‘the killer from Nahariya’ and ‘the Druze terrorist’. Two examples of references to the IDF that appeal to the public’s emotions were:

The army is at the highest alert; as it should be.

Over the years, the IDF has learnt to handle such explosive devices in a way that prevents many casualties among our fighters.

As to the second category – expressions that appeal to the public’s cognition – journalists made the link between Kuntar’s killing and Hezbollah’s revenge attack. In Liebes’ terms, this was ‘Contextualizing’: the linking of two specific events without including their broader contexts.

Two weeks after Kuntar’s killing, a security incident occurred in the north.

Since the killing [of Kuntar], the Hezbollah’s general secretary, Nassralla, has threatened that a response is coming.

In addition, journalists employed the ‘Equalizing’ indicator when they referred to Hezbollah’s strength as being much greater than demonstrated in this specific revenge action:

On the scale of terrorist attacks this action was less severe than Hezbollah is capable of carrying out.

The Hezbollah fighters succeeded in penetrating the electronic fence without a problem and putting the explosive device [in place] in spite of the bad weather conditions and the IDF’s state of high alert.

In summary, the coverage of the two events by the two news websites, Ynet and Nana10, consists of various journalistic techniques that fit into our two suggested categories of patriotic reporting: appealing to the emotions and appealing to cognition. Each technique can fit one or more of Liebes’ indicators for reporting on ‘our war’ (see Table 3).

Discussion and conclusions

While most scholarly writings about patriotic journalism address the coverage of wars between nations and ethnic groups, or terrorist attacks against civilians, the case study reported here addresses a different type of event. This event is still characterized by confrontation and violence, yet it refers to an act of violence by a state against an individual who was a convicted terrorist, and then refers to an act of revenge by this individual’s terrorist organization against this state. The difference between the journalistic coverage of the two instances (wars and terrorist attacks versus a violent act by a state, and an act of revenge) is mainly at the level of dramatization. The first question to be raised in this scenario is whether journalistic patriotic behavior documented in the literature when addressing wars and terrorist attacks is still relevant in instances such as those addressed in this research. The second question is with regard to the difference in the journalistic coverage between the two related events within our case study: the action of the state and the retaliation of the terrorist organization.

The findings provide us with a definitive answer to the first question: yes, the journalistic reporting of this case includes various patriotic expressions and can be classified as patriotic reporting rather than as neutral or objective reporting. This is empirical evidence for the theoretical suggestion that patriotic behavior of journalists is not limited to conventional wars or terrorist attacks. Rather, patriotic journalistic behavior can be found in the coverage of any type and size of national or ethnic confrontation or crisis (Ginosar, 2015a; Nohrstedt et al., 2000; Ravi, 2005; Schudson, 2002). Furthermore, Liebes’ (1992) indicators regarding the coverage of ‘our war’ are relevant to some extent to the types of cases reported here (see Table 2).

As to the second question, we chose a two-stage case which was very similar to the two cases investigated by Wolfsfeld et al. (2008). In both studies, one instance is about a violent act done by a state (killing a leading terrorist) and the other is an act carried out by a terrorist organization. However, there are three main differences between the two case studies: first, in our case study, the terrorist action was directly related to the state’s initial action. This was not the case in Wolfsfeld et al.’s study in which the two events were not directly related to each other, although they were both part of a continuing struggle between Israel and the Palestinians. The second difference is that, in our study, we investigated the coverage of the two related events as reported by two Israeli news websites, Ynet and Nana10, which represented only one side of the conflict, while in Wolfsfeld et al.’s study, the coverage of television channels from both sides of the conflict (Israel and the Palestinian Authority) were investigated and compared. Thirdly, in our case study there were no civilian casualties in either event, while in the other case study there were such civilian casualties. Based on these three differences, we suggest that the comparisons we have made between the journalistic coverage of the two events in our study are more meaningful in terms of shedding light on the phenomenon of patriotic journalism because we were able to compare the coverage of the same news outlets of two related instances: one in which ‘our side’ was the aggressor and the other in which ‘our side’ was the victim. Therefore, Wolfsfeld et al.’s model is relevant to our study as well because it addresses the Defensive mode of reporting (when ‘our side’ is the aggressor) and the Victim mode of reporting (when ‘our side’ is the victim). Our findings demonstrate that there were no outstanding differences in the coverage of the two events by these two Israeli news websites. We could find indications for both the Defensive and the Victim models in both events. This means that the Israeli news websites behaved in a patriotic way no matter whether ‘our side’ was the aggressor or the victim. In both cases, the websites supported ‘our side’, and they did so by employing various reporting techniques that can be identified as one of the two categories of patriotic reporting in our analytical framework: appealing to public emotion, and appealing to public cognition.

The findings of this research strengthen the claim made by several scholars (e.g. Nossek, 2004) that there is a difference between ‘our news’ and ‘their news’. The core idea is that the coverage of a story is affected by the national identities of journalists and editors. This assertion is even stronger when the coverage is of a conflict in which the journalist’s nation is involved. In such cases, it is not so important whether ‘our side’ is the ‘just’ or the ‘evil’ side – it is still ‘our side’, and therefore journalists report on the conflict in a patriotic way rather than in an objective or neutral way.

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author biographies

Avshalom Ginosar is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Communication at the Academic College of Yezreel Valley, Israel. His research interests are media policy and regulation, online journalism and patriotic journalism.

Inbar Cohen is a graduate of Communication Studies at the Academic College of Yezreel Valley, Israel. Currently, she is an investigative reporter with the Weekend news show of Channel 10.

Address: as Avshalom Ginosar. [email: avshalomg@yvc.ac.il]

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