Abstract
Since becoming an independent country in 1991, Kazakhstan has demonstrated a strong desire for international status and recognition by, for example, hosting numerous international events, such as chairing the OSCE and hosting EXPO 2017; creating the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia; and, most notably, presenting the abandonment of its nuclear weapons as a model for other states to emulate. Surprisingly, Kazakhstan has received scant attention by scholars regarding its desire for status, especially considering how the government has framed its decision to relinquish its nuclear weapons in terms of advancing international peace at the expense of its own security self-interest. Kazakhstan’s status-seeking raises two questions. First, how can a mid-level power strategically frame its foreign and domestic policies in order to improve its global status? And second, how can it improve its international status when domestic priorities (such as economic development and political stability) lead to policies that meet disapproval abroad? In this article, we answer these questions by examining issue areas (security, democratization, and the environment) that contain variation in our dependent variable, Kazakhstan’s quest for status. In doing so, we reveal patterns of how a secondary or mid-level state lacking substantial material capabilities can, through its words and actions, construct an image that may enhance its international status. We also show variation by issue area in the reception of these efforts by developed and developing countries. Lastly, we reveal in what issue areas Kazakhstan’s desire for status internationally is constrained by the government’s desire to maintain power domestically.
Introduction
Since independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Kazakhstani government has sought to be recognized as a significant actor in world affairs. It has aimed to advance its status and shape its image internationally by positively framing its words and actions, particularly in the areas of security, democracy, and the environment. Most visibly, Kazakhstan has relinquished its nuclear weapons, hosted international events, and acted as a mediator in international disputes, partially in order to enhance its status. During his decades-long rule, Nursultan Nazarbayev presented his country’s actions regarding giving up its nuclear weapons as central to Kazakhstan’s image. 1 According to Astana, Kazakhstan is an ideal country to emulate for its elimination of its nuclear arsenal and ought to be viewed as a positive model for all states. Like many states in Asia, it has also attempted to positively frame its actions on democracy and associated rights as necessary for achieving economic development for its people. Democracy, 2 according to Astana, can wait; economic development, however, is significantly more urgent. Nevertheless, the Kazakhstani government lays claim to having made significant progress towards liberal democracy. Lastly, Astana frames itself as a cooperative global and regional player on environmental issues, emphasizing sustainable development despite being one of the world’s largest fossil fuel exporters.
Kazakhstan’s domestic priorities impact how it acts in its quest for status. And its bid for status plays out differently with different audiences, for what may be a status gain from countries aspiring for economic development may be a status loss from developed democracies that prioritize political and civil rights. Demonstrating this pattern, Astana has received credit from the West for advancing international peace in terms of its nuclear weapons. In addition, the Kazakhstani government has been praised for hosting international peace talks and other multilateral events. However, Kazakhstan has also received criticism from Western states and Western NGOs for corruption, weak rule of law and the lack of political freedoms in the country.
We seek to explain Kazakhstan’s pattern of status-seeking from different audiences. We further identify to what extent Kazakhstan, which some scholars describe as “a secondary state” 3 that has “moderate regional influence and moderate international recognition” (Vanderhill et al., 2020: 975), seeks to advance its status internationally, given sometimes competing domestic pressures. Astana’s level of engagement in international affairs and what Kazakhstani foreign policy has been able to achieve is not common for a secondary state (Vanderhill et al., 2020: 990). Vanderhill et al. posit that Astana embarked on this robust foreign policy from the start due to its desire to survive as an independent state (Vanderhill et al., 2020: 990). But if survival was paramount, as they posit, then why did Kazakhstan give up its nuclear weapons?
By examining various issue areas related to Kazakhstan’s status-seeking, we establish an overall pattern regarding how the Kazakhstani government operates in these areas and thus offer predictive power in how it attempts to further its desire for status. Achieving status signifies Kazakhstan as an influential country in world affairs. As such, if Kazakhstan achieves such status internationally, it plays out well among the domestic population, which reinforces regime support. Therefore, Astana simultaneously seeks to maximize its international status while minimizing the threats to its political survival that some forms of status-seeking may present. In showing how it attempts to do so, we offer a template for potentially generalizable future research on how secondary, authoritarian powers seek to improve their international status while maintaining their rule.
Among the three issues that we examine, Kazakhstan’s actions on two of those issues—nuclear weapons and the environment—are significantly less contentious than on the other—democracy and related rights. On the latter issues, we see Astana striving to improve its image and advance its status, nevertheless, avoiding taking measures that might placate Western states but could weaken its control domestically. In all cases, however, Astana seeks to advance its status internationally by actively framing why it is deserving of status.
In this article, we incorporate aspects of process tracing (Falleti, 2006; George & Bennett, 2005) and discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1995; Wodak & Krzyzanowski, 2008) to conduct a qualitative analysis of the statements of Kazakh leaders, of Kazakhstani government policies, and of actions related to those policies as they relate to status-seeking. Because of their relevance to the topic but also due to the variation they provide in outcomes, we focus on three specific issue areas: international security, democracy and human rights, and the environment. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We first examine the theories explaining how states seek status. Next, we examine why Astana voluntarily surrendered its nuclear weapons despite the security they provide. The subsequent sections consist of our analyses of Kazakhstan’s quest for status in the specific issues areas noted above. We end with a conclusion summarizing our key findings, relating them to the extant literature, and discussing their potential generalizability.
How States Seek Status
Decades ago, realist international relations theorists stressed the significance of material factors related to status. Hans Morgenthau posited that status is a function of state capabilities (1954: 78) and thus states lacking in capabilities cannot have status. Gilpin largely agreed: “Prestige is the reputation for power, and military power in particular (1981: 31).” Status is, according to Morgenthau and Gilpin, all about power. In international relations, states tend to be concerned with power via material capabilities, either military or economic. Generally, when a country advances materially, it concomitantly seeks greater status. Moreover, according to the views presented above, the ways in which a country seeks status are in large part based on these material capabilities. During the Cold War, for example, the competition for status played out between the US and the USSR over space superiority, which demonstrated both military strength and national prestige. Thus, these superpowers gained the respect and recognition that denotes status. But this focus on status among superpowers neglects how small and mid-sized states (e.g., Kazakhstan) also seek status. In contrast to the scholars above, others, including some realists, argue that it is small states that are the ones most focused on advancing status through means other than capabilities, and there is no reason to believe that states lower in the international hierarchy would not also be concerned with their status in the international system (Wolf, 2019).
According to Larson and Shevchenko (2003), there are three main ways in which states can seek status: social mobility, social competition, and social creativity. For social mobility, non-major power states embrace the preferences of the leading states. Social competition, as the phrase implies, concerns competing with other states via security areas to advance the country’s status. With social creativity, a country aims to change the elements that are viewed as essential in advancing status, and to advance the areas in which the given country performs well (Larson & Shevchenko, 2003). Among these three approaches for secondary powers to seek status, we argue that Kazakhstan focuses on both social creativity (i.e., its actions regarding nuclear weapons) and social mobility (i.e., ceding to the US on the hegemon’s preference regarding its nuclear weapons). But Astana places more emphasis on social creativity. Since Kazakhstan realizes that it cannot compete with Western states in terms of economics or technology (interviews with former Kazakhstani officials in Almaty, 2022), it focuses on creative ways to advance its status and hence embraces social creativity. In addition to its actions on nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan also demonstrates social creativity in seeking to change how democracy is viewed. It pursues a similar strategy on the environment, as it attempts to promote itself as a leader on the issue of climate change while, simultaneously, being a world leader in the production of fossil fuels.
Wolf defines status as “an actor’s position in a social hierarchy,” and the related concept of respect as “adequate recognition of an actor’s status” (2019: 1211). Similarly, Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth (2014) define status as “collective beliefs about a given state’s ranking” (2014: 7). Moreover, they view status in international politics as about “membership in a defined club of actors” and also a state’s “relative standing within such a club” (2014: 7). Kazakhstan’s chairing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2010 serves as an example both of displaying its membership status and of attempting to improve its relative standing.
According to constructivism, identity is the main factor in accounting for states’ political actions. For constructivists, social identity theory (SIT), a social psychology approach that focuses on how groups relate to each other, offers a valuable lens for understanding how and why states seek status. Based on SIT, states want to distinguish themselves in order to be viewed more favorably than other states. SIT posits that people view themselves as belonging to a certain group, which impacts how they interact with those from other groups (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The theory “explores how social groups strive to achieve a positively distinctive identity” (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010: 66). Larson and Shevchenko (2003, 2010) played an essential role in advancing the IR turn toward status and incorporate SIT as their theoretical framework. Since social identity is “how you understand yourself in relationship to others” (Hopf, 2012: 8), in the aftermath of Astana handing over its nuclear weapons, it has promoted its actions and motivations on that issue, however fabricated, as a model for others and thus deserving of recognition.
Indeed, Astana has attempted to construct an image of itself as progressive and as a leader, and perhaps even as exceptional, in several issue areas. Nevertheless, we argue that Kazakhstan’s actions in the cases that we examine are more strategic and less about identity construction per se. These patterns demonstrate how Kazakhstan’s image building is not fundamentally based on its identity; rather, it is a utilitarian or instrumental method to advance its status, as opposed to an intrinsic emphasis on its identity, that best accounts for Astana’s actions in the cases that we examine. In short, in examining our three cases, we employ a theoretical framework that, while informed by constructivist ideas concerning the importance of identity formation in international relations, can be described as utilitarian, strategic, or rationalist. For each case, Astana has calculated how to act in its quest to advance its image internationally while maintaining its monopoly on power domestically.
As mentioned above, some analysts (e.g., Gilpin, 1981; Morgenthau, 1954) tend to collapse the distinction between power and status. Reflecting this, some states view the possession of nuclear weapons as reflecting a “modern” country near the top of the global hierarchy, as very few states have them. Having nuclear weapons, in other words, advances the status of the country. When Charles De Gaulle was the leader of France, for example, he wanted to have nuclear weapons to advance the status of France. Mao similarly sought nuclear weapons for his newly established state, not only for deterrence purposes but also as a symbol of China’s global status (Haynes, 2020). Nazarbayev took a different route in seeking status for the newly independent Kazakhstan, one that Astana believes other countries should emulate; Kazakhstan is deserving of respect and status because it had the power of nuclear weapons and decided to give them up instead of showcasing that power.
Kazakhstan’s peaceful status-seeking behavior diverges from a number of studies (Krickovic & Weber, 2018; Larson & Shevchenko, 2003; Murray, 2019; Renshon, 2017; Ward, 2017) that depict status-seeking states as embracing malevolent behavior internationally. Due to this variance, and especially Kazakhstan’s cooperative actions regarding its nuclear weapons, it is important to examine this neglected case in the IR literature.
International Security and Nuclear Weapons
Structural realists argue that material capabilities are the main assets for states (see Waltz, 1979: 99) and that “states cannot depend on others for their security” (Mearsheimer, 1994/1995: 11). These scholars believe that states must always act in their own self-interest under the anarchic international system (with no overarching authority); as Mearsheimer writes, “it pays to be selfish in a self-help world” (11). Given this structural realist view, why did Kazakhstan relinquish its nuclear weapons, which are both the ultimate material and security capability? 4 The government’s actions are particularly perplexing in security terms given the fact that Central Asia borders four states that have nuclear weapons—China, Russia, Pakistan, and India. 5 The case of Kazakhstan voluntarily giving up its nuclear weapons and related resources is antithetical to such realist views on how states act. 6 While the Kazakhstani government, after the collapse of the USSR, did not have the wherewithal to operate its inherited nuclear weapons, it could have either retained them or pursued a less cooperative path, as opposed to giving up the nuclear weapons as quickly as it did (interviews with Kazakhstani academics in Almaty, 2022). Ceding its nuclear arsenal thus became a starting point for Kazakhstan’s social creativity agenda as it sought status as a model of non-proliferation. While we do address why Kazakhstan gave up its weapons, our focus is on analyzing how Astana has embarked on a social creativity agenda to advance its status.
In contrast to how Astana has framed these events subsequently (i.e., presenting itself as a country seeking to advance international peace through its actions), the government aimed to maximize what it could gain in exchange for giving up its nuclear weapons (Ayazbekov, 2014). Because the Kazakhstani government wanted security guarantees in exchange for giving up approximately 1400 Soviet nuclear warheads, it did, indeed, seek security, but not to the extent that structural realism would predict. Neorealism fails to explain Kazakhstan’s actions since it posits that states cannot rely on other states (Mearsheimer, 1994/1995; Waltz, 1979, 2011) and, furthermore, should view alliances as conveniences that may be broken (Walt, 1985). Indeed, Russia’s recent violation of the Budapest Memorandum, which saw Ukraine give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees from Russia (and other states), is evidence supporting this viewpoint.
The United States, particularly concerned with the more than 1000 Kazakh nuclear warheads, production facilities, and materials falling into the hands of terrorists, pressured Kazakhstan to give them up. Russia, too, supported removing the weapons and material and, at the time, had relatively warm relations with the United States. While Kazakhstan sought security guarantees from the US and Russia, few were predicting an expansionist Russia any time in the near future. As a new state suffering an economic crisis, Kazakhstan also wished to quickly become a part of the international system; in other words, it needed to establish itself as a sovereign state that was a part of international organizations and, especially, the global economy. In addition, there was a strong grass roots, anti-nuclear movement in Kazakhstan related to decades of Soviet testing there (Kassenova, 2021). In some ways, therefore, the outcome seemed preordained. Nevertheless, the negotiations over what to do with Kazakhstan’s nuclear arsenal lasted from December 16, 1991, which was the day that Kazakhstan declared its independence, to May 23, 1992, which was when the Lisbon Protocol to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was signed (Treaty & Protocol, 2023). Just above Nazarbayev’s signature, the agreement stated “Kazakhstan guarantees the carrying out of the elimination of all kinds of nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive arms, located on its territory, over a period of seven years in accordance with the START Treaty.”
Reflecting how Astana bargained hard and was focused on security during this time period, on December 17, 1991, Nazarbayev told US Secretary of State James Baker: “As long as Russia has nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan will too” (quoted in Ayazbekov, 2014: 151). Moreover, in Nazarbayev’s first letter to US President George H.W. Bush, he stated that Kazakhstan would become a member of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and remain a nuclear weapons country (Ayazbekov, 151). But during that same period, Nazarbayev, in private discussions, confirmed to US state actors that Kazakhstan actually would not. Nevertheless, his public statements during the first few months of independence made it explicit that Kazakhstan was, and would remain, a nuclear country (Ayazbekov, 151).
Kazakhstan’s conflicting presentations and positions on the nuclear issue reflect Astana’s strategic decision to obtain what it could for Kazakhstan in negotiations (Ayazbekov, 151). 7 In other words, this refutes the notion central to Astana’s self-crafted identity: Kazakhstan as a country that voluntarily gave up its nuclear weapons without conditions. Since giving up its nuclear weapons, Astana has used its actions in doing so as the central component of its status-seeking project, discarding how it bargained hard for the outcome it sought. Put differently, Kazakhstan has embraced this new image of itself—not of a rationalist 8 state seeking to bargain strategically for its desired outcomes, but instead of a peaceful state that voluntarily gave up its nuclear weapons for the greater good. And because of the positive actions that it took, it is a state that deserves recognition and respect. This strategy reflects both social creativity (as Kazakhstan advances a new way that states should view nuclear weapons) and, to a lesser extent, social mobility (as the US and other major powers oppose nuclear proliferation).
International Image Construction
As a non-major power, Kazakhstan has nonetheless sought a role in international security and non-proliferation. While numerous scholars (Krickovic & Zhang, 2020; Larson, 2015; Larson & Shevchenko, 2010) focus on the status-seeking behavior of major powers (e.g., Russia and China), we focus on this secondary power; given that Kazakhstan does not have extensive material capabilities, it is not in the same category as major powers. While Kazakhstan has been seeking status within the international system with its actions since independence, it has not engaged in social competition; instead, it has been risk-averse or limited its actions to social creativity and mobility. 9 Nazarbayev’s reaction to Russian President Putin’s derogatory comments about Kazakhstan’s lack of history as a state reflects this pattern of seeking status not by social competition but by peaceful, or non-aggressive, means.
Vladimir Putin stated the following about Nazarbayev in August of 2014: “He has created a state on territory where there has never been a state. The Kazakhs never had a state of their own, and he created it. In this sense, he is a unique person in the post-Soviet space and in Kazakhstan” (quoted in Laruelle, 2018: 65). Putin’s statement did not play well in Kazakhstan. In needing to redeem his country’s lost status in the following months after Putin’s insult, Nazarbayev acted to demonstrate the long history of Kazakhstan. In October of 2014, Nazarbayev stated that in the following year Kazakhstan would recognize the country’s 550th anniversary as a state. In addition, Nazarbayev threatened to leave the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, stating: “Astana will never be in an organization that represents a threat to the independence of Kazakhstan” (quoted in Laruelle, 2018, p. 66). Due to the disrespect or lack of recognition that Putin showed toward Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev reacted to redeem the status of the country, albeit non-militaristically.
How the leaders of Kazakhstan, both Nazarbayev and Tokayev, have depicted it demonstrates how they view or aim to present it as a unique country in the international system. This Kazakhstani sense of self distinguishes Kazakhstan from other countries, as social identity theory posits (see Larson, 2015). According to SIT, states seek “a positive but distinctive identity” (Larson, 2015: 323). In the aftermath of Kazakhstan relinquishing its nuclear weapons, Astana has embarked on its social creativity project by presenting itself as a state that is a model for other states to emulate. Its actions on nuclear weapons and other international security issues attempt to promote this view of Kazakhstan as an exceptional state more concerned with peace than its own security. Nevertheless, in his 2008 book, Tokayev described how Kazakhstan brushed aside Russia’s efforts at convincing the new state to give up its nuclear arms. Kazakhstan wanted to establish itself as a state independent of Russia with an independent foreign policy. By multilateralizing the issue, Tokayev, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1994 to 1999 and then again from 2003 to 2007, helped to establish Kazakhstan’s uniquely branded “multivector” foreign policy. This strategy, which emphasizes good foreign relations with all of the major regional and global powers, helped secure an identity for Kazakhstan separate from that of Russia (Tokayev, 2008). As Tokayev stated, “Kazakhstan, by its decision, ensured the unhindered entry into the community of civilized states and declared itself as a mature, reliable and responsible partner” (quoted in Osipov, 2019). More recently, Kairat Sarzhanov, Director of the International Security Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, summarized the view of Kazakhstan that Astana wishes to promulgate: “We offer this model to all countries of the world…It includes the following basic foundations. First, a voluntary decision to close the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site, renounce the possession of nuclear weapons and prohibit their deployment. We have created and strengthened our newly-independent country, and achieved international respect without nuclear weapons” (quoted in Kalmykov, 2021).
Writing in 2004, Tokayev (2004) lauded the security guarantees of the US and the rest of the P5 but went on to criticize Western states for being unappreciative of Kazakhstan for ceding its nuclear weapons (94); this reflected the government’s dissatisfaction with the lack of status that Western states have shown toward Kazakhstan. As Tokayev stated: “certain states that have not yet acceded to the Nonproliferation Treaty or to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty receive much closer attention from major governments and don’t experience any discomfort in international organizations or within the framework of bilateral relations” (94). Kazakhstan should, in his view, receive more recognition for its handling of the nuclear weapons issue. Tokayev and the Kazakhstani government appear discontent with how some states get away with violating non-proliferation norms while others are criticized or sanctioned, even when there is no solid evidence (94). Even though Tokayev expressed the Kazakhstani government’s position and its discontent, in contrast to Moscow or Pyongyang, Astana has not taken any risky actions in an attempt to gain status; Kazakhstan continues to operate within the norms of the current international system with its social mobility project (i.e., advancing the non-proliferation position of the United States) and its social creativity project (i.e., seeking to have all states relinquish their nuclear weapons).
In addition to surrendering Kazakhstan’s nuclear weapons, Nazarbayev often volunteered his country as a mediator for global disputes, including attempting to build further credibility by limiting nuclear proliferation, another aspect of the social creativity project Kazakhstan advances in status-seeking. In 2010 to much fanfare, Kazakhstan hosted the first OSCE summit in over a decade. The 56 states in attendance adopted the Astana Commemorative Declaration, suggesting that the security of all participating states was linked and which focused on all aspects of security, not just military. After making several offers to host nuclear talks regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, in February 2013, Kazakhstan finally did so. While Kazakhstan was not part of the Six Party Talks among Russia, the US, the UK, France, Germany, and China, hosting the event was symbolic of the role of Kazakhstan on the issue. This effort to host the talks demonstrates how Kazakhstan seeks to be a significant actor in world affairs despite being considered by many measures a secondary—let alone geographically isolated—power (Lillis Feb 5, 2013).
Pursuing this role further, in August 2016, Kazakhstan held the Building a Nuclear-Free-World Conference in Astana. At that conference, Nazarbayev emphasized how his country gave up its nuclear weapons and called for other nuclear countries to do the same. Nazarbayev commented that there would be an Astana Peace Summit in November of that year, saying: “For a quarter century, based on the example of Kazakhstan we have formed an effective model for the way to a world free of nuclear weapons. We propose this model to be used by all countries of the world” (quoted in Dyussembekova, 2016). He went on to add: “In today’s world, Kazakhstan holds the leading position in the global anti-nuclear movement” (emphasis added). With its social creativity project on nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan propounds the idea that it represents the ideal paradigm for countries to follow toward more peaceful international relations. More recently, it has played a visible role in attempting to resolve the Syrian conflict, hosting several rounds of talks among Russia, Turkey, and Iran since 2017 in what has become known as the Astana Peace Process.
Both Nazarbayev and Tokayev have hailed their country’s actions internationally in numerous interviews and op-eds. In June 2020, for example, Tokayev stated: “Our country has consistently demonstrated its peacefulness and readiness to make a constructive contribution to global and regional security” (quoted “The Astana Times, 2020” June 26). In a January 2021 op-ed, Tokayev discussed the negative impact of the USSR on Kazakhstan’s identity: “We almost lost our traditions, language and religion. Thanks to independence, we were able to revive and strengthen our values” (quoted in Cohen, 2021). This statement hints at Kazakhstani exceptionalism, a sense of greatness as central to the image that Kazakhstan seeks to further. Noting the 30th anniversary of the newly independent Kazakhstan’s decision to close the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, President Tokayev made the link between the country’s role as a global leader in non-proliferation and its view of itself explicit: “Achieving a nuclear weapon-free world remains a policy priority of my government. Over the last thirty years, this aspiration has led Kazakhstan into the global anti-nuclear movement. It has become part of our national identity” (Official Website of the President 2021).
Kazakhstan’s efforts have also been praised by the United States. In 2021 the US Department of State announced: “Kazakhstan showed leadership when it renounced its nuclear weapons in 1993 and closed the Semipalatinsk Test Site” (US Department of State 1/20/2021). Later that year, the US Department of State further praised Kazakhstan: “We thank the Government of Kazakhstan for its continued partnership [on nuclear issues]” (US Department of State 8/27/2021).
This section has demonstrated how Kazakhstan has embraced social creativity and social mobility agendas to advance its international status in the area of nuclear weapons and international security more generally. Since it has not engaged in aggressive actions, it has not embraced social competition. While explicitly measuring whether Kazakhstan has been successful in improving its international image is not the goal of our study, in September 2022, American Professor Ivan Sascha Sheehan (2022) wrote in The National Interest: “The Kazakh model for nuclear disarmament was a successful political project…The Kazakh model of denuclearization should be commemorated on the Day Against Nuclear Tests and exported worldwide.”
In the section below, we show that social creativity is also the type of status-seeking behavior that Kazakhstan employs to advance an alternative view of democracy, one that deemphasizes political and civil rights and stresses economic development via state capitalism.
Democracy and Human Rights
The Kazakhstani government claims to be worthy of recognition for its positive role on international security issues; similarly, Kazakhstani state actors argue that the government should be recognized for the gains it has achieved in terms of democratization and human rights. These issues, unlike international security, are not something for which it has received much praise from the West. For example, in the same US Department of State press release in which the US praised Kazakhstan on nuclear issues, it also criticized Kazakhstan for a lack of progress in other areas: “serious problems remain, including corruption and arbitrary enforcement of laws and contracts” (1/20/2021). Nevertheless, at the heart of the Kazakhstani government’s efforts to improve its status internationally, as well as to secure legitimacy at home, have been long-standing claims to being a democratic state in Central Asia that is continually reforming toward even deeper democratization. While the audience for such claims is partially domestic, much of these efforts are aimed at the West. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tleuberdi wrote in the American magazine Newsweek in May of 2021: the administration of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has made it a priority to implement reforms in the direction of political diversity, openness and increased engagement between the government and civil society….Kazakhstan's reforms cover three broad areas—democratization of the political system, more power to the people and strengthened human rights.
Not only was the audience for the Foreign Minister’s opinion piece American, he emphasized the significance of these changes internationally: “We believe these reforms hold regional and global significance” (Tleuberdi, 2021).
A decade earlier, during the Arab Spring, Nazarbayev penned a similar piece in the Washington Post (2011) titled, “Kazakhstan’s Steady Progress toward Democracy.” Tellingly, much of the article concerned Kazakhstan’s economy, reflecting both the government’s preferred emphasis as well as the view of modernization theorists that economic development is a prerequisite for political development (Lipset, 1959; Rostow, 1960): “Accountability and an increased focus on individual rights will go hand in hand with economic success.” Regarding the political system, Nazarbayev simply stated, “We are determined to pick up the pace of reform….We are also strengthening the judiciary’s independence, as well as reviewing laws and reforming enforcement agencies to better protect human rights. We are listening to our growing civil society about speeding up change in the culture on rights and freedom” (Nazarbayev, 2011). Like many of the government’s proclamations aimed at an international audience, the piece was light on specific reforms and how they would be enacted and heavy on vague promises of greater democracy and expanded human rights.
It is worth noting that there is an interesting endogeneity in the dynamics among the audiences for Kazakhstani claims of democratic reforms. On the one hand, claims of democratic reforms may enhance the legitimacy of the government domestically if citizens believe they have greater impact over who is in power. However, even if citizens are not convinced by government rhetoric, that rhetoric may enhance the regime’s ability to maintain power; claims, such as those above, aimed at an international audience, may decrease pressure from Western states on Kazakhstan to democratize, thus allowing the state to continue to maintain its rule through autocratic means.
In fact, despite long-standing promises of democratic reforms, by several measures, Kazakhstan has become even less democratic since independence. V-Dem’s liberal democracy index measures not only electoral democracy but also factors that “limit the exercise of executive power,” including civil liberties, rule of law, judiciary independence, and checks and balances. Ranging from a low of 0 to a high of 1, the Index shows Kazakhstan falling from its highest score of .18 in 1993 to .13 in 2020; for comparison, neighboring Kyrgyzstan scored .29 in 2020, while Uzbekistan and Russia scored a slightly lower .10 (The V-Dem Dataset). Similarly, following Kazakhstan’s independence in the early 1990s, Freedom House initially ranked it “partially free,” but in more recent decades and up to the most recent 2022 publication, Kazakhstan is “not free” (Freedom House, 1994-1995 and 2022). The country receives particularly low scores for its electoral process, receiving a 0 out of 4 score for both measures of whether “the current head of government or other chief national authority” and the legislature were “elected through free and fair elections.” Overall, Kazakhstan’s score of 23 (out of 100) is not much higher than Russia’s 19 and is lower than that of Kyrgyzstan at 27 (Freedom House, 2022).
It is evident from these measures of democracy that Kazakhstan’s government has failed to live up to its continual promises of political reform. Domestically, the government relies on soft authoritarianism and cooptation, resorting to harder measures when it feels its grip on power is truly being contested (Schatz, 2008). But that power is not truly contested in elections, which are neither free nor fair. For example, after Kazakhstan’s presidential election in November 2022, the US Department of State issued a statement that both praised and criticized the Kazakhstani government. While the US applauded President Tokayev’s pledge in early 2022 for political and economic reforms, Washington also criticized the November 2022 election. Referencing the OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights report, the Department of State declared: despite there being no violence on election day, “the election took place in the absence of meaningful political competition and continued limits on the freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly” (US Department of State, Nov 22, 2022). Astana attempts to use pro-democracy rhetoric to minimize the external pressure from developed states to democratize, rather than a social mobility strategy, which would require real democratic reforms. At the same time, it utilizes social creativity to advance its status with developing countries by reframing the issue of democracy as a system that prioritizes economic development rather than political and civil rights.
One way Astana does so is by claiming that democracy first requires modernization. And “modernization,” as Nazarbayev (2015) has made clear, first requires economic development: “I put economic reforms at the forefront of modernization because I was sure that the development of democracy would be more successful if the priorities were clearly set: first - the economy, then - politics.” Thus, Nazarbayev followed the model of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, who made that state’s ethnic diversity and drive toward economic development the dual justifications for not pursuing democratic reforms. The Kazakhstani government makes the case that it is limited in the progress it can make in terms of democracy and domestic human rights due to Asian history or “Asian values.” 10 Embracing the Asian values argument, Nazarbayev’s statement on China reflects his discontent with the Western emphasis on democracy promotion: “Unlike the West, China never teaches us about how to live” (quoted in Umirbekov, 2019). Demonstrating social creativity, Astana frames its ability to seek political and civil rights reforms as constrained by structural issues and suggests Western states should be lenient toward it in terms of what it can actually accomplish in the short run.
Writing in a 2004 op-ed, Tokayev expressed his discontent regarding Western criticism of Kazakhstan’s political system, lamenting how the West criticizes Kazakhstan for not achieving political reforms as extensive as its economic reforms (95). He took exception with the West’s view that Kazakhstan is not moving forward with political reforms (95). In justifying the political conditions in Kazakhstan, Tokayev stated, “the truth is that we started the process of building democracy in our country only 10 years ago” (95). Thus, when it comes to its image as a democracy, the regime wishes to have it both ways. On the one hand, it claims to have made significant progress toward liberal democracy; on the other, it defends a lack of progress as grounded in both the relatively brief period since independence and its need, like many states in the region, to prioritize development.
On issues of political stability, democratization, and foreign interference in its internal affairs, Kazakhstan’s preferences, therefore, align much more closely to those of its neighbors, such as China and Russia, than they do with those of the West. This has the dual benefit of helping the regime stay in power domestically while also improving Kazakhstan’s status among non-democracies and developing states regionally, which further enhances its ability to maintain power (O’Neill 2014). Political stability, which is (at least in the short term) enhanced by limiting political and civil rights, is a fundamental norm that is essential for regime survival in Kazakhstan and other non-democracies. States in Central Asia, as well as other non-democratic regimes globally, stress the norm of non-interference in their domestic affairs promulgated by China in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence from 1954 (Vanderhill et al., 2020). In short, authoritarianism is a norm in the region and for many other developing states (Costa Buranelli, 2020). Limiting democracy, in other words, is highly salient in Central Asia and the Global South in terms of how Kazakhstan operates in its quest for status; social stability and economic development are often viewed as a state’s primary roles (and as fundamental rights for citizens) as well as prerequisites for democratic political development.
Coopting the Asian values ideology of Southeast Asian leaders Mahathir bin Mohamad and Lee Kuan Yew for a Central Asian state exemplifies Astana’s social creativity agenda, allowing it to prioritize economic development over liberal democracy, while claiming to make progress on human rights defined broadly. Indeed, while the Kazakhstani government has not aggressively pursued democracy, the government does depict itself as performing well in terms of the progress that it has achieved on domestic political reforms given the constraints it is facing as a developing state land-locked between two of the world’s great powers. As Marat (2009) noted, in a post-Borat effort at “nation branding” aimed at changing its international image and securing the OSCE chairmanship, the government handed out pamphlets to foreign visitors suggesting that the Kazakhstani government not only protected property rights but provided an “extraordinary degree of political freedom.”
In an op-ed that Nazarbayev wrote in 2011, 11 he reflected on the conditions that led people in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to take to the streets during the Arab Spring, arguing that it was due to the lack of economic opportunities, not the lack of having a voice in their country’s affairs. Nazarbayev mentioned that many international observers did not have confidence that Kazakhstan would succeed as an independent state, but they had been proven wrong. Kazakhstan’s president lauded both the economic gains the country had achieved, as well as progress toward democracy (Nazarbayev March 31, 2011). If there were no economic development, he posited, then countries would be at risk of sliding back to authoritarianism. Nazarbayev argued that it took centuries for the world’s leading democracies to develop, and thus it would take time for Kazakhstan to develop its democracy. Nevertheless, he applauded the progress Kazakhstan had made (Nazarbayev, March 31, 2011).
Thus, in terms of seeking status, Nazarbayev has not sought to please the West on the West’s terms (i.e., not pursued a social mobility agenda); instead, he has advanced his vision and values (i.e., pursued a social creativity agenda) regarding political development, which plays well with leaders of many developing countries and non-democratic states (Putz, 2015; Yu, 2022). For many Asian countries, there is a commonly accepted view of security that focuses not just on military strength but also economic development, which is viewed as essential to achieving a secure state. China, of course, stands as the current quintessential example in the region, but has followed an Asian (and, initially German) model of state strength based in industrialization and development pursued more than a century earlier in Japan, and then South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia.
In 2017 at the BRI Forum in Beijing, Nazarbayev praised China’s Belt and Road Initiative as offering a better way forward than the neoliberalism advocated by the US and the Western institutions it dominates. According to Nazarbayev: “The proclaimed approach ‘stability though joint development’ is an attractive form of international cooperation reflecting the economic interests of dozens of countries” (quoted in Orazgaliyera, 2017). In terms of economic development, Nazarbayev posits that China’s model is more attractive than Western alternatives.
Despite showing a preference for autocratic models of development, exemplified by Singapore and China, Kazakhstan has attempted to improve its image globally in the realm of human rights. It creatively pursues a somewhat antithetical stance that promotes a narrow set of transnational rights focused on interfaith cooperation that are not a threat to the regime’s survival, while limiting the civil and political rights of Kazakhstani citizens. In other words, Astana puts great effort into appearing to be a cooperative global player on human rights, despite serious political repression at home. While extolled for progress by authoritarian governments that view democracy more in terms of expanding economic opportunities, among developed Western states and NGOs, Kazakhstan has a dismal reputation regarding domestic human rights. As Human Rights Watch (2022) summarized the situation in 2022: Political reforms promised by Kazakhstan’s President Kasym-Jomart Tokayev since he came to power in 2019 have not led to meaningful improvements in the country’s poor human rights record. Free speech is suppressed and a new peaceful assemblies law, touted by authorities as progressive reform, continues to restrict the right to peaceful protest. Kazakh authorities have used politically motivated prosecutions to silence government critics…and banned political opposition groups.
Despite this well documented record of human rights abuses, in 2012, in order to support its candidacy for the UN Human Rights Council, the government committed to a series of “voluntary pledges and commitments for the promotion and protection of human rights” writing to the Secretary General: “Since gaining independence, Kazakhstan has declared the policy of democratization and rule of law to ensure equal rights to its citizens, recognizing human life, rights and freedoms as supreme values of society. Kazakhstan successfully moves to building a free and open society through democratic transformations in a newly formed State” (Aitimova, 2012).
The Kazakhstani government’s words and actions internationally demonstrate that it is keen on advancing its global status in the realm of human rights. This has been manifested in the various international initiatives that the government has launched or been part of, such as hosting the Fifth Congress of World Religions in June 2015. Kazakhstan’s “dialogue of civilizations,” which promotes religious commonalities and interfaith dialogue regionally and even globally, provides an alternative to Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” narrative (Laruelle, 2015). Such efforts improve the status of Kazakhstan but are relatively cheap for the Kazakh government compared to reforms at home that might threaten the leadership’s grip on power.
Stretching the Limits of Soft Authoritarianism
The fact that Nazarbayev and Tokayev have written numerous op-eds (some of which are quoted above) that focus on the issue of Kazakhstan’s status-seeking demonstrates their desire to construct an image of Kazakhstan as an important state internationally. Examining such Kazakhstani op-eds by the leadership offers a window into how the government frames its desire for status and reveals the leadership's discontent with a lack of recognition. Given that the main objective for all state leaders is to remain in power, US pressure for democratization and regime change or democratization globally under the Bush administration were viewed as a major threat to the regime. This was especially true as the Color Revolutions were occurring in much of the post-Soviet space, including neighboring Kyrgyzstan (Schatz, 2009). In one sense, then, the Kazakhstani government’s words and actions in the realm of democracy and human rights can be viewed as a form of diffusion-proofing (Koesel & Bunce, 2013); regime survival domestically takes priority over Western democratic norms. In addition, opposing the West makes for good politics with some audiences, both domestically and internationally, and, particularly, regionally.
Despite significant political repression, Kazakhstan has long been considered a “soft authoritarian” state (Schatz, 2008) in which the leadership held significant legitimacy with the population and did not resort to some of the extreme measures of its neighbors, such as the crackdown in Uzbekistan by Islam Karimov in 2005 and during Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution the following year leading to the fall of Askar Akaev. “Soft authoritarianism,” as Schatz (2009) observes, “relies more centrally on the means of persuasion than on the means of coercion, although coercion remains a part of the ruling elite’s arsenal.”
However, on the second day of 2022, the government shifted from emphasizing “soft” persuasion to “hard” coercion, as anti-government protests swept the country following a doubling of fuel prices after a price cap was removed. While the price cap removal was the spark, the fuel for the protests was a long list of grievances among many different groups in the country, from coal miners to students. But much of the anger was clearly directed at the stranglehold that Nursultan Nazarbayev, whose leadership dated back to Soviet times, and the political elite more generally have held, not only on politics but also on business in the country since independence. State-business links form a type of crony capitalism that has kept the relatively small ruling coalition content while, until recently, relatively light coercion kept a lid on public dissatisfaction (O’Neill 2014). Nazarbayev had stepped down from the presidency in 2019 but still held the important position of Chairman of the Security Council, which he relinquished to Tokayev 3 days after the protests began. More than two hundred civilians were killed in the 2022 crackdown, and the government arrested more than 12,000.
The recent crackdown came just 6 months after President Tokayev had signed the legal decree “On further measures of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the field of human rights (2021).” That pronouncement promised to approve the Plan of Priority Measures on Human Rights, which would include “the right to freedom of association; the right to freedom of expression; the human right to life and public order; increasing the efficiency of interaction with non-governmental organisations; human rights in criminal justice, enforcement and prevention of torture and ill-treatment.” About the decree, Tokayev tweeted: “An important stage of political modernization is the further realization of concrete measures in the field of human rights. Today I signed the corresponding Decree. The government is instructed to adopt a plan of urgent measures for its implementation” (Arystanbek, 2021).
Tellingly, the ambassador at large for human rights at Kazakhstan’s foreign ministry, Usen Suleimen, emphasized the international audience and the potential economic benefits of the proposed human rights reforms: “The step taken by the president is an important strategic decision aimed at strengthening the economic side of Kazakhstan’s development. We can expect the bolstering of economic relations with the countries of Europe, America and Asia leading up to the formation of a powerful regional economy” (Arystanbek, 2021). Thus, once again, the government made clear its prioritizing economic development over political development. Utilizing a social creativity strategy, the government frames development less in terms of societal and political changes and more in terms of GDP growth.
The Environment
The environment is another issue area in which Kazakhstan has creatively sought to improve its status internationally while confronting domestic economic constraints against reform. In addition, since independence it has faced environmental catastrophes dating from the Soviet era, including the gradual disappearance of the Aral Sea and the nuclear waste and radiation exposure related to the Semipalatinsk Test Site. Having been a victim of the environmental irresponsibility of the Soviet government in Moscow, Kazakhstan is well placed to speak out on environmental issues at the regional and global level and craft an image of a country that is moving from a dark and dirty environmental past toward a cleaner and greener environmental future. But not all of Kazakhstan’s environmental woes stem from its time as a Soviet Republic; as an independent state, Astana has prioritized economic development over sustainability and fossil fuel exports over addressing climate change. Nevertheless, as with the previous issues of nuclear proliferation and democratic rights, the government of Kazakhstan has used its experiences as a Soviet Republic and its rhetoric as an independent state to shape an image as an important player, or even leader, regionally, and a cooperative state globally, on environmental issues.
In terms of the environment—and not without reason—Kazakhstan paints itself as a victim of Soviet Cold War policies aimed at developing military and economic power at all costs. The near disappearance of the Aral Sea symbolizes that victimization, as the Soviets used the water of what was once the fourth largest lake in the world to irrigate cotton fields and other lands to accelerate agricultural output (Altynsarnina, 2018). The Aral, once 26,000 sq miles, has lost 90% of its size and Kazakhstan views itself as at the forefront in regional cooperation to address this environmental, social, and economic crisis. As then Minister of Foreign Affairs Erlan Idrissov wrote in 2013, “At President Nazarbayev’s initiative, an effort was undertaken in 1993 to reverse the consequences of this environmental disaster through a decision by the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to establish the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS).” Nazarbayev was the first president of the IFAS from 1993 to 1996 and held the position again from 2009 to 2012. And Kazakhstan’s success in reviving the Aral, relative to its neighbors, has indeed been notable; the government, working with the World Bank, damned off the northern section of the sea (North Aral Sea or NAS) that is wholly within Kazakh territory, allowing for a return of local economies based on fisheries. According to Masood Ahmad, World Bank task team leader for the Syr Darya Control and Northern Aral Sea (NAS) project: “The NAS project is a great success story. It helped to improve the health and living conditions of about one million people and reduce poverty in the region” (Pribylovsky, 2014).
Kazakhstan has received approbation on the issue from the international press and international organizations. In 2008, then head of the World Bank, Robert Zoellick, was explicit in his praise for Nazarbayev’s role in the attempted revival: “President Nazarbayev had the vision to realize that this was not only an environmental disaster, but it was a destructive aspect for this whole region of Kazakhstan” (Golovnina, 2008). Ten years later, the BBC called Kazakhstan “The country that brought a sea back to life,” contrasting Kazakhstan’s success with Uzbekistan’s failure to manage the Aral crisis (Chen, 2018). Astana’s relative success has allowed it to take a broader role as a regional leader on water issues; more recently, USAID (2022) referred to Kazakhstan as an emerging “regional leader in integrated water resource management.” As Weinthal (2002) has argued, such cooperation with international organizations is not only a means by which less powerful and recently independent states engage in state-building but also a method to enhance their international legitimacy.
Attempting to build upon this relative success on water issues, more recently the government has promoted Kazakhstan as a leader on sustainable development. In 2013, with the explicit approval of President Nazarbayev, the government issued the “CONCEPT for transition of the Republic of Kazakhstan to Green Economy (2013).” The CONCEPT is integrated into the Kazakhstan 2050 development plan, which seeks to make the country one of the top 30 developed countries in the world by 2050. It includes key domestic priorities, like transitioning away from reliance on fossil fuel exports, expanding the use of sustainable energy sources, addressing regional inequalities, and securing domestic sources of natural resources. However, like many major initiatives announced by the government, the CONCEPT also seeks to improve Kazakhstan’s status and global awareness of Kazakhstan by achieving EU standards in a range of areas including air pollution, water quality, and waste. Reflecting the government’s desire to advance its status as a responsible and productive state, The CONCEPT specifically remarks on the expectations on Kazakhstan from the “global community”: The global community expects Kazakhstan to successfully implement several landmark projects: the EXPO 2017 exhibition entitled Energy of the Future and the Green Bridge Partnership Program aimed at contributing to sustainable development in Central Asia and other regions of the world (5).
This government document (i.e., the CONCEPT) reflects the dual purpose of Astana’s many initiatives; they are efforts to reform domestic policies with one eye on the international audience. The CONCEPT was aimed at meeting Kazakhstan’s commitments to international treaties, such as the Paris Agreement, while attempting to move toward a greener economy domestically (Kazbekova, 2020). But the plan appears to be more an international relations strategy than a domestic development program. As Poberezhskaya and Danilova (2021) write, Astana’s “climate change communication is driven by a pragmatic foreign policy which simultaneously strengthens the regime through representing Kazakhstan as a regional leader and an important international actor of global sustainable development (445).”
Similar to the Green Economy CONCEPT, the Kazakhstan Foreign Policy CONCEPT, also based on the Strategy 2050 directives, emphasizes Kazakhstan’s position in the world (Foreign Policy CONCEPT, 2014). It states: “The increased participation of Kazakhstan in world affairs can be seen by the rising role and strengthening international reputation of the state, its increased regional weight and importance for the world financial institutions and global economy.” It explicitly states that one of the 11 main foreign policy goals is the “sustainable international position and positive global image of Kazakhstan.” As with the Green Economy CONCEPT, part of that effort is to be viewed as a cooperative player on the environment. The Foreign Policy Concept declares: Putting a priority on environmental protection and the protection of global climate, Kazakhstan will: pursue efforts to implement the concept on transition of the country to a “green economy”… [and] …implement the Astana initiative “Green Bridge”, aimed at strengthening the partnership between public and private sectors in Europe, Asia and the Pacific, civil and international organizations to implement programs and plans to promote “green growth.”
All of this reflects Astana’s desire to be seen not only as addressing domestic environmental problems but as cooperative, and even at the forefront, on environmental issues regionally and globally. Thus, the government pursues a social mobility strategy in acting on the environment that is viewed favorably by Western states, thereby raising the profile of Kazakhstan as a key player on climate change and the environment.
Greenwashing?
As Kenneth Rapoza (2017) wrote in Forbes about EXPO 2017, “This weekend’s launch of Expo 2017 in Kazakhstan is this former Soviet state’s big moment. Kazakhstan is cementing its role on the world stage and out of Russia’s shadow.” EXPO 2017 was a World’s Fair running for several months before the harsh Kazakh winter. The event’s theme was “Future Energy,” which was somewhat ironic given the country’s major role as a fossil fuel exporter. Indeed, it was the massive revenues the state receives from fossil fuels that allowed the government to spend over $3 billion to put on this show for the world. Yet as Astana’s Mayor Asset Issekeshev stated, “Kazakhstan sees no contradiction between supplying today’s energy needs while also being committed to development of sustainable and cleaner energy that will benefit future generations. The two are not mutually exclusive in our progressive vision” (Buscardini, 2017). 12
While the EXPO emphasized Kazakhstan’s role globally, the Green Bridge Partnership Program put the country at the center of regional efforts to improve the environment; it aims to create cooperative mechanisms to make development more sustainable in Central Asia via technology and knowledge transfers as well as financial support. Reflecting the long arm of the state in civil society, however, Aliya Nazarbayeva, Nazarbayev’s youngest daughter, chairs the Association of Environmental Organizations of Kazakhstan and promotes the Green Bridge domestically and abroad. Indicative of the contradictions inherent in Kazakhstan’s small ruling coalition and corrupt, resource-dominated political economy, her husband, Dimash Dossanov, was chief executive of state-run QazaqGaz, the largest gas supplier in Kazakhstan, until the 2022 political turmoil. Thus, climate change has become another aspect of Kazakhstan’s “resource nationalism”; strategically, the government reframes climate change as a tool or “resource” of the state. As an authoritarian regime, Astana can, to some extent, control climate change discussions, minimizing the state’s role in the global problem while prioritizing development, still greatly dependent on natural resource extraction (Poberezhskaya & Danilova, 2021). And state resources linked to addressing Kazakhstan’s stated climate change goals simply become another source of rents to be battled for among the leadership.
The EXPO, the Green Bridge, and many other meetings and conventions on the environment hosted by Kazakhstan are partially aimed at a developed country audience. As Poberezhskaya and Bychkova (2021) write regarding Kazakh environmental initiatives, “This desire to match expectations of the global community (mostly the EU and the OECD members) correlates with Kazakhstan’s persistent interest in gaining Western approval since its independence in 1991 (904).” But as they also note, Astana is clearly prioritizing the economy over the environment, what others have called “greenwashing”; the country creates a pro-environment narrative aimed at an international audience while continuing to rely on oil and gas exports economically. Given the nature of Kazakhstan’s political economy, including the lack of transparency, these green initiatives also provide opportunities for the state to reward key supporters with business and rent seeking opportunities; thus, so-called “green” projects may be supported less for their impact on the environment than for their role in helping the regime continue in power. In short, on environmental issues, Kazakhstan pursues a mixed social creativity and mobility strategy; it attempts to join the ranks of states at the forefront of sustainable development while creatively attempting to gloss over its role in the climate crisis.
Conclusion
In this article, we have examined how Kazakhstan seeks to advance its status internationally through three main issues: international security, democratic rights, and the environment. Our study contributes to the literature on status in International Relations by focusing on status-seeking by a secondary power. We have joined other recent scholars (e.g., Karim, 2018; Park & Jakstaite-Confortola, 2021) studying status by looking beyond the great powers and also beyond a narrow focus on status-seeking as solely concerning conflict or social competition. The case of Kazakhstan demonstrates that status-seeking can be peaceful, especially its actions with its nuclear arsenal, which, it can be argued, were not just peaceful but promoted global peace. Our case study contradicts much of the literature based on a central argument that Larson and Shevchenko (2003) employ: states that are denied status resort to aggressive behavior. As Macdonald & Parent (2021) also observe (360), much of the literature (Krickovic & Weber, 2018; Murray, 2019; Renshon, 2017; Ward, 2017) presents status-seeking states as destabilizing the international system (360) and, they conclude, scholars “neglect the ways in which status can defuse conflict and promote cooperation (383).” In support of their conclusion, the case of Kazakhstan illustrates that status-seeking does not require competitive behavior and that such pursuits can have positive outcomes for regional and global cooperation. Of the three main ways that states seek status (via creativity, mobility, and competition), Astana has mostly embraced a social creativity agenda but also pursues a social mobility strategy, when the preferences of major Western powers are not a threat to the regime’s political survival. On the issue of nuclear weapons, despite attempting to maximize the benefits of abdicating its nuclear weapons, the Kazakhstani government depicts itself as a country for all others to emulate. This is a social creativity strategy in the sense that Astana seeks to advance its view of how states should regard the possession of nuclear weapons and a social mobility strategy in that the US, and other major powers, oppose nuclear proliferation. On that issue, it has not received international criticism and is frequently praised.
Regarding Kazakhstan’s status-seeking on political rights issues, however, it has received less support, and even pushback, from Western states. Given the fact that the leadership’s desire to remain in power and secure its regime is a higher priority than is its status in the West on democracy and human rights, it is less concerned about international criticism in these issue areas. In addition, given how power is dispersed internationally in an increasingly multipolar world, the target of Kazakhstan’s status-seeking is not limited to Western democratic states. 13 And, as we show above, how Kazakhstan is regarded internationally varies by other states’ own levels of economic and political development. Nevertheless, the Kazakhstani government has used words, if not deeds, to advance its stance that it, indeed, deserves praise as a country that is becoming more democratic. Lastly, on environmental issues, and particularly climate change, the government has creatively sought to have its cake and eat it too. Members of the ruling family are, at the same time, involved in the domestic production of massive amounts of fossil fuels that accelerate global warming as well as in the country’s regional initiatives to promote a greener economy.
All of this reflects the agency of Astana, as a mid-level power actively seeking to improve its status and construct its global image rather than passively accepting how it is regarded regionally and internationally. This suggests that such powers can pursue strategies to improve their status, and, therefore, potentially their influence internationally. It further suggests that such mid-level powers can choose and manage these strategies in ways that will minimize the opposition of greater powers. We hope that this will lead to further qualitative case studies by area experts detailing how individual states seek to shape their image and status internationally, as well as quantitative, large-n studies that provide creative measures of status and determine the impacts of government policies on it, more generally.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The authors thank two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful suggestions.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
