Between centrality and anxiety

Historic and contemporary anxiety about Asia in Australia

In the decade before Australia federated, fear of China became central to the popular and political imagination of Australia. The inflow of Chinese to the gold fields saw the Australian colonies pass laws in the 1850s against Chinese immigration, the rationale being that these Chinese men coming from an ‘inferior’ blood-line and culture might marry white women and therein dilute the racial purity of Australia (Walker and Sobocinska, 2012). The victory of the Japanese navy over the Russian fleet in 1905 enhanced Australia’s fear of invasion from Japan to conquer the under-populated ‘White Australia’ (Walker and Sobocinska, 2012: 4).

The remarkable feature of Australian history is how these moments of anxiety that were evident in Australia’s formation as a nation reappear throughout its history. The nation was in effect founded in 1901 on a racial basis, through the White Australia Policy, and this has remained a subconscious element in Australia’s engagement with Asia ever since (Walker and Sobocinska, 2012). Effectively, the White Australia Policy remained in place from 1901 until it was repealed by the Whitlam government in 1973. Nevertheless, its influence is a continual undercurrent in Australian politics and culture as it is the binary opposite to the dominant white culture and a bookend to the racial discrimination against Indigenous peoples.

The anxiety in Australia was enhanced with the bombing of Pearl Harbour and the fall of Singapore to the Japanese army in 1942, reinforced by Japan’s bombing of Darwin leading to a growing political realisation that Australia needed US military defensive power.

This climate of enhanced fear was politically turned from Japan to China, when in 1949 the Chinese Communist Party secured control over the mainland and established the People’s Republic of China. The signing of the ANZUS Treaty in 1951 and the onset of the Korean War drew Australia closer to the US position and the ‘Yellow Menace’ was now the ‘Red Menace’ and a ‘forward defence’ posture was adopted by Australia. The dominant foreign policy perspective saw China as ‘the enemy’ and this propelled Australia into the Vietnam War as a means of preventing what were seen as dominoes falling to communism (Girling, 1967). Nevertheless, throughout this Cold War period Australia maintained strong trading links to China where economic self-interest and security policy were at odds.

Upon his election victory in 1972, Whitlam recognised the PRC and its position in the United Nations (Fitzgerald, 2015: 78). His successor Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser accepted the new direction towards China but read China as basically a bulwark against Soviet ‘expansionism’ (Fitzgerald, 2015: 142). The Hawke government (1983–1991) developed an all-round relationship with China speaking of it as both ‘special’ and as a model for engagement with Asia. However, the 1989 Tiananmen ‘incident’ problematised the ‘special’ relationship (Sutter, 2002).

In the broader Australian turn to Asia, Bob Hawke in 1989 was able to take an opportunity created by decades of negotiation to promote free trade ideals in Asia by supporting the establishment of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). When he became Prime Minister, Paul Keating promoted further trade liberalisation in Asia, signified by the 1994 Bogor Declaration. APEC was a prominent symbol of how both the Hawke and Keating governments had turned to the Asian region for trade and economic liberalisation. The Hawke government, nevertheless, retained the ANZUS strategic alliance with the US, merely adding this to their new regional focus (Mackerras, 2000).

The Howard government was elected in 1996 on a platform of stressing the US alliance and deliberate disengagement with Hawke and Keating’s multilateral Asian direction. The centrality of Asia and the rise of China, nevertheless, could not be ignored. Upon election in 1996, Howard was embroiled in a US–China dispute with his support for the US navy’s intervention in the Taiwan Straits, to the displeasure of China (Mackerras, 2000).

Moreover, on the domestic front, the 1996 election had brought into Federal parliament Pauline Hanson. She quickly gained prominence by advocating a return to the White Australia Policy and her outspoken anti-Asian rhetoric garnered enough electoral support for her to form the One Nation Party (Megalogenis, 2015: 255). Prime Minister Howard’s silence on her racism gave political space for Hanson to promote anti-Asian sentiments and for her party to gain political prominence (Fitzgerald, 2015: 214). After eight months of polarising racist dialogue, Howard broke his silence and criticised Hanson’s position (Wear, 2008). Subsequent elections saw One Nation falter but the image of Australia in Asia was tarnished as it implied the White Australia Policy had resonance amongst voters.

The Howard government was then embroiled in a series of Asian conflicts. The dispute over the Taiwan Straits, the 1998 nuclear tests in India and Pakistan where Australia found itself in agreement with China in its criticisms of the tests (Mackerras, 2000: 190), and the conflict over East Timor independence which saw tensions between Australia, Indonesia, and the US (Leaver, 2001). The Asian financial crises caused a change in Australian policy as both China and Australia weathered the storm and began to grow economically more complementary (Megalogenis, 2015: 253). Gradually, the Howard government recognised that economic growth in China would benefit Australia (McCarthy and Song, 2015). Howard constructed a formula whereby China was depicted as Australia’s best trading ‘customer’, but the US was depicted as a strategic ally which shared Australia’s values, whereas China did not (McCarthy and Song, 2015).

In 2001, Howard was in Washington on 9/11 and he strongly empathised with then President George W Bush and invoked the ANZUS Treaty and readily deployed Australian troops in the US-led invasion of Iraq. Australia’s unequivocal support for the US’s role in the Middle East gave Australia cover to develop closer economic relations with China. In October 2003, following an APEC meeting, President Bush was invited by Howard to address the Australian Parliament. Simultaneously, President Hu Jintao was also invited to address the parliament the next day when he was due to be in Australia. This unprecedented joint address clearly symbolised how China had become a central part of Australian international policy (McCarthy and Song, 2015).

The Howard years are depicted as a paradox, as his values were Anglo-centric, his foreign policy overwhelmingly US dependent, and yet China became Australia’s major trading partner (Wesley, 2007). The 2007 election saw John Howard defeated by the Mandarin-speaking Leader of the Opposition, Kevin Rudd. Prime Minister Rudd came to power with high expectations that he would offer a more nuanced approach to Asia in general, and China in particular (Johnson, Ahluwalia and McCarthy, 2010: 71). However, Rudd was concerned not to be seen by the Australian press or the US administration as a Sinophile (Cotton and Ravenhill, 2013: 12). When he went to China, Rudd criticised its human rights record in public, saying he was doing so as a ‘true friend’, but this was taken as a diplomatic offence by China (McCarthy and Gao, 2015: 22). Rudd also had grand regional plans for an Asia-Pacific Community that would lock China into Western-based international agreements, but this proposal never gained political traction with Asian national leaders (Jain, 2008: 92–93).

The economic centrality of China to Australia became manifest in the Rudd period. In 2009, China surpassed Japan to become Australia’s largest export market with resources, especially iron ore, underpinning Australia’s trade with China. In 10 years, China rose from Australia’s 10th-largest export market for elaborate manufacturing goods to be the third-largest. In addition, Australia’s services exports to China, valued at A$8.8 billion in 2015, were dominated by educational service at $4.69 billion with Chinese students being 34 percent of the total (DFAT, 2015).

These economic relations were in essence transnational in character, principally involving enterprise to enterprise contracts. The complexity of these relations and how these could evoke political and media anxiety was revealed in 2008–2009 when the Chinese state enterprise Chinalco sought to buy into Rio Tinto. The Chinalco proposal was complex, involving three tranches, and it was referred to the Foreign Investment Review Board by Treasurer Wayne Swan. As the FIRB decision drew to a close in mid-2009, there was a media campaign against the Chinalco bid, led by Senator Barnaby Joyce from the National Party, the Greens Party, and prominent Independent Nick Xenophon. In the end Rio Tinto walked away from the deal but the controversy over Chinese SOEs investing in Australia was now a central public policy topic.

The corporate backlash combined with Rudd’s chaotic management style saw him controversially and unexpectedly replaced by Julia Gillard in June 2010. Gillard, on her first trip overseas, ensured she followed the Howard’s security-first policy of visiting Japan before venturing to China (McCarthy and Song, 2015). To signal her awareness of the centrality of China, Prime Minister Gillard commissioned a major report into Australia and the region, titled Australia in the Asian Century White Paper (2012).

The Asian Century White Paper was an attempt to raise the debate on Asia and for the new prime minister to stamp her credentials as in the Hawke-Keating pro-Asia mould, whilst making a political distinction between her and opposition leader Tony Abbott (Jayasuriya, 2015). The White Paper stressed the need for Australian business, community, and governments to develop cultural capabilities to understand and gain from the economic benefit of China’s rise (Reece, 2014). The key drivers of the White Paper were first to spread public awareness of Australia’s trade with Asia, and secondly to address the lop-sided student market with few Australian students heading to Asia. The Gillard government introduced a student overseas funding mechanism, known as Asiabound, to support overseas students studying in Asia.

However, the Abbott government, elected in 2013, effectively abandoned the White Paper’s comprehensive direction, decommissioned its staffing, and removed it from the government website. The only policy that remained was a rebadged student study abroad program called the New Colombo Plan; an ironic title as the old Colombo Plan was based on the 1950s fear of the ‘Red Menace’. The election of the new government saw a rapid deterioration of relations with both China and Indonesia. These events, together with Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s adherence to the superiority of the ‘Anglosphere’, provoked speculation about the future of Australia’s commitment to Asia. As its foreign policy unfolded, the Abbott government nevertheless returned to the twin pillars of Australian foreign policy: security and trade.

On his first trip to China in April 2014, Tony Abbott followed Howard’s protocol ensuring that China came after visiting both Japan and South Korea. The object of the trip was the promotion of free trade agreements in all three countries. When President Xi came to Australia in November 2014, the free trade agreement was signed between the two countries. However, there remained tensions as Australia’s security alliance with the US was always in the foreground in any Australia–China relationship. This was evident in the debate over the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and over the China–Australia free trade agreement.

Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

China first initiated the idea to establish an Asia-centric multilateral bank in 2008 and its slow progress raised concerns by 2013 that it would be shelved, after doubts in Beijing about the bank’s acceptance and Beijing’s concerns ‘that there was no money for this’ (Koh, 2015). However, after some Middle East nations promised money and some European nations expressed support, Beijing moved more seriously with designing a new financial architecture for the region, despite opposition by leading global players such as the US and Japan. With support from inside Asia and beyond, President Xi Jinping unveiled the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in October 2013, during his visit to Southeast Asia. The proposal moved rapidly. Within a year, 21 nations signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in Beijing, just before the APEC summit in Beijing in November 2014. A deadline of 31 March 2015 was set for nations to join the bank as a founding member and when the time came China announced a list of 57 founding members, including last minute G-7 members the UK followed by Germany, Italy, and France. The only Asian G-7 member, Japan, did not join, nor did the US or Canada. Sixteen of the G-20 members joined excluding Japan, US, Canada, and Mexico (the latter three being North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) members). Both Japan and the US saw the new bank as challenging the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), in which the US and Japan have dominating influence and China has limited voting power despite its rank as the world’s second largest economy. Although reluctant initially, Australia finally joined the bank as a founding member.

Australia’s reluctance was in part a response to the opposition expressed by its key ally, the US, which opposed the establishment of a China-led bank, essentially challenging the existing global financial architecture. The US was also suspicious that China would promote its own interest by pushing exports of Chinese goods and services through the bank as reflected in Xi’s Silk Road Economic Belt initiative announced in September 2013 (Arase, 2015). The Obama administration actively campaigned against the AIIB in an effort to protect US economic and political dominance in the Asian region. As President Barack Obama asserted in April 2015, ‘if we don’t write the rules, China will write the rules in that region, and we will be shut out’ (Milner and Hussein Onn, 2015). Media reports suggested that US Secretary of State John Kerry asked the Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott not to join. Indeed, both announced in October 2014 they would not join the bank. As a result, Australia did not sign the MoU.

But opposing voices began to emerge within the Abbott government. While Abbott himself and Foreign Minister Julie Bishop backed US opposition, Trade Minister Andrew Robb and Treasurer Joe Hockey favoured joining the bank. Tony Abbott’s opposition was partly embedded in his close relationship with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe who also opposed the bank (Earl et al., 2015). Opposition appears to be overly sensitive to the assessment provided by Australia’s key security partners rather than on what will best serve Australia’s national interests. In other words, the case was not fully assessed on its merits but was essentially driven by Canberra’s relationship with a ‘great and powerful friend’ and a close security partner and the voices within Canberra that express a pro-Washington point of view. Australia echoed concerns expressed by the US and Japan about the new bank’s governance structure and inexperience with financial management. But in the wash-up, Australia saw economic benefit in joining, announced it would join the bank as a founding member just days before the deadline, after the national security committee of cabinet and then the full cabinet approved the proposal. Likewise, South Korea awaited the deadline before singing up to the AIIB.

Some key considerations changed the mind of Australian decision-makers. First, Canberra could potentially feel isolated in the region by not joining the new bank, especially when countries like India, Singapore, and even South Korea signed up. Australia’s buckling to pressure by the US and ‘friendly’ Japan to not join would have been clear, and would not serve Australia’s broader interests in the region where it is already perceived to be too Washington-focussed and compliant. Abbott’s rhetoric of ‘more Jakarta and less Geneva’ in foreign policy was also a signal that multilateralism was to be replaced by bilateral regional agreements and was meant to signal his Asian cultural sensitivities over his Anglo-centric values. Second, Canberra’s political leadership saw that the US did not impose political payback when Australia’s neighbour New Zealand and four G-7 members from Europe – the UK, France, Germany, and Italy – all signed on; for Australia this was simply band-wagoning. Third, Australia could recognise potential economic benefits for Australian businesses from AIIB-financed infrastructure projects. With Tony Abbott then chairing G20 and casting himself as the ‘infrastructure prime minister’, policymakers could recognise the AIIB’s significance for Australia’s participation in infrastructure projects in the region. Fourth was recognition that Australia will have greater influence on AIIB’s management and governance as an ‘insider’ rather than an ‘outsider’. Here it is clear that Australia did not calculate its own national interest independently. Even though multiple economic and other benefits for Australia were clear, the Australian political leadership waited to see the consequences of other US allies joining. Concerns about the response of its key security ally, the US, were instrumental in the decision-making process.

China–Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA)

Australia has free trade agreements ¹ with a number of countries including the US, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, and is in the process of negotiating with many more, including India. Negotiations for trade agreements with its three key northeast Asian partners – Japan, South Korea, and China – had continued for close to a decade. When the Abbott government came to power in 2013, it set itself the ambitious goal to conclude what it termed the ‘trade trifecta’ in its first year in office, a goal that was proudly achieved. All three countries are significant for Australia’s trade and investment. China and Japan are Australia’s two largest trading partners and together with Korea constitute more than 55 percent of Australia’s total goods and services exports (OEC, 2015: 1). It is widely canvassed that the benefits to flow to the Australian economy from these agreements will be significant, as then trade minister Andrew Robb speculated with his claim that they will ‘turbo charge’ Australia’s trade. ² Some contend that without free trade agreements with these countries, Australian exporters faced significant disadvantage vis-a-vis their competitors who had better access to these Northeast Asian markets. For example, Australian farmers could not compete with their New Zealand counterparts in China because an FTA that Auckland and Beijing signed in 2008 gave New Zealand exporters competitive advantage (Gray, 2014).

Such agreements enter into force only after domestic legal and parliamentary processes are complete in both partner countries. Each has its own processes for ratifying such agreements. In Australia, international agreements are subject to review by the Australian Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, and the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee. While ratification proceeded rather smoothly on the Japan–Australia Economic Partnership Agreement and the Korea–Australia Free Trade Agreement (both Japan and Korea are security allies of the US, as is Australia), the China–Australia Free Trade Agreement faced politicisation from the Opposition Labor Party, expressed particularly by its leader Bill Shorten, feeding into anti-Chinese sentiments. Since both major political parties had held government during the negotiation process, some may have expected that the China agreement, like those with Japan and Korea, would gain parliamentary approval rather easily. However, domestic politics prevailed as each major party used the issue as a vote winner.

Based on the Australia–China Economic and Trade Framework signed by then national leaders Prime Minister John Howard and President Hu Jintao in October 2003, a joint feasibility study was commissioned to produce a report to serve as the basis for entering into negotiations on bilateral free trade. This joint feasibility study produced in March 2005 concluded that ‘an Australia–China FTA is feasible and, on balance, would substantially benefit both countries’ (DFAT, 2005: 4). After 21 rounds of negotiations between May 2005 and September 2014, a free trade agreement was signed in June 2015. But before the ChAFTA could be approved by the Australian parliament, the Liberal Party overthrew Tony Abbott in a party room leadership contest and elected Malcolm Turnbull as new party leader and so Australia’s prime minister, and therein slowed the momentum on the agreement approval in both houses of the parliament. During the course of the negotiations, Australian governments alternated between the two main political parties and several prime ministers held office through bitter leadership contests, ³ while China saw a smooth leadership transition from Hu Jintao (2002–2012) to Xi Jinping.

Bipartisan support for an FTA with China was clear, as negotiations progressed under both Labor and Coalition governments. Yet, the final process became a political point-scoring match between the two main parties. While the opposition leader accused the government of taking away jobs from Australian workers by bringing in Chinese workers through the FTA, Prime Minister Tony Abbott characterised Labor’s opposition as ‘xenophobic’ and driven by ‘racist lies’ (Kenny, 2015). Warren Mundine, former Labor Party President and chairman of the Australian Government’s Indigenous Advisory Council, observed ‘Labor is “losing its way” in demanding these changes as the deal was “not this open slather of some sort of Chinese invasion”’ and ‘the campaign is not unlike the Party’s role in the White Australia policy’ (Riordan, 2015). Some former Labor luminaries such as Bob Hawke and Bob Carr favoured and supported the agreement, but Bill Shorten and his colleagues argue the deal will take away jobs from Australians by allowing Chinese workers to come in to work for Chinese companies.

The intensity of politics behind the ChAFTA turned it into a major electoral issue in a parliamentary by-election in Canning in Western Australia in September 2015. ⁴ During the campaign, one way that the Labor Party sought voter support was through its opposition to ChAFTA, detailing how this FTA is anti-worker and will take away jobs from Australians, thus asking voters to vote Labor. Michael O’Connor, the national secretary of the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU), the main force behind the Labor Party in its campaign against the pact, commented: ‘ChAFTA sells out Australian workers by allowing Chinese companies to bring in semi-skilled workers for the first time, and doing away with the requirement for employers to advertise for local labour first’ (CFMEU, 2015).

Even polls, commissioned by the union, were conducted to gauge Canning voters’ views on the pact. One poll conducted in late August revealed that 43 percent of voters opposed the China agreement while only 23 percent supported it (CFMEU, 2015). Another poll later that month found 49 percent of voters believed ChAFTA would be bad for Australian workers, while 32 percent responded positively. In the annual 2015 Lowy Poll, Australia’s voters revealed a recognition of the centrality of China to the Australian economy with 77 percent approval of trade with China but equal anxiety with 77 percent expressing concern over China’s investment in real estate (Lowy Institute for International Affairs, 2015). Here we see how what at first glance is an issue of foreign policy is also very much concerned with domestic policies and thus with the concerns of citizens. We also see that in a democratic nation where citizens can express their concerns at the ballot box, the ChAFTA issue was therefore drawn into the space of party politicking, which does not happen in a political system where citizens cannot express support or dissent through their vote.

Growth of Asia’s economic influence in Australia has always raised anxiety in Australia. In the 1980s, increasingly visible Japanese investment in Australia inspired protests and other opposition, with some critics even reminding Australians of Japanese wartime brutalities. Today Australia’s economic ties with Asia are strong, but there is still caution about the prospects of domination by Asian partners in trade and financial matters. With China the caution is especially strong; many outside China are aware of how Chinese firms in Africa, Eurasia, and the Mediterranean use industrial materials and labour from China for infrastructure development projects (Arase, 2015: 4–5). These concerns were also evident in the Chinalco bids for Rio Tinto mentioned earlier over mineral sovereignty.

The new cabinet appointed by Prime Minister Turnbull retained as trade minister Andrew Robb, who was behind accelerating the trade deals through ChAFTA. As was expected, the Australian parliament finally passed this FTA in November 2015 and the deal came into force in December. The new prime minister is more focused economically than his predecessor Tony Abbott, who approached every economic matter through a geostrategic lens. The whole ChAFTA process, however, shows that Australia still remains cautiously disposed towards China, even though the FTA deal is largely economic and was negotiated over a period of almost 10 years. Nevertheless, both Tony Abbott and his successor Malcolm Turnbull were keen to sign the Transpacific Partnership that had as its driver the enforcement of US-based corporate legal structures, whereby the agreement permits corporations to sue sovereign governments; a legal threat to which China, India, and Indonesia have been all not accepted. In this regard, Turnbull has a longstanding corporate experience of Asia, having worked in China for Goldman Sachs. His focus is economic rather than ideological but will confront the twin pillars of security and trade like all his predecessors.

Strategic and security relations

In this balance between trade and security, in 2013 Australia and China declared themselves as comprehensive strategic partners (DFAT, 2013). Yet Australia’s strategic outlook is largely informed and shaped by its relations with the US and its key Pacific ally Japan, which remained Australia’s largest trading partner for four decades until 2009 and through the 21st century has built strong security and defence ties with Australia. While forming closer ties with Japan, Australia has shifted the strategic lens through which it views relations with China (Song and McCarthy, 2015). Tony Abbott’s characterisation of Japan as Australia’s ‘best friend in Asia’ – indeed Australia’s ‘ally’ – did not go unnoticed in Beijing. But when in November 2013 China announced a new air defence identification zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea where China disputes Japan’s ownership of islands, China was furious at Australia’s response when Foreign Minister Julie Bishop called the Chinese Ambassador to explain the Chinese government’s military move. The Foreign Minister claimed the timing and manner of China’s announcement was ‘unhelpful in light of current regional tensions, and will not contribute to regional stability’ and that she was opposed to any ‘coercive or unilateral actions to change the status quo in the East China Sea’ (Jacobson, 2014). Beijing labelled the foreign minister’s statement as ‘irresponsible’ and ‘mistaken’, with Chinese officials advising Minister Bishop that Canberra had clearly taken sides over the disputed sovereignty of the islands when she visited Beijing just a week after the ADIZ announcement. Minister Bishop responded that Australia did not take sides on the issue of sovereignty but was simply concerned about any move that would add to regional tensions and increase the ‘risk of a miscalculation in disputed territorial zones in the region’ (Jacobson, 2014). The episode is a clear illustration of how, on security and defence issues, Australia is unhesitatingly on the side of the US and Japan.

In November 2011, then Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard and President Barack Obama announced the deployment of a Marine Air Ground Task Force to Darwin, at Australia’s central northern tip. This angered the Chinese leadership, who interpreted the deployment as part of Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’, a ‘rebalancing’ from the Middle East and against China, motivated by the typical ‘cold war’ mentality. The Global Times, a state-run nationalist newspaper, warned that ‘if Australia uses its military bases to help the US harm Chinese interests, then Australia itself will be caught in the crossfire’ ( Global Times, 2011).

A statement in May 2015 by US Defence Department Assistant Secretary for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear added fuel to the fire. In a testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he declared, ‘we will be placing additional Air Force assets in Australia as well, including B-1 bombers and surveillance aircraft’ (news.com.au, 2015). Both the US and Australian governments later denied any such plan and claimed that the official ‘misspoke’. But the Chinese response was cautious and strong, declaring that ‘defence co-operation with Washington should not “harm the interests” of Beijing’ (Murray and Kerin, 2015).

Although Australia denies that its closer security and defence ties with the US are directed against any country (read China), Australia’s actions indicate that it strongly supports Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’ and ‘rebalancing’ strategies and that it is helping to facilitate these strategies by making adjustments in its defence and security plans. Australia manifestly sees China as a country of strategic concern. This concern about what it perceives as China’s rising military threat is nowhere as clearly documented officially as in the 2009 Defence White Paper (Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030), which records concern about China’s military modernisation and capabilities in power projection (DoD, 2009: 34). One commentator claimed this Defence White Paper, launched by the Rudd government, boldly redefined Canberra’s official assessment of China’s role in the Asia-Pacific, cast a shadow on the future of Sino-Australian relations and reignited the old debate on the ‘China threat’ (Tubilewicz, 2010: 149). Given Kevin Rudd’s reputation as a ‘China apologist’ and even a ‘Manchurian candidate’, this commentator found the White Paper’s assessment of China ‘rather startling’ (Tubilewicz, 2010: 150). China’s response to the White Paper was rather mixed, including in recognition of its domestic political dimensions that the White Paper served as an excuse for Canberra to increase its military budget and for the Labor Party to improve its electoral successes (Tubilewicz, 2010: 154).

The 2013 Defence White Paper released by Prime Minister Julia Gillard, Rudd’s successor from the same Labor Party, shunned the confrontational language. Rather than levelling China as an ‘adversary’, it encouraged ‘China’s peaceful rise and ensuring that strategic competition in the region does not lead to conflict’. China was even portrayed as Australia’s military partner, with bilateral exercises, confidence-building dialogue, and raising the prospect of an Australia–China Military Culture and Friendship week (Medcalf, 2013). However, this language whilst in the 2016 Defence White Paper is offset by the strategic circumstances; specifically, China’s declaration of ADIZ in the East China Sea, its maritime claims in the South China Sea, and allegations of Chinese cyberattacks all find mention in the document.

Then-Defence Minister Kevin Andrews in his address to the Indian Institute of Defence and Strategic Analysis in New Delhi in September 2015 raised the issue of the South China Sea and concerns about large-scale land reclamation and construction activity, especially by China and other claimants (though no ‘other’ names were specified) (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2015). Although the new Turnbull government saw a new Minister, Marise Payne, appointed, the 2016 White Paper launched 25 February 2016 held the same critical view on China’s role in the South China Seas, saying it was ‘unhelpful’, ‘irresponsible’, and leading to ‘tensions’ (DoD, 2016: 13). The White Paper called for a significant rise in spending, with the centrepiece being 12 new submarines as the strategic ‘hedge’ against the rise of China.

The 2016 Defence White Paper was not as direct about China as the 2009 White Paper, but it reaffirmed Australia’s solid alliance with the US and other emerging partners such as Japan and India, while justifying defence spending on the basis of strategic uncertainties. These uncertainties were easily recognised by China, but a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson commented that ‘We are seriously concerned about and dissatisfied with the white paper’s negative statement on issues concerning the South China Sea and the development of China’s military strength’ (Medhora, 2016).

Australian view of China: Polls and surveys

Only a few polls are carried out in Australia asking for perceptions of countries around the world. One is the annual poll carried out since 2005 by the Lowy Institute, which gives us an idea of what Australians think about other countries’ importance to Australia. The rise of China is a recurring theme in the Lowy polls. On the one hand China is viewed as positively as Japan, for example, for the title of ‘Australia’s best friend in Asia’, but on the other, perceptions that China is increasingly becoming a military threat have risen (from 41 percent in 2009 to 48 percent in 2014). A majority of respondents (56 percent) also expressed concern about Australia allowing too much Chinese investment in Australia (Lowy Institute for International Affairs, 2014: 4–6). Midst these concerns, on the Lowy barometer that measures Australians’ feelings (warm, cool, etc.) towards a number of countries, China does quite well at 60 percent sitting in the mid-range between New Zealand (the warmest at 84 percent) and North Korea (the coolest at 29 percent). Results of the Lowy polls lead us in the same direction as our discussion above: China as central to Australia’s economic wellbeing alongside concerns about a perceived Chinese military threat. As noted earlier, the 2015 Lowy Poll confirms the view that China is a valuable trading partner but is regarded with anxiety over real estate investment (Lowy Institute for International Affairs, 2015).

Another international poll, conducted by Pew, is also worth mention. Its latest Global Attitudes and Trends survey (Pew Research Center, 2015) includes Asians’ views of each other. Interestingly, Australia is included in the Asian section – and results are similar to those from the Lowy polling. For Australians, 57 percent held a favourable view of China, 80 percent held this view for Japan, and 58 percent held this view for India, slightly higher than for China. A 2013 Australian National University Poll on Australians’ views on world affairs revealed that a smaller percentage (30.2) than on the Lowy polls regarded China as a military threat, while more (52.1 percent) regarded China as an economic threat. Percentages differ because of the way questions are put, but Charles Miller of ANU commented that

Overall, the perception that China is a potential security threat to Australia has been subtly rising in recent years relative to the early 2000s, when most people’s minds were on the threat from Islamist terrorism. However, this runs counter to the consensus amongst security experts, most of whom agree China is not a current threat (Liddy, 2014).

Businesses in Australia mainly view China quite favourably. For example, in an Australia China Business Council 2014 survey, two thirds of Australians said they regarded China as ‘being of high importance to their plans for global expansion’ (ACBC, 2014: 53). Three quarters of respondents expected an FTA with China to yield positive consequences, while only seven percent held the opposite view (ACBC, 2014: 57). What is often misunderstood in these opinion polls and business responses is the growing Chinese population and overseas students in Australia, which enhances the stronger bonds between the two countries.

Conclusion

The article set the context of Australia–China relations in terms of security and trade. However, before Australia was even federated, the China question emerged as a threat to racial purity. This form of biological racism lingered into the post-war period but by 1973 there was bi-partisan political support for ending the White Australia policy. Notwithstanding this abolition, racism has not been erased from Australian politics or public opinion, as witnessed in the Asian immigration debate of 1988, or the Hanson led anti-immigration push of 1998. The strong opposition to refugees is also evident of a fear of outsiders and the trade unions campaign against Chinese workers has faint echoes of the1890s.

Nevertheless, past thinking has changed since Whitlam’s recognition of the PRC in 1973; all governments seek to address Asia and China through the prisms of trade and security rather than race. Japan has become a key security and defence partner and India’s strategic rise will be of growing importance to Australia. However, the ambiguity of centrality and anxiety still persists, especially in relation to China, as discussed in this article through several case studies. While China’s domestic politics, its international approach, and its new boldness in the Asian maritime sphere are largely responsible for Australia’s ambiguity, Australia’s close and unquestioning dependence on the US, which essentially sees China as a competitor and not a player based on the existing international rules and norms, is also a major factor. Until Australia positions itself strategically unencumbered by the US outlook on global politics, or China becomes fully integrated into the world system, the dilemma in Australia of China’s centrality and anxiety will remain in some critical policy arenas.