Abstract
President Joko Widodo (Jokowi)’s approach toward rising China was mainly an effort to balance the national interest in two ways. Economically, by adjusting the relations between China and Japan as the main source of financing and investment serving the national development in pursuit of prosperity for the nation. And politically, by maintaining a dynamic equilibrium to preserve peace and stability in the region as a prerequisite for a national sustainable development. Within this perspective, President Jokowi simultaneously set up frameworks for political diplomacy with a focus on commercial, trade, and financial diplomacy that was unprecedented. Never have been a precedent in world history where three global power-house of political, economic, and trade are in one region at the same time, presenting a new strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The shift of world economic power from Japan to China as the number two and three respectively after the United States, change the pattern of the economic development through foreign direct investment to countries of the region. This change also brings new forms of aid and loans for development that is different from the previous practices introducing competition and requirements of interest which that provided by global economic and financial institutions. China’s initiative to establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was a direct challenge to create a new balance of power, and prompted Indonesia to adjust the balance of national interest. The degree of interdependence in the fields of economics, politics, and commerce increasingly developed between Indonesia and China was not supported by the urban middle class in Indonesia perceiving the rise of China. The low awareness became the biggest obstacle to the vital interests of both countries and also to maintaining the balance of Indonesia’s national interest.
Keywords
The relations between Indonesia and China will enter a new critical phase in the 21st century when Indonesia begins a new form of democratic process that will shape society in an era of more advanced political process since the 1998 political turbulences that ended the long domination of the Orde Baru (New Order) of President Soeharto. Since the process of the so-called Reformasi (the order of reformation), Indonesian society is entering a more complex democratic transition and began its highest form after Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was directly elected by the public in September 2004.
During Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s presidency (2004–2014), Indonesian-Chinese relations were constructed following the need to enhance ties with Beijing as the great rising power in Asia and significantly moved toward broadening the cooperation not only bilaterally, but also regionally in the wake of a great power rivalry. Strategically located between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, Indonesia’s necessity of cooperating with China was not only to seek common ground to preserve peace and stability in Southeast Asia but also a way of modernising national development by accelerating improvements in Indonesian living standards.
The flourishing Indonesia-China relations were part of President Yudhoyono’s dream to establish a successful democracy and decentralisation in Indonesia, by building the industrial foundation and creating healthy financial structures to support national development. In deepening relations with China, Indonesia became one of the dynamic emerging economies in the world with the highest growth in China and India (Yudhoyono, 2009). Trade between Indonesia and China increased substantially to almost US$70 billion. The increasing trend of the bilateral relations prompted the leaders to escalate the strategic partnership to a comprehensive strategic partnership in March 2015, covering an extensive range of cooperation from industry, infrastructure development in the transportation sector, financial services, tourism, education, and the creative industry.
After the office of President Yudhoyono, the Indonesian people conducted a more daring democratic experiment with extreme transformation by choosing Joko Widodo (Jokowi), the Governor of Jakarta, as president, paired with veteran politician Jusuf Kalla as vice-president. The contestation for the presidency in 2014 was very tight, where Jokowi needed to compete with Prabowo Subianto, former Special Forces Commanding General and former son-in-law of President Soeharto, who paired with Hatta Radjasa, another senior politician and chair of the Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party). The presidential election in July 2014 was unique since the time of the Reformasi for two reasons. First, highly unusually, a non-politician who started his career as mayor of the small town of Solo, Central Java (2005–2012), and then became a popular Governor of Jakarta (2012–2014), was elected as the country’s president. Not an aristocratic politician like the previous Reformasi’s presidents, Jokowi was an unusual phenomenon in Indonesian domestic politics that embraces the democratic process of the nation. Winning by a small margin in the 2014 presidential election (53.15% against Prabtowo-Hatta’s 46.85%), Jokowi was hailed as the voice of modern Indonesian society. Jokowi dislocated completely from traditional Indonesian politics that was dominated either by cronies of the Orde Baru under Soeharto’s regime or by the military faction that played essential roles in Indonesian domestic politics.
Secondly, at the same time, even though Jokowi-Kalla were the winners of the 2014 presidential election, the presidency was not the ruling authority since most of the coalition parties that supported them were unable to win majority seats in parliament. The supporting Koalisi Indonesia Hebat (Great Indonesia Coalition) of Jokowi-Kalla got only 36.46% of the total 560 seats at the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives), losing to the Koalisi Merah Putih (Red-and-White Coalition) of Prabowo-Hatta who managed to obtain 63.54%. This was entirely different from the Yudhoyono era, when Yudhoyono managed to occupy majority seats in parliament with parties who backed his presidential policies in nearly every aspect, including foreign affairs.
Against this backdrop, Indonesia is facing a new-style leadership, handling the 16th largest economy in the world with 45 million members of the consuming class. By 2030, some analysts predict that Indonesia will be the seventh largest economy in the world, with 135 million people of the consuming class where 71% of the population in the cities will produce 86% of the national GDP. There is enormous potential for this dynamic archipelago to become a great nation in the world. With his strategy of using maritime issues as his platform policy during his presidency, President Joko Widodo tried to tackle the crucial problems of the national logistic system. In his view, the Indonesian archipelago had been neglected for a long time due to the lack of maritime infrastructure connecting its islands. Jokowi also projected crucial roles regionally and globally for being the leader of the maritime nation. Relying on the concept of Poros Maritim Dunia (the World Maritime Fulcrum), Jokowi started to work on challenges in the unexpected international dynamics, grabbing global opportunities in the rise of great power relations.
One of the central issues of Jokowi’s presidency has been how to handle Indonesian foreign policies related to the rise of China, seen by many nations in Asia as a challenge and opportunity especially in reshaping regional geopolitics. China is also facing fundamental changes since President Xi Jinping become the leader of the biggest nation on earth. Xi Jinping wants to rewrite the course of the global future in world politics and security, balancing China’s economic qualities with the developed countries, and build the revival of China as an ancient civilization in the world. Will President Jokowi manage to maintain an equal distance among the great powers who are seeking and expanding the sphere of influence in the Southeast Asia region? Or, will he be a victim of his ambitions in building what he called in his presidential campaign a country which is ‘sovereign politically, independent economically and own personality in culture’ due to lack of domestic support?
This paper will focus on how President Jokowi is planning to run the largest archipelago nation in the world to rebuild the country in the midst of turbulences in domestic politics, especially facing chaos in national bureaucracy full of corruption (Rachman, 2015), incompetency, and rivalries among political parties (Bubandt, 2014: 9–36). Jokowi’s foreign policy in 2014–2019 must deal with issues of development and environment, or between religion and terrorism. When former Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda spoke about foreign policy in the context of intermestic (international domestic), there was friction of non-traditional issues with international-domestic policies, including the issue of human rights and national integrity (Wirajuda, 2007).
This paper will also discuss the position of the majority of society by exploring their opinion of China’s rise. By presenting the public opinion poll perception of China, we could draw on what the Indonesian government’s attitude is toward the rise of China. At the same time, there is an urgent need for President Jokowi to build the national infrastructure, not only connecting islands through the so-called ‘sea toll’ but also developing other public facilities, i.e. transportation, electricity, and social health, which need massive ventures that would rely heavily on foreign assistance and investment.
For President Jokowi, his first year in office already triggered speculations that Indonesia’s foreign policy is shifting toward China more to attract more investment and economic relations and less to implement a comprehensive foreign policy. Jokowi’s decisions to choose China instead of Japan for the high-speed railway without clear reasons after an initial statement to cancel the project was just one of the examples indicating a shift in his policy. At the beginning, there was no talk on the Indonesian side of including China as a prospective investor in building the high-speed railways project planned by Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The Government of Japan offered to provide financing of US$6.5 billion for the high-speed railway (HSR) line between Jakarta-Bandung along 144 kilometers. This path can be extended from Bandung to Surabaya in East Java. However, the government noted that the HSR line cost more than expected and only made sense when connecting the major centers of finance and trade (only Tokyo-Osaka and Paris-Lyon breakeven). Even so, te private companies are welcome to run this idea in the future without state funding (Jeffreys, 2013: 245).
Meanwhile, in 2011 China also offered to invest about US$5 billion in railway projects, including coal lines in Central Kalimantan and South Sumatra, an express passenger train for Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, and trains from Solo to Jakarta. The Sumatra train line is expected to serve a route along 300 km from Muara Enim to Lampung, costing US$1.3 billion and supported by China Railways, the state-owned railway operator in China. China Railways will also invest US$2.3 billion along the 185 kilometer Cahu-Bangkuang track in Borneo (Jeffreys, 2013: 225). China’s involvement in the construction of the HSR line began with a visit by Minister of State-owned Enterprises (SOE), Rini Soemarno, who offered their involvement in the plan, which became controversial because the Indonesian Embassy in Beijing was not informed of her visit. 1 Soemarno’s meeting with the Chinese officials generated mutual agreement, and China was willing to comply with the condition that there would be no government funds involved in the project.
Indonesia’s decision to join the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) led by China was another example. The public, in general, saw the decision as an attempt to pull Indonesia into China’s sphere of influence, and the negotiation on establishing the bank was not well prepared to place Indonesia (or, at least, ASEAN) in the center of the Chinese initiative. This could be seen when Indonesia was the last ASEAN country to sign an agreement to join the development bank, when Minister of Finance Bambang PS Brodjonegoro signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Establishing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Prospective Among Founding Members. The ceremony was conducted confidentially and was only witnessed by the Chinese Ambassador in Jakarta, Xie Feng (Pattiradjawane, 2014). Indonesia was unable to put forward terms of conditions, e.g. having the bank headquarters in Jakarta or a coordinated voice among the ASEAN members who joined the AIIB. 2
This perception was denied by Dr Rizal Sukma, one of President Jokowi’s top foreign policy advisors, who said that Indonesia’s policy toward China was based on rebalancing and hedging in implementing the economy and diplomacy to synchronize with Indonesia’s national interest (Sukma, 2015). The rise of China economically and politically is extraordinary not only for Indonesia but for all of Asia. Never has the history of great power relations in Asia housed two massive powers at the same time, competing economically, politically, and also militarily. The rise of Japan as the number two economic superpower was mainly under the security umbrella of the US in the region and also due to China’s internal domestic relations and the low intensity of its international relations.
In this context, Sukma’s view regarding President Jokowi’s approaches to China was mainly an effort to balance the national interest in two ways. Economically, adjusting the relations between China and Japan as the main source of finance and investment for national development in pursuit of prosperity for the nation. And politically, maintaining a dynamic equilibrium to preserve peace and stability in the region as a prerequisite for a national sustainable development. Within this perspective, President Jokowi simultaneously set up frameworks for political diplomacy with a focus on commercial, trade, and financial diplomacy that was unprecedented.
The questions that need to be addressed are what form of foreign policy is Indonesia projecting handling, not only the great power relations between US and China but also the rise of other powers like Japan and India? Will President Jokowi abandon the previous foreign policy cemented by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of ‘a thousand friends, zero enemies’ that will be disparate according to Jokowi’s campaign promises to stand up for the sovereignty of the Indonesian? Or, will President Jokowi bring new hope in implementing the essence of Indonesia’s foreign policy of bebas-aktif (free and active) as a guiding principle facing new challenges?
The era of President Jokowi
There is a lot of analysis of Asian countries’ perceptions of the rise of China, including Indonesia’s outlining of its future strategies for contending with the uncertainty of a very fluid regional environment. The competition of great power relations between China and the US has already occupied much of the analysis to foresee how the pull and push of these two big powers has affected each Asian nation economically, politically, and militarily. There is also analysis on the variations of perspective in Southeast Asian countries’ responses to China’s rise from hedging, balancing, or band-wagoning, and the combination of these (Kurlantzick, 2006: 270; Roy, 2005; Smith, 2015; Sukma, 2009). The relations between Indonesia and China also has other dimensions (Laksana, 2011) that characterize by sentiment among the Indonesian society related to the ethnic Chinese diaspora. This was a remnant of the Soeharto era toward Indonesian Chinese, as the biggest concentration of the world’s Chinese diaspora, which played important role in reshaping the Chinese national economy (Novotny, 2010: 181, 281).
In the context of rising China, the framework for Indonesia’s domestic politics is focusing on economic diplomacy as a strategy facing the reconfiguration of the international order in defining new goals to achieve economic prosperity and political stability. In this sense, the state is an important actor playing at the global level, and in Indonesia there is a necessity to establish an international cooperation to support the national agenda. It was imperative for Indonesia to define and strengthen economic diplomacy to balance the relationship with China when the different aspects of politics and economy have a different impact on the decision-making process. For Indonesia, economic diplomacy should be inclusive with the interest of national economic growth, where strategic partnership cooperation needs to include the national interest as a whole (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015).
It will also to refer the important nuances related to cooperation models for a new implementation of the foreign policy of Indonesia in Asia. The increasing connectivity is not only as a reference for a more comprehensive integration of the dynamics of regionalism, but also leads to the formation of various opportunities of cooperation and the expansion of economic, trade, and related businesses between nations in the region that has entered a period of dynamic free trade. For Indonesia, the central role it wants to develop will significantly affect the centrality of ASEAN as a whole and will depend on the awareness of the strengths of each member country. ASEAN centrality must be understood in the context of a unity of views and actions. ASEAN is not only for the development of economic cooperation and trade to meet the needs of national development of each of its members, but also building a vision with the aim to develop their centrality for order and peace in the Southeast Asia region. Based on this perception, the governance of ASEAN centrality of multilateralism must have an architecture that can reflect at least two edges of the Indonesian civilization, Bhineka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity) and the so-called ‘gotong royong’ (Pranadji, 2009). 3
For President Jokowi, there is a need to reestablish the idea of the Indonesian founding fathers that was used as the central theme during his presidential campaign in 2014. Jokowi put an emphasis in his ‘Nawacita’ (a Sanskrit term for nine programs) on implementing ‘politik luar negeri bebas aktif’ (free and independent foreign policy) based on national interest and on strengthening Indonesia’s identity as a maritime nation (Jokowi and Kalla, 2014). There is a need in President Jokowi to attract his voters to what George Kahin described as the Indonesian foreign policy, which is always strongly influenced by domestic politics but at the same time is influenced by efforts to expand access to external resources without compromising independence (Weinstein, 2007: 9–12).
At the beginning of the New Order, President Soeharto was fully aware that the Southeast Asian region was an important axis in concentric circles of Indonesian foreign policy that affects the various policies in the political, economic, social, and security roles of Indonesia. Soeharto’s ideals were reflected in his first official speech, clearly relying on ASEAN to set up a policy-oriented region based on the strengths of its member countries. His vision was based on national sovereignty, on continuous synchronization between national security and regional resilience, and was based on a policy of non-intervention. Southeast Asian regionalism differs from others such as the European Union, for example, because ASEAN was built in the interests of its member states to develop national resilience that makes up icons of regional resilience, and according to President Soeharto, an integrated ASEAN should be built on the basic principles of national security and regional resilience which are related to one another.
During President Soeharto’s office, during a crisis in Cambodia the formulation of Indonesian foreign policy faced several world and Southeast Asian challenges, and showed its advantages of being a vision not shared by other countries. At an Asia summit meeting involving 11 foreign affairs ministers from Asia and Australia, for the first time discussing the issue of the Cambodia crisis, President Soeharto accurately formulated the following: No doubt, Indonesia still adhere free and independent foreign policy, remain non-aligned without prejudice favoring one block. Our stance is clear; work toward the realization of world peace, international cooperation of non-discrimination for the progress and prosperity of nations, recognition of the sovereignty and integrity of nations on a reciprocal basis, not interfering in others internal affairs. Indonesia believe that the non-alignment is not based on the principle of opportunities but a part of Indonesia identity. For Indonesia, the foreign policy of non-alignment was not the same as the non-involvement. Therefore, Indonesia would rather call it free and independent foreign policy, because non-alignment is not political sterile, dead, or resting-chin doing nothing. Indonesia’s foreign policy is free in the sense free from any kind of ties, not just free of military or political pacts but also ideology, so that Indonesia is free to assess any accidents or problems and without influenced by any military, political, or ideological restrictions. Indonesia’s foreign policy is independent in sense actively sought cooperation with other loving peace countries resolving issues that endanger world peace and security in order to achieve everlasting peace, in creating justice and prosperity for all mankind (Soeharto, 1970).
Hatta’s brilliant concept known by the slogan ‘mendayung di antara dua karang’ (rowing between two reefs) was durable and managed to bring Indonesia into a complex and dangerous international arena without getting caught in the vortex of the Western and Eastern blocs in the Cold War era. From this concept, the slogans such as freedom, humanity, social justice, brotherly nations, and lasting peace were the backbone of Indonesian foreign policy, where Indonesians placed a high value on solid international relations and were assured that they would finally become a reality. All these help determine the external policy of the country and the means used to carry it out. Mainly, the Indonesian policy must be resolved in the light of its interests and executed in consonance with the situations and facts it has to face (Hatta, 1953).
Since the beginning, the direction of Indonesia’s foreign policy has not deviated from the philosophy that was adopted at the founding of the republic on the role of free and active foreign policy, which Hatta described as, ‘… the effort to work energetically for the preservation of peace and the relaxation of tension …’ (Hatta, 1953: 444). President Joko Widodo acknowledges the identification of foreign policy issues since the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia, that has not shifted too much from the fundamental rights of the people that have been carried out through international cooperation. But on a broader scale, there is the view that the foreign policy of Indonesia in the last five years has not moved far from its previous position accommodating the interests of the big country. Indonesia is looking for a place in an increasingly complex multilateralism, struggling to organize the relationships between various parties to adjust the national interests, and seeking answers to the challenges of interdependence as a requirement for managing growth in the domestic economy. When Jokowi came to power, many people saw that Indonesia tended to ignore the role that was expected by many international circles, and many Indonesians think that the country should play a larger role in accordance not only with the greatness of the country but also with the strategic role it can play (Azra, 2015: 15).
Balancing national interest
The relation between Indonesia and China in 2015, at its 65-year anniversary, coincide with a new environment in Southeast Asia and the rise of cooperation among the peoples of Asia. The establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community 2015 certainly would increase the connectivity among Southeast Asian nations with the foundation of a people-to-people relationship. These linkages are not only looking at the ideal shape of a dynamic regionalism toward the conditions of an integrated and inclusive cooperation among states, but also sharpen the model of cooperation through expansion of opportunities in economic, trade, and business between countries.
The National Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Nasional) in an open public analysis stated that there is a need for Indonesia to expand the mandala in the Indo-Pacific region in an effort to achieve the national interest of Indonesia, to improve not only the prosperity of the nation but also to maintain peace and stability in Southeast Asia (Hikam, 2014; Weatherbee, 2013: 83–89). The ‘mandala doctrine’, 4 (Moertono, 2009; Sarkar, 1919) according to Jokowi-Kalla in their presidential campaign vision and mission, is expanding regional involvement in the Indo-Pacific region, the consolidation of Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN, strengthening cooperation, and ensuring the centrality of ASEAN as the focus of the policy will be made in the next five years (Kompasiana, 2014). Stabilization of Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN is critical for efforts to achieve Indonesian national interests, both to improve prosperity in the country, as well as for efforts to maintain stability and peace in Southeast Asia.
Economic development will be successful if it is supported by political security stability at national and regional levels in Southeast Asia. Strategically, a stable regional environment will be conducive to the economic development efforts of Indonesia in particular and toward nation building in general. Stability in the region is believed to be a factor supporting economic development, placing ASEAN as the ‘main pillar’ in the concentric circles of Indonesian foreign policy. In this context, how might we understand and analyze how Indonesia perceived the rise of China in a regional and global context? To what extent will Indonesia-China relations under President Jokowi balance the interest of both countries in pursuit of national prosperity and political stability? Does the balance of interest between Indonesia and China enable Indonesia to cope with the fear of economic domination by the Indonesian Chinese with the intangible hands of China? How does Indonesia perceive the balance of regional and global power, and what is their perception of a rising China?
There are several conceptual and analytical tools that can facilitate these questions to provide a further regional outlook. Where can Indonesia manifest its foreign policies not only for the benefits of the ongoing economic diplomacy that has been headline news, but also regarding defense and military issues, with increasingly serious debates among government officials and scholars from all over the world mainly related to the overlapping claims in the South China Sea? The close relation between Indonesia and China was marked by the declaration of the Future Direction of Indonesia-China Strategic Partnership Comprehensive which was signed by Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and President Xi Jinping in October 2013. The declaration emphasized the need for closer cooperation between the two countries, and both leaders stated that the trust that grows between Indonesia and China should be directed to the equivalent of intent and content of the national interest of each side. Through this understanding, Indonesia and China will build a common ground of peace and world order as a platform to construct a sustainable prosperity in the close cooperation of both parties (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013).
From this perspective, there is a need to establish a concept of the balance of national interests, rather than to look for the national interest in international relations (Morgenthau 1948: 440), 5 which becomes significant when countries are dealing with the balance of several options. This means that the existence of a global human becomes a more valuable tool than the invisible hands of the states as actors in interstate relations. Thus, errors due to policy decision makers will be easier to correct. Through this approach, the order of economic diplomacy can be conducted with the considerations of political stability and economic prosperity. One explanation that can be used in considering the balance of Indonesia’s national interests in the face of China’s rise is interpreting a set of sequence from business end up to power-play, as choices of relevance that can be prioritized and pursued by policymakers. This sequence of choices will evaluate alternative goals, the cost, risks, and constraints versus the benefits and advantages of the available tools and instruments in the pursuit of those goals, and the likely consequences in the short, medium, and long term (Thakur, 2013).
Every country often has different views, opinions, and preferences among senior officials or ministers in accordance with their backgrounds. Under the administration of Joko Widodo, within one year it already had perceptions about developing the relationship between Indonesia and China. Since the end of President Soeharto’s rule, for example, differences in developing bilateral relations that previously viewed China as a threat changed drastically. After the Reformasi, Indonesia experienced democracy with several presidents: BJ Habibie (1998–1999), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001, eventually impeached), Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001–2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014). Of all the presidents, President Wahid had the greatest inclination to closer relations between Indonesia and China, reflected in his first foreign visit to China before the ASEAN countries in December 1999, and began to create a new stage of relations between the two nations (Pattiradjawane, 1999: 1, 11).
As another example, there are differences of views from the previous era of President Soeharto and other Indonesian presidents regarding the balance of national interest in the issue of the Chinese diaspora in Indonesia. The issue of Chinese ethnic in Indonesia which is always a mix of political and economic problems was seen with different interest among the ruling government. Under Soeharto, the Indonesian Chinese were subjected to both political baggage and economic benefit. The public perceptions of Indonesia regarding ethnic Indonesian Chinese have been dominated by suspicion, as a remnant of the Soeharto regime which brought total annihilation to the Chinese diaspora and led to their problematic position in Indonesian society, especially due to their economic prosperity and their close association with elite politics. So the approaches of the balance of national interest within the context of international relations and the concept of national interest will explore more dimensions in regarding the rise of China, including context, tools, theatres, and processes (Okano-Heijmans, 2013). The perceptions of China’s rise from one country to the other will be very different due to a combination of historical backgrounds, cultural affinities, political engagement, amongst other factors. Concerns that arise in different places will have different impacts, for example Asia is more worried about China rise’s in the context of political and economic implications, whereas Europeans are concerned about violation of human rights, and other countries are worried about a combination of those issues.
Some scholars perceived that Indonesian elites believe that China is gigantic, arrogant, aggressive, and expansionist, and that China is Indonesia’s geopolitical rival (Novotny, 2010: 181–182). But after Reformasi, especially after President Abdurrahman Wahid, there was a significant involvement of the Indonesian Chinese in domestic politics, mainly in the 2009 election compared to the election in 2004. Indonesian Chinese get involved in politics through party lines or by several other ways that were possible under the law. In some cases, the biggest interest of the Indonesian Chinese when getting involved in politics was for equality for the ethnic groups in the country. It may also be to work for an Indonesia which is more prosperous and equitable (Thung, 2012). And in due time, the Indonesian Chinese issues that haunted ethnic relations, and to a certain extent jeopardized Indonesia-China relations, will vanish since there is already new evidence regarding the 1965 abortive coup attempt concerning China’s involvement (Zhou, 2013). It will only be a matter of time before President Jokowi formulates the issues of the Indonesian Chinese as a bigger part of the Indonesia integration, and signs of this integration have already occurred, with a bigger role planned for the ethnic Chinese in sectors of life other than the economy, including the military ( Harian Andalas, 2015: 1, 15).
At the same time, the perception among the Indonesian general public toward China’s rise is very varied and differs within groups of people, including the elites. In the global context, there are anxieties and security concerns perceived by most of China’s neighbors. Most Asian countries support the US as a major force in the region to provide more military resources in the Asia-Pacific region in conjunction with a rebalancing policy by Washington. More than half of the Asian countries, such as Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, South Korea, consider that US military commitment in the region would be good for maintaining peace. Among the ASEAN countries, Indonesia (41%), the Philippines (71%), and Vietnam (71%) consider the presence of US military power to be good for peace, and only Malaysia (54%) believed the presence of a larger US military power would lead to conflict with China (Pew Research Center, 2015). However, in a Pew Research Center poll asking who was the leading global economic power of the day, the US was the answer given by only 47% of Indonesians in 2014 and 2015, a decrease from 50% in 2009 and 52% in 2013. In the Philippines the figure was over 65% for 2013 and 2015, while in Malaysia the figure went up from 44% in 2013 to 53% in 2015 (Pew Research Center, 2015).
The balance in the national interest shows the difference of perspectives and preferences in various sectors of the economy, trade, and politics. For example, in determining the development cooperation between Indonesia and China in high-speed railways (HSR), the question arises why the competition between Japan and China in HSR has become so tight. Why did the Chinese get the project without conducting a feasibility study, giving a public explanation about the construction, or providing a cost breakdown? The Minister of State-owned Enterprises (BUMN) merely explained that what the Chinese offered was better than the Japanese and did not involve state budget funds to finance the project. Developing HSR is a priority for President Jokowi, and the decision is more affected by the geopolitical rivalry in Southeast Asia between Japan and China. On the other hand, President Jokowi’s balance of national interests was also based on domestic considerations, particularly in securing the government’s limited budget, and was an opportunity for Indonesia to obtain the transfer of technology that has not been received from Japan ( Medan Bisnis, 2015: 6).
In dealing with the HSR investment, President Jokowi’s position could be explained as what experts like Robert Putnam call a substantial theory of a mutually constitutive process in the two-level game theory (Putnam, 1988). This approach recognizes the inevitability of conflict in a country on what the main national interests are. At the same time, the decision makers at the national level try to adjust the imperatives of the domestic and international level. In this situation, statespeople were usually facing difficulties in emphasizing the difference between strategic opportunities and strategic dilemmas. Being a new leader, President Jokowi from the beginning indicated that bargaining the HSR project with the Chinese and Japanese governments mainly related to development assistance. He also tried to expand the agreement on other economic issues that could support all his infrastructure development projects, to fulfill his promises during the presidential campaign, including among others the project to provide electricity by building a 35 Megawatt power plant. Internally, he tried to persuade several interest groups to support some agreements that he made with the foreign government (Wicaksono, 2015). Interestingly, China agreed to President Jokowi’s proposal that the HSR project should be conducted as a business-to-business scheme without involving the government, including not allocating state budget for the US$5.6 billion project. Some analysis has suggested that this is in conjunction with bilateral trade as remnants from the previous government. Between 2010 and 2014, the trade balance between Indonesia and China was always in favor of China, and the negative balance grew to an unsustainable point for Indonesia as it reached its peak at around US$14 billion (see Figure 1). Bilateral economic relations between Indonesia and China have improved, and trade has increased since the signing of the strategic partnership document in 2005. Bilateral trade grew from US$3.8 billion in 2003 to US$52.4 billion in 2013. In the second period of President Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono, the two countries were targeting total bilateral trade moving closer to US$80 billion for 2015. Of the total US$48.2 billion in 2014, non-oil commodities stood at 96.95% of total trade and put China as the largest importer of non-oil commodities and gas to Indonesia.
Indonesia-China trade value 2010–2015, in thousands of US$.
The issues that President Jokowi is facing between deficit trade balance and the HSR project can be seen as shaping the balance of national interests. And, as suggested by Klaus Knorr in 1975, this is a result of implementing a policy of economic diplomacy which was used in order to obtain the administration’s military, political, ideological, economic, as well as emotional, values (Knorr, 1975). In this context, we understand that in the game of creating an equilibrium of the national interest, the position of national economic strength has an active and a passive side. The active side reflects President Jokowi’s concerns as to what can be done by Indonesia to other countries (in this case taking part in building the rise of China), and the passive side is seen as an attempt to limit the increasing trade deficit between Indonesia and China. An unfavorable trade balance for Indonesia in relationships with China has been a political issue in the past, and in some instances this has been highlighted as a priority to fix.
Public opinion
President Xi Jinping’s visit to Jakarta in October 2013 became a decisive moment when Indonesian and Chinese leaders extensively identified issues in regional and international affairs and agreed to begin a new era in bilateral relations. Under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the Indonesia-China relationship was enhanced through a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement as efforts to increase the role of two countries in the global economy and international issues. Both leaders agreed to increase relations between the two nations, creating significant opportunity for solving the economic and social development challenges that require collaborative responses between the two countries. Both countries agreed in the common interest of sustainable cooperation needed to expand the prospects for peace, stability, and prosperity in Asia.
The expansion of the comprehensive strategic partnership between Indonesia and China in the second era of the President Yudhoyono administration was not followed by education of the public on the meaning of partnership. Indeed, the majority of Indonesia’s urban population (71%) has a positive perception of China (see Figure 2; Soebagjo and Pattiradjawane, 2014). 6 Compared to other countries, China was not considered in the favorite countries when respondents were asked about the level of preference for five other countries, Japan, the US, India, Australia, and Russia. Indonesia’s urban population considered Japan (86%) as their preferred country, followed by the US (74%) and India (72%). The level of preference, as reflected in this public opinion poll among the urban societies in Indonesia, is almost identical to the poll conducted by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Projects. According to Pew Research, for the question, ‘Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of China’ (Pew Research Center, 2014), 66% of Indonesians answered somewhat favorable. The difference in the levels of Indonesian preference for China, the US, and India is not much, but the preference for the US and India can partly be attributed to an emotional closeness in culture through movies, music, and the like. The Indonesian ignores the reality of the economic and trade relationship that exists between Indonesia and China, which is much stronger after the Reformasi with a larger volume and value of trade relations compared to the US and India. China is still considered a preferred country to Australia (66%) and Russia (39%) for reasons of deteriorating relations with Australia in recent years and the low presence of Russia in Indonesia or Southeast Asia in general.
Level of preference toward countries. Base: All respondents (n: 1096). A1. Please tell me how you describe your opinion about various countries. In general, do you like very much, quite like, quite dislike, or dislike very much [country name]?
In particular, the level of China’s preference as a state tends to be similar in all gender and age groups. However, at the same preference level the tendency toward China increased in the urban population when education levels and socioeconomic status were higher. Meanwhile, if we look at each region, China is much preferred especially in the area of Sulawesi. Conversely, the urban population who did not like China is found in Jakarta, West Java, Kalimantan, and Sumatra.
On other issues, the respondents stated that what they liked about China were matters relating to the economy (particularly because Chinese products are very affordably priced), culture, the population (hardworking), and traditional medical treatments (Table 1). When asked what they did not like about China (Table 2), the top two answers related to trade aspects, namely that the quality of products from China was less good and that the country had a monopoly on world trade (many products from China flooding the Indonesian market). Besides spontaneous things mentioned by respondents about China, respondents were also asked about their perception of China (and five other countries mentioned above) based on some attributes. Respondents’ answers will give an overview of characteristics associated with China (and the five other countries mentioned above). The attributes that were presented were: innovative; respect for human rights; has a modern industrial-based economy; respect for minority groups; concern for environmental quality; has a considerable influence on other countries in the world; concerned and willing to help other countries in alleviating poverty; has good quality education; has a democratic ideology; strives to maintain and improve world peace; actively cooperates with other countries in fighting terrorism; has a sound legal and judicial system to fight drug-related crimes; is the strongest economic power in the world; a travel destination; an important partner to Indonesia; understands the conditions of Indonesia; critical in supporting the Indonesian economy; has a communist ideology; has the best military force in the world; has the best traditional medicine.
Favored things from China. Base: All respondents (n: 1096).
C1a. What are the things that you like about China (as a country)? What else? What else? Make sure the respondent’s answer is clear and detailed.
Unfavored things from China. Base: All respondents (n: 1096).
C1b. What are the things that you dislike about China (as a country)? What else? What else? Make sure the respondent’s answer is clear and detailed.
From the public opinion pools, it is also interesting how the Indonesian urban population perceived China to have the most effective traditional medicine in the world, and that this was their preference for medical treatment (Figure 3). This finding is consistent with previous findings (Figure 4). The strong association of China with traditional medicine is widely expressed by the urban residents of East Java. The second strongest association related to the perception of China by the urban population in Indonesia is that China has a strong culture (expressed by 46.4% of respondents). China also has the potential to eventually become the country with the most powerful economic force in the world. This was indicated by the 38.4% of the urban population of Indonesia who prefer China as a country that has the best economy in the world compared to other countries (particularly compared to Japan, the US, India, Australia, and Russia). In addition, as many as 34% of the urban population in Indonesia also considered that China has a modern industrial-based economy. The finding also indicated that China has not been associated strongly in understanding the condition of Indonesia (27.6%). Likewise, only 25% or fewer of the respondents associated China with the fields of tourism, education, environment, poverty alleviation, law enforcement (particularly in relation to combating narcotics and terrorism), the enforcement of human rights, protection of minorities, or the increase in world peace and military fields.
Perception toward China. Base: All respondents (n: .096). A3. I have several statements given by people about certain COUNTRIES. I will read out every statement and I would like you to tell me which statement fits every country that I mention. For every statement, you can choose more than one country if you feel that the statement fits several countries.
Cooperation between Indonesia and other countries in various fields. Base: All respondents (n: 1096) L1 In your opinion, which country had the best cooperative relationship with Indonesia in the last 10 years?
From this public opinion poll, we can see many opportunities for cooperation between Indonesia and China, including the necessary effort on both sides to put the perspective of the relationship between the two countries in a more strategic position. This cooperation is essential, particularly to change the perception of China for the common people of Indonesia, because relations between the two countries are very important for both sides. Results of the poll that puts China as the country with the best traditional medicine showed there is a misperception in seeing China in the framework of a comprehensive strategic partnership. At the government level, since the beginning of the restoration of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and China, Indonesia considers ties with Beijing ‘very important.’ ‘From the beginning, we recognized the level of relations between Indonesia and China to be very important, not only bilaterally but also important on a wider regional, and even in a global context,’ said Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa when delivering a speech at the seminar ‘Talking about Indonesia-China in the 21st Century: The Future of the Indonesia-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ which was held on 9 October 2014. According to Minister Natalegawa (Natalegawa, 2014), the establishment of relations between the two countries is strategic, so the description of the relationship between Indonesia and China is really a relationship that has the potential to impact far beyond the interests of purely the relevant Indonesia-China relations. He stated that this aspect reminds us that the leaders in China and Indonesia are interested in promoting a very broad relationship and at the same time have a very clear sense of priorities in the future. Various reflections illustrate the relationship between the two countries clearly and unequivocally. And both countries realize the potential in bilateral cooperation; much more can be achieved especially concerning promoting economic investment, connectivity between communities of both countries, as well as many other dimensions. The cooperation agreement of the comprehensive strategic partnership between Indonesia and China since 2013 has a clear roadmap, clear feedback, as well as something that can be monitored, reported, and verified to make adequate progress in strengthening relations between the two countries (Natalegawa, 2014).
Since the restoration of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and China 25 years ago, the second decade of the 21st century marks relations between the two countries that are beyond the scope of bilateral cooperation and security issues in order to advance the cooperation of East Asia, as well as achieving peace, stability, and long-term prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. Indonesia and China have maintained a high economic growth of 5.8% and 7.7% respectively, making them an engine of growth in Asia. They are ranked among the fastest growing economies in the G-20 countries (Natalegawa, 2014). Vice President of the China Association for Public Diplomacy, Ambassador Ma Zhengang, who served as ambassador of China in the UK, has said that Indonesia and China can be important catalysts in the global economic recovery. Ambassador Ma agreed with the view of Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa that the most striking features of the two countries are complementarity in nature and in strategy. According to Ambassador Ma, Indonesia has a big influence in the Southeast Asian region and should play an important role developing ASEAN-China relations. Added to this, the two countries are a regional power and must have a leader that is going to develop the Southeast Asian region to build a regional mechanism to contribute to peace, stability, and development. Ambassador Ma Zhengang’s expectations still require efforts from both Indonesia and China. Results from public opinion polls in the last 10 years showed that only 18% of Indonesia’s urban population still regard China as a good cooperation partner. In a partnership with Indonesia, China still ranks third after Japan which stood at 26.7% and the US which was at 19.7% (Figure 4).
There are concerns among Indonesian academics that to make Indonesia-China a regional power as stated by Ambassador Ma Zhengang would take much effort to improve the public opinion of Indonesia’s urban residents toward China. The cooperation agreements of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Indonesia and China do have a sound basis for both levels of government and are essential for the growth of both countries. However, the foundations at the degree of government require an equal support and the perception among the people of Indonesia and China, so that the potential of the two countries can have bright prospects for the next 20–30 years. In Figure 5 we can see that in the view of 16% Indonesia’s urban residents China is still not considered an important country for Indonesia in the future, lagging far behind Japan (29%) and the US (22%).
Indonesia’s relations with other countries in various fields. Base: All respondents (n: 1096).
There is a concern that the perception of Chinese leaders on the common dream requires close synchronization so that the outcomes of cooperation development schemes inked in the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership could reach various maximum development plans by both countries, including main economic corridors for Indonesia to achieve economic power entered as the 10th economic strength of the world in 2025 and seventh in the world by 2030. Linkages between the Indonesia and China dream, that will celebrate 100 years since the founding of the people’s republic in the 21st century, need to sharpen priorities of cooperation not only at the inter-governmental level, but also the relationship between the people on both sides. There are expectations reflected in the opinion polls when questioned about cooperation in economy and trade in the future. Figure 4 shows that the hope of cooperation with China in economy and commerce in the future reaches 44%, far higher than for Japan (29%) or the US (9%). However, along with the growing expectations of economic cooperation and trade with China, we still saw incomprehension among respondents about China’s importance as a country or as an important partner for Indonesia, with a relatively high percentage of between 11 and 22%.
What is surprising from the public opinion polls and creates questions is when the respondents were asked with what country Indonesia should strengthen cooperation in the field of industrial air and sea transportation. Figure 5 shows a very small percentage for China (7%), compared to Japan (25%) and the US (22%), as countries that are important partners in this industry. China’s position was on a par with Germany (7%) but lower than Russia (8%) as the country to cooperate with in the fields of shipbuilding and aircraft. However, China today is a country that is very active in initiating cooperation in the field of transportation, developing infrastructure through the establishment of the Bank Infrastructure Investment Asia and supporting the initiative One Road One Belt (Pattiradjawane, 2014: 5).
But, at the same time, the positive image perception of the Indonesian urban population on the cooperation in economy and trade with China can be used as an important step for both governments to parse development cooperation priorities following the national interests of the two countries. Both Xi Jinping and Joko Widodo are now making the development of land and sea a priority to follow China’s initiative on the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road, while Indonesia, too, is keen to develop a World Maritime Fulcrum doctrine which stresses the importance of the development of maritime infrastructure. There are concerns, however, that the concept is still too far from the current reality in the perception among Indonesia’s urban population, how to embody and build elements in the concept of maritime related to the bilateral cooperation between Indonesia and China in the field of air and sea transport. After all, the most important aspect of the World Maritime Fulcrum is the availability of an adequate infrastructure to build linkages between ports, not only in connecting domestic transport networks, but also the regional infrastructure network, to deepen economic, trade, finance, defense, social, and cultural cooperation.
But, at the same time, the positive image perception of the Indonesian urban population on cooperation in economy and trade with China can be used as an important step for both governments to parse development cooperation priorities following the national interests of the two countries.
Conclusion
Indonesia’s economic diplomacy in the past 16 years struggling to get involved in economic and political power house played by bigger countries such as China and Japan at regional and global level. In dealing with the rise of China, Indonesia needed to analyze various aspects of bilateral relations because the economic and political system which China adopted was entirely different and it could not be expected that Indonesia would follow the behavior of other countries. For Indonesia, there is need for a clear understanding of the assumptions of balance relating to diplomacy, power, and state and national interest to be able to measure the growth of China as a whole.
It should be recognized that not all of the Indonesian urban population is familiar with the working relations between Indonesia and China that have existed since 1950, and Indonesia had a very close partnership at the time of President Sukarno. From the polls conducted of the urban population in Indonesia, there is a positive perception of continued efforts to develop and deepen relations with China in the administration of President Joko Widodo.
In balancing the rise of China as an economic, trade, political, and military power, President Joko Widodo, like his predecessors, is faced with a strong trading volume and capital into Indonesia. The difficulties experienced by Indonesia are in perceiving the rise of China, not only because of the high level of consumption of products made in China that reaches more than 80%, but also being vulnerable to other external forces including the start of ASEAN Economic Community 2015. Thus, in the balance of national interests, Indonesia faces two sides regarding the national economic power from the rise of China. This is mainly related to the active side to worry about what China could do to Indonesia, and on the passive side constituting Indonesia’s ability to place restrictions on what can be done to it.
This perception explains the policy linkages of President Joko Widodo to maintain a balance between reducing the Indonesia-China trade deficit while gaining the support of Chinese investment in developing infrastructure. This dilemma occurred when Indonesia decided to provide a high-speed railway on the Jakarta-Bandung route in the perspective that the project could reduce the transition of political pressure over the growing trade deficit with China, but at the same time gaining active rail investment projects without involving state budget. President Joko Widodo is actively using a variety of needs to improve the strength of the national economy for the benefit of Indonesia by using financial and economic policy in weakening the Japanese position which is also interested in the project.
In maintaining an equilibrium of the national interest in the process of rising China, other factors are also being considered such as the role of the Chinese conglomerate that is in a different position from the Orde Baru under President Soeharto, who is the sole authority in determining the conduct of economic diplomacy with China. After Reformasi, Chinese businesspeople in large-scale businesses have at least two sides to play different roles compared to during the Orde Baru. On one hand, at the beginning of the Reformasi they coudl still rely on the bureaucracy of the old regime in varied important positions in the government that protects them and helps resolve their debts or restructure businesses as an impact of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. On the other hand, most of the ethnic Chinese conglomerates in Indonesia internationalize their interest in an adequate rate avoiding being extinct after the crisis. While in the era of Reformasi after the 1998 political crisis that brings down President Soeharto, the Chinese diaspora in Indonesia got ample of opportunities to involve in a much larger national political process. The Chinese conglomerates are now in a different situation than in the Orde Baru era, when the late President Abdurrahman Wahid enable to build a non-antagonistic atmosphere and let the ethnic Chinese to involve in a larger scale of national activities. The new reform environment allows them to actively play a broader role not only in the field of economy and trade but also in the nation political process. In this new atmosphere, the opportunity for them to take part in the rise of China is also broadening, especially in the implementation of economic and trade relations between the two countries.
Although the degree of interdependence in the fields of economics, politics, and commerce increasingly develop between Indonesia and China relations, we can see also that the involvement of non-actors in view of the rise of China, especially among the urban middle class in Indonesia, is still very small and becomes a serious obstacle to the vital interests of both countries. Threats facing the Indonesia-China relationship, ranging from terrorism to cyber-crime, the availability of foreign investment in various sectors required by both countries, the wish for cooperation to tackle legal transnational and regional crime, close collaboration in the consular field, as well as other urgent needs related to development assistance, require a rapid response from governments to conform to the objective of Indonesian foreign policy. To apply a holistic foreign policy requires the full support of the Indonesian people, including its relationship with China. So it becomes necessary for Indonesia to understand the aspirations of the population in the relationship with China as the country with the largest population in the world that was only acknowledged by Indonesia as a country with traditional treatment alone.
Maintaining the balance of national interests in the face of the rise of China not only relates to the economic and political relations but also includes managing military strength to meet China’s regional and global ambitions. Because, according to Indonesia’s urban residents, interactions among major countries in the region, especially between China and the US, cannot simply rely on the ASEAN-China strategic partnership. Many urban populations, as reflected in the poll by the Centre for Chinese Studies Indonesia, believe the US is the only country that can encourage and maintain a peaceful and stable Southeast Asia region. They argued that the US is the only superpower in the world (33%). They do not believe in the possibility of China replacing the US as the only superpower, reflected by 5% of respondents. There are also views among the Indonesian middle class in the urban cities that believe China and the US is equally superpower (18%), and at the same time perceived that neither China or the US have the ability to equally become superpower (26%). This fact is in line with the view of the Indonesian people in general about the free and independent foreign policy of Indonesia not to rely only on one big power alone.
In the face of the rise of China, Indonesia should have clear choices to determine the priority of its strategic relationship with the country. Clarity in making development cooperation priorities provide a sufficient basis for Indonesia in response to changes in the regulatory arena of international relations, including with China. This clarity will determine the priority of anticipation that must be done when Chinese growth is not as high as in the 1990s. Thus, the equilibrium of Indonesia’s national interests will continue to balance dynamically the rise of China both when economic growth and trade are high but also facing the slowing down of China’s development.
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.