The Indus and Mekong River Basins: Cooperation and Disputes

Abstract

The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) and the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin are two of the most important transboundary water treaties signed between member states that have a history of disputes and wars. In the case of India and Pakistan, voices to scrap the IWT in both countries are made chiefly because of their day-to-day bitter relationships. The treaty nevertheless remains in effect. The Mekong River Basin countries have had sour relationships in the past, and even after the agreement was signed in 1995 some political differences and disputes between them have remained. In both the Indus and Mekong basins, China is an important upper riparian. This article discusses the IWT and Agreement among the Mekong basin countries and examines the convergences and divergences between the two. It then analyses the role of China, as an upper basin to Indus and Mekong.

Keywords

China Indus Waters Treaty Mekong basin Mekong River Commission USA

Due to the rise in population, accelerating climate change and mismanagement of water resources, some parts of the Indus basin region are expected to witness more water shortage or even water scarcity in the future (Ministry of Water Resources, Government of Pakistan, National Water Policy, 2018; National Institution for Transforming India, Government of India, 2018). Such an imminent threat has no impact on the security-centered India-Pakistan bilateral relationships. Instead of looking at the water problems , the security related issues have enveloped the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) and water sharing matters between the two countries. For example, after a militant attack on an Indian Army camp in 2016 in Uri in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed, the Indian prime minister Narendra Modi said that blood and water cannot flow together (Bagchi and Mohan, 2016). Following that attack, India suspended the annual meeting of the Permanent Indus Commission. However, the Indus commissioners met in 2017 at Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan (The Hindu, 2017). The commissioners subsequently met in 2018, and the last meeting was held in March 2021.

Similar challenging physical factors as in the Indus basin exist in the Mekong basin. To address the challenges in the basin, the Mekong member countries produced the first Basin Development Strategies (BDS) in 2011–2015 and the second 2016–2020. Unlike the two BDS which had a timeframe of five years, BDS 2021–2030 was prepared for 10 years. The 2021–2030 BDS sets out the five following objectives (Mekong River Commission for Sustainable Development, n.d.a):

Environment: Maintain the ecological function of the Mekong River Basin

Social: Enable inclusive access and utilization of the basin's water and related resources

Economic: Enhance optimal and sustainable development of water and related sectors

Climate Change: Strengthen resilience against climate risks, extreme floods and droughts

Cooperation: Strengthen cooperation among all basin countries and stakeholders

Sinha (2021) explores the history of the Indus basin from the time of Alexander to that of Nehru. Michel (1967) analyses the pre-1947 developments and studies the effects of the partition of the British India on the Indus basin. Gulhati (1973) illuminates readers with the signing process of the Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan. Hussain (2017) looks at the political and legal dimensions of the IWT and argues how it odds against Pakistan. Ranjan (2021) talks about the political dimensions of the water disputes between India and Pakistan. Hiroshi Hori (2000) looks at environmental issues in the basin and the impact of dams in the upper basin on the lower basin of the Mekong River. Molle et al. (2009) emphasize three dimensions of Mekong waterscape transformations: the first revolves around hydropower; the second is on the livelihood of people living in the basin region; and the third is governance, which refers to decision-making power. Gao (2014) explores the potential environmental challenges that the basin countries face, and looks at the problems in the cooperative mechanism set up in the Agreement on the Mekong River. Matthews and Geheb (2015a) provide a holistic analysis of the shifting socio-political contexts within the Mekong region within which hydropower is framed, legitimized and executed. Chellaney (2013) looks at the role of China in regulating the Asian waters by trying to become the hydro hegemon of Asia. Biba (2014) discovers that despite Chinese attempts de-securitize the water issues, there are no substantive reasons to believe that there will be no contention. Zhang and Li (2018) look at China's relations with its water neighbours. Focusing on disputes and cooperation on Asian rivers, Ho (2020) attempts to address how the river basin-sharing states can be ‘incentivized to cooperate’. Kirmani (1990 and 2009) analyses the conditions in the Indus and Mekong basins that promote cooperation and the one which defy them. Hasson et al. (2013) tried to draw a hydrological cycle model of both Indus and Mekong basins. Williams (2018) applied the discourse analysis method to analysing the Indus, Mekong and Ganges-Brahmaputra River basins.

Despite the above mentioned and many more literature, disputes resolving mechanism, cooperative arrangements, role of external actors in the Indus and Mekong River basins are needed to study together. This article attempts to look at the historical context in which the two treaties were signed, their convergences and divergences and the role of China in both the Indus and Mekong basins. It attempts to answer three questions. First, why were the IWT and Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin possible only because of mediation by external actors? Second, how do dispute resolution mechanisms in the IWT and Agreement on the Mekong River basin work? Third, how do China's hydro activities in the Indus and Mekong basins affect the two respective regions? This article largely depends on published primary and analytical secondary sources.

The signing of the IWT and Agreement on Mekong River

Religious ‘differences’, communal tensions and years of political fight between the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League in colonial India ended with the Partition of British India in 1947. During Partition-related violence, around 12 to 15 million people were forced to migrate and sought refuge in various parts of India and Pakistan, around one million people were killed more than one million people died (Ahmed, 2020: XX) and around 75,000 women were abducted and raped by men from other religious group, and sometimes even by from own religion (Butalia, 1998: 3). This continues to affect all aspects of India–Pakistan relationships, including river water sharing (Ranjan, 2020a and Ranjan 2021).

In 1947, understanding the significance of the interdependent irrigation network, in the final award, the Chairperson of Bengal and Punjab's Boundary Commissions, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, expressed a desire that the two countries establish joint control to reap mutual benefits (Partition Proceedings Volume VI, 1950: 305). This, however, did not happen. A few months after Partition, on 1 April 1948, the day after the ‘Standstill Agreement’ expired, India cut off water supplies to the canals flowing into Pakistan (Michel, 1967 and Ranjan 2021). To address the issue, representatives from India and Pakistan held an inter-dominion conference in May 1948. The conference could not break the deadlock, and the matter reached the Prime Minister of India, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, who intervened to find a solution to the issue (The Hindu, 1948). Pakistan agreed to pay seigniorage charges to India for the supply of water from East Punjab (Haines, 2017). Pakistan was not comfortable with the 1948 agreement, while India wanted it to make it permanent (Ranjan 2021, 64–65).

Three years later, influenced by David E Lilienthal's article on the Indus region in American magazine Colliers, Eugene Black, then President of the World Bank, offered the help of the World Bank to resolve the water issues between India and Pakistan (Salman and Uprety, 2003). India reluctantly accepted the World Bank's proposal, and after eight years of negotiations on 19 September 1960 the IWT was signed at Karachi (then capital of Pakistan). Under it, Pakistan has rights over three western rivers – Indus, Jhelum and Chenab – barring some limited uses for India which is allowed to withdraw about 3.60 million acre feet (MAF) of storage (0.40 MAF on Indus, 1.50 MAF on the Jhelum and 1.70 MAF on the Chenab). Sector-wise, India can withdraw 2.85 MAF for conservation storage (divided into 1.25 MAF for ‘general storage’ and 1.60 for ‘power storage’) and an additional 0.75 MAF for ‘flood storage’ (Indus Waters Treaty, 1960). In nutshell Pakistan received around 80.52 percent of the waters from the Indus River System while India got 19.48 percent. WAB Iliff from the World Bank signed the treaty for the purposes specified in Articles V and X and Annexures F, G, and H of the IWT (Indus Waters Treaty, 1960: 9).

The Mekong River originates in Qinghai Province in China. It flows through the Tibet Autonomous Region and then goes to Yunnan province. In China, Mekong River is known as Lancang. From Yunnan, Mekong flows at the China-Myanmar border, crosses it to enter in Laos PDR, then in Thailand, Cambodia, and finally in Vietnam. The Mekong River Basin covers 795,000 square kilometres of total territory (Gao 2014: 2). Historically, in the Mekong River Basin wars have occurred between the pre-modern nations, kingdoms and states of Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and China. Major global powers have continued to intervene in the matters of the Mekong region's states. The 1856 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation and the 1893 Treaty for Regulating the Position of the Kingdom of Cambodia were among the first foreign bilateral agreements in the Mekong basin. These agreements and subsequent treaties in 1926, 1937 and 1950 focused on the role of navigation and established the thalweg as the precise border between Thailand and Laos (Matthews and Geheb, 2015b: 2).

Myanmar was colonized by the British in the 19th century. France colonized Vietnam, Cambodia and Lao PDR and occupied half of Lan Xang – the left bank of the Mekong River – and incorporated the region into French Indochina, and gave the other half – the right bank of the Mekong – to Thailand (Kittikhoun and Staubli, 2018). French control increased agricultural efficiency and turned the delta into one of the world's leading rice-growing regions (Hori, 2000: 91). Thailand was left uncolonized and acted as a buffer state between France and Britain. During the French colonization of Indochina, the Khmer kingdom ‘lost’ much of its southern cone, including a large chunk of the Mekong Delta (Kittikhoun and Staubli, 2018). After the end of the Second World War (1939–1945), the Mekong region witnessed intervention by the USA, the former Soviet Union and China. Outside powers also sponsored and supported one state against another during the Indochina/Vietnam/Laos/Cambodian–Vietnamese wars of the 1970s to 1990s (Kittikhoun and Staubli, 2018). Border skirmishes and confrontations sometimes flared up among the Mekong basin states such as between Cambodia and Vietnam (1975–1977), Thailand and Vietnam/Cambodia (1979–1989), Vietnam and China (1979), Laos and Thailand (1987–1988) and Cambodia and Thailand (the 1950s, 2008–2011) (Kittikhoun and Staubli, 2018).

Due to historical tensions between countries, finding cooperation on water issues was difficult. To initiate cooperation, in 1947, the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE – now the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, ESCAP) was established in Shanghai. In 1949, ECAFE set up the Flood Control Bureau, which proposed a study of the Mekong at the Flood Prevention Technology Conference in New Delhi in 1951 (Hori, 2000: 93). In 1957, ECAFE released a report on ‘Development of Water Resources in the Lower Mekong Basin’, proposing irrigation and hydropower plans as well as an institutional framework for the Mekong region (Kittikhoun and Staubli, 2018). Even the USA took an interest in the region and produced reports to develop the Mekong region. For example, the 1956 ‘Reconnaissance Report – Lower Mekong Basin’ of the US Bureau of Reclamation, Department of Interior, called for extensive data gathering and studies on agriculture, fisheries, navigation and education. Another report was by the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), prepared under General Raymond Wheeler in 1958, which saw ‘the great potential of the Lower Mekong for service to the riparian countries in the fields of navigation, hydropower generation, irrigation and other related water uses’ (Kittikhoun and Staubli, 2018: 656). After the Mekong Committee was set up in 1957, a report by the US-based Ford Foundation under Gilbert White on the ‘Economic and social aspects of Lower Mekong development’ stated that the Mekong scheme ‘has a great potential for transforming the life of peoples of the basin’ (Kittikhoun and Staubli, 2018: 656).

China and Myanmar, part of the Mekong basin, were not included in the international planning effort. China was not a member of the ECFAE, while Myanmar was not interested (Jacobs, 1995). This was the first time that the UN was directly involved in the planning and development of an international river basin. The Mekong River project was seen by some as the region's ‘Marshall Plan’. At that time, political relationships between basin states were relatively harmonious (Jacobs, 1995). The Mekong Committee Office in Bangkok was opened in 1959 by Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary-General of the United Nations (Mekong River Commission, 1995). In 1977, Cambodia left the organization because of the internal political situation and its tensions with Vietnam. In 1978, the Interim Mekong Committee comprised Lao PDR, Thailand and Vietnam. Cambodia reactivated the regional water cooperation platform after the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991 that officially ended the Cambodia–Vietnam war (Wolf and Newton, 2007). Four years later, on 5 April 1995, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Vietnam signed the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin in Chiang Rai, Thailand (Mekong River Commission, 1995).

In both drafts – the IWT and the Agreement on the Mekong River – there are dispute resolution mechanisms, yet disputes between the signing members remain. The next section examines the dispute resolution mechanisms and water-related tensions in the two regions.

Disputes resolution mechanisms: Successes and limitations

Article VII (1 c) of the IWT states that ‘At the request of either Party, the two Parties may, by mutual agreement co-operate in undertaking engineering works in the Rivers’ (Indus Waters Treaty, 1960: 6). Article VII (2) of the treaty adds:

If either Party plans to construct any engineering work which would cause interference with the waters of any of the Rivers and which in its opinion, would affect the other Party materially, it shall notify the other Party of its plans and shall supply such data relating to the work as may be available and as would enable the other Party to inform itself of the nature, magnitude and effect of the work. If a work would cause interference with the waters of any of the Rivers but would not, in the opinion of the Party planning it, affect the other Party materially, nevertheless the Party planning the work shall, on request, supply the other Party with such data regarding the nature, magnitude and effect, if any, of the work as may be available. (Indus Waters Treaty, 1960: 6)

The title of Article IX of IWT is ‘Settlement of Differences and Disputes’ and it talks about ‘questions’, ‘differences’ and ‘disputes’. Under the provisions of the IWT, any question concerning interpretation or application of the Treaty or the existence of any fact has to be first examined by the Permanent Indus Water Commission which will endeavour to resolve it by agreement (Indus Waters Treaty, 1960: 8). If the Commission does not reach agreement on any of the ‘questions’, then a ‘difference’ will be deemed to have arisen, which shall be dealt with by a Neutral Expert (NE). In case the NE informs the Commission that, in their opinion, the ‘difference’, or a part thereof, should be treated as a ‘dispute’, then the treaty says that first the two governments shall take necessary measures to resolve their disputes through negotiations mediated by one or more states mutually acceptable to the two countries (Indus Waters Treaty, 1960: 8). If they fail to reach a mutual conclusion then a Court of Arbitration will be established in the manner provided under the provisions in Article IX (5) of the IWT. Under this, the two parties can mutually agree on an arbitration court or a either party can request for it, if they find that the ‘dispute’ is unlikely to be resolved by negotiation or mediation. Also, if after the expiry of one month following receipt of the other side's Indus Commissioner report on ‘dispute’ the party concludes that the other is unduly delaying the negotiations (Indus Waters Treaty, 1960, 8).

One of the early tests the IWT faced was on the issue of the Salal hydroelectricity project which India planned to build on River Chenab in Resai district of the Indian side of J&K. Pakistan raised certain objections in the form of ‘questions’ which were resolved through bilateral talks in 1977, and an agreement to it was signed on 14 April 1978 (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1978).

More than two decades after, in 1999, ‘differences’ emerged between India and Pakistan over the 450 MW Baglihar hydroelectricity project on River Chenab. On Pakistan's complaint, and agreed by India, the World Bank appointed Professor Raymond Lafitte as the NE. In his final verdict in 2007, Lafitte ordered India to make a marginal change in the design of the Baglihar dam (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2007). India made all the necessary changes, and the dam was finally opened in 2008.

Then there is the Kishan Ganga Hydro Electricity Project (KHEP) over which India and Pakistan have ‘disputes’ that could not be settled even after the Court of Arbitration's final verdict in 2013. Pakistan believes that the KHEP has serious implications for the downstream regions of the River Jhelum. In 2016, Pakistan requested the World Bank to review the design of the KHEP and complained about the Ratlay/Ratle dam which India is building on the river Chenab. In November 2016, the World Bank urged the two countries to agree to mediation so that the issue over the dam could be resolved (World Bank, 2016a). A month later, in December 2016, announcing the World Bank's position on the issue, the World Bank Group's President, Jim Yong Kim, stated that ‘We are announcing this pause to protect the Indus Waters Treaty and to help India and Pakistan consider alternative approaches to resolving conflicting interests under the Treaty and its application to two hydroelectric power plants’ (World Bank, 2016b). India had demanded for a Neutral Expert on KHEP and Ratlay/Ratle hydroelectric projects, while Pakistan asked for Court of Arbitration.

Despite this ‘pause’, India continued its work on the Kishanganga dam and had almost completed it by the end of 2017. On 19 May 2018, Narendra Modi inaugurated the Kishanganga hydroelectricity project (Press Information Bureau, 2018). In reaction, Pakistan sent a delegation led by its Attorney General Ashtar Ausaf which reiterated the country's demand to constitute a Court of Arbitration on the Kishanganga issue (Iqbal, 2018). After meeting with the Pakistani team, on 22 May 2018, the World Bank issued a press release saying that it would continue to work with both countries to resolve their issues in line with the IWT (World Bank, 2018).

Like the IWT, the Agreement on the Mekong Basin has provisions to address differences and disputes. Under Chapter IV of the Mekong Agreement, a council comprising one member from each participating riparian has to be set up. The members representing their respective countries must be of cabinet minister level (no less than vice-minister level), and are empowered to make policy decisions on behalf of their government. The chairpersonship of the council is for one year and rotates in alphabetical order. Under 18 C, the council's function is to ‘entertain, address and resolve issues, differences and disputes referred to it by any Council member, the Joint Committee, or any member State on matters arising under this Agreement’ (Mekong River Commission, 1995: 7). The decision of the Council is by unanimous vote except as otherwise provided for in its Rules of Procedures (Mekong River Commission, 1995). Article 21 then calls for a joint committee, composing members from the member countries at no less than the Head of the Department. The Joint Committee under 24 (f) tries to:

address and make every effort to resolve issues and differences that may arise between regular sessions of the Council, referred to it by any Joint Committee member or member state on matters arising under this Agreement, and when necessary to refer the matter to the Council. (Mekong River Commission, 1995: 8)

Then, according to Article 34 of the Agreement:

Whenever any difference or dispute may arise between two or more parties to this Agreement regarding any matters covered by this Agreement and/or actions taken by the implementing organization through its various bodies, particularly as to the interpretations of the Agreement and the legal rights of the parties, the Commission shall first make every effort to resolve the issue as provided in Articles 18.C and 24.F. (Mekong River Commission, 1995: 10)

Furthermore, Article 35 says that:

In the event, the Commission is unable to resolve the difference or dispute within a timely manner, the issue shall be referred to the Governments to take cognizance of the matter for resolution by negotiation through diplomatic channels within a timely manner, and may communicate their decision to the Council for further proceedings as may be necessary to carry out such decision. Should the Governments find it necessary or beneficial to facilitate the resolution of the matter, they may, by mutual agreement, request the assistance of mediation through an entity or party mutually agreed upon, and thereafter to proceed according to the principles of international law. (Mekong River Commission, 1995: 10)

Unlike IWT, provisions in the Mekong Agreement do not have different levels and forms of engagement to resolve water-related differences and disputes. Also, many of the resolutions of the Agreement on the Mekong River are not binding. For example, Lao PDR carried out its dam-building despite opposition from downstream countries. Lao PDR also ignored the results of a 2010 MRC-commissioned study that recommended a 10-year moratorium on dam-building to enable a better understanding of the environmental risks (European Parliament, 2018).

Mekong basin countries have issues over dam-building. Chinese dams in the Upper Mekong Basin and its assistance in building dams in the Lower Mekong Basin, mainly in Cambodia and Laos PDR, affect the environment and water flow in the basin. China is also engaged in building dams on the Indus River System. The following section examines the role of China in the Indus and Mekong basins.

China's engagement in the Mekong and Indus regions

In 2002, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China on providing daily river flow and rainfall data from two monitoring stations in Yunnan Province during the wet season to facilitate improved flood forecasting. The MoU was renewed in 2013 and again in 2019. In October 2020, the MRC and China signed an agreement under which China agreed to provide year-round hydrological data from its two stations at the Upper Mekong (Mekong River Commission for Sustainable Development, n.d.a).

In 2016, China launched the Lancang–Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Mechanism as an alternative forum to discuss matters with the downstream countries (Wyroll, 2011). The proposal to establish the LMC Framework was initiated at the 17th China–ASEAN summit held in November 2014. The first meeting of the LMC leaders was held in Sanya in China's Hainan Province (Lancang–Mekong Cooperation, 2017). The LMC:

aims at bolstering the economic and social development of the Sub-regional countries, enhancing the wellbeing of their people, narrowing the development gap among regional countries and supporting ASEAN Community building as well as promoting the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and advancing South-South cooperation. (Lancang–Mekong Cooperation, 2017)

Showing cooperation, in 2016 when drought occurred in the lower basin China released emergency water supplies from dams on the Lancang River to increase flow in the Mekong River downstream (Mekong River Commission for Sustainable Development, n.d.a). In 2019, the MRC Secretariat and the LMC Water Centre signed an MoU following their two-year negotiation. The two also agreed to give ‘observer status’ to the MRC secretariat to attend annual meetings of the LMC's Joint Working Group on Water Resources (Mekong River Commission for Sustainable Development, n.d.a).

However, as dialogue partners, China and Myanmar are not bound to be guided by the MRC's provisions. Even MRC cannot influence the decisions of China which inevitably impacts the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB) countries (Phan, 2019). The LMC is mainly regarded as a vehicle to address Chinese interests in the Mekong region. China is accused of blocking waters and flooding the LMB countries. For example, in 2019 the upper reaches in China received record rainfall but the Chinese dams, as accused, stopped waters from flowing to the LMB (Johnson and Wongcha-um, 2020). It is also accused that, since the completion of the Nuozhadu dam in 2012 in Yunnan's province, Chinese dams overall withheld more water than in the previous 20 years (Jennings, 2021). On the contrary, a study by Fan and Luo (2019) shows that there is a strong link between intensive and excessive precipitation and annual floods in the Mekong basin. Likewise, drought is often the result of less rainfall in the basin countries. In 2020, the Mekong basin countries feared drought because the rainfall in the LMB, as per MRC studies, was about 68 percent lower than in May 2019 ( VOA, 2020 ).

Among the signatories of the Mekong Agreement, China's influence on Cambodia is very high. In 2017, Cambodia was the first country to sign an agreement with China on the LMC. Soon after signing, China granted more than US$7 million to Cambodia to fund various preservation projects on the Mekong River (Phan, 2019: 114). Cambodia's hydropower potential is estimated to be 10,000 MW, of which 50 percent is located on the Mekong River's mainstream, 40 percent on the Mekong River's Tributaries and the remaining 10 percent in the southwestern coastal area (Middleton et al., 2015: 142). Many Chinese companies are engaged in the construction of hydropower projects in Cambodia. In 2016, six hydropower dams, all financed and built by Chinese companies, produced 47 percent of Cambodia's domestic energy production (Phan, 2019: 115). Planning, construction and other information related to these dams were not submitted to the MRC's consultation process, violating the member countries’ obligations under the Memorandum of Agreement. Most controversial among the projects is the Lower Sesan 2 Dam. This dam evicted many people from their places and caused a 9.3 percent drop in fish stocks across the entire basin (Phan, 2019: 115). Another controversial project is Sambor Dam which was originally proposed by the China Southern Power Grid Company for construction in the town of Sambo. In December 2011, Cambodia inaugurated its first large hydropower dam, the 193 MW Kamchay Dam, developed as a build-operate-transfer project by Sinohydro Corporation. In 2012, the Kirirom III hydroelectric station (18 MW) was also put into operation by the Chinese developer (Middleton et al., 2015). Other than Cambodia, Lao PDR relies a great deal on Chinese money for funding many dam projects in the country (Beech, 2019).

Evaluating the hydro project on the Mekong River, an MRC report found that if all the dams planned on the Mekong River come into effect, 97 percent of the sediment that once flowed to the river's mouth could be blocked by 2040, starving the land of nutrients needed for agriculture (Beech, 2019). It is pointed out that successive droughts in the Mekong region in 2019 and 2020 have damaged habitats for turtles, reptiles and other critically endangered species (Bloomberg, 2020).

As discussed above, the US is deeply engaged in the Mekong region. The earlier US-funded Mekong Dam Monitor uses satellite data to track water levels in the river basin. On water-related tensions in 2020, a US ambassador from the Mekong region described China as ‘hoarding’ water in its 11 dams in the upper basin and therefore harming the livelihoods of millions of people in the lower basin countries. Another US ambassador said that China was trying to ‘sideline’ the 25-year-old MRC (Johnson and Wongcha-um, 2020).

Refuting these charges, China's foreign ministry said they were groundless. The Chinese foreign ministry statement said: ‘Countries outside the region should refrain from stirring up trouble out of nothing’ (Johnson and Wongcha-um, 2020). On the water situation in the Mekong basin, a Washington-funded study in April 2020 concluded that Chinese dams held back waters during the 2019 drought. In that report, US Ambassador to Cambodia Patrick Murphy said ‘To learn that a primary source for the diminished level of the Mekong, and changes in the Mekong in the Lower Mekong region, is what's happening upstream in China – with essentially the hoarding of water’ (Johnson and Wongcha-um, 2020). This was strongly rejected by China. A statement from the Chinese Embassy in Thailand said the claim was ‘politically motivated, aimed at targeting China with ill intent’ (Johnson and Wongcha-um, 2020).

Again in a tweet on 23 February 2021, Ned Price, a spokesperson from the US State Department, raised ‘concerns over the dropping water levels of the Mekong River’ (Yuwei and Hexing, 2021). This tweet came after the MRC expressed concerns that the water level in the river had come down to ‘alarming levels’ due to water control in upstream dams in China (Yuwei and Hexing, 2021). The Chinese media reacted strongly to this statement. In an opinion piece in the Global Times, Hu Yuwei and Lu Hexing wrote that the average discharge of the Jinghong Hydropower Station in January 2021 was 1243 cubic metres per second, 78.6 percent more than the annual average natural discharge of 696 metres per second, and 16.2 percent more than the same period in 2020. Also, in February 2021 the monthly average outbound flow from Jinghong was 1026 metres per second, 75.1 percent more than the annual average natural flow of 586 metres per second. Yuwei and Hexing (2021) observe that the low flow in the dry season from December to May is due to monsoon climate characteristics.

In July 2021, the US produced a report accusing Chinese hackers of targeting Cambodia to steal Mekong River data. The US accusations are outlined in a 30-page court indictment. The report claims that the Chinese hackers obtained data from Cambodia's foreign ministry during the Lancang–Mekong Cooperation summit on 10 January 2018 (South China Morning Post, 2021). In reaction, China said the accusations were fabricated and politically motivated. Cambodia has not yet commented on the issue. A week before the report was made available to the media, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told Southeast Asian foreign ministers that the United States supports a ‘free and open Mekong region’ under the Mekong-US Partnership ( CNA, 2021 ).

As in the Mekong basin, China is also active in the Indus region. In 2006, Indian media reported on the construction of a small hydropower station on the River Sutlej – raising concerns that it would disrupt the flow of water into India. At that time, the Chinese foreign ministry defended the use of the hydropower plant, claiming it was necessary to meet the electricity demands of the local population. More importantly, the ministry countered that China had always adhered to the basic principles of fair and reasonable development of transboundary rivers while building such hydro structures (Daily News & Analysis, 2006).

China is engaged in building hydro projects on the Indus River in Pakistan. In May 2017, China and Pakistan signed an MoU under which the two sides agreed to invest around US$50 billion on ‘Indus Cascade’, including: Bunji Dam, Diamer-Bhasha, Dasu Dam, Patan Dam and Thakot Dam (see China Pakistan Economic Corridor, Government of Pakistan, n.d.). China agreed to fund Diamer-Bhasha under the CPEC framework; however, in November 2017, Pakistan cancelled the deal citing the strings of tough and ‘non-doable’ conditions attached to it (Zhen, 2017). In May 2020, Pakistan re-entered into a deal with China over the Diamer Bhasha Dam.

The second hydropower project agreed between China and Pakistan in 2020 was a dam at Kohala in what Pakistan calls Azad Jammu & Kashmir and India terms Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir. Kohala was listed under the CPEC in August 2014. Differences emerged between the two countries (Bhutta, 2020), which are now resolved. The third hydropower project agreed on between Pakistan and China was in July 2020 and is at Azad Pattan on the River Jhelum near the village of Muslimabad in district Sudhnoti, on the Pakistan side of Kashmir.

China's involvement in dam-building on the Indus River in Pakistan is mainly because the latter does not have adequate money or technology to exploit its available water resources. Such involvement of China and Pakistan's dependence on it hurtles towards a serious debt trap (Ranjan, 2020b).

Conclusion

Despite mechanisms to address their water-related issues, tensions between India and Pakistan continue and some even resurface. This is mainly because of the political relationships that the two countries share. Their day-to-day political relationships have linked water with security issues, and also constructed ‘water nationalism’ in the two countries. Unlike the IWT, the task to resolve the disputes of the Mekong Agreement is largely assigned to the Council and Joint Council. In case they fail, the disputes can move to the government and in case the governments feel necessary they can mutually agree to mediation. In comparison to the IWT, the process is cumbersome. The dispute resolution between the MA member countries is also accused of being not transparent. Hence it is required that the member countries have a more transparent dispute settlement mechanism, which can be used whenever there arise disagreements (Gao, 2021). In the Mekong region, there is also an absence of strong mechanisms to enforce the agreement. This makes the countries such as Cambodia or Lao PDR decide and act on projects even against the MRC resolutions.

One of the major reasons for tensions between India and Pakistan is regarding data-sharing on the flow of the shared rivers. Unlike these, the Mekong River basin countries do not have such issues between them. The Mekong River is the only international water body that does not have disputes over water data (Gao, 2021).

China is an important upper riparian in both the Indus and Mekong regions but is not a party to any water-related treaty or agreement. More than the Indus region, the building of dams in the UMB and providing help to LMB countries such as Cambodia are regarded as reasons affecting the environment and interests of the other members of the Mekong basin. The active presence of the USA in the Mekong region has further complicated the LMB countries’ relationships with China. Growing USA–China tensions in recent times have their shadows in water issues in the Mekong region. Quite often, the USA takes up the issues of the LMB such as water diversion, extra damming in the UMB, etc. China, however, refutes all such accusations and projects itself as a benign upper basin country.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Amit Ranjan

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