This article presents the System Generalized Method of Moments (SGMM) results on the empirical association between innovation and corporate governance for a panel data set of 88 manufacturing companies in India listed on the NSE 200 Index from 2014 to 2020. GMM approach controls the potential sources of endogeneity inherent in the innovation—corporate governance relationship which mainly arises due to unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity bias. We empirically analyze corporate governance and innovation to understand the market value of research and development practices of manufacturing companies in India. Our results indicate that Board size, Board meetings, and CEO duality support the “value creation” hypothesis of corporate governance of manufacturing companies in India. However, ownership concentration and Board meeting contradict “value creation hypotheses.” Therefore, this study identifies various factors of corporate governance that can help manufacturing companies in India in innovation and growth options. Further, this study recommends that ownership concentration and Board meetings should be properly assessed, as the concentrated owners should not merely act as expropriates, but rather should enable the long-term sustainability of the firm by taking the initiative, which enhances growth.
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