A Critical Analysis of Legal Research in Kenya: The Nexus between Research Funding,Academic Freedom and Social Responsibility

Introduction

Legal research may be defined simply as the process of finding and understanding law. ³ The motivation for carrying out legal research may vary, depending on the position of the researcher. For instance, practicing lawyers understand legal research to be the process of finding, understanding and applying law in order to solve a client’s legal problem—or what may generally be referred to as doctrinal research. ⁴ Indeed, for most lawyers, the need to solve client’s problems is the most common motivation for conducting legal research. Further, when law students sit through legal research as a core course, much of the course content focuses on equipping them with the skills that they need in order to solve a client’s legal problems. However, academics and legal scholars also carry out legal research, and their motivation is not necessarily to solve a given legal problem which is presented to them by a client. In this article, we argue that in the context of post-colonial states such as Kenya, academics ought to carry out legal research for a number of reasons, which may include the need to problematize and decolonize our understanding of what law is in our given social contexts, the need to address particular problems in our societies, and the need to develop academic material that may be used to teach and equip law students with knowledge and skills that will enable them to address issues that are of concern in the society. Thus, for instance in Kenya, academics and legal scholars may be called upon to address issues such as the endemic land problems in the country which cut across questions of the proper use of land and land-based resources, dealing with informal tenure systems, addressing land grabbing and dealing with conflicts over land.

Yet, despite the potential that academics and legal scholars have in contributing positively in address ing problems in the society, there are various factors that can limit them from achieving this, and thus undermine the significance of legal research. This article argues that research-and development-related funding does in fact impact negatively on the capacity academics and legal scholars have in addressing social problems. It will be demonstrated here that the negative impact that research funding may have on the capacity of academics to produce research that is useful in addressing social problems is as a result of the stringent conditions that are attached to research grants, which in turn have the effect of limiting the exercise of academic freedom.

While the Constitution of Kenya recognizes and protects academic freedom, the nature of the relationship between research and external funding opportunities may create conditions which undermine this freedom, and this in turn may result in research failing to address the needs of a given society. Indeed, research being the process by which knowledge is produced, or the search for truth, factors which affect academic freedom also have the potential of determining the kind of knowledge that research produces or what is deemed to be true. This article draws on a broad understanding of the role of legal research in any society and demonstrates that there is a need for independence of thought in carrying out such research, but external funding can sometimes limit academic freedom. In addition, there is generally very little contribution to knowledge from Africa.

The focus of this article is to analyse the extent to which research funding limits the exercise of academic freedom in the conduct of legal research in Kenya. It also reviews the role of legal research in Kenya and examines its social value and its ability to address important legal problems in the country. In reviewing the challenges of research in sub-Saharan Africa, the article seeks to understand how the imbalances in stakeholder relations affect the role of academic research for common good. The article reviews the role of funders as major stakeholders in legal research, and highlights the ways in which factors such as globalization of research make legal research in the society less independent or relevant, while allowing funders to control the research agenda. Ultimately, this article argues that there is a need to reform the way in which legal research is conducted, because without relevant legal research it is difficult for Kenya and indeed Africa to protect its interests in the global arena and as a result states such as Kenya will continue to be excluded in the globalized world.

This article is structured in the following manner. The first part of the article discusses the role of research funding and development assistance in legal research and also analyses the relationship between legal research, law and development assistance. The second part discusses the nexus between academic freedom and social responsibility, while explaining what each of these terms means. It also highlights the implications of social responsibility on the exercise of academic freedom by researchers. The third part discusses the specific ways in which research funding has impacted legal research in Kenya, and argues that due to the influence of research funding, legal research and law in the country have not been fully de-colonized. The fourth part provides recommendations and suggests conditions necessary for the transformation of legal research, so that such research is independent, undergirded by academic freedom and capable of addressing various social problems.

The Role of Research Funding and Development Assistance in Legal Research

Research funding is a complex process that may incorporate actors beyond the academic field. In Europe, for example, the knowledge-based economy comprises actors in the academics, politics and industry. ⁵ In post-colonial states, research funding is mainly provided by the same institutions that fund development-related projects, ⁶ the implication being that research plays a significant role insofar as development is concerned. Thus, research funding falls within the ambit of development assistance.

In the context of legal research, this creates a peculiar situation, because law—what it is, how it comes into existence and its purposes—is integral to achieving the overall goal of development. In post-colonial societies, development assistance plays an important role, and most programmes in such societies are facilitated by this type of funding. On the other hand, law is instrumental in the attainment of economic, political and social development. The question which arises then is what is the link between development assistance and legal research? It remains to be understood as to the ways in which legal research influences development assistance and conversely, how development assistance influences the way in which law is understood. Whereas the connection between law and development has been the subject of extensive debate, there is a need to question what law is and how it is developed through research. In the context of post-colonial states, legal research—the process through which the ontological and epistemological foundations of law are tested—is to a large extent facilitated by the provision of development assistance. In this sense, law is not independent of development, and what is known to be law may in fact be the outcome of development assistance.

The link between law and development in developing and least developed countries has been problematized over time. In post-colonial societies, law has been used instrumentally to achieve the purposes of development. In line with modernity theory, the thinking was that the rule of law was important if post-colonial states were going to achieve economic development. ⁷ In fact, economic development was deemed to be achievable only if there was good governance, and law was essential to the creation of political institutions that would provide good governance. ⁸ Of great significance is the fact that during Africa’s independence decade from the 1960s to 1970s, development was mainly founded upon an econometric model and the assumption was that economic development would result in the greater protection of fundamental rights and freedoms as well as political advancement. ⁹

Much of the development assistance that has been poured into post-colonial societies has therefore been geared at law reform projects which would support economic development, but not necessarily support fundamental freedoms or democracy. ¹⁰ For this reason, development assistance is blamed for many of the problems which Africa faces, because hot on the heels of independence, development assistance helped to create conditions that would support the creation of authoritarian regimes, which could excusably ignore and even violate fundamental rights ¹¹ —‘it is the economy, stupid!’ ¹² Law was instrumental in this process of creating authoritarian regimes and giving them legitimacy. In fact, law, as was understood in pre-colonial Africa has gradually been transformed both during the colonial and post-colonial periods. Research has played a key role in the process of law reform, and it is apparent that research into law has largely been informed by donors and development agencies.

What is also clear is that law as reformed through development assistance does not reflect Africa’s reality or truth, given that development assistance failed to address the problems Africa was facing, and additionally, it worsened those problems and even created new ones. The provision of aid has in fact been catastrophic in most post-colonial societies. Programmes that have been funded by donor agencies have failed to meet the needs of their target communities and in some instances, the results have actually been retrogressive. A good example would be the infamous structural adjustment programmes, which rather than achieving the desired economic development, not only failed miserably to meet this objective but also led to the deprivation of fundamental rights and freedoms. ¹³ Despite these problems associated with development assistance, it is still relied upon to a large extent by post-colonial societies.

Legal research is not exempt from the usual paternalism of development assistance provided to poor countries. Problematic aspects of development assistance such as ‘cultural evangelism and subversion’ may also affect the way in which legal research is conducted. To the extent that research is a developmental process, it cannot be divorced from geo-politics, globalization, external influence, preconceptions, racism and stereotypes that encompass human relations. ¹⁴ There is a need therefore, to interrogate the relationship between legal research and development assistance. This would necessarily entail a review of who controls what knowledge, how they control it and why they control it. ¹⁵

Beginning from the premise that research is (or at least ought to be) the search for truth, Freire’s work is indicative. ¹⁶ He compellingly argues that truth is about dialogue, and that neither can a person alone speak truth in the absence of others nor can a person speak truth on behalf of others. In many ways, development assistance is problematized because is it hegemonic, demanding that institutions in Africa, particularly the law, conform to Western conceptions of law in order for the same type of development that was achieved in Europe and America to be achieved also in Africa. ¹⁷ Development, in this regard, is seen as the modernization of African institutions. Of course, development assistance has also been paternalistic, assuming that donor agencies ‘know best’ and hence it operated without taking into account the views of target communities. ¹⁸ If this model of development is apparent in funding for legal research, and if law be the product of donor-funded research, then it is important to revisit the truth of what law is and what its role in society is.

Consequently, reform of the status of research will require the self-awareness of research institutions and critical understanding of donors on the role of research in society, in order for the donors to fund research projects in a way that will achieve their priorities but also be beneficial to the society. The funder’s interest should not stand in the way of making research relevant to the society. Therefore, by studying the relationship between legal research and development assistance, this article assesses the relevance of legal research in addressing social problems.

Exercising Academic Freedom in a Manner That Promotes Social Responsibility

It is important to explain what the terms social responsibility and academic freedom connote, before discussing how the two are related. Social responsibility has been discussed both with regard to the corporate world and also with regard to the media. It is a discourse that requires actors in these fields to act in ways that are socially responsible, and that benefit the community as a whole, rather than few individuals. ¹⁹ In the context of corporate organizations, this means that the pursuit of profits should not result in negative impacts to the community as a whole. With regard to the media, it entails actors to behave in ways that not only focus on the primary ends of putting out information, but ensuring that such information is accurate, fair and will not be more detrimental than it is beneficial. ²⁰ Social responsibility is extended and applied to the context of academics to argue that the work of academics is so important and crucial, as to have an effect on societies as a whole. While an academic may have individual motivations such as climbing the academic ladder, which require him or her to publish and bring in income through research grants, these must not be the only motivations that an academic considers in the course of research. An academic must evaluate the impact of his or her work on the society. Pertinent questions such as the impact of the research on the society must always be asked. Yet, the clamour for research funding can undermine the capacity of academics to act in socially responsible ways. Consequently, it is necessary to consider what counts for research, and even more importantly, how academics choose what to research on.

Benner and Sandstrom argue that funding agencies can influence academic institutions at three levels. Researchers make their application for funding based upon the funding agencies’ administrative structures; the criteria that funding agencies use for evaluation of grant applications will affect the normative orientation of researchers and the decisions of funding agencies indicate the types of organizations (and research topics and methods) that are likely to be successful. At these three levels, academics actually try to tailor themselves so that they are successful in obtaining research grants, and in doing so, their academic freedom is greatly filtered. What is of greater concern in post-colonial states is that the agenda for development is to a large extent set by development agencies, and the lack of participation by the societies themselves has been an issue of serious concern in discourses regarding development. ²¹ Essentially, the risk here is that development agencies have the power of determining what research is relevant and therefore ought to be funded and which is not. This is the power of agenda setting. It is a power that can potentially silence and make invisible that which really exists. Social responsibility on the part of academics is to highlight and make known that which exists. Yet in their tango with funding agencies, academics may actually be going against the social responsibility that they should be upholding.

On its part, academic freedom is one of the freedoms that has been little discussed or analysed in discussions on rights and freedoms. ²² The threat that the state poses to the exercise of academic freedom is well understood, because the academy plays an important role in analysing and critiquing the state’s actions and policies. ²³ In Kenya, for instance, the academy was instrumental in pushing for the re-introduction of multi-party politics during the 1990s, and as a result, the state took measures to silence the voices of academics in the country. ²⁴ Yet the state is not the only actor which may have the interest and power to limit academic freedom. University administrative bodies also limit the exercise of academic freedom by micro-managing and imposing what academics can or cannot do in the course of teaching and research (this is not to say that universities cannot put in place standards of ethics that academics ought to uphold for example, but rather it is necessary to point out that some universities impose what type of research academics can do or what information they can disseminate). Similarly, by using funds to control what academics do, funding agencies also limit the exercise of academic freedom.

Aside from having a number of actors who may have an interest in limiting academic freedom, there are also numerous ways through which ‘interest groups’ undermine academic freedom. Some common avenues that different interest groups use to influence legal research, include, funding, opportunities for publication, providing training on various aspects of law, and creating hierarchy, prestige, and recognition. Insofar as funding is concerned, it has an impact upon what is ultimately taken to be law, because even if it does not influence the result, it definitely guides what is to be researched and determines ‘what things to look for’. Hence, a proper understanding of what constitutes academic freedom is necessary if one is to understand the various and myriad ways through which this freedom may actually be violated, and how it ought to be protected.

Whereas the concept of academic freedom is not properly delineated and many varying definitions exist, ²⁵ it may be understood as the freedom of academics to teach and conduct research; the freedom of learners in the academy to explore and learn; and the freedom of academics to disseminate and transmit their knowledge. ²⁶ This freedom ought to be free from external interference by actors that may have an interest in influencing the work of academic, and these would include actors such as the state and religious institutions. While such definitions emphasize the individual freedom of the academic, there is literature that provides a definition of academic freedom in relation to social responsibility. For example, the Association of American Colleges and the American Association of University Professors have stated that the duty of academic freedom is not merely for individual interest or for the university interest but also for fulfilling the needs of the society as a whole. ²⁷ The UNESCO World Conference on Higher Education also takes the position that academic freedom should be construed in relation to social responsibility, in order for societies to find solutions to many challenges that they face. ²⁸

Academic freedom is also crucial for institutional autonomy. Taken in this way, academic freedom entails autonomy but it also comes with certain responsibilities. Notably, academic freedom applies to both teaching and research and the idea that research is fundamental to the advancement of truth is central to academic freedom. Thus, as already noted earlier, research is what informs the way in which teaching and learning occurs; teaching is (or ought to be) based upon research. To be precise, teaching is the part of the process through which knowledge produced in the course of research is passed on or transmitted. Limiting the exercise of academic freedom in the conduct of research therefore also has a negative impact on teaching. Academic freedom is also closely linked to the freedom of expression, the freedom of thought and the freedom of conscience. Hence, a denial or a limitation of these other freedoms would necessarily limit the exercise of academic freedom and vice-versa.

Whereas academic freedom is an individual freedom to be enjoyed by the researcher, this does not mean that the researcher has the leeway to abuse or waive this freedom in the conduct of his or her research. On the contrary, an academic who chooses to undertake research has an obligation to exercise academic freedom. Therefore, with this understanding of academic freedom as being an individual freedom but with the obligation to exercise it as a social responsibility, there is an ethical and moral obligation placed upon academic institutions not to allow the compromised research at the expense of academic freedom. Universities should not compromise on academic freedom by accepting terms under research grants which allow individual researchers to undermine that freedom. A cogent argument is that academic freedom, like other freedoms has obligations equally. ²⁹ The obligation that may be attached to academic freedom is the idea that research is fundamental to the advancement of knowledge and truth. Hence, academics must conduct research for this primary purpose of producing knowledge that is based on truth and that is relevant and beneficial to the society. Academic freedom comes with social responsibility. According to Colgate Policy, academic freedom encourages the free exchange of ideas that is a necessary prerequisite for academic excellence. ³⁰

Academic freedom can serve the public only if universities as institutions are free from outside pressures in the realm of their academic mission and if individual faculty members are free to pursue their research and teaching subject only to the academic judgment of their peers. ³¹ Ultimately, academic freedom is a means to the end seeking to protect and benefit consumers of law school, like students and the society. The freedom is crucial not just for the university but the society as well. ³² Schools should be a ‘marketplace of ideas’, and therefore, it is crucial to have divergent views. ³³ Just like a market we need diversity and it is upto the consumers, therefore, to not allow the strait jacketing of research. The idea of academic freedom encourages the free exchange of ideas that is a necessary prerequisite for academic excellence.

Consequently, while much of the debate on academic freedom might focus on how governments and university administrative bodies have an obligation to protect and promote academic freedom, it also evident that individual academics have a similar obligation. Academic freedom. This is because can also be abused by individual academics who accept funding conditions from external organizations at the expense of the academic freedom, that is, where academics accept research funding under terms which would limit their free and independent thought. This problem of academics choosing to restrict their own academic freedom to pursue funding is an area ignored by the narrow concept of academic freedom which is based on the liberal view of individual rights. The over-emphasis on individual autonomy and liberty does not auger well with the principles and values of academic freedom. While holding governments and universities accountable for the violation of academic freedom, it is also necessary to hold individual academics responsible for making choices that necessarily undermine the exercise of their independent thought. Thus, academic freedom cannot simply be understood in terms of governments and university administrative bodies refraining from interfering with the process of independent and free research, but must also be understood in terms of the responsibility that individual academics have in exercising this freedom for the benefit of the community and society as a whole.

The Impact of External Funding on Legal Research and Law in Kenya

The Constitution of Kenya recognizes and protects academic freedom. ³⁴ Accordingly, by dint of this constitutional provision, academics are given wide latitude in research and teaching, because academic freedom as set out under the Constitution provides wide discretion to faculty to be involved in research of their choice. However, given the various ways in which academic freedom is defined and the lack of clarity as to what exactly the exercise of this freedom entails, the extent of the constitutional protection that is provided for remains unclear. While academic freedom is recognized and protected under the Constitution, it is not one of the non-derogable rights listed under Article 25. This means that it is a freedom that can be limited, provided that such limitation is provided for in law and is justifiable in an open and democratic society. ³⁵ However, the Constitution is clear that even where a right or fundamental freedom is limited by legislation, such limitation shall not limit the right or fundamental freedom so far to derogate from its core or essential content. ³⁶ Thus, it is important to understand the content of academic freedom for the purpose of determining what may constitute a fair limitation of this freedom. The argument here is that while indeed there may arise situations that call for the limitation of this freedom, ³⁷ it would be unethical to limit this freedom for the sake of obtaining research funding, given that funding can and does in fact determine what kind of research may be done and how it ought to be done.

In Kenya, legal research has not succeeded in decolonizing the nature of law in the country. This failure may be linked directly to the role that funding plays in the process of legal research. Several situations point to the fact that law and legal thought have still not been decolonized, and of greater concern, legal research has had little impact in addressing endemic problems in the country. It is important to note that legal education was generally neglected during the colonial period, and Africans who studied law, did so in Europe. ³⁸ Legal research in Africa during the colonial times was actually meant to meet the needs of colonial rulers, and indeed, colonial authorities funded research on the social systems and institutions in the colonized communities so as to understand them and hence, ensure the success of the colonial project. ³⁹ In the post-independence period, legal research was devoted to modernizing legal systems in Africa, or more specifically, formalizing them. Much of the research during this time remained doctrinal in nature, with few attempts to understand how law interacts with other social systems, such as culture, politics and economics.

Formal law in Kenya also remained fixed within the common law tradition, and this was the law that was taught in law schools in post-colonial Kenya. Much less attention was paid to the fact that customary law systems still existed and continued to operate. The interaction of the formal law system with the political, economic and cultural systems was not well researched, given the limitations of doctrinal research. ⁴⁰ The result was a failure by the legal system to address the country’s problems. Yet, rather than addressing the underlying and problematic nature of the foundations and methods of legal research, focus was on placed on reforming the laws—again with little benefit.

The promulgation of the Constitution in 2010 should have been a turning point for the country, given the extensive provisions that exist in the Constitution for the protection and promotion of fundamental rights and freedom, a new and devolved system of governance, and enhanced judicial mechanisms for the dispensation of justice. Yet, the challenges that existed in the immediate post-independence period continue to subsist.

For instance, using the specific example of formality in various contexts, it is evident that formal law is still seen as the most effective way through which rights may be protected, although this position has been problematized. With regard to land for example, it is evident that the land problems that were created as a result of colonial policies have still not been addressed. ⁴¹ Whereas new land laws ⁴² have been enacted since the promulgation of the Constitution in 2010, the land problems which the country has been facing since the colonial period are far from being resolved. One of the major issues in this regard is the fact that research funded by donor agencies such as the IMF and World Bank plays a crucial role in influencing the law. Whereas it is understood that land in the African context is multi-dimensional, these donor agencies are more concerned with the economic dimension. Hence, there is still great focus on the economic dimension of land, and while such issues such as the registration of lands, a means of providing security of tenure are given primacy within the law, other issues such as the recognition of informal tenure systems are not properly provided for within the existing legal framework. ⁴³ Much less attention is paid to the social and political dimensions of land within the legal framework. Yet, it is clear that unless social and political issues surrounding land in Kenya are addressed, it is likely that land-related conflicts will continue to occur.

Similarly, in the context of family law, it is now a requirement in Kenya to have all marriages registered, including those which are contracted under customary law. ⁴⁴ This is an attempt to bring in an aspect of formality in customary law marriages, and it may have potentially negative outcomes for many Kenyans who are not able to have their customary law marriages registered. Even more concerning is the potential that such a provision has in making invisible customary practices such as the woman to woman marriages, which may not fit the criteria for registration under formal law, given that the marriages that may be registered pursuant to the formal law are those between persons of opposite sex. The idea that formal law is the primary means through which rights may be safeguarded is also evident in this regard, but rather than safeguarded rights, formality may actually erode mechanisms that exist for the protection of rights.

The illustration concerning the primacy of formal law in Kenya points not only to the fact that there is a dire need to de-colonize our understanding of law, but also to the fact that funding agencies have considerable influence in determining what eventually becomes law, or indeed, what we understand to be law. Formality in and of itself is not problematic, what is problematic is how it remains unchallenged and continues to be upheld even in the face of concrete evidence that it may not necessarily lead to positive outcomes, and may in fact have the opposite effect of creating disenfranchisement. The real problem is that the ideology which is endorsed by funding agencies inevitably becomes the ideology which informs the kinds of issues academics research on. Research which is based on ideology that is determined by funders has a strong ‘steering’ process that only looks for what is relevant to the funder’s interest. In addition, when the research agenda is largely influenced by external donors, there is little chance that the interests of donors will automatically coincide with the interest of the society which is meant to benefit from the exercise of academic freedom. Essentially, research that is influenced by external forces is rarely done for the benefit of the society, but for the ‘narrow’ and vested interest of the donor and the personal interest of the researcher. ⁴⁵ This kind of research is less about the society’s interest, but is instead ‘dogmatic’ and mirrors the interest of the powerful donors. ⁴⁶ Such research can actually submerge African societies and undermine the freedom of inquiry enshrined in our Constitution. By controlling the undercurrent of what is legal research, funding agencies are curtailing a constitutional right and the principles behind academic freedom as enshrined under Kenya’s Constitution.

Arguably, scholars engaged in the kind of research that is influenced by special interest will remain narrow in their focus, because their work is aimed at advancing the donor’s interest. This is research that cannot contest dominance or indeed be relevant and contextual. Research funding in this regard causes academics to be concerned solely with their personal independence, and not with the bias of the dominance or underlying presumption on which the research is based. This type of research which merely restates the dominant position is not of much relevance to the post-colonial society, which is, by virtue of its colonial legacy, grappling with marginality. The restatement and/or endorsement of dominance only intensifies marginality.

At best, it is the kind of research Williams calls the ‘cross-dressing’ type, which is trying to satisfy the other interest and might have coincidental value to the society. ⁴⁷ While satisfying the mere requirement of law publishers of having numerous pages and footnotes of major cases and scholars, it might also consider briefly explaining some issues of interest to the community. ⁴⁸ Even though this research may be of some relevance to the community as a whole, it may fail to integrate deeper understanding of the issues. Surely, if the clamour for research funding results in these types of research, then research is setting the society for serious failure by perpetuating dominance. The ideal research therefore must start from the clarity about the concept.

Legal research can fall in the rubric of applied research. The word research is just a verb and not a noun. A verb is ‘an action’ and therefore we must be able understand the experience of that verb, because it is not a mere definition of substance but of action as well. If research is understood to be a verb, then we can even talk of research for hire, by those organizations who seek scholarly legitimacy and support, sometimes for the ‘abuse’ they are planning to perpetuate in that society. This is simply academic corruption and it is not different from the other forms of corruption in Kenya, which are currently moral problems in Kenya. ⁴⁹ By allowing external actors to determine the issues that they research on, academics are inadvertently commoditizing and selling their skills and knowledge to the highest bidder, with the most lucrative consultancy, partnership opportunities with universities, or sponsorship. So long as the research is controlled and determined by such market forces, then the idea of constitutional academic freedom in Kenya remains a mere aesthetic object. Arguably, this could be part of the reason why Africa is missing as a contributor in global research, that the research agenda is majorly controlled by funding agencies, and not by the communities and academics in those communities. There is a clear nexus between research and the power. ⁵⁰

The dilemma therefore is that funding is a critical factor in research, because the reality is that it costs money to produce knowledge, but on the other hand, external sponsorship of academic research might limit academic freedom and the value of research to the society in a number of different ways. Therefore, external funding has the potential to undermine one of the core functions of universities, which is research. ⁵¹ Yet universities need funding in order to carry out their research function. It is necessary to consider therefore, as to how this dilemma should be resolved, so that individual academics still attract research grants, but at the same time maintain their academic freedom and carry out independent research.

The Way Forward: Some Suggestions on How Academics Can Exercise Academic Freedom and Social Responsibility While Also Obtaining Research Funding

We have already noted that academic freedom is an individual freedom, to be exercised and enjoyed by the individual researcher. We have also argued that individual researchers have an obligation not to abuse the academic freedom that has been provided under the Constitution. However, here we argue that academic institutions also play a vital role in ensuring that academic freedom is not abused and further, that it is the responsibility and mandate of academic institutions to encourage and promote research that is based on truth that is relevant and useful to the society. Thus, the obligation to ensure that academic freedom is protected lies both with individual academics and academic institutions.

Whereas the ideal situation is for academic institutions to put in place measures that encourage academics to conduct their research without external interference, the reality is that there are some situations where academics and the institutions to which they are affiliated might make a conscious choice to take the research funding with under unfavourable terms because of the financial need. However, universities should not always accept to stand at a disadvantaged position because of research funding. It is illogical to generate a lot of research, which may eventually weaken the integrity of the university and diminish its role in the society. It is clear that there will always exist external factors such as funding opportunities that affect how and why academics choose to engage in research. It is however the role of universities to encourage, as afar possible, academic freedom and free and independent though. Universities can encourage academic freedom by employing some of the measures mentioned below.

Conclusion

Research is the search for truth and the process through which knowledge is produced. The very nature of research therefore demands that certain ethical and moral standards be upheld. Individuals who engage in research have a duty to the society as a whole, with their knowledge that the produce after all affects the society in one way or the other. With regard to legal research, the stakes are high because legal research is the process by which law is produced; it is the process through which we learn and understand what law is. Law on its part, plays an instrumental role in shaping and ordering our lives as individuals and as communities. Thus, the exercise of academic freedom by academics in law schools is of paramount importance; it must not only be exercised, but must be subjected to social responsibility. Those engaging in legal research ought to be held accountable to the community in which they conduct their research.