Abstract
For decades, governments have sought to deter migration by investing in the development of migrant-sending communities, despite macroeconomic data that shows that development can increase emigration. However, emerging research suggests that well-designed aid can promote rootedness in home communities. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) has increasingly attempted to use development to deter migration from the Northern Triangle states of Central America. Is this policy sound?
This paper argues that development should not be instrumentalized to discourage people from migrating. It examines migration and development policies from the lens of Catholic social teaching, which recognizes the need for states to respect the agency of individuals. This is particularly important when it comes to complex and consequential decisions like whether to migrate. The Catholic Church recognizes both a right to migrate, when necessary, and the responsibility of states, particularly wealthy nations, to help people realize the right not to migrate; that is, to thrive in their home communities. The paper argues for US government assistance to alleviate poverty and invest in human capital in Central America, but independently of efforts to deter migration. Prioritizing aid to potential migrants risks reducing its effectiveness. The United States should instead pursue a whole-of-government strategy that emphasizes the right relationships with aid recipients, and that prioritizes and empowers the poor and marginalized. The paper is strongly influenced by the author's 15 years of work for Catholic agencies on migration and development, more than one-half of those with Catholic Relief Services.
Introduction
In 2014, more than 100,000 unaccompanied children and young families from El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico arrived to the United States in search of protection and opportunity. The trend has continued: between 2014 and 2020, 311,000 people, on average, left the Northern Triangle of Central America (Meyer 2021, 1). Many turned themselves in to US authorities at the border in order to apply for asylum. After another peak in 2019, cross-border travel restrictions due to the coronavirus pandemic slowed movement. The Trump administration then instituted the controversial Title 42 policy, which it justified on public health grounds. This policy has led to the expulsion of nearly 2 million migrants and asylum-seekers at the time of this writing. The vast numbers of migrants waiting just south of the US border demonstrate that any attempt to ameliorate migration to the United States requires governments — sending and receiving — to address root causes of migration, including lack of opportunity, violence, impunity, and climate change.
The Trump administration's “America First” ethos went so far as to separate families in order to deter migration. The policy demonstrates the importance of explicitly examining the values which underlie US policy vis-à-vis migrant-sending communities and migrants. What does an ethical response look like? What obligation does the United States have to its Central American neighbors? Catholic social teaching offers ethical guideposts for reflection on these questions and urges a maximalist response from wealthy nations such as the United States to empower individuals and civil society institutions in the Northern Triangle.
This paper briefly reviews the root causes of migration from Central America. It then discusses research on the impact of development on migration. Finally, it analyzes the US Strategy in Central America through the lens of Catholic social teaching and the perspectives of several US-based Catholic institutions. It concludes that:
The US government should decouple development efforts from migration deterrence; The US strategy should promote “right relationships” with the Northern Triangle states by putting the needs of the poor above the profit of international corporations; The US strategy should prioritize participation of individuals in the region in development efforts, including through more grants and cooperative agreements (rather than contracts); and The US Congress should pass legislation to provide more legal mechanisms for migration to the United States, including by facilitating access to work visas and increasing access to asylum.
Migration from the Northern Triangle to the United States
Why have so many individuals from the Northern Triangle fled to the United States in the past decade? Research and practitioners identify as primary causes of migration both the lack of opportunity and insecurity. The economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic and droughts have exacerbated economic insecurity. Research further suggests that individuals with family members already in the United States are more likely to pursue the American dream (Dexis Consulting Group and the University of Notre Dame 2021; Donato and Sisk 2015).
Lack of economic and educational opportunity drives the flight of many from the Northern Triangle. El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala are among the most economically unequal countries in the world; and they rank 124, 132, and 127, respectively, on the Human Development Index (UNDP 2022). El Salvador has come a long way to reduce poverty, but Honduras remains the second-poorest country in the region. Remittances accounted for approximately 20 percent of the gross domestic products (GDP) of El Salvador and Honduras in 2018 (KNOMAD 2019). Both countries have established networks of migration in the United States, facilitating emigration. Informal work accounts for 70 percent of employment in El Salvador (Ulku and Zaourak 2021a, 25) and Honduras (Ulku et al. 2021, 26), and lack of access to banking and credit inhibit the possibility of formal work. Moreover, the coronavirus pandemic has pushed many residents of the Northern Triangle states back into poverty. Guatemala suffers the fourth highest rate of chronic malnutrition globally (World Bank 2022). The government spends approximately one-half what its peers do for public education (Ulku and Zaourak 2021b, 34), and 12 percent of the population is illiterate. Across all three countries, more than one-quarter of youth between the ages of 15–24 — a growing population — have been outside of work or education since 2011.
Despite economic gains, many individuals flee Central America to escape gang extortion, recruitment, and violence. Violent gangs, some funded by drug cartels and often with the collusion of government officials, prey upon vulnerable youth and effectively control large territories. Nearly one in 10 Hondurans and Salvadorans experience extortion simply to remain in their homes or run their businesses (Selee and Ruiz Soto 2021). Forced conscription — in which gangs demand that a youth join their gang or be killed — leaves many with no choice but to flee. Of the 404 children interviewed for UN High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR's) Children on the Run study, over half of those who stated that they left to reunite with family, for opportunities, or deprivation also cited violence, including “violence in society predominantly by armed criminal actors, and abuse in the home” (Schmidt and Somers 2014, 24). Fifty-eight percent of the children surveyed had conveyed concerns that would require international protection (ibid., 41). The Northern Triangle countries experience some of the highest rates of violence in the world. The coronavirus pandemic and natural disasters have exacerbated economic vulnerabilities.
Rampant impunity in the region — averaging 97 percent (Smith 2020, 4) – exacerbates and enables the violence. A majority of residents do not feel safe, nor that they can rely on authorities to protect them. As Luz's story indicates, inadequate police protection — and possible collusion — can make life impossible even for middle class families who fall on hard times. “Luz, a woman from San Pedro Sula, Honduras, had a degree in marketing, a good job at a bank and a home in a gated community where she was raising two sons as a single mother. When the pandemic began, her salary at the bank was cut by 65 percent and she took out a L5,000 lempira (approximately $200) loan to cover basic expenses. The lenders began extorting her after she had paid off the loan and forced her to pay them over $70,000 lempiras (approximately $3,000) as they stalked her, photographed her coming and going to work and made death threats. She tried to report the crime at two separate police stations but was told at both to keep paying. While family support helped her cope with the greatest dangers, it was not enough to stop the extortion. Several months later in Ciudad Juarez, she was still suffering sadness, depression and guilt from having left one son in hiding in Honduras because she could not pay to travel with both.” (Hollandbyrd and Omar Rios 2021).
Sexual and gender-based violence and violence against the LGBTQ + community are pervasive. Guadalupe's story shows how, lacking police protection and a social safety net, some families feel no other option but to migrate for both their safety and economic security. “Guadalupe, a 36-year-old woman from Siguatepeque in west-central Honduras, ran a motorcycle shop with her husband of 18 years while they raised two daughters and a son. In 2018, she discovered that her husband had been giving drugs to her six- and nine-year-old daughters and sexually abusing them. She appealed to her husband's family for help, but they denied the abuse and threatened to harm her if she went to the police. Guadalupe separated from him and moved her children to a town four hours away, where she rented a room and started a job selling clothes but didn’t make enough to cover food, rent and living expenses. Her husband kept all of their property, forced her to sign a document waiving her right to child support and continued to stalk her and threaten to take her kids back. When the pandemic began, Guadalupe lost her source of income and tried to make money by selling tamales on the street, but they were confiscated by police. While the government provided some food support, it was far less than what was promised and so she volunteered in neighborhood food distribution to earn extra rations. During the hurricanes in November, the wall of her rented home fell down and the landlord would no longer let them stay. Poverty, disaster, and the need to escape fully from her ex-husband led Guadalupe to pay a coyote to take her and her youngest daughter to the border, while she left a daughter and son in hiding with family members to protect them from her ex-husband. She and her daughter presented themselves at a port of entry in Ciudad Juárez in early August but were turned away under the Title 42 expulsion policy. They slept on the street for five days, during which her daughter contracted chickenpox. Desperate and with no recourse, she decided to send her daughter alone across the border, where she was held in a shelter for unaccompanied minors for three months before being reunited with family in the US.” (Hollandbyrd and Omar Rios 2021).
Assessing their relative assets and challenges, many families conclude that sending youth to the United States protects them from gangs and other crime while diversifying income for the family.
Climate change has driven people from the agricultural sector, where the dry corridor has made an already difficult livelihood next to impossible and communities struggle to adapt. Rural areas are not immune to the violence, either. When coping mechanisms wear thin or are exhausted, many leave rural areas for urban areas initially, then eventually migrate outside of their home country (García and Alfonso 2021).
Fleeing both lack of opportunity and violence, migrants from Northern Triangle states are characterized as economic and forced migrants. The response to them, therefore, must include not only economic opportunity but also protection. President Biden directed the US government to develop a root causes strategy under Executive Order 14010. 1 The US Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America largely builds on Obama Administration policies. It commits $4 billion over four years to address economic drivers, challenges to the rule of law, and violence in the region. While important goals, the US government should not expect such investments to significantly reduce irregular immigration in the short term.
Does Development of Source Communities Stem Migration?
Europe and the United States have experimented with efforts to deter migration through development initiatives for decades. Since the 1990s, European governments have attempted “co-development,” with a focus on “more development for less migration” (Gubert 2014, 119). The US Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development recommended this idea to George H.W. Bush in 1990 (Clemens 2014b, 153). European initiatives have included development aid, remittances, and development projects initiated by migrant associations (Gubert 2014, 122). These efforts initially maintained separation between migration and development. Yet more and more, the use of aid “as leverage for increased migration controls ‘at source’, discredited the policy concept of co-development” (ibid., 125).
The relationship between migration and development is complex: there are “multiple links — in each direction, direct, indirect, general equilibrium — as well as exogenous third factors … that affect both [migration and development]; the problem … is establishing causality” (Parsons and Winters 2014, 95). In 2014, Parsons and Winters (2014, 65) found an “almost complete absence of literature of any note” on the topic, despite its “near ubiquity” as a policy tool. The dearth of migration data may be one reason for this lacuna (Lucas 2014, 1), particularly the lack of microeconomic data on the relationship between aid and migration (Parsons and Winters 2014, 107). One exception is the finding by Bethélemy, Beuran, and Maurel (2009, 1592) that “an increase in bilateral aid of 10 percent will increase bilateral migration stocks by about 3 percent. An increase in total aid of 10 percent augments migration by a mere 1.5 percent on average” (ibid.).
In their survey of the literature, Parsons and Winters (2014, 98) conclude that “the hope that development will stem the tide of migrants from low- and lower-middle-income countries is a vain one” (Parsons and Winters 2014, 98). Michael Clemens concurs. Testing what Hatton and Williamson called the “Emigration Life Cycle,” or Zelinsky referred to as the “Mobility Transition,” (Clemens 2014a, 11) Clemens confirms with updated data that over time and geography, emigration rises with incomes, slowing considerably at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) $10,000 (Clemens 2020, 11). Mexico is often cited as a case in point.
The Emigration Life Cycle is often explained by rising incomes, which increase education and urbanization, as well as an associated demographic transition which leads to a youth bulge (Clemens 2020, 2). Youth bulges “raise competition for jobs, land, and other resources among the young –who are the most mobile-even as prosperity soars” (Clemens 2021, 3). Another reason often cited for the increased emigration is the greater access to fund the journey, or even to access credit for it. de Haas (2007) recognizes that “economic and human development increases people's capabilities and aspirations,” prompting increases in emigration. Finally, networks beget migration: once networks have developed between communities of origin and diasporas, they facilitate future emigration.
Catholic Relief Services’ (CRS) recent study on rootedness appears to corroborate the aspirational nature of some migration: urban youth seek a life project in which they not only survive, but can thrive (CRS 2020a, 17). The respondents with greater intention to leave Guatemala had achieved higher levels of education, were optimistic about their futures, and showed “a high level of attraction to the destination to complete a life project” (CRS 2020a, 10). Among the rural cohort in the study, 77 percent of Guatemalans in communities served by CRS had no intention to migrate; more than half of these respondents suffer extreme poverty, consistent with theories that poorer people are less likely to migrate (CRS 2020a, 8). Because investment in human capital tends to build aspirations, development interventions should aim not only to invest in youth's abilities, but also to then connect them to opportunities (Fratzke and Salant 2018).
The complex decision to migrate encompasses such a vast array of influences that it has thus far confounded the development of a unifying theory. Macro factors include political, economic, social, demographic, and environmental matters (Castelli 2018, figure 2). Micro factors include age, educational level, obligations to family, spiritual, and others. Moreover, the decision to migrate often is made not by an individual alone, but rather by a household aiming to not only increase income, but also to minimize risk (Ibáñez 2014, 370).
Although the literature on migration and development appears to apply to some extent to situations of forced migration, as in the case of youth fleeing violence in Central America, much work remains to be done to understand that relationship. Even in situations of forced migration, case studies suggest that individuals measure the costs and benefits of migration in their decision-making, where both violence and socioeconomic factors play a role (Ibáñez 2014, 350). Forced migrants often prioritize increased security at the cost of increased income (ibid., 362). “Reactive” displacement, in which individuals flee a specific threat, is less likely to respond to traditional drivers of migration than more generalized threats that spur “preventive” displacement (ibid., 379). Ibáñez hypothesizes that the higher the intensity of violence, or the more targeted it is, the greater the likelihood of flight (ibid., 378). This is particularly relevant with regard to El Salvador, where income levels suggest that migration may soon wane, but the homicide rate remains among the highest in the world.
The relatively small scale of aid likewise limits its potential impact in the region, whether measured by employment creation or education. Morrison (1982, 15) argued that development is unlikely to stem migration to the US even over decades. Further scaling up aid to the Northern Triangle would help to assist more people, however countries eventually reach absorption capacity. Absorption capacity refers to the amount of aid which implementing institutions can effectively program.
Recent research does suggest that aid, subtly designed, can ease pressure to migrate. Studies have proliferated regarding international development programs and their impacts on emigration, which is not surprising given the political demand to stem migration. A World Bank paper found “across a range of countries that the self-employed are less likely to migrate than wage workers, or than those without jobs at all” (Giambra and McKenzie 2019, 18). CRS’ survey of Guatemalans found that people who worked as day laborers expressed the greatest intention of leaving (31 percent), followed by students and the unemployed (25 percent each) (CRS 2020a, 13). The US Agency for International Development (USAID) has invested in research to deepen its understanding of factors that promote “community-attachment,” (see, for example, Dexis Consulting Group and University of Notre Dame 2021).
Research regarding cash transfers — a very promising and growing development intervention, in part due to their efficiency — provides more nuance to the picture of how increases in income can affect the likelihood of emigration. Rose et al. (2021, 20) posit that cash transfers afford a social safety net and can increase investments in human capital. Parsons and Winters (2014, 100) point to an increase in migration associated with conditional cash transfers targeted at poor rural households in Mexico. The evidence is more mixed over the longer term (Rose et al. 2021, 20). Stecklov et al. (2005, 784) show that a conditional cash transfer program in Mexico reduced US migration in total, though it increased migration to the United States for work. By contrast, a 13-year impact evaluation of a five-year conditional cash transfer program in Honduras found that non-indigenous men in the cohort remained in school longer (Molina Millán et al. 2019, 18); but also, that young men in the oldest cohorts were twice as likely to migrate (from 3 to 7 percentage points) (ibid., 19). Depending on whether their goal is to reduce poverty or stem migration, policymakers may differ on whether to consider such interventions successful.
For many years, the discussion on migration and development centered on the role of remittances and the potential of diaspora investment in their countries of origin. Remittances to “source” countries have grown considerably over the years. In 2021, the World Bank's Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) expected “remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries to reach $589 billion …, a 7.3 percent increase over 2020. Remittances now stand more than threefold above official development assistance and, excluding China, more than 50 percent higher than foreign direct investment” (Ratha 2021).
Most remittances fund staples such as food, school supplies, or small appliance purchases. Diaspora also use them to contribute to development in their countries of origin by investing in trade, technology, health, education, infrastructure, philanthropy and information services (KNOMAD 2022). KNOMAD observes that some countries have fostered relationships with their diaspora, while for others this resource is largely untapped.
Some European governments have implemented development programs in collaboration with diasporas. Their understanding of and motivation to improve their home communities makes diasporas ideal development partners. Yet efforts to co-invest with diaspora organizations on remittances should be considered carefully: programs risk an “extractive” character, which “places a disproportionate burden on migrants to … contribute to needs of communities in areas where neither the public nor private sectors opt to invest” (DeLorey 2009, 43). Flore Gubert (2014) identifies additional challenges to this approach. First, “migrant organizations have been found to focus their interventions at the level of blood relations … or to reinforce social and political fragmentation in the communities of origin” (ibid., 144). Second, “living abroad for many years may have altered their habits and viewpoints” (Horst et al. 2010, 12). Third, migrants may be viewed with skepticism in their home communities (Gubert 2014, 140). Fourth, diaspora organizations often lack adequate staff to undertake major initiatives (ibid., 137). Finally, migrants’ primary obligation to support their families may limit their ability to commit sustainably to additional development projects (ibid.). Thus, while remittances play a vital role in decreasing poverty in developing communities, their potential to foster development outside of the household should not be regarded as a substitute for other interventions. From the perspective of policymakers, remittances may best be viewed as complementary to social services, investment, and aid.
Rather than considering development as an antidote to migration, analysts increasingly see migration as a contributor to development. Migration enables remittances, which allow families to make greater investments in nutrition and education. In this way, migration promotes the agency of migrants. “[F]ree and sustainable agency,” in turn, “emerges as a major engine of development” (Sen 1999, 4). Yet governments should tread carefully in trying to incorporate remittances into their activities, and more generally in trying to alter the migration calculus of individuals.
This short review of the literature on migration and development suggests that development will not deter migration and may in fact spur it, at least in the short term. It also suggests that development should be evaluated on its own terms, and not as a tool to deter migration. The Biden Administration's efforts to use development assistance to increase rootedness has not yet been tested. Even if this strategy proves successful, however, the normative question would remain: should the US government instrumentalize development to deter migration?
The US Strategy in Central America: Catholic Perspectives
In response to the flight of so many unaccompanied children and families to the United States in 2014, the Obama administration developed a strategy to address the root causes in the region, led by then-Vice President Biden. The US Strategy for Engagement in Central America nearly doubled assistance to the region, and aimed to foster security, prosperity and good governance in cooperation with the governments of each country and with multi-lateral development banks (The White House 2016). With regard to development assistance, much of the funding served to scale up already proven programs in the region. During the Trump administration, funding for the region was curtailed and eventually suspended in 2019 at great cost. The Biden administration has resumed implementation of broader and more expansive development and rule of law activities through its US Strategy to Address the Root Causes of Migration in Central America. Committing $4 billion over four years, it seeks to “improve security, governance, human rights, and economic conditions in the region” (The White House 2021).
Catholic social teaching has long argued for charity from wealthier nations to poorer ones, and development assistance serves this end. However, Catholic teaching also argues for justice between wealthier and poorer nations through the establishment of right relationships between them. The United States’ whole-of-government policy could do much more in this regard, including by adjusting trade, foreign investment, and military cooperation. This section considers how current USAID programming aligns with key principles of Catholic social teaching, such as the right to migrate and not to migrate; the right to development; subsidiarity; the preferential option for the poor; and the need for participation. Catholic social thought foregrounds human dignity and calls on governments to protect human rights and promote the common good. From this perspective, US development initiatives should both facilitate the right to migrate and the right not to have to migrate. Yet when coupled with a deterrence strategy and lack of options to migrate, the overall US policy in fact reduces the options available to vulnerable populations.
Agency of Migrants and Subsidiarity
In Catholic thought, governments have a right to manage their borders, but their raison d’être is to protect individuals. The Catholic principle of subsidiarity suggests that migrants themselves are best placed to determine whether to migrate. A Catholic approach to migration and development would honor the agency of individuals in decisions on whether to migrate. It would recognize that migration is a legitimate strategy for persons who cannot meet their needs at home. The Church argues that people have a right to migrate, and a right not to migrate; that is, to meet their needs at home.
Two principles of Catholic social teaching — participation and subsidiarity — underscore the agency of individuals and families in determining whether to migrate. The Church teaches that “All people have the right to participate in decisions that affect their lives. Subsidiarity requires that decisions are made by the people closest and most affected by the issues and concerns of the community” (Caritas Australia 2022). Pope Benedict XVI underscores Paul VI's understanding of development as “rescuing peoples, first and foremost, from hunger, deprivation, endemic diseases and illiteracy” (Benedict XVI 2009, 21). He explained: “From the economic point of view, this meant their active participation, on equal terms, in the international economic process; from the social point of view, it meant their evolution into educated societies marked by solidarity; from the political point of view, it meant the consolidation of democratic regimes capable of ensuring freedom and peace.” (ibid.)
The principle of subsidiarity provides that: “In order to protect basic justice, government should undertake only those initiatives which exceed the capacities of individuals or private groups acting independently. Government should not replace or destroy smaller communities and individual initiative. Rather it should help them contribute more effectively to social well-being and supplement their activity when the demands of justice exceed their capacities” (US Conference of Catholic Bishops 1986, 124).
Taken in tandem, these principles underscore the need of individuals to determine for themselves and their families how best to protect and provide for themselves. Pope John Paul II stated, a person “has the right to leave his native land for various motives — and also the right to return — in order to seek better conditions of life in another country” (John Paul II 1981, 23). The argument preceded, and certainly aligns with Sen's “freedom as development” framework (Sen 1999).
2
This right to migrate limits state sovereignty: “The sovereignty of the State, although it must be respected, cannot be exaggerated to the point that access to this land is, for inadequate or unjustified reasons, denied to needy and decent people from other nations, provided of course, that the public wealth, considered very carefully, does not forbid this” (Pius XII 1952, 51).
Foreign Policy and Right Relationships
The Catholic tradition also requires solidarity — which leads to charity — and justice. Pope Paul VI stated that the obligations of wealthier nations: “…stem from the human and supernatural brotherhood of man, and present a three-fold obligation: 1) mutual solidarity—the aid that the richer nations must give to developing nations; 2) social justice—the rectification of trade relations between strong and weak nations; 3) universal charity—the effort to build a more humane world community, where all can give and receive, and where the progress of some is not bought at the expense of others. The matter is urgent, for on it depends the future of world civilization” (Paul VI 1967, 44).
Right relationships include aid, trade, and legal status for immigrants in the countries to which they emigrate. An increasingly globalized world calls for even more attention to right relationships through foreign policy. As borders opened to the movement of goods and services with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), a commensurate facilitation of the movement of people has not followed. The United States’ “whole-of-government” approach to the Northern Triangle should seek to build right relationships vis-a-vis the Northern Triangle governments and their citizens. Such an approach would prioritize human dignity, the common good, and care for creation above profits. It would require the United States to consider, for example, the extent to which CAFTA has contributed to the decline in the agricultural sector in Central America. It would have required consideration of the impact on smallholder farmers — and provided a means to protect their livelihoods — during negotiations. Many Americans would argue that the US government should represent its citizens first. Yet “membership in the human community” is “a higher value than citizenship in a particular nation-state, at least in extreme situations where humanity itself is threatened” (Hollenbach 2002, 219).
The Sisters of Mercy emphasize right relationships between the United States and Central America in their advocacy. Unlike most others in the public policy sphere, their framing of the root causes of migration focuses on the impact of US policies going back decades. They would like to see the US government apologize for past interventions during the so-called “dirty wars,” for example. The Sisters of Mercy, SHARE El Salvador, the Interfaith Movement for Human Integrity, and the Leadership Conference of Women Religious identify as root causes of migration “an extractive economic model causing displacement, environmental degradation, and worker exploitation; militarization of society; arms proliferation; land theft; and corruption of state institutions” (SHARE El Salvador et al. 2019,1). They argue that the United States “bears significant responsibility for these precipitating conditions” (ibid.). The Sisters of Mercy further assert that NAFTA, CAFTA, and US support of agribusiness have pushed small farmers off their land and destroyed local economies. They also see militarization and arms proliferation as drivers of migration. To that end, the Sisters of Mercy called in 2021 for the United States to, among other things, “suspend US military and police aid to Honduras and prohibit certain munitions sales” (Erickson 2021). Development assistance is important, but the Sisters of Mercy rightly point out that a strategy to address root causes must do more.
Right relationships would also require an updated system of legal immigration to the United States based on the nation's interests in family unity, labor, due process, and refugee protection (Kerwin and Warren 2017). The US Conference of Catholic Bishops have advocated for a more humane immigration system through their “Justice for Immigrants” campaign since 2003. Yet even where visas exist, barriers to access them can be high.
The US government has sought to facilitate legal immigration of workers from the region, an important yet largely overlooked strategy to facilitate development in the region. In 2019, USAID began to facilitate H-2 visa programs in the Northern Triangle (Rose et al. 2021, 8), to ensure that workers know their rights and to build linkages between employers in the United States and communities in the region. In 2021, the administration set aside 6,000 H-2B visas for workers from the region. Such measures relieve competition for scarce work in the region, while also meeting labor needs in the United States and protecting migrants from the dangers of undocumented migration. Reducing the labor pool has been shown to increase wages in migration source countries. Through its two-pronged strategy of both development and increased legal migration, the administration has adopted both short-term and long-term means for citizens of the Northern Triangle to pursue authentic development. Owing to threats and violence, some require immediate access to relief. In these cases, the Administration and Congress must do much more to provide access to asylum for vulnerable populations and ensure their protection.
Integral Development and the Preferential Option for the Poor
Pope Paul VI (1967, 65) asserted the need for “all peoples to become the artisans of their destiny.” “In God's plan, every man is born to seek self-fulfillment, for every human life is called to some task by God. At birth a human being possesses certain aptitudes and abilities in germinal form, and these qualities are to be cultivated so that they may bear fruit” (ibid., 15).
In Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, Pope John Paul II (1987) calls each person and each community to authentic development, broadening the concept of development to include matters related to spiritual, social, civil, and political life. The World Synod of Catholic Bishops, in 1971, articulated a right to development, which they define as “a dynamic interpenetration of all those fundamental human rights upon which the aspirations of individuals and nations are based” (World Synod of Catholic Bishops 1971, 15). Authentic or integral development can also be understood as a prescription for development. Hollenbach's observation about globalization applies both to development and migration: “it cannot be reduced to a single line of analysis such as the economic without distorting it in ways that will lead to serious misunderstanding” (Hollenbach 2002, 219). This broad perspective is echoed by Sen: “development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states” (Sen 1999, 3).
Catholic teaching obligates developed countries and individuals to be neighbors to those in need (O’Neill 2009, 151), in solidarity. Rev. William O’Neill, SJ, calls upon persons to “[take] the victim's side as our own” (ibid.). This preferential option for the poor also applies to societies: “Therefore everyone has the right to possess a sufficient amount of the earth's goods for themselves and their family. This has been the opinion of the Fathers and Doctors of the church, who taught that people are bound to come to the aid of the poor and to do so not merely out of their superfluous goods. Persons in extreme necessity are entitled to take what they need from the riches of others” (Paul VI 1965, 69).
This commitment to assist the most vulnerable underlies US development assistance globally and is of particular relevance to immigrants fleeing their communities based on need. The current US strategy in Central America seeks to provide “hope for citizens in the region that the life they desire can be found at home” (NSC 2021, 4). Among other goals, it aims to facilitate the development of youth by affording them educational and work opportunities (ibid., 9).
Programs such as CRS’ Youth Pathways offer workforce training that connects youth to employers. Based on the YouthBuild model established in the United States, the program recruits youth in at-risk neighborhoods and trains them not only in business skills, but also in soft skills to help them to avoid the gangs in their neighborhoods. Partnering with more than 300 businesses to train workers with relevant skills, it aims to “disrupt the violence.” An evaluation of the program showed that employment among participants increased from 12 percent at the start of the program to 75 percent 18 months after graduation (Jones 2019, 3). Not all such workforce programs have proven as successful, however, and USAID continues to refine its approach in partnership with implementers.
In addition to vocational training, the strategy aims to bolster basic education both to reduce violence and increase job readiness. Research shows that countries that invest the most in education are more likely to show reductions in homicides (UNODC 2019, 30). Additionally, throughout the region, “31.9 percent of firms [identify] an inadequately educated workforce as a major constraint,” in hiring, with Honduras and Guatemala showing a particularly high education gap (Ulku and Zaourak 2021b, 35). In some cases, the lack of educational readiness may be due to violence: as many as 39,000 youth in 2016 could not attend school due to fear of gangs (Smith 2020, 4).
Additionally, the administration has sought to address climate change as a driver of migration, seeking to “build resilience to address climate change and food insecurity” (NSC 2021, 8). Funded by the Howard G. Buffett Foundation, CRS’ Water Smart Agriculture program helped more than 40,000 farmers to manage soil and water to increase their yields and withstand increasing droughts. “In the 2018 drought, 80 percent of farmers using water-smart agriculture practices produced at least 15 percent more crops than those that did not” (Jones 2019, 4). Programs such as these should be replicated across the region to reach more farmers in the largely decimated agricultural sector.
The Center for Global Development proposes further research into indexed insurance schemes for farmers in the Northern Triangle, given the success of Mexico's indexed disaster trust fund, Fonden (Rose et al. 2021, 19). Indexed insurance pays out based on a predetermined index; it can enable a more rapid settlement than traditional insurance schemes, thus affording a more rapid recovery. Improved insurance systems could provide critical resilience for subsistence farmers who sometimes sell off assets or undertake other risky coping strategies.
The Biden administration has touted its partnership with the private sector, the Partnership for Central America. Mastercard is supporting 1 million small businesses; Chobani is supporting food startups in Guatemala; Microsoft is expanding broadband access to up to 3 million people; and Nespresso is starting to source coffee in the region, investing $150 million (Narea 2021). To the extent that these investments support small and medium enterprises, they hold great potential to help to formalize those businesses, and provide credit, internet access, and skills to many entrepreneurial individuals. Yet private investments must be carefully crafted and steered to prioritize the needs of the economically disadvantaged, not simply to reinforce the wealthy elite or serve the goals of international corporations.
USAID incorporates inclusive development in its work, which: “promotes the rights and inclusion of marginalized and underrepresented populations in the development process,” including by “addressing the needs of children in adversity and youth” (USAID 2022). The Country Development Cooperation Strategy for Guatemala, for example, prioritizes indigenous populations. As the US Conference of Catholic Bishops wrote in 1986, “Every economic decision and institution must be judged in light of whether it protects or undermines the dignity of the human person” (USCCB 1986, 13). Even when a decision might benefit Americans at a cost to non-citizens, the preferential option for the poor requires that “the needs of the poor take priority over the wants of the rich” (Hollenbach 1979, 204). Undoubtedly this challenge could prove among the toughest for the US government, which often represents the interests of US businesses. Faith in Action (2022, 8) proposed that one way in which to execute this principle would be to “[m]ake labor rights, including the right to form a union and bargain collectively, and increasing wage and benefit levels a primary focus of the Root Causes Strategy.”
The strategy initiated by the Obama Administration failed to achieve its potential given significant interruption. The Trump Administration took power shortly after initial funding was obligated. It reduced funding levels significantly, reprogramming $396 million in development aid in 2018 and suspending funding altogether in 2019. Suspension of aid halts development progress, harms affected communities, erodes trust, and fails to achieve the return on investments made by beneficiaries towards the endeavor. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 80 percent of USAID projects in the region were adversely affected by the 14-month suspension; as were more than 65 percent of projects funded by the Department of State (GAO 2021, 14).
Despite the damage caused, progress has been made. Violence has waned, as evidenced by “declines in national homicide rates since 2015” and “even greater decreases in homicides in communities where USAID's citizen-security programs are paired with the Department of State's law enforcement efforts” (USDOS and USAID 2021, 3). In several communities in which violence spurred migration, “homicide rates have dropped between 40 and 73 percent since 2015” (ibid.). The Pulte Institute for Global Development has found that in addition to reducing homicides, US assistance has increased the perception of security among beneficiaries (Smith 2020, 5). In addition, in Fiscal Year (FY) 2019, the same year former President Trump suspended aid to the region, USAID programming reached 120,000 at-risk youth and helped to generate more than 30,000 jobs (USDOS and USAID 2021, 2). While this number may not move the needle regarding youth unemployment in the region, it does provide opportunity and possibly greater security for those 30,000 individuals and their families.
Development is a long-term strategy to alleviate suffering and improve lives. Given its intrinsic value, it merits ongoing investment, notwithstanding the fact that migration will continue. Even as households gain wealth, additional push and pull factors will continue to spur migration, including drought and other climate shocks, as well as the desire for family reunification. Yet arguing that development can reduce migration risks reducing the effectiveness of development programs (in part by shifting their goals), thereby potentially jeopardizing their already precarious political support. To the extent that aid and migration afford opportunities for safety and opportunity, each should be facilitated to the greatest extent possible by the US government, but independently of one another.
USAID has increasingly shifted its rhetoric regarding goals in the region with the implicit message of migration deterrence. Its Monitoring and Evaluation office has continued to research the relationships between migration and community attachment. Such information may prove valuable, but USAID should tread carefully in trying to engineer programs to deter migration. Such a goal may skew development priorities and distort program design.
At present, USAID takes a “place-based approach” to “work with governments to establish strategies to provide services in marginalized communities, including internally displaced populations (IDPs), high-threat crime areas, and regions with highest outbound migration” (NSC 2021, 12). While prioritizing marginalized communities fits with the aim of inclusive development, USAID should avoid prioritizing subnational areas of high emigration over other more vulnerable or needy communities. Prioritizing aid to potential migrants means it may not reach those most in need. USAID's own evaluation found that in Honduras, “poorer municipalities … send fewer migrants, and higher rates of unmet basic needs are associated with lower not higher municipal migration rates” (Dexis Consulting Group and University of Notre Dame 2021, 14).
To measure success according to reductions in emigration, particularly in countries where the youth bulge will continue to grow, risks overlooking successful investments in local communities. USAID acknowledges that many factors compelling migration are outside of its control, including climate shocks and job opportunities in the United States. From the perspective of Catholic teaching, programs aimed at reducing emigration infringe upon the right to migrate and the agency of the individual and affected families, who are in the best position to decide upon a course of action to promote their safety and wellbeing.
Civil Society Ownership and Participation
The field of development emphasizes the importance of country ownership for long-term success. In the case of ineffectual, corrupt, or extractive political institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) such as those of the Northern Triangle, a civil society ownership approach can facilitate local development and accountability and can increase the pluralism of economic and political institutions. The Biden Administration could rely even more on non-profits and local entities in the region than it does; and should invest heavily in the initiatives of President Xiomara Castro of Honduras to facilitate her success.
Country ownership is the ideal for development because of the need for governments to sustain the achievements of development projects and programs, and because governments should drive their own agendas. Yet country ownership assumes governments seek the best interests of their populations. The Obama administration sought to ensure country ownership in the Northern Triangle by aligning its strategy to complement the Alliance for Prosperity, a regional plan led by the governments of the Northern Triangle under the auspices of the Inter-American Development Bank. Between 2016 and 2019, Northern Triangle governments allocated nearly US $12 billion for this agenda (Rose et al. 2021, 4). Yet some opposed increased Congressional funding for the Northern Triangle given the extractive nature of their political institutions, in which the political elite “structure institutions to ensure the continuity of their power” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, 345). Given this concern, the Sisters of Mercy and others argued that increased funding enables corrupt governments and exacerbates push factors, including by enabling additional arms purchases which ultimately end up in the hands of gangs (SHARE 2019, 5).
As the Woodrow Wilson Center's report on aid concluded, “there are deep structural challenges to governance, security, and economic opportunity in the Northern Triangle and… the main impediment to addressing these challenges is the resistance to reform by powerful actors with a stake in the status quo (Ernst et al. 2020, 20).” For some observers of the region, international aid would only exacerbate existing power structures by propping up corrupt regimes and elite families. They argue that corruption undermines “the rule of law and trust in public institutions, disrupts economic development and poverty reduction and facilitates a culture of lawlessness and lack of accountability” (Smith 2020, 6).
The Biden Administration and Congress have redoubled anti-corruption efforts. USAID announced a $300 million initiative to empower local organizations that fight corruption. The recently promulgated US-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act sanctions corrupt officials on the so-called “Engel List.” And in February 2022, the US sought the extradition on drug trafficking and other charges of former President Juan Orlando Hernandez of Honduras, sending a strong signal to all leaders.
External pressure helps. Absent pressure from the Trump Administration to fight corruption and impunity, anti-corruption momentum in Guatemala and Honduras came to a halt. But pressure must also come from the bottom up — from civil society actors. Ernst et al. (2020, 4) argues that “support for reformers appears to be among the most cost-effective and productive forms of US assistance in the Northern Triangle.” The Sisters of Mercy, Faith in Action and Catholic Relief Services underscore the need to buttress local leadership. When it comes to combatting corruption, international partners lend greater visibility to local leaders, which can help to protect them from government repression. The empowerment of local civil society actors — those fighting corruption and those building economic opportunity — is a critical aspect of the pluralism that characterizes inclusive governments and economies (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, 455–462).
The government of Guatemala has regressed in its anti-corruption efforts in recent years. The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) was established in 2007 with the United Nations to combat crime, root out corruption and strengthen the rule of law. The International Crisis Group argues that over 10 years, CICIG prevented more than 4,000 homicides and reduced the homicide rate annually by 5 percent (Smith 2020, 6). Then-President Jimmy Morales failed to renew CICIG's mandate in 2019, after having come under investigation himself, and the Trump administration neglected to press for CICIG's continuation. There are few signs for hope under current President Alejandro Giammattei.
In Honduras, the Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH), established in 2016 with the Organization of America States, likewise sought to combat corruption and impunity. Sweeping reforms included the firing of 40 percent of its police force (Cheatham 2021). After only four years, MACCIH was allowed to expire by then-President Hernandez. The inauguration of Xiomara Castro in 2022 and extradition of former President Hernandez provide hope to many that Honduras has reached a turning point. Faith in Action has called for the World Bank to cancel Honduras’ debt as a means of supporting President Castro's ambitious development agenda (Faith in Action 2022, 4).
President Nayib Bukele of El Salvador has consolidated power since his election in 2019. He closed the nascent International Commission Against Impunity in El Salvador after only two years, and reduced transparency, oversight and the independence of the judiciary. Yet his popularity remains high.
One way to avoid corruption is to partner with private organizations. Forty-eight percent of USAID's investments in the region between Fiscal Year 2015 and Fiscal Year 2018 were implemented through private sector entities (Rose et al. 2021, 6), despite USAID's goal writ-large to increase funding through governments. Arguably, even the remaining 52 percent is too much funding through governments. Yet in some cases, local governments or vetted ministries prove important partners for the sustainability of programs. Additionally, a host of conditions on the funding imposed by the US Congress seek to incentivize good behavior among the Northern Triangle governments. In addition, the US government appears to have learned that cuts to development harm beneficiaries and undermine trust between communities and development actors.
A bottoms-up approach to development and governance requires a strong civil society; international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can help to strengthen civil society. Unfortunately, USAID'S efforts to quickly ramp up larger investments in the Northern Triangle resulted in many large contracts, often awarded to for-profit contracting firms. International NGOs, however, tend to operate through cooperative agreements which afford the flexibility necessary to partner with local organizations. Many organizations, including Faith in Action (2022, 5), have called for increased funding to smaller, local organizations. USAID aims to double its assistance to locally based organizations in the region, reaching $300 million (ibid). Yet USAID struggles with a Goldilocks problem. The size of contracts excludes many locally led organizations, but local groups often lack adequate staffing and expertise to manage even smaller grants and cooperative agreements from governmental donors. Many larger US-based development NGOs offer experience managing US government funding and implementing programs in partnership with local organizations. They also leverage additional private funding, offer new technology and techniques to local partners, and build local capacity. “Supporting locally — led development and strong and effective local leadership encompasses [the] subsidiarity ideal. People should play a central role in their individual, community and societal development, including that touched by humanitarian and development assistance programs” (CRS 2020b, 1). Aid organizations continue to improve the means by which they support and accompany local leaders, rather than impose solutions from outside, and call on donors to fund accordingly. One measure of success for US-based NGOs is when their partners independently win grants from US-based funders.
Locally-led development facilitates the agency required for inclusive development. Perhaps not surprisingly, CRS’ rootedness study found in qualitative interviews that “participation in social organizations and local development projects is another factor that can motivate people to stay as long as it is accompanied by sustainable livelihoods” (CRS 2020a, 21). Faith in Action has begun an important effort to strengthen the power of local organizations: having developed a policy framework supported by 340 organizations and faith leaders in the region (Faith in Action 2022, 11). As Hollenbach (2002, 227) puts it, “greater participation by groups that are marginalized … is thus a benchmark for assessing how well the common good … is being achieved”. In Sen's conceptualization, freedoms — including participation — are both the means and the ends of development (Sen 1999, 10).
Some argue that even aid through NGOs scarcely reaches beneficiaries, either because it is diverted by nefarious actors or due to high overhead costs taken by administering organizations. Nonetheless, non-profits and independent evaluators increasingly can demonstrate the impact of their work on alleviating poverty, supporting education, providing access to healthcare, and other development metrics. Even the most ardent critics of aid acknowledge its impact. William Easterly's (2006) The White Man's Burden criticizes not so much aid per se, but rather grand plans that aspire to “solve” poverty. Easterly repeatedly acknowledges that many NGOs closer to local actors make progress against challenges (ibid.). “The aim should be to make individuals better off, not to transform governments or societies” (ibid., 368). To leave the marginalized to fend for themselves, particularly in countries built upon extractive institutions, without providing access to the things that would make them capable of seeking their own solutions, cannot be the productive nor the moral response. Moreover, only through interventions which create capabilities, such as education and access to health care, can a country like El Salvador or Honduras expect to create the fertile ground for a pluralistic, inclusive economy and government.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The arrival of hundreds of thousands of migrants on US borders annually has underscored the reality that wealthy nations cannot simply ignore those in need. The Catholic Church has consistently urged Americans to cast aside self-interested notions and to recognize that “securing human rights or even taking significant steps toward securing them … is a minimal requirement of respect for the dignity of all the members of the human moral community” (Hollenbach 2002, 229). Given current knowledge, governments should decouple development investments from migration deterrence to maximize the efficacy of development efforts, which hold enormous intrinsic value to protect human dignity and to advance the common good.
Macroeconomic evidence suggests that rather than stem migration, development assistance can increase it. Yet emerging literature suggests that well-designed aid can build rootedness in home communities. Still, attempting to ensure that development programs both promote rootedness and deter migration is ill-advised for several reasons. First, this kind of social engineering often fails due, in part, to the complex calculus involved in decisions to migrate. Second, development-as-deterrence seeks to override the agency of the individual, which is at odds with the very purpose of development. Third, attempting to deter migration through rootedness as part of a development strategy risks skewing programs so much that they fail to achieve their development objectives. Fourth, any attempt to deter migration as part of a development strategy runs the risk of tarnishing the credibility of the development initiative and even delegitimizing it, as has occurred with European attempts at co-development. The United States would be better off supporting and expanding legal migration as a means of development for the peoples of the Northern Triangle states.
Governmental actors should broaden their scope of development to consider the authentic development of migrants and their communities. That is, not only their economic well-being, but also their social, civil, and political development. Such a perspective would help to recognize the need for family unity, a sense of belonging, and other important needs. The Biden Administration's Strategy incorporates these elements; the administration and Congress should evaluate the success of efforts in the region through the framework of authentic development, including its principle of inclusive development.
Investment in civil society will promote successful and sustainable development while also providing a democratization dividend. Organizations like Faith in Action and CRS can help to empower, build the capacity of, and fund local groups. Additionally, civil society partnerships such as those provided by the Sisters of Mercy can amplify the voices and needs of local leaders and offer them a level of protection. USAID and other governmental donors should shift more funding to cooperative agreements and grants in order to empower smaller civil society actors. They should also consider simpler assistance instruments for new and smaller partners in the region.
Migration itself serves as a source of development through remittances and by increasing access for individuals to grow their capabilities and provide opportunities for their families. While remittances have proven to be an important source for purchasing basic necessities, they cannot substitute for functioning public services.
The US Congress should increase efforts to protect migrants on their journey and to facilitate access to visas and the US asylum system. Congress should pass legislation to facilitate more legal pathways to the United States and should develop a recruitment system that protects workers. Increased legal migration routes would ameliorate humanitarian crises and promote remittances as a means of alleviating poverty in migrant-sending communities. It would also help to meet labor demands in the United States. Additionally, the administration should study the feasibility of regional visas to facilitate mobility within the region more broadly. The US government should not employ development as a substitute for legal access to the US labor market or access to asylum.
Finally, the participation and agency of affected individuals should be central to all US immigration and development policies. Perhaps not surprisingly, both CRS and the Dexis group found that participation in political acts such as voting engenders community attachment. Rootedness or attachment may result from development activities, but they should be undertaken primarily to facilitate growth in the capabilities of beneficiaries. Many individuals migrate to escape poverty and violence. In this way, they seek to take control of their destinies. As Bishop Emeritus Gerald Kicanas of the Diocese Tucson puts it, “A migrant is a person possessed by a dream, just like you and me” and should be treated accordingly (Kicanas 2009).
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared the following potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Xxxxxxx.For eight years, the author served as Senior Policy and Legislative Specialist for Catholic Relief Services, covering migration and US development assistance to the region.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
