When Internal Migration Fails: A Case Study of Central American Youth Who Relocate Internally Before Leaving Their Countries

Abstract

Executive Summary

This paper examines the experiences of Central American youth who have attempted internal relocation before migrating internationally. Based on interviews and participant observation with Guatemalan, Honduran, and Salvadoran youth migrating through Mexico, this paper shows how youth from the Northern Countries of Central America turn to their domestic networks to escape labor exploitation and gang violence before undertaking international journeys. The paper further demonstrates how those domestic networks lead youth into contexts of poverty and violence similar to those they seek to escape, making their internal relocation a disappointment. The failure of their internal relocation attempts makes them turn to international migrant networks as their next option. This paper sheds light on the underexplored issue of internal migration among Central American youth and that migration's synergy with Central American youths’ migration to the United States. The paper finds that internal relocation is unsuccessful when the internal destination fails to resolve the issues from which youth are attempting to escape. This failure ultimately triggers their departure from their home country.

Keywords

youth migration Central America internal migration gang violence forced migration

Introduction

“Before I left Honduras … I had already been living in Tegucigalpa for months. I had gone there to work with some friends who were already there … I had a good time, but I didn't find good work and I decided to leave [for the U.S.] when one of my friends told me he was going to leave too and asked if I wanted to go with him. I was already looking for ways to make more money, but I didn't want to go back with my family or anywhere else [in Honduras].” Luis, 17, Honduras.

In recent years, the number of Central American youth arriving at the U.S. southern border has reached record numbers. Most of what we know about these youths’ migration deals with their reasons for leaving their home countries, the obstacles they face as they migrate through Mexico, and the policies that countries have crafted to attempt to slow and prevent their migration. However, less attention has been paid to their movement and decision-making prior to leaving their home countries.

Scholars have shown that youth migration from the global South involves trends, problems, and challenges distinct from those faced by adults, and deserves special attention (Veale and Dona 2014). Youth migrants can have different reasons than adults for migrating and can be affected by poverty and violence differently (Boyden and de Berry 2004; Ezeah 2012; Heidbrink 2019; Roth 2017; White 2013). Furthermore, their journeys through transit countries present unique challenges (Brigden 2015; Casillas 2011; Ruehs 2017; Yaghmaian 2006), and they face distinct processes of incorporation in their destination countries (Canizales 2015; Moskal 2014).

However, most scholarship on youth migration is centered on international migration; the migration of youth within countries is rarely studied. Of the studies that do exist, most are quantitative. Some scholars have used national-level datasets on health (Anglewicz, Kidman and Madhavan 2019; Mberu and White 2011) or public census data (Oropesa and Landale 2000) to calculate the effects of internal migration on youth migrants’ health. However, these studies are unable to capture how youth migrants think about internal migration, make migration decisions, and experience internal migration. Su-Ann Oh carried out one of the few qualitative studies with internally displaced children; her work has shown how children living in refugee camps in Burma make sense of this experience in reference to their lives before migrating (Oh 2011). Oh is a pioneer in this space, and much work remains to be done in order to understand how youth living in different contexts conceptualize and experience internal migration.

This paper presents the case of youth from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador (which I will refer to collectively as Northern Countries of Central America [NCCA]) and their unsuccessful attempts to relocate internally before leaving their countries for the United States. Most literature on the migration of NCCA youth focuses on their international movement. Little is known about their movement within their home countries prior to leaving. The paper is based on participant observation and interviews with 24 NCCA youth while they were in Mexico. Each of them attempted to escape contexts of extreme violence and/or poverty by migrating within their countries to join family or friends living in other areas. When they relocated, the youths still found themselves experiencing gang threats or unfavorable labor conditions—the same issues from which they originally fled. Thus, each youth turned to their networks with connections to the United States to seek alternative opportunities.

The structure of this paper is as follows. First, the paper reviews the literature on internal migration, generally, and on internal youth migration within the NCCA, specifically. It then turns to the data and methods. The discussion section follows, explaining the conditions faced by the interviewees, describing their internal relocation efforts and experiences, and analyzing their decisions to migrate internationally. The article ends with a call for additional research on the nexus between internal migration and international movement.

Literature Review

A Literature Divided Between Internal Migration and Internal Displacement

Research on migration that occurs within a country's borders can be divided into two main categories: (1) internal migration studies and (2) internal displacement studies. The main distinction between these two bodies of literature concerns the reasons for migration: the former focuses on economically-driven migration within a country's borders, and the latter on migration spurred by violence or specific events like environmental disasters, civil wars, or genocide.

Studies on economically-driven internal migration, which is sometimes also called domestic migration, have expanded over time. Classic studies focused on explaining the forces driving the movement of people from rural to urban areas in developing countries. Economist Michael Todaro developed one of the earliest theories; his central thesis was that internal migration occurs primarily for economic reasons, specifically wage differences between rural areas and industrialized cities (Todaro 1976). Michael Piore quickly followed Todaro, explaining that industries in urban areas actively sought rural and foreign labor (Piore 1979). Todaro and Piore's theories are still relevant. New studies continue to find that wage differences and industries are a strong force driving the movement of people within countries (van Lottum and Marks 2012). However, economic theories have also been reinterpreted and problematized by both economists and by authors from other disciplines, leading to a richer and more complex understanding of internal migration. For example, in addition to the continued existence of rural-urban wage differentials, researchers have shown that major life events like marriage or finishing school can increase the likelihood of internal migration, while others, like the birth of a child, can diminish that likelihood (Fischer and Malmberg 2001; Msigwa and Bwana 2014).

Work on internal displacement, also known as forced internal migration, largely comes from international organizations like the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, the United Nations, the Red Cross, and the World Bank, and not from academia. In part, this can be attributed to the way internal displacement is defined and understood: internal displacement is largely viewed as a political and human rights problem rather than an economic one, which kept the economists who studied internal migration from paying much attention to internal displacement (Lucas 1993).

The lack of internal displacement studies is also partly related to sovereignty—countries are perceived to be responsible for and in exclusive control of their own populations, leaving other countries and institutions largely out of internal displacement relocation matters (Cohen 2006). And most NCCA countries’ attention to issues of internal displacement can be seen through their own laws or lack thereof. Of the three NCCA countries, only El Salvador has a law specifically recognizing and providing protection to internally displaced people, and that law was passed in 2020 (Republica De El Salvador 2020). At this writing, Honduras is considering similar legislation (UNHCR 2020b). Finally, the lack of internal displacement studies can be partly attributed to the fact that international forced migration (typically, refugees) attracts more attention and resources than internal migrants (Yin 2005). This is despite the fact that, over the last decade, internally displaced people have outnumbered international forced migrants (UNHCR 2020a, 7).

Nevertheless, there is some literature on internal displacement, and the body of literature is expanding. For example, Davenport, Moore, and Poe have studied the relationship between internal and international forced migration, revealing that people move when there are threats to their personal integrity, but that the type of threat impacts the decision to move domestically versus internationally (2003). And a quantitative analysis of internal migration from around the world has shown that civil wars tend to produce more internally displaced people, while conflicts like genocide produce more international refugees (Moore and Shellman 2006). Despite these macro studies, a closer look at the internal migration process shows that internal migrants do not move in a linear fashion. Instead, their movement can range widely and involve multiple destinations for different reasons (Bowstead 2017). As interest in understanding internal displacement grows, authors continue to examine factors influencing people who choose to flee internally instead of internationally (Groppo 2014; King and Skeldon 2010; Skeldon 2008). And, since 2017, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center has released a series of reports dedicated exclusively to the relationship between internal and international displacement across the world (IDMC 2020). These reports use the concept of the displacement continuum, which describes the process through which displaced people are forced to flee their countries due to lack of protection only to return later as returnee-refugees because of the lack of protection abroad (Rushing 2017). These reports are unique in their approach and demonstrate the need for further exploration of the connection between internal displacement and international forced migration.

Just as some authors have studied the relationship between internal and international forced displacement, others have studied the relationship between economically-driven internal and international migration. For example, international migration can lead to the internal migration of family members and create domestic labor needs that are filled by internal migrants (Adepoju 1998; Poertner, Junginger and Müller-Böker 2011). Among the benefits of migrating internally instead of internationally are that migrants can reduce the costs and risks of migration; often do not need to learn a new language; typically already have legal status; have an accredited education that does not need to be revalidated; and may more quickly adapt to their new location than if they had migrated internationally (Massey et al. 1993). On the other hand, international migration creates transnational networks that, in turn, provide support and resources to other migrants, encouraging new migrants to prefer international over internal migration (Bernard et al. 2017; Nawrotzki et al. 2016).

Ultimately, as the literature review suggests, migrants—internal or international, forced, or voluntary or displaced—can be difficult to categorize, and these labels often fail to recognize the reality and fluidity of migration. Scholars refer to this fluidity as the migration-asylum nexus or the migration-displacement nexus (Castles 2007; Koser and Martin 2011). As Castles and Koser and Martin point out, states and scholars who use terms such as “forced” and “voluntary” have largely been left behind by the realities of migration, where migrants may have overlapping motivations for moving, or where migrants’ motivations may change over the course of their migration trajectories.

The case study of Central American youth migration directly unifies these bodies of literature. Central American migration is a mixed-flow migration, where migrants decide to migrate for both economic and violence-based reasons, and where they migrate both internationally and domestically (Lorenzen 2017; Meyer and Taft-Morales 2019). In the following section, I will discuss the literature specifically on Central American youth migration, both internal and international.

Central American Youth Migration in the Literature

The migration of Central American youth came to the forefront in 2014, when there was a surge in the number of minor migrants, primarily from the NCCA, arriving at the southern US border (Rosenblum and Ball 2016). Since then, a group of scholars has researched the causes and consequences of this surge, largely focusing on international, not internal migration. Studies suggest that there are three strong driving forces behind the international surge: 1) violence, 2) poverty, and 3) family reunification (Lorenzen 2017; OMIH-FLACSO 2019). The violence spurring NCCA youth migration relates primarily to maras, which is the common name for various gangs that operate in the region. The maras harass, extort, and recruit youth to join their criminal organizations, and any refusal by a young person to cooperate can lead directly to intense violence, including execution of the youth and even their families (UNHCR 2014). Many youths reach a point whether they must either give in to the maras’ pressure, constantly live-in fear, or leave. Similarly, NCCA youth experience violence at the hands of international drug cartels, which are distinct from maras, but sometimes work in connection with them, and sometimes are in conflict with them. The latter is true especially in Honduras, where cartels have increasingly sought to expand their control into rural areas in order to secure drug trafficking routes, and where this expansion has created violent disputes over territory with other cartels (Appleby, Chiarello and Kerwin 2016; CMS 2017). Thus, the violence perpetuated by both maras and cartels fragment and interrupt the lives of NCCA youth.

In addition to violence, many NCCA youth live in poverty. At least half of the Guatemalan and Honduran population lives below the poverty line, and more than a third of all NCCA youth live in poverty (World Bank 2020). Poverty makes migrating for economic reasons more attractive, but it also makes migration more difficult; in order to leave their countries, youth and their families often acquire large amounts of debt to finance the migration of the youth to the United States. That places extreme pressure on the young migrant to make money to pay back the debt and to support the family that supported his or her migration (Heidbrink 2019). Finally, policies that make it more difficult for undocumented migrants already in the United States to visit their home countries (for example, to see their children) and then return to the United States have led some US-based migrants to instead bring their children to the United States (Massey, Durand and Pren 2014). These factors together have driven international youth migration over the last several years.

NCCA youth also migrate internally, though less attention has been paid to this process in recent decades. Historically, NCCA internal migration followed the rural-urban labor market. In Honduras, for example, over the course of the 20th and 21st centuries, internal migrants moved first to banana and sugarcane plantations, then to large agricultural estates, and finally to factories. This most recent period of industrialization left Honduras with extreme inequality and poverty in both rural and urban areas (ERIC-SJ et al. 2020). Forced migration worked in parallel with this economic migration, beginning largely with the civil wars that devastated Guatemala and El Salvador from the 1960s to the 1990s. During this period of intense internal conflict, thousands of families, including youth, were displaced to other areas within the respective countries (Sandoval Girón 2007).

Contemporary studies of internal migration in the NCCA are rare. In Honduras, some evidence suggests that state's inability to protect people from criminal groups drives internal displacement (IDMC 2018). And researchers have shown that violence, poverty, and, recently, climate change, have caused internal displacement in Guatemala, mostly from rural to urban areas (Caballeros 2013; Hernández Bonilla 2017). While such work is useful to understand the dimensions of internal migration, it does not offer insights about what happens after people have relocated.

As for El Salvador, a 2018 survey by the Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas measured public opinion on internal displacement there. The study is one of the few resources of its kind and reported that at least 5.2 percent of Salvadorans have moved internally for violence-related reasons. Regarding youth, the survey shows that 5.8 percent of participants under the age of 18 had to change schools due to gang threats, and 20 percent of those who had to move did so at least twice (UCJSC 2019). These findings indicate that internal migration is widespread and often forced, and further research is needed to better understand it.

Data and Methods

The data on which this paper is based is drawn from a larger dataset collected from 2015 to 2019 in Mexico and Guatemala. Through a combination of participant observation and interviews, I conducted a multi-sited study with Central American youth migrants crossing through Mexico on their way to the United States. The study's primary goal was to explore the experiences of NCCA youth migrating alone, without coyotes. Though I did not set out to study internal relocation, I often encountered youth whose migration narratives involved prior internal relocation efforts.

Over the course of the study, I spent time in 21 migrant shelters or migrant-serving organizations (collectively referred to as “shelters” in this paper) spread from border to border across Mexico and Guatemala. Those shelters serve individuals of all ages and national origins. Some shelters are affiliated with religious organizations, while others are affiliated with or supported by the Mexican government.

At the shelters, my role was that of participant-observant. I slept and volunteered at 15 of the shelters for periods ranging from one week to one month. I also conducted interviews with migrants, shelter staff, and other individuals that work in fields related to migration of Central Americans through Mexico.

I conducted a total of 86 semi-structured interviews with youth, which I define as individuals ranging up to 21 years of age. My youngest interviewee was 11 years old, and the oldest was 21 years old. The median age was 17 and the mode was 16. The interviews were collected in audio records or handwritten notes. Consent and assent were granted in all cases, and personal information was not collected. I transcribed and coded the interviews using MAXQDA software. For the protection of the youths I met and interviewed, all names in this paper are pseudonyms and details about prior internal migration history have been slightly modified.

Of my 86 interviewees, 24 youths (constituting 28 percent of my interviewees) disclosed relocating within their home countries of Honduras (11), Guatemala (10), or El Salvador (three) before attempting international migration. From this group, 17 identified as male, two identified as female, and five self-identified as transgender. Additionally, two of the 24 youths were gay.

It is important to note the limitations of this data. This sample does not represent all Central American youth that migrates internally; it represents only youth who decided to migrate internationally despite their attempts to first relocate internally. Thus, this paper does not seek to explain all internal youth migration in the NCCA. Instead, it focuses on understanding how internal migration relates to the more often-studied international migration of Central American youth.

Discussion

This discussion is divided into three sections. First, it describes the context of violence and poverty that motivated my interviewees’ decisions to move internally. Then, it explores the youths’ failed internal relocations. Third, the discussion turns to the youths’ decisions to migrate internationally.

The Decision to Internally Relocate

My interviewees’ primary reasons for attempting internal migration can be divided into two main categories: gang violence and poverty. Among the 24 youths, nine (37.5 percent) cited violence as their primary reason for relocating; 13 (54.2 percent) cited poverty; and two (8.3 percent) cited other personal reasons. Understanding how youth experience these two dominant elements in their home communities is necessary to understanding their later migration decisions. Both gang violence and poverty were constant and seemingly inescapable for my interviewees, and, as I explain below, their decisions to leave did not stem directly from a specific threat or incidence of poverty, but rather from the perceived consequences of staying in that circumstance.

Total Control: Young Lives Defined and Controlled by Maras

Gangs, or “maras” in Central America, have a strong presence in NCCA countries (Farah 2012). These gangs are notoriously violent toward youth (Kennedy 2013). More than one-third of my interviewees cited gang recruitment and violence as their main motivation to migrate internally. Their interviews revealed that they felt that gangs were in total control of their communities, were lethal to anyone that refused to join them, and that moving away was their only option to escape gang violence.

The impact of this violence on youths’ lives is evidenced by the ways they understand their home neighborhoods. My interviewees had precise knowledge of the limits of their local gang's territory, the surveillance points where gangs watch for police, and the gang's operational headquarters. Youth also know the gangs’ rules. For example, Pedro, an 18-year-old Honduran male, described how the gang operated in his home neighborhood:

A street about four blocks from my house is where the [Mara] 18 territory ends. There are no signs, and if you’re not from there, you’d never realize it. But, we know that you have to be careful there. At night, you can't go there because they could confuse you with the opposing gang. No one tells you [the Mara 18] operate[s] there, you just know. If I need to cross that street, I greet them and tell them I’ll be right back, but you have to ask permission.

Knowing the rules, like Pedro, helps youth avoid confrontations with gang members; however, it does not provide full protection from gangs. Almost all interviewees, even those who left home for other reasons, reported experiencing various levels of gang violence or pressure in the form of recruitment for membership, requests to assist the gang in other ways, assault, extortion, or robbery. My two female interviewees especially reported sexual harassment from gang members, and the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning (LGBTQ) youth faced death threats and murder attempts. This all happened within the confines of their home neighborhoods.

Notably, gangs are not formed by outsiders, but by residents of their same neighborhoods. Pedro was threatened by a gang member because he declined to work for the gang. Of that gang member, Pedro said:

I have known him since we were little kids, I know his family, he knows mine. We know each other, we talk, we play soccer. He is a gang member, but we have never talked about that. We just talk about soccer and girls, but lately he's gotten violent with me.

As Pedro describes, those who perpetrate violence can be friends, or family, or neighbors. This contributes to youths’ sense that that they are completely surrounded and controlled by maras.

Furthering that sentiment, maras act as the authorities in the areas they control. This leads some youth to seek protection from other, non-gang violence through the maras. Mario, a 15-year-old Honduran male, turned to his old friend and current gang leader to borrow a gun when Mario's stepfather sexually assaulted his sister. Mario used the gun to threaten his stepfather. After returning the gun, Mario was offered a place in the gang, but he refused because he was uncomfortable with the gang's brutality. He then moved away, fearing retaliation against him due his refusal.

The fear of retaliation in Mario's story is real. My interviewees described the way maras punish people for refusal to join the gang, for other crimes like robbery, and how they set rules about what is or is not allowed in their territory. Any refusal to cooperate with the gang can eventually be punished with physical violence, threats, and even death. Seven of the 24 youth (29 percent) mentioned personally knowing other youth that had been killed for refusing to get involved with gangs. Alberto, a 17-year-old Salvadoran male, left his town for another place in El Salvador the same day that he was recruited because his brother was killed just a year before for ignoring the gang's recruitment efforts. Many youths openly commented on the danger of ignoring or rejecting recruitment efforts, even when the recruitment itself is nonviolent. As a result, the youth take any gang threat seriously, and even simple recruitment can lead to almost immediate departure.

Poverty and Unfavorable Labor Conditions

More than half of my interviewees (54 percent) cited extreme poverty or unfavorable labor conditions as the primary reason for their internal migration. Most lived in single-parent households and had left school before finishing high school. They worked in low-skilled and low wage-earning jobs, like agriculture, construction, and carrying merchandise. Their salaries ranged from $4 to $72 per week before relocating, working no fewer than 10 hours per day, six or seven days per week. In all cases, my interviewees felt that the money they earned was insufficient to cover their basic needs and support their families. Furthermore, they felt that job opportunities were scarce in their hometowns or communities and that they needed to leave to find better employment prospects.

This context of poverty, low salaries, and lack of opportunity generates frustration. Eduardo, 17, from Guatemala reflects on his work conditions and options:

The money I made working in the fields isn't enough to pay for anything. I got mad because I worked and worked and couldn't buy anything, we could only pay for food. I worked hard for a year, and then I realized I wasn't going to get anywhere working like that. But there's nothing else to do where I live, and I don't know how to do anything else but work the fields.

Eduardo is describing a vicious cycle, where poverty pushes youths like him out of school, making it impossible for them to get the education required to later earn higher salaries and help them escape low-paying jobs.

The work conditions faced by these youth are also frustrating. Many youths explained that their lack of work experience relegates them to receiving lower wages. For example, Hugo, 16, from Honduras explained:

I’m not able to cut as much sugarcane as an adult, and so they paid me less. I made only 100 lempiras ($4) and an adult can make up to 190 lempiras ($7.70). I still am not as strong as the adults, and even though I try, I just can't cut as fast as they can. So, I don't get paid the same, even though I work just as long.

Youth working in the construction industry as loaders and carriers reported similar experiences. Despite working the same hours and carrying the same job responsibilities as adults, their lack of physical strength, compared to grown men, made them less productive, so they earned lower salaries.

Finally, in addition to lower salaries and long work hours, youth reported other issues like gang extortion at work and bosses who did not pay their salaries. One young woman reported sexual harassment from her employer. Such a work environment creates frustration and anxiety among youth, making them search for opportunities that will provide not only better salaries but also better working conditions.

Internal Relocation: Different Place, Same Context

From these contexts of violence and poverty come youths’ desire to move elsewhere. The youth in my sample explained that they were never looking to move to another place in their home countries nor to migrate to the United States—they simply felt that they had no other option. When asked why they did not immediately leave for the United States, their responses fell into three categories: 1) their departure was rushed and they did not have time to make plans, and therefore moving internally felt easier and cheaper; 2) their families and/or friends in their home countries were the only people available to help; or 3) they were afraid to make the trip to the United States based on what they had heard from others who had made or attempted to make the trip.

The Ever-Present Gangs

Leonardo is a migrant who falls into the first category—the rushed departure. He is a 17-year-old from El Salvador and recalls his rushed departure to live with his grandparents in rural Honduras in order to escape gang recruitment. His grandparents did not even know he was coming:

My parents told me to go live with my grandparents in a village near the coast. I didn't even have time to say goodbye to my friends or my brothers and sisters, only my parents knew. At night I, I walked out the house and some friends were already waiting for me on a motorcycle to take me through the bush, so that no one would notice. They already knew which path we had to take. My grandparents were not going to tell me no. I went with them because, with them, I would have a roof over my head, and I could work with my grandfather in the fields.

In most of the cases in the study, youths like Leonardo employed their internal social networks to move: 79 percent went to live with other family members; 17 percent went to live with friends; and just 4 percent moved without any network support. Despite the relatively short physical distance, their migrations were each perceived as a major step, as it was the first time they had left their towns and families. Some, like Mario above, thought that once they left home, they would never return.

Once relocated, youth described the places where they relocated as impoverished. Generally, they report receiving little support. Their friends and family were only able to offer space to stay and help with food. They quickly realized that gangs were present in their new locations, too. This was problematic because they could be confused as gang rivals, or they could be identified as deserters from other gangs’ cells. Since maras have a detailed knowledge of everyone that lives in their territory and know everyone who enters it (Gutiérrez Rivera 2013, 117), the presence of recent arrivals is quickly noted. Ernesto, an 18-year-old from Guatemala, describes his experience with gangs in his new location, just a few days after he relocated to live with his cousins due to gang recruitment in his hometown:

When I arrived, they were already watching me. They didn't say anything to me, they were just walking around where I went to live… The next day they came looking for me, asking who I was, where I was from, what I was doing there, and they said that if I didn't join the gangs or work for them, they were going to kill me. That's how things were in this place. So, that same day I started to figure out where else I could go, I didn't have time for anything.

Youth like Ernesto do not move into gang-controlled areas by choice. The majority of maras are based in impoverished neighborhoods (Levenson-Estrada 2013). And youth recognize that fact. They explained that while there might be safer areas for them to live, those areas are out of their reach. Juan, a 17-year-old from Honduras, reflects:

Of course, there are places where there are no gangs. I would like to go where there are no gangs. But those places are places where there is money, where the rich live, and there they have their guards, their motorcycles. That's where the gang members don't go. I can't live there; we don't have the money to live there. So, I went to where I had family who would take me in.

Juan's experience captures how the internal relocation possibilities for NCCA youth are restricted, and how issues of poverty and gang violence are often inextricably linked. Instead of being able to move to a safer place, youths’ options for internal relocation are tied to their social networks, which leads them to places much like those from which they have fled.

Better Salaries, But the Same Exploitation

Youth escaping poverty and looking for better labor conditions typically moved to be with friends or family members that were already working or living in a location that seemed more promising. For example, Mario, a 17-year-old from Guatemala, explains why he moved from a rural area in Guatemala to Guatemala City:

I went to Guatemala City to live with a friend. He had been there for a while selling glasses, hats, wallets, and in the street and he was making money. I asked him about it, and he told me to come live with him, and I thought that was the best way. I said to myself, “if I can't find anywhere else to go, I will go with him.

Like other youth, Mario followed the opportunities presented by his network in search of a better salary and better working conditions. However, youth reported that the increased cost of living in the new location erased the wage difference and left little-to-nothing to send back home.

Adverse job conditions in the new location can alter youths’ original plans. For example, Mariano, a 16-year-old from Honduras, discusses the multiple jobs he held and the conditions under which he worked in the place where he relocated:

First, I worked first as a mason's helper, then in a bricklayer's shop, then as a mechanic, then as an electrician, then I worked in a hardware store. The work at the hardware store was really hard, there is no worse job. Imagine being malnourished, not sleeping well because I slept in the workshop, and it was hard labor. You start to lose weight and it doesn't help your body to keep working. I left [for the US] to look for a better salary.

In addition to working physically demanding jobs in poor conditions, youth mentioned having employers who failed to pay or failed to provide proper safety equipment.

Two youth reported working as sex workers. Both of these youth identify as transgender, and explain that sex work was their last option, one that they were forced to take because of discrimination. Carmen, a 19-year-old trans woman from Guatemala, talks about her frustration trying to find jobs:

I knew how to work hard. I washed clothes, cleaned houses, offices, rooms. I went out to look for work, but nobody hired me, and eventually I had to go to work in the streets. I started working in the streets at 16 because I didn't have any work in the city. You don't really have a chance to get an honest job.

Discrimination like that suffered by Carmen was common for the transgender and gay youth I interviewed, both among the sample represented in this paper and in my research more broadly. Research generally shows that lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender youth are exposed to physical and emotional violence and discriminated against by a wide range of actors, from family, to government, to schools. (Ghoshal 2020). The five transgender and two gay youth in my sample suffered far more discrimination and harassment than the straight and cisgender youth, both before and after their internal migration. While their decision to migrate was due to the specific reasons otherwise outlined in this paper, these seven LGBTQ youths reported that violence followed them as they migrated.

Overall, my interviewees report being disappointed with the work options they found upon relocating internally. The amount of time they spent in their new internal locations before migrating internationally varied: youth escaping violence left their countries somewhere between two days to four weeks from when they arrived in their new internal location; those who relocated internally for labor reasons remained in their new locations for one to eight months.

Finally, it bears noting that the reasons youth relocate are not always static: they may migrate internally for one reason, but internationally for another. Two of my respondents disclosed migrating internally for economic reason, but mentioned that they left their countries due to violence. This is consistent with the literature showing that migrants’ decisions to migrate can change over time and place (Van Hear, Bakewell and Long 2018). Nevertheless, in the case of both of these youth, they were similarly affected by violence and poverty like the other youth in the sample, which highlights the fact that both economic and violence-based reasons for migrating can lead to similar migration trajectories.

International Migration

The youths’ internal migration experiences failed to rectify the problem from which they fled, and each began to think about international migration as a better option. However, the decision to leave for the United States was not taken lightly. One of the reasons my interviewees relocated internally instead of internationally was their fear of traveling through Mexico, a necessary journey that can be deadly (Casillas 2011). Carlos, 17 years old from Guatemala, explains:

I already tried living in my country, you can't live there. I didn't have anyone to go with anymore, and when I tried to move to my grandmother's house, the maras gave me trouble. I didn't think I would go to the United States because of everything I have heard. People die, it's difficult to make that trip. But, I asked my uncle to receive me in the States and he said yes, so I came.

For some youth, deciding to leave for the United States meant borrowing the minimum amount of money they thought would be necessary in to avoid accruing unpayable debts. In other cases, youth left with little or no money—the only support they received from their networks was someone in the United States agreeing to receive them if they were able to make it.

Leaving their home countries marks another major life step for these youth. Pablo, a 16-year-old Salvadoran attempted internal relocation due to gang harassment. That relocation quickly failed, and he decided to leave for the United States. He recounts talking to his family by phone before he left:

My parents told me, crying and sobbing, that I should leave. So I did. I told my mother, Mom, I don't want to leave, I don't want to go, send me to another place again. But she told me no, we can't send you with other family members. Look, she said, the gangs are everywhere and they’re going to do something to you. I prefer a thousand times to have you far away than to have to bury you here.

Elmer, 16 years old from Honduras, tells a similar story. Elmer sought economic opportunities after moving from rural Honduras to Tegucigalpa and failing to be able to help support his parents:

Well, I wanted to come here to help my dear Mom, because we’re all so poor. Sometimes I get sad, but I remember how poor we were there, we suffered and didn't have anything, not even food. So, I decided, I’m not going to keep breaking my back like this, let's go.

As the cases of Elmer and Pablo demonstrate, migration to the United States inflicts a heavy emotional toll on youths and their families. This toll underscores the gravity of the situations that all of these youth face. To undertake the international trip is to face intense danger and to leave behind everything they know. And yet, these youth feel that the problems they face make those risks worth taking.

Conclusion

These case studies highlight unexplored spaces of migrant youth decision-making. As demonstrated above, not all youth who migrate to the United States have done so by choice. These youth first attempted to relocate within their home countries, but those relocations quickly failed for the same reasons that spurred their migration in the first place: gang violence and poverty. This finding is important, especially in light of US immigration laws that require anyone seeking asylum—including youth—to have first attempted internal relocation, if reasonable (DHS 2019). This paper suggests that it is unreasonable for youth to attempt internal relocation as a permanent solution to gang violence. Furthermore, it is likely impossible for some to do so, especially if they have limited resources or limited networks and face imminent threats. These youth's asylum claims should be adjudicated with these facts in mind.

This paper also has policy-making implications for the current administration, which has committed to addressing the root causes of Central American migration to the United States.¹ This study makes clear that one important root cause of NCCA youth migration to the United States is the impossibility of internal relocation in NCCA countries. The United States should consider its options for encouraging NCCA countries to improve circumstances for youth who move internally, whether their relocation is motivated by violence or economic considerations. One option may be encouraging Honduras and Guatemala to follow in El Salvador's footsteps and pass legislation recognizing people who have been internally displaced by violence, and creating specific programs in support of them. Another option may be to encourage workplace protections and to push job creation. Of course, any set of policies must recognize that violence and poverty are interrelated with broader social issues such as discrimination and residential segregation. Overall, however, a policy that claims to focus on root causes must not overlook the opportunity to improve internal relocation options for NCCA youth.

The experiences of the youth in this study further demonstrate the important role that networks play in the failure of internal migration. Networks have long been recognized as forces affecting both international and internal migration (Massey and Espinosa 1997; Massey et al. 1993). This study suggests that many networks of NCCA migrant youth are restricted in ways that limit the possible success of internal relocation. The United States should take this fact into consideration when considering the deportation of Central American youth. As this paper shows, many youth have already explored their options for relocating within their home countries and have come to the United States seeking not just the protection of the state, but also the protection of the few people willing and able to offer them support.

Finally, this analysis contributes to the literature by expanding our understanding of the relationship between internal and international migration. However, it leaves much to be explored. Future studies with different data samples may be able to capture successful internal migrations, allowing a comparison of successful versus unsuccessful internal migrations. In addition, studies of internal migration before international migration from other countries and contexts could reveal important similarities and differences with the situations of NCCA youth. Such additional research would help advance an understanding of migration that is not unnecessarily focused solely on internal or international migration, but rather as parts of a spectrum.

As NCCA youth migration continues at a high rate due to the weight of the factors identified by other scholars, the United States is likely to consider increased deportations of migrant youths, and to continue to pressure Mexico—a buffer country—to do the same. The youth represented in this paper—who would essentially be left without any internal or international relocation options—are youth that will face the consequences of such policy decisions. Youth like Pablo, from El Salvador, will be deported to a country where their mothers are prepared to bury them; youth like Elmer, from Honduras, will continue to search for ways to help feed their families; and youth like Carmen, from Guatemala, could be forced by discrimination to return to sex work. This paper challenges the assumptions behind the policies that could force such outcomes, and that fail to recognize the complexity of migration flows and migrant decision-making.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the The Graduate School, Northwestern University (grant number TGS (The Graduate School) Graduate Research Grant, EDGS Graduate Student Summer Research Grant) and The Alumnae of Northwestern University.

ORCID iD

Angel Alfonso Escamilla García

1

Executive Order on Creating a Comprehensive Regional Framework to Address the Causes of Migration, to Manage Migration throughout North and Central America, and to Provide Safe and Orderly Processing of Asylum Seekers at the United States Border. Exec. Order No. 14010, 86 F. R. 8267 (February 5, 2021).

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