Abstract
To combine a debate over Chinese international relations (IR) theories with a regional analysis, including a discussion of how China is viewed in the Middle East and Central Asia, is a laudable attempt to strengthen both endeavours. The volume has contributions from a number of high-calibre scholars from the region, and this has definitely added an authoritative touch to the research and arguments in the relevant chapters.
The chapters in Part I capture some of the major attempts in IR theorization in China, through extensive literature review and focused analysis. From Wang Hui’s conceptual and methodological contributions to other elite scholars’ trendy ideas which commonly smack of ‘Chinese exceptionalism’ and China supremacy, the volume offers an in-depth critique of China’s intellectual challenges to the Western IR paradigms. However, as William Callahan and Linsay Cunningham-Cross indicated, one way or the other, some of those theoretical notions emanating from Beijing are not exactly ‘theories’ but ideas grounded in nationalistic sentiment, the interests of the political regime or historical cherry-picking (was Tibet part of tributary system or part of China ‘from time immemorial’?).
On the other hand, Yongnian Zheng and Dan Wu have made a creative move to bring in Wang Gungwu, a great educator and scholar transcending political fashions and with no interest in ‘advising’ the Chinese government. Wang has been the leading authority on the subjects of overseas Chinese and China’s imperial relations with Southeast Asia (Nanyang) for decades. However, his well-argued historical perspectives assume new significance once placed in an intellectual discussion of Chinese schools or models of IR. Still, Zheng and Wu have not made clear whether Wang has made any analysis of the twenty-first-century huaqiao/huaren, which are presumably in such large scale (from middle-class professionals who worry about pollution to corrupt officials who have money to hide overseas) that new analytical frameworks are needed to interpret the mass exodus.
The editors seem to dismiss the analytical relevance of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) distinct political regime. As Niv Horesh (Introduction) has postulated regarding China and the United States:
for all their stark differences, there are a few startling similarities between the two countries to which one might humorously point: they both seem to put a huge portion of their population behind bars and look pretty comfortable with capital punishment and with sky-high Gini social inequality figures. (p. 2)
This appears to impose one particular line of thinking such that it becomes not surprising that the volume does not include any of the theoretical arguments from Chinese and non-Chinese scholars which claim that China’s authoritarian political system is a source of tension in regional and global relations. These scholars also draw lessons from history and may not agree with the assumption of China’s ‘rise and rise’ underlining this volume.
In a way, the PRC always has had its own unique IR theories—the Maoist ‘world view’ should be something that the much-cited elite scholars in this volume grew up with. However, as Emilian Kavalski (Conclusion) explains, the current round of paradigm creation is caused by China’s rise and newly gained international agency. Still, as a matter of scholarly exercise, it is interesting indeed to see that the various authors skirt over the IR theorization during Mao, and go back to the much earlier political leaders’ ideas of Tianxia and tributary system. It should be noted that Tianxia was one of Mao’s favourite concepts, and he and his lieutenant Zhou Enlai were busy in putting a diplomatic spin on the tributary system (like some of the scholars do today) when trying to win hearts and minds in Southeast Asia.
The chapters in Part II, which discuss individual neighbouring states’ reactions to China’s rise, are generally well structured and convincingly argued. Colin Mackerras has presented an eloquent and comprehensive observation of elite and community sentiment regarding China in the perceived Asian century for Australia. His analysis of the controversies over Chinese economic expansion in Australia in recent years adds interesting comparative angle to the subject, considering Australia is one of those regional states which is caught between the US security umbrella and China’s economic lure. Also it would be revealing to compare and contrast those countries whose relations with China are to a great extent built upon the latter’s interest in resources (e.g., Kazakhstan and Australia).
Yitzhak Shichor’s presentation of China’s role, historical and present, in the Middle East is extensive and analytical but seems to have little discussion of up-to-date developments. There is simply no mention of the huge impact of Arab Spring on Chinese intellectuals and political establishment. It is astonishing that he is still looking at Libya’s positive relations with Taiwan, whereas in February 2011, Muammar Qaddafi invoked the Tiananmen crackdown twice when justifying the massacre of his own people. Beijing was closer to his heart.
Michael Clarke’s analysis of Kazakhstan’s evolving relations with China is in depth and compelling, and conceptually well grounded. It is not only a critical analysis of Kazakh reactions to China’s rise but also a foundational investigation of the rationale of the state/ruling elite’s foreign policy.
Hyun Jin Kim presents a rich historical narrative of the Korean relations with China, and analyzes various political factions’ sentiments towards China, including responses to China’s ascendency. However, he is not interested in giving North Korea any discursive weight, other than treating it as a negative factor in the background of South Korea’s relations with China. What North Korea thinks of China is arguably more interesting than what South Korea thinks of China, if only because the former kind of knowledge is harder to obtain and more useful for those who are ever wondering over what China can and should do regarding nuclearization.
Peter Mauch has given a solid analysis of the various political groups’ debates over relations with China in Japan. He is particularly competent in examining the impact of the historical controversies and making a thorough presentation of where Japan stands in its troublesome relations with China. However, the chapter makes no mention of the second Shinzō Abe government since 2012, when tension is supposed to have reached a new climax after Junichiro Koizumi’s prime ministership (2001–2006).
The chapter on Taiwan (Chih-yu Shih and Ching-chang Chen) critically scrutinizes the island’s intellectual and political responses to China’s emerging IR theories. Shih and Chen have compellingly argued that space for understanding is still limited in light of the American domination of IR in Taiwan, and complex political, security, economic and cultural factors in the evolving cross-strait relations. Their post-colonial tone is welcome, but they could have taken a more critical approach towards such concepts from the PRC as ‘harmony’, which are not exactly intellectual endeavours.
With the chapter on Taiwan being the exception, all the other chapters in Part II show no discussion of responses to China’s emerging IR theories as the editors seem to have intended at the beginning of the volume. In fact, these chapters simply discuss national responses to China’s rise and general bilateral/regional relations with China, without even mentioning any of the PRC thinkers cited in Part I. Peter Mauch does refer to Yan Xuetong, but it is just an interview of Yan on Sino-Japan relations. Hyun Jin Kim explains that South Korea is not keen to follow the development of international theories in China. If this is common in the region, as Emilian Kavalski (Conclusion) indicates it is, then the logical connection between Part I and Part II should be explained more clearly.
A very eye-catching omission in the volume is Southeast Asia. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states have long debated China’s rise and its regional implications, and this is also the region which hosts lots of disputes (with China) and 80 per cent of the so-called overseas Chinese. As Wang Gungwu would know, one cannot have a meaningful historical discussion of Tianxia and tributary system without studying Nanyang.
Overall, despite the few holes in its coverage, Asian Thought on China’s Changing International Relations is a useful addition to the debate over China’s political and intellectual challenges to IR theories, and regional reactions to China’s rise.