India’s Strategic Interests and Partnership with Island States of Africa in the Western Indian Ocean Region

Introduction

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has found renewed emphasis in the strategic geopolitical discourse of the world and is playing an increasingly active role in global security considerations. India, being centrally located in the Indian Ocean Region, has its key strategic interests linked to it. The vast expanse of the region with the presence of strategic island states is the theatre of conflict, competition and cooperation in the twenty-first century. The recent decade has seen an expansion of India’s oceanic strategy. The maritime security domain of India has witnessed an extensive reorientation of its oceanic strategy, owing to the ongoing changes in the power dynamics at sea mostly on the western front. In this regard, India has paid major attention on developing strategic partnerships with the Island states of Africa (Mauritius, Seychelles, Comoros and Madagascar) located around the strategic points in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) Region. The asymmetries in the form of size, economy and maritime capabilities along with the convergence of interests complement the nurturing and development of such constructive engagements as the scope for competition and conflict among the two is very little. India, being the dominant player in the region and having the reputation of a ‘net security provider’ (Ministry of External Affairs, 2013) in the region, has plenty to offer to these small but strategic island states. Some of these states have had a deep Indic connection and have long seen India as a benevolent power, fulfilling their maritime security and policing needs. India effectively acts as a net security provider and guarantor, especially for small island states like Mauritius and Seychelles. However, there is ample scope for India to reorient its strategic posture amid the growing influence of extra-regional actors in the region, and New Delhi requires a proactive approach to further strengthen its footprints in the WIO region.

India being centrally located enjoys strategic advantage as compared to the other powers in the region. India shares a rich cultural and historical legacy with majority of the states of Africa, including the island states of the WIO region. This deep sociocultural linkage gives India a geopolitical advantage over the rest of the extra-regional actors present in the region, but India has not been able to leverage its strategic advantage in the past as it should have. However, ongoing developments in the region have led to a reorientation of India’s oceanic policy where ‘island diplomacy’ has become the main focal point of New Delhi’s new maritime doctrine. This reinvigorated interest in the island states of the WIO region was evident when Prime Minister Narendra Modi made state visits to the island nations of Mauritius and Seychelles in 2015; this was the first visit by an Indian head of government in over two decades (IANS, 2015) and showed the importance of these island states to India’s oceanic strategy. India is a maritime nation with a significant maritime history, and its navy is a force multiplier in the region. Indian Navy has ‘blue water’ naval capabilities and is the net security provider in the WIO region maritime community. A resurgent India, today, is leaving no stone unturned in articulating its oceanic strategy to harness the full potential of the oceans. In this context, the WIO region, which has enormous oceanic potential, has been the focal point of New Delhi’s renewed maritime doctrine. This is one of the reasons why India has increased its presence in the WIO region, especially near the Island states and eastern coast of Africa. India’s clear strategy of ‘SAGAR which stands for “Security and Growth for All in the Region” was articulated by PM Modi at International Fleet Review in Vishakhapatnam on February 07, 2016’ (The Hindu, 2016), showcases India’s key policy objectives meant to engage with the strategic actors in the region. The mission mode deployment of the Indian Navy in the region aims at policing, governing and securing the blue waters by both traditional and non-traditional threats in regions across the key Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) along the strategic island states. The collaborative and constructive engagement is meant to not only secure the high seas but also harness the vast oceanic resources, in order to develop sustainably and equally. Therefore, India’s approach of ‘equity of development’ resonates in its constructive engagement with Mauritius and Seychelles where the Indian Navy maintains a constant presence through patrols and assistance in logistic supports.

The African island states of the WIO region, on the other hand, are leveraging their strategic location as a key driver in engaging with other global actors and power centres in the region to enhance their capabilities in maintaining and addressing their maritime security challenges. These states have large exclusive economic zones (EEZ) at their disposal with vast oceanic potentials, but they lack the capabilities to harness it. Therefore, major actors (India, China, the USA, France, the EU, Australia, South Africa, Japan, etc.) in the region with superior maritime potentials could help build a rule-based maritime order by co-operating among themselves and also by building strategic partnerships with key island states in the region. This sort of multilateral engagement will help develop capacities of these small island states to design and implement strategies of oceanic governance for a sustainable future. However, the challenge for India, an emerging global power, is to retain the perception of a benign power with no hegemonic power aspirations in the WIO region among these small island states of Africa. Situated on the other end of this spectrum, these strategic WIO island states of Africa have the potential to reorient the power relations in the region. The strong linkages between the WIO island states and India are so much that it is often said that the Indian Ocean does not separate them but connects them. They are weaved under the bonds of strong cultural connection dating back millennia. From ‘Islamisation, European colonialism, the destruction of older trading networks to the emergence of new economic relationships, all showcases how human history has been shaped by the significant events, economic linkages and political processes that took place in the WIO region’ (Sanyal, 2016).

The WIO region comprises 10 countries—Comoros, France (Reunion Island), Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa and Tanzania. Of these, five are mainland continental states, four are island states and one, Reunion Island, is a French overseas territory. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) sees the WIO region as a

coherent biogeographic, climatic and socio-political region encompassing the western part of the Indian Ocean and is one of the regional seas identified by the UNEP. It covers some 30 million km², equivalent to 8.1 per cent of the global ocean surface, with EEZ covering over 6 million km² and a combined coastline of over 15,000 km. (UNEP/Nairobi Convention Secretariat, WIOMSA, 2009)

The region ‘boasts of deep cultural heritage, cultures based on fishing, maritime trade, and marine resource use goes back several hundred years’ (Venter, 2017).

For this article, the major focus is on the four island states of the WIO region—Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles. These four states are seen to have wider implications for India’s strategic interests in the region. The article is divided as follows. The first section examines the evolving geopolitics of the WIO region and India’s global aspirations. The second section presents a more focused discussion of the multi-pronged strategic engagement between India and its extended maritime neighbours in the WIO region to understand and explain the potential of mutually beneficial cooperation. The third and final section seeks to address the wider cultural and strategic links between India and the WIO island states, which could potentially play a major role in balancing power equations in the region.

Contextualising the ‘Region’ and Situating the Actors

The extent to which sea power has influenced the course of history has been well documented, and this was the reason why the period from the seventeenth century to the twentieth century has been termed as the centuries of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. These oceans were considered as the centres around which sea power was used to secure empires, colonies and international markets. While the superior sea power capabilities of European powers defined the geopolitics of the twentieth century, the Indian Ocean will define the twenty-first century (Kaplan, 2011). This is the region which has witnessed major economic and cultural exchanges across its waters and around its coasts that date back at least 7,000 years, and these exchanges ‘were greatly accelerated following the rise and expansion of Islam from the seventh century BCE’ (Alpers, 2014).

Among the many challenges to understanding the dynamics of this important world region is how best to define it, for unlike continental land masses, oceanic boundaries are, literally, more fluid (Alpers, 2014). The IOR holds strategic significance owing to the vital SLOCs passing through the region, making it the lifeline of international trade and transport. The region is a demographic powerhouse, as more than 2.7 billion people live in the states whose shores are washed by the waters of the Indian Ocean. The states in the region vary considerably in terms of their areas, populations and levels of development, but they share a convergence of interests and complementarity of goals, which puts a premium on connectivity, contact and cooperation. The states are bound by diversity but connected by the Indian Ocean, a geographical entity which has linked the nations economically, politically, socially and culturally.

A ‘region’ in geopolitics is considered as a geographical, economic, political, social and cultural construct that reflects perceptions, convergences and complementarities of interest. Also,

\regions are not alone defined by political boundaries but imply a realignment of political identities and loyalties from the state to the region. On an institutional level, regionalism involves the growth of norms, rules, and formal structures through which coordination at various levels is brought about. (Heywood, 2011, p. 482)

As regional co-operation can be both an instrument and a goal for economic transformation, political stability and sociocultural co-operation and contact, it makes the IOR one of the potent forces in global politics. Therefore, any analysis of the Indian Ocean as a ‘region’ ought to be based on the five dimensions of geography, political, economic, sociocultural and strategic.

India’s Strategic Interests in the Western Indian Ocean

Emerging as a critical maritime space, the WIO region has become a strategic heartland of the twenty-first century. The existence of critical choke points, which have the potential to disrupt international trade, can have disastrous consequences for both littoral and island states relying heavily on this waterbody. For regional and extra-regional maritime powers, whose cargo traffic passes predominantly through this region, this oceanic zone has become a space of considerable importance in their maritime strategy formulations. The rising economies of the region and beyond, with their ever-increasing energy needs, have become hugely dependent on the SLOCs of the region, the security of which is vital for their national interests.

Historically, the Indian Ocean in general, and the WIO region in particular, has been regarded as a ‘zone of peace’, as per resolution adopted in the 26th Session, 1971, of the United Nations General Assembly (1985), but in recent years, the geopolitical, geo-economic and maritime security ramifications of this waterbody have acquired a critical significance and geostrategic importance. The region is home to the largest concentration of population with contradictory and contrasting identities based on race, religion, ethnicity, language and culture. This often creates a sense of contested territorial space, thereby making the region unstable. Thus we can argue that the WIO resembles an ‘Arc of Instability’, a concept first used by Paul Dibb in 1999 to discuss the South Pacific Ocean and Australian security interests in that region.

The geopolitical engagement of the major powers in the WIO region is mostly driven by their desire to secure the region from falling prey to a hostile environment. The WIO region lies on the arc of growth and opportunity and the arc of energy. The security of the region is important for all those countries that face its waters and for all those states that depend on global maritime trading that passes through the region. The SLOCs in the Indian Ocean are one of the busiest in the world: for instance, ‘more than 80 percent of the world’s seaborne trade in oil transits through Indian Ocean choke points, with 40 percent passing through the Strait of Hormuz, 35 percent through the Strait of Malacca and 8 percent through the Bab el-Mandab Strait’ (DeSilva-Ranasinghe, 2011). The geographical position of the critical choke points and the strategic SLOCs around the WIO also provide the most economical and shortest lines of communication between the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.

Apart from maritime trading and the management of fisheries, the region’s economic potential, particularly its vast reserves of undersea natural resources, has drawn regional and extra-regional powers to its waters. The WIO region holds 40 per cent of the world’s oil reserves, which is critical for the world’s energy security. The Persian Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula and the East African littorals are the key energy sources of the world. Besides oil, the region is endowed with large deposits of uranium, lithium, beryllium, thorium, coal, copper, iron, manganese, tin, mica, bauxite, chromite, nickel, cobalt, antimony, asbestos, vanadium and phosphates; these natural resources are used in various industries in the developed and developing world, which further makes the WIO region geo-economically significant. In addition, jute and rubber are two major products found in the WIO region, which are extensively imported by the Western countries. The WIO region is also home to one-fifth of the world’s total arable land, which produces large quantities of wheat, rice, cotton, tea and coffee. The WIO region is also rich in marine resources. And its continental shelf, covering about 4.2 per cent of the total area of the Indian Ocean, is reported to contain enormous mineral deposits of ferro-manganese nodules, phosphate nodules and polymetallic nodules (Kohli, 1978, pp. 123–124).

Under the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS), the territorial limits of littoral states extend up to 200 nautical miles (known as the EEZ) for economic and commercial exploitations. The littoral states of the Indian Ocean thus have access to approximately 30 million square miles of area of the ocean for the exploitation of its rich natural and deep-water resources (UNCLOS and Agreement on Part XI, 1983). In particular, the UNCLOS has been extremely beneficial to small island states in the Indian Ocean, that can claim a large ocean area for economic exploitation even if they have a small territorial area at their disposal. For example, Mauritius, a small island nation with a population of around 1.2 million people, can claim sovereign rights over a 345,000 square miles area of the Indian Ocean, the 17th largest EEZ in the world. Similarly, Maldives and Seychelles enjoy sovereign rights over a large EEZ. Bigger states such as India and South Africa, too, have benefited immensely from UNCLOS rules; India’s EEZ is approximately 800,000 square miles and South Africa’s EEZ is approximately 580,000 square miles of area of the Indian Ocean. The geo-economic significance of the Indian Ocean for littoral states is thus immense (Wil, 1981, pp. 387–423).

For India, maritime security in the Indian Ocean has emerged as a major issue that includes a strategic dimension like maintaining aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, and carrying out policing functions. India has a vast coastline of around 7,500 km with a sizable EEZ. Heavy dependence on SLOCs for trade and energy transportation forms one of the many strands in India’s multifaceted oceanic security. India’s maritime vulnerability came into sharp focus in November 2008 when India’s financial capital Mumbai became the target of a major sea-borne terrorist attack. In the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, India adopted an extensive maritime security strategy by restructuring its capabilities and increasing its profile and presence. In keeping with its economic and military rise and to counter an aggressive China’s growing naval footprints in the IOR, India’s naval strategy in the Indian Ocean has shifted from a posture of isolation to active engagement with various actors in the region. David Brewster has noted in this context:

…driven by its global power aspirations and strategic rivalry with China, India is expanding its naval capabilities and security relationships throughout the Indian Ocean region. It is paying specific attention to developing relationships at the key points of entry into the Western Indian Ocean i.e. with the strategic island states of the WIO region, the Strait of Hormuz (from the Persian Gulf into the Arabian Sea), the Bab-el-Mandeb (from the Red Sea into the Gulf of Aden), and through the Mozambique Channel northwards into the south-western Indian Ocean along the shores of the Southern and East African littorals. (Brewster, 2010, p. 1)

India’s national interests are compositely linked to its strategic interests in the WIO region. As we have noted earlier, the WIO region is witnessing a rise in great power politics, and as India sees itself as a future great power, its engagement with other great powers and its perception of regional strategic interests are two strands that are driving India’s policy towards the IOR in general, and WIO in particular. In 2007, India’s External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee (2007), commented that

after nearly a millennium of inward and landward focus, we are once again turning our gaze outwards and seawards, which is the natural direction of view for a nation seeking to re-establish itself, not simply as a continental power, but even more so as a maritime power, and consequently as one that is of significance on the world stage. (PIB, 2007)

Resonating a similar viewpoint, the former Indian Foreign Secretary, Rajiv Sikri (2009, p. 250), noted ‘If India aspires to be a great power, then the only direction in which…its strategic influence can spread is across the seas. In every other direction there are formidable constraints’.

According to several analysts, New Delhi has come to regard the WIO region as a critical maritime domain for India’s national interest and global power aspirations. The region holds enormous potential in the geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic fronts. Situated on the arc of energy, the region is vital for India’s energy security. As most of India’s energy needs is met through oil and gas imports from West Asia, the Persian Gulf and Africa, securing the Indian Ocean SLOCs is critical for India’s energy security. Moreover, recent discoveries indicate an estimated offshore presence of ‘at least 150 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas’ around the eastern coast of Africa, which has further invigorated India’s growing interest in the WIO region (Richmond, 2016). The WIO region also has vast quantities of oil present in several offshore blocks discovered near the coast of Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique, which is of interest to India. The renewable source of energy in the form of Tidal Wave energy is also an important aspect in safeguarding India’s energy security.

India’s strategic interest in the WIO region is also driven by the geo-economic potential of the region. The region can be termed as an arc of growth and opportunity as it is one of the fastest growing regions in the world and provides huge investment opportunities to Indian firms. The small island states of the region also hold vast EEZs that can be developed through joint ventures with Indian firms. Harnessing the deep oceanic resources will not only help meet the sustainable development goals of the region but also provide livelihood and prosperity to the people of the region. On the strategic and military fronts, the WIO region provides locational advantage that is critical for projecting power. India’s strategic dominance of the IOR is largely dependent on how well the Indian navy is able to expand its maritime domain in the WIO region.

India’s Strategic Partnership with the Island States of Africa in the Western Indian Ocean Region

With centuries-old exchanges across the Indian Ocean, India’s engagement with Africa has gone through dynamic transformations in recent times with changing global and regional environments. India’s economic growth and global rise have led New Delhi to reorient its policy towards Africa where India’s geostrategic, geopolitical and geo-economic interests converge. In particular, Africa is important for India to meet its growing energy needs; maintain the security of critical SLOCs; consolidate trade and investment opportunities; maintain sociocultural and economic linkages with a vast Indian diaspora; obtain diplomatic support for India’s positions in multilateral fora; and strategically counter China and other major powers in the IOR (Xavier, 2015, p. 694). India’s African outreach initiatives in recent years thus confirm how important the states in East Africa, and more particularly the island states of Africa, are to India’s strategic thinking and policy.

The island states in the WIO region figure prominently in India’s maritime strategy, which is focused on three main priorities: to counter the aggressive power projections of extra-regional powers and deny them hegemonic dominance in the region; to expand India’s extended neighbourhood outreach and strengthen the regional security framework by helping regional partners with strategic capacity building; and to forge a maritime partnership to mitigate the security challenges manifesting in the IOR. These priorities have shaped India’s ocean diplomacy, with the thrust on forging strong strategic ties with the island states of East Africa. For instance, initiatives like the ‘India-Africa Forum Summits’, which was initiated in 2008, have played a central role in promoting New Delhi’s ‘Look West policy’. Today, India’s engagement with the East African island states has become more dynamic and energetic, encompassing various sectors from trade and commerce to technology and knowledge sharing and capacity building.

The East African island states in the WIO region, comprising the Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles, are often termed as India’s extended maritime neighbourhood and hold the key to New Delhi’s strategic interests in the region. However, the East African region’s volatility, such as chronic instability and violence in Somalia, create security concerns. This hostile environment coupled with poverty, piracy and terrorism has a direct impact on the region in general, and India in particular, whose trade and energy security are dependent on the safety and security of this maritime space.

In recent times, India

has established good strategic partnership with many island states throughout the Western Indian Ocean [region], with particular emphasis on the maritime choke points of the Mozambique Channel in the Western Indian Ocean and the entrance to the Persian Gulf in the northwest and western SLOCs across the Indian Ocean. (Brewster, 2010, p. 7)

The island states of East Africa see India as a natural maritime partner due to their historical cultural connections with India and their perception of India as a non-threatening power. The two island states in the WIO region with whom India has established strong strategic ties are Mauritius and Seychelles: ‘India’s strategic relationships in the region are anchored by its close relationship with Mauritius and Seychelles, the island states that lies around 900 km to the east of Madagascar’ (Brewster, 2014, pp. 69–76). Indicating their strategic significance to India, soon after assuming office, the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, visited the Seychelles and Mauritius in March 2015. Issues such as energy, food security, trade, maritime cooperation and diaspora interactions, leading to people-to-people contact, were discussed during Modi’s visit.

India considers the WIO maritime space as its ‘strategic backyard’ and extended neighbourhood. It is imperative for India, therefore, to protect the vast littoral and tiny island states from various traditional and non-traditional security threats in the wider IOR. Maritime security cooperation and energy security amid growing non-traditional threats were the prime focus of Prime Minister Modi’s visit. In order to counter China’s ‘string of pearls’ naval strategy, India emphasised on greater naval cooperation under the aegis of Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and various other bilateral security measures with Comoros, Mauritius, Madagascar and Seychelles.

In fostering close security ties with the island states in the WIO region, a key advantage that India has over other competitors is that, historically, India has been a net security provider in the region, and it continues to play a crucial role in the region’s security. In the 1980s and 1990s, Indian forces carried out several security operations in the region. For instance, during the political turmoil in Mauritius in 1983, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi initially ordered but subsequently cancelled Operation Lal Dora, where Indian soldiers were supposed to deploy in Mauritius to help restore order and provide security. Then, in 1986, the Indian navy prevented a coup d’état in the Seychelles by carrying out Operation Flowers are Blooming (Scott, 2015). The Indian navy also took part in Operation Restore Hope, a US-led United Nations-sanctioned multinational task force aimed to create a protected environment and provide humanitarian assistance to the local population in Somalia, from December 1992 to May 1993 (Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1997). More recently, the Indian Navy has carried out Operation Rahat, a humanitarian effort to evacuate Indian nationals from Yemen in 2015. The Indian Navy has also contributed immensely to keeping the IOR safe by deploying strategic naval assets like: warships, submarines and aircraft carrier in this maritime space.

Seychelles is very important to India’s maritime strategy, while India has been a time-tested benign security provider for Seychelles. In 2005, India gifted the INS Tarmugli, a fast attack boat, to the Seychelles coast guard (Mohan, 2013, p. 136). India also gifted ‘two new Dronier-228 aircraft and two Chetak helicopters for maritime surveillance. In February 2012, India announced the setting up of a Coastal Surveillance Radar System with Automatic Identification System to help identify vessels in fight against piracy in the region’ (Naidu, 2013). India is working on developing naval facilities at Assumptions Island, off the coast of Seychelles, to strengthen its maritime reach in the region. The Indian Army and Seychelles People’s Defence Force have been conducting a biennial bilateral military exercise called Lamitye, aimed at enhancing military cooperation and interoperability between the two militaries.

Security cooperation between India and Mauritius has intensified over time and a strategic shift is visible in their engagement. India shares close political, economic and security association with Mauritius. Some 70 per cent of the Mauritian population is of Indian ethnic origin, and for several decades, Mauritius has acted as the primary gateway for international investments into India. Former Mauritian Prime Minister Paul Bérenger described the bilateral relationship as ‘umbilical and sacred’ and security relations as ‘intense’ (Baruah, 2003; MEA, 2005, April 2), while former President, Sir Anerood Jugnauth referred to the connection in terms of ‘blood relations’ (The Hindu, 2009, December 3) mostly due to the diasporic linkages between the two nations. The perception of India as a peaceful power has played a huge role in the acceptance of India as a net security provider for the region in general, and Mauritian security in particular. With a vast EEZ, Mauritius needs Indian naval support to patrol and secure this area from the threats of piracy, terrorism, illegal mining and fisheries. This was the backdrop under which Indian–Mauritian partnership took constructive shape in 1974 when a defence cooperation agreement between the two nations was signed:

It was under this agreement that India transferred patrol boats and helicopters to Mauritius which also included the supply of a patrol vessel in 2010. India has also delivered an advanced Light Helicopter in 2009 and a Coastal Radar Surveillance system in April 2011 as a part of a grant. There is also an agreement between the two where India will supply two off-shore patrol vehicles (OPV) to government of Mauritius. (Naidu, 2013)

India has been providing training to the personnel and officers of the Helicopter Squadron and the Mauritian National Coast Guard, considered as the Mauritian air force and navy, respectively. The Indian Navy’s counter-piracy operations in the Mozambique Channel and in the territorial waters of Mauritius have been a regular affair since 2003 (Deccan Chronicle, 2009, November 24). ‘India also backs Mauritius’ territorial claims to Diego Garcia which was separated from Mauritian administration in the 1960s’ (Vyas, 2001). ‘Mauritian political leaders have publicly indicated on several occasions that India would be permitted to establish naval facilities on Mauritius if it so wished’ (Harrison & Subrahmanyam, 1989, p. 263). India also has been negotiating to lease out the Agaléga Islands of Mauritius for tourism purposes, but speculations are ripe that India is contemplating the upgradation of the Agaléga airstrip for surveillance purposes. The plan went into rough waters due to opposition from the local Creole population.

India is also focused on growing its strategic relationship with Madagascar and the Comoros. Both these island states are situated near the strategic Mozambique Channel, the critical transit route (SLOC) used by the commercial shipping industry to transport goods and energy to Southern Africa and from the Cape of Good Hope. In Madagascar, India built a monitoring station in 2007. It also secured birthing rights for the Indian Navy (Pubby, 2007). In the field of Blue Economy, India is working together with island states of eastern maritime Africa, particularly the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) member states, to harness these vast resources for the sustainable development of the region. One major area of concern for the region remains to be the competitive maritime policy of the major powers, owing to the increased geostrategic significance of the WIO region.

Since 38 African states are coastal states and since India has a coastline of more than 7,500 km, the potential for cooperation between India and African states in the field of Blue Economy for sustainable growth and development is huge. The recent announcement by India and Seychelles for a strategic partnership in the area of Blue Economy to harness the vast oceanic resources is a big step towards augmenting the strategic partnership between the two in the region. India being a technological powerhouse could aid in developing the capacity of these small island states to harness the vast oceanic potential for their economic development. Furthermore, India is enhancing its strategic partnership with WIO island states, in order to tackle common challenges in the region. The WIO region is beset with non-traditional security threats such as piracy, illegal fishing, human trafficking and weapon smuggling. Tackling piracy off the Somalian coast has been a unifying factor that has resulted in a near constant presence of a combined naval task force that includes the Indian, US, EU, Japanese and Chinese navies.

From an Indian perspective, Chinese naval deployment in the WIO region is a cause for worry. China’s naval footprint in the IOR in general and the WIO in particular has grown exponentially over the past decade. President Xi Jinping’s Maritime Silk Road initiative has further dotted the Indian Ocean with growing Chinese influence. This has spawned a growing Sino-Indian strategic rivalry in the IOR and the WIO. Capacity building of the island states in the WIO through multi-sectoral approach has enormous potential to generate considerable local goodwill for India against promises made by China. India needs to work on developing a more transparent and comprehensive strategy that combines military coordination with civilian aspects, including the deep cultural heritage it shares with these WIO island states.

Conclusion

Geographical determinants provide India with a great advantage in the WIO region. It links India’s geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic interests in the region with regional states’ interests within an environment of growing global and regional instability and turbulence. The WIO’s location, along with the rise of traditional and non-traditional threats and rivalry among major powers, has made the strategic significance of the region enormous today. Therefore, to foster peace, stability and growth in the region, a framework of co-operation to mitigate common threats and strategic risks, while anchoring peace and sustainable development needs to be created and nurtured. India is ideally placed to do this effectively. It has deep historic, cultural and demographic connection with states in the region. It is also perceived as a benign power by the regional states, and it has historically played the role of a net security provider in the region. India’s acceptability and trustworthiness in the region are therefore much higher than other major powers like China. India also has tangible geostrategic, geopolitical and geo-economic interests in the region.

India, therefore, can provide massive benefits to the WIO island states. It can work with the WIO island states to secure their common maritime space, build these states’ capacity to police their vast EEZs and help deal with common threats such as piracy, sea-borne terrorism, drugs and human trafficking, and illegal fishing and mining. Another area of co-operation can be in the management of vast oceanic resources, which has the potential to transform the regional economic architecture. Prime Minister Narendra Modi articulated this vision of co-operation between India and the WIO island states when he talked about the concept of SAGAR.

To say that India and the Indian Ocean are inseparable means that India is not only vital for peace and security of the IOR but also for maintaining the region’s strategic balance and stability. This can be particularly seen in India’s interactions with the island states in the WIO region. While a lot has been achieved, India’s growing interface with the WIO island states has the potential to reorient and reconfigure the geopolitics of the region in the twenty-first century.