Abstract
The giant of the international order, the USA, has recently cocooned itself in its nationalistic ambitions since the election of President Donald Trump. Since 2017, the USA has shaken up previous alliance commitments, notably labelling North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) obsolete and withdrawing from several international treaties, forcing its allies to be on tenterhooks. In such a backdrop, can Japan and Germany’s rearmament drive be seen as a recognition and acceptance of a long-outsourced responsibility or a yearning to regain lost stature and preponderance? Is the road to remilitarisation smooth or impregnated with abrasions? Reluctant Warriors: Germany, Japan and their U.S. Alliance Dilemma edited by Alexandra Sakaki et al. provides an excellent empirical-based study to help one navigate these and other perplexing questions.
Fundamentally, Reluctant Warriors aims to understand how Tokyo and Berlin’s security policies are affected by their post-war anti-militarism, domestic institutional structure and political context, which often exist in tension with their respective external security environment and the expectations of their allies (primarily the USA). The book rightly characterises Germany and Japan as reluctant warriors as the two countries have traversed with circumspection, cognizant of numerous inextricable factors that operate domestically and globally. The origins of this tension lie in the unrelentingly ambitious and unsparingly brutal agendas of Japan and Germany of the Second World War, which tarnished their reputation, destroyed international institutions and killed civilians in the millions. Both nations, after surrendering unconditionally to the USA, were forced to disarm and delegate the task of guarding their territory to Washington. Although this responsibility was quickly seen as a burden by the USA leading it to frequently accuse its allies of ‘free-riding’, Sakaki et al. also note that this allowed them to secure firm control over two of the most geo-strategically significant regions in the world. However, the international situation has clearly changed significantly since the 1950s. In a world where the USA in the tide of protectionism and is juggling between the policies of retrenchment, off-shore balancing and deep engagement, and a weak European Union owing to Brexit and immigration crisis, Japan and Germany find it more urgent than usual to be militarily independent. Yet this independence is somewhat complicated, owing to the deeply embedded anti-militarist political culture that developed in both countries during the post-war years.
Reluctant Warriors begins with a look into historical factors behind the development of anti-militarism in both Japan and Germany. In the aftermath of the Second World War and throughout the Cold War, both states sought to remake themselves, in part, by rejecting the unbridled military aggression that had characterised their behaviour in the early twentieth century. In Japan, the twin goals were democratisation and demilitarisation, while, in Germany, de-Nazification was the driving ideal. For both states, this involved them actively avoiding any military engagements beyond self-defence and strengthening their constitutional limitations in an effort to prevent autocratic regimes from re-emerging. A lot of this change was mandated by their status of being on the losing side of the war and occupied during their formulative years, with the Japanese constitution even being mostly written by General Douglas MacArthur’s staff. However, the role of Japan’s and Germany’s political elites who were also dedicated to the project of anti-militarism was vital. Reluctant Warriors explicitly argues that ‘political elites can act as strategic “users of culture,” seeking to redefine the limits of what is permissible and legitimate by recasting their agenda as the most appropriate response to the particular circumstances of the times’ (p. 11).
Nevertheless, the power realities of the Cold War compelled Japan and Germany to engage in some limited rearmament for self-defence and providing the minimum alliance contribution. One of the strengths of Reluctant Warriors is how it has eloquently brought out how threat perceptions play with the politics of security. West Germany was the front-line state throughout the Cold War and hence felt keenly the need to preserve its territorial sovereignty. Despite the anti-militarism of the political elites and general public, Germany ultimately decided that a partial rearmament and entry into the multilateral security arrangement like NATO appeared to it as the most feasible solution. Japan, despite having the Korean War fought on its doorstep, was more resistant to rearming. Instead, under Prime Minister Yoshida, it sought to, instead, become a ‘merchant nation’, under the protection of Washington, thereby maintaining a strong bilateral security relationship with the USA (pp. 26–27).
While this narrative is relatively well known to scholars of international relations, arguably the most significant contribution of Sakaki et al. comes from their exploitation of how the post-Cold War era resulted in a change of their threat perceptions. Japan was increasingly alarmed with a rising China and the impact of a nuclear armed North Korea on their security. Berlin, which was basking in the glory of its unification, was wary of the Balkan crisis being fought. More recently, the Russian annexation of Crimea and global terrorism were further additions to it. The change in the threat perceptions also marked divergences in their attitudes and trajectories. However, what acted as an adhesive and shaped the military policies of the two countries was the inherent ‘alliance dilemma’. Both feared of getting abandoned by their allies if they did not toe their line and simultaneously of getting entrapped in an unnecessary protracted escalation to the angst of their respective civilians. In response, the political elites in power have legitimised many acts that were in contravention with constitutional anti-militarism. Of note, Japan felt obligated by their alliance with the USA to support its Iraq invasion, and Germany was an active participant in the Afghanistan War as a NATO member.
However, both Tokyo’s and Berlin’s anti-militarism has remained strong within their respective publics, and any involvement in the various wars of the USA has been unpopular. Hence, Germany specifically went to the extent of camouflaging its involvement in Afghanistan as a peace-keeping operation for many years. Yet, as the authors of the book rightfully observe, neither Japan nor Germany is a pacifist nation. Although both Germany and Japan have largely avoided the battlefield, their elites have tried to unshackle their state’s military inhibitions by way of financial contribution, humanitarian missions or supply of arms and ammunitions. However, many a times, the motives of strengthening military power have been unsuccessful, owing to deep suspicion of the armed forces at home.
Among the more unique case studies provided by Sakaki et al. is the impact that their anti-militarism has had on their efforts to manufacture and export arms. Since the late twentieth century, Germany has invariably figured in the list of top five arms exporter, whereas Japan has been reluctant to enter the market and still struggles to land any arms export deals. The authors point to Germany’s less restrictive security policy and multilateral security engagements as being behind the relative success of their arms export trends and policies despite Japan also having similarly developed their arms industry. Reading between the lines, one can assert that Germany has tried to come out of its anti-militaristic shell in bits and pieces. In contrast, Japanese public opinion has largely been unsupportive of arms exports and its companies reluctant to court any public backlash. Under the politically dominant Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Tokyo is slowly moving towards increased militarisation, but, as its failed efforts to sell Sōryū-class submarines to Australia illustrates, they have a long way to go (pp. 164–165).
Reluctant Warriors provides an excellent insight into the trajectories of Germany and Japan’s security policy. The authors have critically examined how and why Berlin and Tokyo have modified their military postures since 1990, and what and why more needs to be done amid the volatile international security environment. A deeply ingrained anti-militarist political culture in the minds of both civilians and leaders has held both of them back in developing full-fledged military capacities. Although the book is repetitive in some instances, it will undoubtedly leave a positive footprint on the minds of its readers and is a value addition to the existing corpus of literature on the matrix of Germany, Japan and their US alliance dilemma.