The Evolution of Turkey’s ‘South Asia Policy’: Continuities and Ruptures in Outlook,Roles,Actors and Constraints

Introduction

The AKP government in Turkey announced the ‘Asia Anew’ policy in late 2019 to advance its diplomatic, political and economic footprint in Asia in the coming years. Yet, a ‘return’ to Asia theme—as implicit in this policy—is not appropriate for Turkey’s relations with South Asia. South Asia has historically occupied an important, but overlooked place in modern Turkish foreign policy. Active political and military engagement in Afghanistan was perhaps the only foreign policy position the new Republic gladly inherited from the Ottomans. In Afghanistan, Turkey became one of the major political actors in the modern state-building process under Aman Allah Khan in the 1920s (Ahmed, 2017). In fact, the first time Turkey served as a political model for other nations to draw inspiration from was not 2000s and Middle East, but the 1920s and Afghanistan. Additionally, Turkey has been involved in mediation activities in conflicts in South Asia from Pashtunistan issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan and Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan.

However, South Asia’s weight in Turkish foreign policy has not been matched by equal scholarly attention. In otherwise, very concise appraisals of Turkish foreign policy, several authors limited Turkey’s South Asia relations to the ‘Saadabad Pact’ signed in 1937 between Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq or Turkey becoming a member of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 (Balcı, 2017; Hale, 2013; Mufti, 2009). Although it is true that once Turkey joined the western alliance early in the Cold War its ties to Asia became weaker (Anas, 2020, p. 432), this is no reason to overlook Turkey’s political engagements in South Asia during and after the Cold War. This research addresses several questions to remedy this gap in the literature: How has Turkey viewed and understood ‘South Asia’ in the first place? Which dynamics and motivations shaped Turkey’s South Asia policies? How have shifts in domestic actors involved in foreign policy making process over the years influenced Turkey’s South Asia relations? What are the continuities and ruptures in Turkey’s engagement with the region? How can we explain when and why Turkey engages the region?

This is an idiographic case study where ‘the aim is to describe, explain, interpret, and/or understand a single case as an end in itself rather than as a vehicle for developing broader theoretical generalizations’ (Levy, 2008, p. 4). It seeks to explain Turkey’s involvement in South Asia across a comparative historical time frame running from early Cold War to this day. In addition to secondary sources, this article relies on data collected from primary sources drawn from Turkish, American, Indian and Australian archives, memoirs by retired generals and ambassadors, and interviews the author conducted with retired Turkish diplomats serving in New Delhi and Islamabad. This article makes several arguments. First, Turkey has felt most motivated to get involved in the region when encouraged by the United States and had the ability to coordinate its policies with Washington. Except a brief hiatus in 1978–1979, Turkey never sought ‘strategic autonomy’ from the west in its involvement in South Asia. Second, notwithstanding the close ties established between Turkey and India before partition and though geographically not distant, the degree of foreignness between Turkey and South Asia has been considerable in view of either few or discontinuous economic, social and educational links with states in the region. Accordingly, unlike for the Middle East or the Balkans, there has never been a ‘return discourse’ vis-à-vis South Asia in Turkey. Third, it is only for the last half-decade that a Turkish government looked at Kashmir from religious lenses and chose to transform it into an item for popular consumption. Past Turkish governments supported Pakistan’s position on Kashmir all along, but they did so without a populist embrace and not from the perspective of religious camaraderie. Fourth, except for two brief but revealing periods in the late 1970s and 1990s, Turkey’s South Asia relations have been characterised by consensus/unanimity among Turkey’s domestic foreign policy actors. Turkish approach to the region has therefore largely been followed as a ‘state policy’, supported by the Turkish army, foreign ministry, governments, the media and the public. Finally, except for the issue of Kashmir, Turkey became a firm supporter of territorial integrity and status quo in South Asia, yet without remaining neutral in conflicts as it habitually supported its CENTO-ally Pakistan.

This article contributes to the literature on Turkish foreign policy by excavating an understudied area. Given Turkey’s ‘Asia Anew’ policy, this article has policy relevance in the sense that by revisiting Turkey’s previous engagement in one part of Asia, namely, South Asia, it seeks to bring to light and explain the nature, extent and limits of Turkish policy at a time when Turkey seeks to enhance its presence in Asia today. This article proceeds as follows. The first section provides a theoretically guided explanation of Turkey’s activism in South Asia from the onset of the Cold War to the mid-1960s. It explains Turkey’s involvement in mediation attempts in South Asia and its policies vis-à-vis regional conflicts. The second section discusses an attempt at a gradual shift in approach to the region in 1970s and 1980s in light of shifting global and domestic context but still within western security structure. The third section zooms in on the 1990s to discuss how transformation at three levels, namely, systemic, regional and domestic, influenced Turkey’s South Asia policies. The final section concludes by discussing the AKP period and its ‘Asia Anew’ turn, and reviews Turkey’s policies, roles and limitations in the region.

Fighting Communism

Analysts of Turkey’s immediate post-Second World War foreign policy agree that Turkey chose the western security umbrella in the emerging bipolar system over the communist bloc and rejected the non-aligned option for two reasons. First, Soviet demands over Turkish territory came across as threatening to the Turkish foreign policy elite and historical distrust towards Russia learned through the history of Ottoman–Russian wars, pushed Turkey to the west (Aydın, 2000; Mufti, 2009, p. 29). Second, Turkey’s western-oriented new state identity shaped with the new nation state and pulled it to the western camp (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003; Yilmaz & Bilgin, 2006). With a new political leadership under the Democrat Party (DP; 1950–1960) governments who were more daring, ambitious and temperamental than the former Republican elite (Mufti, 2009, p. 30), Turkey did not hesitate in the 1950s to spearhead pro-western regional alliances in the Balkans (the Balkan Pact), the Middle East (the Baghdad Pact) and attack the ‘non-aligned position’ at Bandung Conference in 1955.

However, the Cold War structure did not immediately tell Turkey who was a friend and who was a foe in South Asia. That is, Turkey did not immediately adopt a stance against non-aligned India or Afghanistan in favour of Pakistan. In fact, the Indian government led by Prime Minister (PM) Nehru had devised a new forum, ‘Indian Council of Cultural Cooperation’, to enhance cultural and educational contacts and exchange among Asian nations (National Archives of Australia, 1949, p. 2). One of the two sections in this Council ¹ covered Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Egypt. The Indian Education Minister, Maulana Azad, who was the father of the idea of cultural relations among Asian nations, visited Turkey in June 1951 and signed a cultural agreement. The ‘Turkish-Indian Cultural Association’ founded in Turkey was a direct outcome of this agreement (Malkoç, 2016, pp. 115–116). In those years, Turkey’s Foreign Minister (FM), Fuat Köprülü, expressed in a speech his regret for the existence of unresolved disputes between India and Pakistan and counselled toleration and understanding (National Archives of Australia, 1953, p. 58) without openly siding with Pakistan. Turkey, in this period, refused to participate in ‘Pan-Islamic confederacy’ proposed by Pakistan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Zafrulla Khan during his 1952 tour of Turkey, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon (Turkey Refuses to Attend, 1952, p. 9). Turkey turned down this proposal because ‘Islam, as a cultural link, could not be substituted for the political association Turkey needed in view of her long frontier with the Soviet Union; also that Turkey was satisfied with NATO and its military guarantees’ (National Archives of Australia, 1953, p. 105). Therefore, Turkey’s threat perception against the Soviet Union did not yet translate into distance from India or proximity to Pakistan.

It should also be noted that Turkey did not question ‘South Asia’ as a geographical construct. Unlike the post-2002 period, where public and official discourse in Turkey questioned ‘Middle East’ and its imperially drawn ‘artificial’ borders after the First World War, Turkish officials never held South Asia to the same scrutiny despite similar discourse entertained inside Afghanistan over the ‘Durand Line’ or Pakistan over ‘Kashmir’. As such, India and Afghanistan were the fulcrum of Turkey’s interest in South Asia until India’s partition. Turkish policy makers saw the region as ‘Indian subcontinent’ or ‘Indian peninsula’. Turkey’s interest in the rest of South Asia such as Bangladesh (after 1971), Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan or the Maldives remained marginal. Turkish ambassadors to Islamabad were often accredited to Nepal, Mauritius and even Cambodia (Dinç, 1998, pp. 111–114), indicating that Ankara paid only incidental attention to these countries. Due to shared threats Turkey perceived as affecting South Asia and Middle East, its perception of both regions was interlinked during the Cold War. Turkey’s ambassadors to Pakistan would therefore be invited to Ambassadors’ Conference on ‘Near and Middle East’ in Ankara. Gradually developing Cold War approach to South Asia would effectively mean later on that Indian neutrality needed to be countered, Afghanistan had to be cultivated to pull it away from Soviet domination, and Pakistan had to be supported as a bulwark against communism.

After the initial years of balanced relations with India and Pakistan, Turkey’s involvement in anti-Soviet regional alliances in the Middle East started to drive a wedge between India and Turkey. In 1953, discussions for a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) against communism pushed Turkey and India apart. During the visit of a Turkish parliamentary delegation to India in April 1953, the leader of the delegation, Haluk Şaman, an MP from DP, said at a press conference that as Turkey was not neutral in the Second World War, it would not be neutral in the Cold War since neutrality did not serve Turkey’s interests. The delegation also claimed that there was unanimous support among political parties in Turkey for Ankara’s Cold War foreign policy choices and for Turkey’s participation in the MEDO (Australian High Commissioner’s Office, 1953). Indian PM Nehru had spoken openly against rumours of Pakistan joining the Middle East Defense Organization in 1953 (Pakistan and Middle East Defense Organization, 1953, p. 34) first and the Baghdad Pact later because Nehru believed that it would bring global power struggle to India’s doorstep and undermine the neutrality of the Indian subcontinent (CIA, 1954, pp. 6–7). The DP government increasingly viewed India with strong suspicion and the Turkish PM, Adnan Menderes, remarked to the US Secretary of State at a meeting in late 1956 that Nehru was an ‘able but most dangerous man, champion of Baghdad Pact opponents and intent on isolating Pakistan’ (Office of the Historian, 1956). It is true that as PM Nehru’s visit to Ankara in May 1960 neared, relations between him and the Turkish PM had cooled. However, this did not come about because Menderes inched closer to nonaligned thinking, as is recently claimed (Bhattacherjee, 2016). On the contrary, Menderes, together with the leaders of Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq, saw Nehru (and Egyptian President Nasser) as an ‘evangelical neutralist’ (Office of the Historian, 1956). By the time of Nehru’s visit to Turkey in May 1960, Menderes seemed to think that Nehru was gradually coming to grips with the reality of Cold War power politics and distancing himself from the non-alignment. In his meeting with US Ambassador Warren, PM Menderes reportedly said that ‘much water has run under the bridge’ since he and Nehru had last met a few years earlier. He thought that Nehru’s views came closer to his considering the India–China border issues, (Office of the Historian, 1960) in which India faced aggression from a non-western power (China) and it appeared that only the West would come to India’s help.

Owing to its geographical proximity to Russia, Afghanistan was a key state for Turkey in South Asia. The DP government believed that due to the strategic imperatives of the Cold War, Afghanistan should stop being a neutral state and join the western camp. Political leaders often aspire to position their states to play certain roles in international politics (Breuning, 2007, p. 155). In Turkey’s case, during the 1950s, the DP government leaders desired Turkey to play a ‘regional gatekeeper’ role in South Asia to keep communism in check and to allow western access to the area by utilising Turkey’s cultural proximity and historical ties to the region. Turkey’s ‘regional gatekeeper’ role perception in South Asia was very similar to its ‘regional subsystem collaborator’ role perception in the Middle East in the 1950s (Pehlivanturk, 2019, p. 116). Turkey’s utility in South Asia was not lost on the United States. For instance, during the Second World War, before Turkey and the US became strong allies, American officials requested the Turkish Ambassador to Washington, Münir Ertegün, to intercede with and persuade the Afghan government to allow the opening of a US Legation in Kabul (Office of the Historian, 1942).

During the Cold War, Turkey tried to use its close ties with Afghanistan to pry Afghanistan out from Soviet influence. For instance, in a conversation with King Zahir Shah in 1957, Turkish President Celal Bayar criticised the ‘non-aligned position’ and warned that ‘neutrality’ makes countries easy targets for communist infiltration. Bayar’s words, however, provoked a passionate defence of Afghanistan’s unique posture of neutrality by King Zahir Shah (Mülakat Proseverbali, 1957, pp. 13–14). Turkey also revitalised its longstanding programme to train Afghan military personnel and to counter communist ideological influence within the Afghan military establishment (Yamak, 2006, pp. 157–172). However, according to US Embassy officials in Kabul, Turkey’s military mission in Afghanistan was poorly staffed and ineffectual; Turkish diplomatic representation in Kabul was also not particularly strong (CIA, 1960, p. 4; Yamak, 2006, p. 162).

Mediation Missions

Cold War dynamic also shaped Turkey’s involvement in mediation in the region. Except for the issue of Kashmir, Turkey was a status quo power in South Asia; it defended the preservation of existing borders and favoured maintaining the status quo during the Cold War. For instance, Turkey criticised India’s military operation to regain Goa, an old Portuguese colony on India’s west coast, in December 1961 (Bishku, 2016, p. 86). Turkey also blamed Afghanistan and its Pashtunistan bid for aiming to destabilise Pakistan and risking opening the region to communist infiltration. Moreover, straying from the ideal of ‘neutrality’—‘not getting identified too closely with any Middle Eastern state and avoiding involvement in regional conflicts’ (Mufti, 2009, p. 32)—one of the central principles in Turkey’s Middle East policy during the Cold War, Turkey largely privileged its ally Pakistan in regional conflicts in South Asia.

Two mediation missions that Turkey took part in South Asia show how Turkey’s involvement in South Asia was different from its Middle East policy. In South Asia, Turkey welcomed a mediator role but did not remain equally distant from parties to the conflicts. To begin with, Turkey found itself in a position to mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 1950s. We have on record a conversation between PM Adnan Menderes and Henry Byroade, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs in 1954, where Byroade asked Menderes if they were giving consideration to ‘becoming openly a mediator on the problems between Afghanistan and Pakistan.’ It was decided that Turkey and United States should try to work out a solution by engaging individually and secretly with both sides (CIA, 1955, p. 5; Office of the Historian, 1954). However, after two violent incidents in Kabul and Peshawar on 30 March 1955 following Pakistan’s declaration of the ‘One Unit’ system (designed to create parity between West and East Pakistan by merging all the provinces in West Pakistan, including the Pashtun-dominated North Western Frontier Province into one unit) and tensions consequently rerose high between Pakistan and Afghanistan, different countries offered to mediate the escalating conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Initially, Saudi Arabia tried to mediate but its approach was not accepted by Pakistan (CIA, 1955). A mediation commission consisting of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran was then formed. While Pakistan promised in advance that it will accept recommendations of this committee, hoping that Iran, Iraq and Turkey would back Pakistan’s claims and counteract Egyptians and Saudis Pakistan perceived more likely to back Afghanistan (CIA, 1955, pp. 5–6), Afghanistan hesitated mainly due to Turkey’s presence in the commission (CIA, 1955, p. 6). Daud in Afghanistan, however, ordered the demobilisation of the Afghan army on 27 July 1955 to demonstrate to Saudi Arabia and to Turkey its good-faith and non-aggressive intentions (CIA, 1955, p. 5). Pakistan’s position on mediation, however, changed in August 1955; it now wanted to wait for Turkish mediation on the belief that Turkey would be more favourable to Pakistan (CIA, 1955, p. 11).

In aspiring to mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Turkey acted more favourably towards Pakistan. The issue of Pashtunistan—the Afghan claim that Pashtun areas left to Pakistan by the British belonged historically to Afghanistan and that the Afghanistan-Pakistan border (called the Durand Line) is arbitrary and artificial—came up in a meeting between PM Menderes and Afghan PM Daoud Khan in 1956. Khan pleaded for Menderes’ help to stop the Pakistani government from bringing to a halt the transit line to Pashtun-dominant areas of Pakistan, which was rather pushing Afghanistan into Russian hands (Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, 1956, pp. 4–5). Menderes was not persuaded and instead tried to convince PM Daoud to simply end their Pashtunistan campaign because it created an opening for Soviet penetration into the region. Sharing Turkish side’s impressions of this visit to Kabul with American officials, Secretary General of Turkish MFA, Muharrem Nuri Birgi, who had accompanied Menderes to Kabul, reportedly said that PM Daoud Khan must either be ousted from power or forced to change his Pashtunistan bid against Pakistan. PM Daoud Khan’s rejection of Turkish military assistance also estranged Menderes from the Afghan PM. Turkish visitors, however, were reportedly very satisfied with King Zahir Shah, FM Naim, and former PM Shah Mahmud (CIA, 1956).

PM Adnan Menderes met PM Daoud Khan again on 18 April 1957. During the talks, PM Daoud Khan tried to establish a parallel between the Pashtunistan and Cyprus issues, suggesting that both issues pertain to a people’s right to national self-determination (Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, 1957, p. 3). PM Menderes instead repeated his prior warnings against Soviet penetration into Afghanistan, emphasising the importance of Afghanistan remaining connected to the west, the Northern Tier (Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, 1957, pp. 4–5). Turkey’s main objective was to keep Afghanistan away from the Soviets. In a meeting with President Eisenhower, Turkish FM Zorlu ‘recommended that the President use all influence possible on the Afghans. They [Afghans] are not willing to be Soviet satellites but fail to realize the danger of cooperation with the Communists. The Turks are attempting to encourage help from NATO in influencing the Afghans’ (Office of the Historian, 1959). Turkey’s attempt at mediation on the Pashtunistan issue, however, did not succeed in bringing the parties together and negotiating a deal between them. This happened for two main reasons. First, Turkey was completely committed to Pakistan’s security and territorial integrity. Second, believing that the Afghan state was weak, Turkey’s mediation effort mainly consisted of trying to force the Afghan government to abandon its territorial claims vis-à-vis Pakistan and focus on the higher goal of containing Soviet expansion and interference in the region.

Turkey’s second mediation attempt was on Kashmir in 1962 under the Republican People’s Party (RPP) government. Initial post-coup civilian governments led by İsmet İnönü, leader of RPP, experienced domestic instability due inter alia to two coup attempts in 1962 and 1963. In this period, Turkish foreign policy remained western in orientation yet became subject to bargaining between increasing number of domestic actors due to the rise of new domestic actors, such as the armed forces and public opinion (Harris 2004, p. 265, Aydın, 2000, pp. 117–118). Interestingly, Turkey’s South Asia policy was an exception to this emerging pattern in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey continued to perceive South Asian security in the 1960s in terms of a fierce rivalry between communism and the ‘free world’. This perception continued to shape Turkey’s approach to South Asia. For instance, during a meeting with the Prince of Sikkim and the Indian Ambassador to Ankara on 24 May 1963, PM İnönü was mainly concerned to know two things: if his guests expected further communist Chinese aggression against India after the 1962 Sino-Indian war, and whether there were communist centres in and around Sikkim and the rest of India (Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, 1963b). A 1965 report archived by the Turkish PM’s office openly declared that ‘the possibility of an aggression against or infiltration into the Indian subcontinent, which borders China and Russia, is one of the constant concerns in our [Turkish] foreign policy’ (Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, 1965c, p. 13). Regardless of the party and ideological affiliations of the government in power in Ankara, the bipolar international structure and Turkey’s membership in the western bloc continued to be the primary determinants of Turkey’s relations with South Asia.

To return to Turkey’s one and only mediation attempt on Kashmir, it was under above circumstances in 1962 that Turkey played ‘mediator’ role at a time when Pakistan and India were already in talks. In reference to then ongoing India–Pakistan talks, the General Secretary in Turkish MFA, Namık Yolga, invited the Indian Ambassador to Ankara, Jai Kumar Atal, to the foreign ministry on 17 October 1962 to inquire about a possible Turkish mediatory role in the ongoing India–Pakistan talks. Atal told Yolga that his government viewed PM İnönü’s possible role in the talks as ‘deus ex machina’. He said that British and American involvement in the talks could make things even worse because both India and Pakistan have deep misgivings about British and the US intentions in South Asia. Atal emphasised, however, that both India and Pakistan have a strong sense of friendship, appreciation, and deep respect for Turkey. If the ongoing bilateral talks stall or hit a roadblock, PM İnönü’s mediation could then be the key to move forward. Ambassador Atal remarked that PM Nehru had the deepest respect for PM İnönü and that ‘attempts to improve Indian–Pakistani relations began after Turkey’s and particularly İnönü’s personal suggestions.’ Ambassador Atal further suggested that PM İnönü could propose the following as a possible solution to the Kashmir problem:

There could be a condominium administration in Kashmir. Kashmir would be declared a new entity: its president would be Muslim, its PM would be Hindu. Composition of its civil service would be 77% Muslim, 23% Hindu. Borders would be protected by India and Pakistan together. This could be accepted for a five-year period until public opinion soothes, settles down. (Devlet arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, 1962)

What followed was a modest Turkish mediation effort in November 1962. As India accepted Turkey’s mediation, former FM and reputable diplomat Feridun Cemal Erkin thought both sides pulling their forces back would be a good initial confidence-building measure. Erkin then suggested that both countries prepare a joint communique to declare their agreement that the Kashmir dispute should be solved in a fair manner in line with both sides’ interests. Once both countries concurred with this recommendation, Turkey proposed a preliminary meeting to prepare individual speeches for the Kashmir issue to pave the way for direct meetings between PM Nehru and President Ayub Khan. India’s military defeat in the 1962 Sino-India war and ensuing Anglo-American involvement further pushed India and Pakistan towards bilateral talks (Schaffer, 2009, pp. 79–80), which were held in 1962 and 1963 (Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, 1965a, p. 10). During these Indo-Pakistani talks over Kashmir, the Turkish government noted that both sides agreed to leave the ‘plebiscite’ issue aside and instead focussed on generating a bilateral political agreement on the partition of Kashmir. India reportedly offered to convert the ceasefire line as the official border, while Pakistan offered to give only Ladakh and Jammu to India. This led the Turkish government to think that the sole remaining issue left to be resolved was which side would control the Kashmir Valley (Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, 1965a, p. 6).

These episodes of Turkish mediation in South Asia show two things. First, as Brighi and Hill (2016) argue, implementation of foreign policy depends on the ability to use foreign policy instruments which are a function of societal resources and capabilities. Turkey, however, lacked the necessary economic, political and military capabilities to succesfully achieve its mediation objectives in South Asia. Turkey could have no visible impact on the train of events, whether it was conflict resolution or coups or change in foreign orientation. Second, as in DP’s Middle East policy in the 1950s (Benli Altunışık, 2009, p. 172), Turkey became active in South Asia in the 1950s and first half of the 1960s as part and parcel of western security architecture to serve the western alliance purposes.

Regional Conflicts

Leaders’ beliefs, prejudice, perception and lessons learned from history form their ‘cognitive map’ and influence foreign policy decision making (Alden & Aran, 2017, p. 27). For instance, in the cognitive map of the Turkish Republican elite in the interwar period, the Middle East ‘represented what Turkey was, and not what Turkey wanted to be’ (Benli Altunışık, 2009, p. 173). Turkey desired to separate itself from the Middle East, did not want to get involved in its disputes, and saw Arab alliances as a liability. South Asia, however, did not invoke the same image in the minds of Turkey’s political and state elite. Turkey therefore did not try to stay aloof from conflicts in South Asia; on the contrary, Turkey picked the side of its ally Pakistan in several conflicts.

First, in the Sino-Indian war of 1962, Turkey initially wanted to support India against ‘Red China’. Turkey offered ‘some light mountain artillery and ammunition’ which were to be transported to India by the US (Office of the Historian, 1962). However, ‘… not to hurt Pakistani feelings, Turkey rescinded its earlier decision to transfer weapons to India at the last minute’ (Divanlıoğlu, 2007, pp. 34–35; also see Ahmad, 1981, p. 114). Despite this last-minute disappointment, the new Indian Ambassador to Ankara, Kanhaiya Lal Mehta, ‘relayed PM Nehru’s respect and regards to PM İnönü and expressed gratitude over Turkey’s desire to send arms to India and appreciation for Turkey’s efforts to help solve the India–Pakistan dispute (Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, 1963a). Turkey’s change of heart in favour of Pakistan even in a conflict not involving Pakistan directly and despite Chinese communist aggression is a testimony to Turkey’s approach to regional conflicts in South Asia during the Cold War.

Second, on Kashmir, a succession of Turkish governments accepted Pakistan’s perspective on the conflict. Ankara thought that following the 1947–1948 India–Pakistan war, both India and Pakistan had agreed to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir in line with UN resolutions. However, as Turkey’s reading of the Kashmir issue went, India made up excuses to hold on to Kashmir for strategic purposes since it knew that in a plebiscite Kashmiris would most likely choose to join Pakistan (Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, 1965a, p. 5). This is why, when speaking at the UN General Assembly on 25 January 1965, FM Feridun Cemal Erkin said that Turkey supports a fair and sustainable solution to the Kashmir issue in complete agreement with UN resolutions (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni, 1964–1965, p. 64). While Pakistan supported Turkey on Cyprus in return, Turkey and India had a deep fallout over the Cyprus issue. For instance, at the 2nd Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Conference in Cairo in 1964, the Turkish government came to regard the section on Cyprus in the final Summit document to be written by India in total conformity with the Greek side’s position. The Greek Cypriot delegation in the UN was also preparing a similar document to that of Cairo Summit communique and India agreed to co-sponsor that UN draft resolution. Failing to convince India to drop its decision to co-sponsor Cyprus’ draft resolution, the Turkish side attributed India’s attitude to three reasons: Turkey’s close relations with Pakistan; Turkey’s support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue; and the possible adverse impact of the Cyprus dispute vis-à-vis India’s claims over Kashmir (Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, 1964).

Third, when India–Pakistan war broke out in 1965, a report in the Turkish archives dated 3 September 1965 initially discussed both Indian and Pakistani interpretations of why the war broke out. It notably stated in passing that ‘as of August 5th, conflict broke out in Kashmir occupied by both India and Pakistan’ (Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, 1965c, p. 1). The war led to frenetic joint activity by Turkey and Iran to support their CENTO-ally Pakistan. Turkey immediately supported the UN Security Council’s call for a ceasefire; Turkish and Iranian officials visited Rawalpindi to show support and requested assistance for Pakistan from any state with interest in the war (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni 1964–1965, 1965, p. 6). In response to questions about Turkish arms transfer to Pakistan, FM Hasan Işık observed that ‘Turkey is not giving arms as aid; what is being done is simply implementation of “arms sales” section of a previous trade agreement between Pakistan and Turkey’ (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni 1964–1965, 1965, p. 39). Government spokesperson İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil further added that ‘Turkey routinely delivered arms and ammunition/military equipment to Pakistan in accordance with previous trade agreement signed. [Pakistani] Request to speeding up the process and increasing the quantity met positive response’ (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni 1964–1965, 1965, p. 40).

Turkey and Iran ‘also proposed to provide soldiers to a possible “United Nations Peace Force” in line with their mutual constitutional requirements’ (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni 1964–1965, 1965, pp. 40, 68). After a meeting with Turkish officials, Iranian PM Abbas Howeida said that Turkey and Iran would like to send a message to Indian PM Shastri that they unequivocally support Pakistan and demand an immediate ceasefire followed by the withdrawal of Indian forces from Pakistan territory (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni 1964–1965, p. 41). FM Işık further added that Pakistan’s request for arms from Turkey was not meant for ‘war, but peace’ (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni 1964–1965, p. 73). The issue of Turkey’s arms aid to Pakistan worried India. The ‘Indian government called Turkish and Iranian Ambassadors to its Foreign Office on 17 September that informed them that military aid in the form of arms and ammunition to Pakistan will be accepted as hostile to India’ (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni, 1964–1965, p. 44). On 28 November 1965, Turkey’s Ambassador to Pakistan said that Turkish government supported ‘Kashmir’s right to self-determination’ (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni, 1964–1965, 1965, p. 46).

Finally, when the 1971 India–Pakistan war broke out, once again the Indian government believed (based upon rumours and reports) that Turkey (together with Iran) was either sending or planning to send military equipment and arms to Pakistan (CIA, 1971, p. 6; Office of the Historian, 1971). Ambassador Dikerdem (1977) reported that General Yahya Khan had requested the Turkish government for military support and to put pressure on India to pull back its troops. However, luckily the war ended before Turkey could send military aid to Pakistan (p. 126). A note in an Indian archival document substantiates this claim. Pakistan’s Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Aziz Ahmad, said in a CENTO Ministerial Council meeting in July 1973 that except for Iran, no other CENTO allies had offered military help to Pakistan during the 1971 war against India (National Archives of India, 1973, p. 4). According to former Turkish Ambassador to New Delhi (1987–1991) Eralp, the movement for Bangladesh as a separate Muslim majority state had placed Turkey in a very difficult spot in terms of militarily supporting Pakistan while simultaneously protecting Muslim lives in East Pakistan from Pakistani atrocities (Yalım Eralp, personal communication, 8 March 2019).

Turkey’s close ties to Pakistan continued to constrain it after the 1971 war ended and Bangladesh was established. What eventually untied Turkey’s hands to some extent was the onset of post-war talks between India and Pakistan in Shimla in 1972 which led to the release of 93,000 Pakistani prisoners-of-war by India. Still, Turkey continued to support Pakistan’s position on the issue of Bangladesh’s membership to the World Health Organization. Ankara also abstained in the voting on Bangladesh’s admittance to the International Labour Organization and even voted against the admission of Bangladesh to the UN (Söylemez, 1973, pp. 135–140). FM Bayülken expressed satisfaction on 14 February 1973 for the positive turn in India–Pakistan relations due to the Shimla and Lahore agreements. The FM noted that the return of 93,000 Pakistani prisoners-of-war was a positive step for India–Pakistan relations to further move forward. He also thought that the positive momentum in India–Pakistan relations would give Turkey greater freedom regarding the establishment of ties with Bangladesh, which happened to be a Muslim majority state (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni, 1973, p. 102). According to Erdem Erner, former Turkish ambassador to Islamabad (1973–1976), the Turkish government informed Pakistan’s PM Bhutto during his visit to Ankara in 1973 that Turkey was planning to recognise Bangladesh. Ambassador Erner (1993), however, intervened and warned Ankara that this move would embarrass PM Bhutto and thus managed to get Turkey’s recognition of Bangladesh postponed (p. 173). Turkey’s eventual recognition of Bangladesh on 22 February 1974, during the Organisation of Islamic Conference summit meeting in Lahore, was carefully timed to coincide with Pakistan PM Bhutto’s announcement a week earlier that Pakistan was ready to recognise Bangladesh on condition that Dhaka not put on trial 195 Pakistani prisoners-of-war (The National Archives, 1974).

Dawn of a New Approach?

While Cold War mentality characterised Turkey’s mediation missions and involvement in regional conflicts until the mid-1960s, a softening of inter-bloc relations after 1965 and Turkey’s disappointment with the west over Cyprus allowed Ankara to diversify its foreign relations while remaining within the western security architecture. Turkey increased its contacts in Asia and Africa, improved relations with the Soviet Union and Middle Eastern states and became more engaged with the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (Aydın, 2000, p. 125). During this time, Turkey also started to explore ways of establishing a better working relationship with India as well.

Ankara realised that despite frictions over Cyprus and Turkey’s support to Pakistan during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, Turkish and Indian viewpoints actually overlapped on several issues. This first became apparent during the 2nd Asia–Africa Conference in 1965. A Turkish PM Office note entitled ‘India and 2nd Asia–Africa Conference’ commented that several policy positions held by the Indian government were similar to Turkey’s, including support for peaceful coexistence, support for general disarmament and ban on nuclear testing, elimination of colonialism and racism, support for the termination of the apartheid regime in South Africa and building economic cooperation and solidarity among developing nations (Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1965 b, pp. 2–3).

In January 1968, Turkey’s FM Çağlayangil visited India (Çağlayangil, 1990, p. 178). On his arrival, Çağlayangil emphasised the common value of ‘democracy’ between both countries (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni, 1968, p. 33). In the joint declaration on 9 January, the Turkish FM further said that India and Turkey share the same motivation to form friendly relations with as many countries as possible regardless of these countries’ social and political regimes. He added that there were no direct issues in conflict between India and Turkey (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni, 1968, p. 34). Çağlayangil touted his visit as a good and timely start to tackle any lingering bitterness in bilateral relations and to reanimate ties (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni, 1968, p. 36). Çağlayangil also wrote in his memoirs that he and PM Indira Gandhi had agreed that India and Turkey should bracket their respective positions on Cyprus and Kashmir and try to enhance their economic cooperation (Çağlayangil, 1990, p. 179). The Indian Embassy in Ankara wrote in its 1968 Annual Report that Çağlayangil’s visit had allowed an opportunity to the Indian side to clarify to Turkey that it supported independence, sovereignty and integrity of Cyprus but not the idea of Enosis as Turkey seemed to think (National Archives of India, 1969, p. 8). The visit also paid off as the Turkish delegation at the United Nations accepted Indian request that year to drop its customary references to Kashmir (National Archives of India, 1969, p. 8). The selection of Mahmut Dikerdem as the next Turkish Ambassador to New Delhi (1969–1972) fit this picture well. Dikerdem’s (1989) mission was to explain to India that Turkey’s alliance with Pakistan will not prevent friendship with India (p. 178). As significant as these moves were, they were upset by two events.

First, rumours that the Lyndon Johnson administration was preparing to rearm Pakistan by furnishing it with new Patton tanks via a third country including possibly Turkey put the first dent. The Indian Embassy in Ankara noted in its 1968 Annual Report that although Turkey had indicated special interest in forging closer ties with India early that year, an agreement in principle between Washington and Ankara to deliver 100 tanks to Pakistan showed Turkey–India relations would not but be a derivative of Turkey–Pakistan relations (National Archives of India, 1969, p. 2).

Second, a commotion during the Islamic Conference meeting in Rabat in 1969 damaged the prospects of warmer Turkey–India relations. When Morocco and Saudi Arabia invited India to the conference in the belief that India has as many Muslims as Pakistan, Jordan and Turkey felt obliged, under Pakistani pressure, to table a joint motion to kick India out of the conference. This caused considerable strain in Turkish-Indian relations, which disappointed the Turkish Ambassador to New Delhi but also pushed him to actively counteract allegations emerging in the Indian media against Turkey (Çağlayangil, 1990, pp. 64–65; Dikerdem, 1989, p. 180).

Turkey’s attempt to create a more balanced engagement with South Asia continued unabated in the 1970s. FM Haluk Bayülken visited Afghanistan in May 1973, which was ‘designed to increase bilateral contacts and lessen identification with CENTO partners—specifically Pakistan in case of Afghanistan, b) develop whatever trade advantages possible and c) offer some alternatives—no matter how small—to continuing Soviet influence and growing Chinese activities in area’ (Access to Archival Databases, 1973). In the view of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, during this visit Bayülken tried to play the role of a honest broker between Pakistan and Afghanistan and expressed the hope that they would reach peace soon lest ‘enemies would exploit the situation’ (Access to Archival Databases, 1973, p. 3).

FM Bayülken then visited India in August 1973. During this visit, Turkey asked India to oppose the Greek Cypriot administration’s request to discuss the Cyprus question at the upcoming Non-Aligned Summit in Algiers. After the visit, it was announced that a Turkish trade delegation planned to visit India to sign a commercial agreement. However, this visit lacked substance since the signing of a commercial agreement was not actually a new thing and there was little chance that the volume of bilateral trade would go up significantly (The National Archives, 1973, July 11). Indian–Turkish relations still improved a little because of the trade agreement and Turkey’s recognition of Bangladesh. Indian policy on Cyprus also became less pro-Greece (Access to Archival Databases, 1974). In 1977, after a dispute between Bangladesh and India broke out over the Farakka Dam and the sharing of river water, Turkey agreed with India and offered to support the Indian delegation at the United Nations Water Conference in Mar Del Plata, Argentina. The Indian Embassy in Ankara believed that in 1977–1978 Turkey was genuinely looking for warmer relations with India (The National Archives of India, 1977, pp. 3–4).

A more radical opening to India was attempted in 1978–1979 under the social-democratic RPP government, which was leaning towards non-alignment at a time when a pro-Third-Worldist diplomatic faction was dominant within the Turkish foreign ministry (Sert, 2020). This new approach also coincided with the new international milieu of superpower détente, debates around the creation of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), and a downturn in Turkey’s relations with the West. In this context, Brighi and Hill (2016, p. 150) have argued that ‘because of its inherently relational nature, context means different things to different actors, depending not only on where they are placed, but also on how they interpret the features of the terrain surrounding them.’ It was therefore PM Bülent Ecevit who felt closer to India than Pakistan and believed that Turkey’s military, economic, and political ties as constructed did not benefit Turkey. This supports the argument that individual leaders often play a decisive role in changing the course of a state’s foreign policy choices (Alden & Aran, 2017). As will be discussed later, this will not be the last time that PM Ecevit would try to change Turkey’s South Asia policy.

Under PM Ecevit, Turkey did not approach India out of economic or diplomatic motivations. Rather, Ecevit government seemed to have been inspired by India’s non-aligned position in world affairs. FM Gündüz Ökçün visited India in July 1978, seeking guest status for Turkey in the non-aligned movement (NAM). In a speech he made in India, Ökçün reportedly said Turkey ‘closely observes India’s role and the way in which the policy of non-alignment is implemented for the progress of all humanity.’ Ökçün said his government wanted to develop relations with India in line with its desire to create a zone of peace around Turkey (Access to Archival Databases, 1978). When this raised question marks in western capitals as well as in Turkey’s foreign policy establishment, the Turkish army tried to sooth the US that it had things under its control (Eralp, 2017) while Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) downplayed Ökçün’s India visit. yet, due to this backlash, Ökçün later said that ‘guest status’ within NAM would not be pursued that year (The National Archives, 1978). Turkey’s engagement in South Asia as well as in other parts of Asia throughout the 1970s was considered by US diplomats as

part of a modest Turkish diplomatic campaign to spruce up its independent image and to improve relations with the nations of Asia and Africa. Turkish interest in relations with the third world is not new; it goes back at least to the mid-sixties when votes on the Cyprus question in the United Nations revealed the extent to which Turkey had become isolated by its concentration on its ties to the US and NATO. (The National Archives, 1978)

As a consequence of this shift in Turkey’s South Asia approach in the 1970s, Ankara was no longer interested in mediation in South Asia. The goodwill Turkey enjoyed both in Afghanistan and Pakistan convinced the US Embassy in Islamabad in 1975 that Turkey could, once again, try to mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan. An Embassy cable from November 1975 reported that the Turkish MFA had already agreed to mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan and a visit to Kabul at the foreign ministerial level was imminent (The National Archives, 1975). However, it became clear after Foreign Minister Çağlayangil’s visit to Kabul in January 1976 that Turkey only passed Pakistan’s views on the conflict to the Afghan government without actually trying to mediate (The National Archives, 1976). Interestingly, in the Indian Embassy’s reporting on Çağlayangil’s visit, it was said that the Afghan government regarded the joint Turkish-Afghan official communique as a diplomatic gain for Afghanistan since Turkey accepted for the first time that ‘there is a dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan relating to rights of Pathans and Baluchis’ whereas in the past Turkey regarded Baluchistan and Pashtunistan issues as Pakistan’s internal affairs (National Archives of India, 1976, p. 1). Besides, In the mid-1970s, Turkey suddenly halted its military training programme for Afghan military officers. Once again American pressure was exerted and the US hoped that Turkish–Afghan ties would be repaired (Access to Archival Databases, 1978) and the military training of Afghan military officers would restart in 1979 (Access to Archival Databases, 1978).

One line of continuity in Turkey’s engagement with South Asia from the early-1950s to the late-1970s was its weak diplomatic presence in the region. For instance, between 1976 and 1978, the Turkish Embassy in Kabul did not have an ambassador, and it was only after American pressure that a new Turkish ambassador was appointed (The National Archives, 1978). The US Embassy in Ankara wanted to use the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a window into critical developments in Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion. Yet, it does not look like Turkish officials were of much help (The National Archives, 1978/1979). It was not only in Afghanistan that Turkey’ diplomatic presence remained weak. Even in Pakistan, in spite of Turkish–Pakistani special relationship, some former Turkish ambassadors to Islamabad acknowledged that they had had serious human capital issues at the embassy. They did not have enough diplomats and experts proficient in the Urdu language; ambassadors themselves often did not have detailed knowledge of the country and the region and more broadly about Asia; and institutional resources remains very weak (Hasan Kemal Gür, personal communication, 25 July 2019; Kamel, 2008, p. 26, 47; Dinç, 1998, p. 106).

Change in Motivations: An Economic Turn

In the post-1980 coup period, Turkey’s general outlook for South Asia was shaped by a new consensus among domestic actors from the military to the government and foreign ministry that Turkey should switch from import-substitution policy to export-oriented economy, privatise state-owned companies, encourage remittances from Turks abroad to boost currency reserves, empower businesspeople, and find new export markets abroad (Balcı & Gülener, 2018). PM Turgut Özal formulated an alternative national role conception where Turkey would form a Middle Eastern zone of economic interdependence facilitating peace and paving the way for Turkey to become a regional leader in the Middle East (Benli Altunışık, 2009, pp. 179–180) and play the role of a bridge between east and west (Aras & Görener, 2010). Though Turkey had no intention of being a regional power in South Asia, this new outlook influenced Turkey’s new approach to South Asia.

Although the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 actualised what Turkey had been trying to prevent for decades, Turkey limited its involvement in South Asia to economic considerations in the 1980s. Following Deputy PM Kaya Erdem’s visit to boost Turkey–Pakistan economic relations, PM Özal’s visit to Pakistan in 1984 was duly attended by a large group of businesspeople (Kamel, 2008, p. 38). At the same time, Turkey unambiguously sided with the US-led efforts to evict the Soviets from Afghanistan. It sent donations to Afghan refugees in Pakistan and hosted four thousand Afghan refugees from Pakistan (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni, 1984–1985, p. 59; Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni, 1985–1986, p. 28). However, it was doubtful if Turkey provided any military support to the Afghan mujahideen (Yousaf & Adkin, 2001, p. 94).

Although Turkey and India supported opposing sides in the Afghan war, PM Özal also visited India in 1986 to rejuvenate bilateral relations. Though Özal made sure that his approach to India was not seen as abandoning Pakistan, he was determined not to allow Turkey’s relations with Pakistan to get in the way of closer relations with India. During Özal’s visit, PM Rajiv Gandhi harkened back to how Turkey’s independence war had echoed in India, how Turkey’s modernisation and secularism inspired the Indian experience, and how India assumed pro-Arab position and called Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab lands. Gandhi said India stood ‘for a unified, sovereign, independent and non-aligned Cyprus in which all communities live together in amity and goodwill. To this end, we reaffirm our strong support to the good offices mission of the UN Secretary General’ (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni, 1985–1986, pp. 44–46). Gandhi proposed exploring the possibility of cooperation with Turkey in defence industry, which caught the Turkish side off guard. Özal also offered to help soften Pakistan–India relations as Turkey had tried back in 1962–1963 (Milliyet, 1986). Indian PM Gandhi visited Ankara in 1988.

During his India visit on in February 1989, President Evren was taken to Bangalore, known as the Silicon Valley of India, where he was amazed to see how technologically developed India had become. President Evren was therefore keen to utilise well-known Turkish businesspeople as intermediaries to enhance Turkish-Indian economic relations (Divanlıoğlu, 2007, pp. 128–130, 135–137). This, however, did not mean an abrupt rupture in Turkey–Pakistan relations. While Turkish PM Akbulut was ambiguous about Kashmir during Pakistan PM Benazir Bhutto’s visit to Turkey in May 1990, President Özal intervened and promised that Turkey will continue to support Kashmir in OIC and international platforms (Cumhuriyet, 1990). At the same time, Özal reportedly encouraged PM Bhutto to try to resolve bilateral issues with India (Batur, 1990).

While alliance with Pakistan had tied Turkey’s hands in relations with Bangladesh in the 1970s (Söylemez, 1973, pp. 135–140; Erner, 1993, p. 173), Turkey engaged Bangladesh more freely in the 1980s. While visiting Bangladesh in 1982, President Evren did not mind that a military government was in power in Dhaka. During this visit, Bangladesh President Hussain Ershad requested Turkey to encourage its construction firms to build an air base in Bangladesh (Milliyet, 1983). When President Ershad visited Ankara in 1985, Turkey reached an agreement with Dhaka to train Bangladeshi military officers in the Turkish military academy and to explore economic cooperation in the cement and chemical industries (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni, 1984–1985, October 1985, p. 15). PM Özal visited Bangladesh in November 1986. Özal signed two agreements on shipping and investment incentives and offered loans to Bangladesh to buy consumer goods and machinery from Turkey (Islam, 1987, p. 171). As with the rest of Asia throughout the 1980s, economic motivations coloured Turkey’s outlook towards South Asia.

Turkey’s South Asia Approach After the Cold War

The end of the Cold War generated three concurrent changes: disappearance of the bipolar world structure, political instability in multiple regions surrounding Turkey, and emerging domestic identity debates triggered by resurgence of political Islam and Kurdish identity. Though students of Turkish foreign policy have largely neglected it, these changes prompted a rethink in Turkey’s relations with South Asia as well. In addition to the collapse of the threat of communism, significant shifts occurred in the region. Afghanistan fast descended into chaos after Soviet withdrawal; Indo-American relations started to improve Pakistan fell out of favor with the US after its lack of support for the First Gulf War, and its nuclear programme. Besides, Iran and Pakistan, CENTO allies until a decade earlier, clashed more openly over rival policies towards Afghanistan as well as armed insurgency in Baluchistan. Turkey’s relations with South Asia consequently transformed. Turkey’s focus was still exclusively on India, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan. While cracks in Turkey–Pakistan relations became wider, Indian–Turkish relations improved steadily.

Two of Turkey’s former ambassadors to India were particularly impressed with the political model Indian democracy presented. India, unlike Pakistan, was able to remain a democracy, free from military tutelage, despite its great ethnic, cultural and religious mosaic. One of these ambassadors was influenced by the fact that as opposed to deep fears in Turkey that broadcasts in Kurdish language and Islamic dress in ‘public’ could compromise secularism, national unity and territorial integrity, diversity in dress and languages did not become a problem for India (Anonymous Ambassador, personal communication, 27 March 2019). In his visit to India in 1989, President Evren too had marvelled at India; he, as a former general, asked if coups happen in India, and then Turkish ambassador to New Delhi Yalım Eralp replied that ‘this is not Pakistan; coups do not happen here’ (Eralp, 2017).

It is true that Turkey–Pakistan relations did not break in the early 1990s. For instance, Turkey still supported Pakistan on Kashmir through the Organisation of Islamic Conference (Pant & Mehta, 2019, pp. 171–172). However, there was a clear change in tone. Turkey’s own domestic identity debates around Islamic, Kurdish and Alevi identity claims and its desire to serve as a role model for a ‘secular yet Muslim-majority democracy’ for Central Asia in the 1990s directly shaped Turkey’s perception of events in Afghanistan, particularly the rise to power of the Taliban and Pakistan’s role in it. Turkish Ambassador to Kabul (1995–1997) Cankorel (2017) makes it clear in his memoirs that Pakistan and Turkey worked at cross purposes in Afghanistan as the Taliban was rising. According to him, Pakistan was fermenting ethnic discrimination against Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens, in favour of Pashtuns, thereby regionalising the Afghan crisis by pulling Iran, India and Russia to Afghanistan (pp. 38–39). Cankorel was disturbed as Pakistan pretended to be ‘the sole sovereign power over the future design of Afghan politics…’ (p. 38).

Turkish and Pakistani perspectives over the future of Afghanistan clashed in this period for three overall reasons. First, as opposed to Pakistan, the rise of the post-Soviet Turkic world brought to the attention of Turkish foreign policy makers Uzbeks and Turkmens living in Afghanistan. Turkey therefore aimed to carve up influence in Afghanistan by ensuring the military and political presence of Rashid Dostum, the Uzbek warlord (Bishku, 2020, p. 58). Second, in a notable change from earlier decades, Cankorel found an opportunity to engage in intra-Afghan mediation between Kabul government factions, Tajik commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, and Dostum, against the Taliban which he perceived as their shared enemy (pp. 58–59, 71–72, 109). Interestingly however, Cankorel acknowledged significant problems between Turkey and Dostum, writing that Dostum and his people were not realists, they were day dreaming, and that Turkey’s consulate in Mazar-i Sharif was weak (pp. 81–85, 91). This underlined once again that though the presence of Uzbeks and Turkmens in Afghanistan could be an instrument for Turkish foreign policy, Turkey did not have the capability to use it efficiently. In terms of clash between Turkish and Pakistani policies over Afghanistan in this period, the Pakistani side was also not happy with Turkey’s organisation of peace conferences on Afghanistan and new mediation initiative between warring parties including the Taliban (pp. 143–147). Finally, while Pakistan supported the Taliban in Afghanistan, Turkish foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan had domestic components. As Brighi and Hill point out, ‘sometimes domestic objectives are achieved via particular foreign policies, whereas foreign policy objectives are pursued via domestic policies’ (p. 156). In other words, Turkey’s Afghan policy was as much about domestic politics and the rise of Islamism in Turkey as it was about Afghanistan (Cankorel, 2017, pp. 111–112, 115). With the rise of the Turkic world as well as the coming to power of the Islamist-oriented Welfare Party in 1996, the number of domestic actors vying for influence in Turkey’s Afghan policy multiplied. While Turkish nationalist groups assisted Turkic groups in Afghanistan using their own channels (Cankorel, 2017, pp. 90–91), Islamists shunned the Foreign Ministry to form their parallel channel in connecting with Afghan Islamists (pp. 121, 127). It deserves mentioning that notwithstanding the unprecedented degree of divergence between Pakistan and Turkey over Afghanistan, Ambassador Cankorel still avoided meeting Indian Foreign Office officials over Afghanistan when he was in India ‘to avoid complications with Pakistan’ (p. 45). Moreover, while Turkey’s earlier mediation missions in South Asia had been more or less in coordination with its western partners, Cankorel wrote that the Clinton Administration left Turkey alone over Afghanistan in this period: ‘Despite the fact that Turkey was the only NATO member operating an embassy in Kabul in the middle of Afghan civil war, United States was not interested in our ideas about Afghanistan’ (p. 108).

Afghanistan was not the only issue that put a dent in Turkey and Pakistan’s relations. In the past, Cold War political requirements had forced Turkey to be pragmatic and to accept military takeovers in Pakistan in 1958 (National Archives of India, 1959, p. 2) and 1977 (Dinç, 1998, p. 103; Çağlayangil, 1990, p. 72). The post-Cold War period opened the way for the emergence of new dynamics. In the 1990s, individual political leaders found more room to implement their own thinking and to change the course of policy toward South Asia. As alluded to earlier, Bülent Ecevit, leading a coalition government (1999–2002) treated India far more warmly than Pakistan. PM Ecevit not only gave 1999 coup makers in Pakistan an unexpected cold shoulder when he refused to see General Musharraf during a visit to Turkey, but also refused to stop in Pakistan even as a gesture of support during Ecevit’s later visit to India. This was a drastic change from the times when ‘Turkish Ambassador to Islamabad [Ali Binkaya] would not visit India to avoid upsetting Pakistanis’ (Girgin, 1998, p. 154). However, despite major irritations in bilateral ties, especially over Afghanistan, the Turkish Foreign Ministry showed ‘understanding’ in its first official reaction to Musharraf’s coup in October 1999 (Dışişleri Güncesi, 1999, p. 112). When Ecevit would not see President Musharraf, the Turkish Ambassador to Islamabad had to convince President Ahmet Necdet Sezer (2000–2007) to do damage control (Gür, personal communication, 2019).

During his visit to India, PM Ecevit referred to shared values of democracy and secularism between Turkey and India and expressed Turkey’s desire to promote bilateral trade relations and technical cooperation (Kohen, 2000). Turkey also signalled a shift in its position on Kashmir and for the first time started to talk about the ‘necessity of bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan’ (Ahmad, 2000, p. 2), which happened to be the Indian position on the issue. PM Ecevit also spoke about dangers of terrorism and the necessity for India and Turkey to cooperate against armed terrorist groups.

The post-9/11 environment dominated by the ‘global war on terror’ created opportunities as well as challenges for Turkish foreign policy. A tectonic shift in the region occurred when the US occupied Afghanistan in 2001. The new AKP government in Ankara tried to follow a proactive and multidimensional foreign policy and encouraged policy inputs from members of the Turkish civil society, think tanks and economic actors in its first years in power (Keyman & Gümüşçü, 2014, p. 73). Ankara coordinated its foreign policy with the United States, pursuing EU membership, and implementing a liberal-democratic political agenda at home. This was reflected in AKP government’s maintaining its predecessor’s approach vis-à-vis India and Pakistan. There was therefore hope in the first decade of the AKP governments that Turkey and India as two rising powers could now look at their relations beyond the stifling issues of Cyprus and Kashmir (Özkan, 2010, pp. 6–7). There was also a significant rise in Turkish–Indian trade, bilateral diplomatic visits and political relations (Pant & Mehta, 2019, p. 172).

Turkey’s troop contribution to NATO operations in Afghanistan added a layer of legitimacy to the foreign forces deployed there. Turkey’s third-party mediatory role in South Asia also resumed. Ankara hosted summit meetings of Afghanistan’s neighbours in 2007, an effort otherwise marred by Turkey’s failure to invite India upon Pakistan’s request (The Hindu, 2010). Turkey also co-initiated with the Afghan government a new platform called ‘Heart of Asia–İstanbul Process’ to contribute to Afghanistan’s rebuilding. Turkey brought back its training mission for Afghanistan as well. It supported reconstruction and state-building efforts in Afghanistan by assisting provincial reconstruction teams and by providing training to the Afghan military officer corps and to police personnel. Despite earlier experience and problems in ties, Turkey continued to support its Uzbek ally Rashid Dostum in Afghanistan during the AKP period. When Dostum had a row with President Karzai in 2008, he was exiled to Turkey. Turkey lobbied hard in Afghanistan and the US for Dostum not to be arrested and to be allowed back into Afghanistan (Wikileaks, 2008). While Turkey’s recent failure to convince Taliban to agree to relocation of Afghan peace process from Doha to İstanbul underscores the limits of its influence in the country, Turkey’s bid to take over security and operation of Kabul airport is an index of Turkey’s desire to prove Turkey still operates for and under western security structure.

Finally, Turkey announced in 2019 that through its ‘Asia Anew’ policy it seeks to increase the weight of Asia in its foreign policy compass. However, little change can be expected in Turkey’s South Asia policy as a result of this new Asia outlook for a number of reasons. First, despite the end of the Cold War, long disappearance of CENTO, and several previous attempts to seek balance in its South Asia relations, Turkey is still acting as if it is in an informal alliance with Pakistan. In other words, Turkey’s Pakistan-centric South Asia approach has proved to be surprisingly durable in the face of many changes in regional and international context. Second, the pendulum of the role of public opinion and non-governmental actors on Turkish foreign policy has radically swung from non-involvement during the Cold War to over-involvement in the last decade. Though it is natural for domestic constituencies, public opinion and interest groups to influence and even restrict the foreign policy options that leaders may have to choose from (Breuning, 2007), ironically it has been the AKP government itself that pushed for a far more pronounced role for public opinion and non-governmental organisations in the making of Turkish foreign policy. While it was initially intended to consolidate its position in domestic politics, the AKP government’s mobilisation of public opinion on various foreign policy issues has ironically created a hurdle for its South Asia policy. For instance, coming under pressure from public opinion and NGOs, the AKP government has turned the Kashmir issue into an Islamic cause a là Palestine, which has killed President Erdoğan’s mediation offer between India and Pakistan (Chaudhury, 2018). In similar fashion, Ankara overreacted to the execution of Jamaat-e-Islami leaders in 2016 plunging Turkey’s fledgling relations with Bangladesh into turmoil (Baba, 2017, p. 580). The third obstacle before Turkey’s recalibrated South Asia policy is the growing influence of Turkish religious foundations on the shaping of official discourse on issues such as Kashmir, Jamaat-e-Islami Taliban, and the condition of Muslim minority in India.

Conclusion

Literature on Turkish foreign policy has neglected Turkey’s South Asian engagements. This article tried to address this gap by excavating Turkey’s perception of South Asia and the history of Turkey’s involvement in South Asia during and after the Cold War. In the minds of Turkish policy makers during the Cold War, South Asian security was directly linked to Middle Eastern security owing to the threat of communism. Turkey’s focus was therefore on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.

This article has also argued that in the 1950s and after the 9/11 attacks, Turkey demonstrated a willingness and activism to play a mediatory role in South Asia. But lacking sufficient political, diplomatic, economic and military instruments to offer incentives and implement sanctions, Turkey felt most comfortable in engaging the region when encouraged and supported by the West. But in playing this role, Turkish leaders often picked sides by backing Pakistan. In the late-1990s/early-2000s, Turkey tried to change the tone of and bring more balance to its South Asia policy. Yet, Pakistan-centrism still remains the cornerstone of Turkey’s South Asia relations.