Taliban 2.0 and Afghanistan–Pakistan Relations

Introduction

Afghanistan remained the epicentre of global politics and policy owing to the Afghan jihad which ended with the Soviet collapse that also ended the Cold War. Subsequently, civil war engulfed Afghanistan in which the Taliban emerged as a strong actor by the mid-1990s. The United States of America (USA) held the Taliban regime responsible for not only hosting the top Al-Qaeda leadership but also refusing to hand Bin Laden over to the former in the wake of 9/11 (Rashid, 2010; Sergeev, 2013). Consequently, the USA-led NATO forces toppled the first Taliban regime (1996–2001) which was supported by Pakistan diplomatically and strategically. In the post-Taliban period, despite resort to electoral politics—in which, first, Hamid Karzai served as president for two terms (2001–2014) and, later, Ashraf Ghani ruled in power-sharing formula with Abdullah Abdullah (2014–2021)—Afghanistan could not realise an effective governance mechanism and a stable politico-economic system (Murtazashvili, 2022).

Issues of poor governance and security provided a contextual justification to the US-led military alliance to prolong its stay in the country in order to neutralise militant organisations which were deemed to be not only anti-Kabul but also antithetical to the American interests in West Asia (Malkasian, 2021). Nevertheless, owing to domestic political factors along with a shifting strategic interest from South Asia to the Indo-Pacific, the US opted to withdraw from Afghanistan in August 2021 after doing a deal with the Taliban a year earlier (Congress, 2018; State Department, 2020).

The deposed president, Ashraf Ghani, had to secretly flee the country to save his skin (Mohamed & Allahoum, 2021). The Taliban led by their supreme leader, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, had operationally staged their comeback—which is termed Taliban 2.0 in this study for analytical purposes—to Afghan politics, polity and economy after a lapse of some 20 years. The US, which had remained in this war-ravaged country for two decades, opted to conduct a large-scale rescue operation to evacuate its nationals. Noticeably, the Taliban, while manifesting military restraint, logistically enabled the US to complete its withdrawal. However, other militant organisations such as Islamic State-Khorasan Province (aka ISIS-K) targeted civilian and security forces during and after the American pullout (Gardner, 2021). Administratively, the Taliban have controlled Afghanistan for more than a year. Socioeconomically, however, the country has been facing a severe humanitarian crisis. Legally, the Taliban rule lacks de jure recognition from the major powers such as the US or China. The latter along with Russia and Pakistan have, however, accorded a de facto approval to the Taliban regime (Cafiero, 2022).

In view of the foregoing, this study tends to address the following questions. Will the Taliban gain regional, if not, international legitimacy/recognition? Will Pakistan aid the Taliban in this respect? To what extent intra-Taliban friction impacts bilateral relations? How does Pakistan view Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and vice versa? And, above all, how will Afghanistan and Pakistan treat each other in the foreseeable future? These are some crucial questions that this study attempts to address underpinned by primary data, that is, elite interviews and secondary sources, that is, books.

Taliban 2.0: Politics and Policy

Having assumed administrative control of Kabul on 15 August 2021, the Taliban claimed victory over rest of the country in political terms. Though Ahmad Massoud, the leader of the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan—and son of former anti-Soviet and anti-Taliban Afghan military commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud—put up resistance against the Taliban forces in Panjshir valley, the latter thwarted it with the threat of force to the effect that Ahmad left for Iran where he held talks with the Taliban over power-sharing in January 2022 (Mehdi, 2022). Another warlord commander from Herat, Ismail Khan, also resisted initially but later preferred talks to use of force for political purposes. In the remaining parts of the country, the Taliban had already established administrative and military control for the past couple of years. Nonetheless, the way the USA-led Western forces withdrew under the framework of the 2020 Doha deal further exposed the political and security weaknesses of the Ghani-Abdullah government which, with the arrival of the Taliban on 15 August, fell like a house of cards. Ghani fled not only the presidential palace but also the country in a dubious manner. Other members of the government including Vice President, Amrullah Saleh, dispersed hurriedly, literally placing the country in the hands of the Taliban who, while taking full advantage of the power vacuum, filled it with its manpower and ideology (Basu, 2021).

Post-takeover, Taliban’s politics and policy in this second tenure received regional and international attention of various stakeholders such as governments and humanitarian agencies. The latter compared Taliban 2.0 with the Taliban 1.0 (1996–2001) when they captured Kabul brutally. Moreover, they run the country in a primordial fashion by implementing a version of puritan Islam in terms of governance and jurisprudence. Operationally, thus, gender segregation, tribal economy, primitive punishments and medieval diplomacy became the hallmark of the Taliban rule during the said period (Amnesty International, 2022). As already argued, only Pakistan and a couple of Gulf Arab countries recognised their rule while rest of the world including USA, China, Russia and the European Union (EU) carried reservations, for example, on the issue of women education. However, the Taliban’s hosting of Osama bin Laden and later their refusal to hand him over to Washington in the wake of 9/11 caused not only the quick fall of the Taliban but also the collapse of the rudimentary governmental and state structures—which were re-established along a Western-style democratic model post-Bonn Agreement signed in December 2001. Paradoxically, however, despite the USA-led Western supervision of democratic order in Afghanistan in the past 20 years through various presidential elections and political personalities the likes of Karzai and Ghani, Afghanistan practically regressed to the start of the millennium: political primordialism and ideological obscurantism couched by none else but the Taliban (Rashid, 2009).

Comparatively, the Taliban 2.0 carries some interesting political and policy similarities with their first regime. To begin with, while capturing Kabul on 15 August, the Taliban commanders announced public mercy; however, they yet manifested their military power through an effective use of social media. Moreover, as per media reports they captured and killed around 100 of their top opponents in different parts of the country (Al Jazeera, 2022b). Second, in order to look moderate and sound soft to the Western capitals in this second attempt to govern Afghanistan, the Taliban announced little restrictions on women mobility and, importantly, education. However, on the ground though women were seen going to schools and colleges in, for example, capital Kabul yet they faced stringent restrictions in other parts of the county (Graham-Harrison, 2022). Moreover, as they did in the 1990s, this time around there are reports of local bans on music in, for example, Zabul (Wertheimer, 2021). Third, compared with their first rule, the Taliban have struggled in the past 1 year in so far as urban governance is concerned. Hundreds of innocent people especially from the minorities have been killed in terrorist attacks launched by ISIS-K since August 2021. Moreover, due to lack of policy vision and financial resources, little has been done with respect to, for example, infrastructural development. As far as economy is concerned, the country is having subsistence agriculture where opium production has been intensified under the Taliban control. There is little focus on industry and services. Indeed, the banking sector seemed to have collapsed post-Taliban takeover (Weitz, 2022). Moreover, bilateral trade has been informally done, and that too at low scale, with Pakistan and Iran since the Taliban are yet not formally recognised by any country in the world.

Last but not the least, owing to increasing food insecurity coupled with substandard housing particularly in the rural areas, millions of Afghans are witnessing a humanitarian crisis which has been aggravated by the Biden Administration freezing Afghanistan’s financial assets. Had financial resources poured into the country in time, chronic hunger and abject poverty could have been dealt with effectively (Hussain, 2022). The Americans seemed to have developed some serious policy differences with the Taliban, the one the USA did a deal with and, later, accomplished a hasty withdrawal as discussed already. Finally, compared to Taliban 1.0 where they were recognised by at least three countries from the broader region, this time around their control of the country since 15 August 2021 has not yet been accepted by any country around the world including Pakistan. The latter has walked cautiously in a changed geopolitical context where the USA and the EU seem tough on the regime. Pakistani authorities, being dependent on the Western financial support, opted not to offend the USA-led European stakeholders by recognising Afghanistan. This shall be explained later in the article. However, Islamabad accorded de facto approval to the Taliban rule. The next section of the article analyses the legitimacy crisis the Taliban are facing since takeover. Moreover, the political effects of this lingering crisis on Afghanistan’s relations with Pakistan are discussed with reference to intra-Taliban power tussle as well as regional geopolitics.

Lingering Crisis of Legitimacy

Having established their administrative and military control over Afghanistan, the Taliban might have expected immediate political and legal recognition from regional and global powers such as the USA with whom they negotiated the deal that paved the way for Western withdrawal in August 2021. The fact that both the parties did the said deal—and the Taliban did not disturb the conduct of American and its allies’ pull-out after the takeover—political analysts and legal experts expected a timely recognition of the Taliban by regional and international powers and institutions such as the Unites Nations. Ironically, however, the Taliban’s efforts did not pay off. They have not been formally recognised by any country of the world despite their diplomatic dynamism of the past 1 year. Pakistan, however, has accorded a de facto political recognition to the Taliban rule which has enabled the latter to resume ambassadorial work in Islamabad (Khan, 2021). However, Pakistan has maintained a cautious diplomatic stance on the recognition issue. In the past, Pakistan was the key player which not only recognised the Taliban rule but also convinced Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to grant recognition to the Taliban. Islamabad has adopted a different option this time around due to certain reasons:

Pakistan became the first country to formally recognize the Taliban after they defeated their rivals militarily in 1996. Pakistani [military] authorities always tried to counter India within the region and beyond. With Taliban in power in next-door Afghanistan, Pakistani policymakers were contended with the fact that India had little room to maneuver in Afghanistan in any manner…Other powers such as Unites States [of America] were in touch with the top Taliban leadership to develop trade linkages. Chinese and Russian would have done the same…However, 9/11 changed all that. Taliban were no match to American military power… The US[A] blamed Pakistan for recognizing the Taliban…It [USA] pressured Pakistani authorities to reverse their approach on Afghanistan.

(R. Naveed, personal communication, 12 March 2022).

As the above reflects, Pakistan had tense ties with the USA post-9/11. Given American pressure, though Pakistani military leadership opted to work with Washington vis-à-vis War on Terror, yet the former did not completely abandon its traditional stance on neighbouring Afghanistan:

If realism is true, Pakistan never wished the American [policy makers] or India to establish its foothold in that country. To counter India, Pakistan provided strategic support to [a section of the] Taliban which it trusted…Similarly, India and Iran would have supported their factions since the Taliban were not a monolithic entity…Now [the] Taliban are in power once again, Pakistan is not recognizing them on its own in order to avoid being labelled as pro-Taliban…it recognized Taliban last time and faced lot of criticism from the Western world in the wake of 9/11. Now, Pakistan wants to recognize Afghanistan along with other key regional and international powers so that if the Taliban acts against the West, Pakistan is not blamed by the latter. (S. Mustafa, personal communication, 9 April 2022).

What can be deduced from the foregoing is that Pakistan seemed to have learned from the past. It has been urging the regional and global powers such as the USA to formally recognise the Taliban rule—and provide economic assistance to it since it is facing a humanitarian crisis—yet it has not formally accepted the latter singly in order to avoid global repercussions particularly on the part of Washington whose behaviour with the Taliban has remained very aggressive and non-cooperative post-withdrawal. Moreover, Pakistani civil-military elite has, in line with the Western and other players such as China, Russia and Iran, emphasised on an ‘inclusive’ political setup which contains representatives from other ethnicities, too (Dawn, 2021). Diplomatically, an inclusivity-oriented stance would, arguably, make Pakistan’s position not only pluralist and egalitarian but also reflect non-reliance on any one Afghan stakeholder given intra-Taliban power tussle, for example, between the Baradar faction and the Haqqanis—the latter are generally considered close to Pakistan’s security establishment (Latifi, 2021).

Nonetheless, despite regional and global demand for having an inclusive political dispensation for realising a stable Afghanistan, the Taliban leadership so far has not showed any signs of having taken the regional and international input meaningfully. Regionally, the Taliban representatives held talks with their counterparts from China, Russia and the USA (Al Jazeera, 2021). Reportedly, each of the said stakeholder stressed on having an inclusive government. Internationally, the Biden Administration has repeatedly urged the Taliban to fulfil their commitments that they agreed in the deal with the USA in February 2020. For example, the Taliban were supposed to treat women and minorities in equitable terms; they were to ensure effective law and order; they were not supposed to let a non-state actor such as ISIS plan terror attacks on unarmed and innocent civilians, both local and foreign. The Taliban have fumbled at achieving the stated goals in the past 1 year (Al Jazeera, 2022).

Consequently, the USA led by President Joe Biden has not only hardened its diplomatic stance in terms of non-recognition of the Taliban, but it has also encouraged its key allies not to establish diplomatic ties with the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Little wonder, the Western governments have criticised the Taliban for their failure to ensure good governance and a stable economy. To add insult to injury, the Biden Administration allocated half of the frozen financial assets of Afghanistan to the victims of 9/11 (TRT World, 2022). ‘This is a clear signal to the Taliban regime that the USA views it as collaborator of Al-Qaeda that planned and executed the terrorist attacks on the United States twenty years ago.’ (A. Mahmood, personal communication, 18 April 2022). Indeed, the very presence and killing of Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda’s top leader, on Afghanistan’s soil corroborated the USA’s concerns (Debusmann, 2022). Besides, the remaining half of the frozen funds would reportedly be put in the so-called Afghan fund which is proposed to provide economic relief to people facing humanitarian crisis.

Nonetheless, despite the American and the EU’s hard stance on the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan on account of the stated factors, Pakistan has been busy in the past 1 year, pursuing regional and international powers and other stakeholders such as global civil society associations to take a holistic view of Afghanistan, which has witnessed (civil) wars, faced armed conflicts, observed extreme poverty and chronic diseases in the past 40 years. Pakistan has urged the world to rescue Afghanistan at this critical juncture. If the Taliban and other local contenders for political power do not find a way out in political terms, Afghanistan may again face a deadly phase of civil war which would be detrimental for Pakistan, which has already witnessed refugee influx, drugs and weapons due to Afghan jihad of the 1980s (Hussain & Jahanzaib, 2015).

Put differently, Pakistan finds itself in a perplexing situation. It seemingly desires to formally recognise the Taliban as a legitimate government in Afghanistan yet owing to international implications such as a tougher diplomatic and economic stance by the USA through, for example, Financial Action Task Force (FATA), Islamabad is walking in tandem with both regional and global stakeholders. Regionally, though the former has strived, in the recent past, to build a China–Russia–Pakistan bloc to help the Taliban get, at least, regional recognition. However, it seems both Beijing and Russia are not yet unanimous in their support owing to their respective calculations. Arguably, the Chinese would watch what the USA does in the coming months since a purely China-led initiative regarding Taliban-recognition would carry geopolitical and commercial challenges for the former vis-à-vis Washington and its key European allies. Similarly, Russia would safeguard its own regional interests. It still maintains close strategic and commercial ties with India. Moreover, Russia has strategic stakes in Central Asian States (CAS) which, interestingly, are deeply engaged with New Delhi. Importantly, when Pakistan hosted an ‘extraordinary’ OIC summit on Afghanistan in December 2021, the foreign ministers of all the CAS attended an India-led session on Afghanistan (Hussain, 2021). This reflects divergence of interests and strategies not only between India and Pakistan but also among Pakistan and the CAS. Whether Pakistan would continue to support the Taliban gain regional, if not international, recognition in formal terms and whether an inclusive government is formed in the foreseeable future—and how this impacts Afghanistan–Pakistan bilateral relations—are discussed in the following section.

At a Crossroads

Afghanistan–Pakistan relations are at a crossroads. Since the Taliban’s takeover of the country on 15 August 2021, Pakistan has not only accorded de facto recognition to the Taliban rule but also urged its regional allies such as China to manoeuver (extra-) regional support for the Taliban with respect to formal recognition, that in Islamabad’s calculation, would help find ways to establish an inclusive political setup there. This, however, has not materialised in the past 1 year due to factors and forces highlighted in the previous pages. Since the political, socioeconomic and security situation is currently murky in Afghanistan—and it is hard to predict on the future course of direction due to lack of first-hand data—the following is a predictive attempt based on certain scenarios. This may deductively provide some insights into the foreseeable future of Afghanistan, on the one hand, and Afghanistan–Pakistan relations, on the other. To begin with, the legitimacy crisis is the key challenge for the Taliban regime which it is struggling with since the takeover in August 2021. This legitimacy crisis with respect to formal recognition may be managed in the following three scenarios, each carrying its pitfalls, too.

First scenario: The Taliban-controlled Afghanistan’s legitimacy crisis can be resolved amicably if the USA led by President Biden opts to accord (in)formal recognition to the former. In that case, the Taliban would be able to get not only their frozen funds back but also get much-needed economic aid along with access to the American and European markets. This would gradually put the country on the track of political and socioeconomic stability. Nevertheless, given the current mistrust between the USA and the Taliban, the likelihood of such cooperation and consequent recognition is very low. In order to win the American confidence, the Taliban would need to treat women and minorities equitably, clear its soil of non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda and refrain from hurting the USA’s interests in the region. Pakistan, being in strategic cahoots with the Taliban, would also need to reset its ties with Washington in a manner that assuages the latter’s past grievances. Whether Kabul and Islamabad are willing to act as per American desire is to be seen. The other side of this scenario is that if the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and the military-dominated Pakistan opt to either ignore or harm American interests in South Asia and beyond, both Afghanistan and Pakistan are very likely to face tough measures such as economic sanctions. It would be even hard for Pakistan to accrue funds from the IMF. In addition, the country may also struggle to get clearance from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF, 2022).

Second, if the Taliban regime is not bothered about the USA, it would try to seek regional recognition from major powers such as China and Russia. Here, one can build a sub-scenario: Due to global geopolitics between China and the USA, the former is least likely to accord a formal recognition to the Taliban despite Pakistan’s urgings in a singular fashion because Beijing’s topmost priority seemingly is to avoid confrontation with Washington in South Asia and safeguard its interest in the Taiwan strait. Similarly, Russia, owing to its own regional calculations, is not likely to formally approve of the Taliban rule in the coming days. Moscow’s topmost priority currently is to handle the Ukraine crisis in its favour (The Indian Express, 2022). Importantly, however, both China and Russia have engaged the Taliban leadership diplomatically. Moreover, India has engaged Russia and the Central Asian States on Afghanistan with a desire to open a communication channel with the Taliban in order to realise its regional objectives, that is, countering Pakistan (The Hindu, 2021). If this materialises, such a move would jeopardise Afghanistan–Pakistan relations. Reportedly, India is already in touch with the Taliban leadership through back-channel diplomacy (Al Jazeera, 2022a). Faced with economic hardships, the regime’s top priority is to get economic assistance from all possible sources including New Delhi. Being India’s archrival, Pakistan, is likely to counter India’s presence in Afghanistan. However, Pakistan may face challenges in this respect:

The Afghan Taliban and Tehreek-i-Taliban [TTP] share close ethnic and ideological ties which have been strengthened immensely after the regime change in Afghanistan. To that extent Pakistan’s calculus was misplaced as the Taliban leaders in Afghanistan have taken a well thought out decision to protect the TTP and act as arbiters in the negotiations. TTP’s attacks inside Pakistan during the past year only support [this] logic. Pakistan’s options are limited due to factors of geopolitics and perhaps realpolitik. Military action seems to be the very last and distant recourse…Pakistan’s control over the TTP was greatly exaggerated at the best of times and is perhaps only marginal now. It does not seem likely that our relations will be restored to the extent that it existed in the heydays of the Jihad…

I am not too sure of the factors which led to the group [TTP] taking roots in this region. But obviously the cadres are local extremists and breakaway factions.

(S. Saeed, personal communication, 15 August 2022).

The above highlights frictions between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the past 1 year. The Taliban regime has instrumentalised the TTP very smartly vis-à-vis Pakistan particularly its military which is a key player in so far as relations with Kabul are concerned. Indeed, the TTP has attacked the state institutions in Pakistan in the past 1 year (Gilani, 2022). Currently, Pakistan’s civil-military leadership is engaging TTP diplomatically than militarily. However, if Afghanistan and India get closer at the expense of Pakistan in the foreseeable future, the TTP is likely to get emboldened to carry out more terrorist activities in Pakistan, thus, ruining Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, on the one hand, and endangering regional peace and stability, on the other.

Second scenario: In the second scenario, it is likely that China and Russia may formally recognise the Taliban rule in strategic understanding with Pakistan, Iran and Central Asian States. If this happens, it would, in the short run, strengthen the Taliban politically and commercially since Afghanistan, being land-locked, is linked with regional markets of the said countries. Hence, there would be enough room for bilateral and multilateral trade and economic cooperation. However, in the long run, India and the USA, whose bilateral strategic cooperation is on the rise, are very likely to undo such a bloc through various measures such as economic sanctions and using anti-Taliban proxies in terms of guerrilla warfare. In other words, durable peace and socioeconomic security in Afghanistan would remain a distant dream.

Third scenario: Another plausible but challenging scenario revolves around a collective effort to find consensual solution to the Afghanistan problem. For this to materialise, USA, China and Russia need to play a pivotal role in terms of urging regional stakeholders such as India, Pakistan, Iran and the Central Asian States to avail, for example, the UN forum in order to reach a consensus on the nature and character of the future Afghan government along with defining ways and means to support such a setup politically and economically. In other words, the much-hyped inclusive government can only be established if all stakeholders agree on the said scenario. Divergences in this respect will lead to different paths and perspectives, thus, adding to Afghanistan’s troubles.

Conclusion

Afghanistan has remained in the grip of (civil) wars in its recent, if not remote, history. In the wake of 9/11, Taliban’s first stint in power was ended by the USA and its allies. However, despite the latter’s desires and designs, political and socioeconomic stability and security could not be realised in the last 20 years. The USA, due largely to its shifting strategic interests from West Asia to Indo-Pacific, preferred to withdraw from Afghanistan. In the post-withdrawal period, the Taliban have controlled Afghanistan politically and militarily. Ironically, however, the Taliban rule has not been formally recognised by any county including Pakistan that strategically supported the Taliban in the past 1 year. However, Pakistan has accorded a de facto recognition to the Taliban.

The study deductively built three scenarios under which the Taliban may possibly get (in)formal recognition from the USA, China, Russia and other regional stakeholders such as Iran, India and Central Asian States. However, each scenario has its pitfalls, too. For example, if the American interests are harmed by the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, the latter would face consequences such as economic sanctions. Similarly, if Russia and China along with Iran, Central Asian States and Pakistan choose to formally recognise the Taliban rule, this would antagonise not only anti-Taliban factions within Afghanistan but also expose regional geopolitical fault lines between USA and China and their allies such India and Pakistan, respectively. India seems in touch with the Taliban through backdoor diplomacy. In case India–Afghanistan ties improve at the expense of Pakistan in the coming months, this would impact Afghanistan–Pakistan relations negatively. In such a scenario, anti-Pakistan elements such as TTP’s instrumentality would serve as a means for the Afghan Taliban to deal with Islamabad antagonistically. Here, it is pertinent to mention that the Taliban did not recognise the Durand Line as international border between the two countries in their first tenure, and they have maintained a similar stance in the current context too.

The best scenario for the Taliban and Afghanistan could be the one where regional and international stakeholders, namely, USA, China, Russia, Pakistan, India, Iran and Central Asian States reach a consensus on an inclusive political dispensation that is representative of all Afghan interests. If this is achieved, Afghanistan would realise a meaningful stability and security. However, this is easier said than done. Due to divergence of interests and choices of the said stakeholders, such a scenario seems less probable. The worst scenario could be where the Taliban’s legitimacy crisis lingers on beyond 2022, where no regional and international player is willing to accord a formal recognition to the former. In that case, the Taliban will find little economic base to feed its population which is already facing a humanitarian crisis. Moreover, internal in-fighting over power-sharing within the Taliban ranks cannot be ruled out. Such schism invites elements such as ISIS-K to establish its footholds in the country. In addition, (extra-) regional players such as India and USA may try to win over various warring Taliban factions in order to use them as proxies against Pakistan, China and Iran. In other words, civil war seems likely in this worst-case scenario.

Currently, however, the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan is approaching all major players such as China, Russia and the USA in a bid to end its legitimacy crisis. Pakistan is playing a lead role in this respect due to its own strategic and commercial interests. Indeed, Pakistan and China have urged other regional stakeholders to provide economic support to the Afghan people under China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is a part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The latter may get disturbed in South Asia, at least, if Afghanistan witnesses more turmoil in the days ahead. Similarly, Pakistan’s economic and governance problems will be doubled if there is political and socioeconomic unrest in Afghanistan. The latter’s future is as much dependent on domestic power machinations as it is on (extra-) regional political economy. A reconciliation between the two variables, on the one hand, can provide with a viable course of action that can incrementally ensure durable peace and socioeconomic stability in Afghanistan and, on the other hand, consolidate Afghanistan–Pakistan relations under the Taliban 2.0.