Abstract
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) resulted from 20 months of hard bargain and intense negotiations leading to an understanding between P5+1 and Iran. The deal has been touted as a potential beginning of a thaw in US–Iran relations. It aims at preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon capability and enabling Iran to resume normal relations with the world by lifting bilateral and multilateral sanctions. The JCPOA was concluded despite intense opposition and strong objections by American allies in the Middle East including Saudi Arabia and Israel and was supported by many world and regional powers such as China and Russia. The deal has implications for the domestic and foreign policies of the US. Developments in the Middle East, domestic American politics as well as US–Iran bilateral equations carry a cart load of unpredictable events that would cause difficulties on the road to implementation of the nuclear deal.
After 20 months of hard bargaining through intense negotiations, the United States succeeded in promoting an understanding between the P5+1 and Iran to conclude a nuclear deal. The deal aims at preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon capability and enabling Iran to resume normal relations with other countries by lifting bilateral and multilateral sanctions against it. Why did Iran agree to such a deal? Why did the US, its allies, and competitors—such as China and Russia—want this deal? How did the disinterested countries—the neutrals—react to this deal? How did the opponents of this deal within the US, in Iranian domestic politics, and in the Middle East behave?
Iran had little option but to negotiate the nuclear deal, since it was under prolonged US-initiated bilateral and multilateral sanctions which have considerably affected its economy and had isolated it from normal international activities. There are factors that can explain the Iranian nuclear behavior. First, Iran was under protracted political isolation since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and this isolation was expected to end in the wake of a successful nuclear deal. Second, Iran was also under prolonged sanctions of various kinds, both bilateral and multilateral, that had adversely affected its normal trade and investment relations with other countries and a nuclear deal could lead to demise of the anti-Iran sanctions regime. Third, Iranian government aspired to improve its economy, normalize its oil and gas trade, and further develop the country’s infrastructure and these could be facilitated by a successful nuclear deal. Fourth, Iran self-admittedly was not interested in developing nuclear weapons and arguably was seeking civil nuclear power as an alternative source of energy. If that was the case, it would be easier for Iran to seek foreign nuclear technology and indulge in nuclear-related commerce, if other countries would be convinced of its peaceful intentions. Thus, it did not hesitate to conclude the nuclear deal that was the best way to demonstrate its innocence in the face of spreading suspicion about its nuclear weapons ambition.
The Americans and other members of the P5+1 pushed for such a deal due to a host of reasons. First of all, the US has all along been a champion of nuclear proliferation. There is no doubt that Washington’s approach to nonproliferation has never had a standard formula. Proliferation by allies was not considered a national security threat and proliferation attempts by potential adversaries or unfriendly countries was never tolerated by the US administrations. The US–Iran relations have been marked by open hostility since 1979 and any Iranian attempt to acquire nuclear technology, civilian or military, would naturally face the US opposition.
The US had a series of grievances against Iran, including its anti-Israeli policies, promotion of terrorism, efforts to be a regional heavy-weight, and many others. While the US was not able to prevent Iran from establishing a civil nuclear program, because Tehran was signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), its apprehension that Iran would be able to emerge as a nuclear weapon power was never hidden. A hostile country in the volatile Middle Eastern region acquiring a nuclear weapon capability was considered antithetical to the US security and economic interests in that region. Successive US administrations found it difficult to have firsthand knowledge of Iranian nuclear activities, since the US did not have an embassy in Tehran.
The US also found that sanctions could not induce Iran to abandon the nuclear path. Moreover, sanctions against Iran made it difficult for neutral as well as friendly countries to buy their oil requirements from Iran. Military options to wipe out Iran’s nuclear facilities were often dangled, but lack of international consensus or unanimity in the UN Security Council made military option unviable. Even the Pentagon could not ensure that military intervention would be foolproof (Kroenig, 2012). Punitive measures against suggested in the UN Security Council faced opposition from Russia and China. Thus, the Obama Administration embraced the P5+1 option more appropriate to negotiate a deal with Iran that would prevent or further delay the possibility of the latter acquiring nuclear bomb capability.
The most pressing reason as to why the Obama Administration proactively pushed other negotiating team members to conclude a deal was the belief that Iran had already become a nuclear threshold state with a breakout time of about 2–3 months. When President George W. Bush tried to get a deal in 2003 and again in 2007, Iran had a few hundred centrifuges. It then went ahead to increase the number to 19,000. It had enough fissile material for making a couple of bombs, but it could increase it up to 12,000 kg of fissile material that could produce 10–12 bombs. Iran did all these without violating the NPT. It also had developed the capacity to enrich uranium to 20 percent, which would enable it to make medicine, but its capacity to enrich further was known.
Russia, China, or other members of the P5 had no interest in seeing Iran emerge as a nuclear weapon power, since Tehran had acquired a full nuclear cycle capability. What Russia and China wanted was less punitive sanctions that would not adversely affect their economic interest in Iran. Moscow and Beijing were prepared to negotiate a deal that would increase the breakout time for Iran to at least one year and then to get an assurance from Iran that it would not seek any weapon ambition (Reidel & Samore, 2008). The US was successful in persuading Russia, China, India, and other relevant countries to accept the sanctions and reduce their oil purchase and these countries supported the US policy with a belief that that would dissuade American and Israeli hardliners from toying with the idea of military option.
How Good Is the Deal?
The deal is touted as a very good deal by the Obama Administration. Secretary of State John Kerry and other senior administration officials have repeatedly testified in the US House of Representatives and Senate (Riechmann, 2015) and have given several interviews to the media to highlight what is good about the deal.
The key aspects of the nuclear deal are the following:
Iran, that currently has about 20,000 centrifuges, will keep no more than 5,060 of the oldest and less efficient centrifuges at Natanz for about 10 years.
Iran will reduce its uranium stockpile to about 300 kg from the current 12,000 kg in its possession and send the rest to Russia. This is almost 98 percent of reduction.
It will not enrich uranium beyond 3.67 percent.
Its nuclear facility at Natanz will be devoted to research and development only for 8 years.
Its nuclear facility at Fordo will not indulge in uranium enrichment for 15 years and this underground facility will be turned into nuclear physics and technology center.
Iran will keep 1,044 centrifuges that will be used to produce radioisotopes for possible use in medicine, agriculture, and other peaceful purposes.
Iran has also agreed to redesign its heavy-water reactor at Arak that would not allow it produce weapons-grade plutonium.
The IAEA inspectors will monitor 24/7 all declared nuclear sites in Iran to verify that no fissile material is illegally diverted for potential use in making bombs (US Department of State, 2015a).
The Obama Administration points out that all these provisions will make it easy for “robust monitoring, verification, and inspection” of Iran’s nuclear program. By implication, Iran’s breakout time has been considerably extended for about a year and if Iran tries to cheat, it will not be difficult to detect and put in place appropriate responses. Secretary of State Kerry also argues that if the deal would not have been signed, Iran was free to pursue its nuclear program and it could further narrow down the breakout time. Sanctions had not prevented or halted Tehran’s march toward a full nuclear cycle capability and none could argue for a better deal. Some have argued that it might not be a “good deal,” but certainly an “acceptable deal” (Marcus, 2015). All the cohorts who negotiated the deal appear to be satisfied with the outcome. After all, as a commentator wrote in the Wall Street Journal: In both the “preface” and the “preamble and general provisions,” the following commitment is made: “Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons” (Dershowitz, 2015). While seeking to sell the deal, President Barack Obama said the day the deal was struck that “put simply, no deal means a greater chance of more war in the Middle East” (Drezner, 2016).
The Challengers
However, several section of the policy making community in the US, in Iran, and many countries in the Persian Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia and Israel, tend to challenge the belief that a good deal has been concluded that would prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon capability. The following arguments are paraded to challenge the notion that the nuclear deal is a good deal:
This deal limits Iran’s nuclear activities to a maximum period of 15 years and that Tehran would be free to do anything it wants with little obligation of this period.
This deal has delayed Iran acquiring nuclear weapon capability and not prevented it.
Although International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can inspect declared nuclear facilities on a 24/7 basis, it can only request for access to other suspected facilities and Iran will have the right to delay permission for about 24 days—enough time to hide valuable information and equipment.
The nuclear deal was a reward and would not make Iran refrain from supporting terrorism in the region, backing the Assad regime in Syria and interfering in Iraqi internal affairs.
Iran would rather emerge more powerful after sanctions are lifted once it gets back billions of dollars of its frozen assets and resumes oil and gas sells abroad. An empowered Iran would assert its policies in the region with more verve and harass American allies in the region.
An emboldened Iran can create more problems for Israel by supplying more intelligence, equipment, and financial support to HAMAS and Hezbollah.
Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps was also understandably opposed the deal that would weaken Iranian power (Robbins, 2015; Sanger & Gordon, 2015).
None, however, opposed the Iran nuclear deal more than Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called it an anti-Israeli step that could lay on the line the survival of the country. Iran, which once openly threatened to wipe out Israel from the surface of the earth and systematically backed anti-Israeli terrorist groups, it was argued, was being rewarded with sanctions relief without ensuring complete destruction of its bomb-making capability (Greenberg, 2015). Israel saw in the nuclear deal a fragile effort to prevent nuclearization of Iran that would allow it to cheat, as it had been cheating for years in the name of pursuing a civil nuclear program for power generation. An oil-rich country looking for alternative sources to oil was not convincing in the eyes of Israeli policy community.
Netanyahu, in fact, took the battle to American soil, addressed the joint session of the Congress and challenged the Obama Administration. The social media came up with reports of financial benefits given to some US legislators, particularly Republicans, to support its case against the nuclear deal. 1 The ding-dong battle between the president of a superpower and prime minister of a regional power turned nasty, even as Netanyahu government left no stone unturned to garner support among the Republican majority in the US Congress and the Obama Administration letting the National Security Agency to spy on the conversations between the Israeli prime minister and US legislators. 2 Significantly, the Jewish community in the US was not united either in favor of Israel’s position or against the Obama Administration’s strategic gamble. 3
The Obama Administration seemed determined to achieve a nuclear deal with Iran, whereas the Netanyahu government appeared dogged to prevent that. The two closest strategic allies in contemporary world history were at loggerheads even as Israel’s detractors in the Middle East watched with anxiety such an unprecedented event unfolding at critical moment of the region’s strategic landscape. Curiously, some key allies of the US in the Persian Gulf were more inclined toward the Israeli position than toward Washington’s policy. The most important among such American allies in the Arab world has been Saudi Arabia. Tehran and Riyadh have been waging a kind of regional cold war and the latter considered its closer defense and security ties as cushion against various Iranian efforts to spread its influence in the region. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been on the opposing sides of the political divide in civil war-like situations in Yemen and Syria. There were fears that if Iran would go nuclear, Saudi Arabia would be the first in the queue in the region to seek a nuclear weapon status. Saudis rightly felt that lifting of sanctions would empower Iran both economically and geopolitically and strengthen its efforts and involvement in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen (Morris & Naylor, 2015).
The status quo in terms gridlock in the US–Iran relations would have favored Saudi Arabia and, if the nuclear deal could destroy Iran’s ability to ever manufacture a nuclear bomb, that would also be acceptable. However, when the Israeli propaganda and the positions of the opponents of the Iran deal in the US came up with forceful arguments suggesting that Iran would be rewarded with sanctions relief without surrendering its nuclear program, Saudis turned excessively apprehensive. The Saudi ruling family did not come out openly against the Obama Administration, as the Netanyahu government did but Riyadh appeared to have made its potion clear in private discussions with the Obama officials. In fact, it took nothing else than a direct meeting between President Obama with King Salman in September 2015 to buy Riyadh’s acquiescence to the P5+1 and Iran nuclear deal (BBC News, 2015).
However, the most robust challenge to the Obama Administration came neither from Israel nor from Saudi Arabia. It had even succeeded in roping in Russia and China to its efforts toward striking a nuclear deal with Iran. Obama’s difficulties to surmount challenge came from the Republican Party in the US. This party controls both the houses of the US Congress. The strength of the Republican Party in the House of Representatives is 247 as against 188 of the Democratic Party; 54 in the Senate as against 44 of the Democratic Party. Without the support of the Republican Party, the Iran deal would remain either fragile or not be materialized. It is true that there is no need to pass a legislation to implement this deal. If the Iran deal would be treated as a treaty, it would, of course, need two-thirds support in the Senate for ratification.
The Obama Administration sought to present the P5+1 and Iran nuclear deal as a non-treaty to avoid facing the requirement of ratification. The Republican Party leaders, on the other hand, came up with their own strategy to enact a law to prevent this deal from going through. The White House in turn threatened to veto any legislative action against its Iran deal. The great political polarization over the nuclear deal was stunning. The Republican Party was united against the deal and the Democratic Party was partially divided with a few opposing the deal. In fact, as the White House was counting the number of votes required in the Congress to prevent overriding of a presidential veto, it was reported that three Senate Democrats and 14 House Democrats voiced their support to the Republican views on the Iran deal. There were hardliners and liberals in the foreign policy analysis community as well. The Jewish lobby, particularly the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) was active in lobbying among the legislators and also seeking popular backing to its position (AIPAC, 2015). Finally, a compromise formula was worked out. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act 2015 requires the President to submit to Congress the nuclear agreement reached with Iran for review and it symbolized an outstanding bipartisan executive–legislative accommodation (US Congress, 2015a). The act enables President Obama to go forward with the deal unless Congress disapproves it by a veto-proof margin. 4 Congress would be empowered to review the P5+1–Iran agreement that came to be known as joint action plan of action (JCPOA). Congress would have 60 days to review the agreements from the date of submission of all the related documents by the White House to the Congress (Katzman & Kerr, 2015). There was still a possibility that the Congress could pass a disapproval resolution against the implementation of the JCPOA. As the Republican leaders threatened to pass a disapproval resolution, the White House threatened to veto such a resolution. However, the White House would require enough veto-proof support in both the Houses.
According to this act, the agreement between Iran and six Western powers would also include
any additional materials related thereto, including ... side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future. (US Congress, 2015b)
The key portion of this act freezes the president’s ability to “waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to Iran” while the Congress is reviewing the agreement (Pompeo & Rivkin Jr., 2015). However, when the White House did not submit all the documents, particularly the one signed between Iran and the IAEA, three resolutions were passed in the House of Representatives that would have prevented the implementation of the JCPOA (Wilner, 2015). The deal survived because those resolutions could not be taken up for voting in the Senate.
Concluding Observations
Now that the US Congress could not pass a resolution of disapproval and the Iranian Parliament has approved the JCPOA on October 13, 2015, the Iran nuclear deal is technically ready for implementation. The US Secretary of State remarked that the deal would be implemented soon when Iran shipped about 25,000 pounds of uranium to Russia as part of its commitment under the deal.
Nonetheless, other difficulties remain. Iran has tested a ballistic missile in December 2015, thereby violating a UNSC resolution (UNSCR, 1929) and the critics are urging the Obama Administration to impose new sanctions. Tehran, on the other hands, insists that its missile test was not in violation of its commitments. The Obama Administration reportedly has been contemplating a set of new sanctions and its fallout on US–Iran relations cannot be predicted. The supports of the deal in the US argued that Iran would be more cooperative with the US policies in the region, particularly in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and refraining from supporting terrorist elements. Iran, however, has been vocal and active on the ground in supporting the Assad regime in Syria and Houthi rebels in Yemen (Blake, 2015). Saudi Arabia and a few other Gulf countries have cut-off diplomatic ties with Iran and the Shia—Sunni divide is getting worse by the day (BBC News, 2016). These developments have strengthened the hands and voices of those in the US who are opposed to the nuclear deal and weakened the conviction of the supporters.
The key question lies in the fact that the Republican presidential candidates have come out openly against the Iran nuclear deal and, if a Republican candidate is elected to the White House in 2016 presidential election, the fate of the Iran deal could hang in the balance. Donald Trump, the leading candidate of the Republican Party in the polls and the author of the best-selling The Art of the Deal, described the nuclear Deal as “very dangerous” and “horrible” for America, while “perhaps catastrophic” for Israel (Kant, 2015). Ted Cruz, another hopeful of the Republican Party said: “This deal makes war a certainty” (ibid.) and warned that: “Billions of dollars under control of this administration will flow into the hands of jihadists who will use that money to murder Americans, to murder Israelis, to murder Europeans” (ibid.).
In the recent Congressional hearings, concerns have been raised about the role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the Iranian economy and politics, Tehran’s ballistic missile test, noncooperation in addressing the Syrian question, persistent backing of Houthi rebels in Yemen, and its half-hearted support to the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria (Congressional Record, 2015). What happens if a Republican candidate becomes the next US President and the US Congress remains under the Republican control? What happens if the Republican Party wins the race to the White House, but loses control of both the Houses of the US Congress? What happens if the White House is occupied by a Democratic candidate but Republicans continue to control the Congress? And, finally, what happens if the Democratic Party controls both the White House and the Congress, but Iran refuses to cooperate with the US policies in the Middle East?
Thus, there are too many uncertainties before Iran deal is implemented to the satisfaction of all the interested parties. The critics who have pointed out that Iran would be free to buy arms and ammunition from the international markets after 5 years and conduct ballistic missile tests after 8 years of the implementation of the nuclear deal cannot sit idle when Iran’s policies in the current turmoil in the Middle East are unacceptable to them. Moreover, the vagaries of the hydrocarbon bazaar, outcome of the Syrian civil war, ultimate fate of the ISIS, consequences of the Yemeni civil war, progress/failure of the Libyan political developments, and the internal political developments in Iran will also influence the course of the implementation of the nuclear deal.
The Iran nuclear deal, in addition, is not a treaty. It is more of a political understanding. Once implemented, it may change course in the middle. Some may wonder, what happens to the Iranian uranium already shipped to Russia. Can Iran go back on the deal? Yes, it is possible. Russia is not the US or a European ally of the US. Given the nature of US–Russian relations and Russia–Iranian relations, those uranium are in safe hands as far as Iran is concerned. If, as the US Secretary of State Kerry once mentioned (US Department of State, 2015b), is already threshold nuclear state, cannot Iran return to the status quo sooner than later, if the deal is not implemented or implementation stops half way? Can anyone deny that the olden days when Washington kept its military option open to deal with a nuclear Iran may not return? Is it not possible that even if Iran continues to swear upon the fatwa of 2004, issued by the supreme leader Ali Khamenei, 5 other regional countries may not hold faith and begin pursuing their own nuclear path? If Iran can pursue a policy, feared or disliked by its regional rivals, even after beginning to implement the nuclear deal, would not a return to the status quo unleash a nuclear arms race?
At the time of writing of this article, reports have already appeared that a new bill has been introduced in the House of Representatives to raise Congressional oversight of the implementation of the Iran nuclear deal (US Congress, 2015a). If passed, this piece of legislation would not allow the US Treasury Department to remove individuals and companies from the sanctions list, unless the White House certifies to the Congress that they were on involved in Iran’s ballistic missile program or terrorist activities. While the Obama Administration is preparing a list of entities that help Iran ballistic missile program for possible sanctions against them, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has already warned that he would consider new sanctions as violation of the nuclear deal (Business Standard, 2015).
Thus, action–reaction event in the Middle East, domestic American politics, as well as US–Iran bilateral equations carry a cartload of unpredictable events that would cause difficulties on the road to implementation of the nuclear deal.
Footnotes
1.
Republican Senator Tom Cotton was reportedly given one million dollar by Bill Kristol’s Emergency Committee for Israel to sabotage the Iran nuclear Deal. Soon after taking office the senator penned a letter, along with 47 other senators, to Iranian leaders asking them not to go ahead with a deal that would not be honored by a Republican president.
2.
The NSA, according to the Wall Street Journal, intercepted conversations of Israeli leaders and officials with US legislators and members of the American Jewish Community.
3.
A moderate Jewish organization called J Street, though pro-Israel, supported the Iran nuclear deal (J Street, 2015).
4.
The act defines “agreement,” with exceptional precision, to include not only the agreement between Iran and six Western powers but also
any additional materials related thereto, including … side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future.
5.
Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, issued a fatwa in September 2004 that “the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire these weapons” (Morrison, 2009).