State-sponsored Persecution of Baha’is in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Abstract

The largest non-Muslim minority in Iran, the Baha’i community, has been subjected to systematic religious persecution under the current Islamic regime. This article examines the nature of this persecution and the change in its pattern from a brutal and partly chaotic campaign in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic revolution to an institutionalized process with well-defined policies. It also discusses the historical roots of hostility toward the Baha’i community and considers the prospects for its continued presence within Iranian society. The assault on Baha’is has not led to large numbers of conversions to Islam, and, in spite of anti-Baha’i propaganda, more Iranians today than ever before condemn the persecution of their Baha’i compatriots and consider them entitled to freedom of belief.

Keywords

Baha’is Islamic Republic of Iran religious persecution historical roots future prospects

The Baha’i community is the largest non-Muslim minority in Iran, and at the time of the Islamic revolution of 1978–1979, there were an estimated 170,000 Baha’is in the country. In the first decade following the revolution, over 30,000 Baha’is left Iran because of religious persecution. The community also ceased to enroll new converts, and since 1979 only individuals born to Baha’i parents have been registered as Baha’is. The persecution of Baha’is is part of the larger problem of ongoing human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), which have affected all religious and ethnic minorities, women, political dissidents, and others, and which are manifested in the large number of executions, use of torture, and restrictions on freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly. In committing these rights violations, not only has the IRI disregarded its obligations under the international treaties to which it is a party, it has also ignored the laws of the country. Since 1984, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and its successor, the United Nations Human Rights Council, have been appointing special representatives for monitoring and reporting on human rights in Iran. Few other countries in the world have been singled out in this fashion by the United Nations (Afshari, 2011).

Non-Muslim minorities constitute a small segment of Iran’s population, around 2 percent according to some estimates. Their situation has deteriorated significantly under the Islamic regime (Beck, 2014; Sanasarian, 2000). The concept of ritual “impurity” as defined in classical Islamic law applies to all non-Muslims. They are generally suspected of not being fully loyal to the regime. In addition, they are subjected to prejudices that go well beyond the notion of ritual impurity. The 2005 remarks of Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, head of the Guardian Council, comparing non-Muslims to “animals who roam the Earth and engage in corruption” (Choksy, 2012, p. 289) are symptomatic of the attitude of some among the ruling elite in Iran today.

The situation of Baha’is, however, is worse than those of other non-Muslim minorities for a number of reasons. Unlike Jews, Zoroastrians, and Christians, Baha’is are not recognized as followers of a divine religion and are thus excluded from the protections afforded to other minorities under Islamic law. Article 13 of the Constitution clearly states that “Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians are the only recognized religious minorities.” As adherents of a post-Islamic religion, Baha’is are referred to as followers of “the misguided and misleading sect” (firqa-yi ḍālla-yi muḍilla). Baha’is are also considered apostates, even though by far the large majority are not recent converts but were born to Baha’i parents. Far more important is that, historically, the Baha’i community, unlike the other non-Muslim communities of Iran, has attracted many converts from among the Muslim population and is thus considered a unique threat. The main recognized non-Muslim religious communities of Iran are also ethnic groups, and this has contributed to rendering the boundaries between these minorities and the Muslim majority population relatively firm.

What has also further enraged the Iranian authorities is that the Baha’i International Community (BIC) has vigorously and persistently attempted to bring the plight of the Iranian Baha’is to the attention of the international community and to demand that the Iranian government stop the persecution and honor the international human rights conventions and treaties to which it is a signatory. In the case of the recognized non-Muslim minorities, their co-religionists outside Iran have not been as active in pleading their case on their behalf. Moreover, official representatives of these minorities in Iran have occasionally stated that their communities enjoy religious freedom. Although such statements are often made in the hope of averting a worsening of their situation, they have provided the Iranian authorities with “political capital,” which they have used to legitimize the Islamic regime (Afshari, 2011, p. 137).

A further complicating factor is that the headquarters of the international Baha’i community is located in Israel. The IRI authorities construe this as evidence of a political alliance between the Baha’i community and the state of Israel. It is irrelevant to them that the founder of the religion, Mirza Husayn-Ali Nuri Baha’u’llah (1817–1892), was banished—with the direct involvement of the Persian Government—to that land 80 years before the establishment of the state of Israel, when Palestine was Ottoman territory. The authorities also consider Iranian Baha’is’ reporting on the ongoing persecution of the community to the international headquarters of their religion as espionage for Israel, a charge frequently leveled against them since 1979.

Throughout its history, the Baha’i community in Iran has been subjected to persecution of varying degrees of intensity. What distinguishes the current phase is that it is systematic and more vicious and has continued uninterrupted for 37 years and that its orchestrators are sworn enemies of the community from among the Shia clerical establishment and lay Islamists who are now in full control of the state apparatus and use its resources for their anti-Baha’i campaign. Religious antagonism and fear of the influence of the Baha’i religion over the Iranian people are the main forces driving this persecution. This is confirmed by the reports of independent bodies and observers, including successive UN Special Rapporteurs on the situation of human rights in the IRI and on the freedom of religion or belief. It is also corroborated by statements of Iranian leaders and leaked official documents.

This article provides an overview of the persecution of Baha’is in the IRI and examines how its pattern changed. It briefly discusses the historical roots of hostility toward the Baha’i community and concludes with the prospects for its future existence within Iranian society. In the immediate years after the victory of the Islamic revolution, the campaign against the Baha’i community was brutal and partly chaotic. By the early 1990s, however, it had become institutionalized and has since proceeded according to well-defined policies. In spite of concerted efforts during the past three and a half decades to bring about the extinction of this minority, Iranian Baha’is have remained loyal to their faith. The persecution has not led to a mass conversion to Islam. Moreover, efforts to poison the mind of the public against this minority have largely failed, as more Iranians today than ever before express sympathy with their Baha’i compatriots, condemn their persecution, and consider them entitled to enjoy basic human rights, including the right to freedom of belief.

Persecution of Iranian Baha’is in Historical Perspective

In late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Iran, under the Qajar dynasty (1796–1925), Shia clerics were the prime instigators of hostility toward Baha’is (Amanat, 2008). When government authorities and officials engaged in the persecution of Baha’is, they were, for the most part, motivated by personal gain and not because they perceived in the Baha’i claims a threat to their power and influence. The rise of the secular and nationalist Pahlavi dynasty (1925–1979) marked a significant improvement in the situation of all non-Muslim minorities in Iran. By the early 1930s, however, the attitude of the new regime toward the Baha’i community had turned hostile, and for a period the community was persecuted by the state.

By the 1940s, the state was no longer actively persecuting the Baha’is. However, many Islamist groups were emerging aimed at combating the Baha’i religion, as well as materialist and secularist ideologies, the main proponents of which were the communist pro-Soviet Tudeh party and the anti-clerical intellectual Ahmad Kasravi and his followers (Tavakoli-Targhi, 2008). In the 1940s through the 1950s, Iran suffered from severe political instability. Owing to its weakness, the state needed the support of the Shia clerical establishment; hence, it gave anti-Baha’i elements a free hand and even lent them some assistance. For instance, when in 1950 a prominent Baha’i physician and chair of the Baha’i governing council (Local Spiritual Assembly) in the city of Kashan was killed by Islamist activists, the police, army, and judiciary actively collaborated with anti-Baha’i clerics and Islamists to obstruct the exercise of justice (Vahman, 2010). This trend culminated in 1955 when the government allowed the clerical establishment to use the national radio to incite the Muslim masses to wage a holy war against Baha’is across Iran; in Tehran, the authorities seized the national Baha’i headquarters, and the military governor of the city and the Iranian Chief of Staff began the demolition of its dome (Bayne, 1955a, 1955b; Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, 2006).

In the 1960s and 1970s, while the rift between the Pahlavi state and the clerical establishment was deepening, the regime was giving its tacit support to the activities of the Hojjatiyyeh Society, which had been founded in the 1950s with the primary purpose of opposing the Baha’i community. The authorities’ objective was to prevent religious fervor from being channeled into political activity against the state. In the closing months of the Pahlavi regime, individuals in the state apparatus and its secret police, the SAVAK, made a failed attempt to deflect the revolutionary rage away from the regime and toward the Baha’i community (Vahman, 2010).

In spite of the attitude of the Pahlavi state to the Baha’i community, which was at best ambivalent, many among the public regarded the Baha’is as natural allies of the regime. The fact that some Baha’is, ex-Baha’is, and Muslims of Baha’i descent held high positions in the state was interpreted as evidence for this supposed alliance (Chehabi, 2008). This belief gained further credence when Iranian Baha’is, in loyalty to the Baha’i teachings of non-participation in partisan politics and rejection of violence, did not take part in the revolution. The public also held quite exaggerated views about the Baha’is’ influence in government institutions and thought that Baha’is, like members of other non-Muslim minorities, were disproportionately represented in the public sector—which may well have been the case—and attributed this to menacing Baha’i influence in the state apparatus rather than to higher levels of education among the Baha’is.

Throughout the period prior to the Islamic revolution, prejudicial views toward Baha’is were prevalent in Iranian society. From an early date not only were Baha’is accused of blasphemy and heresy, they were also accused of engaging in sexually immoral behavior. By the mid-twentieth century new accusations of a more political nature had been added: Baha’is were being depicted as unpatriotic elements and willing instruments used by foreign powers to promote their own sinister designs to the detriment of Iran’s national interests, which were alleged to be best secured by common adherence to Islam. A notorious work that contributed to popularizing such views was The Confessions of Dolgoruki, the fictitious memoirs of Prince Dmitri Ivanovich Dolgorukov, the Russian Minister to Iran from 1845 to 1854. Forged originally in the 1930s and going through several redactions until the 1940s, it purported to reveal that the founders of the Babi and Baha’i religions had been enticed by Dolgorukov to launch their movements in order to undermine Iranians’ adherence to Islam and their national unity and thereby pave the way for the country to become prey to Russia (Yazdani, 2011). While the hitherto dominant accusations of blasphemy and sexual immorality against Baha’is appealed primarily to traditional religious classes, the Confessions’ political accusations had the potential to appeal to educated, including secular-minded, Iranians. Thus, it is no surprise that not only was the Confessions widely circulated by religious groups and individuals, its fundamental message was also embraced by various Iranian intellectuals, who propagated their own versions of it through their works. Despite its patently spurious and even ludicrous nature, the claim that Russia and Great Britain created the Baha’i religion in the nineteenth century to promote their imperial and colonial interests in Iran remains a staple accusation in anti-Baha’i publications produced in Iran for domestic consumption. It is even cited as an indisputable fact in official statements and documents issued by the IRI directed to international bodies and foreign governments.

By the early 1960s, in the wake of the establishment of the state of Israel and with the growing involvement of the United States in the Middle Eastern arena, new accusations against Baha’is were gaining currency. In particular, Baha’is were being accused of being agents of Israel and Zionists, as well as enemies of Islam and Iran (Tavakoli-Targhi, 2008, pp. 220–224). Some of the initiatives of the Pahlavi state were thought to have come about as a result of undesirable Baha’i influence. For example, Baha’i views on the advancement of women and universal education were in line with Pahlavi state policies aimed at modernizing Iran (Higgins, 1984, pp. 53–54). Some among the clerical establishment were particularly averse to the Baha’i teaching of the equality of women and men, which they considered antithetical to the tenets of Islam. When in 1962 the state took steps to introduce a new bill, which also granted women the right to vote, many clerics, including Ruhollah Khomeini (d. 1989), the future leader of the Islamic revolution, were alarmed. He warned that the Zionists who had appeared in Iran in the guise of Baha’is (hizb-i Bahā’ī, literally ‘the Baha’i party’) had endangered the economy and the independence of Iran (Ghanea, 2002, p. 101; Yazdani, 2012, p. 598). As he later pointed out, he believed that “the irreligious assemblies of the Baha’is of Jewish origin in Iran and America had decided to use the equality of men and women as a means to infringe upon the sanctuary of the official religion of the country” (Yazdani, 2012, p. 599). In a speech delivered in June 1963, Khomeini alleged that the ideas of the equality of women and men and universal compulsory education originated from ‘Abdu’l-Baha (d. 1921), Baha’u’llah’s successor and leader of the Baha’i religion, and were injected into the mind of the Shah to cause a rift between him and the clerical establishment in the hope of bringing about his downfall and paving the way for a Baha’i takeover of the country (Yazdani, 2012, pp. 600–601).

Thus, on the eve of the Islamic revolution, a range of prejudicial views about Baha’is prevailed in Iran. Baha’is were thought to be religiously, morally, and politically harmful and were considered a threat to Islam, the well-being of Iranians, and the national interests and sovereignty of the country. Although some of the negative views, such as those expressed in the Confessions or by Khomeini, were conspiratorial and far-fetched, this did not detract from their appeal to the public, including many among educated Iranians.

The Islamic Republic and Its “Baha’i Question”

The Islamic revolution brought to power elements within the religious establishment that were hostile to the Baha’i community. In the first decade of the new regime, persecution of Baha’is took place with the approval of Ayatollah Khomeini. Subsequently the campaign has been directed largely by the office of his successor and current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the Ministry of Intelligence, which operates under the guidance of the Supreme Leader and is accountable only to him. In the persecution that has taken place under the IRI, the first six years stand out for the intensity of the assault on the Baha’i community: the large majority of executions and killings of Baha’is took place during those years.

By the early 1990s, a new pattern had emerged, characterized by systematic violations of the economic, social, and cultural rights of Baha’is. In comparison with the most brutal phase of the persecution, there have been relatively few executions and killings of Baha’is since the late 1980s. The authorities are aware that bloody killings and executions are more visible and provoke international objections while the slow strangulation of the Baha’i community can be carried out without attracting attention. The overall pattern of the persecution has not changed since the early 1990s, but its intensity has varied at different times. During the presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005), whose moderate and reformist government made an effort to curb human rights abuses in Iran, there were some modest improvements in the situation of the Baha’i community. The past decade, however, has witnessed an intensification of the regime’s anti-Baha’i campaign.

The Early Years, 1979–1984

During this six-year period following the revolution, the new regime had to deal with various external and internal threats, most importantly the war with Iraq (1980–1988) and the armed uprising of the Islamic Leftist organization Mojahedin-e Khalq (June 1981). By 1982 the regime had crushed the Mojahedin uprising and was on the offensive in the war with Iraq, but the large number of executions of political opponents and of Baha’is continued (New York Times, 1987).

On the eve of his return to Iran, Khomeini made statements that presaged difficult times ahead for Baha’is. In an interview with Professor James Cockroft of Rutgers University (December 1978), he said that Baha’is were “a political faction” and “harmful,” and would not be “accepted” or allowed to practice their religion under an Islamic government (Cockcroft, 1979). His comments implicitly indicated the rationale of the persecution that was to come. Imprisonment, torture, and killing of Baha’is and other punitive measures taken against the community did not need to have anything to do with what any individual Baha’i did or failed to do; the entire community was considered harmful to the state and the country and was not to be tolerated.

There is no indication that Khomeini changed his position later in the period considered here. When in May 1983, the United States President Ronald Reagan appealed to him not to execute some 20 Baha’is who were on death rows, he responded as follows:

Mr. Reagan says that the poor Baha’is are calm and quiet people engaged in their own devotions and performing their own religious practices and that Iran has arrested them only because our beliefs are against their beliefs. Were they not spies, you would not have raised your voices … Baha’is are not a religious group (madhhab); they are a party (hizb), a party which was previously supported by Britain and now is being supported by America. (Khomeini, 1999, pp. 459–460)

In effect, not only was Khomeini giving the green light for the execution of those Baha’is who had already been sentenced to death, he was also legitimizing the persecution to that date and indicating that Baha’is had only themselves to blame for whatever happened to them in the future. Among the death row Baha’i prisoners, there were 10 Baha’i women from Shiraz, whose crime was teaching religious classes to Baha’i youth. All of them, including the 17-year-old Mona Mahmoudnezhad, were hanged on June 18, 1983. One may note that on neither this nor any other occasion did Khomeini call on the public to exterminate the Baha’i community—a measure which could have entailed horrors unparalleled in the history of that community. His attitude and statements, however, ensured that the radical anti-Baha’i elements had free reign in their dealings with the Baha’is and could not be stopped by more moderate voices in the leadership.

Early on individuals associated with the Hojjatiyyeh Society played a key role in the assault on Baha’i institutions and individuals. Supported by the secret police of the Pahlavi regime, the SAVAK, the Hojjatiyyeh had engaged in anti-Baha’i activities for many years and, by the 1970s, had infiltrated the Baha’i community. In the last months of the Pahlavi regime, in Tehran and several major provincial capitals, Hojjatiyyeh activists seized the records of Baha’i institutions, including Baha’i membership lists. After the revolution, members of the society managed to position themselves in the emerging organs of the new regime where they could use their organizational network and knowledge of the Baha’i community to launch an assault on its institutions and elected representatives and other members.

During the tumultuous revolutionary period of 1978–1979, which ended with the fall of the Pahlavi regime, nine Baha’is had been killed, mostly as a result of random acts of violence committed by religious fanatics, as well as individuals who had personal scores to settle with Baha’is. From 1980, however, executions of Baha’is began in earnest, and within five years 175 Baha’is were killed. Considering the Baha’is enemies of Islam, the authorities had no concern for adhering to a code of conduct toward them in accordance with any ethical or Islamic standards, let alone due process of law. Referring to the executions of Iranian Baha’is, Reza Afshari, a leading historian of human rights in contemporary Iran, writes:

No credible trial ever took place. None could be charged with any real crime in a credible court. What was even more heart-wrenching was that many of them could have avoided execution if they had professed—nominally, as is often the case in repentance—to have accepted Islam. (Afshari, 2008, p. 246)

Baha’is were also routinely subjected to torture in prisons. At least 13 Baha’is who died in prison are believed to have been tortured to death. Their bodies were buried before the families could view them (BIC, 2008, p. 30). Many others who were executed had been tortured while in prison, including the 10 Baha’i women who were hanged following President Reagan’s appeal. The November 1989 interim report of the UN Special Representative on the situation of human rights in Iran, Reynaldo Galindo Pohl (EI Salvador), provides a summary of eyewitness descriptions of the use of torture against Baha’i prisoners in the 1980s:

Usually arrest was followed by physical and psychological torture. Mock executions were frequently used method of psychological torture. Torture was used as an inducement to change faith, to confess links with the deposed monarchic régime or to confess spying for the benefit of foreign Powers….

One person affirmed that he had witnessed a man of Baha’i faith die under torture, whereas the authorities had reported his death as suicide. Another person testified that Mr. Tolouï, an interrogator especially assigned to the interrogation of [Baha’is], inflicted in Kerman such torture to one of the Baha’i prisoners, that he later had to use a walking stick. Two other witnesses related how torture left them permanently mentally impaired ... (UN Special Representative on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1989, paras. 54–55)

In 1979, the authorities seized the Baha’i community’s central financial institution, the Nawnahalan Company, as well as the Umana Corporation, which held title to all Baha’i endowments in Iran, including Baha’i holy sites and cemeteries. The seizure of these two companies resulted in some 15,000 Baha’is losing their savings and pensions (Cooper, 1982, p. 13). In that same year, the purge of Baha’i employees in government departments began, and private companies were pressured to dismiss their Baha’i employees. Later, a circular from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (December 7, 1981) stipulated:

The penalty incurred by those who belong to any of the misguided sects recognized by all Muslims as heretical deviations from Islam, or to organizations whose doctrine and constitution are based on rejection of the divinely-revealed religions, shall be permanent dismissal from public office ... and also from organizations that can be classed as governmental associations or offices ... (UN Special Rapporteur on the Question of Religious Intolerance, 1996, para. 64)

In all some 10,000 Baha’is were expelled, and some dismissed government employees were ordered to repay all salaries they had received previously. Retirement pensions were also suspended.

In 1979, the authorities also began to seize Baha’i holy places, historical sites, administrative centers, and cemeteries across the country. Many Baha’i holy places were destroyed, including the House of the Bab, the holiest shrine of the Baha’i religion in Iran (demolished in September 1979) and Baha’u’llah’s house in Takur in northern Iran. Many Baha’i cemeteries were also destroyed, desecrated, or vandalized (Amanat, 2012).

The new regime also attempted to embed the discrimination against Baha’is at the core of the legal system. The provisions of the new constitution, adopted in December 1979, were formulated in such a way as to deny Baha’is the status of a religious minority. The purely theological rationale for this was indicated in a statement issued by the IRI embassy in Buenos Aires (September 26, 1979). It noted that the Baha’i religion, having appeared after Islam, could not be “a true religion” but had to be a political party; it could not be regarded as a religious minority on a par with Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian communities (Martin, 1984, p. 43 and n. 112).

In 1980, the Islamic regime launched a campaign to purge Iranian universities of Western and non-Islamic influences. During this Cultural Revolution, universities were closed for three years and undesired elements, including Baha’i faculty and students, were expelled. The denial of the right to higher education to Iranian Baha’is has remained in effect ever since. Baha’i children were not spared pressure to abandon their faith. At the start of the school year of 1981–1982 the Ministry of Education issued an official recantation form that asked children whether their parents and they themselves were Baha’is, inquired about the identity of their other Baha’i relatives, and asked whether they were willing to recant their faith (Martin, 1984, p. 50).

In August 1983, Seyyed Hossein Mousavi Tabrizi, the Chief Prosecutor of the IRI, announced in the course of an interview that all Baha’i institutions in the country were banned. Upon learning of this ban, the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Iran ordered the dissolution of all Baha’i Local Spiritual Assemblies around the country and then itself formally disbanded (Martin, 1984, p. 80). This action did not hinder the authorities from subsequently arresting and executing several of its members, even though they no longer held any official position in the community. The nine members of the first National Assembly formed after the Islamic revolution had been abducted in August 1980 and are presumed to have been killed; eight members of the second National Assembly had been executed in December 1981.

The Period from 1985 to 1997

While the first and most intense phase of the persecution of Baha’is had been in many respects uncoordinated, by the early 1990s it had become well planned and institutionalized. The first noticeable change was a sharp decrease in the number of executions and killings of Baha’is beginning in 1985: whereas in 1983 and 1984 altogether 59 Baha’is were executed, killed, mobbed, or died in prison, the corresponding number for 1985 and 1986 was 14, and after 1988 no Baha’i was killed for a few years. In 1984, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights had appointed a special representative to observe the human rights situation in Iran, and the situation of the Baha’i minority was a significant human rights concern of the international community. The IRI authorities may well have been looking for a way to make a quick adjustment in their dealing with the “Baha’i question” to avoid triggering an international outcry, and a sharp reduction in the number of executions would have served that purpose. Other changes followed slowly. The number of arrests and imprisonments initially remained high. At one point in 1986, some 747 Baha’is were in prison (BIC, 2008, p. 29). By the end of 1989, however, the number of Baha’i prisoners had decreased to 13 (UN Special Representative on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1990, para. 53).

In 1987, the Baha’i community began organizing a program for higher education for young Baha’is, who were systematically denied access to colleges and universities by the government. The instructors were Baha’i academics who had been purged from universities during the Cultural Revolution, as well as Baha’i professionals. Initially, courses were delivered by correspondence, and the instructors’ identities were unknown to the students. The initiative, which came to be known as the Baha’i Institute for Higher Education (BIHE), continued operation until 1998, when a coordinated attack by the government forced it to shut down temporarily.

In the last years of the 1980s, the authorities were searching for a more effective way to prosecute the campaign against the Baha’i community that would also be less costly in terms of negative international reaction. In 1987, the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution (SCCR) considered the “Baha’i question” (this is briefly mentioned in a 1991 memorandum discussed below). The SCCR is the highest body responsible for the cultural policies of the IRI and was formed in 1984 and superseded the Cultural Revolution Headquarters, which had engineered and carried out the initial phase of the Cultural Revolution. The President of Iran acts as the chairman of the SCCR, and other members include the speaker of the Parliament, the head of the Judiciary, and the Minister of Education. In 1987 the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, was the president of Iran and the chairman of the SCCR. It seems that the SCCR’s deliberations at that time did not lead to the adoption of a well-defined plan concerning the Baha’i community. This is suggested by a circular issued in early 1989 by the office of the Prime Minister, Mir-Hossein Mousavi. The circular aimed to address the existing lack of “co-ordination within the organs of the executive” concerning “persons belonging to the Baha’i sect” by providing clear directives to all the ministries, provincial governors, and other governmental and revolutionary bodies. According to the directives, which were approved by the then President of Iran Ali Khamenei, “[n]o official or representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran [was] allowed to deprive [Baha’is] of their legal and social rights” if they had not been “recognized as spies by the competent authorities …” (UN Special Representative on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1990, Annex V).

By the early 1990s the authorities had developed a unified, coordinated, and comprehensive approach to the Baha’i community. Its main objectives and policies are articulated in a secret memorandum dated February 25, 1991, drawn up by the SCCR. The memorandum, which came to light in 1993 in the report by the UN Special Representative Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, was prepared at the instruction of Ayatollah Khamenei, who was now Iran’s Supreme Leader, and endorsed by him. A note in his handwriting stated that the SCCR’s decision seemed “sufficient” (BIC, 2008, p. 23). The memorandum confirms what has been known to independent observers since the early days of the IRI, that is, human rights violations against Iranian Baha’is are a matter of official policy.

With regard to Baha’is’ general position in the country, the memorandum indicates that they should not be arrested, imprisoned, or penalized without reason. It states, however, that the government must treat them in such a way that “their progress and development are blocked.” With regard to the Baha’is’ legal and social status, it states: “To the extent that it does not encourage them to be Baha’is, it is permissible to provide them the means for ordinary living in accordance with the general rights given to every Iranian citizen, such as ration booklets, passports, burial certificates, work permits, etc.” Baha’is, however, were to be denied employment if they identified themselves as Baha’is and were not to be employed in positions of influence such as in the educational sector. With respect to their cultural status and right to education, the memorandum indicated that Baha’is could be enrolled in schools as long as they did not identify themselves as Baha’is, but they were to be barred from higher education. Moreover, Islamic propaganda organizations were to set up designated sections to counter activities of Baha’is aimed at promoting their beliefs and faith. Also striking was the statement that a plan was to be devised to confront and destroy the cultural roots of Baha’is outside Iran (BIC, 2008, pp. 22–23; UN Special Representative on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1993, para. 310).

The authorities’ objective, as the memorandum indicates, was to create conditions that would force growing numbers of Iranian Baha’is to abandon their religious identity and ultimately bring about the demise of this minority in Iran. It may not be possible to establish beyond any doubt a link between concrete anti-Baha’i measures taken by the authorities since 1991 and specific policies articulated in this memorandum. It is clear, however, that the regime’s overall objective has not changed. Moreover, to the extent that we can infer from the actual measures taken against the Baha’i community in the ensuing years, the main policies of this memorandum have remained in force.

In 1993, the authorities destroyed the Baha’i cemetery in Tehran and built a cultural center over its ground. The cemetery, the largest in the country, had been confiscated in 1979 and closed down in 1981. Following its confiscation, the mortuary and memorial hall had been demolished, all gravesite markings obliterated, and the headstones sold at public auction. As a result of the destruction, approximately 15,000 graves were desecrated. The human remains were loaded into trucks and removed to a destination unknown to the relatives (UN Special Representative on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1994, paras.7, 150, 152). The authorities chose to disregard “the Shia prohibition against the exhumation of graves prior to a thirty-year interregnum” in order to “erase a Baha’i presence, even that of the dead” (Amanat, 2012, p. 273).

In December 1995, Abdelfattah Amor, the UN Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance, visited Iran and was also able to meet with the representatives of the Baha’i community. His report documents the attitude of the authorities toward the community and sums up the problems that Iranian Baha’is continued to face in late 1995. The authorities considered the Baha’i community “as a political sect historically linked to the Shah’s regime and, hence, as counter-revolutionary and characterized by its espionage activities for the benefit of foreign entities, particularly Israel.” During his interviews with the authorities, Amor noticed “an almost instinctive rejection with regard to the Baha’i community” (UN Special Rapporteur on the Question of Religious Intolerance, 1996, para. 56).

Baha’is were denied the right to profess their faith. The continued ban on Baha’i organization prevented the community from electing and operating administrative institutions, which, in the absence of a clergy, were vital for Baha’is’ ability to conduct their religious activities. Baha’is faced difficulties in burying their dead and identifying the location of tombs, as they were allowed to use only wasteland for burials and were prohibited from erecting inscribed gravestones. Baha’is were barred from higher education. Lacking the status of a recognized religious minority, Baha’is were prevented from applying their religious law in their personal and community affairs. Baha’is’ marriages and divorces and their right of inheritance were not legally recognized. Their personal property, including residences, was subject to confiscation. Baha’is who wished to travel abroad faced major obstacles, as the passport application form required that the applicant’s religion be specified. Baha’is were denied access to public office, and pressure was also brought on the private sector to dismiss Baha’i employees. The judiciary as a rule ignored complaints lodged by Baha’is. Requests by defense counsel for files of Baha’i prisoners were normally rejected. Lawyers were subjected to pressures and threats so that they would refuse Baha’i clients. While the number of Baha’is arrested for their religious faith had declined and executions of Baha’is had apparently stopped, in the period from January 1990 to June 1993, 43 Baha’is had been arrested. As of December 1995, seven Baha’is were in prison, two of whom had been sentenced to death (UN Special Rapporteur on the Question of Religious Intolerance, 1996, paras. 59–65, 67, 69).

Amor also made a number of recommendations to the IRI authorities. He noted that although the situation of the Baha’is as a non-recognized minority was covered by articles 14, 22, and 23 of the Constitution, in which the concepts of citizen, individuals, and persons were used, it was necessary for “a legislative enactment” to “give clearer recognition to these rights for every citizen, individual or person, regardless, inter alia, of his beliefs or the community to which he belong[ed]” (UN Special Rapporteur on the Question of Religious Intolerance, 1996, para. 90). This was a tacit acknowledgment that Iranian authorities, in their treatment of Baha’is, were disregarding constitutional provisions that safeguarded their rights as citizens and persons living in Iran.

The Period under President Khatami, 1997–2005

In the 1997 presidential election, Mohammad Khatami won a landslide victory on a platform of reform and social and cultural liberalization. Improving relations with the West was high on his agenda. During his presidency, the situation of the Baha’i community slightly improved in some respects. As the execution of Ruhollah Rouhani and the coordinated attack on the Baha’i Institute for Higher Education showed, however, the reformist faction that supported Khatami had limited power and was unable to alter the regime’s overarching policy toward the Baha’i minority.

Rouhani, who was killed in July 1998, was accused of converting a Muslim woman to the Baha’i faith, even though the woman herself maintained that she had already been a Baha’i. Three other Baha’is were tried along with Rouhani, and two of them were sentenced to death. From late September to early October 1998, the authorities also launched a coordinated attack to dismantle the BIHE. Expanding significantly since its modest beginning in 1987, the Institute had become a full-fledged underground university with approximately 900 students, more than 150 instructors, and course offerings in 10 subject areas, including dental science, civil engineering, computer science, psychology, and law. In addition to courses delivered by correspondence, many small classes were held, mostly in private homes. The BIHE also had classrooms and more than 45 depository libraries in various cities and towns across the country, as well as laboratories in and around Tehran. By 1998 a handful of its early graduates had gained admission to universities outside Iran (BIC, 2005). During the attack, government agents raided over 500 homes, arrested at least 36 members of the faculty and staff of the BIHE, and confiscated equipment and records belonging to the Institute, including large photocopying units and libraries, which were essential for its operation. The scope of the attack, which forced the BIHE to shut down temporarily, indicated that it had taken time to plan (BIC, 2005).

Later during Khatami’s presidency, several Baha’is who were awaiting execution, including the two who had been tried along Rouhani, had their sentences commuted to imprisonment. The number of Baha’i prisoners was also reduced, and many Baha’is who had previously been denied business licenses were able to obtain these. It also became much easier for Baha’is to obtain passports for travelling abroad (Kazemzadeh, 2000, p. 556). In March 2000, the BIC was able to report that, as a result of recent measures taken by the Iranian government, Baha’is were able to register their marriages (Ghanea, 2002, p. 149). This development, as the September 2000 interim report of the UN Special Representative noted, had positive implications for “the rights of Baha’i women and children,” who had until then “been exposed to charges of prostitution and denied the right to inherit” (UN Special Representative on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2000, para. 75). The January 2001 report of the special representative noted further positive changes. Similar to the matter of registration of marriages, religion was no longer to be requested at the time of registration of birth, divorce, or death (UN Special Representative on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2001, para. 74).

In the last years of Khatami’s presidency no further steps were taken to mitigate the persecution of Baha’is. The hardliners defeated the reformers in the 2003 municipal elections and decisively won the parliamentary election of 2004. The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief Asma Jahangir indicated in her December 2004 report that the Baha’is of Iran “continued to be targeted because of their beliefs” and that “little progress” had been made regarding their situation (UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, 2004, para. 38).

Intensification of Persecution Since 2005

In June 2005, the hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected President. He was re-elected in 2009 in a disputed election that triggered large protests in Tehran and several other major cities and led to the emergence of the Green Movement. During his two terms as president the situation of Baha’is worsened. The current president, Hassan Rouhani, was elected in June 2013. During his campaign, Rouhani embraced reformist rhetoric, spoke of greater freedoms, and promised to address human rights abuses. He even mentioned religious minorities, remarking that “[a]ll Iranian people should feel there is justice” and that “all religions, even religious minorities, must feel justice” (International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran [ICHRI], 2013). Rouhani’s definition of “Iranian people” and “religious minorities,” however, did not include Baha’is: his proposed draft Citizenship Rights Charter, released in November 2013, excluded them from any legal protections (United States Commission on International Religious Freedom [USCIRF], 2015, p. 46). The situation of Baha’is and the human rights situation in Iran generally have deteriorated under his presidency. Thus, despite the differences in their political rhetoric, from the perspective of human rights abuses against Baha’is, the policies enforced under President Rouhani are a continuation of those implemented during President Ahmadinejad’s terms in office.

Three months into Ahmadinejad’s presidency, at the instruction of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, the Command Headquarters of the Armed Forces in Iran issued a “top secret” letter dated 7 Aban 1384 (corresponding to October 29, 2005) to the Ministry of Intelligence, the Revolutionary Guard, Police Force, and other organs and officials to step up surveillance of Baha’is. All Baha’is were to be identified and all their activities reported to the Command Headquarters (Baha’i World News Service [BWNS], 2006). Prompted by this letter, Asma Jahangir, the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, issued a statement noting that she considered such monitoring to be “an impermissible and unacceptable interference with the rights of members of religious minorities” and expressed her concern that the information gained would be used “as a basis for the increased persecution of, and discrimination against, members of the Baha’i faith, in violation of international standards.” She also stated her concern that the situation of religious minorities in Iran was deteriorating (UN Press Release, 2006). By the end of that year, various entities, including the European Parliament, the UN General Assembly, the United States Department of State, and Amnesty International, were expressing alarm about the worsening of the situation of the religious minorities in Iran (Sanasarian & Davidi, 2007).

In March and May 2008, the seven members of the national-level coordinating group that, in the absence of an elected governing body, tended to the needs of the Baha’i community—with the full knowledge of the Iranian government—were arrested. These Baha’i leaders, two women and five men, also acted as a liaison between the authorities and the Baha’i community. No charges were laid against them for at least nine months, in violation of international, as well as Iranian law. For over a year they were denied access to their lawyers and denied the right to seek bail and be released pending trial.

When the trial commenced in January 2010, Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi, founder of the Defenders of Human Rights Centre, which represented the seven defendants, told in an interview with WashingtonTV that “if justice is to be carried out and an impartial judge should investigate the charges leveled against my clients, the only verdict that could be reached is that of acquittal.” She noted that her clients were charged with spying for America and Israel, acting against national security, and engaging in propaganda against the Islamic Republic’s system and further stated that “I read the dossier and fortunately or unfortunately found in it no cause or evidence to sustain the criminal charges upheld by the prosecutor.” Maintaining that the authorities had acted against the law of the country, she stated that “this case was set up wrongly from the start. That is, my clients should have been released immediately.” She linked the trial of the Baha’i leaders and the spurious allegations brought against the Baha’is in hard-line Iranian media to the popular protests that had occurred across the country following the 2009 disputed presidential election. The IRI authorities, she noted, had attempted to blame various countries, factions, and groups for the protests, but the Iranian public had remained unconvinced, and now it was the Baha’is’ turn to be blamed (WashingtonTV, 2010).

In August 2010 each of the Baha’i leaders was sentenced to 20 years in prison, a sentence which, in the case of the oldest member of the group, amounted to life imprisonment. Their charges included espionage, “propaganda activities against the regime,” and organization of an “illegal administration.” Mohammad Moqiseh, Chief Judge of Branch 28 of the Islamic Revolutionary Court, used the final court judgment to launch an attack on “the world administration of the perverse Bahaist sect” accusing it of engaging with “opposition groups” and collaborating with “hostile governments” with the aim of “assisting in propaganda against the Islamic Iran” (BIC, 2014, p. 26). Following the announcement of the verdict, Shirin Ebadi told in a television interview broadcast by the Persian-language service of the BBC that she was “astonished” by the 20-year jail terms. She noted that she had personally read their case file page by page and found no evidence that could prove the charges against them or any document that could prove the claims of the prosecutor. In response to the interviewer’s comment that the court had surely produced some documents to issue such a sentence, she stated that unfortunately the judiciary had lost impartiality for some time and become a tool in the hands of “the security interrogators” (bāzjūyan-i amniyyatī) (BBC Persian, 2010). In November 2015, the term of the imprisonment of the seven Baha’i leaders was reduced to 10 years.

In the past 10 years, the numbers of arrests of Baha’is and Baha’i prisoners have increased. Early in 2005, toward the end of Khatami’s presidency, fewer than five Baha’is were in prison. As of November 2015, however, 79 Baha’is were in Iran’s prisons (ICHRI, 2015b). Since 2005 more than 800 Baha’is have been arrested, including more than 100 since President Rouhani assumed office in August 2013 (BIC, 2015b). For example, in May 2006, more than 50 Baha’is were arrested in Shiraz “while teaching underprivileged children non-religious subjects such as math and science.” Three of the Baha’is were later sentenced to four years in prison “for ‘spreading propaganda against the Islamic Republic,”’ while the others “were given one year suspended sentences, conditional upon their attendance at courses held by the state’s ‘Islamic Propaganda Organization,’ which would require them to sign documents saying they are Muslim” (USCIRF, 2008, p. 141). In April 2015, agents of the Ministry of Intelligence arrested 13 Baha’is in the city of Hamadan, most of whom were released after paying bail ranging from US$8,000 to US$20,000 (BIC, 2015b). In an incident on November 15, 2015, the Ministry of Intelligence agents arrested 20 Baha’is in Tehran, Isfahan, and Mashhad (IranWire, 2015b).

Killings of Baha’is continue to be used as a tool of intimidation, but official executions are avoided because of their repercussions in the international community. Since 2005 at least nine Baha’is have been murdered or died under suspicious circumstances. One of the Baha’is murdered was Ataollah Rezvani. On August 24, 2013, his body, shot in the head, was found in his car on the outskirts of Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf. Previously, agents of the Ministry of Intelligence had instigated his dismissal from his job, and he and his family had been under pressure to leave the city. For several years, local clerics had been attacking Baha’is from the pulpit. Other forms of religious hate crimes against individual Baha’is have also continued. In February 2014, three Baha’is were stabbed in Birjand in eastern Iran (BWNS, 2014a; USCIRF, 2015, p. 46).

In addition to arrests, imprisonments, assailing, and killings, since 2005 there have been over 50 incidents of arson against Baha’i properties and over 40 incidents of vandalism at Baha’i cemeteries. No one has ever been arrested or prosecuted for these attacks. In October 2014, for example, two Baha’i homes were firebombed in Yazd, but the police did not investigate. In December 2012, the cemetery of the Baha’is of Yazd was vandalized. The site is the third allotted by the authorities to the Baha’is for the burial of their dead after their communal cemetery was confiscated following the Islamic revolution. As in other localities in Iran, it is an area in wasteland without access to water. It had been vandalized more than once previously. The authorities did not investigate this latest incident, but when Shamim Ettehadi, a 28-year-old Baha’i from Yazd, made a video recording of the site and sent it to the London-based Persian-language TV channel Manoto 1, he was sentenced to seven years and three months imprisonment, as well as 75 lashes and a fine of 4 million tumans (Behnazar, 2013). His case is but one example of reprisals taken against individuals who bring human rights abuses in Iran to the attention of the international community, including the United Nations. In 2014, the Baha’i cemetery in Shiraz, the resting place of some 950 Baha’is, including the 10 Baha’i women who were hanged in 1983, was partly destroyed by Revolutionary Guards, ostensibly to make way for new buildings and facilities, including a cultural and sports center. The commander of the Revolutionary Guards in Shiraz allegedly stated that “the Baha’is had ‘no rightful place’ in Iranian society and that the Islamic regime would not take note of a ‘foul, unclean and rootless sect’” (UN Secretary-General, 2015, para. 46, n. 28).

Economic pressures aimed at blocking Baha’is from earning a livelihood have intensified since 2005. The authorities continue to bar Baha’is from government jobs and to put pressure on employers in the private sector to dismiss their Baha’i employees. Moreover, Baha’is have been denied business licenses, have not been able to renew them, or have had them revoked by the authorities. During the presidency of Hassan Rouhani alone, more than 200 Baha’i-owned businesses have been shut down or threatened. In October 2014, for instance, around 80 Baha’i-owned shops in three cities in Kerman Province were forcibly closed (USCIRF, 2015, p. 46). The owners were accused of violating government regulations concerning business and trade practices. After negotiations the shops were allowed to reopen in January 2015, but in April and May 2015 the authorities once more swept through those three cities and others and sealed at least 35 shops (BIC, 2015a, p. 4). In November 2015, all Baha’i businesses in the city of Rafsanjan in Kerman Province and 23 businesses in several cities in Mazandaran were closed by the authorities (IranWire, 2015b).

Young Baha’is continue to face discrimination in education. Baha’i students in primary and secondary schools continue to be insulted and have their faith and beliefs slandered and ridiculed. School textbooks present and justify a particularly discriminatory view of Iranian Baha’is. They refer to the Baha’i religion as a “false sect” and to Baha’is as tools in the hands of foreign powers. The history textbook for grade eight, in a lesson entitled “Sect-building by Colonialism,” claims in regard to the emergence of the Baha’i religion that “[t]he British and Russian governments were extremely afraid of the unity of Muslims in Iran” and “strove to sow discord among the people and destroy their unity” by supporting new false sects, including Babism and Baha’ism (Paivandi, 2008, pp. 43–44). Such misrepresentations put Baha’i students in a difficult situation. If, prompted by their peers, they attempt to clarify matters, they are threatened by the school authorities with expulsion.

Baha’is also continue to be barred from public and private colleges and universities. When Baha’i students manage to enroll, they are expelled as soon as it is discovered that they are Baha’is. Moreover, Baha’is supporting the educational efforts of the BIHE face harassment, arrest, and imprisonment. In May 2011, the authorities launched another major attack on the BIHE. In Tehran and several other localities 39 Baha’i homes were raided and 16 individuals involved with the work of the BIHE were arrested (BWNS, n.d.). Many of those arrested received prison terms ranging from four to five years for supporting the work of the BIHE in different capacities. Several of them have since been released after serving their prison sentences, while others are still in prison. The government claims that the BIHE was “established illegally” and was operating “under the guise of educational activities [but] was [furthering the] political and economic goals of an outlawed cult” (UN Special Representative on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2015, para. 88).

In October 2015, another BIHE instructor, Azita Rafizadeh, was ordered to report to prison to begin serving her term. In June 2014, she had received a four-year sentence for working for the BIHE. She could have avoided prosecution if she had pledged to cease working for the BIHE. In May 2015, her husband, Peyman Kushk-Baghi, received a five-year prison sentence. Like his wife, he was charged with “membership in the illegal and misguided Baha’i group with the aim of acting against national security through illegal activities at the BIHE educational institute” (ICHRI, 2015a). The Appeals Court upheld their sentences. The greatest concern of the couple is the fate of their five-year-old son (IranWire, 2015a).

Depriving young Baha’is of access to higher education is designed to diminish their prospects for social progress. It goes a long way towards robbing them of a decent future. It aims to reverse the earlier trend of higher educational levels in the Baha’i community. It is also intended to demoralize rising generations of Baha’is. It is thus one of the most pernicious policies implemented by the present regime.

Since President Khatami stepped down in August 2005, there has been a surge in anti-Baha’i propaganda in state-controlled media in the form of articles, videos, and web pages. In 2004 the national daily newspaper Kayhan, which has served for over two decades as the unofficial mouthpiece of the Supreme Leader and is one of the most influential newspapers in the country, published two anti-Baha’i articles. The number of such articles increased to 36 in 2005 and 108 in 2006. An article published on October 27, 2005, argued that “Baha’ism” was a “sect” created by “colonialists to corrupt the noble and pure Islamic ideas.” Over a period of 17 months, from December 2009 to May 2011, more than 400 anti-Baha’i items were propagated through official and semi-official media and other means (BIC, 2011). For example, an article published on March 8, 2011, on the Web site of Rasa News Agency under the headline “Baha’ism is pursuing the gradual subversion of the Islamic regime” cited a “senior scholar” of Baha’ism that this “group” aimed to shake the faith of “the young and the intellectuals in Islamic Iran” (javānān va nukhbigān-i Īrān-i Islāmī) and, ultimately, to bring about the gradual subversion of the regime. The scholar also alleged that this “group” had been created with the assistance and under the direction of the British colonial power (BIC, 2011, p. 36). From January 2014 to August 2015 Iranian media published more than 7,000 anti-Baha’i items (BIC, 2015a, p. 13).

The fact that there has been an unprecedented surge in the resources devoted to vilifying the Baha’i faith in the past few years under deteriorating economic conditions indicates the regime’s resolve to continue on the path it has taken with regard to the Baha’i community since 1979. It also suggests that the IRI authorities are actively seeking to scapegoat the Baha’i community for their own failures to address Iran’s massive social and economic problems, which have caused overwhelming hardship for the generality of the populace.

Position of Baha’is in a Future Iran

In Qajar and Pahlavi Iran, prejudicial views concerning Baha’is could persist among the Muslim population for various reasons, including the public’s low literacy and educational levels, which facilitated subservience to Shia clerics and unreserved acceptance of their pronouncements about Baha’is; Muslim Iranians’ reticence and aversion to contact with Baha’is given the latter’s status as ritually unclean heretics believed to be prone to sexually immoral behavior; the Baha’is’ limited numbers and geographical spread in the country; the tendency among some Baha’is to keep a low profile in the unfriendly environment in which they lived; the denial to the Baha’i community of a public forum in which it could freely respond to false accusations and attacks on its beliefs and practices; and the hesitation of fair-minded Muslims to come to the defense of Baha’is given the repercussions such actions could have for their own reputation and safety.

Today, however, the situation is very different. In 1956, at the time of the first national census, less than 15 percent of Iranians aged 10 years and above were literate, whereas in 2012 Iran had an adult (15+) literacy rate of over 83 percent. Iranians today seem to be less religious than the population in other Muslim countries. Their values are also changing in opposition to the ideology and policies of the Islamic regime (Moaddel, 2009). In 2011, more than half of the country’s population was under the age of 30. Young Iranians, in particular, are becoming more secular.

A growing number of Iranians outside and inside Iran are condemning the persecution of Baha’is and defending their right to freedom of belief. As regards Iranians living in the West, experience of life in diaspora and exposure to Western stereotyped and negative views of Muslims, Middle Easterners, and Iranians have contributed to awakening them to the prejudices and twisted views that they and their compatriots held about the Baha’is earlier. Iranians inside Iran see a parallel between the regime’s widespread violations of their own civil and political rights and its persecution of the Baha’i minority. Those inside Iran who have spoken out in defense of the rights of Baha’is as citizens of the country include prominent clerical figures, as well as lay intellectuals. Many of them formerly held positions of influence within the regime or were its staunch supporters but have now become alienated from it.

In May 2008, for example, Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri (d. 2009), who was at one point designated to succeed Khomeini, issued a fatwa acknowledging the citizenship rights of Baha’is and observing that they must be treated with “Islamic compassion” (BIC, 2008, p. 18). He was and remains the most senior cleric to have made such a pronouncement. Considering that Montazeri, during the anti-Baha’i campaign of 1955 referred to earlier, had called on the public in his hometown of Najafabad to boycott the Baha’is, this change of attitude on his part at the end of his life was nothing short of dramatic. In April 2014, Ayatollah Abdol-Hamid Masoumi-Tehrani, a senior dissident cleric, in a show of sympathy with the Baha’is of Iran, gifted to them and the Baha’is around the world an illuminated calligraphic rendering of a passage from the writings of Baha’u’llah (BWNS, 2014b). He also called on all his fellow citizens to adopt an attitude of friendship and solidarity with others. Following Ayatollah Masoumi-Tehrani’s call for religious tolerance, another senior cleric, Hojjat al-Islam Mohammad Taqi Fazel Meybodi published a piece stating that Baha’is were ritually pure and noted further that, in the modern world, all the citizens of a country should enjoy the same rights (Fazel Meybodi, 2014).

Such signs of changing attitudes among individuals from the ranks of the gatekeepers of religious orthodoxy, who have historically been the source of the greatest opposition to Baha’i presence in Iran, illustrate the transformation that is taking place in Iranian society today. Disillusioned with how their experiment with the fusion of Islamic fundamentalism and politics has turned out and weary of continued human rights abuses in the name of Islam, a growing number of Iranians hope for a future in which religion can no longer be used as an instrument for promoting intolerance and hatred or as a measure of citizens’ entitlement to basic human rights.

Iranian Baha’is do not make any territorial claims and have no desire to carve out a piece of Iran for themselves. They do not even seek the right to political representation. They only wish for their civic rights to be respected, including the right to freedom of belief and religious practice. They are also committed to working for social change and the betterment of society through non-violent means. For these reasons, many Iranians sympathize with them and find their aspirations legitimate. They also recognize that the question of religious freedom for Baha’is is inherently linked to the broader issue of building a truly democratic and pluralistic society.

In Qajar and Pahlavi Iran, under adverse circumstances and with limited human and material resources, Iranian Baha’is were able to contribute to promoting modern educational institutions and demonstrated initiative and resourcefulness in other areas such as public health and the advancement of women (Fazel & Foadi, 2008; Momen, 2008; Shahvar, 2009; Zabihi-Moghaddam, 2013). One may anticipate that they will be able to contribute more fully, along with their fellow Iranians, to the progress of their country in an environment characterized by commitment to human rights in the true sense of the term, as the inalienable rights due to humans solely on account of their being human and without regard to their religious beliefs.

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