Iran’s Aid Diplomacy in Afghanistan: The Role of Imam Khomeini Relief Committee

Aid Diplomacy: Theoretical Considerations

“Aid” is a broad concept. There are some gray areas about what could be included in aid. Basically, “aid” covers any transfer of public resource from one country to another country seemingly for the purpose of improving human condition in the receipient (Lancaster, 2008, pp. 10–11). “Aid diplomacy” is one of the newest concepts in international relations. Hans Morgenthau views “aid diplomacy” as one of the “real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy” (Morgenthau, 1962, p. 301).

The present concept of “aid diplomacy” is essentially a Cold War phenomenon. Prior to that “aid diplomacy” was limited in scope. In the early nineteenth century, it was mainly confined to humanitarian assistance. In interwar period (1918–1939), it was largely understood as “aid” by colonial powers to their respective colonies (Lancaster, 2008, pp. 25–27). After the Second World War, the scope of “aid diplomacy” became wide, and its importance also increased, particularly amongst the superpowers, the US and the erstwhile USSR. Both these countries had entered into a race in the field of “aid diplomacy” (Goldman, 1965). Nonetheless, “aid diplomacy” is no longer viewed as merely a business of developed countries as many developing countries have also started introducing foreign “aid programs” (Lancaster, 2008, p. 2).

Although every country claims that its aid programs in other countries are purely humanitarian, there are enough reasons to argue otherwise. Carol Lancaster, a former deputy administrator of the US Agency for International Development says,

My personal sympathies were with using aid to better the human condition abroad … But, I also recognized the legitimacy and necessity of using aid for other compelling purposes, especially the diplomatic ones where aid was an instrument of the US leadership in the world. (Lancaster, 2008, p. x)

Similarly, Morgenthau identifies different types of foreign aid, and argues that all but one are political. The exception being the humanitarian aid extended to other countries only at the time of natural catastrophes, like famine, flood, etc. (Morgenthau, 1962, p. 301).

According to Lancaster, the nature and purpose of aid diplomacy of a country are determined by that particular country’s domestic forces. She classifies these forces into four categories. First, the world-views, principles, and beliefs of the ruling-elites, and these originate from different sources such as religion, ideology, and culture; second is the nature of political system and the types of institutions involved in decision-making, related to aid diplomacy (Lancaster, 2008, pp. 18–21). Third are the interest groups as they constitute “a pervasive and dynamic force in politics” and among the different interest groups, there are groups “with affinity for particular foreign countries, ethnicities, or religious orientation that support “aid” directed to groups and countries” (Lancaster, 2008, pp. 21–22). Fourth, the nature of the aid machinery, as “the way governments organize themselves to manage their ‘aid’ affects the voice for the development purpose of ‘aid’ within governments and the extent of encouragement and collaboration by government agencies with groups outside government, supportive of the development aid” (Lancaster, 2008, p. 22). Against this background, the underlying objectives of the Islamic Republic of Iran relief efforts in Afghanistan are discussed.

A Background to Iran’s Aid Diplomacy

“Aid diplomacy” constitutes an important part of the Iranian foreign policy. According to Sarkhayl, any well-planned effort for influencing the public opinion is counted as “public diplomacy.” Therefore, he argues, supporting the underprivileged people is in line with “exporting the revolution” and in the direction of Iran’s foreign policy goals and objectives (Sarkhayl, n.d., p. 84). Ayatollah Khomeini also would attribute the 1979 Iranian revolution to the underprivileged of the world. He would urge the Iranian leaders to make “supporting the underprivileged people” a principle of Iran’s foreign policy (Khomeini, 1990, p. 238). Addressing to the Iranian elites, Khomeini was quoted as saying, “On behalf of me and the entire Iranian nation, we ensure all Muslims that the Islamic Republic of Iran is their supporter and the sponsor of their struggle and Islamic agenda” (Khomeini, 1990, p. 132). Article 3(16) of the Iranian Constitution also bounds the government of this country to support the underprivileged of the world.

Among the Iranian think-tanks, efforts related to foreign aid are widely discussed under the label of “support diplomacy” (dīplumāsī-e Himāyāt). Hassan Fattahi defines “support diplomacy” of Iran, as a wide network that consisted of supportive contacts with particular ethnic groups, and underprivileged Shias. To him, Iran’s support diplomacy is a counter attack against Iran’s enemies and undermines their technological superiority. It neutralizes the underprivileged groups and Shias, and then directs their loyalty toward Iran (Fattahi, 2008, p. 60). Although Fattahi believes that support diplomacy in essence is not a tool, he asserts that Iran must use it as a tool (2008, p. 136).

According to Sarkhayl, the “support diplomacy” of Iran serves the following objectives: (a) it softens the hearts toward the Islamic political system of Iran; (b) it expands Iran’s social sphere of influence, as it connects Iran with downtrodden layers of other societies; (c) it enhances the strategic goals of Iran through changing public opinion in Iran’s favor (Sarkhayl, n.d., pp. 83–86); (d) it keeps Iran in constant contact with masses, and thus paves the ground for building other types of relationships with them; (e) it defies Iran’s enemies outside the Iranian borders (Sarkhayl, n.d., p. 89); (f) it mobilizes the unprivileged people under different frameworks such as Islamic movements; (g) it utilizes the deprived and oppressed peoples’ capacities in favor of Iran; (h) it exploits the recipients’ stand on various issues, and increases the bargaining capacity of Iran with other illegitimate regimes; (i) it promotes the Iranian Political System as a role model among the downtrodden segments of other countries; and (j) it closely relates Iran with Islamic movements, so that Iran can emerge as a spiritual mentor to those entities (n.d., pp. 95–96).

Ibrahimi and Fahimi view “support diplomacy” as a component of Iran’s “cultural diplomacy.” They argue that from an Iranian perspective, “cultural diplomacy” includes those activities that are cultural in nature, that is, educational programs, art exhibition, etc., but in a deeper view, “cultural diplomacy” also includes all those activities that convey a cultural message under the guise of non-cultural activities to the target audience (Ibrahimi & Fahimi, 2010–2011, p. 214).

Fattahi says that “support diplomacy” is an effort to make the receiving society consistent with the ideology and foreign policy of Iran. In a more explicit tone, he regards the support diplomacy of Iran as a safe channel for propagation and missionary activities. To him, giving aid to the people of other countries is not a one-way deal but is accompanied by an expectation from the donor’s side. He argues that “aid” makes the recipients oblige to respond to this expectation positively. According to him, in the case of Iran, responding to such an expectation is very easy because it is nothing more than accepting the ideas and values of Iran. He believes that it is a kind of expectation which is rarely put down by the recipient. He regards creating such an expectation as one of the most comprehensive, effective, long lasting, and real propagation in the service of the highest goals and objectives of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Fattahi, 2008, pp. 45–46). Perhaps, that is why Fattahi views “support diplomacy” as a business with a small amount of investment but a huge profit (Fattahi, 2008, p. 146).

The above discussion reveals that the Iranian leaders are aware of the importance of “aid diplomacy” in enhancing Iran’s foreign policy goals and objectives. In consonance with this, there are several institutions involved in Iran’s “support diplomacy.”

IKRC: Structure, Goals, and Objectives

One of the institutions which are active in the area of “support diplomacy” is IKRC. It was established on 5 March 1979, and its first statute was ratified on 10 June 1987 by Khomeini. After his demise some changes were made to the statute, and its modified version was ratified by Ali Khamenei on the 20 December 2001 (Statute of Imam Khomeini Relief Committee (IKRC), n.d., p. 3). Article 3 of the statute reads, “IKRC is a revolutionary, public, non-profitable and welfare institution, possessing an independent legal personality, and also financial, administrative and employment independence, [and it is managed] under the high supervision of the Absolute Authority of the valī-e faqih [Supreme Leader]” (Statute of IKRC, n.d., pp. 7–8). It is necessary to note that in the Iranian political system when an institution is under the supervision of the Supreme Leader, it is only accountable to him, not to any other republican institutions such as president or parliament.

Based on Article 2 of the statute, IKRC aims at offering supportive, cultural, and social services to the needy and deprived people in order to ensure their self-reliance, and upgrade their faith (Statute of IKRC, n.d., p. 7). In line with this, Article 6 defines a number of duties for IKRC. Among the notable ones are (a) to assess, identify, and meet the material and spiritual needs of the underprivileged people, and improve their living standards; (b) to render cultural service to the needy individuals and families and provide them with necessary educational facilities and equipment, and develop their religious beliefs; and (c) to work for the maximum support of the needy people abroad in line with the policies of the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Statute of IKRC, n.d., pp. 8–11).

According to its 20-year vision, IKRC would pursue the following objectives in international arena: (a) maximum support to the needy and deprived people outside Iran on the basis of the aims and intents of the Supreme Leader; (b) securing relationship with international charity organizations and humanitarian associations; and (c) identifying suitable opportunities for the expansion of IKRC’s international engagement (20-year plan of IKRC, n.d., p. 25).

In addition, the document defines a number of roles for IKRC in the Iranian politics and they include to (a) become the most powerful arm of the Islamic political system in materializing the latter’s goals and objectives; (b) become a pioneer in reviving and promoting Islamic teachings, and securing people’s loyalty toward the Islamic political system of Iran; (c) become the source of inspiration to the world, particularly the Muslim World; and (d) emerge as a reliable backrest for the underprivileged and oppressed of the world (20-year plan of the IKRC, n.d., p. 25).

The IKRC is functioning under the direct authority of the Supreme Leader. He is controlling it through the IKRC Central Council comprising five members, who are appointed for five years by the Supreme Leader in tandem with Article 10 of IKRC’s statute. These individuals are known as “representatives of valī e faqih.” They choose a person from among themselves as the head of IKRC who is known as “Superintendent” (sarparast) (Statute of IKRC, n.d., pp. 12–13). However, the appointment should be endorsed by the Supreme Leader in line with Article 11(1) of IKIC’s statute (Statute of IKRC, n.d., p. 14). Article 17(5) of IKRC statute, asserts that the institution presents its annual report directly to the Supreme Leader (Statute of IKRC, n.d., p. 21.)

In the recent years, attempts have been made to bring IKRC under government control, so that it would be accountable to the parliament. In his interview with Khabar Online published on 30 December 2009, Syed Jawad Zamani, a member of Social Affairs Commission at the Iranian Parliament, admitted that there was no transparency in IKRC activities. He disclosed that some parliamentarians were working on a bill to incorporate IKRC into the Ministry of Welfare (Khabar Online, 2009). However, so far, the IKRC authorities have strongly opposed the plan. Anwari, IKRC’s Superintendent, regards the supporters of incorporation as ignorant people, who, according to him, are not mature enough to realize the sanctity of this institution (Mīqāt, September 2011, p. 4).

It is necessary to mention that politically, the top leadership of IKRC is controlled by the leaders of the conservative Islamic Coalition Party (ICP; Hizb-e Mu’talifih-e Islami). The party was established in 1963 under the patronage of Ayatollah Khomeini (Latifi Pakdih, 2013, p. 8).

In fact, the top leaderships of IKRC and ICP are identical. For instance, the former leader of ICP, Askarawladi (1932–2013), was the Supreme Leader’s representative at the IKRC Central Council. Among the Iranian leaders, Askarawladi was widely regarded as spiritual father of IKRC. The other authorities of IKRC such as Taraghi, Nayeri, and Haji Rahimi and others are also members of ICP’s leadership cadre.

As far as the funding sources of IKRC are concerned, Article 8 of IKRC statute mentions several sources. Its first source is the government. IKRC has a separate budget-line in the country’s public budget. In the fiscal year 1396 (2016–2017), IKRC received 43,723,071 million rials (approximately US$1.25 billion) from the public budget (Planning and Strategic Monitoring Department, 2016, pp. 135–136). However, it is clearly mentioned in the budget draft that this amount is considered as donation and confirmed expenditure. It means that IKRC is not accountable to give report on the spending of the said amount.

The second financial source is the Supreme Leader. According to Hamid Reza Taraghi, IKRC’s Undersecretary for Cultural Affairs, the Supreme Leader, is the major source of funding for IKRC (Risālat, 2007, p. 7). In fact, since its establishment, the IKRC has enjoyed the generosity of Iran’s religious leaders Ayatollah Khomeini and his successor Ali Khamenei. For instance, on 7 February 1985 Khomeini ordered that some properties from the Mustaẓ’cafān Foundation be transferred to IKRC (Public Relation Office of IKRC, 2012, p. 58). Following that over 100 agricultural and industrial industries, huge pieces of properties controlled by Mustaẓcafān Foundation were transferred to IKRC. Later on, some other confiscated properties controlled by the Supreme Leader were also transferred to IKRC (Economic Complex of IKRC, n.d.[a]). Similarly, on 13 May 1986 Khomeini ordered that all unclaimed properties and two-fifth of the properties of the convicted people be given to IKRC (Public Relation Office of IKRC, 2012, p. 60).

The third financial source of IKRC is public donation, zakat, vows and alms (Public Relation Office of IKRC, 2012, pp. 11–12). The Iranian Supreme Leader always urges the IKRC authorities to mobilize religious donations and endowments (see Public Relation Office of IKRC, 2012, p. 71). In line with this, IKRC is believed to be the most successful fund raiser in Iran. There are 7,620,000 donation boxes installed by IKRC in part of the country (Mīqāt, August 2012a, pp. 1–2). Giving alms and vows is very common among the Iranians particularly the middle class, being considered as “repulsing the evil” (dafc balā). Based on observations, most of the people drop an amount however small into the first IKRC donation box on their way to work almost every morning. Even if they buy some things and the seller does not have change at the moment, the buyer would request him to drop the remnant amount later into an IKRC box. Therefore, IKRC collects a significant amount out of these boxes.

For instance, Sattari, Deputy Superintendent Public Donation Affairs, reported that from March to September 2009, the IKRC had collected 185 billion rials (approximate US$15,416,000). He predicted that by February 2010 the sum would reach up to 285 billion rials (approximate US$23,750,000) (Mīqāt, January 2010, p. 8). However, Anwari, makes it clear that the fund collected through these boxes are never used for administrative purpose, but for cultural support of the poor people and would be done under the direct supervision of the representatives of the Supreme Leader (Mīqāt, March 2004, p. 6). As of 2017 the total income of IKRC from public donations reached to 12,000 billion rials (approximate US$342,857,000) (Islamic Republic of Iran’s Broadcasting News Agency, 2017).

In addition, there are also several charity institutions which contribute to IKRC budget. Since the IKRC is affiliated to the Supreme Leader, giving donation to it is considered as an expression of loyalty to the Supreme Leader, the Islamic political system, and the Shia cause. As of 2009, over 750 charity organizations and civil networks were collaborating with IKRC (Mīqāt, January 2010, p. 8). It goes to say that the IKRC is also generating income through its own economic activities. For this purpose, it has established an independent institution, Economic Complex of Imam Khomeini Relief Committee (Mujtamac e IqtiSādī Kumitih e Imdād e Imām Khomeini). The institution is currently running 13 agro-industrial complexes across the country (Economic Complex of Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, n.d.[b]).

With such huge resources under its control, the IKRC is nominally working as relief-providing organization, but there are ideological objectives behind IKRC’s relief efforts. The relief efforts of IKRC are designed in such a way to enhance the grand ideological objective of Iran’s theocratic political system (Sarkhayl, n.d., p. 88). These relief efforts are supposed to target the masses, and generate support for the foreign policy of Iran from within the recipient societies (Fattahi, 2008, p. 136). The ideological nature of IKRC relief services is also visible through the statements of IKRC’s authorities and other Iranian leaders. For instance, Anwari says, “IKRC is a revolutionary institution, and belongs to vilāyat-e faqih system, and whatever it does, must be in accordance with this perspective” (Mīqāt, September 2013, p. 4).

Moreover, the Shia religious authorities stationed in Qom Seminary often hold meetings with IKRC authorities, and instruct them to promote Shiism through relief efforts. For example, Ayatollah Makaram in his meeting with the members of IKRC Central Council in May 2012, emphasized on religious education of the poor people alongside their material assistance (Mīqāt, May 2012a, p. 13). He specifically urged the IKRC authorities to support Shia seminaries. It is important for the IKRC authorities to follow the instruction of such religious authorities, as these individuals are key sponsors of IKRC activities. For instance, Ayatollah Makarem contributed six billion rials (approximate US$5,000,000) only for a single event—Emotions’ Festival (jashn e cātifihā)—organized by IKRC in October 2013 (Mīqāt, September 2013, p. 7).

In consonance with above, the IKRC authorities emphasize on the cultural aspects of IKRC services. There are hundreds of IKRC staff who are specifically called “cultural associates,” whose task is to ensure that all IKRC services are accompanied with cultural and ideological elements. At the biannual conference of IKRC cultural associates held in May 2012, Syed Mahmoud Hussaini, the then Education Minister of Iran, stated,

Every major industrial, technical, agricultural and developmental project should have a cultural annexure .... It is a great pleasure that IKRC, which is one of the symbols of nizam [Islamic political system of Iran], offers its all services within the cultural framework. Anyone who does not perform his duty within the cultural package, instead of service, he is committing treachery. The country needs cultural package in all programs. (Mīqāt, May 2012b, pp. 40–41)

At the same occasion, the IKRC Superintendent, Anwari, emphasized that all services of the IKRC should have cultural footing, and the IKRC’s cultural and service sections should work concurrently. He said, “In order to transform the thinking foundations of the IKRC clients, we need to invest according to the principles and values of our religion” (Mīqāt, May 2012b, p. 42). “At IKRC we are seeking to infuse into our clients the thoughts and religious views which are originated from [the teachings of] Quran and ahl-ul-bayt [Shiism]” he added (Mīqāt, May 2012b, p. 42). Similarly, Hamid Reza Taraghi, General Secretary of IKRC’s Central Council, said, “Cultural activities are valuable opportunities which should not be missed, and we must use every single moment of our contact with the client for cultural activity” (Mīqāt, May 2012b, p. 42).

IKRC: Activities, Strategies, and Achievements

Over the years the IKRC has emerged as one of the most important players in Iran’s “aid diplomacy” front. Its services include organizing collective marriage ceremonies for young couples, establishing schools, orphanages, mosques, and hospitals, sponsoring pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, organizing trips to the shrines of Shia imams in different countries, distributing substantial items to the poor and sponsoring school and university students. These services are offered by IKRC’s international outlets in several countries. Lebanon was the first country where IKRC established its office following an order by the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1366 SH (1987–1988) (IKRC Annual Statistical Report, 2012–2013 p. 333). Later on, IKRC extended its activities to other countries. In 2013, it was running over 282 permanent centers in seven countries, namely Lebanon, Syria, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Iraq, Comoro Islands, and Afghanistan. These centers gave assistance to 27,267 households with a total population of 83,327 people (IKRC Annual Statistical Report, 2012–2013).

In addition to the countries where IKRC has established permanent offices, there are countries such as Pakistan and Myanmar where IKRC is working on ad hoc basis. In some regions such as Palestine where IKRC cannot be engaged directly, it is giving assistance by cash. In 2013, it donated 5.4 billion rials (approximate US$450,000) to Palestine (IKRC Annual Statistical Report, 2012–2013, p. 354). The IKRC authorities also claim that many other countries have formally requested for IKRC services, but they make it clear that IKRC would go to those countries after the approval of Iranian leaders, and would work in the direction of Iran’s foreign policy goals and objectives (IKRC Annual Statistical Report, 2012–2013, p. 332).

However, in the recent years, the Islamic Republic has been struggling with serious economic problems due to international sanctions imposed over its nuclear programs. The Syrian civil war, to which Iran is an active player, has also been an additional problem. The overall situation has forced the IKRC to introduce some structural changes in relation to its international set up. In this regard, the IKRC’s Superintendent on 14 February 2017 announced that the nature of the IKRC’s international branches would be changed. According to him, the IKRC international branches would utilize their local and indigenous capacities to fund their activities. In order to avoid any public criticism, he asserted that these branches would have no financial burden for the Islamic Republic, and only would cash on Ayatollah Khomeini’s name. In the meantime, the IKRC International Office was also renamed as the IKRC International Coordination Office (Tasnim News Agency, 2017).

As noted in the previous section, IKRC is conducting its activities not only on humanitarian ground but doctrinal intention. The IKRC Annual Report, 2012–2013 [1391 HS], under the section “Statement of IKIC”s pivotal values’, clearly mentions “centrality of “vilāyat,” a key concept in Shia political thought, as one of its core values (IKRC Annual Statistical Report, 2012–2013, p. 18.). Similarly, IKRC Annual Report 2008–2009 (1391 HS), quotes imam Sadiq, the sixth Shia imam, who said, “God has created a group of people and has selected them to meet the needs of our Shias” (IKRC Annual Statistical Report, 2008–2009, p. 439).

To enter into a country, the IKRC chooses its strategies according to the ground realities of its target society. In this regard, natural catastrophes are suitable situations, in which IKRC under the guise of relief efforts can engage in missionary activities, and promote Shia doctrinal values. When the Buddhist–Muslim feuds erupted in Myanmar in 2012, IKRC immediately sent its relief team to the affected areas. However, as reported by ABWA News Agency, besides its relief services, IKRC also distributed hundreds of copies of a book (translated into Burmese language) freely among the refugee camps. The title of the book is Make Your Judgment (qadhāwat bā shumāst) and its main theme is which one—Shiism and Sunnism—is the right religion (ABWA News Agency, n.d.).

Meanwhile, as reported by daily Kayhan, the IKRC delegation also met with the Shia political activists in Myanmar (Kayhān, 2013, p. 13). Similarly, in 2011 following the flood disaster in Pakistan, Anwari personally visited Pakistan. Besides meeting with the disaster management authorities of Pakistan, he met that country’s Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, during which Anwari reportedly offered the Pakistani minister to jointly work on exerting religious values in relief efforts (Mīqāt, September 2010, p. 2).

However, the most common strategy of IKRC is to develop a friendly environment in the target country with the help of Iranian top officials. That is because the IKRC’s relief activities are subsidiary to its cultural and propagation activities and hence, they easily lead to suspicion in recipient societies. An example can be seen in 2008, when the Azerbaijani authorities seized the IKRC relief items, and publicly set them on fire in Lankaran city, Azerbaijan (Anwari, 2009, p. 21). Therefore, it is crucial to IKRC that the political authorities of its host country are taken into confidence. For this purpose, several top level diplomatic exchanges take place between Iran and the target country before IKRC arrives. These diplomatic exchanges allow IKRC to freely operate on the ground without causing any suspicion in its target country.

For instance, the IKRC Office in Comoros was established after series of negotiations between Iranian political and cultural authorities with Comorian leaders, which was followed by an official visit of the special representative of Iran’s Supreme Leader to Comoros (IKRC Annual Statistical Report, 2012–2013, p. 465). Then, Ahmadinejad inaugurated the Comoros Office (Anwari, 2009, p. 21). Soon afterwards, a delegation from Comoros comprising the Head of Comoros Broadcasting, General Secretary of the Association of Comoros’ Jurist-consults (muftis), and the prayer leader of the Moroni’s grand mosque, visited Iran on IKRC invitation (IKRC Annual Statistical Report, 2008–2009, p. 465). In Iran, the delegation met with the representative of the Supreme Leader and some officials from Al-Mustafa International University (MIU) (IKRC, Annual Statistical Report 2012–2013, 465). It is necessary to note that MIU is also a public diplomacy institution which is the in-charge of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s “educational diplomacy” (see Ra’ees & Bani Kamal, 2018). The very composition of the Comorian delegates, and introducing them to MIU authorities clearly show how a relationship which had initially been established on humanitarian ground, in its later stage was deliberately manipulated for political purposes.

On moving into a society, the most important strategy of the IKRC is to target the youngsters from downtrodden layers of that particular society. That is why the IKRC’s relief efforts are, by and large, focused on students, youth and children, particularly the orphans. However, these people are not only recipients of assistance, but also pushed to participate in various religious–cultural programs conducted by the IKRC’s cultural outlets. As reported by IKRC Education and Training Director, Behrooz Mehrabanian, the IKRC is running 102 cultural centers. These centers are conducting programs related to Shiism and the life stories of Shia imams for 50,000 clients (Mīqāt, 2013, p. 12). Anwari admits that cultural programs are given top priority in IKRC. He asserts that these religious–cultural activities have reached to the grassroot families (Safīrān e Nūr, 2013, p. #1). Amongst various religious–cultural modules, one can mention about the book reading competitions, which IKRC regularly holds among its clients, but the books selected for these competitions are Shia religious texts carefully chosen for such purposes.

The IKRC offers a variety of incentives to attract its clients to its religious–cultural programs. In this regard, the IKRC funded camping and trips are of particular importance. Most of these trips and camping are religious pilgrimage to Shia holy places, particularly to the shrines of Shia imams in different parts of the world. It has been observed that a Shia religious cleric, always accompanies the participants as a guide and mentor throughout the trip and camping. Hence, they are suitable places for ideological indoctrination because the participants are detached from their families and surroundings, and would live in an environment as designed by IKRC cultural and propagation experts.

Mir Shekar, IKRC Deputy for Cultural Affairs, clearly says that the cultural message of IKRC should be conveyed through camping programs, dormitory complexes, cultural clubs, and student associations (Mīqāt, May 2012b, p. 43). Likewise, Anwari asserts that cultural, educational, and camping activities are the inseparable parts of IKRC services (Mīqāt, August 2012b, p. 7). He discloses that these camping and trips are organized on religious grounds and gives an example of the trip to Imam Redha mausoleum in Mash’had city of Iran, and argues that such trips would lighten faith in the hearts of the participants (Mīqāt, August 2012b, p. 7). Therefore, it is not surprising to know that from April to September 2012, over 15,000 IKRC clients were sent to different Shia holy places (Mīqāt, November 2012a, p. 1, 7). There are cases where the mothers of orphans and underage children accompany them, as it was done in October 2012, when the IKRC sponsored 40 orphans along with their mothers in Iraq, to visit Iranian holy cities of Qom and Mash’had (Mīqāt, November 2012b, p. 4).

The IKRC has always been under criticism for its international activities, instead of focusing on needy Iranians and the level of criticism has increased in the recent years. In this regard, the most significant incident happened in May 2018, when Iranian Press TV aired a report on the IKRC’s program to provide 300,000 Palestinians with daily Iftar (meal eaten by Muslims after sunset during the fasting month of Ramadan) from May 16 to June 15, 2018 (Press TV, 18 May 2018). Reacting to this, Iranians launched a campaign on social media, using the Hashtag No to the IKRC asking citizens to break donation boxes or throw those into dustbin. Many users responded to this call, and shared their video clips on social media. However, the head of the IKRC stated that: “the program [in Palestine] is a part of the very existence philosophy of the IKRC, and the campaign [no to the IKRC] is a conspiracy initiated by the agents of Zionists” (Manoto News, 2018).

IKRC Activities in Afghanistan

The 1979 revolution in Iran coincided with the USSR invasion of Afghanistan and was followed by the Afghan civil resistance which forced the USSR to leave that country in 1989. However, it already caused Afghanistan to be engulfed in a civil war, and as a result, displacing many Afghan families who took refuge in neighboring countries. Iran became one of the main hosts of Afghan refugees, given its 864-km-long border with Afghanistan (Haft Lang, 2003, p. iv).

The Iranian leaders and scholars give augmented figures about the value of services Iran has provided to Afghan refugees. But based on observations from 1990 to 2000, the Afghan refugees were deprived of any legal status during their refuge in Iran. They were subject to discrimination both legally and socially. They were not allowed to own a car, have a driving license, or business permit. Socially, they were faced with regular racist and discriminative behavior on a daily basis, at the bus stations, in hospitals, and in queues at the bakery. The majority of Afghan refugees were working on daily wages with much lower payment when compared with their Iranian counterparts and they were not entitled to any social security.

Contrary to such treatment of the Afghan refugees in Iran, the Iranian leaders demonstrated interest in helping Afghans within Afghanistan. In line with this, the IKRC established two offices in Kabul in 1992 following an order by Iran’s Supreme Leader. In 1994, it opened offices in Mazar-e-Sharif, and Bamian. In 1995, IKRC opened an office in Yakawlang, Bamian. The escalation of the civil war led to the closure of IKRC Kabul offices in 1996 but the IKRC was determined to operate in Afghanistan, so it established two other offices within the same year in Pol Khumri, (Baghlan) and Panjab (Bamian). However, all offices were closed in 1998 following the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan (IKRC Annual Statistical Report, 2012–2013, p. 456).

In 2001 the Taliban government was removed by the American and allied forces and the IKRC immediately resumed its activities in January 2002 in Kabul. In the following year, it opened its offices in Herat and Zaranj, Nimruz (IKRC, Annual Statistical Report 2012–2013, p. 246). In the latter years, IKRC offices experienced a mushrooming increase. As of 2012, there were 130 IKRC offices and centers operating in Afghanistan (IKRC, Annual Statistical Report 2012–2013, p. 347). In 2013, the IKRC centers provided service to 5,086 families with a total population of 21,084. In addition to this, according to the IKRC Annual Report 2012–2013 [1391 Hijrī Shamsī, HS], 5,965 persons received services on occasional basis (IKRC Annual Statistical Report, 2012–2013, p. 347).

However, a micro analysis of IKRC offshoots reveals a clearer picture of what the IKRC has been doing in Afghanistan. Out of 130 IKRC offices in Afghanistan, there are only four health centers, 117 are training centers, another four are cultural centers and the one is a library (IKRC Annual Statistical Report, 2012–2013, p. 347). Thus, the major portion of IKRC’s Afghanistan machinery consists of its training and cultural centers, rather than relief centers.

Similarly, according to the IKRC Annual Report 2012–2013 [1391 HS], the IKRC has offered medical services to 1,863 persons and only one family has received assistance in housing sector. On the other hand, 9,643 school students and 189 university and seminary students have been under the sponsorship of the IKRC. Besides, it has sponsored a number of school and university teachers (IKRC Annual Statistical Report, 2012–2013, p. 347).The sharp disparity between cultural and non-cultural services suggests that IKRC is pursuing its ideological goals as enshrined in its constitution. The nature of programs and activities which IKRC is conducting in relation to its sponsored students also seem ideological. For instance, in August 2009, Masoud Ashkan, the then head of IKRC Afghanistan Chapter, announced that his office had conducted a book-reading competition among IKRC sponsored students, and 40 students had been awarded. He disclosed that the book had been The political will of Imam Khomeini (Āftāb e Yazd, 2009, p. 11).

Additionally, according to Reza Salam Abadi, Head of IKRC Afghanistan Chapter, IKRC would pay 30 percent of expense forall students who are studying at those institutions whose Islamic values are consistent with the ideology of Iranian political system. He also mentioned that such students could get additional 1,000 afghani (approximate US$18), if they involve in the IKRC’s cultural activities (Jam e Jam, 2013, p. 17). The IKRC’s sponsored students also play an important background role in Iranian sponsored events; for instance, in 2008 a children rally was staged in front of the UN Office in Afghanistan. The event was highlighted as a spontaneous action by Afghan children to show their solidarity with Palestinian children. During the event the participant children in a symbolic act donated their savings to Palestinian children. Later, some children disclosed to the media that they had received money from IKRC to donate the amount for Palestinian children during the event (Majidyar, Ahmad, & Alfoneh, 2010, p. 3).

One of the prominent strategies of IKRC is to sponsor collective marriage ceremonies for the unprivileged couples. However, the timing of these functions is carefully chosen to convey a Shia political and religious message and such programs are always scheduled on those days which are important on Shia calendar. For instance, the IKRC organized a collective marriage ceremony for 42 Afghan couples in Kabul on 6 August 2009, the birthday of Imam Mahdi, the twelfth Shia Imam (Afghan Voice Agency, 2009). According to an informed source, to be eligible for such a sponsorship, the couples need to undergo different intensive courses and counseling all designed on Shia principles (Anonymous Interview, 3 February 2014).

Apart from services in which the IKRC is directly involved, and the number of clients it is assisting in Afghanistan, according to informed sources, the IKRC clients are much more than the number stated in its annual report. They assert that in some parts of Afghanistan, IKRC is conducting its activities through its Afghan Shia allies, and/or the civil society institution which are controlled by Shias (Anonymous Interview, 10 January 2014). This claim seems valid if one takes into account the statement made by the head of IKRC Afghanistan Chapter in his interview with daily Jam e Jam on 9 June 2013. He disclosed that his office was offering services to 170,000 persons in Afghanistan on a regular basis. He also disclosed that besides its direct involvement, the IKRC was sponsoring several cultural institutions in Afghanistan (Jam e Jam, 9 June 2013, p. 17).

The IKRC has established a subsidiary charity institution in Afghanistan with several branches in different parts of the country. It is named after the ninth Shia Imam and known as Imam Jawad Foundation (Mu’assissih-e-Imam Jawād). The foundation is conducting a project aimed at introducing the twelve Shia imams to the school children in Afghanistan.Under this project, at the beginning of every educational year the foundation distributes stationaries, and other items such as bags, clothes etc. to the school children in Afghanistan in the name of one imam respectively. It is specifically printed on every item that the item is a gift from that particular imam (Anonymous Interview, 10 January 2014).

The foundation also runs the Tawhid [monotheism] School in Herat. The school is a standard school and as such, even Sunni families enroll their children at this school. In fact, it is one of the most important educational strategies of IKRC to establish standard schools, so that it can attract talented children. In 2013, the Tawhid School distributed a CD whose title was ‘Reappearance is around the corner (zuhūrnazdīkast)’. The CD contained religious quotations, ahadiths (tradition of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)) and rawayat (narrations from Shia imams), claiming that Imam Mahdi, who according to Shia belief system is alive living in occultation, would reappear very soon. The distribution of this CD stood controversial as the families of some students protested and this led to the closure of the school temporarily but was reopened following the intervention of the Iranian diplomatic mission in Herat (Anonymous Interview, 12 March 2014).

Besides its open activities, the IKRC role in Afghanistan should be seen in the context of the larger role of Iran in post-Taliban Afghanistan. As noted earlier, the IKRC’s Superintendent clearly says that the main task of IKRC is to pave the ground for other Iranian institutions at worst international situations (Safīrān-e Nūr, 2012, pp. 1 & 6).Therefore, although the IKRC was in Afghanistan long before, its role became more important following the US invasion of Afghanistan and the removal of Taliban in 2001 as the American and NATO forces reached next to the Iranian borders.

In its first step, Iran appointed someone by the name Hassan Kazemi Qomi, one of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard commander and liaison to Hezbollah in Lebanon, as Counsel General in Herat (Majidyar & Alfoneh, 2010, p. 3). Another Revolutionary Guard’s commander, Kazem Mash’hadi, was appointed as head of IKRC Office in Herat. In the meantime, Khātam al-Anbīyā Construction Company took charge of constructing a highway from the Iranian border to Herat. The company is owned by Islamic Revolutionary Guard and is the parent company of 812 subsidiary companies (Calabresi, 10 June 2010). It is also in the list of the UN sanction (United Nations Security Council, 9 June 2010).

To bring a pro-Shia demographic change in the Sunni dominated Herat, the company also initiated a number of settlement projects naming them after Shia imams, such as Taqi, Naqi, and vali e asr (Mahdi). According to local sources, the majority of the real estates of these settlements are owned by Shias, who were brought from other parts of Afghanistan, particularly Bamian. They assert that the IKRC, under the guise of its relief programs, is covertly giving loan to these Afghan Shias. They are gradually dominating Herat’s market, as can be seen in the fact that, the majority of the Jewelry shops in Herat are owned by them (Anonymous Interviews sometime singular, 10 January 2014).

It is necessary to note that the heyday of the IKRC activities in Afghanistan was during the early years of Hamid Karzai’s government. From one side, the Afghan government was premature, thus it would welcome relief offers from any country. On the other hand, it had no proper mechanism to monitor these efforts. As a result, the IKRC quickly got an upper hand given its earlier experience and a pre-existing infrastructure in Afghanistan, as well as language and cultural affinity with Afghans. Karzai’s anti-American temperament and his good relations with Iran also contributed a lot. He did not see any problem with the IKRC’s activities as he himself was receiving bags of dollars from Iranian authorities on his visits to Iran (The Guardian, 2010). During his tenure, the IKRC also expanded its activities beyond Shia-dominated regions to include many Sunni-dominated areas. It aimed to bring a gradual demographic change in these cities, propagate Iran’s official ideology among the poor, as well as to hide the sectarian nature of its efforts.

However, in the closing years of the Karzai government, the situation began changing. By then the IKRC activities were noticed by the Western media and think-tanks. On 5 August 2013, the Christian Science Monitor published a detailed account of IKRC’s engagement in Afghanistan, and its role in enhancing Iran’s “soft power.” It informed about the IKRC’s extensive network of charity works and community service in Afghanistan particularly in the Herat province. According to the report, the IKRC services in Afghanistan ranges from “payments of $220 to newlyweds and $600–$800 loans for farmers, to helping 7,000 families and 72,000 orphans” (Peterson, 2013).

Similarly, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, published a report in September 2013 which informed about the IKRC’s activities in predominantly Shia regions in Afghanistan such as Bamian and the Northern region, particularly those areas which were previously the sphere of influence of the United Front Party (Koepke, 2013, p. 11). Ali Alfoneh, from “Foundation for Defense of Democracies,” asserts that, on the surface, the IKRC “is an ordinary charity rendering humanitarian assistance to the poor communities in Afghanistan but in reality however, it is exploiting a variety of soft-power tools to further the Iranian government’s political and ideological agenda” (Majidyar & Alfoneh, 2010, p. 3).

Moreover, some Afghan politicians became equally suspicious of the IKRC activities in their country. In this regard, perhaps the most important disclosure was an article by Amrullah Salih, the former Head of Afghanistan’s Intelligence Service, which was published by BBC’s Pashto service. In his article, Salih explicitly accused the Iranian government and its institutions for intervening into the domestic affairs of Afghanistan (Salih, 2013). Not much later, a much more straightforward statement came from Bilqis Roshan, a member of the Afghan Senate Assembly from Farah province, who called the IKRC a “spy-breeding hub” (8Subh, 2013, p. 4). In the meantime, Karzai was succeeded by Ashraf Ghani, who did not have the same anti-American temperament as his predecessor had. Additionally, the Iranian secret relations with the Taliban became evident to Afghan authorities. Even reports about an official Taliban’s delegation’s clandestine visit to Tehran came into the surface (Shargh, 2015).

The overall situation generated more suspicions about the IKRC activities in Afghanistan. Perhaps due to these allegations, the IKRC has stopped reporting about its activities in Afghanistan since 2014. Though the IKRC offices in Afghanistan are still operating, there is almost no report about their specific activities in this country in the newspapers or online fora. Yet, the fact is that the Islamic Republic of Iran has already began harvesting the fruits of IKRC efforts in the form of recruitment of poor Afghan citizens under the Fatimiyoon Brigade. The brigade is fighting a sectarian war in Syria. According to the recent report over 2,000 of the people have been killed while 8,000 others are injured (AFP, 6 January 2018).

Conclusion

Aid diplomacy is one of the main components of public diplomacy. Many countries use aid and humanitarian assistance to enhance their soft power and promote their national interests. Aid and humanitarian assistance help countries to leave a memorable image about themselves among the recipient countries as well. Iran is using the instrument of “aid” to promote its ideological and political objectives as part of its “exporting the revolution” project. For this purpose, Iran has established a conglomerate, the IKRC. This institution is playing an important role in Iran’s “aid diplomacy” front, or what is known as “Iran’s support diplomacy.” However, the major portion of the IKRC activities falls onto the category of relief efforts rather than large scale aid. The IKRC under the guise of “aid and relief efforts,” is promoting Shia values among its clients. The empirical evidence from Afghanistan and other parts of the world clearly validate this view. Through its “support diplomacy” Iran has succeeded in penetrating into the poor layers of several Muslim countries including Afghanistan.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.