Re-adapting to Changing Middle Eastern Politics: The Modification in Turkey’s Actor Perception and Turkey-Free Syrian Army (FSA) Relations

Abstract

This article investigates the current modification in Turkey’s actor perception according to the Middle East’s changing dynamics. Clarifying the shift in Turkish foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party (JDP) and the emergent structural realities in the Middle East as a result of increasing agency of the violent non-state actors (VNSAs) in the aftermath of several Arab revolutions, the current article scrutinizes the adaption of Turkish foreign policy to these regional realities. In this context, to prove Turkey’s active orientation toward the recent regional environment, its exceptional engagement with one of the important VNSAs, namely the Free Syrian Army (FSA) or Syrian National Army (SNA), has been empirically examined. Within this background, the current resurrection of the VNSAs in the Middle East and regional-global actors’ reactions to this reality will also be analyzed. Afterward, Turkey’s unique and swift compliance with this reality and the consequent modification of its actor perception will be explored.

Keywords

Turkey Free Syrian Army (FSA)Violent Non-State Actors Arab revolutions

Introduction

After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey after World War I, the Turkish decision-makers developed a foreign policy doctrine, and this doctrine has largely guided state behavior since then. First of all, the new regime continued the modernization and Westernization project of the late Ottoman administrations. Indeed, the new republic went further and created a Western-oriented foreign policy, which led to a major disengagement with the Middle East. Thus, the regime largely aimed to keep the republic out of the problematic Ottoman legacy that ruled most of the Middle East for centuries and had then lost control over that region with the First World War. The Western-oriented policy further deepened and institutionalized under the Cold War circumstances, and Turkey became a part of the Western camp. Since then, Turkey has developed limited relations with the Middle East. Yet, some developments related to the Cyprus issue and Kurdish problem forced Turkey, on occasions, to build up its contacts with several Middle Eastern countries and consequently to show more attention to regional affairs.

Along with Western-centralism, Turkey followed a non-interference policy for a long time to keep the country out of any trouble originated both at the regional and global affairs. By formulating this non-interference policy through the famous quote of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, “Peace at home, peace in the world,” the new regime insisted upon avoiding any conflict that would negatively affect the stability and development of the country.

As the last point, the Turkish governments have seen state sovereignty as the main protector of both regional and national security and stability. For that reason, under any circumstances, they have avoided any attempt against the territorial integrity of all states in the region. Moreover, the terrorist actions of the Partîya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK) solidified Turkish statist policy by creating a decisive stance against any attempt to state sovereignty. By considering all these, the Turkish administrations developed a foreign policy understanding based on Western-oriented, non-interference minded and statist (Işıksal, 2018, p. 18).

Despite this traditional foreign policy, nowadays, the Turkish decision-makers pursue partially different policies. Middle Eastern politics is seen as one of the fundamental issues of the foreign policy agenda; the Turkish government organizes military operations in Iraq, Syria, and Libya and more importantly, it does not avoid having strong relations with non-state actors such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA). This shift in Turkish foreign policy creates a puzzle that deserves an academic inquiry. For that reason, the main goal of this article is to investigate why and how this shift in Turkey’s actor perception occurred.

As the main argument of this study, it is claimed that the shift in the Turkish foreign policy is suited to the structural realities and changes in the Middle Eastern politics that occurred because of the capabilities and policies of the regional actors/agents. To explain these arguments, the article focused on Turkish foreign policy toward the Syrian civil war and its cooperation with a violent non-state actor (VNSA) that is the FSA. It is argued that the Arab revolutions strikingly demonstrated the VNSAs that could manipulate the fate of the whole region and become an indisputable part of the regional structure as alternative actors. To begin with, it is argued that Turkey, which is willing to strengthen its status both regionally and globally, is partially moving away from its traditional foreign policy understanding and, in conformity with this structural reality, prefers to cooperate with the FSA.

To defend these arguments, initially, the study explained the shifting policies in Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis the Middle East during the Justice and Development Party (JDP) era and the rising importance of the VNSAs as actors following the Arab revolutions. Subsequently, the study focused on the Syrian civil war and the specific reasons for Turkey’s involvement in this conflict. Lastly, after elaborating on Turkey’s notable alignment with several VNSAs, the content, domains, and possibilities of the Turkish–FSA relations will be evaluated as an empirical indication of Turkey’s modifying actor perception.

Arab Revolutions and the Shift in the Turkish Foreign Policy

The Arab Revolutions shook the political status quo of the region. It initially led to several political transformations, either democratically or forcefully, by putting an end to the decades-long regimes in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt. However, in some countries like Syria, Libya, and Yemen, the process transformed into bloody civil wars. These socio-political transformations pushed many regional and external actors to re-position their foreign policies accordingly. Similarly, in Turkey, these social and political changes and the non-state actors leading these changes created concerns and a quest to re-position itself, since these revolutions directly challenged the several pillars of Turkey’s traditional foreign policy. The revolutions required a certain focus on the Middle East against the non-interference policy; the internal conflicts of several Middle Eastern countries damaged the economic interests of the country and raised security and humanitarian concerns; lastly, the driving actors of the revolutions were largely the non-state organizations. On the other hand, it would be a huge mistake to relate the shift in Turkish foreign policy directly to the Arab revolutions. Instead, it should be evaluated as a part of a comprehensive process formulated by the JDP after it came to power in 2002 (Aras & Falk, 2016, pp. 2252–2258; Salamey, 2015, pp. 111–129; Dalacoura, 2012, pp. 63–79, Keyman, 2016, pp. 2274–2287; Öniş, 2014, pp. 203–219).

After gaining power, the JDP government began to deconstruct the traditional foreign policy understanding by criticizing it as too passive and status quo based, which was limiting the country’s potential capability (Demirtaş, 2013, p. 111). For that reason, the JDP government formulated a liberal-oriented foreign policy based on developing mutual relations with, especially, its immediate environment. As described in an article written by Hakan Fidan, Director of the National Intelligence Organization, Turkey has been developing a new foreign policy that “relies heavily on diplomacy, engagement, and dialogue with parties to conflicts and…seeks to address regional crises with broad-based participation” and also focuses on “promoting closer economic integration in the neighboring regions and beyond in an effort to deepen interdependence” (Fidan, 2013, p. 91).

Within this “Zero-problem with neighbors” policy, the JDP governments have sought to recover and strengthen political and economic ties with the Middle East, especially with the Arab world, which had worsened and been pushed into the background with the Westernization project of the previous governments. In other words, the JDP strived to use “soft power” to gain influence in the Middle East. For instance, before the uprisings started, Turkish-Syrian economic relations were enhanced to a high-level point that a free trade area between the two countries was about to be built ( Demirtaş, 2013, pp. 111–112; Oztig, 2019, p. 120).

With both the liberal “zero-problem” policy and the rising emphasis on cultural–historical emphasis with the Middle Eastern countries, the JDP administrations modified their Western-based foreign policy agenda and pursued a more multi-dimensional strategy by deeply engaging with other regions, specifically the Middle East. Therefore, when the Arab revolutions started, Turkey was building relations with the Middle Eastern regimes. The Arab revolutions accelerated this process, and Middle Eastern politics became the priority in the Turkish foreign policy agenda. Against this background, the JDP administrations interpreted the Arab revolutions as an opportunity to raise the country’s influence. It was estimated that with the revolutions in many countries, the old pro-Western regimes would be replaced by the several Islamic-oriented or conservative groups, the most powerful opposition groups demanding democratic transition in their countries and were close to the JPD’s worldview. Thus, the JPD administration assumed that the post-revolution region would be more suitable for their active and ambitious foreign policy (Işıksal, 2018, p. 22). For that reason, they did not refrain from directly supporting the opposition groups and their struggle against existing regimes. Moreover, specifically, the Syrian civil war accelerated the engagement process by provoking Turkey’s security concerns related to the terrorist activities of both PKK and DAESH-ISIL. For that reason, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared Turkey’s new security concept to move quickly against any potential threat wherever it emerged (TCCB, 2016b).

Thus, the Arab revolutions not only intensified Turkey’s re-position of the direction of its foreign policy but also accelerated its engagement process with Middle Eastern politics and both were a significant break-away from traditional foreign policy understanding. The JDP administration’s quest for engagement in Middle Eastern politics, especially within the Arab revolution period, brought about a major challenge to the statist dimension of the traditional foreign policy understanding as sub-state movements are now fundamental actors of Middle Eastern politics. For that reason, a new foreign policy understanding with a focus on engaging with the Middle East should involve strong relations with not only states but also sub-state organizations, especially with the VNSAs, which claim state-like autonomy in many parts of the region (Oktav, et al., 2018; Akbarzadeh, 2016, pp. 127–140).

Historically, the Middle East region has always hosted a myriad of different VNSAs. Firstly, most of the region was colonized in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and many of the contemporary states such as Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon were established under the control and guidance of the colonial powers. As is well known, the region’s borders were drawn in the famous Sykes–Picot agreement done between Great Britain and France in 1916. Also, along with borders, the colonial powers constructed their political institutions throughout the region. It is well-argued in the literature that the Western-type state mechanism and the imperial borders imposed on the region have far away been from the realities and the necessities of the local people (Aras & Yorulmazlar, 2017, p. 60; Işıksal, 2018, p. 14–15). Therefore, many sub-national groups have always questioned the colonial rule and led to the emergence of resistance factions, which could be considered the pioneer movements of the current VNSA tradition in the region. Moreover, the new establishment of the state mechanism and its inconsistency with the social realities creates weak state structures but fierce regimes based upon mere military power, leading to the emergence of suitable ground for the foundation of VNSAs. It should be underscored that over this suitable ground, the global (mainly among the US, Russia, China, and the European powers) and the regional (mainly among Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt) leadership rivalries facilitate the expansion of VNSAs (Yeşiltaş & Kardaş, 2017; Yeşiltaş & Duran, 2019; Oktav et al., 2018; Herrick, 2011, pp. 167–197; Mulaj, 2010, pp. 1–25).

The most recent example that demonstrates the power and influence of the VNSAs is the Arab revolutions which began in December 2010. Throughout these revolutions, some VNSAs intensified their internal and external activities, enabling them to have structural and regional power. Additionally, they have further empowered their territorial control where they implement their own rules, create distinct cultural symbols and allegiance relations at times (Halliday, 2001, pp. 21–23). Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, Houthi Forces in Yemen, Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq, and Haftar Forces in Libya enjoy such authority over the areas they control (Herrick, 2011, pp. 167–197; Qadri, 2019, pp. 387–414; O’Driscoll & Zoonen, 2017, pp. 1–51; Polat, 2019). Moreover, having completed the internal organization process and gained necessary military-political status, VNSAs formulate their foreign relations policies. These VNSAs produce policies to shape the regional developments and strive for a regional order that favors the bloc/axis with which they align. In other words, they position themselves within the pre-established regional polarization. This is indeed a critical moment that points out the transformation of these actors from local groups to regional partners. Such transformation reminds us of an unfolding reality that VNSAs should also be reckoned with to analyze the regional issues due to their recent empirical strength (Aydınlı, 2015, pp. 424–444; Williams, 2008, pp. 1–21; Qadri, 2019, pp. 387–414; Yeşiltaş & Kardaş, 2017).

In almost all the countries affected by the Arab revolutions, the VNSAs largely guided the opposition movements. This resurgent structural reality has largely shaped the regional–global actors’ calculations and policies, especially after the Arab revolutions and the Syrian civil war (Aras & Yorulmazlar, 2017, p. 64). It enabled the emergence of distinct alliances and alignment systems in the region and, by extension, regional–global actors overtly considered legitimate to strengthen their links with those groups. In this context, they collaborated not only with other states but also with these groups to advance their regional–global ambitions. In this manner, alliance-based engagements between some states and these groups came into existence as exemplified within intensified the US–Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), Hezbollah–Iran–Syria, and FSA–Turkey relations (Al-Husseini, 2010; Slim, 2014, pp. 61–68; Slim, 2019; Üstün, 2016). Unlike the previous decades, as a direct result of such systemic transformation, these connections have become frequent and leading to the normalization of this process.¹

Like many actors, Turkey followed suit and modified its earlier agent perception as reflected in its increasing cooperation with several VNSAs. As is largely underlined, Turkey is one of the leading pro-Westphalian countries, which primarily sticks to settled international principles and has a definite stance on recognizing states as the only legitimate actors. However, following the Arab revolutions, not only its liberal orientation but also this statist perspective was challenged (Yetim & Hamade, 2014, pp. 69–77). The shifting regional realities forced Turkey to reformulate its actor understanding, which accepted several VNSAs as alternative actors despite its constant emphasis on the Westphalian premises (AA, 2018). This change rendered Turkey’s military–political support to some VNSA groups possible. Turkey extended support to the Iraqi-based Hashdi Watani (Nineveh Guard) and forged stronger ties with the FSA, one of the most leading and legitimate armed opposition groups in Syria (Daily Sabah, 2017; Hammad, 2018). As understood from these new engagements, Turkey has already embraced the current structural reality and multiplied its actor understanding through balancing its traditional state-based Middle Eastern approach and preferred getting involved in major regional issues such as the Syrian civil war via VNSAs.

Engagement with the New Regional Realities: The Syrian Civil War and Turkish–FSA Alliance

The Syrian civil war might be the most suitable case to follow the Turkish new foreign policy and actor understanding under the JDP rule. Firstly, at the political and social levels, the national agenda has focused on the conflict and Middle Eastern politics. Secondly, the Turkish army’s three major operations with the FSA are the most significant overseas missions during the Arab Uprisings and engagement examples. Lastly, contrary to the traditional Statist foreign policy, Turkey developed an alliance with a VNSA, namely the FSA.

The Syrian Multi-dimensional Civil War and Turkey

Before moving to the Turkish–FSA relations, to understand the ground of that relation, the question of why Turkey engaged in the Syrian civil war should be answered. First, since the beginning, it was almost impossible to define the Syrian civil war as an internal war with complicated regional-international dimensions since both the regime and anti-regime forces relied on the external powers to keep up their resistance. The Assad regime enjoyed the support of Russia and Iran and other regional actors such as Hezbollah. Similarly, the opposition groups have had political and military assistance from many regional and global actors. The US, France, Great Britain, Turkey, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia have supported the opposition at different times (Ulutaş, 2016, pp. 31–37).

What makes Syria so important at the global and regional level is essential to understand these actors’ involvement, including of Turkey, in the conflict. At the global level, Syria is an important actor for Russia and the US for their policy vis-à-vis the region. On the one hand, traditionally, Russia sees Syria as one of the most important allies against the American influence in the region. On the other hand, by weakening the Syrian regime with the help of the uprising, the US planned to break the Russian influence in the region and create a much more secure environment for its most important ally Israel. For that reason, initially, the US did not hesitate to support the FSA overtly. Moreover, it has been claimed that within its “train and equipped” program, the US-trained FSA members. But it should be noted that, with the rise of the DAESH/ISIS, the US prioritized the struggle with this terrorist organization. For that reason, combating the Assad regime and the support for the FSA lost popularity in the American agenda. The US preferred focusing its support on the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Northern Syria, which was seen as an ally by Washington in the struggle against the DAESH (BBC News, 2018; Acun, 2019, pp. 299–324; Gürler & Özdemir, 2019, pp. 463–475).

Similarly, at the regional level, the Syrian case can be considered as another important theater of the power struggles between historic rivalries. There has always been a leadership rivalry among strong regional powers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. Within this power struggle, there have emerged strong alliance relations. Iran and Syria have constructed one of the most powerful alliance relations in the region, especially against Saudi Arabia. For that reason, from the beginning of the uprising, Iran has supported the Assad regime. On the contrary, states such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar aim to undermine the Iranian influence in the region by weakening the Iran-Syria block by supporting the anti-Assad groups (Carpenter, 2013, pp. 3–7). For those global and regional interests, the external powers got into the Syrian civil war. While the pro-Assad forces such as Russia and Iran were directly involved by sending their troops on the ground, the anti-Assad forces preferred to combat indirectly via mainly the FSA. The political and military mechanisms developed by the opponents in Syria have been a clear “entry point” for those anti-Assad powers to get into the Syrian civil war (Kahf, 2014, p. 557).

Along with these global and regional dimensions of the Syrian civil war, Turkey has particular reasons to engage. The National Security Council (NSC), the highest security organ of the Turkish state consisting of top-level civil and military bureaucrats, determined that the Syrian civil war is one of the country’s major security issues by giving it a place in almost all meeting declarations since 2011.² The first particular reason highlighted both in the NSC declarations and the speeches of the JDP leaders, especially of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is the presence of the terrorist organizations that threaten Turkish internal security. For instance, in the August 2012 meeting, the NSC underlined that Turkey would resist any terrorist organization that exploits the power vacuum in Syria (MGK, 2012). Historically, Turkey has considered Northern Syria a safe haven for PKK, along with its counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), as a terrorist organization, which has had separatist ambitious and violent activities within Turkey since the mid-1980s. With the beginning of the uprising, Turkey has had great concerns about the growing activities of these organizations, which would enable them to launch operations easily on Turkish soil. Their goal to establish an independent Kurdish state would embolden Kurdish separatists within Turkey (Carpenter, 2013, pp. 6–7). Along with the PKK threat, the DAESH, which managed to control a vast territory both in Iraqi and Syrian soils, had been defined as another threat by the Turkish governments since that terrorist organization further stimulated Turkey’s security concerns and threatened Turkish-FSA military presence along with Turkish minorities in Iraq and Syria (Barel, 2016; Oztıg, 2019, p. 117).

The other major concern of the Turkish government is the migration issue. After the regime’s brutal assault on Jisr al- Shughur, located close to the Turkish border, many Syrians, civilians, and combatants rushed to the border. The JDP government has followed an open-door policy since then. It is estimated that the number of Syrian immigrants approached five million in 2020, which is almost a quarter of the population at the beginning of the conflict (Worldometer, 2021). The huge number of Syrian immigrants created social and economic uneasiness in Turkey. Therefore, by engaging in the conflict, the JDP governments claim to create a suitable environment for refugees’ return to Syria.

Lastly, it can be argued that the Syrian civil war was a showcase for Turkey to demonstrate its new ambitious leadership claim in the region. With the Arab revolutions in general, the JDP government had the chance to “export” its democracy model fitted to the Islamic norms that JDP itself presents in Turkey. For that reason, it was important to help the resistance against dictatorships in the region to expand this new democratic model, and the JDP government did not hesitate to be directly involved in the Syrian civil war (Hinnebusch, 2015, pp. 15–16).

To achieve these goals, from the beginning, the Turkish government has offered a three-phase plan. Firstly, a no-fly zone should be declared to secure the civilians and protect the opposition groups from the regime’s air forces. Secondly, a security zone should be provided via a full-scale collective operation as the security zone would be useful for the safe return of the Syrian immigrants, especially from Turkey. Lastly, to support the revolution and end the Assad regime, a train and equip program for the opposition groups should be implemented (TCCB, 2014).

Operationalization of Turkish-FSA Relations

Turkey immediately produced an active policy toward the Syrian civil war with the concerns mentioned above and did not hesitate to engage in the conflict. While doing that, it seems that the VNSAs had become a structural factor that could not be ignored in regional politics and pushed Turkey to accept these non-state actors’ importance. From the beginning, like other external powers such as the US and France, Turkey realized that it was impossible to get directly involved in the conflict, and they needed the help of the FSA. Moreover, several times the JDP leaders declared that the FSA was the real representative of the Syrian opposition and people on the ground (Sputnik News, 2016). As defined by President Erdoğan, Turkey sees the FSA as “a moderate opposition group” which “strives for saving their territories” (TCCB, 2016a).

Besides, to advance its declared interests within Syria, such as eliminating People’s Protection Units’ (YPG) and DAESH terrorism, for the formation of several security zones for Syrian refugees and supporting the possible democratization process in Syria, Turkey considers the FSA as a critical actor. Consequently, Turkey allowed both the Syrian opposition’s political and military mechanisms to get organized within the Turkish borders. In the case of the FSA, Turkey’s support to the organization started with just sheltering the organization’s leaders in Turkey and increased gradually to financial and military aid, training, guiding, and lastly, combating together within the Syrian borders (Ataman & Ozdemir, 2018, p. 22; Hinnebusch, 2015, p. 17; Lister, 2016, p. 6)

It is necessary to remind that normally the Syrian uprising started with peaceful, non-violent demonstrations of several social groups that were against the authoritarian policies of the Assad regime and were affected by the general Arab revolutions in the region. The regime did not very much welcome the reform demands of these movements. Instead of considering their democratic demands, the regime preferred putting more pressure on these movements and used violent means. As an important external actor having friendly relations with Syria, Turkey initially tried to convince the Assad regime to handle the uprising moderately by compromising (Hinnebusch, 2015, p. 14), but since the regime demonstrated that they would not step back, the JDP government gave up diplomatic pressures on the regime and preferred working with the US which had been in favor of toppling the Assad regime (Demirtaş, 2013, p. 116; Öztıg, 2019, p. 117).

In the meantime, the Syrian opposition groups became militarized after the regime’s brutal crackdown against their demonstrations. The resistance got organized in two ways. On the one hand, to construct the post-Assad period, a political and non-violent mechanism called the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (NCSROF) has been built by the opponents based abroad. On the other hand, since the regime’s violent crackdown on protesters demonstrated that there was no other way besides armed struggle for possible success within Syria, many opposition groups got militarized. It became necessary to create a central leadership mechanism to solve the coordination and collaboration problems and increase the effectiveness of these local armed groups. Thus, to accomplish these objectives, with the permission of the Turkish government, the FSA was officially established by Colonel Riad Assad (a defector from the Syrian Arab Army) in July 2011 in Hatay, located at the Turkish side of the Syrian border (Aras, 2012, p. 47; Lister, 2016, p. 5). However, Assad’s organization was not the only attempt in the creation of such a central mechanism.

Meanwhile, several other high-ranking officers who defected from the Syrian Arab Army declared their claim for the revolution’s leadership. After a period of leadership debate between important rebel figures (Qabalan, 2013, p. 1), in December 2012, the Supreme Military Command (SMC) was established as the commonly accepted central leadership mechanism of the Free Syrian Army (the FSA) under the command of General Salim Idris. The SMC was founded to become the Defense Ministry of the future government designed by the NCSROF and has since been acting under its authority (MFA, 2013; O’Bagy, 2013, p. 16; Ulutaş, 2016, pp. 31–32).

As declared in the Proclamation of Principles, the FSA was established “to end the dictatorship of the Assad” regime and “to protect the Syrian civilians and to guarantee a brighter future.” It was highlighted that the organization would strive for the whole Syrian people without any discrimination and would respect “the authority of a democratically elected civilian government” (FSA Platform, 2012).

Along these lines, the alliance between Turkey and the FSA rests upon mutual gains. From the point of the FSA, the alliance with Turkey has been crucial for overcoming the groupings’ organizational weaknesses and the endurance of the revolution. Even though the FSA claimed to be the legitimate military force of the revolution, it differs from both the regular army and traditional freedom fighters in certain ways. First, it lacks organizational unity, which is a necessary element for a regular army. It is estimated that there have been dozens of different armed groups created by defectors from either the Syrian Arab Army or local civilians (Lister, 2016, p. 34).

Even though many of these groups identified themselves as a part of the FSA (Lund, 2013), these groups never became an organic part of this mechanism. Since these groups blamed the central commandership as too far away to understand and fit with the ground’s fast-changing situation, they never accepted the command of the central leadership (Spyer, 2012, p. 47). For that reason, the FSA has always had a multi-compartmental structure, which has been one of the major obstacles in the success of the revolution. Moreover, many FSA members accept that there is competition within different factions over the command of the organization (Spyer, 2012, p. 47). With the inclusion of several Jihadi-Salafist groups against the regime into the revolutionary camp, these groups got into religious and ideological conflict with each other, and this situation created a brutal internal struggle within the opposition forces (Ulutaş, 2016, p. 32).

Another important deficiency of the FSA is the military capability of the organization. In contrast to the Syrian army, the FSA has never been well equipped to have a full-scale assault; instead, they are fit for guerrilla and street fighting (Spyer, 2012, p. 47). One of the reasons for this deficiency is the sponsors of the FSA. The FSA needs financial and military aid from external powers, but in order not to deepen the level of violence and responsibility, those powers have always been reluctant to give them heavy weapons.

To overcome these deficiencies, the FSA needs military guidance to increase coordination between sub-units, safe zones which would enable them to organize their operations and to train their members without the fear of the regime’s assaults and financial and military assistance that would raise the effectiveness of the groupings (Spyer, 2012, p. 47). Turkey has been a vital actor in overcoming these deficiencies. With Turkish support, the FSA has gained a safe and secure environment both in Turkish and Syrian soils to organize its activities (O’Bagy, 2013, p. 10; Salt, 2018, p. 89). Moreover, the Turkish administration allowed and supported both political and military organization-building processes inside Turkey. In this sense, Turkish officers trained the FSA members, including high-level soldiers, to decrease the groupings’ organizational weaknesses. Lastly, Turkey has been one of the most important supporters of the groupings both in finance and equipment sustainment (Hinnebusch, 2015, p. 17).

From the Turkish perspective, even though the FSA is still far away from winning the war against the regime, which meant that the FSA’s support did not work out in the regional leadership ambitions of Turkey, this relationship provides great gains in Turkish security concerns. With the FSA’s help, Turkey successfully weakened the DAESH, which was a real threat close to the Turkish border, and Turkey managed to prevent the expansion of the PYD in the Northern regions of Syria, which paved the way for a separate Kurdish state. Along with the human resources, the FSA provides the necessary legitimacy for the Turkish operations in the Syrian territories. Although the Turkish government claims that the military operations rest upon its right to self-defense against terrorist activities of PKK/PYD and the DAESH, they also tend to justify their operations as an activity to open a life-zone for the real possessors of these lands, which are represented by the FSA. It should be noted that moving with the FSA was a deliberate choice since the Syrian opposition has widely been accepted as a legitimate social movement by the international community. For instance, many regional actors, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, and some European states such as France, the United Kingdom, and Italy recognized the NCSROF, and thus the FSA is seen as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people (Talmon, 2013, pp. 220–226). Similarly, the direct support of many external powers to the FSA demonstrates that it has been accepted as a fundamental actor in the conflict (Lister, 2016, p. 9).

Despite major support from many different actors, the FSA’s success on the ground has been uneven. With the support of the external powers, mainly Turkey, the FSA started to launch successful operations against the Syrian Arab Army and control some parts of the country. The foundation of the SMC and the FSA’s centralization increased the effectiveness of the opponents’ operations. However, the FSA’s expansion stopped through the end of 2013 with the rise of terrorist organizations DAESH and al-Nusra, the decline of the US support to the FSA, the increase of the Russian support to the Assad regime, and the internal struggles within the FSA. The retreat of the FSA caused demands within the organization. It was well-understood that centralization measures could not solve the organization’s major problems since the biggest issue in the organization was the lack of coordination between the goals of the central leadership and the demands and interests of the groups on the ground (Spyer, 2012, p. 47). To increase the effectiveness of the FSA, two large command-regions were established. While the forces in the South had direct relations with Jordan, the forces in the North belonged to Turkey (Lister, 2016, p. 13). While this new division increased the intensity of the Turkish-FSA relations, all these centralization measures and policy mechanisms had little effect on the FSA’s revitalization.

The turning point in Turkey’s relations with the FSA was its decision to launch operations on the Syrian soils to prevent the expansion of both the DAESH and the PYD actors. After Turkish pressures for a collective ground operation were rejected by the US, Turkey herself launched operations. The first full-scale operation named as the “Operation Euphrates Shield” started in 2016, and the Turkish army, along with more than 7,000 FSA combatants (Yeşiltaş et al., 2017, p. 22; Yüksel, 2019), targeted Jarablus, a border city in Northern Syria, that was held by mostly DAESH members. Again, the Turkish army, along with more than 20,000 FSA members, launched the “Operation Olive Branch”³ in 2018 that aimed at Afrin, another important Northern Syrian city under the control of the PYD. After these two operations, Turkey and the FSA gained a territory more than 3,000 kilometers in Northern Syria (Salt, 2018, p. 83). Lastly, the Turkish army started “Operation Peace Spring” in 2019, which again targeted the Ayn al-Arab (Rojava) region held by the PYD forces. With this last operation in which more than 18,000 FSA members accompanied the Turkish Army, Turkey managed to expand its safe zone to the east of Euphrates (The Defense Post, 2019). After these operations, Turkey was successful at stopping the advancement of both DAESH and the PYD forces.

The FSA contributed to the Turkish operations not only in military terms but also in security and social terms. For example, the FSA has provided main policing services within the Turkish-controlled regions. Also, the FSA helped the Turkish forces while clearing mines and other explosives left by the DAESH and the PYD (Yeşiltaş et al., 2017, p. 34). With these efforts, Turkish forces allowed the FSA to contribute to the normalization of daily life in those regions. Moreover, the Turkish officers have been training many new FSA recruits, which strengthened the organization’s human resources and enabled the FSA to regain its “important actor” status in the Syrian civil war again (Ashawi, 2018).

Conclusion

Regional revolutions in the Middle East revived a wide range of discussions and subsequently shattered long-standing regional premises concerning the democratization process, authoritarian persistence, and expansive impacts of the revolutions in this region. New concepts and frameworks were developed to account for this emerging unprecedented process and its transformative implications over the regional socio-political developments. Therefore, regional studies and the relevant theories in international relations have gradually modified their earlier arguments and have started to question their failure to predict the possible dynamics and reasons for Arab revolutions.

Putting aside this self-reflection process within regional studies and international theories, these revolutions have also exposed the empirical power and agency of the VNSAs. Although they are historically effective and important within the “modern” Middle East, these actors were mostly undervalued and considered not as an actor by most regional studies. However, in recent times, the growing power and influence of VNSAs have been at the center of regional studies.

This changing structural reality in the region not only shaped the aforementioned discussions but also partially transformed perceptions of the regional–global players toward the Middle East. Turkey is also among these countries, which adjusted its actor understanding to the resurgent agency of the VNSAs. Even though several countries have previously founded stronger relations with these actors, as in Hezbollah-Iran relations, Turkey has embraced this reality with the Arab revolutions, but in a transformation process in which it was striving to adjust its foreign policy understanding. Within this adjusting process, Turkey puts more weight in Middle Eastern politics, leaves passive policies and engages in issues in its environment, and develops relations with not only states but also non-state actors.

While this hardly means that Turkey completely left its state-based actor approach, which is deeply institutionalized within Turkish foreign policy, the non-state preference in its Middle Eastern approach points out its realization of multiple-actor structure in this region and, by extension, acceptance of some VNSAs as also possible actors and partners. In other words, it tries to balance its long-term state-based actor understanding and partially broadens it by favoring several VNSAs and their central importance within the regional affairs. Such structural constraints brought this shift within Turkey’s actor understanding and are the main reasons behind Turkey’s intensified engagement with several armed groups such as the FSA. Turkey never gives up backing the FSA politically, economically, and militarily, and over time increases its support from sheltering FSA’s members to getting into active combat. Both actors considered each other as indispensable partners to advance certain domestic and regional purposes. From the perspective of the FSA, Turkish support is vital since, in general, the Syrian opposition dramatically needs external financial and military aid to continue its resistance.

On the other hand, from Turkey’s perspective, the underlying rationale for its relationship with the FSA depends both on its regional ambitions and security concerns. Initially, by being an effective actor in the Syrian civil war, Turkey wanted to demonstrate that it could have a leadership role in the region. But with the rise of PKK-affiliated PYD and the DAESH in Syria, Turkey prioritized its security concerns, and rather than a leadership role, it focused on the struggle against those terrorist organizations and further strengthened its direct ties with the FSA.

After nine years since the beginning of the civil war, in 2020, it seems that the Assad regime has managed to regain control over vast portions of the country, and it is fair to say that the Assad regime is the “winner” of the war with the help of Russia and Iran. This shows that the FSA and other opposition groups are unable to achieve their main goal, which is to topple the regime. Similarly, the JDP government’s expectations about the end of the Assad regime did not come true. Yet, it seems that with its operations, Turkey managed to destroy the presence of DAESH and end the project for a separate Kurdish state under PKK-affiliated YPG leadership. Hence, the question about the future of both the Turkish military and the FSA in northern Syria creates a deadlock. Sooner or later, Turkey would leave northern Syria if there emerge an international agreement and mutual understanding among the basic actors in Syria. However, there are important problems that should be resolved before Turkey leaves Syria: The possible political-military status of the FSA, the return of Syrian refugees to their homelands, elimination of the possible emergence of terrorist organizations, and the re-construction of Syrian state mechanisms based on stronger reconciliation between the opposing sides. Along these lines, Turkey’s presence in Northern Syria, and therefore its relations with the FSA, have enabled it a substantial seat and weight in the negotiation table to raise these concerns; but still, how these issues would be resolved remains unclear.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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