Abstract
China sees Iran as a crucial power with significant influence over the security landscape of the Middle East. Despite being sensitive to regional and global dynamics surrounding Iran, China cannot ignore Tehran’s strategic significance. Yet, their bilateral relations are significantly influenced by the regional security environment. China has consistently prioritized its ties with the United States over Iran and has generally adhered to UN regulations concerning Iran. China’s sensitivity to Arab and regional interests in the Middle East significantly impacts the China–Iran arms relationship. These concerns significantly restricted the flow of Chinese arms to Iran since 2005, with UN sanctions ultimately sealing the cessation of arms flow.
Introduction
On April 13, 2024, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force launched an offensive operation codenamed “True Promise,” deploying 185 drones, 110 ballistic missiles, and 36 cruise missiles directed at Israel (Yong, 2024). Presumably, this was a response to Israel’s military strike on 1 April in Syria, which killed seven senior Iranian military officials, including two generals, within a facility near Iran’s diplomatic compound in Damascus. Iran justified its direct assault on Israel as a retaliatory measure. The scope and diversity of the Iranian assault stunned the strategic community worldwide (Jeffrey et al., 2024; Kasapoğlu, 2024; Salem et al., 2024). Iran’s ability to amass such a substantial arsenal of long-range aerial platforms, despite prolonged exposure to international sanctions on military and strategic commerce, engendered disbelief (Kahwaji, 2024; Nagata et al., 2024; Schwartz, 2024). Its capacity to deploy these warheads, albeit with questionable accuracy, against Israel, a distant target, astonished many. Without credible evidence or explanations, several otherwise reliable sources have attributed the strength of the Iranian military–industrial complex, especially its aerial platforms, to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Anand, 2024; Banerjee, 2024; Green & Roth, 2021; Papageorgiou, 2024).
It is widely recognized that China and Iran have maintained enduring and productive military ties, with the former significantly contributing weapon platforms and critical military and dual-use technologies to the Islamic Republic. However, their bilateral military relationship has encountered challenges over time, undergoing at least three discernible phases marked by fluctuations in the flow of Chinese arms. This article examines the arms sales over the past five decades, identifies broad patterns indicative of future trends, and evaluates whether the prima facie impression of China’s predominant role in augmenting Iran’s military capability is accurate and credible.
China–Iran’s Historical Relationship
China and Iran are two Asian civilizations with a long history of commercial, diplomatic, and cultural relations (Garver, 2006, pp. 3–7). Despite this, they found themselves on opposite sides during the Cold War: China aligned with the then Soviet Union, while Shah Reza Pahlavi remained within the US-led Western bloc. After the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953, the Shah became even more dependent on the United States, moving further away from the possibility of fostering friendship with China. The Sino-Soviet split and the US-China rapprochement created conditions for the eventual establishment of diplomatic relations between both in 1971. However, the Shah’s regime did not survive for long. The 1978 visit of Hua Guofeng, China’s paramount leader at the time, aimed to improve relations with the Shah but ended up souring China’s relationship with the Iranian clergy, which came to power the following year.
The hostility between Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran and Deng Xiaoping’s China was however, short-lived. Iran sought an ally among the permanent five (P-5) members of the UN Security Council, and under changed circumstances, China emerged as a neutral and potential partner. Chinese engagement in the Middle East would serve to counterbalance the American and European presence. Additionally, China’s expanding defense manufacturing industry presented a critical option for Iran, particularly given the limited availability of arms suppliers during the Iran-Iraq War. For China, its relationship with Iran offered a strategic foothold in the Middle East and Central Asia and access to a significant source of energy imports. Iran served as a valuable distraction and leverage point for China in negotiations with the United States. Moreover, Iran acted as a bulwark against Soviet ambitions in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, the resumption of relations in the early 1980s proved beneficial and necessary for both states.
Since then, both countries upheld a collaborative relationship, notably seen in their joint efforts to counter the erstwhile Soviet Union and, since 1991, to address the American hegemony (Fan, 2011, pp. 48–50; Xi, 2016). They have engaged in energy trade and explored economic and military realms. Energy became a key component of their relations, especially since 1993, when China became a net importer of crude oil; for example, in 2023, China purchased 90% of Iranian oil indirectly, to calm American concerns (Hanafusa et al., 2024). Throughout this period, they have consistently acknowledged each other’s capabilities and positions, recognizing the mutual advantage stemming from their complementary economic strengths (Garver, 2006, pp. 3–7).
At times, they have employed sophisticated rhetorical narratives to depict their long-standing civilizational interactions and supposed ancient solidarity, along with shared anti-Western sentiments against oppression (Garver, 2006, pp. 3–7). The Silk Road remains a source of pride for both China and Iran and depicts their ancient greatness, though their cooperation is primarily motivated by shared national interests rather than lofty notions of solidarity. They often invoke civilizational solidarity during challenges or when launching new initiatives. China’s arms sale is yet another measure to reinforce their historical bonhomie.
China’s Global Arms Exports
Since its formation in 1949, the PRC has supplied arms to a variety of countries, including Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Venezuela, Argentina, Iran, and several African states. The trajectory of Chinese arms exports can be divided into three distinct phases: the revolutionary years, characterized by ideological motivations; the commercial and reverse-engineered era; and the current period marked by high-technology-based weaponry.
First Phase: Revolutionary Years
From 1949 to 1978, under Mao Zedong’s ideological influence, China primarily focused on supplying weapons to communist and socialist regimes. The aim was to incite revolutionary disturbances, foster anti-American and later, anti-Soviet Union sentiments, while positioning China as a leader among Third World countries (Gill and Medeiros, 2000, pp. 1–2; Shinn, 2008). During this period, arms exports mainly consisted of small arms and light weaponry, often provided as military grants-in-aid. These Chinese weapons were largely inexpensive and of questionable quality (Lee, 1987, p. 35).
The Sino-Soviet split in 1960 severed China’s primary military and technology pipeline from the USSR, forcing it to rely on low-quality and low-cost arms produced domestically. Until then, most Chinese defense manufacturers, including those producing small arms and light machinery, required significant Soviet technical assistance and guidance. The Sino-Soviet split greatly affected China’s arms production, including the defense metallurgy sector, impacting its low-grade exports, leading to a reliability crisis in Chinese weapons that persists even in 2024.
During this period, Iran did not figure prominently in the Chinese arms trade. Until 1979, the Iranian armed forces were among the preferred markets for the United States and the Western military–industrial complex. The Shah of Iran, a skilled pilot, had a strong interest in the latest defense technology and weapon platforms, particularly for its air force, with aspirations to establish Iran as a major non-nuclear armed force (Pace, 1977). The Shah frequently monitored defense technology developments in both the East and the West, acquiring cutting-edge military materiel (Sulzberger, 1975). His patronage and anti-Soviet stance remained crucial for the United States and its defense industry. For instance, he played a pivotal role in sustaining the American F-14 fighter production program by purchasing a substantial quantity, along with a large inventory of their long- and short-range air-to-air missiles (Witt, 2023). After the 1973 oil crisis, Iran was flushed with petrodollars, providing the Shah with substantial funds to invest in military goods for his armed forces. As a result, he procured the latest radars, artillery, AWACS planes, naval craft, American M-60 and British Chieftain tanks, armored personnel carriers, aerial tankers, and a large inventory of F-4 and F-5 fighters from the United States and its allies (The New York Times, 1977). Iran had plans to replace its aging F-4 and F-5 fighters with the latest F-16 and a land version of the F-18 naval fighters in the early 1980s. However, these plans were thwarted by Khomeini’s arrival (Pace, 1977).
In addition to petrodollars, the Shah had other reasons to continue purchasing from the West. The Arab-Israeli War in 1973 underscored the importance of technology and military doctrines. The Shah’s rivalry and competition with Iraq was another factor, and he utilized arms purchases to counterbalance Iraq’s substantial weapon acquisitions from the former Soviet Union (Bergquist, 1988, p. 24). Furthermore, the oil trade through the Strait of Hormuz was vital for his economy, making it imperative to prevent its disruption (McGlinchey, 2013; Pace, 1977). Additionally, the India-Pakistan War of 1971 and the subsequent liberation of Bangladesh unsettled the Shah, who viewed it as an organized armed intervention in a fellow UN member state (Malik, 2024). As a result, he endeavored to ensure that Iran remained strong enough to prevent such occurrences in the future. With memories of foreign interference in his early years that led to his father losing power, the Shah consistently sought to enhance Iran’s deterrence capability in the region.
Therefore, by 1978–1979, the Iranian armed forces were equipped with significantly more advanced and sophisticated weaponry and military platforms compared to China and its inventory of ex-Soviet reverse-engineered materiel. Chinese military exports, in comparison to Iranian imports, were relatively basic and unremarkable (Wang, 2011). Therefore, Iran showed no interest in acquiring any weapons or military platforms from China during this period, as indicated in Table 1 and Figure 1.
China’s Arms Exports 1981–2023: Global Versus Iran (Million $).
Second Phase: Commercial and Reverse Engineered Era
The second phase can be subdivided into two periods: the prosperous 1980s and the uncertain 1990s. Following Mao’s death and Deng Xiaoping’s ascent to power, the Chinese government renounced its policy of exporting revolutions, ceased providing military goods at friendship prices or as grants-in-aid, and opted instead to sell to any party capable of affording its weapons (Bitzinger, 1991, pp. 4–6). Chinese defense industries, along with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), actively promoted and exported arms sales to a wide range of customers. These exports were necessary to generate substantial funds for further research of advanced weaponry (Bitzinger, 1991, p. 5). Moreover, the 1980s witnessed a gradual breakdown of Cold War divisions, granting China the freedom to pursue a relatively independent foreign policy. This newfound flexibility allowed Beijing to sell weapons to nontraditional customers as well. Its arms industries experienced a significant surge in exports, especially during conflicts such as the Cambodian Civil War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and notably, the Iran-Iraq War (Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 1).
Iranian Arms from China since 1980.
The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) presented a particularly lucrative opportunity for China. During this conflict, China exported nearly $8 billion worth of military goods to both the warring parties, with the majority going to Iraq (Gill & Medeiros, 2000, pp. 4–5). China’s share in arms exports to the developing world surged from 1.8 to 8% during this decade, and it consistently ranked among the top five arms exporters globally during this period. Beijing also emerged as a supplier of last resort for certain weapon systems and for countries seeking fighter aircraft, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles (Gill & Medeiros, 2000, pp. 4–5). These arms exports further helped elevate the PLA and Chinese defense manufacturers to influence stakeholders in China’s arms export policy and nuclear proliferation decisions.
Uncertain Nineties: 1990s
The growth witnessed in the 1980s was succeeded by a period of apprehension in the 1990s, a transition marked by the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, the commencement of the Cambodian peace process, and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. The end of the Cold War also undermined the Western bloc’s justification for extensive armament research, development, and production. The collapse of the USSR resulted in a surge of affordable Soviet weapons, contributing to a glut in the global arms market (Anthony, 1998, pp. 223–228). China, therefore, saw a decrease in its market share, a decline in purchases by traditional customers, and the loss of several previous clients; thus, its share of arms exports to developing nations decreased from 8 to 2.01% by the decade’s end, indicating a 75% decline in its global arms trade share (Gill & Medeiros, 2000, pp. 4–5).
Furthermore, Chinese arms exports, particularly to failing states, came under increased scrutiny during the 1990s. In 1997, China introduced military materiel export control regulations to formalize its export principles and align with international export control measures and standards (PRC Law, 1997). While these regulations did not guarantee comprehensive transparency, they signaled a future where Chinese arms exports would undergo deeper scrutiny and verification. The legislation also triggered a significant restructuring of China’s export control system and defense industrial framework in March 1998. China’s adherence to arms control and nonproliferation commitments began to restrict its capacity to export weapon platforms, including heavy weaponry, ballistic, and cruise missile systems, to UN-sanctioned states (Gill & Medeiros, 2000, p. ix).
Moreover, the performance of US forces in the 1991 Gulf War and the 1993 Kosovo conflict triggered a global revolution in military affairs. The glaring inefficiency of outdated weapons and combat doctrines witnessed in these conflicts prompted a shift in the global arms market toward advanced, high-technology-based, networked, and precision weapons. Many of the adversaries facing the US-led bloc during this period were armed with Soviet-era weapons, and their dismal performance highlighted a crisis in these armed forces and laid bare the shortcomings of Soviet-sourced weapons, significantly impacting the market for Chinese weapons. At a time when Soviet weapons themselves were being labeled obsolete, China’s retro-engineered military products inspired by Soviet-tech garnered an even poorer reputation in the export market (Bitzinger, 1991, p. 14).
With the end of the Cold War, the United States, Russia, and prominent European arms suppliers became inclined to export advanced weapons to countries with the means to purchase them, a concept previously considered unthinkable. The ready availability of sophisticated arms further undermined China’s position in the arms export market, and China found itself primarily catering to state customers with limited financial resources or those encountering political-legal constraints to acquire Western weapons (Gill & Medeiros, 2000, p. ix). Even then, China’s low-tech weaponry, persistent performance and technical issues, and challenges in securing spare parts prompted several countries to replace Chinese weapons with those from Western or Russian suppliers.
Iranian Situation
Between 1981 and 1996, Iran had few arms suppliers, predominantly China, North Korea, and Libya. The Soviet Union (later Russia) began supplying arms to Iran after US defense manufacturers exited the Islamic Republic. During this period, China’s arms trade with Iran mainly focused on heavy weaponry, including tanks, APCs, towed and self-propelled artillery, multi-launcher rocket systems, fighter aircraft, naval vessels, air-search radars, and various types of missiles such as anti-tank, anti-ship, surface-to-air, air-to-air, surface-to-surface, ballistic, and cruise missiles (Table 2).
Furthermore, Iran augmented its Chinese imports by acquiring similar heavy weaponry from other sources such as North Korea and the Soviet Union. The expansion of Iran’s arms supplier pool was further fueled by the availability of sophisticated yet comparatively affordable Russian arms, leading Iran to adopt a more discerning approach to its arms imports from China. Factors such as inferior technology, inadequate performance, inconsistent service support, and limited availability of weapon systems contributed to Iran’s dissatisfaction with Chinese weapons during the 1990s. So disillusioned was Iran that it even canceled a significant arms export deal in 1996 (Karniol, 1997, p. 14). China also grew frustrated with Iran’s payments through barter oil trade and began to take its nonproliferation commitments more seriously. Intense international and US pressure prompted China to cancel the export of M-9 ballistic missiles to Iran (and also to Syria) in 1992 (Garver, 2006, p. 187). Furthermore, during the US-China Summit in Washington in October 1997, China pledged to halt the sale of C-801 and C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran (Gellman, 1998, p. 1).
In sum, China ceased supplying the weapon platforms that Iran most desired, leading Tehran to perceive China as an unreliable arms supplier. As a result, arms trade between China and Iran experienced a significant decline in the late 1990s and beyond (Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 1).
Third Phase: Current High-tech Arms Exports
Since 2000, China began to position itself as a niche arms exporter, focusing on a select group of countries. As of 2023, China’s share in the global arms trade fluctuated around 5% annually, significantly lower compared to major players such as the United States and Russia, which held 40% and 16% shares, respectively (Bitzinger, 2023). Sixty percent of Chinese arms exports go to three main clients: Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, with the remaining portion distributed among smaller South Asian, African, and Latin American countries. Most clients often see China as the last option (Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2003). Price inflation within contracts facilitates corruption, allowing top military leaders in client countries to divert funds from Chinese military import contracts (Kumar, 2024, pp. 11–12).
In its third phase of arms exports since 2000, China has aimed to export advanced and high-tech military equipment to international customers. Due to their inferior quality, lack of performance reliability, and inadequate spare parts and service support, Chinese arms exports have garnered notoriety (Zheng, 2023). Although China remains a preferred supplier for clients with limited alternatives, once viable options become available, China’s customers frequently opt for Western, Russian, or even Israeli alternatives (Bitzinger, 2023). Thus, China has gained a reputation for selling basic equipment at low prices, often with minimal conditions, primarily targeting the lower end of the arms market.
China’s Arms Sale to Iran: Missile Trade (1998–2015)
By 1998–1999, the primary focus of China’s arms sale to Iran had shifted toward missiles and components. Missiles were a significant aspect of China’s arms transfers to Iran, but in the new millennium, they took center stage (refer to Table 2). Over the last two decades, Iran has acquired hundreds of different types of missiles from China, amassing a substantial inventory of ballistic and cruise missiles, both via imports or local production based on reverse engineering. While Iran’s ballistic missile activities have been closely monitored by the international community (refer to Figure 2) and are often considered inaccurate and still evolving, cruise missiles offer a unique capability for Iran and its proxies operating in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.
The advantages of cruise missiles for Iran are numerous. First, their automated nature makes it challenging for average military powers, such as Saudi Arabia or other Gulf monarchies, to ascertain their timing, type, and trajectory. Cruise missiles, similar to unmanned aircraft, are disposable with preprogrammed warheads containing flight routes and target details, rendering them unpredictable, cost-effective, and highly accurate. Second, the low-flying and often terrain-hugging anti-ship missiles present difficulties to intercept, even for advanced military powers, thus, providing only a brief window for destruction. For example, Israel’s navy could not defend INS Hanit against C-701 anti-ship missiles launched by Hezbollah off its coast on July 14, 2006 (Harel, 2006).
Third, cruise missiles provide Iran with an asymmetric military capability, particularly in the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) role in the region. These missiles enable Iran to impede external powers from accumulating resources in the region through port and harbor facilities, potentially averting a scenario similar to the build-up of US forces in the 1991 Gulf War. Through cruise missiles, Iran could effectively disrupt the oil flow in its nearby waters, effectively holding the entire region hostage (refer to Figure 3). These cruise missiles are pivotal for Iran as they can be converted into land attack missiles with minimal modifications, allowing shorter-range missiles to address local threats while longer-range ones can target critical facilities further inland (Brookes, 2020).
Iran’s Hoveyzeh Cruise Missile Range—1,350 km.
China has played a crucial role in enhancing Iran’s cruise missile capabilities, although Iran’s long-range land attack missiles do not originate from China. Nevertheless, China’s establishment of a factory in Isfahan in 2010 to produce local versions of C-801 and other cruise missiles highlights the significant role of technological collaborations in Iran’s capability development in this domain (UPI, 2010). With a vast inventory of missiles, China sees Iran as potentially disrupting the power and influence of the Western bloc in the Middle East, while also alleviating pressure on China in the Indo-Pacific region by tying down the United States in the Middle East.
Key Features of China-Iran Arms Transfer
In the three-and-a-half-decade-long history of China’s arms transfers to Iran, two main features emerge vividly. First, China remained eager to sell Iran weapons that were either Soviet-sourced, reverse-engineered, or low-tech during 1980–1998, at full price. It even assisted Iran in establishing local production centers for these crucial military platforms, namely cruise missiles, artillery, armored vehicles, naval crafts, and multi-launcher rockets (Garver, 2006, p. 187). Additionally, Iran received significant assistance in its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs from Beijing during the initial phases (Garver, 2006, pp. 146–147). Although this support dwindled amid international sanctions, it is undeniable that for a significant duration during 1980–1998, China was a major industrial source for Iran’s weapons of mass destruction programs. China also played a crucial role in supplying illegal spare parts for Iran’s US-manufactured weapons through smuggling. Yet, China showed marked reluctance in cooperating or selling indigenous high-tech military goods, namely advanced drones or advanced fighter aircraft due to various reasons, as discussed below.
Cooperation in NBC Sectors
Beginning in the mid-1980s, China provided extensive support to Iran in developing its nuclear capabilities (Spector, 1996). This assistance commenced with China’s facilitative role in establishing the Isfahan nuclear research facility in 1984. China trained Iranian engineers and offered assistance in uranium mining, enrichment, and conversion technologies. China provided blueprints for production facilities, research reactors, and electromagnetic separators, all under the assertion that these items were intended solely for peaceful purposes, such as medical imaging and research (Garver, 2006, pp. 146–147).
The façade crumbled in 1992 when China entered into an agreement with Iran to sell 300-MW nuclear power reactors (Pfeiffer, 1991). Pressures from the United States compelled it to reconsider nuclear cooperation with Iran. During the 1997 US-China Summit, the United States received an “authoritative, written communication,” affirming that China would cease providing nuclear assistance to Iran (US Department of State, 1997a; 1997b). Only upon this assurance Washington certified the China-US Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement of 1985. Furthermore, the US administration opted to review China’s future nonproliferation commitments to determine whether to continue or suspend the nuclear cooperation agreement. Nonetheless, China played a pivotal role in initiating Iran’s nuclear program and significantly enhancing it to achieve weapon-capable enrichment levels. A similar, albeit smaller, role was observed in China’s assistance to Iran in acquiring chemical weapons (Brugger, 2002). The majority of these cooperative efforts ceased as China ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in April 1997 and began adhering to other international nonproliferation regimes (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2011).
Sourcing Subcomponents and Spare Parts
A significant yet less conspicuous aspect of China-Iran arms sales lies in subcomponents, technology assistance, and spare parts provision. Iran has greatly benefited from scientific assistance, technology collaboration, transfers, and dual-use trade with China, contributing to the enhancement of Iran’s military capabilities without attracting significant scrutiny from Western and regional powers (Cirincione et al., p. 303; Smith, 1991). For example, China has provided computerized machine tools, seekers, sensors, gyroscopes, and guiding technologies for Iran’s ballistic missile program (Gertz, 1998). Besides Pakistan, Iran is one of the few countries granted access to China’s Beidou satellite navigation system and its critical guidance data, crucial for missile and drone navigation in 2015 (Nadimi, 2016). Iran has further received substantial support from China in developing solid fuel propulsion technology, crucial for faster launch rates, quickened reaction times, improved maneuverability, and enhanced combat effectiveness. More significant than the M-7 missile sale, these subcomponent transactions reveal a deeper Chinese involvement in Iran’s ballistic missile production process and leave an imprint on Iranian inventory. China is also a major market for Iran in sourcing small engines, voltage converters, and guidance electronics for drones (81UAV.cn, 2023; Nissenbaum, 2023). Prominent items provided to Iran include subcomponents for weapons and armored vehicles, artillery platforms, as well as IT platforms, electronic items, and microchips, among others.
Furthermore, China facilitated Iran’s acquisition of spare parts for its Western weapons and aircraft platforms. Through intermediaries, smugglers, and front companies, China has supplied approximately 30% of the required spares to Iran (Shakil & Ayyub, 2024). According to a US Department of Treasury report, Iran received electronic components for its nuclear program through Emily Liu and four associated agencies in 2014 (US Department of Treasury, 2017). Chinese-origin intermediaries were apprehended in the United States while attempting to solicit spare parts for Iran’s F-14 fighters and radars. These transactions appear primarily motivated by financial interests, and whether the Chinese government turned a blind eye to them remains unclear. Often, Iran has utilized this illegal smuggling route from China to acquire advanced microchips or electronics from high-end US manufacturers, such as Texas Instruments and others, for installation in its indigenous drones, networked systems, and weapon platforms (US Department of Justice, 2018).
In summary, this less overt collaboration between China and Iran on subcomponents, technology assistance, and spare parts significantly bolstered Iran’s military capabilities, underscoring the multifaceted nature of their bilateral arms relationship.
Lack of Cooperation in Advanced Aviation Platforms
One notable aspect of the China-Iran arms trade is the absence of any purchases of drones. Despite China supplying its ASN and CH-4 drones across the Middle East since 2000, Iran has notably refrained from procuring them. The reasons for this are both fundamental and existential. Iran holds a historical position as one of the pioneering countries in the unmanned aviation sector. After the 1979 Revolution, the Iranian Air Force encountered challenges in maintaining its predominantly American inventory. During the Iran-Iraq War, Tehran struggled to keep its F-14, F-4, F-5, and other platforms operational due to a lack of spare parts and service support. Therefore, Iran sought alternative methods for conducting aerial surveillance during the conflict. In 1985, a group at Isfahan University, utilizing radio-controlled drones for aerial photography, caught the government’s attention (Hambling, 2023). These drones and their operators were subsequently organized into the first RAAD battalion, a drone squadron in the IRGC, providing valuable intelligence on Iraq’s trench lines and troop movements (Frantzman, 2020).
Iran also established the Qods Aviation Industry Company, which produced Iran’s inaugural weaponized drone, Mohajer. This drone has undergone continuous upgrades, with the 2023 release of the Mohajer-10, and has been exported to clients like Ethiopia, Sudan, Venezuela, and proxies, including Hezbollah (Kenyette, 2021; Marks, 2024). The Mohajer-10 has a range of 2,000 km and can fly for 24 hours with a payload of 300 kg. Another of Iran’s drones, the Shahed series, has gained prominence during the Russia-Ukraine War (Desmarais, 2024; Terajima, 2024). Notably, Shahed 136, a loitering munition with a range of 2,000–2,500 km, can evade radar detection while flying slowly, offering an effective and cost-efficient means of destroying valuable targets. The similarities between drones and cruise missiles, whose substantial import volumes and eventual local production have enabled Iran to extend its expertise in developing advanced drones.
Investigations into captured Shahed drones in Ukraine in 2022 revealed that Iran sourced most of its internal components from outside suppliers, with only engines and voltage converters originating from China (China Defence, 2024; NAKO, 2023). Approximately 80% of its components were sourced from well-known Western manufacturers, namely Texas Instruments, among others. Apparently, Iran has stockpiled drone components from illicit sources and has engaged in large-scale industrial smuggling to advance its drone industry. Iran’s expertise in drones extends to reverse engineering captured enemy drones, such as the MIM Streaker, ScanEagle, and RQ-170. Therefore, drones, whether weaponized or not, represent a crucial area of expertise for Iran, demonstrating its independence from reliance on or help from China.
Additionally, the Iranian Air Force’s inventory is filled with obsolete aviation platforms. It continues to operate ancient F-4 and F-5 aircraft, and even its F-14 fighters are nearly five decades old and well beyond their operational lifespan, resulting in frequent air crashes (Iran International, 2023a). Therefore, Iran has continually sought to purchase advanced fighters from arms-supplier nations. Due to UN sanctions and the arms embargo, none of the European or American manufacturers and their allies would sell any aircraft to Iran. Only China and Russia are two probable suppliers of fighter jets. As expected, Iran has been pursuing Russian Su-35 and Chinese J-10 fighters for almost a decade (Chan, 2021; Iranwire, 2023). However, these agreements are yet to materialize.
China is cautious about the regional and global impact of the fighter deal. Additionally, Iran typically pays for weapons with oil or gas rather than dollars or euros, conserving its foreign currency reserves. China prefers hard cash for these fighters as it already has a substantial energy reserve in place. This cautious approach does not align with China’s focus on maximizing profits from arms deals, making the sale of J-10 fighter jets to Iran less appealing (Iran International, 2023b). Instead, China has already sold 25 J-10CE fighters to Pakistan in 2022 and may increase the inventory to 36 (Dawn, 2022). Therefore, China’s decision not to sell to Iran appears to be influenced by external factors. Amid challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the US trade war, China is prioritizing stability and avoiding actions that could disrupt its existing relationships with the United States. Therefore, the China-Iran deal for J-10 fighter aircraft has failed to gain traction in recent years and might collapse.
Factors Influencing China-Iran Arms Sale
The arms trade between states signifies a substantial level of trust in the quality and reliability of weapons, as well as confidence in obtaining adequate technological and service support throughout the weapons’ service life. China’s major customers, such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, exemplify these traits. However, Iran has not exhibited the same level of enthusiasm. It has been facing comprehensive US-led international sanctions since 1979, which have hindered Iran’s ability to sell energy resources and procure weapons, thus impacting its economy and regional influence. Therefore, China could be the supplier of last resort to Iran for both general and crucial strategic weapons.
However, the real situation diverges significantly from the assumed scenario. China discontinued entering into arms export agreements with Iran in 2005, although it fulfilled deliveries from existing contracts until 2015. The imposition of UNSC sanctions (with a positive Chinese vote) on Iran in 2007 underscored a significant and binding commitment by China. It ceased signing new arms agreements with Iran in 2005 and did not resume arms sales even after the expiration of UN sanctions in October 2020 (Yang, 2020). Indeed, since 2015, there have been no credible records of any Chinese arms sale to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
It is possible to identify four primary reasons for this.
The US Factor
China has consistently prioritized its economic development and relationship with the United States, often at the expense of its ties with other countries, including Iran. The flow of Chinese arms to Iran was a primary concern for Washington. This sparked strong opposition, prompting intense US-China backchannel negotiations. Measures such as the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (Berman, 1992) and the US-China Summit of 1997 were pursued with the aim of influencing and halting the flow of Chinese arms to Iran. By 1997, China had grown wary of the adverse impact its arms deals had upon US-China relations. Furthermore, China’s commitment to adhering to the main principles of international arms control regimes played a critical role in curbing its previous unregulated arms exports.
In 1991, China voted in favor of the UN Register on Conventional Arms (UNROCA) and adhered to the principles of the Wassenaar Arrangement, despite not becoming a member (UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, 1991). These agreements aimed to enhance transparency in China’s arms export practices. China further introduced military materiel export control regulations in 1997 on this issue. As a result, China’s acceptance of arms control and nonproliferation commitments gradually restricted its ability to export weapon platforms, including heavy weaponry and ballistic and cruise missile systems, to UN-sanctioned states (Gill & Medeiros, 2000, p. ix). This situation has endured thus far. Even in 2024, despite the tense state of US–China relations, Iran remains a red line that China is hesitant to cross, given the sensitivity of the issue in the United States. China has refrained from supplying fighters to Iran, even when the United States provided fighters to Taiwan (Reuters, 2023). China is cautious about engaging with diplomatically challenged countries like Iran, considering the possible reactions from the United States.
Arab Sensitivity
The China–Iran arms relationship must also take into consideration the Arab sensitivity to Iran and its military capabilities. On its part, Beijing is particularly concerned about the potential impact of conflict and instability in the region on its economic engagements with the Middle East. It is wary of the influence of political and fundamental Islamic ideologies on its domestic political landscape, especially in regions like Xinjiang and Ningxia Hui (Sekin, 2015). While it desires to enhance strategic relations with Iran, the prevailing regional political dynamics in the Arab world require Beijing to maintain a considerable distance from Tehran.
China remains cautious when considering large-scale arms transfers to Iran, as its economic and strategic ties with Arab countries in the Middle East weigh heavily in its decision-making process (Iran International, 2023b). Significant arms sales to Iran would provoke Arab countries, who feel threatened by ascending Iranian military strength. The success of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the region heavily relies on funding from Arab monarchies (Liu & Wang 2017; Lons, 2024), underscoring the need to address their apprehensions vis-à-vis Iran. Furthermore, the Middle East serves as a crucial market for Chinese goods, and any disruption to economic opportunities in the Arab world must be carefully managed.
Technological Concerns
China’s arms transfers to Iran are further hindered by the latter’s lack of confidence in the reliability, quality, performance, and service and spare part support of the Chinese weapon systems. Over the past two decades, Chinese arms have consistently exhibited subpar quality, leading to a dearth of repeat customers. Consequently, China has observed numerous one-time military sales, wherein customers have chosen to enhance Chinese military platforms with advanced Western subcomponents, while discarding Chinese electronics, sensors, radars, and engines (Bitzinger, 2013).
For instance, Algeria purchased nearly $900 million worth of military equipment from China between 2014 and 2016 (Defenceweb, 2015); but retrofitted French electronics and radars into these platforms. Nigeria’s acquisition of 15 F-7 fighters (a Chinese variant of the MiG-21) in 2008–2009 resulted in numerous crashes, with the majority of aircraft requiring maintenance and upgrades (Lionel, 2022). Myanmar encountered persistent technical issues with its JF-17 fighter fleet, including malfunctioning radars and missile systems, as well as structural problems necessitating extensive maintenance (The Irrawaddy, 2022). Bangladesh’s purchase of two Ming-class submarines from China in 2016 led to the acquisition of unusable and unserviceable vessels (Khabarhub, 2024). Even Chinese logistical aircraft such as the Y-12 and MA-60 have failed to meet operational expectations in multiple countries, including Nepal (Prasain, 2023). Chinese infantry mobility vehicles supplied to various African nations lack sufficient protection against enemy fire (Tubei, 2019). Indonesia experienced a failure of the C-705 anti-ship cruise missile during the launch, witnessed by President Joko Widodo (Chan, 2016). Despite decades of imitative production, reverse engineering, and opaquely sourced technology infusion, Chinese military equipment still fall short of Western, Russian, or Israeli standards. This explains the Iranian hesitation, as manifested in the drones sector.
Apprehension of Iranian Reverse Engineering
China has perfected reverse engineering to keep pace with defense and civilian technology. Whether aviation, electric vehicles, solar power, telecommunications, armored vehicles, rocketry, missiles, naval ships, submarines, or radars, the Chinese defense industry has used high levels of reverse engineering to grasp know-how and know-why of technological advancement. With this fundamental understanding, Chinese scientists and engineers have worked to create advanced weapons and other military or civilian products using the latest technology. While they may not yet match Western quality standards, Chinese products are becoming increasingly competitive across various sectors, as manifested by Huawei in 5G.
Since China is a major player in reverse engineering, any other country using this method on Chinese products would undermine and disrupt China’s plans. Already, Iran’s indigenous research and development infrastructure, coupled with its local manufacturing and reverse engineering capabilities, has enabled the Islamic Republic to produce numerous iterations or enhanced variants of imported missiles. As expected, China’s concerns extend beyond the political implications of a significant arms deal to concerns about the risk of Iran reverse engineering fighter aircraft and other advanced defense technologies, a practice for which it is known for (Mironova, 2023).
Iran has successfully reverse-engineered numerous weapons supplied by China. Cruise missiles such as the C-701 and C-704 have been adapted into the Kowsar, Zafar, and Nasr-1 missiles (Hanna, 2020; Miller, 2019), while the C-801 and C-802 missiles are locally produced as the Tondar and Noor 1/2 missiles, respectively (Gentry, 2013; SpaceWar.com, 2004a). The ranges of these missiles vary; for instance, short-range ones like Tondar, Noor-1, Zafar, and Kowsar have a range of about 40 km, while Noor-2 and Nasr-1 can reach up to 170 km, potentially posing a threat to the entire UAE from Abu Musa Island. Additionally, Iran has repurposed the HY-2 Silkworm missile into the RAAD missile, boasting a range of 360 km (SpaceWar.com, 2004b).
In contrast to short-range cruise missiles of Chinese origin, Iran has developed long-range Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs) procured from various sources. Iran’s arsenal includes four distinct LACMs, including the Soumar and Hoveyzeh families (Figure 3) with ranges of 700 and 1,350 km, respectively, as well as the Quds-1 and Ya Ali missiles, which are reverse-engineered versions of the C-602 missile with a range of 700 km (Iran International, 2023a; Reuters, 2019). In 2001, Iran illicitly acquired six KH-55 Soviet long-range LACMs with ranges of 2,500–3,000 km from Ukraine. After a decade of research, it unveiled the Soumar missile in 2013, followed by the upgraded Hoveyzeh in 2014. Both missiles feature different engines, the development of which posed a significant challenge for Iran due to its limited capabilities in advanced materials and design research. Nonetheless, even a 70% replica of the original missile provides Iran with a long-range capability that serves its military objectives. Iran used these missiles to attack Israel in 2024.
With its advanced skills in reverse engineering and production, Iran seeks to improve its own manufacturing efficiency by looking to Chinese products. China is worried about this Iranian approach and avoids sharing any sensitive, high-tech defense items that Iran could misuse. As a result, Iran not only jeopardizes potential future sales of Chinese goods but also poses a threat as a competitor, potentially taking away Chinese markets in the Third World, similar to what China did to the Soviet Union since the 1960s.
Conclusion
China and Iran, both with rich historical legacies, have engaged in diplomatic and commercial exchanges to fulfill their distinct national objectives. China sees Iran as a crucial power with significant influence over the security landscape of the Middle East. With its formidable military capacity and aspirations for reclaiming past grandeur, Iran’s geopolitical importance for China is undeniable. Therefore, despite being sensitive to regional and global dynamics surrounding Iran, China cannot ignore Tehran’s strategic significance in the Middle East and beyond. Iran’s energy resources, strategic geographic location, and its role in the Belt and Road Initiative highlight its importance in China’s regional diplomacy.
Furthermore, a strong Iran in the Middle East serves to redirect the United States from its pivot to the Indo-Pacific region. This diversion of US attention provides China with leeway in the Eastern Hemisphere, enabling it to strengthen its economic and military capabilities. In this scenario, China may be inclined to provide military equipment to Iran for two main reasons. First, to retain the American involvement in the Middle East, thereby preventing a concentrated US presence in the Indo-Pacific. Second, supplying arms enables China to evaluate the performance of its weapons in actual combat situations, with the data gathered used to develop even more advanced weapons.
At the same time, the bilateral relations between China and Iran are significantly influenced by the regional security environment. China has consistently prioritized its ties with the United States over those with Iran, while also striving to maintain its international reputation as a responsible global actor and a key member of the UN Security Council. Consequently, Beijing has generally adhered to UN regulations concerning Iran and upheld international treaties on missiles, arms exports, and nuclear materials. Moreover, China has largely complied with the UN-led sanction regimes, aiming to avoid being singled out as the primary state undermining these measures. Above all, China’s sensitivity to Arab and regional interests in the Middle East significantly impacts the China–Iran arms relationship. Beijing seeks to avoid conflict and instability in the region and thus exercises caution in its arms transfers, mindful of their potential impact on regional security.
Iran, however, aims to make the US presence in Iraq and Syria unsustainable, expediting American withdrawal from the Middle East (Aboudouh, 2024). Additionally, it seeks to assert control over navigation and shipping in the Red Sea while undermining the normalization of relations between Israel and the wider Arab world. While Iran’s strategic moves against the United States interests may indirectly benefit China, Beijing cannot afford to overtly ally with Iran in this endeavor. China, moreover, previously provided heavy weaponry, missiles, and subcomponents to Iran, especially during the Iran-Iraq War. In later years, it mostly focused on enhancing Iran’s cruise and ballistic missile inventory while supplying crucial technologies and components to support local production. China was wary of Iran’s reverse engineering capabilities, given its history of replicating Chinese cruise and ballistic missiles. Iran was also mindful of China’s unreliable weapons quality, performance, and lack of spare parts and service support. Accordingly, these mutual concerns significantly restricted the flow of Chinese arms to Iran since 2005, with UN sanctions ultimately sealing the cessation of arms flow.
In the past two decades, China has not significantly influenced Iran’s conventional weapons inventory. Tehran has predominantly favored local or Russian options and has retained a minor manufacturing role in the aviation and defense sectors, facing challenges in reverse-engineering advanced technology-based weapons. Furthermore, Iran has not sought assistance from China in its drone production sector, where Tehran has established itself as a significant producer. Finally, although China has played a significant role in Iran’s military advancement and procurement, Iran’s primary power resides in its own domestic production capabilities. Despite common beliefs stemming from the Iranian strike on Israel, Iran’s regional deterrence and anti-access/area-denial abilities may take cues from China but are not dependent on or supplied by Beijing. Thus, China aims to avoid international isolation and has refrained from deep involvement in Iran’s nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons sectors. China’s compliance with UN Resolution 1747 in 2007 led to the cessation of overt arms trade with Iran. Despite the expiration of sanctions in October 2020, there has been no credible evidence of a resurgence in Chinese arms supplies to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.