A framework for analyzing and practicing Integrative Governance: The case of global animal and conservation governance

Step 1: Analyzing the interactions between governance instruments

This first step is focused on the governance instruments to be included in the analysis and the relationships between them, and is mainly inspired by institutional and regime literature (see for a detailed discussion of this literature step 3 below). Goal of this first step is to understand the main characteristics of the relationships between governance instruments and/or systems over time.

As briefly introduced above, governance instruments include public, private and hybrid policies and rules, with policies defined as “a course of action or a plan” or a “rationale, a manifestation of considered judgment”, thus aiming to direct behavior (Parsons, 1995: 14). This relatively small unit of analysis of individual rules and policies is necessary in order to capture the relationships between all instruments. The framework allows analyses also at a higher level of abstraction by clustering governance instruments into governance systems. It is expected that most analyses will actually be done at such a higher level of abstraction. A governance system can be defined as the total of instruments on a certain issue at a specific level of governance, allowing analyses of relationships among governance systems at different levels. Governance systems at different levels of governance can be studied together if necessary or appropriate. The analysis is done through the following process.

a. Mapping the governance instruments to be included in the analysis. Here, the governance instruments to be included in the analysis are analyzed. The decision on what instruments to include should be seen as an ongoing process throughout the first step of analysis, since the research of the relationships between instruments (under b–d.) will also inform the decision on which instruments to include in the definition of a governance system.

Step 2: Analyzing the performance of governance systems

Step 2 analyzes the combined performance of a governance system, and is done for each governance system as established in step 1. The operationalization of the concept of performance is mainly inspired by the literature on institutions, regimes and policy evaluation. While institutions and regimes only represent certain kinds of governance instruments, the frameworks to study their performance can also be applied to other governance instruments (see e.g. Visseren-Hamakers, 2013). I here further expand the application to governance systems, instead of the usual evaluation focused on the performance of a single instrument.

The operationalization of performance distinguishes direct and indirect performance. Both are operationalized using more objectivist and subjectivist epistemologies, combining both the evaluation by the researcher him/herself, and the perceptions of policy stakeholders on the performance. This latter aspect of evaluating performance is inspired by constructivist evaluation (Crabbé and Leroy, 2008; Guba and Lincoln, 1994), which argues for the recognition of diverse values in policy evaluation. While the framework does not go as far as constructivist approaches that claim that there are no absolute answers to policy evaluation, since some effects can easily be determined (e.g. the number of protected areas worldwide), it does acknowledge that stakeholders have different priorities and opinions on the performance, which can inform the evaluation and recommendations for improvements.

a. Direct performance. Here, the framework follows the differentiation between effectiveness or performance in terms of output (the established rules and policies), outcome (changes in behavior) and impact (effect on the ground) in order to establish the extent to which the governance system has achieved what it intended to accomplish (Crabbé and Leroy, 2008; Underdal, 2002). The impact analysis may need input from natural scientists, or secondary sources can be used to establish the effects on the ground.

Step 3: Explaining the relationships and the performance of a governance system

Here, insights from different theoretical perspectives are used to explain the relationships and performance of governance systems, incorporating insights from rational choice theory, institutionalism, constructivism and critical theory. While the four clusters of explanatory factors presented here represent different bodies of literature, authors from different theoretical perspectives have contributed to each of these literatures. The clusters are thus related and overlap (for example, norms are discussed both in the literatures on institutions and discourse). Application of the framework should recognize these linkages, instead of treating the clusters separately. Therefore, the four clusters are discussed together at the end of this section. Also, the explanatory factors should not be analyzed in a static manner, but the historical context and development of these factors should be taken into account, with the aim that the analysis results in an understanding of the main factors that together explain the relationships and performance of governance systems. For each cluster of explanatory factors, guiding questions are presented to facilitate the analysis.

a. Actors. The actor cluster reflects (neo)realist and constructivist perspectives in IR and critical pragmatism (Forester, 2013; Hopf, 1998; Morgenthau, 1973; Waltz, 1979). (Neo)realist perspectives, in which nation states are seen as autonomous, rational actors aiming to defend their national interests in an anarchic international system, are anchored in rational choice theory (Simon, 1959), which sees actors as rational, aiming to maximize their “utility”, or benefits, acting according to a “logic of consequence” (March and Olsen, 1989).

I borrow from (neo)realism and critical pragmatism their focus on actors’ power and interests. These issues are very relevant for IG, since relationships between governance instruments are often highly political in nature, especially among governance systems that have different goals (e.g. trade and environment) (Biermann et al., 2009a). Following Barnett and Duvall (2005), the framework complements the (neo)realist focus on material power with those of other theoretical perspectives, namely institutional, discursive and structural power (see also Kuindersma et al., 2012). Here, in the cluster focused on actors, I only include material power, or tangible resources (e.g. money, land, facilities, machinery, natural resources), with some elements of discursive power, or intangible resources (e.g. trust, knowledge, capabilities, and skills) (see also Austin and Seitanidi, 2012). The other perspectives on power will be addressed as part of the relevant cluster. For interests, both (neo)realist approaches to interests, and perceived, constructed interests are included (Hopf, 1998).

Guiding questions for analyzing actors include:

Which are the main actors (organizations and their specific representatives involved in the governance systems)?

b. Institutions. This cluster is derived from institutionalism (see e.g. Keohane, 2005), focused on the role of rules and norms. Institutions can be defined as “sets of rules, decision-making procedures and programs that define social practices, assign roles to the participants in these practices, and guide interactions among the occupants of individual roles” (Young, 2002: 5). Related is the concept of regimes, which refers to “principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area” (Krasner, 1982: 185). The IG framework uses a “thick” interpretation of institutions in which rules in use are the focus, instead of rules on paper, and in which informal rules and social norms are also included (Keohane, 1988; March and Olsen, 1989; Young, 2002). Norms are discussed in more detail in section c. below.

Analyzing institutions as a cluster of explanatory factors in IG allows us to understand how relationships between governance systems are shaped by rules and norms in their context, and is thereby related to the concept of institutional power (Barnett and Duvall, 2005). It is important to realize that actors in the past have shaped current rules, linking this cluster of explanatory factors to the previous one (Koremenos et al., 2001; Raustiala, 2005). The analysis here should include the instruments aimed at improving the relationships in or between governance systems (see step 1d).

Guiding questions for analyzing institutions include:

To what extent and how have the relationships and performance of governance systems been influenced by institutions in their context?

c. Discourses, norms, and practices. This cluster is inspired by constructivism, and the literatures on discourses, norms, and practices. There are different theoretical approaches to discourse analysis, including “thin” and “thick” approaches, with thick approaches considering all reality socially constructed, and thin approaches differentiating between the discursive and non-discursive (Arts et al., 2010: 59). I here, obviously, adopt a thin approach to discourse theory, since the framework views discourses as one of several factors – instead of the one and only – in understanding the relationships and performance of governance systems.

Following Hajer and Versteeg (2005: 175), a discourse is defined as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices”. According to Hajer, discourse coalitions, defined as “a group of actors that, in a particular set of practices, shares the usage of a particular set of storylines over a particular period of time”, struggle for discursive hegemony in politics (Hajer in Takahashi and Meisner, 2012: 348). With this, discourse analysis enables the unveiling of the underlying meanings driving IG.

Social norms can be defined in different ways. Hechter and Opp (2001a) differentiate two types of definitions, with the first interpreting social norms as a moral imperative, a “sense of oughtness” (Hechter and Opp, 2001a: xiii), or the “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen, 1989). The second interpretation is broader, interpreting social norms as “behavioral regularities that generate social expectations” (Hechter and Opp, 2001a: xiii). Both interpretations include some kind of punishment or reward for (in-) appropriate behavior (Hechter and Opp, 2001b).

Practices “are the result of inarticulate know-how that makes what is to be done self-evident or commonsensical” (Pouliot, 2008: 257). Practices are able to “reproduce actors through identity, but also reproduce an intersubjective social structure….” (Hopf, 1998: 178).

The above shows that the concepts of discourses, norms and practices are highly related. Discourses are produced and re-produced through practices, and norms, in the broad interpretation of behavioral regularities, also include elements of practices. All three have the power to “produce predictability” (Hopf, 1998: 178), influence behavior and decisions of actors involved in IG, and thus are related to the concept of “productive power” (Barnett and Duvall, 2005). When analyzing these explanatory factors, it is important to differentiate between discourses, practices and norms among actors involved in the governance systems, and those beyond the systems (although these can of course overlap).

Guiding questions for analyzing discourses, norms and practices include:

To what extent and how have (hegemonic) discourses, norms, and practices influenced the relationships and performance of governance systems?

d. Structures. This cluster is mainly derived from contributions to (environmental) sociology, geography, critical theory and more specifically political economy and (critical) political ecology, which study the influence of basic and structural social, institutional, political, economic and technological forces on social order, and the relationship between these forces and the environment (Bryant, 1998; Foster et al., 2010; Gould et al., 2008; Gupta, 2012; Schnaiberg, 1980). Critical theory thus looks at how these structures influence power relations among actors, and thereby explain behavior (White et al., 2016), and is related to the concept of structural power (Barnett and Duvall, 2005).

While this cluster of explanatory factors clearly overlaps with the others, it is important to include structures as a separate potential explanation, because of its focus on systemic characteristics. So while structures can include discourses, power relations among actors, and institutions, here, the focus is on how these factors together influence the relationships and performance of governance systems. Moreover, the focus here is on societal structures, while the other factors can also be applied at a more “micro” level, for example looking at the resources of the actors involved in the analyzed governance instruments, the institutions directly related to the analyzed governance instruments, or dominant discourses among the actors involved in the instruments.

Guiding questions to analyze structures include:

To what extent and how can societal structures explain the relationships and performance of governance systems?

Bringing the explanatory factors together

As explained above, the clusters of explanatory factors should be considered together, in recognition of the overlap and relationships between the different factors. The following hypotheses integrate insights from the four clusters.

The performance of a governance system is supported if:

The main interests of the main actors are in line with addressing the issue that the system governs, and the actors perceive their interests as such

The relationships between governance systems are more positive if:

The main interests of the main actors are in line with addressing all issues governed by the different governance systems, and the actors perceive their interests as such

Crucial questions emerge from combining the insights from the different theoretical perspectives, which should be considered when applying the IG framework, including the following:

To what extent can governance systems that are not in line with dominant societal structures, discourses, norms or practices be successful?

Step 1: Interactions between global animal and conservation governance instruments

While the academic debate on animals mainly focuses on animal welfare and rights, the majority of GAG instruments are focused on animal health. I therefore define the GAG system as the total of global governance instruments on animal health, welfare and rights. Since there is no global agreement or treaty specifically aimed at protecting the welfare or rights of animals (Gibson, 2011), one could argue that in this sense it’s a “nonregime” (Dimitrov et al., 2007). Most animal welfare laws have been developed at the regional (e.g. European Union), national and sub-national level, with some countries having relatively strong legislation and others completely lacking such standards (Bowman, 1988; Otter et al., 2012; White, 2013).

Most interviewees agree that the standards of the World Organization for Animal Health (Office International des Epizooties – OIE) are currently positioned at the center of the GAG system. Most of its rules are focused on animal health, with recently an increasing number of rules on animal welfare, but none on animal rights. Most of the work of the OIE is focused on animal health in the food industry, and research and education. The OIE has agreements with several other organizations, including the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Health Organization (WHO), World Trade Organization (WTO), and Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). The OIE, FAO and WHO collaborate on health issues through a tripartite agreement. The agreement embraces the concept of “one health” (Murtaugh et al., 2017), which approaches the human–animal–environment interface from an integrative perspective (FAO-OIE-WHO, 2017). The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures recognizes the OIE standards on animal health (WTO, 1995). Interviewees and authors consider CITES to be part of both the global animal and conservation governance systems (Otter et al., 2012; Wagman and Liebman, 2011). CITES includes provisions for animal welfare during international transport of live animals (Favre, 2011). The OIE and CITES have signed an agreement to collaborate on wildlife health and welfare (CITES-OIE, 2015).

Over the last century, several attempts have been made to develop global animal welfare or rights treaties (Bowman, 1988; Favre, 2011). World Animal Protection is currently leading the campaign for a Universal Declaration on Animal Welfare (UDAW), which has been ongoing since 2000, and hosts the secretariat for the Steering Committee (WAP, undated a; White, 2013). The idea is for the UDAW to gain official status within the UN and eventually convert the declaration into a convention. The UDAW has been endorsed at several high level forums, and 46 countries and ministries from an additional 17 countries have indicated their support (Gibson, 2011; WAP, undated b). Although the OIE and UDAW can be seen as representing two competing models for a future global animal protection regime (Otter et al., 2012), they have expressed support for one another (WAP, 2014).

For the GCG system, this preliminary analysis focuses on the main rules, namely the CBD Aichi Biodiversity Targets for 2020 (Table 1), which are meant as overarching targets for the entire global community working on biodiversity-related issues. All members of the Biodiversity Liaison Group (BLG), through which eight biodiversity-related conventions collaborate (including the CBD, CMS, and CITES), have accepted the Aichi targets. While it goes beyond the analysis in this article, it is important to acknowledge the intricate relationship between the Aichi targets and the SDGs. The SDGs can thus be regarded as part of the GCG system, especially the goals on the conservation and sustainable use of oceans and terrestrial ecosystems (CBD, undated).

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Table 1.

Overview of Aichi biodiversity targets (adapted from CBD, 2010).

Strategic goal	Target
A. Addressing the underlying causes of biodiversity loss	1. Raising awareness
	2. Integration of biodiversity values into national development policies
	3. Elimination of harmful incentives and development of positive incentives
	4. Sustainable production and consumption
B. Reducing the direct pressures on biodiversity	5. Loss of natural habitats
	6. Sustainable fish harvesting
	7. Sustainable agriculture, aquaculture and forestry
	8. Pollution
	9. IAS
	10. Coral reefs and other vulnerable ecosystems
C. Safeguarding ecosystems, species and genetic biodiversity	11. Protected areas
	12. Threatened species
	13. Genetic diversity of cultivated plants and farmed animals
D. Enhancing benefits	14. Ecosystem services
	15. Conservation and restoration of carbon stocks
	16. Nagoya Protocol
E. Enhancing implementation	17. NBSAPs
	18. Indigenous and local communities
	19. Knowledge, science base and technologies
	20. Financial resources

Because the GAG system is mainly focused on kept animals, and the GCG system on endangered wild animals and rarely includes animal welfare provisions (Harrop, 2011; White, 2013), there are few relationships between the systems (Table 2).

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Table 2.

Interactions between the global animal and conservation governance systems.

Source	Target	Topic	Animals	Focus (Health, Welfare, Rights, or Conservation)	Type of interaction	Effect of interaction	Explanation
OIE terrestrial animal health code	GCG system	Use of animals in research	Wild and kept terrestrial animals	W	Commitment	Neutral	(Non-binding) guiding principles promote consideration of welfare of animals used in any research, thus also for conservation
Aichi target 4	GAG system	Addressing unsustainable use	Wild animals	C	Impact	+	Addressing unsustainable hunting and fishing supports animal welfare
		Promoting sustainable use	Wild animals	C	Impact	–	Promoting sustainable hunting and fishing, e.g. to provide income for conservation, negatively influences animal welfare
Aichi target 7	GAG system	Sustainable diets	Kept animals	C	Impact	+	Promoting sustainable diets supports animal welfare if this includes using less animal products
Aichi target 9	GAG system	IAS	Wild animals	C	Impact	+/–	Controlling or eradicating IAS has a negative impact on the welfare of animals considered invasive. It may indirectly positively influence the health of other wild animals
Aichi target 12	GAG system	Breeding, reintroduction, trans-location	Wild animals	C	Behavior	+/–/ neutral	The effect depends on the extent to which animal health and welfare are taken into account
Aichi target 13	OIE terrestrial and aquatic animal health codes	Agricultural biodiversity	Kept animals	C	Impact	+	Conserving genetic diversity of farm animals influences the health of future generations of farm animals

OIE: Office International des Epizooties; GCG: global conservation governance; GAG: global animal governance; IAS: Invasive Alien Species.

There are a few initiatives that aim to enhance the relationships between the governance systems, for example, platforms through which actors of the two governance systems collaborate (among others the OIE and the secretariats of biodiversity-related conventions), e.g. the Inter-Agency Liaison Group on IAS, the Inter-Agency Liaison Group on Health and Biodiversity, and the Collaborative Partnership on Sustainable Wildlife Management.

Step 2: The performance of global animal and conservation governance

The performance of both governance systems has been limited. Many rules have been developed, but implementation and monitoring have been lacking.

As introduced above, the majority of the GAG system is focused on animal health, with recently an increasing number of rules on animal welfare, but none on animal rights. While most of the work of the OIE is focused on the health of kept animals, it also has a working group on wildlife, mainly focused on monitoring wildlife disease. The OIE has convened four global conferences on animal welfare, and its World Assembly of 181 member countries has adopted 14 animal welfare standards, covering: transport of animals by land, sea, and air; slaughter of animals; killing of animals for disease control; use of animals in research and education; welfare in beef and dairy cattle and broiler chicken production systems; stray dog population control; welfare of working equids; welfare of farmed fish during transport; and killing of farmed fish for human consumption and disease control purposes (OIE, 2017a, 2017b; Otter et al., 2012). In 2017, the OIE adopted a global animal welfare strategy, which sees the common uses of animals as legitimate but also recognizes animals as sentient beings. The strategy includes the development of standards, capacity building, communication, and implementation of standards and policies, and promotes the development of regional animal welfare strategies (RAWS). The OIE encourages the development of national animal welfare focal points (OIE, 2017c).

In terms of animal welfare, the OIE recognizes the so-called “five freedoms” (freedom from hunger, thirst and malnutrition; freedom from fear and distress; freedom from discomfort and exposure; freedom from pain, injury and disease; and freedom to express normal behavior) (McCulloch, 2013; Mellor, 2016), and the “three Rs” for animals in experiments (reduction in numbers of animals; refinement of experimental methods; and replacement of animals with non-animal techniques).

According to critics (in the literature and interviewees), the longstanding focus of the OIE has been prevention and control of animal diseases, thereby facilitating animal production and trade in animals, with its work on animal welfare dating back only to the turn of the century. Also, its language on animal welfare has been critiqued as aspirational, limited in scope, nonbinding, and lacking meaningful content or enforcement mechanisms (Favre, 2011; Otter et al., 2012; White, 2013). The UDAW also recognizes animals as sentient beings (McCulloch, 2013; WAP, 2014), but this text has also been criticized as being too vague and not legally binding (Favre, 2011; Gibson, 2011).

Little is known on the implementation and impacts of the GAG system. Although the OIE currently does not have a system in place to monitor national implementation, information on animal health and the Performance of Veterinary Services is gathered through its World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS) and PVS evaluations. Despite the increasing number of GAG instruments, production of animal products worldwide continues to grow (FAO, 2009), with an estimated 1.43 billion cattle, 1.87 billion sheep and goats, 0.98 billion pigs, and 19.60 billion chickens used in 2014 (Robinson et al., 2014), and an estimated 115.3 million animals were used in research worldwide in 2005 (Taylor et al., 2008).

The GCG system includes meaningful rules for conservation. However, the Aichi targets and SDGs are not legally binding, and there are no enforcement mechanisms, although there are systems in place for national reporting. Of the 196 countries that are Party to the CBD, 138 have submitted a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) that takes the Aichi targets into account, and 189 submitted the latest national report (NR5) (CBD, 2017).

However, several evaluations show that these commitments and efforts will need to be significantly scaled up if the Aichi Targets are to be met by 2020 (CBD, 2014, 2016). As one interviewee put it, there has been limited progress towards the Aichi targets, and the performance of the GCG system is mixed. On relatively “simple” issues, on which conservation actors are not depending on other sectors, e.g. creating protected areas or targeted species conservation, the performance is relatively high. Some progress is also being made on issues that are a bit more complex, e.g. avoiding IAS introductions or regulating trade in endangered species. However, conservation efforts trying to address the structural, underlying causes for environmental problems, e.g. demographic changes, or unsustainable economic development and behavior, have been less successful.

Step 3: Explaining the performance and relationships

According to some interviewees, one of the main explanations for the limited performance of both governance systems is that countries are defending their interests: their economies in general, and their natural resource and animal products industries more specifically. Most countries do not see conservation or animal governance as their prime interest. In order to enhance the performance of both governance systems, countries would “have to stop doing certain things”, as one interviewee put it. Several interviewees name the power of the animal products and extractive industries as explanation, and one interviewee highlights the systemic aspects of factory farming. Current economic structures are ex- or implicitly named by all interviewees. Since the majority of the global economy is not (yet) sustainable or animal-friendly, both governance systems would have to challenge the current political economy in order to enhance their performance. The global trade rules of the WTO are also named; these are seen as limiting the possibility of countries to address the import of animal- or conservation-unfriendly products.

One interviewee pointed out that the limited performance of the GAG system can be explained by the fact that (kept) animals are legally seen as private property – many states thus don’t see animal welfare as a governmental responsibility. Interestingly, the lack of progress in conservation is explained by the fact that natural resources are often “commons” (Hardin, 1968) – no one’s property. Both legal statuses are thus used as explanations. Also, the vast majority of global animal and conservation rules are not legally binding, and there are few enforcement measures available.

The anthropocentric perspective underlying both governance systems can also explain their limited performance. Animal health is mainly being addressed to prevent disease among humans and ensure food security. The anthropogenic perspective can also explain why the GAG system is mainly based on an animal health (and to a much lesser extent, welfare) perspective. The aim of preventing animal exploitation and suffering, as promoted by an animal rights perspective, is not represented in the system, since there are no common global norms on animals – the position of animals if very different across societies around the world. As one interviewee put it, seeing animals as individuals is still in its infancy. The widely recognized concept of ecosystem services in the GCG system also represents an anthropocentric perspective, although the intrinsic value of nature and biodiversity is widely recognized in the governance system (Díaz et al., 2015).

The limited performance of both systems can also be explained by practices involving the use of animals. The consumption of animal products (meat, dairy, eggs, fish), for example, is continuing to increase, with tremendous impacts on both animal welfare and conservation (CBD, 2014).

As stated above, the low number of relationships between the two governance systems can simply be explained because the GAG system is mainly focused on kept animals, and the GCG system mainly on wild animals. Also, different actors are involved in the different systems, and these networks overlap very little. Ministries of environment and conservation NGOs are mainly involved in the GCG system; veterinary representatives and animal welfare organizations participate in the GAG system.

The limited relationship between the two governance systems can also be explained by the fact that individual animals are not the focus in the GCG system, where animals are approached as “biodiversity”, “species”, and “natural resources”. In the Aichi targets and SDGs the word “animal” is barely mentioned. So while the SDGs are integrative for environmental, social and economic issues, animal welfare or rights are not included.