In pursuit of diverse energy futures: The political economy of electricity in Senegal

Abstract

In recent years, Senegal has proactively pursued the expansion of renewable energy generation, particularly from solar and wind. In addition to starting exploration of offshore liquefied natural gas, the expansion in renewable energy is posited as a way to help the country move toward low(er) carbon development, reduce dependence on volatile oil markets, and improve reliable (and especially rural) access to electricity. To achieve these objectives, the electricity sector has continuously undergone structural reforms to improve its financial viability and to achieve objectives around universal access to electricity, particularly by increasing private sector participation in electricity generation. Through the lens of “electricity capital,” this paper examines the implications of reforms in the electricity sector for processes of accumulation, in a context of efforts to improve environmentally sustainable development. It asks how capital in the electricity sector is constituted and operates in the Senegalese context, who has power in shaping how it operates, and how this has influenced the potential for achieving a fair and equitable transition to a low(er) carbon energy system. This paper draws on recent work in political ecology on energy transitions and emerging literature on the political economy of electricity, as well as on analysis of policy and technical documents and semi-structured interviews carried out with those involved in the energy sector between 2018 and 2020. Findings suggest that even though the Senegalese government has set clear objectives for the electricity sector that are based on principles of equity, environmental sustainability, and justice, the current power relations and financing arrangements taken on by the state and other actors active in the sector has, paradoxically, led to an approach that risks undermining these very principles.

Keywords

Electricity energy transitions renewable energy Senegal

Introduction

In recent years, the Senegalese government has made increased renewable energy production a priority in its power generation strategy. Driven by a combination of national development goals, climate change mitigation objectives, and the desire to reduce costly dependence on imported petroleum products, the country is reforming its energy sector by diversifying the energy mix toward lower carbon sources and introducing institutional reforms in the electricity sector—all through heavy involvement of bilateral, multilateral and private financing (MCC and République du Sénégal, 2018; République du Sénégal, 2019a, 2019b).

The transition from an energy system almost entirely dependent on the import and combustion of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO)¹ to an energy mix in which renewables make up at least 30%² of installed capacity by 2025 presents the country with an opportunity to institute climate change mitigation measures and address long-standing issues of equity in energy access and control (Government 5, 2020; République du Sénégal, 2019a). More specifically, the global shift toward renewable energy sources for electricity generation, the push to “electrify everything,” and the need for many countries in the global South to expand access to power mean that the electricity sector plays an increasingly important role in transitions to low-carbon energy systems (IRENA, 2018; Ram et al., 2019). Beyond technical and managerial issues, the current moment in Senegal thus raises political and social questions about who has a stake in energy sector reform, what rationales are put forward for pursuing certain energy options and not others, and who will (or will not) benefit from these changes.

Scholarship examining energy transitions as fundamentally geographic and political processes has burgeoned in recent years, attending to how relations between society and energy take on different forms across time and space. This work illuminates how energy generation and use affects control over space and emphasizes the significance of studying the political economies and related power dynamics that influence transition processes (e.g. Bridge, 2018; Bridge et al., 2013, 2018; Calvert, 2016; Cederlöf, 2019; Huber, 2015; McCarthy, 2015; McEwan, 2017; Newell and Mulvaney, 2013). More recently, this work has focused on how a large-scale energy transition can serve as a “socioecological fix” to capitalist crisis tendencies without addressing issues of equity and justice (e.g. Baker, 2015; Baker et al., 2017; Ekers and Prudham, 2015; Kennedy, 2018; McCarthy, 2015; Newell and Phillips, 2016; Rignall, 2016).

What remains less explored is how electricity specifically, as a carrier of energy, is wound up with capital accumulation processes, how politics and power relations shape the pathway of this sector, and how this affects social and environmental outcomes (Baker and Phillips, 2019; Bakke, 2016; Huber and Luke, 2019; McDonald, 2009). The way in which “electricity capital,” understood as the “nexus of state, regulatory, and financial relationships that shape private accumulation through electricity provision” (Huber and Luke, 2019), shapes social relations and possible energy futures in particular places thus merits further analysis.

This paper attends to two overarching questions. First, how is electricity capital constituted in Senegal, who has power in shaping how it operates in this context, and how has this influenced the pathway of the sector? Second, does the way that electricity capital is constituted in Senegal and the related transformations in the electricity sector prioritize a transition to a lower carbon economy that is inclusive and just? In addressing these questions, the paper contributes to existing literature on the politics and geographies of energy transitions (Bridge, 2018; Bridge et al., 2013; Huber, 2015; Lawhon and Murphy, 2011; McCarthy, 2015; McCarthy and Thatcher, 2019; McEwan, 2017), including work on the role of finance and financialization (Baker, 2015; Knuth, 2018; McDonald, 2009), as well as the nascent but growing body of work on the role of electricity in such transitions in the global South (e.g. Baker and Phillips, 2019; Harrison, 2013; Kennedy, 2018; McDonald, 2009; Silver, 2015). It responds to this special issue’s specific call for further examination of the relations between energy, capitalism, and space through the lens of electricity capital (Huber and Luke, 2019).

The paper proceeds as follows. The next section situates this paper in the political ecology literature on energy transitions and the political economy literature on electricity, outlining why it is important to examine electricity capital in Senegal and how it shapes the possibility for a transition to a lower carbon economy. Then, the methodology is discussed. The section that follows reviews recent shifts in the energy mix and the country’s approach to electrification to shed light on the tensions between the state’s objectives for development and the manner in which and through whom these objectives are pursued. Next, the “Potential for a just energy transition in Senegal” section examines how transformations in the political economy of electricity shape the potential for a just energy transition. This is followed by a discussion section that reflects on the implications of these political, institutional, and financial factors for patterns of accumulation and energy justice. The final section concludes.

Energy transitions and electricity capital as “fixes” to capitalist crisis tendencies

Limiting the increase in global average temperatures will not only require extraordinary systems transitions in infrastructure and land use but also major shifts in electricity generation from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources (IAEA, 2019; IPCC, 2018). At a global level, a shift from a largely fossil fuel-based economy to one driven mainly by renewable energy is considered a financially and technically feasible project, and a socially and environmentally critical one (Jacobson and Delucchi, 2011; de Vries et al., 2007; Mackay, 2009). However, as recent scholarship in political ecology, anthropology, and political science suggests, the political feasibility of such a sweeping transition is much less straightforward, nor necessarily indicative of more equitable and just outcomes (Boyer and Howe, 2019; Huber and McCarthy, 2017; Malm, 2013; McCarthy, 2015; McDonald, 2009; Riofrancos, 2019). Apart from technical and financial aspects, energy transitions provoke profound political questions with regards to how and by whom they are justified and managed, and who may or may not benefit from them (Burke and Stephens, 2017; Huber and McCarthy, 2017; Lawhon and Murphy, 2011; McCarthy, 2015; Newell and Mulvaney, 2013; Wilson, 2018).

A key argument in the political ecology literature is that a transition to renewable energy may serve as a temporary “socioecological fix” to capitalist crisis tendencies (Ekers and Prudham, 2015; McCarthy, 2015). Capitalism, defined as “a system organized around the perpetual expansion and accumulation of capital” (McCarthy, 2015: 2486), is inherently prone to crises based on its exploitation of labor and nature. Much work in geography has focused on how these crisis tendencies are alleviated or postponed through “fixes” that rely on control over capital and space (Harris and McCarthy, 2020; Harvey, 1982; McCarthy, 2015). More recently, scholars have focused on the ecological dynamics of these fixes, that is, the aversion or postponement of potential crises by addressing the ecological factors that threaten accumulation (Ekers and Prudham, 2015, 2017a, 2017b; McCarthy, 2015). This work introduces the concept of the “socioecological fix” and is concerned with the way in which “new elements of nonhuman “nature” [are incorporated] into circuits of capital” as well as “the extension of market rationalities and techniques to environmental governance and politics” (McCarthy, 2015: 2488). Investment in renewable energy development on a grand scale could be an example of such a fix, in that it provides new grounds for capital accumulation by turning natural energy sources into commodities according to market principles. While this may temporarily stave off crises in accumulation perpetuated by climate change, it risks leaving intact or even exacerbating issues of inequity and injustice that are so common to the current fossil fuel-based system (McCarthy, 2015; Newell and Mulvaney, 2013).³

A second line of argument that this scholarship advances is that a transition to an economy based on renewable energy would require “substantial activity and coordination on the parts of both states and finance capital” (McCarthy, 2015: 2498). States have an important role to play in setting targets for carbon emission reduction and making territories they govern available to renewable energy investment. Given the scale of investment involved, financialization, the “rising financial sector interest in the production and management of [energy] infrastructure as a profit-generating enterprise” (Knuth, 2018: 19), may therefore encourage a specific type of transition “predicated on ‘bankability’, risk minimization, and short term profit maximization” (Baker, 2015; Kennedy, 2018: 231). Indeed, the scale of investment in energy infrastructure (including the positing of energy infrastructure as a key asset for investment) and the way in which it brings together and advances interests of particular state and non-state actors across scales has been coined as a new “infrastructural moment” (Bridge et al., 2018), in which the national scale has taken on renewed importance in discussions about and rationalizations for countries’ energy trajectories. This is also the case in the global South, where many governments rely on development banks, bi- and multilateral institutions, as well as private developers and investors to finance utility-scale energy projects, in line with national development and climate change goals (e.g. Bridge et al, 2018; Kennedy, 2018; Rignall, 2016).

These debates are particularly poignant for the electricity sector, considering its increasingly important role in low-carbon transitions. However, extant research on the role of electricity in energy transitions often uses technological and managerial approaches instead of emphasizing electricity’s social, economic, and political dynamics (Baker and Phillips, 2019; Eberhard and Godinho, 2017). In addition, research in energy geographies developed from a relatively small set of case studies in the global North and China, which are based on social, institutional, and regulatory contexts that differ substantially from many countries in the global South (Baker and Phillips, 2019; Bridge, 2018; Bridge et al., 2013; Lawhon and Murphy, 2011). For example, in much of sub-Saharan Africa, energy transitions and electricity reform is shaped by the need to extend electricity access to rural and generally poor areas, challenges vis-a-vis maintaining grid stability, informal land tenure regimes that influence the spatial dynamics of energy systems and projects, as well as distinct “configurations of power between states, donors and transnational capital” (Baker and Phillips, 2019; Eberhard and Godinho, 2017; Newell and Phillips, 2016: 39). These factors present challenges to and priorities for the sector that tend to differ from circumstances in the global North and involve a different network of actors who have a stake in setting its direction (Bridge et al., 2013). Thus, the relationship between whether and how electricity capital operates in distinct contexts, and who shapes how it operates in these contexts, is likely to be quite different depending on the circumstances in which the relationship between these two factors is examined. It also has distinct implications for whether a just and sustainable energy transition can be achieved.

Literature on the political dynamics of the electricity sector, electricity sector reform, as well as its distributional effects in the global South has started to emerge in recent years, examining the ways in which capital invested in electricity shapes distribution and access through different modes of finance (e.g. Baker et al., 2017; Baker and Phillips, 2019; Kennedy, 2018; McDonald, 2009), power relations (e.g. Newell and Phillips, 2016; Silver, 2015), and the creation of new kinds of governable territories (e.g. McEwan, 2017). This work has pointed out the essential role that electricity plays in capitalist modes of production, and how electricity infrastructure has come to serve as an important “spatial fix” for over-accumulated capital elsewhere. As McDonald (2009) points out:

Electricity may not loom large in every accumulation crisis, but it often plays a critical role in the rebuilding of the productive assets required for reconfigured accumulation regimes: new power plants for increased electricity demands; updated technologies for new production systems; [and] expanded grid lines into new geographic areas of production and consumption. […] Investments in the built environment […] are, quite literally, fixed into the ground, […] catering to new regimes of capital accumulation and the sociospatial and economic demands of those that control them. (McDonald, 2009: 6)

Yet despite electricity being a core part of capitalist production and intensification processes, questions about whether and how electricity capital operates and is constituted in distinct contexts, and who has power in shaping how capital operates in these contexts, continue to be understudied (Baker and Phillips, 2019; Huber and Luke, 2019; McDonald, 2009).

In light of the increasing urgency around facilitating large-scale transitions to low-carbon energy sources and increasing electrification, as well as the importance of making these transitions beneficial for all, scholars are calling for enhanced theorization and empirical work on the concept of “electricity capital,” understood as the interrelations between state, financial, and regulatory actors that shape private accumulation through the provision of power (Huber and Luke, 2019). Studying the constitution of electricity capital in different contexts is critical in order to better understand how it arises out of distinct historical and political processes, and how this contributes to understanding broader accumulation processes (Hart, 2018). Considering research to date, examining these questions in the global South is particularly important.

Scholarship on socioecological fixes and the political economy of electricity provides conceptual tools with which to better understand how and why certain energy sources are prioritized over others, by whom, and how this affects the potential for ensuring equitable energy access and control in different contexts (Newell and Phillips, 2016). It also invites questions about how capital behaves in the electricity sector, in response to distinct social, political, and environmental challenges, who does or does not participate in defining a country’s energy future, and how this will ultimately affect social and environmental outcomes (Baker, 2015; Kennedy, 2018; Knuth, 2018; Newell and Mulvaney, 2013). Because historical, political, economic, and social factors differentially influence power dynamics and decision-making, it is important to carry out analyses of the political economy of such transitions in specific places.

Senegal is an interesting case study to do so. The Senegalese state plays a critical role in coordinating the energy sector writ large and facilitating expansion of electricity access. It has attracted significant foreign private investment for reforming electricity sector governance and building energy infrastructure. It has also set ambitious renewable energy targets and committed to an emissions reduction strategy. These developments thus allow for an examination of whether and how a political commitment to a low(er) carbon transition—framed in terms of national development, energy independence, and climate change mitigation—might risk overlooking objectives of equity and justice.

Methodology

Research for this paper was carried out by the author during two preliminary research periods in Dakar, Senegal, and Washington, DC (May–July 2018; June–August 2019), and during the first part (October 2019–January 2020) of the primary data collection period (October 2019–March 2020) in Senegal.⁴ This paper draws on peer-reviewed literature, primarily the political ecology of energy transitions and the political economy of electricity sector reform, as well as relevant policy and technical documents and semi-structured interviews with key informants working on energy sector reform in Senegal. The researcher, while based in the United States, has worked in the realm of food security and nutrition in Senegal since 2010 and speaks French, which facilitated establishment of contacts with persons working on (renewable) energy in Senegal.

Policy and technical documents relevant to the electricity sector and renewable energy specifically in Senegal and West Africa were sourced through web and institutional website searches and through interviews. A Google web search was carried out using a search string with keyword combinations to identify relevant policy and technical documents from 1998 onward. The year 1998 was chosen because it marks the passing of the Electricity Law no. 98-29, which set the stage for subsequent sector reforms. Websites of institutions working on issues of renewable energy in West Africa were also searched using keywords.⁵ Additional documents, including those not available online, were acquired through interviews. Documents were coded in NVivo v12 according to key themes, which were then grouped to compare information across documents.

The research also draws on preliminary findings from 19 interviews carried out in Washington, DC and Dakar, Senegal in 2018, 2019, and 2020, with 18 actors involved in the (renewable) energy sector and/or electricity specifically (Table 1).

Table 1.

Summary of interviews.

In-text citation	Interviewee description	No.	Language	Place	Year
Government 1	High-level employee, Senegal Rural Electrification Agency	1	French	Senegal	2019
Government 2	High-ranking official, Ministry of Environment	1	French	Senegal	2019
Government 3	High-ranking official, Ministry of Petroleum and Energy	1	French	Senegal	2020
Government 4	High-level employee, Senelec	1	French	Senegal	2020
Government 5	High-level employee, Senelec	1	French	Senegal	2020
Government 6	High-level employee, Senelec	1	French	Senegal	2020
Academia 1	Faculty & Researcher (solar energy), Senegalese university	2	French	Senegal	2018, 2019
Bilateral 1	High-ranking employee, Energy program, U.S. international development agency	1	English	Washington, DC	2019
Bilateral 2	High-level employee, Energy program, U.S. trade association	1	English	Skype	2019
Bilateral 3	High-level employee, independent U.S. foreign aid agency	1	English	Senegal	2019
Bilateral 4	Mid-level employee, Energy program, U.S. international development agency	1	English	Senegal	2019
Bilateral 5	High-level employee, German development bank	1	French	Senegal	2020
Multilateral 1	Energy specialist, U.S.-based multilateral institution	1	English	Washington, DC	2018
Multilateral 2	Energy specialist, U.S.-based multilateral institution	1	English	Washington, DC	2018
Independent 1	Mid-level employee, U.S. energy association	1	English	Senegal	2019
Private consulting 1	High-ranking employee, Energy program, U.S. consulting and engineering firm	1	English	Senegal	2018
Private consulting 2	High-level climate change and energy expert, U.S. private international development company	1	English	Washington, DC	2019
Private consulting 3	Mid-ranking employee, Energy program, U.S. consulting and engineering firm	1	English	Senegal	2019
Total		19

Interviewees were identified through purposive and snowball sampling methods. Interviews were carried out in English or French and were audio recorded if the interviewee provided written consent (n = 18). If the interviewee did not consent to audio recording (n = 1), the researcher took notes during the interview. A translator was present in interviews conducted in French in the event of a translation issue. Interviews focused, broadly, on drivers of changes in the energy sector; rationales for utility-scale renewable energy development and offshore oil and gas; actors involved and influential in the energy sector; and future challenges and opportunities regarding renewable energy development in Senegal. Interview notes were written up in MS Word; audio recordings were transcribed in MS Word in the interview language; transcriptions in English were done by the researcher, while transcriptions in French were done by a translator/research assistant and reviewed for accuracy and quality by the researcher. Transcripts were analyzed in NVivo v12 based on a prepared codebook, capturing information according to themes and sub-themes, complemented by a grounded theory approach to identify additional codes as needed (Charmaz, 2006).

To contextualize the theoretical examination of how electricity capital has shaped the sector and how this influences its potential to contribute to a just energy transition, the next section examines the shifts in the energy sector and electrification efforts over time, as well as how the electricity sector has been shaped by institutional interests, priorities, and investments, and how this in turn has shaped the contemporary institutional and financial structure of the sector.

The political economy of electricity in Senegal’s energy transition

Improving electricity access through diversification of the energy mix

In 2014, the newly elected government of President Macky Sall adopted the Plan for an Emerging Senegal 2035 (Plan Sénégal Emergent 2035), a national development framework that aims to get Senegal “on the road to development by 2035” (Presidency of Senegal, 2021). The plan identified energy as a priority sector for the development and growth of the national economy, following long-term popular dissatisfaction with frequent power cuts and the inability of the state-owned electricity company Senelec (Société National d'Electricité du Sénégal) to meet demand under the country’s former administration of President Abdoulaye Wade (BBC News, 2011; République du Sénégal, 2014). A year later, the country signed on to the Paris Climate Accords and developed its national climate commitments in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 5% by 2030 (République du Sénégal, 2015a, 2019b).

In line with this vision and based on the financial, infrastructural, and operational challenges in the sector, the Government of Senegal set out to reduce the cost of electricity, one of the highest in the West Africa region, and from an equity and access perspective, expand rural electricity access (Academia 1, 2018, 2019; Bilateral 1, 3, 4, 2019; Government 1, 2, 2019; Government 3, 2020; Presidency of Senegal, 2021; Private consulting 1, 2018; République du Sénégal, 1998, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2015b, 2019a, 2019b). To achieve these objectives, the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE), in charge of setting the strategic direction of the electricity sector, began to diversify the energy mix away from expensive imported petroleum products to one primarily based on solar, wind, hydro, and liquefied natural gas. Lowering greenhouse gas emissions, extending and reinforcing the electricity grid, and improving electricity sector governance are considered critical to ensure energy independence and improve “access to all of energy of sufficient quantity and quality, at least cost, and sustainable and respectful of the environment” (République du Sénégal, 2019a: 3).⁶

The momentum around harnessing energy sources alternative to oil has thus picked up significantly in Senegal in recent years. The importance of renewable energy was explicitly recognized in the country’s Energy Sector Development Policy Letters (“Energy Policy”) from 2008 onward (2008–2012, 2012–2017), with the latest (2019–2023) identifying a target of at least 18% renewable energy penetration by 2022, excluding hydroelectricity, and a total of 30% renewable energy penetration by the mid-2020s, including hydroelectricity (Government 5, 2020; République du Sénégal, 2019a).⁷ Several notable institutional and policy developments relevant to renewable energy development and energy diversification have also taken place. A Renewable Energy Law was passed in 2010, outlining the regulatory structure for the subsector (République du Sénégal, 2010). That same year, the Ministry of Energy and Renewable Energy Development was created (although subsumed into the MPE two years later). In 2013, a renewable energy department was established within the national utility Senelec, and the National Agency for Renewable Energy (Agence National pour les Energies Renouvelables) was set up, meant to support regulatory, policy, and technical development (Government 2, 2019). In 2015, the National Action Plan for Renewable Energy (2015–2020/2030) (Plan d'Actions National des Energies Renouvelables) was developed, outlining key targets for the subsector (République du Sénégal, 2012, 2015b, 2019a).

Between 2013 and 2018, Senegal installed seven utility-scale solar photovoltaic plants with a combined capacity of 152 megawatt (MW) (Ndiaye, 2019; République du Sénégal, 2019a). In 2019–2020, an additional 60 MW plant for solar photovoltaic energy was undergoing construction through the World Bank Group’s Scaling Solar project, as well as 158 MW of wind energy through the region’s largest wind power project in Taiba N’Diaye, approximately 2 hours northeast of the capital city Dakar (Table 2).⁸ This takes installed capacity of solar and wind energy generation up from effectively non-existent in 2013 to nearly 400 MW in 2020, or 27% of the country’s total installed energy generation capacity. Including large-scale hydro, this figure rises to 36% in 2020, surpassing the country’s renewable energy goals ahead of schedule (Ba, 2018; Government 3, 4, 2020) (Figure 1, Table 2).¹⁶

Table 2.

Past and projected future installed capacity (2017–2023) in megawatt (MW) (% of total energy mix for that year).

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Coal (MW)^a	16 (2)	141 (12)	141 (11)	141 (10)	141 (9)	141 (6)	141 (6)
Organic waste (MW)	73 (8)	73 (6)	73 (6)	38 (3)	0	0	0
Wind (MW)	0	0	51 (4)	158 (11)	158 (10)	158 (7)	158 (7)
Natural gas (MW)	24 (3)	24 (2)	24 (2)	24 (2)	24 (2)	584 (25)	584 (25)
Heavy Fuel Oil (MW)	643 (68)	723 (61)	723 (55)	748 (51)	745 (49)	895 (38)	895 (38)
Hydroelectricity (MW)	81 (9)	81 (7)	129 (10)	129 (9)	225 (15)	325 (14)	325 (14)
Solar (MW)	103 (11)	143 (12)	168 (13)	228 (16)	228 (15)	228 (10)	228 (10)
Total	940	1185	1309	1466	1521	2331	2331

Source: Senelec (République du Sénégal, 2019a).

Numbers are rounded and therefore may not add exactly to 100%.

^aWhile these figures are from 2019, the Government of Senegal also took a decision in late 2019 to transition two coal plants to natural gas plants; this change is not yet reflected in these figures.

Figure 1.

Energy mix in 2020.

Solar and wind are not the only focus, however (Table 2). The discovery of large offshore oil and gas deposits from 2014 onward means that Senegal now expects to start adding liquefied natural gas to its energy mix by 2022. In total, these developments will more than double the country’s installed power generation capacity within just five years (2017–2023), reaching 1.6 gigawatt (GW) by 2030 (Climatescope, 2017).

The diversification of the energy mix is expected to improve access to more affordable power, particularly in rural areas. Government documents and interviews with those working in the sector make clear that the state considers expansion of (affordable) electricity access critical for poverty reduction and economic development, as it facilitates access to social services, infrastructures, and productive activities (Academia 1, 2018, 2019; Ba, 2018; Bilateral 1, 2, 3, 2019; Government 1, 2, 2019; Government 3, 2020; Ndiaye, 2019; République du Sénégal, 2014, 2015b, 2019a). While the national electrification rate in Senegal has improved significantly since the early 1990s, rural access rates have remained comparatively low (∼42% in 2018) and rural electricity costs comparatively high, despite these areas representing 55% of the population (Table 3) (World Bank, 2015). These trends reflect long-term inequalities in socioeconomic status and provision of basic services between urban and rural parts of the country (République du Sénégal, 2019a). (Rural) electrification thus continues to be a political priority and an important electoral issue, demonstrated by years of public political commitments to reaching universal access to electricity by 2025, primarily through private sector financing (Government 1, 2, 2019; République du Sénégal, 1998, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2019a).

Table 3.

Rural and urban electrification rates in Senegal.

Electrification rate (%)	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Urban	88	88	88.5	88.9	90.6	91.82	93.6
Rural	27	29	29.5	30	32.2	39.98	42.3
National	58	60.6	61.5	62	64	67.88	69.6

Source: Energy Policy 2019–2023 (République du Sénégal, 2019a).

The efforts by the Senegalese state to reduce carbon emissions and simultaneously reduce the price of electricity through utility-scale renewable energy and natural gas projects are supported by the discursive and material commitments of development partners, primarily bi- and multilateral institutions such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and World Bank Group institutions, as well as foreign developers and utilities (MCC and Republique du Senegal, 2018; Private consulting 2, 2019; USAID, 2019, 2020; World Bank and Republique du Senegal, 2017). These commitments have materialized in the form of multi-million-dollar grants, loans, technical support, and infrastructure investment, which over time have helped shape energy policy, institutional reform, technology choice, and regulations for foreign investment. This type of approach to energy sector reform has allowed for the rapid rollout of the new vision for electricity through regulatory, tax, and contractual incentives that attract foreign investors to new energy projects (République du Sénégal, 1998, 2010, 2012, 2019a; Senegal, 2014). It presents a dynamic in which the Senegalese state, deeming large-scale investment critical for achieving its energy objectives, needs to balance facilitating the increase of donor and private sector financing into electricity with maintaining authority over the direction of and objectives for the sector.

Electricity sector reform over time

The more recent sector changes should be contextualized in what is now a decades long effort to lower electricity costs and improve (rural) electrification, with the electricity sector undergoing several structural changes since the late 1990s (Independent 1, 2019; République du Sénégal, 1998; Simmet, 2018). Until 1998, the electricity sector in Senegal was entirely state-run, whereby infrastructure for generation, transmission, and distribution was largely state-funded, although “connection fees and internal installation costs were passed directly to consumers” (Mawhood and Gross, 2014: 482).⁹ This model was considered ineffective as neither consumers nor Senelec had the capacity to cover high upfront investment costs. Selection of rural villages for electrification was seen as inequitable (e.g. based on proximity to the existing grid), progress in rural electrification was slow, and there was skepticism about stalled rollout of renewable and decentralized solutions (Mawhood and Gross, 2014). With rural access rates at less than 10% at the time, there was a need to drastically improve coverage and address the sector’s growing financial woes (World Bank, 2015).

Following years of blackouts and financial constraints in the sector, the government started sector reforms in 1998 with the passing of Electricity Law no. 98-29 (République du Sénégal, 1998). One of the key results of the law was the creation of a new sectoral structure, whereby responsibility for regulation and rural electrification was transferred from Senelec to two new institutions: the Electricity Sector Regulatory Commission (Commission de Régulation du Secteur de l’Electricité) and the Senegalese Rural Electrification Agency (Agence Sénégalaise d’Electrification Rurale). The regulator became responsible for setting tariffs and licensing standards for contracts with Independent Power Producers (IPPs) (private companies that generate electricity for sale to utilities or end users, in this case Senelec), and the Rural Electrification Agency was put in charge of expanding rural electrification (Hosier et al., 2017). Senelec remained in charge of generation, transmission, and distribution in urban and peri-urban areas.

The developments brought about by the 1998 Electricity Law were part of broader power sector reform efforts encouraged by the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund (Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008). The “standard power sector reform model” involved the liberalization of electricity markets through regulation (by creating an independent regulator), restructuring (through corporatization and structural reform of the utility), private sector participation (particularly in distribution and generation), and competition (a wholesale power market) (Eberhard et al., 2016; Foster and Rana, 2019; Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008; Lee and Usman, 2018). The idea behind this model was that opening up the sector to (competitive) private power generation would leverage much needed financial and technical performance improvements and eliminate inefficiencies in the bureaucracy of a large state-run monopoly utility such as Senelec.

Thus, under multilateral lending stipulations, the 1998 reforms were fundamental in sector restructuring, facilitating the entry of new types of capital into the power generation market¹⁰ and underpinning subsequent sector reforms that encouraged mostly private provisioning of electricity. The combination of financial constraints faced by the sector, the (neoliberal) logics underpinning financing provisions by development partners, and the priorities of private companies entering the market have led to an opportunity for (primarily E.U. based) shareholders to invest in and profit off new infrastructure projects south of their borders. As a result, electricity generation capacity and access in the country has acquired a particular geography, whereby large-scale power generation continues to grow yet access to power for many continues to stall. While the Senegalese state plays an important role in attracting finance and making (rural) spaces available for such projects, its electricity sector is simultaneously undergoing reforms that reduce state ownership of and control over this sector. The framework for energy development that the Senegalese state has come to accept to reach its development objectives of equity in energy access, thus elicits questions about the feasibility of such objectives actually being achieved.

The rise of IPPs in electricity: Renewable energy and rural electrification

A key method for bringing in private sector investment has been through IPPs. These involve “power projects that mainly are privately developed, constructed, operated, and owned; have a significant proportion of private finance; and have long-term Power Purchase Agreements (contracts) with a utility or another off-taker” (Eberhard et al., 2016: xxiii). IPPs, often utilities or developers from the global North, are primarily attracted to markets where “security and credit enhancement mechanisms [create] the opportunity to achieve required rates of return” (Eberhard et al., 2016). These include the development of tax incentives for private investment, sovereign guarantees (government guarantee that a financial obligation will be satisfied in case of default), and a regulatory environment attractive to investors and developers (IRENA, 2013, 2020; Valverde et al., 2018). Senegal’s long-term political stability and its “business-friendly” environment mean that it provides an attractive and profitable market for IPPs (Multilateral 2, 2018; Private consulting 1, 2018). Leaving investment in new power generation infrastructure to the private sector is expected to free up Senelec’s resources for transmission and production, allowing its share in generation to continue to fall (Figure 2) (Ba, 2018; Bilateral 3, 4, 2019; Government 3, 2020; Independent 1, 2019). As a representative of one of the key institutions involved in reform of the sector explained: We tried to lay out the vision for the sector for the government. In that roadmap, by 2035, Senelec’s share of production should be less than 15%, and the rest is the private sector (Bilateral 3, 2019).

Figure 2.

Past and present power generation shares.

To rapidly ramp up renewable energy generation capacity, most of the newly built solar and wind projects are utility-scale, managed by international developers or utility companies from France (Greenwish, Meridiam, Engie) or the UK (Lekela) and financed by venture capital groups (ECREEE, 2018; Independent 1, 2019; Private consulting 1, 2018; République du Sénégal, 1998; Simmet, 2018).¹¹ While most agreements between IPPs and the Senegalese government (Senelec) are so-called “negotiated deals” (direct negotiations), there is an expectation that securing deals through competitive bidding processes (referred to as tenders or reverse auctions), whereby governments invite companies to bid on large energy projects, will become the new standard, increasing sector transparency and accountability and bringing costs down (Multilateral 2, 2018; République du Sénégal, 2010; World Bank, 2020).¹²

While IPP involvement in renewable energy is new, IPP involvement in the energy sector as a whole is not. Under the Rural Electrification Agency, rural electrification was converted to a “concessions” approach in the early 2000s; rural areas of Senegal were divided into 10 concession areas, with the goal to make these areas attractive for private investor power generation, and reduce the fiscal burden on the state (Hosier et al., 2017). Under this approach, foreign and domestic IPPs engaged in a technology-neutral international bidding process to generate electricity in a concession area under 20- to 25-year contracts (Ba, 2018). Six such concession contracts were signed between 2008 and 2012, primarily by Moroccan, Tunisian, Spanish, and French utility companies, in partnership with Senegalese firms, and started operations between 2011 and 2015 (Hosier et al., 2017; Mawhood and Gross, 2014; World Bank, 2015). In addition, because of perceived investor risk, significant involvement of development financing institutions, such as the World Bank Group’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), was key to ensure projects reached financial close (Eberhard et al., 2016). Success of this approach has been disappointing, however; the remaining four concessions were never awarded and recently brought back under Senelec’s responsibility. Because these concessions were in remote areas, nobody was interested in taking them (Bilateral 4, 2019). Tenders got messy; There is a question as to what extent did the Senegalese buy into concession areas or to what extent it was imposed by the World Bank […] Internally people have different opinions. The Ministry wants to keep donors happy, Senelec isn’t interested (Private consulting 3, 2019).

Despite disappointing progress in rural electrification, the advent of IPPs in the sector is largely seen as necessary, not only by those traditionally promoting private sector involvement in power generation, but also by high-level Senelec staff and those in leading positions at the Electricity sub-directorate within the MPE. Despite the opinion that on a purely economic level, you lose money by making an IPP, compared to a plant which is going to belong to you (Government 6, 2020), … Senelec is not always able to mobilize funding to make investments in production… Because these are capitalist investments that require a lot of funds, we have to leave that to the private sector, in part (Government 4, 2020). Thus, with rapid provisions being made for private grid-connected capital-intensive energy projects, rural electrification continues to lag in terms of improving household connections in areas most in need, despite it being a primary objective in government plans. While the original rationale for introducing IPPs remains (introducing competition and improving transparency), IPPs have been instituted more recently as a means to, quickly, generate power from renewable energy sources and increase total power generation capacity through installation of grid-connected plants. While Senelec benefits from technical expertise and quality control in project installation as part of these deals, IPPs benefit from long-term “take or pay” contracts that in most cases provide them, in words of one interviewee, with a 25-year cash flow guaranteed by the government, without any risk (Private consulting 1, 2018). These contracts lock in a 20-year price based on current wind and solar technology prices, despite the likelihood that these prices will continue to drop.

Recent power sector reforms

More recent reforms have taken the implementation of the World Bank’s power sector reform model a step further. In 2019, the Senegalese government signed a 600-million-dollar Compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a U.S. foreign assistance agency, with the objective to create an “enabling environment to improve the financial viability of, and ensure good governance in, the power sector, to improve the quality and quantity of the electricity supply” (MCC and Republique du Senegal, 2018: 2; Multilateral 2, 2018). Core to the Compact, and in fact conditions for MCC funding, are third-party access to the grid, i.e. the ability for IPPs to sell to those other than Senelec, such as domestic mining or cement industries. In addition, they involve the vertical and horizontal “unbundling” of Senelec,¹³ entailing a further shift away from a state-owned vertically integrated utility (one whereby Senelec owns generation, transmission, and distribution) toward separate production, transmission, and distribution companies (Baker and Phillips, 2019: 180; Bilateral 1, 3, 4, 2019; Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008; Independent 1, 2019; Silver, 2015).

Those involved argue that such reforms will further free up Senelec’s resources to focus on transmission and distribution and allow for better identification of inefficiencies in the sector and within Senelec (Bilateral 4, 2019). Others are less convinced of the willingness of Senelec to undergo such reform, however, and ask whether this has emerged from donor pressure (Private consulting 3, 2019).

These more recent reforms thus continue a familiar pattern whereby those who control flows of finance to a large extent also set the terms of the institutional and regulatory environment for the sector. That is, liberalization of the electricity market in Senegal has continuously been shaped by a small group of bi- and multilateral actors with substantial financial leverage, and, increasingly, by individual private interests from abroad. The reforms in the sector, while strongly echoing the “standard model” prescribed by the World Bank, have led to a hybrid market where public and private investment, for now, exist simultaneously, with the state performing a delicate balancing act between maintaining authority over the sector and attracting much needed finance.¹⁴

The interest of the state to be reliant primarily on domestic energy sources and abide by its climate change commitments, yet its historical reliance on foreign financing due in part to long-term legacies of colonialism (Koddenbrock et al., 2020), thus underpin its push for developing a power sector that provides sufficient regulatory and financial incentives for private sector actors. In this way, the Senegalese state progresses toward its national development goals and imaginaries around improving low-carbon electricity generation, electricity access, and climate change mitigation, while electricity infrastructure increasingly serves as an important asset for foreign investment. While this has ramped up investment in the sector, it has also reduced state (Senelec) control over production and institutional governance of electricity, leaving it to (mostly) private actors to determine how, where, and when low-carbon electricity should be produced, and who should be able to receive it. The current vision of (economic) development is thus based on large-scale installations that boost overall power production and access in urban spaces, yet do not, thus far, result in more equitable access to energy in the rest of the country. Despite the MPE’s mandate to set the direction of the sector, the discursive and financial authority of these other actors poses “questions about what instruments states have available to them to address the challenges of decarbonizing their economies in a socially just manner, when many have ceded direct control over the energy sector” (Newell and Phillips, 2016: 47).

Electricity in this sense functions as a “spatial fix” (Harvey, 1982; McCarthy, 2015; McDonald, 2009), in that it plays a critical role in absorbing the transnational capital entering the country in the form of renewable energy and gas-to-power plants along the grid, and, to a certain extent, the expansion of the grid eastward, if profitable, through the concessions approach. Simultaneously, in terms of its ecological dimensions, investment in low(er) carbon electricity infrastructure addresses the country’s emissions reduction targets (McCarthy, 2015). This requires significant coordination between the state, the regulator, and foreign finance, with the national scale poised to take on renewed importance in the construction of political imaginaries around energy, even as it is mediated by multi-scalar interests, priorities, and relations. The next section briefly reflects on what implications these developments in the power sector may have for issues of justice and equity in Senegal’s energy future.

Potential for a just energy transition in Senegal

While it is not within the scope of this paper to assess the effects of Senegal’s transition for households across the country, the above discussion requires consideration of what these recent changes in the power sector mean for an energy transition that centers equity and inclusion. The concept of a “just transition” draws attention to the fact that the efforts to direct societies away from reliance on fossil fuels and toward a lower carbon energy system must be based on principles of justice and equity (Newell and Mulvaney, 2013); that is, any such transition should not lead to new types of social or environmental injustices (Mulvaney, 2015; Sovacool et al., 2020).

In the case of Senegal, two dimensions relevant to energy justice are particularly worth highlighting. First, utility-scale projects—renewable or otherwise—are placed in proximity to high-voltage grid lines, which dominate the northwestern border of the country. Even if located within specific rural concession areas, these installations do not individually guarantee increased community access to power, as concession areas are managed separately by the Rural Electrification Agency. The result is that in a mostly privatized power production market, third-party access influences the spatial character of electrification, as these companies can produce power in one area and sell it in another, where profit margins are high enough. Due to the absence of a tariff harmonization policy until 2019, people in rural concession areas have paid different electricity prices depending on the concessionaire, and generally paid relatively higher prices than urban centers, leading to suppressed demand from rural populations for connections (Ba, 2018, 34; Bilateral 4, 2019; Government 1, 2, 2019). Thus, while investments in electricity have facilitated renewable energy integration into the grid and ramped up overall production capacity, they have not yet guaranteed extension of access for populations currently not connected to the grid, or improved affordability of electricity tariffs. Significant geographical discrepancies in terms of who gets access to power, and at what price, have thus far not yet been resolved.

Second, as highlighted in both recent theoretical as well as empirical literature on energy transitions (e.g. Avila-Calero, 2017; Dunlap, 2018; Huber and McCarthy, 2017; McCarthy, 2015; McEwan, 2017; Rignal, 2016), grid extensions and utility-scale solar and wind projects require extensive surface areas, risking dispossession of nearby communities of key resources. Because 95% of land in Senegal is unregistered and owned by the state, with populations having access and use rights but no formal ownership, utility-scale project developers can obtain a formal (private) title, even if land identified for the project is occupied (Academia 1, 2018, 2019). The result is that projects either need to be relocated or go through complex consultation and resettlement negotiations, with varying impacts for local populations’ livelihoods in terms of employment, access to agricultural lands, access to project equity, or access to electricity. In at least one such project, the Taiba N’Diaye wind power project (Parc Eolien Taiba N’Diaye), community members expressed that while the consultation and negotiation process employed by the implementing company Lekela to occupy land in the municipality was far better than that of other projects in the area, and while the development of renewable energy was perceived as positive for the environment and for Senegal’s overall development, compensation processes for land and other resources that were lost due to project construction were often not considered sufficient. Community members expressed that the project did not follow through on promises for generating local employment opportunities and that they did not feel like they had a choice in giving up their agricultural plots due to their lack of ownership (e.g. PressAfrik, 2019).

Thus, the question of who gains and who loses in Senegal’s electricity sector reforms and (renewable) energy infrastructure rollout is one that remains as pertinent as ever. Grid-connected utility-scale projects have provided opportunities for powerful transnational companies and traditional development actors. All of these projects supply electricity to the existing grid that crisscrosses urban/peri-urban areas, while rural areas are thus far not seeing the development objectives these projects purport to achieve for all Senegalese. Yet those driving the electricity sector reforms in the country find that restructuring the sector toward more private ownership over production, allowing third party access, and restructuring the country’s major utility company will ultimately allow for the extension of the electrical grid to rural and poorer areas. The expectation is that this will attract much needed investment to the sector, and enhance its sustainability, even though evidence on the success of this in Africa is mixed (Eberhard et al., 2016; Eberhard and Godinho, 2017; Newell and Phillips, 2016).

Discussion: The role of electricity capital in Senegal’s energy transition

What is clear in Senegal is that the state, development institutions, private companies, at least at the highest levels, appear united behind what is essentially a neoliberal approach to electricity provision, in which there is increased reliance on private actors for the provision of a public good through regulatory, tax, and contractual incentives. The vision of national development and an “emerging” economy of the Senegalese state—particularly as held by President Macky Sall and the MPE—is dependent upon the harnessing of domestic energy sources (wind, solar, natural gas) that have become new bearers of value amidst efforts to lower the price of power, reduce reliance on the import of oil, and reduce carbon emissions (Bridge et al., 2018; Kenney-lazar and Kay, 2017). The limited capacity of the state to generate such large-scale investments from the public budget, however, implies a heavy dependence on foreign direct investment to work toward the country’s vision of increasing affordable access to electricity across the country in an environmentally sustainable manner.

The opportunities that Senegal’s move away from imported oil products has provided investors, IPPs, and development institutions are affecting the type of energy transition that is taking place. While many of these institutions have committed to no longer invest in oil, investment in domestic natural gas is seen as both necessary to secure energy independence and lower electricity costs, and as complementary to the development of renewable energy sources by serving as a “bridge fuel” that balances intermittency of solar and wind on the grid (Bilateral 2, 3, 4, 2019; Government 2, 2019; Government 3, 4, 6, 2020; Independent 1, 2019; NYTimes, 2020).¹⁵ While the switching of two plants from coal to gas in 2019, following significant advocacy and resistance to these projects by local communities, is seen as an example of Senegal’s climate commitments (Bilateral 4, 2019; Government 3, 2020), there are concerns that the MPE’s pivot to exploitation of domestic natural gas resources, alongside its track record of adopting market-based development approaches, will lead to stalled momentum on development of renewable energy, and a “carbon lock in” that may avert a truly sustainable energy future (Academia 1, 2019; Bilateral 5, 2020; RFI, 2017; Urry, 2014). Existing political and financial relationships thus have an important effect on “who captures the value of energy booms, and who bears the price” (Newell and Phillips, 2016: 47), including which population groups will be required to make sacrifices in the name of national development. Hence, the interests of those making decisions on electricity sector reform, technologies, and investment strategies may not necessarily align with those who should benefit most from this energy transition.

The nature of electricity capital in this particular context is thus one that is distinctly influenced by Senegal’s particular (colonial) history, social and political relations, and regulatory and financial environment that makes it attractive for foreign actors to invest in large-scale infrastructure projects (Hart, 2018). Capital invested in electricity, aside from “virtually landing” based on institutional arrangements and the potential of a new resource to be “harnessed” to generate power, physically lands through infrastructure development in particular places (le Billon and Sommerville, 2016; Li, 2014). The opportunities that renewable energy and new offshore gas deposits present for Senegal’s climate change mitigation and development plans, and for private companies’ investment strategies, while thus serving as a fix in some places, also lead to social and environmental neglect or externalities in another, such as the lack of materialization of electricity networks and access to power, or dispossession by utility-scale installations (Huber and McCarthy, 2017; Kenney-lazar and Kay, 2017; République du Sénégal, 2019a). Hence, power generation in one place (e.g. a rural concession) can mean consumption in another, where profit margins are higher, attempting, in one sense, to overcome the barriers that the materiality of electricity poses to accumulation processes (Harrison, 2013) and in another, quite literally representing Marx’s definition of capital as “value in motion,” an immaterial relation with real material effects (Harvey, 2018; Marx, 1981 [1867]; McDonald, 2009). Electricity capital may thus not represent a particular fraction of capital as we know it—e.g. industrial, merchant, or finance capital, each of which represent different distributions of value and surplus value (Harvey, 2018; Marx, 1981 [1867])-but may work across their inherent tensions through distribution networks that connect and sell to consumers, intermediaries that transmit electricity from point of generation to point of distribution, and banks and other financial institutions that oversee lending and credit arrangements and the circulation of interest-bearing capital.

There are several ways in which the case of Senegal is relevant for further thinking about energy transitions and electricity capital. First, while the dynamics in Senegal do not prescribe energy pathways in other countries, this case study provides key insights into the relational dynamics that shape (re)constitution of electricity capital and has clear pertinence for energy transitions in other contexts. For one, many governments in the global South, along with traditional and new development partners, are proactively pursuing utility-scale renewable energy reform, according to similar rationales appealing to national development narratives, financing mechanisms and partnerships, and implementation methods.

Second, and related, there are trade-offs involved in energy transitions in these contexts that have relevance beyond the Senegalese case. For example, in contexts where land tenure regimes are not formalized, the central state can lay claim to land for large development projects, often in partnership with foreign developers, based on discourses that portray land as unproductive and colonial-era strategies for dispossession (Fairhead et al., 2012). Increasingly, such “green grabs” are carried out for purposes of renewable energy development (e.g. Rignall, 2016). The implications of large-scale (renewable) energy projects for local access and use of land and other resources in Senegal will likely parallel dynamics in many other countries in the global South, allowing for a level of comparability across countries. Lastly, the Senegalese case demonstrates the importance of examining capital in the electricity sector specifically, as the sector becomes an increasingly attractive “sink” for and sustainer of existing regimes of accumulation. Conceptualizing electricity as a social relation is useful in this way, as it illuminates how existing political economic and social relationships influence access and distribution pathways, as well as how transitions in energy take shape materially, and unevenly, in different landscapes.

Conclusion

Extant critical geography scholarship on energy transitions has found that transitions to lower carbon energy systems can serve as temporary solutions to capitalist crises through incorporation of new elements of nature into circuits of capital accumulation, investment in large-scale energy infrastructure, or appropriation of new (often rural) spaces for production facilities (Ekers and Prudham, 2015, 2017a; Harris and McCarthy, 2020; Huber and McCarthy, 2017; McCarthy, 2015; McEwan, 2017). Investment in new sorts of energy, particularly renewable, could serve as one such a “fix”, in that it presents opportunities to stave off crises of accumulation in an energy system driven by fossil fuels, yet simultaneously prioritizes a transition that is based on profit maximization over equity and justice (Baker, 2015; Kennedy, 2018; Knuth, 2018). Scholars have started to explore the role of electricity in such transitions by examining how its networked nature produces and changes spaces and everyday livelihoods, how it reproduces existing unequal power relations, and how it serves as a vehicle through which relationships between finance, the state, and regulatory bodies direct energy transitions. Yet work on examining how interests, power relations, and investments in this sector influence its pathway and its potential for contributing to just and sustainable energy transitions remains limited. The concept of electricity capital, then, is one that has directly and indirectly started to be explored in recent years in different contexts (Baker and Phillips, 2019; Harrison, 2013; McDonald, 2009; Newell and Phillips, 2016; Silver, 2015). This paper examined how electricity capital operates in Senegal as it undergoes significant transformation of its energy sector, and whether its particular constitution in this context prioritizes an energy transition that is inclusive and just.

The findings of this preliminary research suggest that the Senegalese state has set objectives for the sector that are indeed based on principles of equity and justice (primarily through lowering electricity costs and expansion of electricity access to the rural poor), as well as climate change mitigation (by lowering emissions). However, the way in which priorities for the sector have been shaped by governance and financing preferences of development institutions long present in the country, as well as strategic interests of new developers, combined with the promise of energy independence through gas and renewables, has meant that, paradoxically, the Senegalese state has adopted an approach that may undermine these principles. This approach emphasizes large-scale grid-connected infrastructure for which private financing is more easily sourced, setting the electricity sector up for privatization, and generating questions about for whom electricity will be generated and made accessible. It has also created potentially new risks for dispossession and for subverting climate change mitigation goals, through installation of new utility-scale operations in rural spaces and heavy investment in infrastructure for liquefied natural gas. This risks leaving behind those who stand to benefit the most from the original goals for the electricity sector around expansion of access to environmentally sustainable and affordable power. In such contexts, where discursive commitments to a business-friendly approach to power production unites governments, donors, and investors, the potential for envisioning an alternative energy future that includes fundamental political and social change can easily fall to the wayside.

Highlights

“Electricity capital” is a useful concept for considering how state, regulatory, and financial interests facilitate private accumulation through electricity provision.

This paper examines effects of electricity sector reform in Senegal for processes of accumulation and potential for a just transition.

Efforts to expand electricity access through lower carbon sources stand in tension with achieving truly socially and environmentally just outcomes.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Matt Huber (Syracuse University) and Nikki Luke (University of Tennessee Knoxville) for organizing the session on “Uneven Geographies of Electricity Capital” at the American Association of Geographers (AAG) annual meeting in 2019, on which this Special Issue is based. I would also like to thank James McCarthy (Clark University) for overall guidance on this research project and for reviewing several drafts of this paper, as well as Helen Rosko (Clark University), Dan Santos (Clark University), and Halie Kampman (University of California Santa Cruz), who read several iterations of the paper. I would like to thank those interviewed for this project for their time and insights, and Papa Abdou Calloga and Modou Mbaye for their research and translation assistance. Lastly, I greatly appreciate the insightful and detailed comments by three anonymous reviewers; these greatly improved the manuscript.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Pruser Dissertation Enhancement Award by the Graduate School of Geography at Clark University, the Albert, Norma, and Howard Geller ’77 Endowed Research Award by the George Perkins Marsh Institute at Clark University, the Edna Bailey Sussman Foundation Sussman Fund Graduate Scholarship, the American Philosophical Society Lewis and Clark Fund for Exploration and Field Research, and the National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Award.

Notes

ORCID iD

Mara van den Bold

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