Filling the Gap in White-Collar Crime Detection Between Government and Governance: The Role of Investigative Journalists and Fraud Examiners

Abstract

This article suggests that investigative journalists in the media and fraud examiners in private investigations have the potential of filling some of the detection gap. Based on the theory of crime signal detection, this article suggests that investigative journalists are in the position of detecting white-collar crime scandals as they rely on tips and whistleblowing. Empirical evidence from Norway documents that the media disclose a significant fraction of crime stories that later result in prosecution and conviction of white-collar offenders. Empirical evidence from Norway does not document any contribution from fraud examiners in private policing of economic crime, as they typically conclude with misconduct, but no crime, often to the satisfaction of their clients.

Keywords

white-collar crime crime signal detection investigative journalists fraud examiners governance gap

Introduction

Gottschalk and Gunnesdal (2018) have estimated a detection rate for white-collar crime of less than 1 of 12 offenders in Norway, which seems supported by an empirical study of bribery detection in Norway by Andresen and Button (2019). The detection rate in the United States is even lower based on estimates of the magnitude of white-collar crime by the National White-Collar Crime Center (Huff et al., 2010) and the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE, 2008, 2014, 2016). Offenders tend to move under the radar (Williams, 2019).

However, it is important to note that the term white-collar crime is famously problematic. In the Norwegian estimate, a white-collar offender is a person who abuses the professional position to commit financial crime to benefit the organization and/or the individual (Gottschalk, 2019). The detection rate of less than 1 of 12 refers to individuals, not organizations.

Kourula et al. (2019) argue that there is a gap between government and governance, where neither public authorities nor self-regulating bodies involve themselves in detection of corruption and other forms of financial crime. Actors in the criminal justice system have traditionally a preference toward street criminals rather than white-collar criminals (Galvin & Simpson, 2020; Michel, 2016; Piquero et al., 2008). Actors in auditing and compliance functions in business and public enterprises seem to have a preference toward formal rules and guidelines in the form of window dressing rather than detection of potential offenders (Desai, 2016). Alon et al. (2019) argue that accounting and auditing functions have undergone a legitimacy crisis in recent years. At least part of the answer why there is a preference for formal rules and guidelines is the task of confirming rather than questioning figures in financial statements, and conflicts of interest between auditing and the provision of accounting and management consultation.

Kourula et al. (2019, p. 1109) suggest, “Civil society was perceived to be left to fill the gaps that other sectors did not address” because “growing private regulation often put civil society in the driver’s seat in ‘policing’ business activities” as “privatization of authority” has occurred. Furthermore, Kourula et al. (2019, p. 1110) suggest, “Governments are losing power,” and “Governments lack enforcement capacity to impact multinational companies.” Governments are losing oversight power for various reasons including lack of business knowledge and variations in national jurisdictions. One problem in state cooperation is that they do not agree on what should be legal and illegal activities, as exemplified by Boghossian and Marques (2019).

Eberlein (2019) argues, “Globalization opens markets for corporations but outstrip the capacity of states to regulate cross-border business conduct for the public good.” Schneider and Scherer (2019, p. 1147) argue, “The extent to which state authorities can regulate the externalities and the behavior of multinational corporations is limited” and “Gaps in governance abound in today’s globalized world.” Maher et al. (2019) found that governments not just in global business but also in local business are reluctant to intervene.

Therefore, executives and other privileged individuals in multinational companies tend to have convenient opportunities for tax evasion in high-tax countries, for money laundering in tax havens, and for corruption and other kinds of white-collar crime in transnational operations. There are also complex issues of global versus local auditing and lawyering making the opportunity structure even more convenient for potential offenders (Gottschalk, 2019). Moreover, some executives are simply too powerful (Pontell et al., 2014). A potential avenue to fill the gap between government and governance might be to strengthen business–government interactions. However, Hamann (2019) found that business–government interactions result in corporate social irresponsibility, where a process of dynamic deterioration leads to passivity in both government and governance.

This article suggests that investigative journalists in the media and fraud examiners at global auditing firms and local law firms seem to fill some of the gap between public government and private governance when it comes to detection of white-collar offenders (Button & Gee, 2013; Schneider, 2006; Williams, 2005, 2008, 2014). Press reporters’ detection of misconduct and crime “represented an important ingredient of the nineteenth-century newspaper” (Taylor, 2018, p. 346), and this is certainly also the case so far in the 21st-century media in many countries. While the tabloid press dominates the media in many countries, there are still some prominent publishing houses, where investigative journalism is the rule rather than the exception.

This article raises the question of the contribution of private actors, such as journalists and fraud examiners (Brooks & Button, 2011; Button, 2019; Button, Frimpong, Smith, & Johnston, 2007; Button, Johnston, Frimpong, & Smith, 2007b; Button & Gee, 2013; Gottschalk & Tcherni-Buzzeo, 2017; Schneider, 2006; Williams, 2005, 2014), in detecting white-collar crime. The role of journalists in exposing white-collar crime seems to be an underdeveloped area of study. In that context, this article is an important addition to research. It provides a detailed assessment of a large number of white-collar crime cases in Norway and their resolution, including the role of journalists.

White-Collar Crime Detection

The theory of crime signal detection is relevant to the study of white-collar crime detection. Signal detection theory is concerned with the ability of individuals to understand pieces of information that can come from various sources. The theory emphasizes individuals’ varying signal discrimination processes. Discrimination processes include the sensitivity toward signals in general as well as the separation of real signals from noise signals.

Signal detection theory is a model for how humans detect signals in a background of interference or noise. The theory assumes that the human observer behaves like a rational economic decision maker and attempts to balance costs and benefits to arrive at an optimal solution. There are four possibilities in the decision matrix of the observer of potential misconduct and crime (Karim & Siegel, 1998, p. 368):

The observer notices a noise when it is a signal (called a miss)

The observer notices a signal when it is a signal (called a hit)

The observer notices a noise when it is a noise (called a correct identification)

The observer notices a signal when it is a noise (called a false alarm)

The observer needs to make a decision concerning the event and classify it either as a signal or as a noise. In an organizational context—where less powerful individuals suspect powerful individuals of wrongdoing—the less powerful will conveniently prefer to think of the event as a noise rather than as a signal.

Signal detection theory may shed some light into why some actors discover and disclose more white-collar crime than other potential observers disclose. Signal detection theory holds that the detection of a stimulus depends on both the intensity of the stimulus and the physical and psychological state of the individual. A detector’s ability or likelihood to detect some stimulus is affected by the intensity of the stimulus (e.g., how loud a signal is) and the physical and psychological state of the detector (e.g., how alert the person is). Perceptual sensitivity depends upon the perceptual ability of the observer to detect a signal or target or to discriminate signal from nonsignal events (Szalma & Hancock, 2013).

Furthermore, detecting persons may have varying ability to discern between information-bearing recognition (called pattern) and random patterns that distract from information (called noise).

According to the theory of signal detection, there are a number of determinants of how a person will detect a signal (Huff & Bodner, 2013). In addition to signal intensity, signal alertness, and pattern recognition, there are other factors such as personal competence (including knowledge, skills, and attitude), experience, and expectations. These factors determine the threshold level. Low signal intensity, low signal alertness, and limited pattern recognition, combined with low competence, lack of experience, and lack of expectations will lead to a high threshold level, meaning that the individual will not detect white-collar crime.

Signal alertness is not a stable set of mind over time. Rather, the extent of signal alertness by an observer varies with other concerns that the person may have (Qiu & Slezak, 2019).

Signal detection theory implies that persons make decisions under conditions of uncertainty. The theory assumes that the decision maker is not a passive receiver of information but an active decision maker who makes difficult perceptual judgments under conditions of uncertainty. Whether a stimulus is present or absent, whether a stimulus is perceived or not perceived, and whether an observer ignores a perceived stimulus will influence the decision in terms of detecting or not detecting white-collar crime.

Gomulya and Mishina (2017, p. 557) introduced the term signal susceptibility since signals may be differently susceptible to potential errors and manipulation:

This could be due to a variety of possible reasons, including whether the signal is self- or other-reported, whether it is verifiable, or whether it is a “stock” or a “flow” signal. Self-reported signals should on average be more susceptible to manipulations by the focal signaler (i.e., the one who can benefit from a positive signal) compared to signals reported by third parties.

Given this definition, signal susceptibility can be included as an aspect of signal intensity, where signal intensity deteriorates at suspicion of errors and manipulation increases. Similarly, noise in general will reduce signal intensity. Gomulya and Mishina (2017, p. 555) distinguish between two sources of noise during signaling—noise from the signal itself and noise from the behavior of the signaler.

Another term introduced by Gomulya and Mishina (2017, p. 55) is signal reliance, where reliance on different types of signals is based on the credibility of the signaler, and “thus a similar signal is likely to have different effects for credible versus less credible” signalers. Given this perspective, signal reliance can be included as an aspect of signal alertness, where less credible signalers cause lower alertness to the signal.

Gomulya and Mishina (2017) discuss pattern recognition in terms of screening theory where the receiver prioritizes among possible types of signals. The focus is on how receivers place differential value on signals that may come from different senders such as documents, accounts, and individuals. Screening theory posits that receivers screen by focusing on signals that they believe are highly correlated with unobservable characteristics of interest.

Signal detection theory characterizes the activity of an individual’s discrimination as well as psychological factors that bias their judgment. The theory is concerned with the individual’s discriminative capacity or sensitivity that is independent of the judgmental bias or decision criterion the individual may have had when the discrimination took place in the head of the observer.

Whistleblowers and informants in general are often important actors in the discovery of white-collar misconduct and crime for both investigative journalists and fraud examiners. Whistleblowing is the disclosure by an individual in an organization or in society of deviant practices to someone who can do something about it (Bjørkelo et al., 2011). Whistleblowing is an action by employees who believe that their business or colleague(s) are involved in activities of misconduct and crime, cause unnecessary harm, violate human rights, or contribute to otherwise immoral offenses (Mpho, 2017). However, one mechanism preventing many potential whistleblowers is the fear of retaliation and reprisals (Gottschalk, 2018; Miceli & Near, 2013; Regh et al., 2009). This article is not concerned with whistleblowing as such and refers thus only to relevant research on the phenomenon (Alleyne et al., 2013; Andrade, 2015; Culiberg & Mihelic, 2017; Dyck et al., 2010).

Research Method

This research is concerned with detection of white-collar criminals. The collection of our Norwegian sample of white-collar offenders applied the original definition and characteristics of white-collar crime. Our sample thus has the following characteristics: famous individuals in terms of high exposed social status and respectability, famous companies in terms of major suppliers in their businesses, surprising stories, important events, substantial consequences, matters of principles, and significant public interest. The operational definition of famous is simply that the press has exposed individuals and companies. The two main financial newspapers in Norway are Dagens Næringsliv and Finansavisen, both of which are conservative-leaning business newspapers. In addition, the business-friendly national daily newspaper Aftenposten regularly reports news of white-collar criminals. Left-wing newspapers such as Klassekampen very seldom cover specific white-collar criminal cases, although generally report on white-collar crime. The total number of white-collar criminals was 408 reported during those years from 2009 to 2015. We carried out verification of facts in newspaper accounts by obtaining court documents. After registering newspaper accounts as an important indication of white-collar offenders, we compared the contents of newspaper articles and expanded our notes by court sentences, which typically range from 5 to 50 pages in Norwegian district courts, courts of appeal, and the Supreme Court.

The collection of our Norwegian sample of fraud examination reports took place again by reading the same newspapers and then identifying client organizations for the investigations. Client organizations in the public and private sector hire investigators from law firms and auditing firms to conduct fraud examinations. Contacting client organizations often led to refusal of insight based on privacy issues and other matters. After several years of contacting client organizations, 130 reports became the basis for this research.

Investigative Journalists

Norwegian courts convicted 405 white-collar offenders to prison from 2009 to 2016. Table 1 lists sources of detection for these criminals. We find journalists occupy the top position, followed by crime victims, bankruptcy lawyers, internal auditors, tax authority clerks, bank employees, external auditors, and police officers.

Table 1.

Detection of White-Collar Crime.

#	Crime Detection Source	Sum	%
1	Journalists investigating tips from readers	101	25
2	Crime victims suffering financial loss	52	13
3	Bankruptcy lawyers identifying misconduct	45	11
4	Internal auditors controlling transactions	45	11
5	Tax authority clerks carrying out controls	25	6
6	Bank employees controlling accounts	18	4
7	External auditors controlling clients	18	4
8	Police officers investigating financial crime	9	2
9	Stock exchange clerks controlling	4	1
10	Other knowledge workers as detection sources	88	23
	Total	405	100

A real example of the contribution of an investigative journalist to uncover white-collar crime in Norway is relevant to provide here. Seven decommissioned Norwegian naval vessels ended up in the hands of a warlord in Nigeria. The 2012 sale took a surprising turn when an investigative journalist in a Norwegian daily newspaper (Egeberg, 2014, 2015) revealed that the vessels were serving, 2 years later, in the private flotilla of a former Nigerian rebel (Evans, 2017; Tufts, 2018). Nigeria is rich on oil resources, where the rebels fight for control (Ezeonu, 2020; PricewaterhouseCoopers [PwC], 2015; Reporter, 2013). The news about the six demilitarized missile torpedo boats and one naval support vessel triggered both an internal fraud examination by PwC (2014, 2015) for the Ministry of Defense in Norway and a police investigation by Økokrim (Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime).

The police investigation led to the conviction in May 2017 of one Norwegian official on bribery charges and the revelation of the role played by a UK intermediary, CAS-Global Ltd. The firm applied for export licenses in Norway and for a re-export license for the naval support vessel from the UK, telling the Norwegians that the ships would support an official West African mission, and the British that the ships should serve the Nigerian government (Tufts, 2018).

The Norwegian official appealed the conviction in a district court in Norway in May 2017 via a court of appeals and further to the Supreme Court (Oslo tingrett, 2017; NTB, 2019). The Supreme Court confirmed in May 2019 the sentence in Borgarting court of appeals from October 2018 of 4 years and 3 years in prison for the former commander Bjørn Stavrum in the Norwegian navy (Borgarting, 2018; Eriksen, 2019; Høyesterett, 2019).

Table 2 presents an exploratory attempt to describe signal detection features of observers who have noticed and discover white-collar crime. Signal intensity, signal alertness, pattern recognition, and personal experience from signal detection theory are characteristics of detection ability.

Table 2.

Characteristics of Stimulus in Detection of White-Collar Crime.

#	Crime Detection	Signal Intensity	Signal Alertness	Pattern Recognition	Personal Knowledge	Score
1	Media journalists	High	High	Low	Medium	9
2	Crime victims	High	Low	Medium	Low	7
3	Bankruptcy lawyers	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	6
4	Internal auditors	Low	Medium	Medium	Medium	7
5	Tax clerks authority	Low	Medium	Low	Medium	6
6	Bank employees	Low	Medium	Low	Low	5
7	External auditors	Low	Medium	Medium	Low	6
8	Police officers	Low	Medium	High	Low	7
9	Stock clerks	Low	Low	Medium	Low	5
10	Other sources	—	—	—	—	—

Pattern recognition is a matter of sensemaking and contextualization. Contextualization captures the ongoing process of understanding and explaining relationships between information elements. High gives a score of three, medium a score of two, and low a score of one.

We argue that signal intensity for tips to journalists normally is high, as whistleblowers tend to be upset and want to get attention (Andresen & Button, 2019). Furthermore, we suggest that signal alertness is high among journalists, as they are dependent on tips in their daily work to cover news stories. The issue of pattern recognition is not obvious for journalists, since they often present fragments on a publishing basis, rather than a complete and consistent story of events. Personal experience will vary among journalists who may or may not have been writing about white-collar crime before, depending on the extent of specialization among journalists in the newspaper.

The idea of Table 2 is to apply four characteristics of signal detection theory to detection of white-collar crime. At this stage, the items and values represent exploratory research that need further study to be trustworthy. Selection of characteristics as well as judgment along these characteristics for each crime detection source requires multiple raters to enable interrater reliability in future research.

One reason for the high signal alertness among journalists is their complete dependence on external tips to produce news stories. Journalists always need sources to which they have no access unless the sources cooperate with the media. By being polite and receptive, journalists increase the likelihood that whistleblowers and others will contact the media when they learn of potential misconduct and crime (Andresen & Button, 2019). There seems to be a lot to learn from investigative media and their journalists. Rather than formal procedures often applied on a routine basis by auditors and internal controllers, information sources in terms of persons in networks seem to be a more fruitful approach to detection of white-collar crime.

It is beyond the scope of this article to speculate about the extent that journalists have the top position in relation to exposing white-collar crime. However, there might be reasons to believe that it is peculiar in Scandinavia, where the media has a strong position in any public rating of trustworthiness. Especially in Norway, where the publicly funded broadcasting corporation (NRK) has a strong position, combined with state subsidies to a number of newspapers to keep a large spectrum of publications, the role of investigative journalism is important.

Fraud Examiners

Fraud examiners at global auditing firms and local law firms are in the business of reconstructing past events and sequences of events when there is suspicion of white-collar crime in client organizations. They contribute to the detection of offenders. Table 3 lists 125 reports of investigations in Norway, which were available for research. The investigated organization is the client for the examination, such as nursing home Adecco, hospital Ahus, municipality Andebu, traffic station Arendal, and so on. The investigating firm is the fraud examiner such as local law firm Wiersholm, auditing firm PwC, auditing firm BDO, an internal audit function, and so on. The suspected white-collar crime included fraud, corruption, embezzlement, and so on.

Table 3.

Characteristics of Fraud Examinations at Suspicion of White-Collar Crime in Norway.

#	Investigated Client Organization	Investigating Examination Firm	Suspicion of White-Collar Crime Investigated	Detect
1	Adecco nursing home	Wiersholm law firm 2011	Fraud in employment contracts
2	Ahus hospital	PwC audit firm 2013	Fraud when charging mapping services
3	Andebu municipality	BDO audit firm 2014	Abuse of mayor position in procurement
4	Arendal traffic station	Internal audit function 2017	Corruption for illegal vehicle permits
5	Askøy municipality	BDO audit firm2018	Public procurement from family members
6	Bergen municipality	Internal control function 2018	Building permit to friends without control
7	Bergen havn port authority	Havarikommisjon commission 2019	Accident from maintenance cost savings
8	Bergensklinikkene private health clinic	Ernst & Young audit firm 2019	Subsidy fraud by false number of addicts
9	Betanien foundation	BDO audit firm 2014	Embezzlement by chief executive (CEO)	Victim
10	Briskeby public sports arena	Lynx law firm 2011	Fraud in public construction funds
11	Bærum municipality	G-partner law firm 2007	Corruption at public procurement	Media
12	Bårlidalen public water waste site	Svendby consulting firm 2016	Fraud by overbilling the municipality
13	Dale property development	Komrev. Rogaland public audit 2015	Public funds spent on private vacations
14	Demokratene political party	Partirevisjon internal control function 2016	Illegitimate government subsidy
15	DNB banking	Hjort law firm 2016	Tax evasion in wealth management
16	Drammen municipality	Deloitte audit firm 2017	Corruption in building permits	Media
17	Eckbo foundations	Thommessen law firm 2009	Chairperson fraud in foundation funds
18	Fadderbarna foundation	BDO audit firm 2011	Fake documents hiding fraud
19	FilmCamp public fund for productions	Komrev. Nord public audit 2016	Fraud by abuse of public funding
20	Fjell municipality	Deloitte audit firm 2017	Corruption in construction permits
21	Flyktningtjenesten public refugee funding	Buunk et al. internal audit 2015	Embezzlement by refugee services manager
22	Forsvaret military contracts	Dalseide special committee 2006	Corruption in military computer contracts
23	Forsvaret military logistics	PwC audit firm 2014	Corruption in military sales unit	Media
24	Forsvaret department of defense routines	PwC audit firm 2015	Illegal profits from sale of discarded equipment	Media
25	Fredrikstad municipality	PwC audit firm 2018	VAT fraud by public company
26	Fredrikstad municipality	Simonsen law firm 2018	VAT fraud by public company
27	Fretex Salvation Army	Grette law firm 2017	Financial targets to remove executive
28	Furuheim foundation nursing home	Hald law firm 2006	Fraud in foundation construction
29	Fyrlykta foundation child care	Deloitte audit firm 2017	Fraud of public funds for excessive salaries
30	Fyrlykta foundation child care	Stiftelsestilsynet public examination 2018	Fraud of public funds for excessive salaries
31	Gartnerhallen fruits and vegetables	Wiersholm law firm 2018	Fraud by farmers demanding repay	Audit
32	Gassnova public projects	BDO audit firm 2013	Corruption in public procurement
33	Grimstad municipality	BDO audit firm 2016	Corruption in public procurement
34	Grimstad municipality	Hjort law firm 2018	Corruption in public procurement
35	Grimstad municipality	Tinia consulting firm 2018	Fraud against caretaker of handicapped person
36	Hadeland broadband mobile company	PwC audit firm 2014	Embezzlement by chief financial officer (CFO)	Police
37	Hadeland energy supply company	PwC audit firm 2014	Embezzlement by chief financial officer (CFO)	Police
38	Halden municipality skating hall	KPMG audit firm 2012	Fraud in construction project
39	Halden municipality buildings	Hjort law firm 2013	Corruption in building permits
40	Hedmark municipality	Wiersholm law firm 2007	Illegal benefits for executives
41	Helse Nord hospital	PwC audit firm 2018	Fraud at executive removal from position
42	Hordaland police department	Wiersholm law firm 2015	Whistleblower financial retaliation
43	Hordaland police department	Stamina consulting firm 2019	Corruption in public procurement
44	Jondal municipality	SBDL law firm 2018	Corruption and private enterprise
45	Karasjok municipality	Vest-Finnmark public audit 2018	Friends got illegitimate favors
46	Kjøpsvik municipality	Komrev. Nord public audit 2015	Fraud by property developer
47	Klengstua kindergarden	Halden municipal internal audit 2019	Fraud in subsidies from municipality
48	Kommunaldepartement department of interior	BDO audit firm 2018	Fraud in subsidies for kindergartens
49	Kragerø shipping	Deloitte audit firm 2012	Compensation for leader without contract
50	Kristiansand municipality	Komrev. Agder public audit 2016	Private property developer abused political position
51	Kristiansand municipality	Tofte law firm 2018	Harassment for financial benefit
52	Kvalsund municipality	Vest-Finnmark public audit 2012	Fraudulent consulting fees
53	Kvam Auto car dealer	Wikborg law firm 2015	Majority shareholder fraudulent behavior
54	Kvinnherad municipality	Deloitte audit firm 2019	Fraud in chief executive retirement compensation
55	Langemyhr building company	PwC audit firm 2008	Fraudulent working hours invoicing
56	Larvik havn port authority	Komrev. Telemark public audit 2018	Corruption in container terminal
57	Larvik municipality	Komrev. Telemark public audit 2017	Corruption in building permits
58	Leksvik municipality	Midt-Norge audit organization 2017	Illegal benefits to chief executive
59	Lenvik municipality	KomRev audit organization 2018	Fraud by executive
60	Lunde transportation company	Vierdal law firm 2012	Bankruptcy fraud	Bank-ruptcy
61	Lyoness-Lyconet gambling enterprise	Stiftelsestilsynet public examination 2018	Pyramid play similar to Ponzi scheme
62	Moskvaskolen school in Moscow	Ernst & Young audit firm 2013	Paid teachers without teaching
63	NAV social security authority	Wiersholm law firm 2016	Employees illegal abuse of information for gain
64	NDLA public learning software	Deloitte audit firm 2015	Private abuse of public funds
65	NFF football players association	Lynx law firm 2012	Fraud in player transfers
66	NIF sports association	BDO audit firm 2014	Association president bribed
67	Norsk Tipping public betting	Deloitte audit firm 2010	CEO private property served
68	Norwegian Poker Team private gambling	Aftenposten media investigation 2018	Money laundering at poker game
69	Næringsdepartement department of industry	PwC audit firm 2016	Corruption in state-owned enterprises
70	Næringsdepartement department of industry	Ernst & Young audit firm 2018	Embezzlement by executive in aid program
71	Orange health services provider	Bergen municipality audit function 2016	Fraud by executive compensation
72	Oslo Boligbygg municipal housing	BDO audit firm 2017	Corruption in public procurement	Media
73	Oslo Boligbygg municipal housing	Deloitte audit firm 2018	Corruption in public procurement	Media
74	Oslo Boligbygg municipal housing	Komrev. Oslo public audit 2018	Corruption at procurement of facilities	Media
75	Oslo Bymiljø municipal parks	Ernst & Young audit firm 2019	Fraud by fake invoicing of park works	Media
76	Oslo Lindeberg nursing home	Kommunerevisjon public audit 2013	Fraud in employment contracts
77	Oslo Omsorgsbygg housing administration	PwC audit firm 2009	Abuse of Norwegian public funds in Spain
78	Oslo Omsorgsbygg housing administration	Komrev. Oslo public audit 2018	Chief executive employed family members
79	Oslo Omsorgsbygg housing administration	PwC audit firm 2019	Chief executive employed family members
80	Oslo Renovasjon public garbage collection	Deloitte audit firm 2017	Fraud in employment contracts	Media
81	Oslo Samferdsel public transportation	PwC audit firm 2007	Corruption in public procurement
82	Oslo municipal school buildings	Kommunerevisjon public audit 2006	Project manager bribed in corruption	Bank
83	Oslo municipal school buildings	Kommunerevisjon public audit 2006	Property manager bribed in corruption	Bank
84	Oslo Unibuss public transportation	Wiersholm law firm 2012	Corruption in public procurement	Media
85	Oslo Vei public transportation firm	Kvale law firm 2013	Bankruptcy fraud
86	Politiets utlending police department	KPMG auditing firm 2016	Executive abuse of overtime compensation
87	Rana municipality	PwC audit firm 2008	Corruption in public investment fund
88	Re municipality	Komrev. Vestfold public audit 2015	Insurance fraud by putting a building on fire
89	Romanifolket foundation	Stiftelsestilsynet public examination 2017	Fraud in abuse of public subsidies
90	Romerike Vannverk public waterworks	Distriktsrevisjon public audit 2007	Fraud in privatization of public property	Media
91	Sandefjord municipality	Tenden law firm 2017	Abuse of executive position for family benefit
92	Siva state funding of industries	Wikborg law firm 2018	Chief executive funded his own company
93	Skien municipality	BDO audit firm 2017	Fraudulent removal of sand from public property
94	Skjervøy municipality	KomRev public audit 2015	Public funds allocated to personal property
95	Stangeskovene forest company	Ernst & Young audit firm 2013	Private stock exchange excluding bidders
96	Statoil energy	Hagen et al. internal controllers 2013	Cost savings in security measures causing accident
97	Statoil energy	Saure et al. internal controllers 2016	Cost savings in security measures causing accident
98	Statoil energy	Østby et al. internal controllers 2017	Cost savings in security measures causing accident
99	Stavanger municipality	PwC audit firm 2013	Kidnapping fraud in public child care
100	Sykehusapotekene hospital pharmacies	Moberg Segrov consulting firm 2019	Harassment for corporate profits
101	Sykehusbygg hospital buildings	Kluge law firm 2017	Executive benefit from harassment of subordinate
102	Sykehuset Innlandet hospital	Haavind law firm 2011	Fraudulent abuse of chief executive position
103	Telenor VimpelCom mobile company	Deloitte audit firm 2016	Corruption to obtain licenses in Uzbekistan
104	Tennisforbundet tennis association	Lewis et al. consulting firm 2018	Fraudulent arrangements of game results
105	Tidal music streaming service	NTNU research group 2018	Fraudulent manipulation of streaming accounting
106	Tjøme municipality	BDO audit firm 2017	Corruption in building permits at the seaside
107	Tolga municipality	Fylkesman public examination 2019	Fraudulent diagnoses for retarded inhabitants
108	Tomter shopping center association	Holmen audit firm 2014	Fraud in deregulation of shopping area
109	Transocean oil rig company	Riksadvokaten public prosecutor 2017	Tax evasion
110	Trendtech investment securities	Finanstilsynet public audit 2016	Misrepresentation of investor figures
111	Troms Kraft energy company	Norscan consulting firm 2013	Fraudulent abuse of company funds
112	Universitetssykehuset Nord hospital	Arbeidsrettsadvokatene law firm 2015	Economic exploitation of work force
113	Uppsala municipality	KPMG audit firm 2018	Manipulation of audited numbers
114	Utenriksdepartement state department	Duane Morris law firm 2016	Fraud in housing rental for diplomats
115	Utenriksdepartement state department	Kontrollenhet internal audit 2016	Fraud in financing of development project
116	Utenriksdepartement state department	Kontrollenhet internal audit 2017	Fraud in financing of development project
117	Utlendingsdirektoratet foreign affairs	Deloitte audit firm 2016	Subsidy fraud at return of refugees
118	Verdibanken banking	Wiersholm law firm 2012	Insider trading in bank shares
119	Vestre Viken hospital	PwC audit firm 2018	Fraudulent diagnoses to obtain more state funding
120	Vestvågøy municipality	Komrev. Nord public audit 2018	Illegal procurement
121	Videoforhandlere series production	BDO audit firm 2013	Abuse of state subsidies
122	Vistamar rehabilitation center	Komrev. Trondheim public audit 2018	Embezzlement by chief executive
123	Vitalegruppen private nursing	BDO audit firm 2017	Fraud in municipal subsidies
124	World Ventures gaming company	Stiftelsestilsynet public examination 2014	Illegal pyramid of Ponzi scheme
125	Zachariasbryggen property development	Selmer law firm 2014	Fraud in transfer of property rights

The final column in Table 3 lists crime detection source, where white-collar offenders became defendants in court and convicted to prison. As the list indicates, very few of the fraud examination reports resulted in convictions. Most of the reports of investigations resulted in blame for misconduct and wrongdoing, and some resulted in sanctioning where individuals had to leave the organization. Some reports concluded that suspicions of white-collar crime were unfounded and accusations were unjust.

Among the few investigations that lead to cases in the criminal justice system, media journalists detected most of the crime. We have thus the following distribution based on Table 3:

12 conviction cases detected by investigative journalists

2 conviction cases detected by bank employees

2 conviction cases detected by the police

1 conviction case detected by a victim

1 conviction case detected by a bankruptcy lawyer

1 conviction case detected by an auditor

111 suspicion cases categorized by fraud examiners as no misconduct, or misconduct, but no crime.

The biggest category in the final column in Table 3 is blank entries. Unfortunately, we do not know the outcomes of all these cases. What we know is that none of the cases led to prosecution and conviction. This result is in itself interesting for two main reasons. First, fraud examiners hired by client organizations tend to deliver what clients expect in terms of descriptions of misconduct and suggestions for preventive actions in the future. Clients prefer fraud examiners to avoid indications of crime in terms of law violations (Gottschalk & Tcherni-Buzzeo, 2016). Second, miscarriage of justice should be avoided at all costs in the Norwegian culture (Holmes et al., 2020). If there is any doubt at all, a suspected offender should never be prosecuted. Therefore, a large number of guilty persons are never on trial to avoid that an innocent person ever ends up on trial. If Norway would have the same incarceration rate as the United States relative to the national population, Norway would have 38,000 individuals rather than the current 3,800 individuals in prison. There is thus a 10 times difference, which is explained by a number of factors, including the fear of miscarriage of justice.

While Table 3 lists a total of 130 fraud investigation reports, which is a large sample, we have no way of telling whether the sample is in any way representative of all fraud examination reports in Norway. As emphasized by Gottschalk and Tcherni-Buzzeo (2016), most reports remain secret and never disclosed to neither the public nor the police. Our sample can thus be biased in some unknown direction. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the most frequent fraud examiner is a local law firm (33 cases), which is followed by public audit (27 cases). The distribution among global auditing firms is 15 cases by PwC, 13 cases by BDO, 11 cases by Deloitte, 6 cases by Ernst & Young, and 3 cases by KPMG.

Discussion

It is beyond the scope of this article to compare with other countries. However, over the years, we have been able to collect some fraud examination reports from other countries as listed in Table 4. As in Table 3, the final column is mostly blank, as suspected offenders never ended up in prison. In the few cases resulting in incarceration, the media is the main source of detection, which typically received early tips from informants and whistleblowers.

Table 4.

Characteristics of Fraud Examinations at Suspicion of White-Collar Crime Globally.

#	Investigated Client Organization	Investigating Examination Firm	Suspicion of White-Collar Crime Investigated	Detect
Bangladesh
1	Padakhep Save the Children NGO	Office of the Inspector General U.S. 2012	Embezzlement of funds to fight disease
Canada
2	Niagara municipality	Ombudsman of Ontario	Improper hiring of chief administrative officer
3	Pelham town	KPMG auditing firm 2017	Development project manipulation
Denmark
4	Danske Bank banking	Bruun & Hjejle law firm 2018	Money laundering in Estonian branch
5	Region Syddanmark public authority	Kromann Reumert law firm 2015	Fraud by abuse of public position
6	Socialstyrelsen social security	PwC auditing firm 2019	Embezzlement by trusted employee	Media
7	Socialstyrelsen social security	Kammeradvokaten law firm 2019	Executive lack of guardianship
Ghana
8	BioFuel bioenergy production	Kluge law firm 2009	Corruption in Ghana to obtain licenses
Iceland
9	Samherji fishing industries	Al Jazeera investigative journalists 2019	Corruption for fishing rights in Namibia	Media
Japan
10	Olympus digital equipment provider	Deloitte auditing firm 2011	Accounting manipulation and fraud	Media
11	Toshiba digital equipment provider	Deloitte auditing firm 2015	Accounting manipulation and fraud	Media
Moldova
12	Banca de Economii, Banca Sociala	Kroll investigation firm 2015, 2017	Bank fraud by loans transferred abroad for money laundering
Netherlands
13	Oceanteam offshore services	Sands law firm 2019	Abuse of company money by majority shareholder
New Zealand
14	FujiFilm digital equipment leasing	Deloitte auditing firm 2017	Accounting fraud
	Nigeria
15	Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation	PwC auditing firm 2015	Embezzlement and corruption in oil exploration
Sweden
16	Karolinska hospital	Setterwalls law firm 2018	Public procurement of consulting without tender
17	Kraft & Kultur energy enterprise	Ernst & Young auditing firm 2012	Accounting fraud by misrepresentation	Media
18	Nordea banking	Mannheimer Swartling law firm 2016	Tax evasion in wealth management
19	Swedbank banking	Clifford Chance law firm 2020	Money laundering in Baltic states
Switzerland
20	Fifa football association	Garcia special committee 2014	Corruption at allocation of world cup
	United Kingdom
21	Sandstorm bank	PwC auditing firm 1991	Manipulation of loans and deposit accounts
United States
22	British Petroleum offshore oil	Freeh special committee 2013	Fraud in settlement program after deepwater accident
23	Coatesville school district	BDO auditing firm 2014	Embezzlement of income from athletic activities
24	Coatesville school district	Contrad O’Brien law firm 2015	Embezzlement of income from athletic activities
25	Chief Technology Officer D.C.	Sidely Austin law firm 2010	Corruption in software procurement
26	Enron energy company	Wilmer Cutler Pickering law firm 2002	Accounting fraud	Media
27	General Motors car manufacturer	Jenner Block law firm 2014	Ignition switch failure fraud
28	Lehman Brothers bankruptcy	Jenner Block law firm 2010	Executive deviance in securities
29	Motorola electronic products	SEC Securities and Exch. Commission 2002	Selectively disclosed information for insider trading
30	Peregrine financial group	Berkeley research group 2013	Ignorance of concerns for reverse repurchasing
31	Philadelphia Police Department	Pennsylvania Crime Commission 1974	Police corruption in drugs, gambling and prostitution	Police
32	Philadelphia Sheriff’s Office	Deloitte auditing firm 2011	Contracts with vendors not in compliance
33	Tax Administration D.C.	Wilmer Cutler Pickering law firm 2008	Embezzlement of property tax refunds	Audit
34	Texas university	Hastings law firm 2012	Abuse of university funds for private travel
35	Wells Fargo’s Community bank	Shearman Sterling law firm 2017	Deviant sales practices
36	WorldCom communications	Wilmer Cutler Pickering law firm 2003	Fraudulent accounting influencing share prices	Media

Conclusion

One of the main problems with detecting many forms of white-collar crime is that they are not obvious. Indeed, the perpetrators often deliberately design the offenses so that they appear to be legitimate business practices. Thus, unlike most ordinary forms of street crime, outsiders do not often recognize white-collar offenses, at least not for some time. Piecing together evidence that a white-collar crime has actually occurred is always much more difficult than it is for other types of offenses. This means that detecting and interpreting signals of a white-collar offense is indeed a problem, and perhaps signal detection theory can find a useful application in this context.

This article first reviewed literature on public government versus private governance in regulating business conduct in organizations. Next, the theory of signal detection illustrated factors that influence detection of white-collar crime signals. Two empirical studies from Norway followed, where one is a sample of convicted white-collar offenders, and the other is a sample of investigations by fraud examiners. While investigative journalists disclose a significant fraction of crime stories that later result in prosecution and conviction of white-collar offenders, few fraud examiners make similar contributions to fill the gap between government and governance.

While miscarriage of justice is a top priority in Norwegian society with less than 6 million inhabitants, crime detection and evidence development seems more at the core of investigative journalism compared to fraud examination. An avenue for future research is to study mandates in fraud examinations and competence of fraud examiners. Maybe auditing and legal knowledge are less relevant compared to competence in psychology, sociology, and management.

This article confirms a long-standing finding that businesses generally prefer the handling of misconduct, broadly defined, internally. In addition, the avoidance if injustice at all costs within the Norwegian culture is an important factor.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Petter Gottschalk

References

Alleyne

Hudaib

Pike

(2013). Towards a conceptual model of whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors. The British Accounting Review, 45(1), 10–23.

Alon

Mennicken

Samsonova-Taddei

(2019). Dynamics and limits of regulatory privatization: Reorganizing audit oversight in Russia. Organization Studies, 40(8), 1217–1240.

Andrade

(2015). Reconceptualising whistleblowing in a complex world. Journal of Business Ethics, 128(2), 321–335.

Andresen

M. S.

Button

(2019). The profile and detection of bribery in Norway and England & Wales: A comparative study. European Journal of Criminology, 16(1), 18–40.

Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. (2008). 2008 Report to the nation—On occupational fraud and abuse. Author. https://www.acfe.com/report-to-the-nations/2008/

Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. (2014). Report to the nations on occupational fraud and abuse, 2014 global fraud study. https://www.acfe.com/report-to-the-nations/2014/

Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. (2016). CFE code of professional standard. www.acfe.com/standards/

Bjørkelo

Einarsen

Nielsen

M. B.

Matthiesen

S. B.

(2011). Silence is golden? Characteristics and experiences of self-reported whistleblowers. European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 20(2), 206–238.

Boghossian

Marques

J. C.

(2019). Saving the Canadian fur industry’s hide: Government’s strategic use of private authority to constrain radical activism. Organization Studies, 40(8), 1241–1268.

10.

Borgarting. (2018, October 10). Case number 17-108216AST-BORG/02, Borgarting lagmannsrett (Borgarting court of appeals), Oslo, Norway.

11.

Brooks

Button

(2011). The police and fraud investigation and the case for a nationalized solution in the United Kingdom. The Police Journal, 84, 305–319.

12.

Button

(2019). The “new” private security industry, the private policing of cyberspace and the regulatory questions. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 36(1), 39–55. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986219890194

13.

Button

Frimpong

Smith

Johnston

(2007). Professionalizing counter fraud specialists in the UK: Assessing progress and recommendations for reform. Crime Prevention and Community Safety, 9, 92–101.

14.

Button

Gee

(2013). Countering fraud for competitive advantage—The professional approach to reducing the last great hidden cost. Wiley & Sons.

15.

Button

Johnston

Frimpong

Smith

(2007). New directions in policing fraud: The emergence of the counter fraud specialists in the United Kingdom. International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 35, 192–208.

16.

Culiberg

Mihelic

K. K.

(2017). The evolution of whistleblowing studies: A critical review and research agenda. Journal of Business Ethics, 146(4), 787–803.

17.

Desai

V. M.

(2016). Under the radar: Regulatory collaborations and their selective use to facilitate organizational compliance. Academy of Management Journal, 59(2), 636–657.

18.

Dyck

Morse

Zingales

(2010). Who blows the whistle on corporate fraud? The Journal of Finance, 65(6), 2213–2253.

19.

Eberlein

(2019). Who fills the global governance gap? Rethinking the roles of business and government in global governance. Organization Studies, 40(8), 1125–1146.

20.

Egeberg

(2014, June 14). Norske krigsskip havnet i nigeria—Langt i fra hva som var avtalen, sier Forsvaret [ Norwegian warships ended up in Nigeria—Far from what was the agreement, the military defense says ]. Dagbladet . www.dagbladet.no

21.

Egeberg

(2015). Nigeria-båtene: Metoderapport til skup-prisen 2014 [ The Nigeria boats: Methods report to the SKUP prize 2014 ]. Dagbladet . Report of Methods applied by investigative journalists in the daily Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet.

22.

Eriksen

(2019, May 15). Rettskraftig korrupsjonsdom i nigeriabåt-saken [Enforceable corruption verdict in Nigeria boat case]. Dagbladet . www.dagbladet.no

23.

Evans

(2017, May 14). Anti-corruption police investigate UK firm over ex-Nigerian warlord deal. The Guardian. www.theguardian.com

24.

Ezeonu

(2020). Market criminology: A critical engagement with primitive accumulation in the petroleum extraction industry in Africa. In Rorie

M. L.

(Ed.), The handbook of white-collar crime (Chapter 25, pp. 398–417). Wiley & Sons.

25.

Galvin

M. A.

Simpson

S. S.

(2020). Prosecuting and sentencing white-collar crime in US federal courts: Revisiting the Yale findings. In Rorie

M. L.

(Ed.), The handbook of white-collar crime (Chapter 24, pp. 381–397). Wiley & Sons.

26.

Gomulya

Mishina

(2017). Signaler credibility, signal susceptibility, and relative reliance on signals: How stakeholders change their evaluative processes after violation of expectations and rehabilitative efforts. Academy of Management Journal, 60(2), 554–583.

27.

Gottschalk

(2018). Suspicion of white-collar crime: A case study of retaliation against whistleblowers. International Criminal Justice Review. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1177/1057567718814286

28.

Gottschalk

(2019). Convenience triangle in white-collar crime—Case studies of fraud examinations. Edward Elgar Publishing.

29.

Gottschalk

Gunnesdal

(2018). White-collar crime in the shadow economy: Lack of detection, investigation, and conviction compared to social security fraud. Springer Publishing.

30.

Gottschalk

Tcherni-Buzzeo

(2017). Reasons for gaps in crime reporting: The case of white-collar criminals investigated by private fraud examiners in Norway. Deviant Behavior, 38(3), 267–281.

31.

Hamann

(2019). Dynamic de-responsibilization in business-government interactions. Organization Studies, 40(8), 1193–1216.

32.

Holmes

M. C. S.

Huuse

C. F.

Engen

R. V.

Kristiansen

(2020, January 13). Kallmyr i NAV høring: En annen type justismord [ Kallmyr in NAV hearing: Another kind of miscarriage of justice ]. www.vg.no

33.

Høyesterett. (2019). Dom avsagt 13. mai 2019 i anke over borgarting lagmannsretts dom 23. oktober 2018 [Verdict announced May 13, 2019 regarding appeal for borgarting court’s verdict October 23, 2018]. Supreme Court of Norway.

34.

Huff

M. J.

Bodner

G. E.

(2013). When does memory monitoring succeed versus fail? Comparing item-specific and relational encoding in the DRM paradigm. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 39(4), 1246–1256.

35.

Huff

Desilets

Kane

(2010). The national public survey on white collar crime. National white collar crime center, Fairmont, West Virginia. www.nw3c.org

36.

Karim

K. E.

Siegel

P. H.

(1998). A signal detection theory approach to analyzing the efficiency and effectiveness of auditing to detect management fraud. Managerial Auditing Journal, 13(6), 367–375.

37.

Kourula

Moon

Salles-Djelic

M. L.

Wicker

(2019). New roles of government in the governance of business conduct: Implications for management and organizational research. Organization Studies, 40(8), 1101–1123.

38.

Maher

Valenzuela

Böhm

(2019). The enduring state: An analysis of governance-making in three mining conflicts. Organization Studies, 40(8), 1169–1192.

39.

Miceli

M. P.

Near

J. P.

(2013). An international comparison of the incidence of public sector whistle-blowing and the prediction of retaliation: Australia, Norway, and the US. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 72(4), 433–446.

40.

Michel

(2016). Violent street crime versus harmful white-collar crime: A comparison of perceived seriousness and punitiveness. Critical Criminology, 24, 127–143.

41.

Mpho

(2017). Whistleblowing: What do contemporary ethical theories say? Studies in Business and Economics, 12(1), 19–28.

42.

NTB. (2019, May 1). En del av nigeriabåt-saken opp i høyesterett [ Part of the Nigerian boat case in the Supreme Court ]. Dagbladet , www.dagbladet.no.

43.

Oslo tingrett. (2017, May 16). Verdict 16-110357MED-OTIR/04, judge lise bogen behrens, OIslo tingrett (Oslo district court).

44.

Piquero

N. L.

Carmichael

Piquero

A. R.

(2008). Assessing the perceived seriousness of white-collar and street crimes. Crime and Delinquency, 54, 291–312.

45.

Pontell

H. N.

Black

W. K.

Geis

(2014). Too big to fail, too powerful to jail? On the absence of criminal prosecutions after the 2008 financial meltdown. Crime, Law and Social Change, 61(1), 1–13.

46.

PricewaterhouseCoopers. (2014, October 31). Forsvarets logistikkorganisasjon: Rapport etter gjennomgang av salg av fartøy [ Military logistic organization: Report after review of sales of vessels ].

47.

PricewaterhouseCoopers. (2015, March 20). Forsvarsdepartementet: Undersøkelse av forhold knyttet til forsvarets avhending av fartøyer [ Ministry of Defense: Examination of circumstances related to the Military’s sale of vessels ]. Oslo, Norway.

48.

Qiu

Slezak

S. L.

(2019). The equilibrium relationships between performance-based pay, performance, and the commission and detection of fraudulent misreporting. The Accounting Review, 94(2), 325–356.

49.

Rehg

M. T.

Miceli

M. P.

Near

J. P.

Scotter

J. R. V

(2009). Antecedents and outcomes of retaliation against whistleblowers: Gender differences and power relationships. Organization Science, 19(2), 221–240.

50.

Reporter. (2013, December 31). Nigerians yawn over missing billions. The Sun. Retrieved November 3, 2018, https://infoweb.newsbank.com/apps/news/document-view?p=AWNB&t=&sort=YMD_date%3AD&maxresults=20&f=advanced&val-base-0=NNPC&fld-base-0=alltext&bln-base-1=and&val-base-1=oil%20revenues&fld-base-1=alltext&bln-base-2=and&val-base-2=2013&fld-base-2=YMD_date&docref=news/14C0EF3456A37C88

51.

Schneider

Scherer

A. G.

(2019). State governance beyond the “shadow of hierarchy”: A social mechanisms perspective on governmental CSR policies. Organization Studies, 40(8), 1147–1168.

52.

Schneider

(2006). Privatizing economic crime enforcement: Exploring the role of private sector investigative agencies in combating money laundering. Policing & Society, 16(3), 285–312.

53.

Szalma

J. L.

Hancock

P. A.

(2013). A signal improvement to signal detection analysis: Fuzzy SDT on the ROCs. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 39(6), 1741–1762.

54.

Taylor

(2018). White-collar crime and the law in nineteenth-century Britain. Business History, 60(3), 343–360.

55.

Tufts. (2018). CAS-global ltd. and the Private Nigerian Coast Guard Fleet. Compendium of Arms Trade Corruption, World Peace Foundation, the Fletcher School, Tufts University. www.sites.tufts.edu/corruptarmsdeals/

56.

Williams

J. W.

(2005). Reflections on the private versus public policing of economic crime. British Journal of Criminology, 45, 316–339.

57.

Williams

J. W.

(2008). The lessons of Enron: Media accounts, corporate crimes, and financial markets. Theoretical Criminology, 12(4), 471–499.

58.

Williams

J. W.

(2014). The private eyes of corporate culture: The forensic accounting and corporate investigation industry and the production of corporate financial security. In Walby

Lippert

R. K.

(Eds.), Corporate security in the 21st century—Theory and practice in international perspective (pp. 56–77). Palgrave Macmillan.

59.

Williams

M. L.

Levi

Burnap

Gundur

R. V.

(2019). Under the corporate radar: Examining insider business cybercrime victimization through an application of routine activities theory. Deviant Behavior, 40(9), 1119–1131.