Abstract
The study analyses the effectiveness of the Early Warning System (EWS) for forecasting bank defaults during the recent financial crisis based on Moody’s KMV Expected Default Frequency (EDF) measure and accounting ratios using a sample of European listed banks. The Bank Financial Strength ratings D+ and below are used as a bank default indicator. Independent variables include 1-year and 5-year EDFs, one for the adverse selection effect and another for accounting ratios. Our results show that EDF metrics combined with four CAMEL covariates and the variable capturing adverse selection are able to predict the defaults of European banks up to 8 quarters before an event. When comparing the model with another only including the EDF indicator, the statistical significance improves considerably, suggesting that added variables provide additional information and power to the model. This study proposes possible improvements to the EWS which could be useful to identify inputs to incorporate in intelligent models.
Introduction
The on-going financial turmoil evident in European financial markets and the rest of the world re-emphasizes the economic importance of bank stability. Since the banking system is the main mechanism for financial stability, monitoring the appetite for risk within banks has become a central issue for regulators. The inability of central banks to foresee and respond in a timely manner to financial meltdown has contributed to a further spread of the crisis resulting in the consequent high cost of bank bailouts. Only in the period 2008–2011, 1.6 trillion Euros (equivalent to 13 % of the EU’s annual GDP) were spent to bail out European banks. The crisis has demonstrated the vulnerability of the EU banking system and highlighted the need to strengthen financial sector supervision. As has been evidenced, the early detection of a bank in distress and timely intervention help regulators to promptly address the causes and to mitigate negative effects, thus preventing a contagion effect.
This study analyses the effectiveness of the Early Warning System (EWS) based on financial market information for forecasting bank defaults during the recent financial crisis. The selection of the EDF measure over other ones is based on its two distinctive characteristics: it is grounded on corporate theory (unlike reduced models) and incorporates market information (unlike conventional structural credit risk models such as Merton’s distance-to-default indicator). It is argued in several empirical works [2, 8] as being an efficient measure of firms’ defaults which generally outperforms the basic Merton structural model and Hull and White’s reduced form models. Moreover, EDF incorporates more realistic assumptions which better adjust to reflect real-world default dynamics.
The majority of the earlier papers use data from the pre-crisis period with relatively fewer default events, while we use both pre- and post- crisis data and expect that this will improve the statistical power of our research. In this paper we study the ability of EDF and other accounting-based ratios to anticipate a financial crisis and make a timely discrimination of bank defaults. Following Otero [18], market indicators seem to value the risks not perceived in accounting terms and both of the measures are complementary. Specifically, we endeavour to answer two crucial questions: Is EDF a good measure to predict the financial distress of banks? Do CAMEL and adverse selection variables bring additional predictive power to the EDF measure?
We test the validity of EDF using the logit model in spite of intelligent techniques performing better than statistical techniques [5]. For example, Dynamic Bayesian Networks provide early-warning models which are more precise than logit methods [13]. Furthermore, López Iturriaga and Pastor Sanz [4] developed a neural network model for US banks which outperforms traditional models of bankruptcy prediction. Our selection is based on the fact that Le & Viviani [5] recognise that the use of traditional techniques still works effectively and with many intelligent techniques like K-nearest neighbour, artificial neural networks and support vector machines it is not possible to evaluate the influence of each ratio to the model.
This study proposes possible improvements to the EWS which could be useful to identify inputs to incorporate in intelligent models. In addition, the paper could help central banks to better anticipate future banking crises and take preventive action against them. For assessing a bank’s solvency, it can also be handy for bank stakeholders, depositors and creditors. Bank managers can also benefit by applying the enhancement to measure the impact of their financial decisions such as change in capital level and credit growth stability.
The paper is organized as follows: firstly, it presents a review and discussions of the related empirical studies on EWS. Secondly, the methodology section describes the statistical model and data used in the model. The next section shows the results received along with discussions followed by the final section which concludes the study.
Related literature
To our knowledge Gropp, Vessala and Vulpes [23] and Distinguin, Rous and Tarazi [6] are the first authors to study the EWS for EU banks based on security data. One undertaken by Gropp, Vessala and Vulpes [5] for European banks finds that the distance-to-default (DD) measure is both comprehensive and unbiased and may prove a useful leading indicator of bank fragility. By estimating logit and proportional hazard models it was found that both indicators could predict bank distress up to 18 months prior to an event, even taking into account the safety net effect. Recent regulatory changes and financial and technological innovations have changed the existing banking environment and the causes of financial distress both in US and European markets. To capture these changes, the introduction of more risk-focused indicators has been suggested to adapt risk-measuring models to the new banking environment [23]. This implication is empirically tested using a sample of 82 EU banks observed from 1991 to 2005 by Brossard, Ducrozet and Roche [20] The aforementioned study constructs DD indicators to test the predictive power of bank failure while introducing a variable detecting the adverse selection effect of rapid growth strategies in their model. The latter study confirms the robustness of DD as an early indicator of banks’ failure. DD remains significant when it is joined with CAMEL accounting indicators and after the introduction of the “Too-Big-To-Fail” effect. Another important finding is that the new indicator of the adverse selection effect improves the predictive power of the model. In the same line, the work of Auvray and Brossard [28], focuses on another factor which may have a negative effect on the reliability of share prices in predicting bank distress. The test confirms that ownership dispersion of a bank’s shareholders clearly reduces the effectiveness of distance-to-default as a predictor of bank distress and bank recovery. In contrast, when ownership is concentrated it raises the predictive power of the indicator. Empirical findings in emerging markets also are favourable towards equity market signals in predicting banks’ financial distress. Chan-Lau et al. [10] show that DD indicators can forewarn bank distress, defined as a rating downgrade to CCC or below, up to nine months ahead of the sample. Later, Chan-Lau and Sy [9] offer an alternative risk measure named Distance-to-Capital (DC) to serve as the regulatory purpose of bank supervisors in intervening well ahead of a bank’s default. Another test of the predictive power of DD for eight failed Japanese banks is proposed by Harada et al. [14]. In addition, Eichler and Sobansky [25] consider that distance-to-default based on market data works well as an indicator of banking fragility in the Eurozone. Chen and Chu [13] explain that during the financial crisis, the correlations between large- and small- sized companies in terms of EDF fluctuated severely during the financial crisis and that the large firms face a higher default risk because of the higher level of leverage. Jessen and Lando [1] also show that distance-to-default is successful in ranking firms' default probabilities, even if the underlying model assumptions are altered. Additionally, Nazeran and Dwyer [22] make a detailed analysis of EDF calibration and explain that EDF continues to be a very useful tool that incorporates the most recent information which can affect the likelihood of default. Recently, EDF has been used by Gomes, Grotteria and Wachter [11] to develop a model that explains the ability of credit indicators to forecast aggregate real outcomes.
EDF could also be included in intelligent techniques because they perform better than statistical ones [5]. Neural networks are the most popular tool in predicting defaults. Some authors like Olmeda y Fernández [7], Tam [15], López and López Iturriaga & Pastor Sanz [4] developed neural-network models that outperform traditional models of bankruptcy prediction. Other techniques like Support Vector Machines have also shown significant accuracy and in some cases they work better than neural networks [16]. What is more, Dabrowski, Beyers and Villiers [13] showed that dynamic Bayesian networks provide early-warning models which are more precise than logit methods. But Le & Viviani [5] recognise that the use of traditional techniques still works effectively and are useful when the objective is to evaluate the influence of each ratio in the model.
Data and empirical methodology
The sample comprises 93 European listed banks for which Moody's EDF was available. The Accounting rating data is taken from the Bankscope International Bank Database provided by Fitch/Bureau Van Dijk. Since downgrades are announced in an irregular manner and do not occur at equally-spaced intervals, we decided to use quarterly data to better match the announcement times. Finally, we cover the period 2005–2011 to consider the effect of the financial crisis.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable should indicate the occurrence of bank default. In our research we use Bank Financial Strength ratings as a default indicator. The rating reflects a bank’s intrinsic financial strength and ranges from A to E including ‘+’ and ‘–’ qualifiers, where A is assigned to the strongest banks. In line with Gropp, Vessala & Vulpes [23] and Brossard, Ducrozet & Roche [20], we consider a bank’s downgrade to D+ or below as a proxy for being “defaulted” as it reflects a substantial weakening of a bank’s financial strength. The general statistics table with the sample (see Table 1) shows that about 12% of all rated banks have experienced a downgrade event, totalling 90 out of the 759 rated banks.
Statistics from the “default” events in the sample
Statistics from the “default” events in the sample
Our main independent variable is Expected Default Frequency –EDF. Essentially, EDF is based on Merton’s option-based structural model of credit risk. The model measures the creditworthiness of an entity through the distance-to-default indicator. Distance-to-default denotes the number of standard deviations of assets’ volatility to a company’s default point. The higher the distance-to-default, the lower the default risk. Distance-to-default measures the difference between the asset value of a firm and the face value of its debt, scaled by the standard deviation of the firm’s asset value:
Consequently, the probability of default or EDF can be defined as the cumulative normal distribution of the distance to default:
Vasicek and Kealhofer have extended the Black-Scholes-Merton framework to produce a model of default probability known as the Vasicek-Kealhofer model (VK model) [19, 27]. KMV (Moody’s KMV) is a commercial version of the VK model which provides commercially available EDF measures for firms and financial institutions. EDF, unlike the distance-to-default measure, represents the probability of default, i.e. the likelihood of a bank being insolvent within a specified period of time. Despite being well grounded in economic theory, EDF is a forward-looking measure based on market information.
In line with the previous literature, we test the validity of the supervisory CAMEL ratios for our Early Warning Models. CAMEL ratios are standard balance-sheet and income-statement financial ratios which are widely used by supervisory agencies around the world. They include capital, asset quality, management, earnings, and liquidity ratios and are often combined with other early warning indicators to detect the financial vulnerability of banks. CAMEL covariates are used together with EDF to test if they imbue our models with additional power. Another variable used is an indicator of adverse selection effect, which captures the effect of aggressive growth strategies undertaken by many banks before the outbreak of financial crises. According to Brossard et al. [20], this indicator improves the predictive power of the EWM.
Based on previous studies [20, 28], and Eichler and Sobansky [25] we propose the following hypotheses with regards to our measures:
H1: The higher the bank’s EDF, the more likely it will be downgraded to D+ and below.
H2: CAMEL variables bring additional predictive power to the EDF measure.
H3: Banks undertaking aggressive growth strategies prior to crises have a higher probability of default.
In our analyses we apply a binary choice model, the binomial logit model. The binary model assumes that banks belong to either one of two states: in our case it is either downgraded to D+ and lower, or it is not. In binary models an increase in X corresponds to an increase in probability of outcome 1. The equation of the logit model is:
The logit model uses the cumulative logistic probability distribution for the cumulative distribution function (cdf). The baseline logit model is as follows:
To analyse whether the baseline models have more predictive power when combined with CAMEL ratios and/or variables of adverse selection effect, we introduce two groups of additional variables. In the first group we have 5 CAMEL ratios which are widely used by investors. Concerning the adverse selection effect, Brossard et al. [20] report a very significant positive impact on banks’ default probability even at the 2-years horizon. We test the impact of this factor in our dataset by applying two alternative measures: the average growth of total assets and the average growth of gross loans.
Table 3 presents average indicators of the main explanatory variables for downgraded and non-downgraded banks. The table compares expected default rates with a 1 year horizon for both types of entities, downgraded and non-downgraded. The mean and standard deviation of EDF for downgraded banks is much higher than for non-downgraded banks.
Summary of definitions and sign predictions of variables we use in our estimation
Summary of definitions and sign predictions of variables we use in our estimation
Summary statistics for EDF 1
A two-sample t test on the equality of means with unequal variances (see Table 4) shows that the means are statistically and significantly different even with a 6-quarter lag. The differences between the means of non-downgraded and downgraded banks are persistently negative implying a higher default probability in downgraded banks.
EDF 1: Two-sample t test with unequal variances
Note: Difference equals mean (Status = 0) –mean (Status = 1); T stands for t-statistics for testing the hypothesis that difference is not equal to 0; legend: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
The estimation of the baseline model with the edf1year variable exhibits a general trend between dependent and independent variables (Table 5). It is worth mentioning that when there are missing values in quarterly data, in line with study of Brossard et al. [20], we duplicate the previous quarter value until the end of the calendar year. In doing so we are able to maintain more observations while not stretching out financial information from one year to another. To avoid supplementary autocorrelation which could arise with the duplication of data we use robust standard errors adjusted for clustering between banks.
EDF 1: Baseline Model
EDF 1: Baseline Model
edf1year is EDF for one year; L1.- L8. are EDF values lagged for 1–8 quarters; _cons –constant; legend: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Consistent with our a priori expectations, all lagged EDF signs are positive in all estimations suggesting a positive relation between bank defaults and 1-year EDF. The results are significant at the 99% level in all 8 lags. We follow the existing literature and add CAMEL covariates to our baseline model. In this way, we test the predictive power of the model with the addition of all CAMEL covariates lagged up to 4 quarters. Table 6 shows the results of regressions with both CAMEL ratios only and a combined model with EDF1 and CAMEL. When we regress CAMEL covariates without EDF, all variables’ coefficients become significant at the 99% level, also being in line with our hypothesis. The results show that bank defaults are negatively associated with capital ratio, earnings and liquidity ratios. Defaults are positively associated with the impaired loans ratio and the management efficiency measure. When we combine edf1 with 4, 5 and 6 lags and CAMEL components, edf1 demonstrates a high level of significance in all three specifications. The statistics tests of the combined models have also improved in comparison with their earlier specifications. Pseudo R increases to 38.2%. All CAMEL components except capital ratio remain significant. Brossard et al. [20] also combine distance-to-default measure with CAMEL covariates. They attribute the lower insignificance of capital ratios to the relative homogeneity of European banks’ capital indicators. They argue that European banks maintain their capital ratios in accordance with the Basel II regulatory framework and thus do not vary to a great extent unlike US banks’ capital ratios. This may reduce the signalling power of equity ratio in our model too.
EDF 1 with CAMEL covariates
edf1year is EDF for one year; L1.- L6. are variable values lagged for 1–6 quarters; _cons –constant; legend: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Next, the validity of the adverse selection effect is tested. To estimate, we add an adverse selection variable to models with the selected CAMEL components, producing two different results for each definition of the adverse selection effect. The addition of the assets growth variable with no lag (moving average of assets growth in the same year when the default happens) does not give significant results. After some iteration of the process we find that a 4-quarter-lagged moving average of asset growth has a more apparent effect. The results for 1-year EDF with past assets growth are given in Table 7. In line with other studies, our results suggest that past asset growth is positively associated with the probability of bank default and is significant at 95%. It suggests the perilous consequences of banks’ rapid/aggressive growth strategies that may trigger asset quality deterioration and lead to severe downgrades of bank ratings.
EDF 1 with CAMEL components & adverse selection effect: asset growth
edf1year is EDF for one year; L1.- L6. are variable values lagged for 1–6 quarters; _cons –constant; legend: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Using our two alternative models –selected CAMEL covariates and the adverse selection variables - we predict the probability of default for two EDF categories. The predicted probability indicates the likelihood that the bank will default. We compare our predictions with the actual results of our final models in Table 8. Poghosyan & Cihak [30] suggest putting greater weight on Type I errors in analysing bank defaults due to supervisors being mainly concerned with overlooking potential bank defaults. Hence, we will use a lower cut-off value for prediction in spite of providing graphs for sensitivity vs. probability cut-offs. The predictions of EDF 1-year lagged for four quarters and with asset growth indicate that the final model correctly classifies 37 out of 41 default events, and 120 out of 157 non-default events with a 15% cut-off rate. The overall rate is estimated to be 80%, with 90% of the defaulted banks and 76% of the sound banks well-classified. The prediction of the model with loan growth correctly classifies 22 out of 27 defaulted banks and 113 out of 132 sound banks. The accuracy of prediction is 82% for defaulted banks and 86% for non-defaulted ones. As we mentioned above, this classification is sensitive to the relative sizes of each component group and to the cut-off value.
EDF 1- Comparing predicted values vs. actual values, 15% cut-off rate
EDF 1- Comparing predicted values vs. actual values, 15% cut-off rate
The recent European banking crisis has highlighted the need to improve early warning systems for bank fragility. Our study analyses how changes in financial environments of the banking sector have affected the predicting power of the EWS and whether as well as how the conventional models of predicting bank distress need to be modified. To discriminate defaulted banks from sound ones we use the expected default frequency (EDF) as the main explanatory variable. In line with the previous literature we examine CAMEL supervisory ratios together with EDF. Another variable tested is the adverse selection effect measured by way of two alternative ratios: past-asset growth and gross-loans growth. Our results reveal that EDF metrics combined with the four CAMEL covariates and the adverse selection variable are able to predict the defaults of European banks up to 8 quarters before an event. When comparing the final model with the one that only includes the EDF indicator, the statistical significance improves considerably, suggesting that added variables provide additional information and power to the model. Considering the adverse selection effect, both definitions contribute to the predictive power of the model. Our findings suggest that unsustainable growth strategies could lead to the subsequent deterioration of a bank’s financial state and increase the likelihood of default.
To summarize, in Early Warning Models it is beneficial to use both market-based indicators and balance sheet indicators as they mutually complement each other. It also implies that EDF provides additional information to that of balance sheet ratios but is not a complete substitute for them. The models can be applied as complementary tools to foresee a potential banking crisis and as offsite means of regular monitoring. Eight quarters’ notice of a potential bank default should permit a timely response to it, and thus improve financial stability in the banking sector as a whole. Our paper is interesting to identify variables to be included in intelligent models and to increase the accuracy of the logit models considered in this study.
